TWI308445B - Method and system for securing wireless communications - Google Patents

Description

1^08445 IX, invention description: μ l body for wireless communication. Furthermore, it is said that the present invention is a method and system for strategically locating the source and/or recipient of these communications to communicate with the wireless communication. Prior art

Ik's wireless connection activities are becoming more and more popular and reliable, and all the digital computing, data storage and media storage devices that are used today are part of the hoc wireless network. However, these networks are easy to have in many ways. (4) Security For example, individual users directly communicate with each other without using the intermediate network #point Ad_h()e network to create new vulnerability to users and the Internet. Attack characteristics. To reduce the vulnerability of wireless networks, technologies such as Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), Wi-FH Protected Access (WPA), Extensible Authentication Protocol (ΕΑΡ), and GsM-type encryption have been developed. While these technologies provide some protection, they are still vulnerable to multiple trusts, rights, identities, privacy, and security issues. For example, although a particular wireless communication node may have the correct WEP key to communicate with a wireless user, the user may not know if the particular node is trusted. In addition, the authentication of users who use these keys typically occurs at the more layers of the communication stack. In this case, even when these controls are located, a wireless consumer or hacker may have some (limited) access to the communication stack. This access creates weaknesses such as blocking service attacks and others. The fact that the wireless signal degrades with distance triggers a natural secrecy measure, because a signal needs to be close enough to the source to detect the signal. This is especially significant for small networks where the transmission power is typically low and communication is typically done at the highest rate and in an Ad-hoc manner. In many cases, the physical proximity distance may be the most difficult property to achieve for a malicious attacker. In fact, communication that can only be detected within a very short proximity of one of the transmitters does not require very good protection. Therefore, it would be desirable to implement a wireless network security system that would take advantage of the natural security provided by wireless signal degradation. In addition, it would be desirable to ensure that any information to be transmitted to a user is only accessible at the location of the user, such that an 'eavesdropper' who is located near the user but not at the user's current location cannot receive it. The complete message transmitted to the user. SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION The present invention is directed to a method and system for securing wireless communications. In one embodiment, different security measures are employed based on the distance between a receiver and a transmitter, whereby the data in the wireless communication can be demodulated only by the recipient within a particular trust zone. In another embodiment, a plurality of bit stream segments are transmitted by a plurality of transmitters to a receiver located in an area of the transmission pattern transmission from the transmitters. Alternatively, the receiver performs a function on the Packet Data Units (PDUs) sent by the transmitter. In another embodiment, the primary modulation point of a modulated constellation is divided into clusters adjacent to the secondary modulation point, which can only be demodulated by a receiver within range of the transmitter. In another embodiment, a master waveform is transmitted that is superimposed on a QPSK signal with a graded modulation (HM) having encoded descrambling information. 1308445 A. ft. In this specification, the term WTRU non-limiting includes a user equipment (UE), a mobile station, a fixed or mobile subscriber unit, a pager, and a Station (STA) or any other type of device that can operate in a wireless environment. In this specification, the term v' access point (AP) non-limiting includes a base station, a Node B, a network controller, or any other type of interface device in a wireless environment. The present invention is based on the fact that most conventional channel codes (e.g., Turbo code, low density parity code (LDPC), or the like) operate in close proximity to the Shannon limit in most practical architectures. When applied to a wireless communication system, (ignoring the fading effect), the receiver's ability to demodulate the variable data is almost a binary function of the effective SNR of the input at the receiver decoder. Features of the invention may be incorporated into an integrated circuit (1C) or constructed in a circuit containing a plurality of interconnected components. Figure 1 is a graph showing the relationship between the effective decoder input SNR and a decoder output BER. There is a critical SNR such that when the actual effective SNR falls below the critical SNR, the decoder is completely disabled (i.e., the decoder output BER is 1) and data within a wireless communication cannot be read. Conversely, if the actual effective SNR at the decoder input is above the critical SNR, the error probability at the decoder output is extremely low and the data within the wireless communication has a very high probability of being read. Since it is assumed that the channel code is approaching the Shannon limit, it can be assumed that the coding operation is performed at the Shannon capacity rate. In addition, it is best to actually consider spectral efficiency work because it makes the digital results independent of bandwidth. For a complex value plus a Gaussian 1308445 noise (AWGN) channel, the Shannon capacity rate is: R^log2(l + SNR) Equation (1) where SNR is used in Eb/N〇 orientation. It is generally accepted that for information rates above this rate, reliable information decoding is not possible, and for encoding rates below this rate, reliable information decoding is essentially guaranteed. In fact, this is a realistic assumption in the case of large block length codes such as LDPC and Turbo codes.

The SNR basically depends on the distance between the transmitter and the receiver. The dependence of the SNR on the distance from the transmitter is given by the following power law: SNR{d) = ^r Equation (2) a7 where is the nominal SNR at 1 unit distance. In open space, the index T is 2, but in a practice wireless network, the index γ is between 3 and 4, depending on the topology of the channel. Today, SNRC is the critical SNR of the chosen coding architecture. Then, the distance covered by this critical SNR is determined by: d = /I Equation (3) \smc and it can be rewritten as dBs as follows: log - (log £ - log SNRC) = - (EdB - SNRcdB ) Equation (4) 7 r The present invention makes d a function of one of the security measures. By dynamically selecting d, a receiver that is closer than d can operate with a looser security measure, and a receiver that is farther away than d will require a stricter security measure. In a traditional communication architecture, the channel coding architecture is fixed because it is quite expensive to have a ''programmable 〃 encoder for a completely different coding architecture. Therefore, the SNRC is fixed. Then, from equations (3) and (4), 1308^45d can be controlled by controlling E and r in a communication system. In order to achieve this goal, at least one of these controls must be subject to change based on external confidentiality information that may or may not be present at the receiver. E is defined as the nominal SNR at a unit distance. In reality, E is the transmission power of each information bit that is desired to be given to a particular receiver. The nominal SNR definition is necessary because the power law model of equation (2) collapses for small d values and derives infinite SNRs. Therefore, controlling E means controlling the output power of each of the information bits. For example, the control of the output power per information bit can be accomplished by any one or combination of the following: 1) by directly controlling the output power applied to a particular receiver data; 2) by transmitting the signal in pairs Adding an additional noise-like signal reduces the output SNR and thus the receiver's received SNR. This has the advantage of maintaining a constant output power while adjusting the SNR for individual receivers. 3) By controlling a modulation architecture (such as selecting QPSK/M Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM) / M Phase Shift Keying (PSK) / Frequency Shift Keying (FSK), or similar architecture); 4) by adjusting one Bit length (for example for UWB systems); • 5) by controlling the jitter and timing of the transmission operation; 6) by controlling the effective coding rate of a data for delivery to the receiver, which is a comparison of the present invention Good architecture. The method provides the ability to maintain a constant power level between APs and WTRUs in a WLAN system in a manner that maintains a consistent regular grid spacing between APs in a system without affecting the performance of the CSMA system due to fluctuating transmission power levels; 7) by changing the rate matching rule to trigger the breakdown or repetition of the symbol and effective bit energy; • 1308445 8) by controlling a modulation indicator; and 9) by controlling the amount of interference that the receiver will experience. Interference, system non-limitation can be done by one or combination of the following methods: 1) By applying variable interference management techniques, such as receiving pre-communication A and / or interference receiver signals for pre-processing and changing The extent to which cross-interference is removed or imported; 2) by selecting power control (this power control can be a procedure that is optimized together with security measures); 3) controlling potential interferers by time/frequency/code scheduling The number of; 4) by dynamic interference control (such as on and off); and section 2) by sending a message through a third-party beacon, and the beacon is subsequently sent to cause additional interference patterns. In the case where multiple receiving antennas are present, the value of E can be made according to the angular position of the transmitter (8) (ie, e = 丄 = and thus d can also be made a function of one. Initiating another set of techniques may be non-limiting, including the following: Receiver); shaping the beam toward or away from the azimuth, elevation, or both 2) using smart antenna technology for interference management; 3) Import of transfer patterns. (The value of D::7 '7 depends on the wide range of Doppler effects of the received signal.) It usually depends on the receiver = to increase the range of the Dow. By: Shooting " can be processed by internal signal Because the value depends on the geography of the environment 1308445 'j situation, if the transmitter is equipped with multiple antennas, it can control r to some extent by aiming at transmitting signals in an appropriate manner. The receiver can be used in accordance with the present invention. The wireless channel detects an active interference of the enemy. If the receiver is informed through the auxiliary component that the receiver should be able to successfully demodulate the variable stream, in fact, after enough attempts, there is no way to do so, and because The receiver's security measures and communication control are set in a manner that facilitates data stream demodulation, and the receiver can determine that the wireless channel is being invaded. • The present invention preferably uses a coding rate as a dependent receiver. The parameters of the security measures. In general, the ability of the receiver to demodulate a signal depends on the geographical situation (effective distance), which is more complicated than the straight-line distance. If necessary, The transmitter and receiver can find out by slowly increasing (or slowly reducing) one or more of the control parameters and detecting the point at which reliable data decoding becomes possible (or is no longer possible). The effective distance between the two. Figure 2 is a block diagram of a communication system 100 including a transmitter 110 and a receiver 120 in accordance with the present invention. The transmitter 110 includes a protocol stack unit 112, a channel encoder 114, and a rate. The matching unit 115, a multi-layer security bit (MLSB) scrambler 116 and a physical channel processing unit 118. The receiver 120 includes a physical channel processing unit 128, an MLSB descrambler 126, and a rate dematching unit 125. a channel decoder 124 and a protocol stacking unit 122. The protocol stacking units 112 and 122, the channel encoder 114, the rate matching unit 115, the rate dematching unit 125, the channel decoder 124, and the physical channel processing units 118 and 128 are essentially The same components are used as the conventional transmitter and receiver. The protocol stacking unit 112 generates a 13 1338445 stream and the information stream is processed by the channel encoder 114 and the flat channel is processed by the physical channel. 118 further steps, ''code to prevent errors, and then handle the pass for channel 130 (that is, a specific empty intermediation plane). This /,,,, and two are reversed by a wireless pass. / Map into a round out channel channel symbol. These channels have to be scrambled and scrambled.

Channel encoder 114 will enter a sequence of data sequence symbols. The MLSB snubber 116 can confuse the symbols as bit or higher order modulating symbols. Not secret. One of the symbols of the MLSB scrambler 116 may know which symbols are partially disturbed.

Several privacy layers are defined in accordance with the present invention. —M LSB descrambling pain The proportion of disturbed symbols that can be descrambled depends on the privacy layer. Any symbol that the descrambler 126 can descramble will be processed. For the MLSB descrambler 126, the MLSB descrambler 126 inserts an erasure (ie, channel observation). Any conventional decoder has the ability to eliminate signal operation. Therefore, this does not cause problems for a current system. The utility of the security system according to the present invention on receivers that are unable to descramble all symbols is an improvement in coding efficiency and a synchronous reduction in the effective SNR per information bit. The specific amount of increase in coding rate and effective snr reduction depends on the level of confidentiality, which will be explained below. The rate matching unit 115 within the transmitter 110 operates in accordance with a rate matching rule. The rate matching rule can be changed to cause a breakdown or repetition of the symbol and effective bit energy. A channel having a coding rate R is used. R is greater than 1 symbol per channel and the efficiency of the privacy layer η is given by: 14.1308445 Equation (5) where Θ represents the proportion of the symbol being scrambled and en is “having a secret layer descrambling 11 (i.e., the rate dematching unit 125 within the receiver 12G) is capable of approximately deciphering the symbol scale. In all cases, e”, (4), etc., per information bit SNR (more precisely Eb/NQ) is represented by Eq. The effective SNR of the layer η is given by: Εη-Ε0[ι -Θ(ι~βη)] Equation (6)

^匕 rate and SNR—there is simply a ratio of undisturbed known bits, which is given by: , Qiao, 1-0(1-e)) Equation (7). The analytical formula is programmed solely for this amount. The dependence of the SNR on the distance from the transmitter is given by equation (2). According to the invention, it is determined that the un-erased symbol is known (ie, the receiver is capable of descrambling the symbol) The specific ratio can determine the transmitter-to-receiver distance that can demodulate the data. Equation (7) is solved in equation (7) and d is obtained to obtain the following equation: Equation (8) d: ηΕ l2% Equation (9) Next, assuming that one of the symbols is not erased, equations (5 and (6) are substituted into equation (8) to obtain the following equation: d{n): a specific level of confidentiality ^ achievable distance _ percentage It is expressed as a percentage of the distance that can be reached by full confidentiality (β=ι). This is NSpR, which is initially defined as follows:

Equation (10) 15 1308445 The NSPR is not dependent on E, but it is dependent on the nominal transmission rate. As an example, Figure 3-6 presents a plot of the known symbol percentages for the NSPR pairs of four different architectures. These four architectures are: R = 1, 7 = 2; R == i, r -4 ' R=i/2, γ = 2 'R=l/2, 7=4. It is observed from the simulation results that the receiver may not be able to demodulate the information by only revealing 50% of the channel symbol, located at a ratio, and completely safe, about 60% of the transmission radius. Therefore, if a receiver exceeds the effective distance of its secret parameters, it is theoretically prohibited to decode data with a BER well above 50%. Figure 7 shows a secure network 700 comprising a plurality of WTRUs 705, 710, 715, 720 and 725, which are in a plurality of non-overlapping trusted areas 730, 740, 750 or one outside of the trusted areas. , and the zone of untrustworthy operation within 76. The trust zones 730, 740, 750 and the untrusted zone 760 are established in the following manner: selecting a transmission parameter such as a code rate architecture, a breakdown architecture, a power architecture or the like to cause a trust zone 750 and a do not trust zone , the receiver outside the boundary of 760 (ie, a WTRU) cannot decode the transmission signal, even if the receiver knows all transmission parameters thoroughly. In addition, selecting a bit-to-disturbance architecture (to be implemented by the MLSB subsystem) causes the receivers inside the trust zone 73〇 to demodulate the data, even if the receivers do not know any of the disturbed bits* The same is true. The received power will be high enough for a successful demodulation operation to occur even if the disturbed bit is simply used to be broken down. The receiver within k-area 740 is no longer capable of demodulating the transmitted data unless it knows some portions of the tamper-type pattern applied by the MLSB. Accordingly, the receiver located in the 740 任区区 740 will be forced to go through some sort of 16 1308445 type certificate procedure to expose the necessary parts to it. The receiving $ in the 75G area knows The portion of the scrambling sequence that is exposed to the receiver in the trust zone (for example, by eavesdropping side communication so that these receivers are scaled to access the sequence) also has no ability to demodulate the (four) transmitter. In fact, Receive H is required to request additional information about the scrambling sequence (eg, it may have to know the complete sequence), and therefore it must go through a certification process that is independent of the reception H (probably f is higher) within the trust zone 74G.

sequence. As mentioned earlier, the area? The receiver within 60 cannot demodulate the transmitted data under any circumstances. In accordance with an embodiment of the invention described above, the distance from a transmitting Wtru 705 to a receiving WTRU is a function of privacy measures. By dynamically selecting the distance d (e.g., 50 meters), a receiving WTRU 71 that is closer than d can operate with a looser security measure, while receiving WTRUs 715, 720, and 725 that are more than d will require a stricter security. Measures. Figure 8 shows a conventional network 800 including an AP 805 and a WTRU 810. When the AP 805 transmits a one-bit stream 815 to the WTRU 810, an eavesdropper 820 within range of the AP 805 can receive a full bit stream, such as 111000101. FIG. 9 illustrates a network 900 including a plurality of access points (APs) 905, 910, 915 and a WTRU 920 and an eavesdropper 820 of FIG. 8 in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. By using multiple APs 905, 910, 915 instead of the legacy network 800 of Figure 8, using only a single AP 805, the bit stream 815 is guaranteed not to be decrypted by the eavesdropper 820. The WTRU 920 is located at the intersection 935 of the transmission pattern of the APs 905, 910, and 915, whereby the WTRU 920 will be from 17 • 1308445

The AP 905 receives the first segment 93 〇 α , , ηη / / of the bit stream 815, and receives the second segment 93 〇 b , 〇〇〇 / / of the bit stream 815 from the AP 910, and receives from the AP 915 The third segment 93〇c , , 1〇1// of one of the bit stream 815. Each segment 930A, 930B, 930c is referred to as a PDU, and the original bit stream 111000101 is referred to as a Service Data Unit (SDu). The WTRU 920 then reassembles the entire encrypted SDU from the 14 PDUs 930A, 930B, 930C. Since the eavesdropper 820 is not physically located in the intersection 935 of the transmission patterns of aps 905, 910, and 915, all segments 93A, 930B, and 930c are received as an eavesdropper at an error rate compared to the 肇WTRU 920. Gw cannot interpret the entire bit stream 815 (even if one knows a key).

In the network 900 of Figure 9, the SDU interpreted by the WTRU 920 is 111000101, where PDUA = in, PDUb = 000, and PDUC = 1 (H. If the eavesdropper 820 barely interprets two of the three PDUs (e.g., 000 and 101) 'Eavesdropper 820 will barely get incomplete but positive; partial information. In an alternate embodiment, any PDUs that eavesdropper 820 does receive become meaningless as long as it is incomplete. Said, within the network 9 • The SDU that needs to be sent to the WTRU 920 is 111000101. However, three PDUs (eg PDm, PDU2, PDU3) sent by three different APs 905, 910 and 915 are not like Figure 9. The representation is fragmented, but instead SDU = PDU1 XOR PDU2 XOR PDU3, where PDU1 = 100110011, PDU2 = 110000111 and PDU3 = 101110001, resulting in SDU = 100110011 XOR 110000111 XOR 101110001 2111000101, where XOR is a mutually exclusive or Thus, assuming that the WTRU 920 is in the intersection 935 of the transmission pattern of the APs 905, 910, and 915, the 18 1308445 WTRU 920 can receive all three PDUs and x 〇 these PDUs to interpret the SDU 111000101. If the eavesdropper 820 captured Any two of these three pDUs, which is completely meaningless for interpreting the SDU. Alternative mechanisms other than x〇R are also possible, such as disturbing the sealed package in a meaningless manner unless all transmissions are successfully received and Different bits are emitted from different transmitters. In another embodiment, a location type authentication mechanism can be incorporated into network 900 of Figure 9. WTRU 920 receives transmissions from APs 905, 910, and 915, and to APs 905, Each of 910 and 915 reports its location. Based on the reporting locations of WTRU 920 and APs 905, 910, and 915, each of APs 905, 910, and 915 can initiate a protocol to be higher or lower than each corresponding AP 905, A variable sequence of high or low recommended effective coding rates between 910 and 915 and the WTRU 920 sends a sequence of messages requesting a positive acknowledgement (ACK) or a negative acknowledgement (NACK) from the WTRU 920. Thus, the agreement establishes a quasi-bay ij that specifies whether the WTRU can decode transmissions received from APs 905, 910, and 915 based on the location of the WTRU 920 relative to the locations of APs 905, 910, and 915. If the location reported by the WTRU 920 is determined to be correct, the agreement will verify the confidence of the location of the WTRU 920 by processing the ACK/NACK message received by the WTRU 920 in response to the sequence of messages. The verification of the WTRU 920's confidence may also be made to cause the WTRU 920 (or the user of the WTRU 920) to share a common secret with the APs 905, 910 and 915. For example, if APs 905, 910, and 915 require the location indicated by WTRU 920 to be authenticated, then APs 905, 910, and 915 are sent via multiple 19 1308445 PDUt PDUs (which may be segmented or encrypted as previously described) A challenge issue 'causes this, challenge issue' can only be interpreted by the WTRU 920 when the WTRU 92 is in its location. Therefore, the WTRU 92 will not be in a position to interpret the challenge issue. Can't, 'answer', 'this', challenge the problem.

The first diagram shows an example of a hierarchical modulation (HM) architecture, which is defined by a combination of the main and the human beings (in this case, respectively). It is well known that a QPSK modulation architecture is defined by four modulation points. These two "weeks" point together with the QpSK modulation constellation. The modulation points are respectively seen in the carrier phase of 7Γ/2 3ττ/2, _π/2, and -3 7Γ/2 and represent a bit 00, 01, 10, η 士 〇 / tL w w and 11, respectively. Similarly, it is well known that a BPSK modulation architecture is defined by two (four) points, which are the same as the BpsK modulation constellation. The modulation points respectively exhibit carrier phases of W and ·0 degrees and respectively = table bits 〇 or i. The service architecture is then defined by eight modulation points, constructed from primary and secondary modulation constellations. „Change points are (1)24), “(4)), (3;r/2 :/2+ 5 ), ( - K /2 6 ), ( - 7Γ /2+ 5 ), (-3 7Γ /2- (5), (the carrier phase of _ and represent three bits _, Xie, 〇1〇 and U1 respectively. These eight modulation points constitute four clusters, "Guang 3 a small interval modulation point. For example The modulation phase represented by the carrier phase (η一益绿Έ : /2+5 ) will constitute a cluster. The transmitter will pass through the sequence of symbols obtained from the constellation, and the farther away (4) (four) will (4) and pollute the signal. Overall, two: once, the receiver of the ejector will receive a signal with a better signal ' 'so that it can break the ground _ carrier phase and its associated 20 J308445 n bits. But - away from the transmitter receiver Usually, you will receive a signal with a stronger strength and signal quality, so that even if you can _ disconnect the cluster to which the symbol belongs, you can also identify the small space in each cluster _ change point 1, this m can make the main modulation However, it is impossible to detect: it is necessary to adjust this, and the receiving device can produce two bits of data but cannot detect the third bit.

This embodiment of the invention can be used to implement a privacy or trust zone. The data associated with the primary modulation point (i.e., the first 2 bits) is encoded or encrypted or scrambled, and the key itself is transmitted via the third bit of the sequence of symbols. Thus, the -trust zone_receiver can go to the material and use it to decode or decrypt or descramble the primary material. 1 pure (four) receiver _ detected the main information but the data _ material 'can not decode or _ or descramble the main information. The variability architecture can be used as the primary and secondary modulation architecture of the present invention. Examples include M-ary PSK, M_ary FSK, M_ary QAM, or the like. In addition, only selected modulation points within the main modulation constellation can be superimposed by the secondary cluster. Finally, more than two layers of grading can be applied. For example, QpSK plus BPSK plus BPSK presents a three-layer hm. In another example, a layered HM architecture can be implemented. Figure 10 illustrates a simple two-layer architecture in which the main waveform is a QPSK signal that is stacked with a double phase shift keying (BPSK) HM. When the SNR of a receiver is high, it is possible to distinguish all constellation points. As the SNR decreases, it becomes difficult to distinguish the point of the bpsK level from the nominal QPSK constellation point and thus lose the HM data. According to the present invention, the scrambled data is modulated by the main waveform, and the descrambling key afl is encoded in HM. The descrambling information facilitates successful reception when the receiver is located in an area in which the HM can be recognized. When the receiver is too far and therefore cannot be 21 1308445

When extracting HM data, the descrambling information must be explicitly requested through other channels. By varying the power assigned to the HM waveform, the range can be area controlled. Although the features and elements of the present invention have been described in terms of a particular combination of the preferred embodiments, each of the features or elements may be used without or without other features and elements of the preferred embodiments. Used under a variety of combinations. 22 1308445 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS The following is a more detailed description of the present invention by way of example and with reference to the accompanying drawings in which: FIG. 1 is a diagram showing the effective input SNR of a receiver decoder and the output BER of the decoding FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a wireless communication system, including a (four) and a (four) connection for the communication of materials according to the present invention;

Figure 3 is a graph showing the relationship between the normalized safety close-up radius (NSPR) and the known symbol at R = bu r = 2; Figure 4 is a diagram showing NSPR and known symbols in R Fig. 5 is a graph showing the relationship between NSPR and known symbols under the condition of R = 1/2, y; Fig. 6 is a graph showing NSPR A graph representation of the relationship of known symbols at R = 1 / 2; conditions; Figure 7 is a simplified diagram of a secure network having a plurality of trusted areas for ensuring wireless communication in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 8 is a conventional network in which - an eavesdropper can intercept - a bit stream transmitted from _ to a WTRU; Figure 9 is a network in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention, wherein a plurality of APs Each of the transmitting PDUs gives a WTRU located in one of the trusted areas of the transmission pattern of the APS to ensure wireless communication; and FIG. 1 shows a - QPSK modulated constellation, the illustration of which is based on how Another embodiment ensures wireless communication. Further 23 1308445 Component Symbol Description BER Decoder Output SNR Valid Decoder Input 100 Communication system access point AP WTRU wireless transmit / receive unit

twenty four

Claims (1)

1308445 X. Patent Application Range: A method for ensuring wireless communication within a wireless communication system, the wireless communication system comprising a plurality of wireless transmission/reception units (WTRUs) for transmitting and receiving wireless communication, the method comprising: a plurality of non-overlapping fs areas associated with the WTRUsi-specific WTRU; The WTRU sends a wireless communication message containing modulated data such that the wireless communication signal can be demodulated in the first trust zone of one of the trusted zones, but in the trusted zone - The % received in the second trust zone cannot be demodulated. Wherein the first trust zone WTRU - the first distance 2. The method of claim 1 of the patent scope, including extending from the particular WTRU to the particular area. The method of claim 2, wherein the second trust zone extends from the first distance to an area further than the first distance from the second distance of the particular WTRU. (4) The method of the first item, (4) wireless communication: 爻捃 爻捃 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一 在一Consultant%眭: Provided at the receiver-related use certificate of one of the second trust zones. The method of claim 1, wherein the security level of the wireless communication device is a function of the distance between the device receiving the wireless communication signal and the specific WTRU of 25 1308445. Private... 7. The method of claim 1, wherein - with the wireless communication. The correlation level of the correlation is a function of the wireless communication signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). / 8. If the method of claim 1 is applied, the confidentiality level associated with the wireless communication U is one of the power levels of the wireless communication signal. Renzhu 9./ Please refer to the method of item 1 of the patent scope, which - with the wireless communication. The signal-related confidentiality level is a function of the rate of the wireless communication signal (4). Guan Shenming's patent & method of the first item's one of the county-related turns associated with the wireless communication i#u is a function of the normalized female close-up radius (NSPR) associated with each letter (4). 11. A method for ensuring wireless communication for wireless communication. The system includes a plurality of wireless transmissions for transmitting and receiving wireless communications... receiving early WTRUs, the method comprising: ???, a specific shot with one of the WTRUs The ribs are related to multiple non-repetitions, and the different levels of confidentiality are associated with each of the trust zones, wherein the WTRU sends a wireless communication request based on the confidence zone associated with the device's trusted zone. ^^ I2. The method of claim n, wherein the first-trust zone covers an area from the WTRU to the first distance. A to I is 4 to 26 1308445 X < 1 The method of claim 12, wherein the trust zone is further away: the second zone covers a distance from the first distance to the first distance An area that is further separated from the second distance of one of the specific WTRUs. 14. If the method of applying for patent scope 帛U is applied, the wireless communication signal sent contains the modulated data;; ^ the miscellaneous area-绮 in the communication device is located in the first “trust”... the wireless communication signal is solved, But the wire of the second zone of trust is not (4) The second communication of the wireless communication signal & (4), if the wireless communication signal is spoofed and the second confederation is determined when the spoofing sequence is determined; Dispelled. 16. The method of claim 15, wherein the scrambling sequence is provided to the communication device when the subscriber associated with the communication device is located at the second trust. He π. The method of claim n, wherein the security level associated with the wireless communication signal is a function of the distance of the communication device from the particular wtru. 18. The method of claim U, wherein the security level associated with the wireless communication signal is a function of a per-information bit-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the wireless communication signal. 19 • The method of claim U, wherein a level of confidentiality associated with the wireless communication signal is a function of a power level of the wireless communication signal. 27 1308445 2〇.If the method of applying for the patent range is n, the communication signal is related to the 7fcm 3 , and the wireless code rate is the function of the water #疋 and (4) line communication signal. In the method of n n slaves, the confidentiality level of the towel is a function of one of the normalized queen close radii (NSPR) associated with each of these trust zones. Ways to ensure wireless communication (four) to help wireless communication, the wireless ^Hand = 3 multiple access points (APs) and at least - WTRU's method includes: each of the APs sends a segment of a one-bit stream to the WTRU, and the WTRU is located at each The Aps are transmitted within one of the transmission pattern areas; and the 4 WTRUs recompose the fragments into the bit stream.牦A^3 De as in the method of claim 22 of the patent scope, wherein it is impossible to receive all such segments in the position outside the region where the transmission pattern of the specific AP intersects. 24 24 as claimed in the patent application scope The method wherein each of the bit stream segments is within a unit-side packet (four) unit (pDU), and the wtru reassembles the individual PDUs into a service data unit (SDU). 25. The method of claim 22, wherein the % sizing rule 1; reporting the location of the WTRU to each of the APs, and the Aps is morphing with a variable effective coding rate - requesting from the WTRU The message sequence of receiving the signal j^CK) or a negative acknowledgement received signal (NACK) enables the APs to determine whether the location of the WTRU is correct. 28 1308445 26. The method of claim 25, wherein the Aps determines whether the WTRU can decode the transmission transmitted by the APs. 27. The method of claim 25, wherein the WTRU is authenticated by sending a challenge question to the WTRu via a plurality of packet data units (PDUs), such that the challenge has a cough Wmu is located in the WTRU's (4) branch of the village _ W1; RU solution ^ and answer. • 28. A wireless communication system for ensuring wireless communication, the system comprising: a receiver; and a wireless transmit/receive unit (WTRU) configured to transmit wireless data containing θ modulated data The communication signal is used to establish a plurality of non-overlapping trusted areas so that the wireless communication signal can be modulated by the receiving when the receiver is located in one of the trusted areas, but in the connection It cannot be demodulated when it is in a second trust zone. And the system of claim 28, wherein the first pass includes: a system extending from the TMJ to a first distance from the WTRU, an area 0 claiming range, wherein the second The singularity of the TT is extended to the area that is further away from the second distance of one of the particular WTRUs. [2] The system of claim 28, wherein the wireless communication is in the second trusted zone when the interference phase is established.