Kassym-Jomart Tokayev

Kassym-Jomart Tokayev (born May 17, 1953, Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, U.S.S.R. [now Almaty, Kazakhstan]) is the president of Kazakhstan (2019– ), known before his presidency for his role in the disarmament of Kazakhstan’s nuclear arsenal and for his international work on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. His diplomatic career began as a member of the Soviet Union’s foreign ministry and later that of independent Kazakhstan before serving as prime minister (1999–2002). He also served as director general of the United Nations Office at Geneva (2011–13).

Political career

Tokayev joined the foreign ministry of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) in 1975 after completing a degree at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. He was stationed at the Soviet embassy in Beijing from 1985 until the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1991. Upon Kazakhstan’s independence, he attained senior rank within the new country’s foreign ministry, and in 1994 Pres. Nursultan Nazarbayev appointed him minister of foreign affairs. During his tenure the disarmament of Kazakhstan’s nuclear arsenal was completed.

When the incumbent prime minister resigned in 1999, Tokayev—an experienced senior member of government who had developed extensive foreign relationships as foreign minister—was appointed to take his place. Although the country’s economic performance was highly successful under his premiership, political instability prompted his resignation in early 2002. After stepping down he returned to his work in the foreign ministry.

In 2007 he was appointed to the Senate and was elected as its chair. Four years later United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon appointed Tokayev to head the United Nations Office at Geneva, owing to his active role in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. He left the post two years later to return to Kazakhstan as head of the Senate. First in line in the order of presidential succession, he took over as president of Kazakhstan when Nazarbayev resigned in March 2019. He was elected to the office two months later when a snap presidential election was held.

Presidency

Tokayev’s first few years as president were generally regarded as transitional in scope. Nazarbayev, the constitutionally designated “Leader of the Nation,” continued to hold key policy-making posts, but he gradually relinquished them to Tokayev. In April 2021 Tokayev took over chairmanship of the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, a body tasked with representing the country’s several ethnic groups, and in November he assumed leadership of the ruling party, Nur Otan, from Nazarbayev. The party was renamed Amanat in March 2022—thus removing the “Nur” that was also found in Nazarbayev’s first name—and the following month Tokayev handed over the party’s leadership to the speaker of the Mäjılıs (the lower house of the parliament).

Despite promises to advance political freedom and human rights in Kazakhstan, liberalization was confined to economic development, while political opposition remained suppressed. At the start of 2022 the government ended price caps on liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) as part of a plan to liberalize the energy market and end fuel shortages. The move backfired, however, as the price of LPG doubled, prompting demonstrations across the country. The government in its initial response reinstated the price caps, and the prime minister resigned from his post. However, as unrest continued, Tokayev took over leadership of the security council from Nazarbayev and called in forces from the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to quell the protests.

The incident proved a watershed for Tokayev’s independence from Nazarbayev. He blamed much of the country’s ills on a system of elitism and nepotism created by the policies of the former president and promised reforms to address those problems. In June a series of constitutional amendments for a “New Kazakhstan” were put to referendum that would make the executive branch more accountable to other branches and local leaders, create obstacles for nepotism, and strip Nazarbayev of his “Leader of the Nation” title and its associated privileges. The amendments were approved in a landslide, a result that many observers believed demonstrated popular support for Tokayev and his agenda.

Access for the whole family!

Bundle Britannica Premium and Kids for the ultimate resource destination.

Subscribe

In the wake of the instability, Tokayev sought to shore up support by calling in September for early presidential and legislative elections. With little time for any opposition to organize, he won the presidential election in November in a landslide. In a similar fashion, he called in January 2023 for snap parliamentary elections to be held in March. The results indicated that Amanat had lost support since the previous general election, but it once again won a majority of the vote.

Kazakhstan’s foreign policy also shifted under Tokayev away from Nazarbayev’s post-Soviet orientation, which prioritized Kazakhstan’s relationship with Russia over other world powers and fostered close coordination between Kazakhstan and other post-Soviet states in Central Asia. Tokayev, who had launched his career as a Soviet diplomat in Beijing, emphasized his vision of Kazakhstan as a middle power and to balance relations with Russia, China, and the United States. While he continued Kazakhstan’s key roles in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the CSTO, which began under Nazarbayev and promote close economic and security connections to Russia, he also expanded Kazakhstan’s relationship with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and strengthened its coordination with China in the latter’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Kazakhstan also saw a marked increased in trade with the United States and the European Union during Tokayev’s presidency. Its market for uranium, one of Kazakhstan’s most strategically important resources, also demonstrated this balance: in the mid-2020s China was the biggest importer of uranium from Kazakhstan, and the United States received about one-fourth of its uranium imports from the country. At the same time, Russia controlled about one-fourth of uranium production in Kazakhstan. After voters in Kazakhstan approved the construction of nuclear power plants in 2024—a noteworthy outcome given the legacy of the Soviet Union conducting nuclear tests in Kazakhstan and causing lasting environmental harm—the contract for the first nuclear power plant was given to a Russian company. A Chinese company was slated to receive the contract to construct the second nuclear power plant.