JP2008233965A - Portable terminal device and program thetreof, and alternation prevention system and alternation prevention method - Google Patents

Abstract

<P>PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To easily update software of a portable terminal device to unaltered normal software with a simple configuration. <P>SOLUTION: This portable terminal device for communicating data with a computer to which hardware keys can be connected is provided with an authentication means for authenticating the computer by transmitting and receiving an authentication message including the identification information of the hardware keys; and a reception means for receiving data to be transmitted from the computer (for example, the software of the portable terminal apparatus) only when authentication by the authentication means is established. <P>COPYRIGHT: (C)2009,JPO&INPIT

Description

  The present invention relates to a mobile terminal device, a program thereof, a falsification prevention system, and a falsification prevention method, and in particular, when updating software of a mobile terminal device, it is possible to update to legitimate software without falsification. The present invention relates to a terminal device, a program thereof, a falsification prevention system, and a falsification prevention method.

  In recent years, so-called mobile terminal devices such as mobile phones, PHS (Personal Handyphone System) terminals, or PDA (Personal Digital Assistance) are rapidly spreading. Most portable terminal devices are configured to operate by computer software.

  When a new function is added to such a portable terminal device, or when a defect is corrected, it is possible to cope by updating the software.

  As described above, since various functions of the mobile terminal device are realized by software, on the other hand, if an inappropriate software is inserted, the mobile terminal device can be falsified. It has become a thing.

  In recent years, tampering with mobile terminal devices has been steadily increasing, and if such actions cannot be prevented, large losses are incurred to mobile phone and PHS business companies and mobile terminal device manufacturers. It has become a serious matter to bring. Therefore, it is an urgent need to prevent such tampering.

  A case where software of the mobile terminal device is tampered will be described with reference to FIG.

  FIG. 11 shows a configuration in which software of the UE 100 is downloaded from a PC (Personal Computer) 200 to the UE (User Equipment: mobile terminal) 100 via a USB (Universal Serial Bus) cable 400. ing.

  In the normal case, the software is downloaded directly from the PC 200 to the UE 100, but in the case of FIG. 11, the data exploitation device 900 is inserted and installed between the PC 200 and the UE 100. Then, the software to be downloaded is extracted by the data exploitation device 900, the contents of the software are analyzed, falsified, and then downloaded to the UE 100. In this way, the UE 100 is falsified.

  In addition, although the abbreviation “UE” means a mobile terminal in a third generation mobile phone, in the following, as representatives of all the mobile terminal devices (mobile phone, PHS terminal, PDA, etc.) described above, It is assumed that the UE is used.

  One method for preventing software tampering as described above is to encrypt all data to be downloaded (ie, software), send it to the mobile terminal device, and decrypt it for use on the mobile terminal device side. (For example, refer to Patent Document 1).

  Patent Document 1 “Communication apparatus, data processing method, communication method and system thereof” described above describes the following technique.

  That is, mutual authentication is performed between the server device and the computer and between the computer and the small memory card, and the encrypted communication program for update is written into the small memory card. The small memory card is attached to the wireless terminal device, performs mutual authentication with the wireless terminal device, and after verifying whether the update communication program is compatible with the control of the wireless terminal device, the wireless terminal device Set to

  By doing so, it is possible to avoid that the program that defines the communication processing of the communication device is updated by an update program that performs inappropriate processing.

  Some software download systems via a network have proposed a system that satisfies security requirements such as counterpart authentication and non-falsification guarantee (see, for example, Patent Document 2).

  Patent Document 2 “Software Download System, Server Device, Terminal Device, Server Control Program, Terminal Control Program, Server Control Method, Terminal Control Method” described above describes the following download system.

  That is, for each of a plurality of terminals belonging to the download server, the validity of the terminal identifier registered in advance is determined, thereby reliably performing partner authentication. Also, the download software from the download server to the terminal is encrypted with the encryption key generated each time, and the encryption key is encrypted with the terminal key generated and acquired from the terminal each time and downloaded to the terminal together. .

  By doing so, the secrecy of the download software can be sufficiently secured. In addition, it is said that non-tampering can be guaranteed by attaching an electronic signature to the downloaded encrypted software and confirming its validity.

  Furthermore, when software (program) for performing a download operation in the PC 200 in FIG. 11 leaks to the outside, a malicious third party can use it to conveniently update and tamper with the software of the UE 100. Can be done.

  In order to prevent such tampering, a mechanism that prevents unauthorized use of the PC 200 is required.

  As an example of a technique for preventing unauthorized use of a terminal such as a personal computer, a technique has been proposed in which a hard key is provided in the terminal so that the terminal cannot be used in an environment where the hard key does not exist (for example, , See Patent Document 3).

  Patent Document 3 “Storage Service System” described above describes the following system for improving security in a storage service that manages user data via the Internet and can store and share the file. Yes.

  That is, the storage service operator installs a storage server and a user authentication server in a dedicated network. When a user of a terminal such as a PC receives a storage service, it is necessary to attach a hard key to the terminal. This hard key contains a client certificate issued by the storage service operator, a public key, and a private key. The user authentication server authenticates the user with the client certificate in the hard key transmitted from the terminal. Once authenticated by the user authentication server, the storage server can be used by the terminal.

  As a result, the security of the user and the strength of authentication can be increased.

Japanese Patent Laying-Open No. 2003-283417 (page 5-9, FIG. 1-7) JP 2003-202931 A (page 5-10, FIG. 1-11) JP 2004-005037 A (page 7-10, FIGS. 1 and 2)

  In the conventional patent document 1 described above, the communication program for updating the wireless terminal device is encrypted and written to the wireless terminal device. Therefore, it is necessary to encrypt the communication program for update in the server device on the transmission side, and it is necessary to decrypt it on the wireless terminal device side on the reception side. Accordingly, an additional circuit or software for encryption processing is required on the server device side, and decryption processing is required on the wireless terminal device side, which complicates the configuration and increases the cost of the server device and wireless terminal device. Have the problem of In addition, there is a problem that the time for encryption and decryption is required, and the download time increases, so that the productivity of software update is also reduced.

  Also in the conventional download system described in Patent Document 2, the software is encrypted and downloaded. Therefore, as in Patent Document 1, a means for encryption is required on the transmission side, and a means for decryption is required on the terminal side on the reception side, which increases costs on both the transmission side and the reception side. The problem is that the productivity of software updates is also reduced.

  Conventional Patent Document 3 describes a method for preventing unauthorized use of a terminal. However, there is a problem that unauthorized use by a malicious third party cannot be prevented if the hardware key is also leaked simultaneously with the outflow of software (program) for performing a download operation from the terminal.

  The present invention has been made to improve the above-described circumstances. Therefore, the object of the present invention is to easily update the software of the mobile terminal device to a legitimate software with a simple configuration and without falsification. It is an object of the present invention to provide a portable terminal device, a program thereof, a falsification prevention system, and a falsification prevention method that can be updated.

The portable terminal device of the present invention is a portable terminal device that performs data communication with a computer to which a hardware key can be connected,
Authentication means for authenticating the computer by transmitting and receiving an authentication message including identification information of the hardware key;
Receiving means for receiving data transmitted from the computer only when authentication by the authentication means is established;
It is characterized by including.

Specifically, the authentication means includes
Means for generating a message including a random number and terminal identification information;
Means for encrypting the message using a public key;
Means for receiving from the computer the message decrypted using the private key in the computer and embedded with the identification information of the hardware key and signed with the private key;
Authentication processing means for authenticating the computer based on the signed message;
May be included.

  More specifically, the authentication processing unit may authenticate the computer based on signature information, the random number, and the terminal identification information.

  Further, specifically, the authentication processing means may authenticate the computer based on signature information, the random number, the terminal identification information, and the hardware key identification information.

  More specifically, the authentication processing means authenticates the computer based on any two of the signature information, the random number, the terminal identification information, and the hardware key identification information. May be.

The portable terminal device performs data communication with a computer connectable to a predetermined input means,
Authentication means for authenticating the computer by transmitting and receiving an authentication message including a temporary ID input from the predetermined input means;
Receiving means for receiving data transmitted from the computer only when authentication by the authentication means is established;
It is characterized by including.

Furthermore, specifically, the authentication means includes
Means for generating a message including a random number and terminal identification information;
Means for encrypting the message using a public key;
Means for receiving from the computer the message decrypted using a private key in the computer and embedded with the temporary ID and signed with the private key;
Authentication processing means for authenticating the computer based on the signed message;
May be included.

  Specifically, the authentication processing means may authenticate the computer based on signature information, the random number, and the terminal identification information.

  More specifically, the authentication processing unit may authenticate the computer based on signature information, the random number, the terminal identification information, and the temporary ID.

  Specifically, the authentication processing means may authenticate the computer based on any two pieces of information among signature information, the random number, the terminal identification information, and the temporary ID.

The program of the present invention is stored in a computer of a portable terminal device that performs data communication with a computer device to which a hardware key can be connected
An authentication process for authenticating the computer device by transmitting and receiving an authentication message including identification information of the hardware key;
A reception process for receiving data transmitted from the computer device only when authentication by the authentication process is established;
Is at least executed.

In addition, the computer of the portable terminal device that performs data communication with a computer device that can be connected to a predetermined input means
An authentication process for authenticating the computer device by transmitting and receiving an authentication message including a temporary ID input from the predetermined input means;
A reception process for receiving data transmitted from the computer device only when authentication by the authentication process is established;
Is at least executed.

The falsification preventing system of the present invention is capable of connecting a hardware key, a first computer that updates software of the mobile terminal device, and a second computer that can be connected to the first computer via a secure communication line. A tamper prevention system including a computer,
The second computer includes an approval unit that approves whether the update is possible based on internal individual information of the first computer,
The first computer has data communication means for transmitting a communication certification request to the portable terminal device that enables data communication with the portable terminal device only when approval by the second computer is established. Including,
It is characterized by that.

  Further, specifically, the approving means is configured such that the first computer only when the internal individual information transmitted from the first computer matches the internal individual information registered in advance in the second computer. The update may be approved.

  More specifically, the portable terminal device may include an authentication unit that starts authentication of the first computer only when the communication certification request is received from the first computer.

Further, specifically, the authentication means authenticates the first computer by transmitting / receiving an authentication message including identification information of the hardware key of the first computer,
The portable terminal device may further include receiving means for receiving data transmitted from the first computer only when authentication by the authentication means is established.

Furthermore, specifically, the authentication means includes
Means for generating a message including a random number and terminal identification information;
Means for encrypting the message using a public key;
Means for receiving from the first computer the message decrypted using a secret key in the first computer and embedded with the identification information of the hardware key and signed with the secret key;
Authentication processing means for authenticating the first computer based on the signed message;
May be included.

Further, the present invention includes a first computer that can be connected to a predetermined input means and updates software of the mobile terminal device, and a second computer that can be connected to the first computer via a secure communication line. A system,
The second computer includes an approval unit that approves whether the update is possible based on internal individual information of the first computer,
The first computer has data communication means for transmitting a communication certification request to the portable terminal device that enables data communication with the portable terminal device only when approval by the second computer is established. Including,
It is characterized by that.

  Further, more specifically, the approving means is configured so that the first computer only when the internal individual information transmitted from the first computer matches the internal individual information registered in advance in the second computer. The update may be approved.

  More specifically, the portable terminal device may include an authentication unit that starts authentication of the first computer only when the communication certification request is received from the first computer.

More specifically, the authentication unit authenticates the first computer by transmitting and receiving an authentication message including a temporary ID input from the predetermined input unit of the first computer,
The portable terminal device may further include receiving means for receiving data transmitted from the first computer only when authentication by the authentication means is established.

Specifically, the authentication means includes
Means for generating a message including a random number and terminal identification information;
Means for encrypting the message using a public key;
Means for receiving from the first computer the message decrypted with a private key in the first computer, embedded with the temporary ID and signed with the private key;
Authentication processing means for authenticating the first computer based on the signed message;
May be included.

The falsification preventing method of the present invention includes a first computer that can be connected to a hardware key and that updates software of the mobile terminal device, and a second computer that can be connected to the first computer via a secure communication line. In a system including a computer,
The second computer performs at least an approval process for approving the availability of the update based on the internal individual information of the first computer,
Data communication processing for transmitting a communication certification request to the portable terminal device that enables the first computer to perform data communication with the portable terminal device only when the approval processing by the second computer is established. Do at least the
It is characterized by that.

Further, specifically, the portable terminal device starts an authentication process of the first computer only when the communication certification request is received from the first computer,
In the authentication process, the first computer is authenticated by sending and receiving an authentication message including the hardware key identification information to and from the first computer,
The data transmitted from the first computer may be received only when the authentication of the first computer is established.

Furthermore, in a system including a first computer that can be connected to a predetermined input means and updates software of the mobile terminal device, and a second computer that can be connected to the first computer via a secure communication line ,
The second computer performs at least an approval process for approving the availability of the update based on the internal individual information of the first computer,
The first computer performs a data communication process for transmitting a communication certification request to the mobile terminal device that enables data communication with the mobile terminal device only when approval by the second computer is established. At least do,
It is characterized by that.

Further, specifically, the portable terminal device starts an authentication process of the first computer only when the communication certification request is received from the first computer,
In the authentication process, the first computer is authenticated by transmitting and receiving an authentication message including a temporary ID input from the predetermined input means to and from the first computer,
The data transmitted from the first computer may be received only when the authentication of the first computer is established.

  The portable terminal device of the present invention is configured to perform data communication with a computer to which a hardware key can be connected. And authentication means for authenticating the computer by transmitting and receiving an authentication message including identification information of the hardware key, and receiving means for receiving data transmitted from the computer only when authentication by the authentication means is established And.

  That is, when the computer is not authenticated, the data transmitted from the computer, for example, the software of the mobile terminal device is not received, and the data transmitted from the computer is received only when the computer is authenticated. Is configured to do.

  Therefore, it is possible to prevent an unauthorized update of the software of the mobile terminal device by a third party.

  Next, embodiments of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings.

  FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing an embodiment of the falsification preventing system of the present invention.

  In the present embodiment shown in FIG. 1, software of the UE 100 is transmitted from a PC (Personal Computer) 200 to a UE (User Equipment: mobile terminal) 100 via a USB (Universal Serial Bus) cable 400. Is to download.

  In this embodiment, the abbreviation “UE” is used not only for mobile terminals and mobile phones, but also for PHS (Personal Handyphone System) terminals and PDAs (Personal Digital Assistance: portable information terminals). It shall be used as a representative of all the mobile terminal devices included.

  The PC 200 is configured to include a hard key 280 to prevent falsification of software downloaded to the UE 100. Here, the term “hard key” is usually used as an abbreviation for what is called a hardware key.

  The PC 200 is connected to another PC 300 via the secure Internet 500.

  Next, the detailed configuration of the embodiment of FIG. 1 will be described with reference to FIG.

  FIG. 2 is a detailed block diagram illustrating an example of a detailed configuration of the present embodiment.

  The UE 100 includes a control unit 110 that controls the entire UE 100. Further, a memory 120 for storing data of the UE 100 and application software, and a USB-IF (Interface) 130 for connecting to the PC 200 via a cable are provided.

  The control unit 110 is configured to perform control operations by a CPU (Central Processing Unit) (not shown), and includes at least an authentication unit 112, an encryption / decryption unit 114, and a pseudo-random number generation unit 116. Yes.

  The authentication unit 112 performs generation of a message necessary for mutual authentication between the UE 100 and the PC 200 and control of transmission / reception thereof.

  The encryption / decryption unit 114 encrypts and decrypts the message generated or received by the authentication unit 112.

  The pseudo random number generation unit 116 generates a pseudo random number to be inserted into the message generated by the authentication unit 112.

  The PC 200 includes a control unit 210 that controls the entire PC 200. Further, the memory 220 stores data of the PC 200, application software, UE 100 software to be downloaded to the UE 100, and the like. Further, a USB-IF 230 for connecting to the UE 100 via a cable and a USB-IF 240 for connecting to the hard key 280 are provided. Furthermore, an NW (Network) -IF 250 for connecting to the PC 300 via the Internet 500 is provided.

  The control unit 210 is controlled by a CPU (not shown), and includes at least an authentication unit 212, an encryption / decryption unit 214, and a download unit 218.

  The authentication unit 212 generates a message necessary for mutual authentication with the UE 100 or the PC 300 and controls transmission / reception thereof.

  The encryption / decryption unit 214 encrypts and decrypts the message generated or received by the authentication unit 212.

  The download unit 218 downloads the UE100 software stored in the memory 220 to the UE100.

  The UE 100 and the PC 200 are connected via a USB cable 400 between the USB-IF 130 and the USB-IF 230, which are USB interfaces.

  The PC 300 includes a control unit 310 that controls the entire PC 300. Further, a memory 320 for storing data of the PC 300, application software, and the like is provided. Furthermore, an NW-IF 350 for connecting to the PC 200 via the Internet 500 is provided.

  The control unit 310 is configured to perform a control operation by a CPU (not shown), and includes at least an authentication unit 312.

  The authentication unit 312 performs generation of a message necessary for the PC 200 and control of transmission / reception thereof for the PC 200 to approve that the PC 200 is a legitimate device for downloading the UE 100 software to the UE 100.

  Here, an outline of the operation in the embodiment shown in FIG. 2 will be described.

  The PC 200 sends data (for example, software of the UE 100) stored in the memory 220 to the UE 100 via the USB-IF 230 under the control of the control unit 210. The control unit 110 of the UE 100 stores data (such as software of the UE 100) acquired via the USB-IF 130 in the memory 120. The stored data is a program for operation of the UE 100 when it is software of the UE 100.

  As a data flow between the UE 100 and the PC 200, there is a flow opposite to the above. That is, in the UE 100, the control unit 110 sends the data stored in the memory 120 to the PC 200 side via the USB-IF 130. The control unit 210 of the PC 200 stores data acquired via the USB-IF 230 in the memory 220.

  In addition, the PC 200 transmits / receives data to / from an external hard key 280 via the USB-IF 240 to generate authentication data and stores it in the memory 220.

  Further, the PC 200 transmits / receives data to / from another PC 300 connected to the secure Internet 500 via the NW-IF 250. Data received by the PC 200 is stored in the memory 220.

  Next, the operation of this embodiment will be described with reference to FIG. 3, FIG. 4, and FIG.

  FIG. 3 is a first sequence diagram illustrating the operation of the present embodiment. In FIG. 3, components corresponding to those shown in FIGS. 1 and 2 are denoted by the same reference numerals or symbols, and description thereof is omitted.

  FIG. 3 shows a message sequence for requesting the PC 300 to authenticate the validity of the PC 200 in order to prove that the PC 200 is authentic before downloading software from the PC 200 to the UE 100. is there.

  First, the authentication part 212 of the control part 210 of PC200 produces | generates the message of a loading permission request | requirement (Loading Permission Request), in order to obtain permission to download software to UE100. The authentication unit 212 adds the internal individual information of the PC 200 to the loading permission request message. Here, the internal individual information is the CPU-ID of the CPU of the control unit 210, the MAC (Media Access Control) address of the NW-IF 250, and the user ID and password for logging in to the PC 300. Then, the authentication unit 212 transmits the generated loading permission request to the PC 300 via the NW-IF 250 (step S11 in FIG. 3).

  The authentication unit 312 of the control unit 310 of the PC 300 receives the loading permission request via the NW-IF 350. Then, the internal individual information added to the loading permission request is compared with the internal individual information of the PC 200 registered in advance in the memory 320 of the PC 300. As a result of the comparison, if it is confirmed that the two match, the authentication unit 312 generates a send key for the PC 200 and returns it to the PC 200 via the NW-IF 350 (step S12). The send key is a command that is normally transmitted to the application to automate key operations. In the present embodiment, the send key is used as a proof of authenticating the PC 200.

  The authentication unit 212 of the control unit 210 of the PC 200 receives the send key via the NW-IF 250. The authentication unit 212 is configured to be able to transmit a communication certificate request (Communication Authenticate Request) to the UE 100 only after receiving a correct send key. Thus, the authentication unit 212 of the control unit 210 of the PC 200 that has received the send key generates a communication certification request message and transmits the communication certification request to the UE 100 via the USB-IF 230 (step S13).

  The UE 100 is configured to be able to exchange data with the PC 200 only after receiving the communication certification request. Thereafter, the original software data can be downloaded.

  Next, the second operation of the present embodiment will be described with reference to FIG.

  FIG. 4 is a second sequence diagram illustrating the operation of the present embodiment. 4 corresponding to the components shown in FIGS. 1 and 2 are denoted by the same reference numerals or symbols, and the description thereof is omitted.

  FIG. 4 shows a sequence of messages transmitted and received between the UE 100 and the PC 200 in order to prove and authenticate that the PC 200 is genuine when downloading software from the PC 200 to the UE 100.

  First, the above-described communication certification request is issued and transmitted from the PC 200 to the UE 100 (step S21 in FIG. 4). The UE 100 is configured not to accept any other command from the PC 200 before receiving the communication certification request.

  The UE 100 that has received the communication certification request generates a pseudo random number in the authentication unit 112 of the control unit 110 (step S22). This pseudo random number is composed of 128 bits, for example, and is generated so as to be different from other UEs. This can be generated by inputting a system parameter unique to the UE 100, for example, a device manufacturing number or a numerical value uniquely set by the user of the UE 100, to the pseudo-random number generation unit 116 of the control unit 110. It is.

  Next, the authentication unit 112 of the control unit 110 of the UE 100 generates a return message including the generated pseudo random number. FIG. 5 shows an example of the format of the return message.

  As shown in FIG. 5, the return message 70 generated by the authentication unit 112 of the control unit 110 of the UE 100 includes the field of the pseudo random number 71 generated in step S22 and the IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity: international mobile phone identification information of the UE 100. ) 72 columns. In addition, the PC 200 has a dongle ID 73 field of the hard key 280 of the PC 200. A dongle is a kind of hardware key used to prevent unauthorized copying of software. The hardware key can be configured to have identification information, that is, a dongle ID. Here, it is assumed that the dongle ID 73 field of the return message 70 generated by the authentication unit 112 of the control unit 110 of the UE 100 is padded with 0 (zero).

  Then, the authentication unit 112 encrypts the return message 70 using the public key by the encryption / decryption unit 114 of the control unit 110 of the UE 100 (step S23), and passes through the USB-IF 130. Is transmitted to the PC 200 (step S24).

  The authentication unit 212 of the control unit 210 of the PC 200 that has received the return message 70 decrypts (Decrypt) the received return message 70 by using the encryption / decryption unit 214 (step S25).

  Next, the authentication unit 212 of the control unit 210 of the PC 200 embeds the dongle ID obtained from the hard key 280 of the PC 200 in the dongle ID 73 field of the decrypted return message 70 (step S26). The authentication unit 212 of the control unit 210 of the PC 200 continues to sign the entire message using the secret key to generate a signature message (step S27). Thereafter, the authentication unit 212 transmits a signature message to the UE 100 via the USB-IF 230 (step S28).

  The authentication unit 112 of the control unit 110 of the UE 100 performs confirmation (Validate) of the received signature message (Step S29).

The signature message is confirmed with respect to the following three points (α) (β) (γ).
(Α) Is there no doubt that the signature information is the signature of the PC 200?
(Β) Is the pseudo random number exactly the pseudo random number generated by itself (the pseudo random number generated in step S22 in FIG. 4)?
(Γ) Is IMEI correct in its own IMEI?

  At this time, if there is any problem with the confirmed contents of the three points, data transmission / reception with the PC 200 is not performed thereafter.

  In addition, although the confirmation here is performed for the above three points (α), (β), and (γ), in order to improve the accuracy of authentication, another element (for example, dongle ID) is further added for confirmation. You may make it perform. Or, when the accuracy of authentication is guaranteed, it may be changed as appropriate, such as confirming only two points of signature information and IMEI.

  If confirmation is successful in step S29, the authentication unit 112 of the control unit 110 of the UE 100 generates a communication certification response (Communication Authenticate Response) for notifying that there is no problem from the UE 100 to the PC 200. -It transmits via IF130 (step S30).

  After receiving the communication certification response, the PC 200 downloads the UE 100 software stored in the memory 220 to the UE 100 based on the control of the download unit 218 of the control unit 210 (step S31). Here, the software to be downloaded is not subjected to a confidential operation such as encryption, and the software is downloaded as it is.

  As described above, according to the present embodiment, the following effects can be obtained.

  First, it is possible to prevent tampering of a mobile terminal device (mobile phone, PHS terminal, PDA, etc.).

  This is because the mobile terminal device according to the first embodiment of the present invention is configured to perform data communication with a computer to which a hardware key can be connected. And, an authentication means for authenticating the computer by sending and receiving an authentication message including identification information of the hardware key, a receiving means for receiving data transmitted from the computer only when authentication by the authentication means is established, It is because it contains.

  That is, when the computer is not authenticated, the data transmitted from the computer, for example, the software of the mobile terminal device is not received, and the data transmitted from the computer is received only when the computer is authenticated. It is because it is comprised so that it may do.

  In the falsification prevention system according to the first embodiment of the present invention, since the computer verifies whether the computer is valid before downloading the software to the mobile terminal device, the software data is not falsified. The effect to prevent can be raised.

  That is, the falsification prevention system can connect a hardware key, the first computer that updates the software of the portable terminal device, and the second computer that can be connected to the first computer via a secure communication line Including. Further, the second computer includes an approval unit that approves whether the update is possible based on the internal individual information of the first computer, and the first computer, when approval by the second computer is established. Only includes a data communication means for transmitting a communication certification request to the portable terminal device to enable data communication with the portable terminal device.

  Specifically, first, a loading permission request is transmitted from the PC 200 to the PC 300, and the send key is returned only when the PC 300 can authenticate the PC 200. The PC 200 starts the data communication procedure to the UE 100 for the first time by receiving the correct send key.

  As a result, before starting to download software to the mobile terminal device, it is determined whether or not the download side and the download side device can be connected, and it is confirmed that the mutual device is a legitimate device. The effect of prevention is raised.

  Further, in the first embodiment of the present invention, the authentication means of the mobile terminal device includes means for generating a message including a random number and terminal identification information, means for encrypting the message using a public key, Means for receiving from the computer a message decrypted by the computer (first computer) using the private key and embedded with hardware key identification information and signed with the private key; and to the signed message Second authentication means for authenticating the computer based on the second authentication means.

  Specifically, in response to a communication certification request from the PC 200, the UE 100 generates a return message using a pseudo random number and IMEI, encrypts it using a public key, and transmits it to the PC 200. The PC 200 decrypts the return message using the secret key, embeds the actual dongle ID of the PC 200 in the message, signs the message using the secret key, and transmits the signature message to the UE 100. The UE 100 authenticates the PC 200 by confirming the signature information, the pseudo random number, IMEI, and if necessary, the dongle ID. The subsequent data communication is performed only when the PC 200 is authenticated.

  Accordingly, the mutual authentication between the computer (PC 200) and the mobile terminal device (UE 100) can be performed quickly and surely with a simple configuration, and unauthorized download by a third party when downloading and updating the software of the mobile terminal device. Update can be easily prevented.

  The second effect is that the amount of software download processing is reduced and the execution time is shortened.

  The reason is that only the communication message for determining whether or not connection is possible before starting the download is limited to encrypting and decrypting without encrypting and decrypting all the data to be downloaded.

  Next, a second embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to FIGS.

  FIG. 6 is a block diagram showing a second embodiment of the falsification preventing system of the present invention.

  As in the first embodiment, the second embodiment shown in FIG. 6 downloads the software of the UE 100 from the PC 200 to the UE 100 via the USB cable 400.

  However, the PC 200 is different from the first embodiment only in that a keyboard 290 is provided instead of the hard key 280 of the first embodiment. The keyboard 290 is used to input a temporary ID to the PC 200 in order to prevent falsification of software downloaded to the UE 100.

  Since the second embodiment is different from the first embodiment only in that the keyboard 290 described above is provided, components corresponding to those shown in FIG. 1 in FIG. 6 are assigned the same reference numerals or symbols. Further description of FIG. 6 will be omitted.

  Next, a detailed configuration of the embodiment of FIG. 6 will be described with reference to FIG.

  FIG. 7 is a detailed block diagram illustrating an example of a detailed configuration of the second embodiment. In FIG. 7, components corresponding to those shown in FIG. 2 are denoted by the same reference numerals or symbols, and explanations of abbreviations and the like are omitted.

  The PC 200 includes a USB-IF 240-1 for connecting to the keyboard 290 instead of the USB-IF 240 of the PC 200 of the first embodiment. Since the other configuration is the same as that of the first embodiment, further description regarding FIG. 7 is omitted.

  Here, an outline of the operation in the second embodiment shown in FIG. 7 will be described.

  The PC 200 transmits data (for example, software of the UE 100) stored in the memory 220 to the UE 100 via the USB-IF 230 under the control of the control unit 210. The control unit 110 of the UE 100 stores data (such as software of the UE 100) acquired via the USB-IF 130 in the memory 120. The stored data is a program for operation of the UE 100 when it is software of the UE 100.

  As a data flow between the UE 100 and the PC 200, there is a flow opposite to the above. That is, in the UE 100, the control unit 110 sends the data stored in the memory 120 to the PC 200 side via the USB-IF 130. The control unit 210 of the PC 200 stores data acquired via the USB-IF 230 in the memory 220.

  In addition, the PC 200 receives data from the external keyboard 290 via the USB-IF 240-1, generates authentication data, and stores it in the memory 220.

  Further, the PC 200 transmits / receives data to / from another PC 300 connected to the secure Internet 500 via the NW-IF 250. Data received by the PC 200 is stored in the memory 220.

  Next, the operation of the second embodiment will be described with reference to FIG. 8, FIG. 9, and FIG.

  FIG. 8 is a first sequence diagram for explaining the operation of the second embodiment. In FIG. 8, components corresponding to those shown in FIGS. 6 and 7 are denoted by the same reference numerals or symbols, and description thereof is omitted.

  FIG. 8 shows a message sequence for having the PC 300 authenticate the validity of the PC 200 in order to prove that the PC 200 is authentic before downloading software from the PC 200 to the UE 100. is there.

  First, the authentication unit 212 of the control unit 210 of the PC 200 generates a loading permission request message in order to obtain permission to download software to the UE 100. The authentication unit 212 adds the internal individual information of the PC 200 to the loading permission request message. Here, the internal individual information is the CPU-ID of the CPU of the control unit 210, the MAC address of the NW-IF 250, and the user ID and password for logging in to the PC 300. Then, the authentication unit 212 transmits the generated loading permission request to the PC 300 via the NW-IF 250 (step S41 in FIG. 8).

  The authentication unit 312 of the control unit 310 of the PC 300 receives the loading permission request via the NW-IF 350. Then, the internal individual information added to the loading permission request is compared with the internal individual information of the PC 200 registered in advance in the memory 320 of the PC 300. If it is confirmed as a result of the comparison that the two match, the authentication unit 312 generates a send key for the PC 200 and returns it to the PC 200 via the NW-IF 350 (step S42). The send key is a command that is normally transmitted to automate key operations for an application. In the second embodiment, the send key is used as a proof of authenticating the PC 200.

  The authentication unit 212 of the control unit 210 of the PC 200 receives the send key via the NW-IF 250. The authentication unit 212 is configured to transmit a communication certification request to the UE 100 only after receiving a correct send key. Therefore, the authentication unit 212 of the control unit 210 of the PC 200 that has received the send key generates a communication certification request message and transmits the communication certification request to the UE 100 via the USB-IF 230 (step S43).

  The UE 100 is configured to be able to exchange data with the PC 200 only after receiving the communication certification request. Thereafter, the original software data can be downloaded.

  Next, a second operation of the second embodiment will be described with reference to FIG.

  FIG. 9 is a second sequence diagram illustrating the operation of the second embodiment. 9, components corresponding to those shown in FIGS. 6 and 7 are given the same reference numerals or symbols, and description thereof is omitted.

  FIG. 9 shows a sequence of messages transmitted and received between the UE 100 and the PC 200 in order to prove and authenticate that the PC 200 is genuine when downloading software from the PC 200 to the UE 100.

  First, the above-described communication certification request is issued and transmitted from the PC 200 to the UE 100 (step S51 in FIG. 9). The UE 100 is configured not to accept any other command from the PC 200 before receiving the communication certification request.

  The UE 100 that has received the communication certification request generates a pseudorandom number in the authentication unit 112 of the control unit 110 (step S52). This pseudo random number is composed of 128 bits, for example, and is generated so as to be different from other UEs. This can be generated by inputting a system parameter unique to the UE 100, for example, a device manufacturing number or a numerical value uniquely set by the user of the UE 100, to the pseudo-random number generation unit 116 of the control unit 110. It is.

  Next, the authentication unit 112 of the control unit 110 of the UE 100 generates a return message including the generated pseudo random number. FIG. 10 shows an example of the format of the return message.

  As illustrated in FIG. 10, the return message 80 generated by the authentication unit 112 of the control unit 110 of the UE 100 includes a column of the pseudo random number 81 generated in step S52 and a column of the IMEI 82 of the UE 100. In addition, a temporary ID (One Time ID) 83 field input from the keyboard 290 of the PC 200 is provided. The temporary ID indicates a keyword or numerical value that is temporarily used by the user of the PC 200 for that time. Here, the temporary ID 83 field of the return message 80 generated by the authentication unit 112 of the control unit 110 of the UE 100 is padded with 0 (zero).

  Then, the authentication unit 112 encrypts the return message 80 using the public key by the encryption / decryption unit 114 of the control unit 110 of the UE 100 (step S53), and transmits it to the PC 200 via the USB-IF 130. (Step S54).

  The authentication unit 212 of the control unit 210 of the PC 200 that has received the return message 80 decrypts the received return message 80 using the secret key by the encryption / decryption unit 214 (step S55).

  Next, the authentication unit 212 of the control unit 210 of the PC 200 embeds the temporary ID input from the keyboard 290 of the PC 200 in the temporary ID 83 field of the decrypted return message 80 (step S56). The authentication unit 212 of the control unit 210 of the PC 200 continues to sign the entire message using the secret key to generate a signature message (step S57). Thereafter, the authentication unit 212 transmits a signature message to the UE 100 via the USB-IF 230 (step S58).

  The authentication unit 112 of the control unit 110 of the UE 100 confirms the received signature message (step S59).

The signature message is confirmed with respect to the following three points (δ) (ε) (ζ).
(Δ) Is there no doubt that the signature information is the signature of the PC 200?
(Ε) Is the pseudo-random number the same as the pseudo-random number generated by itself (the pseudo-random number generated in step S52 in FIG. 9)?
(Ζ) Is IMEI correct in its own IMEI?

  At this time, if there is any problem with the confirmed contents of the three points, data transmission / reception with the PC 200 is not performed thereafter.

  In addition, although the confirmation here is performed with respect to the above three points (δ), (ε), and (ζ), in order to improve the accuracy of authentication, another element (for example, temporary ID) is further added and confirmed. May be performed. Or, when the accuracy of authentication is guaranteed, it may be changed as appropriate, such as confirming only two points of signature information and IMEI.

  If the confirmation is obtained without any problem in step S59, the authentication unit 112 of the control unit 110 of the UE 100 generates a communication certification response notifying that there is no problem from the UE 100 to the PC 200, and via the USB-IF 130. (Step S60).

  The PC 200 that has received the communication certification response then downloads the UE 100 software stored in the memory 220 to the UE 100 based on the control of the download unit 218 of the control unit 210 (step S61). Here, the software to be downloaded is not subjected to a confidential operation such as encryption, and the software is downloaded as it is.

  As described above, according to the second embodiment, the following effects can be obtained.

  First, it is possible to prevent tampering of a mobile terminal device (mobile phone, PHS terminal, PDA, etc.).

  This is because the portable terminal device according to the second embodiment of the present invention is configured to perform data communication with a computer to which a predetermined input means can be connected. And the authentication means for authenticating the computer by transmitting and receiving the authentication message including the temporary ID inputted from the predetermined input means, and the data transmitted from the computer only when the authentication by the authentication means is established This is because it includes receiving means.

  That is, when the computer is not authenticated, the data transmitted from the computer, for example, the software of the mobile terminal device is not received, and the data transmitted from the computer is received only when the computer is authenticated. It is because it is comprised so that it may do.

  In the falsification preventing system according to the second embodiment of the present invention, since the computer verifies whether the computer is valid before downloading the software to the mobile terminal device, the software data is not falsified. The effect to prevent can be raised.

  That is, the falsification preventing system can connect a predetermined input means, the first computer that updates the software of the mobile terminal device, and the second computer that can be connected to the first computer via a secure communication line Including. Further, the second computer includes an approval unit that approves whether the update is possible based on the internal individual information of the first computer, and the first computer, when approval by the second computer is established. Only includes a data communication means for transmitting a communication certification request to the portable terminal device to enable data communication with the portable terminal device.

  Specifically, first, a loading permission request is transmitted from the PC 200 to the PC 300, and the send key is returned only when the PC 300 can authenticate the PC 200. The PC 200 starts the data communication procedure to the UE 100 for the first time by receiving the correct send key.

  As a result, before starting to download software to the mobile terminal device, it is determined whether or not the download side and the download side device can be connected, and it is confirmed that the mutual device is a legitimate device. The effect of prevention is raised.

  Further, in the second embodiment of the present invention, the authentication means of the portable terminal device includes means for generating a message including a random number and terminal identification information, means for encrypting the message using a public key, Means for receiving from the computer a message decrypted using a private key and embedded in the computer (first computer) and having a temporary ID embedded therein and signed with the private key; and the computer based on the signed message And second authentication means for authenticating.

  Specifically, in response to a communication certification request from the PC 200, the UE 100 generates a return message using a pseudo random number and IMEI, encrypts it using a public key, and transmits it to the PC 200. The PC 200 decrypts the return message using the secret key, embeds a temporary ID input to the PC 200 in the message, signs the message using the secret key, and transmits the signature message to the UE 100. The UE 100 authenticates the PC 200 by confirming signature information, pseudo-random numbers, IMEI, and if necessary, a temporary ID. The subsequent data communication is performed only when the PC 200 is authenticated.

  Accordingly, the mutual authentication between the computer (PC 200) and the mobile terminal device (UE 100) can be performed quickly and surely with a simple configuration, and unauthorized download by a third party when downloading and updating the software of the mobile terminal device. Update can be easily prevented.

  The second effect is that the amount of software download processing is reduced and the execution time is shortened.

  The reason is that only the communication message for determining whether or not connection is possible before starting the download is limited to encrypting and decrypting without encrypting and decrypting all the data to be downloaded.

  In the first and second embodiments described above, the UE 100 and the PC 200 are connected by the USB cable 400 to perform data communication. However, any data communication method can be used. . For example, data communication using other types of cables such as a SCSI (Small Computer System Interface) cable or a LAN (Local Area Network) cable may be used.

  Further, as a means for data communication between the UE 100 and the PC 200, inter-device connection using a wireless communication method may be used instead of cable connection.

  As the wireless communication method, for example, a wireless LAN (Local Area Network) or Bluetooth can be used. Alternatively, WUSB (Wireless USB), HomeRF (Home Radio Frequency), or the like may be used. When any of the above wireless communication systems is used, the UE 100 and the PC 200 have an interface (LAN card, transceiver, etc.) corresponding to each wireless communication system and a function of executing wireless communication protocol processing. It should be implemented.

It is a block diagram which shows one Embodiment of the tampering prevention system of this invention. It is a detailed block diagram which shows an example of the detailed structure of this embodiment. It is a 1st sequence diagram explaining operation | movement of this embodiment. It is a 2nd sequence diagram explaining operation | movement of this embodiment. It is a figure which shows an example of the format of a return message. It is a block diagram which shows 2nd Embodiment of the tampering prevention system of this invention. It is a detailed block diagram which shows an example of the detailed structure of 2nd Embodiment. It is a 1st sequence diagram explaining operation | movement of 2nd Embodiment. It is a 2nd sequence diagram explaining operation | movement of 2nd Embodiment. It is a figure which shows the 2nd example of the format of a return message. It is a figure which shows an example of the tampering of the software of the conventional portable terminal device.

Explanation of symbols

100 UE
110 Control Unit 112 Authentication Unit 114 Encryption / Decryption Unit 116 Pseudorandom Number Generation Unit 120 Memory 130 USB-IF
200 PC
210 Control Unit 212 Authentication Unit 214 Encryption / Decryption Unit 218 Download Unit 220 Memory 230 USB-IF
240 USB-IF
240-1 USB-IF
250 NW-IF
280 hard keys 290 keyboard 300 PC
310 Control Unit 312 Authentication Unit 320 Memory 350 NW-IF
400 USB cable 500 Internet 900 Data exploitation equipment

Claims (26)

A portable terminal device that performs data communication with a computer to which a hardware key can be connected,
Authentication means for authenticating the computer by transmitting and receiving an authentication message including identification information of the hardware key;
Receiving means for receiving data transmitted from the computer only when authentication by the authentication means is established;
A portable terminal device comprising: The authentication means includes
Means for generating a message including a random number and terminal identification information;
Means for encrypting the message using a public key;
Means for receiving from the computer the message decrypted using the private key in the computer and embedded with the identification information of the hardware key and signed with the private key;
Authentication processing means for authenticating the computer based on the signed message;
The mobile terminal device according to claim 1, comprising:   The portable terminal device according to claim 2, wherein the authentication processing unit authenticates the computer based on signature information, the random number, and the terminal identification information.   3. The portable terminal according to claim 2, wherein the authentication processing unit authenticates the computer based on signature information, the random number, the terminal identification information, and the hardware key identification information. apparatus.   The authentication processing means authenticates the computer based on any two pieces of information among signature information, the random number, the terminal identification information, and the hardware key identification information. Item 3. The mobile terminal device according to Item 2. A portable terminal device that performs data communication with a computer connectable to a predetermined input means,
Authentication means for authenticating the computer by transmitting and receiving an authentication message including a temporary ID input from the predetermined input means;
Receiving means for receiving data transmitted from the computer only when authentication by the authentication means is established;
A portable terminal device comprising: The authentication means includes
Means for generating a message including a random number and terminal identification information;
Means for encrypting the message using a public key;
Means for receiving from the computer the message decrypted using a private key in the computer and embedded with the temporary ID and signed with the private key;
Authentication processing means for authenticating the computer based on the signed message;
The mobile terminal device according to claim 6, comprising:   8. The portable terminal device according to claim 7, wherein the authentication processing unit authenticates the computer based on signature information, the random number, and the terminal identification information.   8. The portable terminal device according to claim 7, wherein the authentication processing unit authenticates the computer based on signature information, the random number, the terminal identification information, and the temporary ID.   8. The computer according to claim 7, wherein the authentication processing unit authenticates the computer based on any one of the signature information, the random number, the terminal identification information, and the temporary ID. Mobile terminal device. To a computer of a portable terminal device that performs data communication with a computer device to which a hardware key can be connected,
An authentication process for authenticating the computer device by transmitting and receiving an authentication message including identification information of the hardware key;
A reception process for receiving data transmitted from the computer device only when authentication by the authentication process is established;
A program characterized by causing at least to be executed. In a computer of a portable terminal device that performs data communication with a computer device that can be connected to a predetermined input means,
An authentication process for authenticating the computer device by transmitting and receiving an authentication message including a temporary ID input from the predetermined input means;
A reception process for receiving data transmitted from the computer device only when authentication by the authentication process is established;
A program characterized by causing at least to be executed. A falsification preventing system including a first computer to which a hardware key can be connected and software of a mobile terminal device is updated, and a second computer that can be connected to the first computer via a secure communication line There,
The second computer includes an approval unit that approves whether the update is possible based on internal individual information of the first computer,
The first computer has data communication means for transmitting a communication certification request to the portable terminal device that enables data communication with the portable terminal device only when approval by the second computer is established. Including,
A falsification prevention system characterized by that. The approval means approves the update by the first computer only when the internal individual information transmitted from the first computer matches the internal individual information registered in the second computer in advance.
The falsification preventing system according to claim 13.   15. The portable terminal device according to claim 13, further comprising an authentication unit that starts authentication of the first computer only when the communication certification request is received from the first computer. The falsification prevention system described. The authentication means authenticates the first computer by transmitting and receiving an authentication message including identification information of the hardware key of the first computer,
16. The falsification preventing system according to claim 15, wherein the portable terminal device further includes receiving means for receiving data transmitted from the first computer only when authentication by the authenticating means is established. . The authentication means includes
Means for generating a message including a random number and terminal identification information;
Means for encrypting the message using a public key;
Means for receiving from the first computer the message decrypted using a secret key in the first computer and embedded with the identification information of the hardware key and signed with the secret key;
Authentication processing means for authenticating the first computer based on the signed message;
The falsification preventing system according to claim 16, comprising: A falsification preventing system including a first computer capable of connecting a predetermined input means and updating software of a portable terminal device, and a second computer connectable to the first computer via a secure communication line There,
The second computer includes an approval unit that approves whether the update is possible based on internal individual information of the first computer,
The first computer has data communication means for transmitting a communication certification request to the portable terminal device that enables data communication with the portable terminal device only when approval by the second computer is established. Including,
A falsification prevention system characterized by that. The approval means approves the update by the first computer only when the internal individual information transmitted from the first computer matches the internal individual information registered in the second computer in advance.
The falsification preventing system according to claim 18.   20. The portable terminal device according to claim 18 or 19, further comprising authentication means for starting authentication of the first computer only when the communication certification request is received from the first computer. The falsification prevention system described. The authentication means authenticates the first computer by transmitting and receiving an authentication message including a temporary ID input from the predetermined input means of the first computer,
21. The falsification preventing system according to claim 20, wherein the portable terminal device further includes receiving means for receiving data transmitted from the first computer only when authentication by the authenticating means is established. . The authentication means includes
Means for generating a message including a random number and terminal identification information;
Means for encrypting the message using a public key;
Means for receiving from the first computer the message decrypted using a private key in the first computer, embedded with the temporary ID and signed with the private key;
Authentication processing means for authenticating the first computer based on the signed message;
The falsification preventing system according to claim 21, comprising: In a system including a first computer capable of connecting a hardware key and updating software of a mobile terminal device, and a second computer connectable to the first computer via a secure communication line,
The second computer performs at least an approval process for approving the availability of the update based on the internal individual information of the first computer,
Data communication processing for transmitting a communication certification request to the portable terminal device that enables the first computer to perform data communication with the portable terminal device only when the approval processing by the second computer is established. Do at least the
A falsification preventing method characterized by the above. The portable terminal device starts authentication processing of the first computer only when the communication certification request is received from the first computer,
In the authentication process, the first computer is authenticated by sending and receiving an authentication message including the hardware key identification information to and from the first computer,
Receiving data transmitted from the first computer only when authentication of the first computer is established;
The falsification preventing method according to claim 23. In a system including a first computer capable of connecting a predetermined input means and updating software of the mobile terminal device, and a second computer connectable to the first computer via a secure communication line,
The second computer performs at least an approval process for approving the availability of the update based on the internal individual information of the first computer,
The first computer performs a data communication process for transmitting a communication certification request to the mobile terminal device that enables data communication with the mobile terminal device only when approval by the second computer is established. At least do,
A falsification preventing method characterized by the above. The portable terminal device starts authentication processing of the first computer only when the communication certification request is received from the first computer,
In the authentication process, the first computer is authenticated by transmitting and receiving an authentication message including a temporary ID input from the predetermined input means to and from the first computer,
Receiving data transmitted from the first computer only when authentication of the first computer is established;
The falsification preventing method according to claim 25.

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