TW201002011A - Method and system for securing wireless communications - Google Patents

Abstract

A method and system for securing wireless communications is disclosed. In one embodiment, different security policies are used based on the distance between a receiver and a transmitter, whereby data in the wireless communications can only be demodulated if received in particular trust zones. In another embodiment, a plurality of bit stream fragments are transmitted by a plurality of transmitters to a receiver located in an area where transmission patterns radiated by the transmitters intersect. Alternatively, the receiver performs a function on packet data units (PDUs) transmitted by the transmitters. In yet another embodiment, primary modulation points of a modulation constellation are split into clusters of proximate secondary modulation points which can be demodulated only by a receiver that is within range of the transmitter. In yet another embodiment, a main waveform is transmitted which overlays a QPSK signal with hierarchical modulation (HM) having encoded descrambling information.

Description

201002011, invention description: TECHNICAL FIELD OF THE INVENTION The present invention generally relates to wireless communication. More clearly. It is necessary to strategically locate the communication and/or the recipient's method and system for line communication. [Prior Art] #Connected lines are increasingly popular and reliable. It is expected that there are widespread, digitally-transported, data storage and media vulnerabilities. For example, there are many aspects of data security network _ users directly communicate with each other without using the middle

Ad-h〇e is the _ _ road (four) noisy, Hong private secret (Cong >), Wl_H bowling take (talking about the connection effect and GSM type plus poor 箄 淋 _) extended weaving agreement (ΕΑΡ) i plus benefit seeking skills*. While these techniques provide _ / for multiple trusts 'rights, identities, privacy, and security questions', for example, although - a particular wireless communication node may have a disk to lift: correctly guess the key, but the user may not know This; the fourth section; in addition to the higher level of the certification of the user who shoots b gold. According to this, even if these controls are located, the user or the hacker may have a _from %, male wireless access to create a weak point, such as blocking service attacks and limited access. This stored wireless signal is triggered by the fact that the distance is degraded - a natural security measure, because 201002011 = extract - the signal needs to be close enough to the source to lie down to the signal. This is notable for small, pro-n's where the transmission power is usually low and communication is usually done in the highest mode. In many cases, physical proximity may be the most difficult attribute to achieve for 攻击 and heart attackers. In fact, only very short-term proximity _ marriage-measured communication does not need non-ferrous companion line--can provide shed wireless signal degradation provided by [invention content] _ t: TT - fine face touch Method and _. In 1: Borrowing; Qing L) can be transmitted to the receiver in the trusted zone. The transmitter is sent by the transmitter. A function is executed on PDUs). The receiver demodulates in the range of the packet that is separated into the vicinity of the secondary modulation point. In /, only one can be in the shape of the emission, which has the transmission-main wave signal. The sub- _ HM of Kasaki a is superimposed on - 201002011 [Embodiment] In this "Children's book, the wireless transmission/reception unit, (^ top ^) is not a bureau, the sexual inclusion - user equipment _, - Mobile stations, "fixed or mobile" "early: - pager, one station (STA) or any other type of device capable of operating in a wireless territory. In this book, the term, access point, (Ap) = limited to a base station, a Node B, a point controller, or any other type of interface device in a wireless environment. The present invention is based on the fact that most conventional channel codes (e.g., touch code, low density code (caffe, lie) are in most practice _ close to ^10 (n). In the case of the secret wireless communication U, the slightly fading effect), the ability of the receiver to demodulate the variable data is almost a binary function that receives the effective SNR of the input of the reading. The features of the month can be incorporated into an integrated circuit (IC) or constructed in a circuit with a multi-connected component of four people. The chest ^ 1 picture is - showing the effective solution into the S and - decoder output ==! gamma_performance. Existence-criticality, causing the miscellaneous failure to be completely invalid in the Chencheng Town of Shicheng District (also the code reading BER is 丨), and the resource resident method in the wireless communication is read ^^, the actual at the domain decoder input The post-shipship has a very high level of information that is extremely high in the county. _ 5 = The f-channel code approaches the Shannon limit, so the code can be assumed to be (4):, = the digital result is independent of the bandwidth. For a complex value (4) ‘AWGN channel, the Shannon capacity rate is: 201002011 i? = log2(l + ^) Equation (1) where SNR is used in Eb/N〇 orientation. It is generally accepted that for information rates above this rate, reliable information decoding is not possible, and for encoding rates below this rate, reliable information decoding is essentially guaranteed. In fact, in the case of large block length codes such as LDPC and Turbo codes, this is a realistic assumption.

The SNR basically depends on the distance between the transmitter and the receiver. The dependence of SNR on the distance from the transmitter is given by the following power law: SNR^^ Equation (2) where is the nominal SNR at i unit distance. In the open space, the number r is 2, but in the practice wireless network, the index r is between 3 and 4, and it is Zhao. . Then, with this criticality, the SNRC is the criticality of the chosen coding architecture. The distance covered by the SNR is determined by: d =

Equation (3) 砀 Early breaks and rewrites are as follows: i〇g^Mi〇gB-i〇gsm^i(£^sm } rr she's equation The invention makes d a function of privacy measures. The distance ratio d is close The receiver can use _ looser security θ measures ^ select d than (4) the receiver will need - stricter security measures. Operation, while in the traditional communication _, the interface has a completely different coding architecture, Can be & & 疋 疋 疋 疋 疋 疋 因 因 因 因 因 因 因 因 因 因 因 因 因 因 因 因 因 因 因 因 因 疋 疋 疋 疋 疋 疋 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^. 7 and fork control. In order to achieve at least 201002011, some of the control must be changed according to the reception of confidential information. The external protection E with or without this is defined as the nominal s at a unit distance. The transmission power of each information bit of the receiver is in the middle, and E is the necessary 'because of the square (four) force sheep. The nominal SNR is determined to collapse and the limit is _8 bd value (10) Rs. Therefore, Control the loss of the sound of _. For example, every - or combination of the program of each bit of the bit channel is completed: 4 force (four) control ^ ^ Under direct control by the wheel on the power of the receiver information) for transmission by post added to -. Additional classes Wei output SNR and thus reducing cry recognize you pick a private manner to reduce contact heteroaryl _ Wei test. The benefit is that 3) ^ ^ power is simultaneously adjusted for individual receivers. Work 1 a modulation architecture (for example, choose QPSK / M orthogonal 碉俨 = M) ship phase shift PSK) __ (FSK), or similar field 4) 5) 6) f by adjustment - bit length (for example In the UWB system); by controlling the vibration and timing of the transfer operation; = ^ has _ code rate, this is the best structure of the car. This method provides the ability to maintain a consistent regular grid spacing between the various systems in a WLAN system without affecting the fixed power level between the milk and W in the case of a fluctuating transmission power level; By changing the rate matching rule to induce breakdown or repetition; 8) by controlling a modulation indicator; and 8 201002011 9) by controlling the amount of interference that the reception will experience. The Γ ΪΓΓ ΪΓΓ 可由 可由 可由 可由 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Control can be - in conjunction with security measures ^ time / fresh / coded (4) the number of potential interferers; by dynamic interference control (such as switching on and off), and

The third-party beacon sends a message, and the beacon then sends a signal to create an additional interference pattern. In addition, in the case where there are multiple receiving antennas, the receiver of £ is made (ie, Ε) ',) relative to the angular position (θ) of the transmitter, and thus d can also be made into one of the numbers) And its non-touch contains the undergap: this triggers [group_energy, 1) = azimuth, elevation angle or both to shape the beam towards or away from reception u§ 2) using smart antenna technology for interference management; and 3 ) Import of transfer patterns. Regarding 7, the value of τ depends on the Doppler effect range (_erSprcad) of the received signal, which usually depends on the speed of the connection (4) relative to the transmitter and its environment. However, the transmitter can artificially increase the Doppler effect range by internal signal processing. Since the value of 7 depends on the geographical situation of the environment, if the transmitter is equipped with multiple antennas, it can control T to some extent by arranging the signals in a suitable manner. ° 9 201002011 Receiving can be used in accordance with the present invention. If the receiver transmits the data stream through the auxiliary 槿 ^ 贝 贝 贝 敌 敌 敌 敌 敌 , , , , , , , , , , , , , 主动 主动 主动 主动 主动 主动 主动 主动 主动 主动 主动 主动 主动 主动 主动 主动 主动 主动 主动 主动The rate as a (effective distance) dependent on the receiver's security measures, ° its ability to demodulate the signal - depending on the geographical situation of the receiver can be slow (four) = away _. If necessary, the transmitter and the receiver can provide an effective distance between them. The transmitter 110 of the communication system 100 and the receiving-receiving encoder 兀 (MLSB) tamper 116 and the 曰 曰 位 120 120 include the physical channel at the point of the month b (or 疋 is no longer possible) Processing unit 128 receives receiver-rate dematching unit 125, —, s, and paper 兕 126, 122. The protocol stacking single W decoder 124 and a protocol stacking unit element 115, the rate dematching unit, the encoder 114, the rate matching unit (10) and the 128 forest code 11 124 and the physical channel device. The protocol stacking unit ^ is used by the traditional transmitting money receiver as the same group - the second is to be processed by the channel to be broken by the channel processing 7^18 further - this program is connected ==::13. (ie - specific air intermediaries) pass. 10 201002011 Channel Encoding 11 114 will pass the input and output solutions into a sequence of round-out channel symbols. The MLSB scrambler 116 confuses the channel symbols. The pass: can be a higher order modulation of the bit field. Not all tokens must be subdivided and distracted by a subset of the symbols. The receiver should know which symbols are partially disturbed.

Several privacy layers are defined in accordance with the present invention. _ He committed to disturbing the poor crying from being able to descramble _ already _ voyage depends on the silk layer. For any symbol that the smuggler U6 can be dense, the new confusing and crying i26 will be handled. For any symbol ML that MLSB_U 126 cannot resolve _, the toe turbulence 126 inserts a cancellation signal ((10)(4)) into the symbol (ie, the channel observation of 〇). Any conventional decoding section is available. Therefore, this does not make a difference. The utility of the wire according to the present invention on a receiver that is incapable of being a simple symbol is an improvement in coding efficiency and an effective simultaneous reduction of each information bit. The increase in coding rate and the reduction in effective SNR depends on the level of confidentiality, which will be explained below. " The rate matching unit m in the transmitter 110 operates according to the rate matching rule. The rate matching rule can be changed to cause the symbol and the effective bit energy to be worn or repeated. Use - a channel with a coding rate R. R is greater than ^ channel symbol 1 bit and the efficiency of the secret layer η is given by: Equation (5) "where β represents the proportion of the scrambled symbol and en is a descrambler with a privacy layer n (That is, the rate in the receiver 120 matches the symbol ratio of the second de-scrambling. In all cases, the illegitimate one is. LJ e, =〇, ~=1. Initial. Mother-bein SNR ( The more refined disk is _〇) represented by E〇. The effective SKR of the security layer 201002011 is given by the following equation (6). The ratio and SNR are purely converted according to the ratio of the undisturbed known bits. It is given by: η^ι~θ{\~βη) Equation (7) Therefore, it is sufficient to formulate an analytical formula for this quantity alone. The dependence of SNR on the distance from the emitter is given by equation (2). According to the present invention, it is determined that the specific ratio of the un-erased symbols (i.e., the symbols that the receiver can solve, the dense symbols) is known, so that the mosquito can demodulate the emission state of the variable data to the receiving state distance. Equation (2) is substituted into the equation (?) and solved to obtain the following formula:

E d 丨2λ Equation (8) ηΕ Next, assuming that one of the symbols 々 is not erased, equations (5) and (6) are substituted into equation (8) to obtain the following equation: Equation (9) Poor r The percentage of the fineness of the 2nd level can be expressed as a percentage of the distance that can be reached by ~(77=1). This is NSPR, which is defined as follows: 咖) = 絮 = right 'program (1.) The NSPR does not stay up all night, but it depends on the standard = NSpR on the different architectures of the figure W. For example, _ structure (four) is: R = 1, (5) (four), = 1/2 ^ γ -2 > R =] / 50% of the martial symbol, (4) 结 靡 靡 鸠 鸠 鸠 鸠 : : : : : : : : : : ϋ The transmission radius is about 6〇% farther than the reception at 201002011. The information may not be demodulated. Therefore, the effective distance of the secret parameter is theoretically prohibited from decoding data with a BER of 50%. Figure 7 shows a secure network 7 comprising a plurality of WTRUs 7〇5, 71〇, 715, 72〇 and 725, the #WTRUs being in a plurality of non-overlapping trusted areas 730, 740, 750 or one It operates outside the zone of trust and outside of the zone of trust 760. Trust zones 730, 740, 750 and, do not trust „zone·established in the following ways:

Selecting transmission parameters such as - coding rate miscellaneous, breakdown architecture, power architecture - like causing - outside the boundary between the trust zone 75 and the trust zone, receiving W, ie, the WTRU) The receiver knows exactly what the financial transmission parameters are. In addition, the choice of - (to be seen by the system, the system is implemented) bit TL scrambling architecture enables the receiver inside the trust zone 73〇 to demodulate the dragon's even if these New Zealand knows that any of the elements are still in this way. The receive power is turned high enough for a successful demodulation operation to occur, even if the victim bit is simply used to be broken down. The receiver within the trust zone 740 will no longer be able to demodulate the transmitted data unless it knows that the portions of the tamper type I applied by 1 § 8 are no longer available. Accordingly, the receiver located in the L-Rent 740 is forced to pass the transmitter with some type of authentication procedure to expose some of the necessary portions of the scrambling sequence. The receiver within the zone 750 does not have the ability to demodulate even if it knows the portion of the scrambling sequence that is exposed to the receiving benefit within the zone of trust 74 (e.g., sneaking the communication so that the receiving benefits are allowed to access the sequence) Data transmitter. In fact, these receivers are required to request additional information about the scrambling sequence (eg, they may have to know the complete sequence)' and therefore they must go through a receiver that is independent of trust 201002011 Zone 740 (probably more demanding) ) the certification process. The receiver in the 'area 760' as described above cannot demodulate the transmitted data under any circumstances. In accordance with an embodiment of the invention described above, the distance from a transmitting WTRU 7〇5 to a receiving WTRU is a function of privacy measures. By dynamically selecting the distance d (e.g., 50 meters), a receiving WTRU 710 that is closer than d can operate with a looser security measure' and receiving WTRUs 715, 720, and 725 that are more than d would require a stricter security measure. Figure 8 shows a conventional network 800 including an AP 805 and a WTRU 810. When the AP 805 transmits a one-bit stream 815 to the WTRU 810, an eavesdropper 820 within range of the AP 805 can receive a full bit stream, such as 111000101. FIG. 9 illustrates a network in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. 900, which includes a plurality of access points (APs) 905, 910, 915 and a WTRU 920 and an eavesdropper 820 of FIG. By using multiple APs 905, 910, 915 instead of the conventional network 800 of Figure 8, only a single AP 805 is used, the bit stream 815 is guaranteed not to be decrypted by the eavesdropper 820. The WTRU 920 is located at the rendezvous zone 935 of the transmission pattern of the APs 905, 910, and 915, whereby the WTRU 920 receives a first segment 930 Α, 11 之一 of the bit stream 815 from the AP 905, and receives the bit from the AP 910. A second segment 930β ', 000'' of stream 815 is received, and a third segment 930c ''10Γ of one of bit stream 815 is received from AP 915. Each segment 930A, 930B, 930c is referred to as a PDU, and the original bit stream, 'ιιι〇〇〇ι〇ι〃 is referred to as a Service Data Unit (SDU). The WTRU 920 then reassembles the entire encrypted SDU from the three PDUs 930A, 930b, 930c. Since the eavesdropper 820 is not physically located in the intersection 935 of the transmission patterns of the APs 905, 910, and 915, the segments 930A, 930B, and 930c are received at an error rate compared to the WTRU 920, the eavesdropper 820 cannot interpret the entire bit stream 815 (even if you know a secret note).

In the network 900 of FIG. 9, the SDU interpreted by the WTRU 920 is 111000101, where PDUA=111, PDUB=000, and PDUC=10 if the eavesdropper 820 barely interprets two of the three PDUs (eg, 〇〇〇和1〇1) 'Eavesdropper 820 will barely get incomplete but correct part of the information. In an alternate embodiment, the eavesdropper 820 reads any pj)Us that are received as long as they are incomplete and become meaningless. For example, the SDU that needs to be sent to the WTRU 920 within the network 900 is 111000101. However, three PDUs (eg, PDU1, PDU2, PDU3;) issued by three different 905, 910, and 915 are not fragmented as shown in FIG. 9, but instead caused sdu=PDU1 XOR PDU2 XOR PDU3 by alternative selection, Where PDU1 = 100110011, PDU2 = 110000111 and PDU3 = 101110001, causing SDU = 100110011 110000111 XOR 1〇111〇〇〇1 = 111〇〇〇101, where x〇R is a mutually exclusive or function. Thus, assuming that the WTRU 920 is at the intersection 935 of the transmission pattern of APs 905, 910, and 915, the WTRU 920 can receive all three PDUs and XOR these PDUs to interpret the SDU 111000101. If the eavesdropper 82〇 captures either of these three PDUs, this is completely unthinkable for interpreting the SDXJ. Alternative mechanisms other than XOR are also possible, such as disturbing the sealed packet and issuing different bits from different transmitters in a meaningless manner unless all transmissions are successfully received. In another embodiment, a location type authentication mechanism can be incorporated into the network 900 of Figure 9. WTEU 920 receives transmissions from APs 905, 910, and 915 and reports its location to each of APs 905, 910, and 915. Based on the reporting locations of the WTRUs 92〇15 201002011 and APs 905, 910, and 915, each of the people ps 905, 910, and 915 can initiate an agreement to be higher or lower than each respective Ap 905, 910, and 915 and WTRU 920. The variable effective coding rate with a high or low recommended coding rate between the nominal distances sends a sequence of messages requesting a positive acknowledgement (ACK) or a negative acknowledgement (NACK) from the WTRU 920. Accordingly, the protocol establishes a criterion that specifies whether the WTRU can decode transmissions received from APs 905, 910, and 915 based on the location of the WTRU 920 relative to the locations of APs 905, 910, and 915. If the location reported by the WTRU 92 is determined to be correct, the agreement will verify the confidence of the location of the WTRU 920 by processing the ACK/N ACK message received by the WTRU 92 in response to the sequence of messages.

The verification of the WTRU 920's confidence may also be made to cause the WTRU 920 (or the user of the WTRU 920) to share a common secret with the aps 905, 910 and 915. For example, if APs 905, 910, and 915 require the location of the WTRU 920 to be hacked, then APs 905, 910, and 915 are via multiple PDUs (which may be segmented or encrypted as previously described). Sending a challenge question causes the challenge issue to be interpreted by the WTRU 920 only when the WTRU 920 is in its location. Therefore, the WTRU 920 cannot answer, challenge, or challenge the problem unless it is located at a location that can resolve the problem. Figure 10 shows an example of a hierarchical modulation (ΗΜ) architecture that is combined with one of the primary and secondary modulation architectures (qPSK and BPSK in this example, respectively). It is well known that a QPSK modulation architecture is defined by four modulation points, which together construct a QPSK modulation constellation. The modulation points respectively represent carrier phases of redundancy / 2, 3 ΤΓ / 2, - π /2, and -3 π /2 and represent two bits 〇〇, 01, 10, and 11, respectively. Similarly, it is well known that a BPSK modulation architecture constructs a BPSK^ constellation together with two modulation points of two 16 201002011 = point ’. The modulations represent carrier phases of ten tens and tens of intensity and represent one bit 0 or one respectively. The ΗΜ architecture is defined by eight modulation points, constructed from primary and secondary 戋 constellations. Following the modulation point, respectively, (π/2-5 ), ( ;τ/2+(5 ), (3ττ/2-(5 ), )'(-ττ/2+(5 )'(-3^/ 2-(5)>(-3 7γ/2+ carrier phase 彳1L and represents three bits ◦(8), (8)1, _, OH, 1〇〇, 101, Π 0 go? ” 1 〜

隹- and in. These 8 modulation points form four clusters, and each cluster is S__ small interval modulation points. For example, the carrier phase (1)^)' (the π represents the machine (4) into - (4). The transmission through the wireless channel sends U = the sequence of symbols obtained by the HM constellation, the wireless channel goes with the signal η away from the signal. Attenuates and pollutes the signal. Overall, the receiver closer to the transmitter will have a better signal strength and a job number, so that it can accurately pin her and turn off 3 bits. For a multi-transmitter, the receiver will receive a signal with a lower signal strength and signal quality, so that even if it can determine the cluster to which the transmitted symbol belongs, it may not be able to distinguish the small interval modulation points in each cluster. Therefore, the receiver can be mainly modulated but cannot be placed in a secondary modulation. Accordingly, the receiver can produce two bits of data but cannot detect the third bit. This embodiment of the present invention can be Implementing a secret or zone of trust with the primary, change-related material (ie, the first 2 bits) is encoded or encrypted or scrambled with a secret and the key itself is passed through a sequence of symbols Bit transfer. So 'receiver in a trusted zone The key is detected and used to decode or decrypt or descramble the primary data. - Receive II outside the zone of trust can do the main data of the lake but the town cannot detect the secret record' and thus cannot solve the problem or decrypt or descramble The main data. Any 17 201002011 modulated wood structure can be used as the primary and secondary modulation architecture of the present invention. Examples include M-ary PSK, M-aiy FSK, QAM, or the like. In addition, only the main modulation star The selected tuning (4) can be superimposed by the secondary cluster. Finally, more than two layers can be applied. In other words, QpSK plus BpsK plus BpsK presents a three-layer HM. In another embodiment, it can be implemented - layered. Architecture. The 1Q diagram shows a simple touch _, the main waveform is the qPSK signal of the private-double phase shift keying (BPSK) HM. When the receiver's Na is high, it can be distinguished by the monthly b. With the SNR reduced, it is difficult to distinguish the point of the booklet level from the nominal QPSK constellation point and thus lose the data. 曰 According to the invention, the 6-disturbance data is modulated by the main waveform, and the solution Disturbing the HM code. When the receiver is located in the area where the cell can be recognized, I will disturb the bribe. Receiving of the work. When the connection is too far and the wire method is used, the data must be explicitly requested through other channels. [The power allocated to the HM waveform can be borrowed. The range can be controlled by the area. - Although it is specific Combination of features and features of the invention may be in the absence of preferred embodiments of other ships and elements in a strip with or without other combinations of other features and elements of the invention [simplified illustration] The present invention will be described in more detail by way of example and with reference to the accompanying drawings, which is a graph showing a relationship between the effective input of a receiver decoder and the output BER of the disc state. Figure 2 is a block diagram of a wireless communication system including one of the transmitters and receivers for ensuring wireless communication in accordance with the present invention 201002011; in ['Figure normalized safety proximity radius (nspr) and known The graph shows the relationship of the relationship under the condition of r=br=2; Fig. 4 is a graph showing the relationship between the illuminance and the known symbol under the condition of R 二卜r=4; 〃 5th Figure is - shows NSPR with known symbols at r=i /Characteristics of the relationship between / pieces; 7 2

Figure 6 is a graph showing the relationship between · R and known symbols under the components; the remaining Figure 7 is a privacy net having a plurality of trusted areas for ensuring wireless communication according to an embodiment of the present invention. A schematic diagram of the road; , '8th 传统-traditional network, where the _ eavesdropper can intercept the bit stream that is input to a WTRU; the t-picture is - a network according to another embodiment of the present invention, Among them, one of the mothers of the milk transmits PDUs to a γ-crossing--the transmission type of the Fm mother. The WTRU within the lease ensures wireless communication; and the other shows - QPS_converted yoke, which illustrates how to ensure wireless communication in accordance with another K embodiment of the present day and month. Mouth [Major component symbol description] BER decoder output SNR effective decoder input 100 communication system ^ access point WTRU wireless transmission/receiver unit 19

Claims (1)

201002011 VII. Patent Application Range: 1. A device for use in a WTRU, the device comprising: receiving a signal comprising a sequence of modulated symbols; and using a selected one based on a dominant modulation constellation And demodulating the symbol sequence with a modulation point of a hierarchical modulation (HM) constellation of a constellation to be modulated such that the modulation point in the constellation is located in the immediate cluster. 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the main modulation constellation comprises four main modulation points, each of the main modulation points being defined by two data bits. 3. The method of claim 2, wherein the constellation includes eight modulation points, each of which has two, each of which has a modulation point defined by three data bits. 4. The method of claim 2, wherein the primary modulation constellation is a phase shift keying (PSK) constellation. 5. If you apply for a patent scope! The method of clause wherein the primary modulated constellation is a frequency shift keying (FSK) constellation. 6. The method of claim 2, wherein the primary light constellation is a quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) constellation. 7. The method of claim 1, wherein the secondary modulated constellation is a phase shift keying (PSK) constellation. 8. The method of claim 1, wherein the secondary modulated constellation is a frequency shift keying (FSK) constellation. • The method of claim 1, wherein the secondary modulated constellation is a quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) constellation. a wireless transmission/reception unit (WTRu) comprising: 201002011 - a receiver configured to receive a signal containing a sequence of symbols of the machine; and a demodulation metamorphosis configured to be selected based on a primary Modulating the constellation and demodulating the symbol sequence by a modulation point of a hierarchical modulation (HM) constellation of the living plane, such that the modulation point in the HM constellation is located in the immediate cluster . 11. The 2 WTRU as claimed in claim 2, wherein the primary modulated constellation comprises four primary modulation points, each primary modulation point being defined by two data bits. 12. The WTRU as claimed in claim 11, wherein the HM constellation comprises eight modulation points, two in each cluster, wherein each modulation point is defined by three data bits. 13. The WTRU as claimed in claim 10, wherein the primary modulated constellation is a phase shift keyed constellation. 14. The WTRU as claimed in claim 10, wherein the primary modulated constellation 疋~frequency shift keying constellation. 15. The WTRU as claimed in claim 10, wherein the primary modulation constellation r is a quadrature amplitude modulation constellation. 16. The WTRU as claimed in claim 1, wherein each modulation point is generated by a phase shift keying constellation. 17. The WTRU as claimed in claim 10, wherein the secondary modulated constellation is a frequency shift keyed constellation. 18. The WTRU as claimed in claim 10, wherein the secondary modulation constellation is a quadrature amplitude modulation constellation. twenty one