HK1152788A - Genuine & counterfeit certification member - Google Patents

Description

Authenticity proving member

Technical Field

The present invention relates to a method for determining authenticity of an object that is often counterfeited and requires authentication for whether or not the object is counterfeited, a member used for determining authenticity, and a device for reading a chip used for determining authenticity.

Background

The distribution of so-called kana-brand commodities, which are directly copied from a powerful manufacturer called nameplate commodities or manufactured and sold in a similar manner, is a very big social problem. Some of such kana-brand products can be identified as not being genuine at first glance, but some of them are made elaborately, so that it is extremely difficult to identify as not being genuine.

Further, in some places, there is insufficient recognition that a kana-brand product is an illegal product, and it is clear that a kana-brand product is still on the market. Such kana products are being sold to consumers directly on the internet without going through distribution facilities, and the number of the products is increasing in recent years.

Further, the chassis number of the stolen vehicle is changed, and the vehicle is exported to the sea as a non-stolen vehicle.

In order to cope with such a situation, a manufacturer or a seller of the genuine product creates and delivers a certificate unique to the genuine product to the consumer, but the certificate may be forged.

In addition, by attaching a label such as a hologram (hologram) that is difficult to copy to a genuine product, it is easy to confirm whether the product is genuine, but copying of the hologram is only difficult, and not impossible.

Moreover, the hologram is confirmed by human visual observation, that is, by a sense of sight. Such confirmation by sense organ is not only different in ability of the person to be confirmed, but also different in environment, psychological state, physical state and the like even in the same person, and thus is low in reliability.

Furthermore, in the case of mounting a sophisticated counterfeit hologram, confirmation by human power is almost impossible.

In some cases, the IC chip is mounted on a genuine product, and the genuine product is confirmed by using digital data stored in the IC chip. However, it is not so difficult to counterfeit the IC chip for verification by reading out the digital data stored in the IC chip and writing the digital data into another IC chip.

Further, japanese patent application laid-open No. 10-44650 discloses an authentication chip for authenticating the authenticity of a card by metal particles mixed in a transparent medium.

Further, japanese patent application laid-open No. 2003-29636 discloses an authentication chip for authenticating a card by a fiber sheet mixed with a transparent medium.

In addition, international publication WO2007/072793 filed by the present applicant discloses a method for automatically authenticating a card by sensing.

Further, international publication WO2007/072794 filed by the present applicant discloses an authentication chip, an authentication method, and an authentication device for authenticating a card by a hologram.

Further, international publication WO2007/072795 filed by the present applicant discloses an authentication chip, an authentication method, and an authentication device for performing card authentication using phosphor particles.

Further, international publication WO2007/072796, which is filed by the present applicant, discloses an authentication chip, an authentication method, and an authentication device for performing card authentication using radioactive plasmids.

These conventional techniques can authenticate the authenticity of a card on which an authentication chip is mounted, but it is necessary to mount the authentication chip and read the digital data of the mounted authentication chip.

However, since it is practically impossible to mount an authentication chip capable of reading digital data on a product to be counterfeited, a technique for authenticating the authenticity of a product has not been put to practical use.

Patent document 1: japanese laid-open patent publication No. 10-44650

Patent document 2: japanese patent laid-open publication No. 2003-29636

Patent document 3: international publication WO2007/072793

Patent document 4: international publication WO2007/072794

Patent document 5: international publication WO2007/072795

Patent document 6: international publication WO2007/072796

Disclosure of Invention

Problems to be solved by the invention

The present application provides a method for easily and reliably discriminating a genuine product from a counterfeit product and verifying whether the discriminated product is authentic, a discriminating unit used in the method, and a method for manufacturing the discriminating unit.

Means for solving the problems

The present invention is an invention in which an authentication chip having authentication information that cannot be copied is inseparably attached to a certificate issued by a person (authorized person) having the authority to issue the certificate, the authentication information of the authentication chip is read as digital data, the digital data is encrypted using a key of the authorized person, the encrypted digital data is stored in a storage medium such as an RFID chip, and the storage medium is inseparably attached to a genuine certified item such as a commodity.

In order to confirm whether or not the certification target is authentic, encrypted digital data is read from a storage medium that is inseparably attached to the certification target, the encrypted digital data is decrypted using a key, information of an authentication chip attached to the certification is read as digital data, and the digital data decrypted from the storage medium of the certification target and the digital data read from the certification are compared, thereby confirming the correspondence between the certification target and the certification target.

In addition, the digital data read from the certificate may be encrypted using a key of an authorized person without decrypting the encrypted digital data, and the encrypted digital data may be compared with the encrypted digital data stored in the storage medium attached to the certified object.

Further, the authenticity of the certificate itself can be discriminated by a configuration in which a storage medium is attached to the certificate and the information of the authentication chip encrypted with the key of the authorized person is stored in the storage medium of the certificate.

In this case, the key used for the encrypted data stored in the storage medium of the certificate and the key used for the encrypted data stored in the storage medium of the certified object may be the same or different.

Further, the authentication chip is attached to the object to be certified, the storage medium storing the encrypted digital data is attached to the certificate, the authentication information of the object to be certified is confirmed by the encrypted digital data stored in the storage medium attached to the certificate, and the information of the authentication chip attached to the certificate is confirmed by the encrypted digital data stored in the storage medium attached to the object to be certified, whereby the authenticity of the certificate and the object to be certified can be discriminated.

In this case, the key used for the encrypted digital data stored in the storage medium of the certificate and the key used for the encrypted digital data stored in the storage medium of the certified object may be the same or different.

Data such as a certificate number is added to the digital data before or after encryption.

When the storage medium has a small recording capacity, the digital data obtained by encrypting the hash value is stored.

An electronic signature in which the hash value is encrypted with the key of the authorized person can also be used.

As the authentication information, it is possible to use: metal particles dispersed in a transparent medium; a fibrous sheet dispersed in a transparent medium; regularly arranged embossed hologram pits formed by chance; embossed hologram pits arranged regularly and arranged according to a random number; embossed hologram pits formed by scattering or etching; regularly arranged, by chance formed, multi-color embossed hologram pits; regularly arranged multi-color embossed hologram pits arranged according to a random number; multicoloured embossed hologram pits formed by spreading or etching; particles of an immunofluorescent substance dispersed in a transparent medium; radioactive plasmids dispersed in a medium; regularly arranged structural color (structural color) visualizations formed by chance; a structural color developing body formed by scattering or etching; the structural color display body formed by coating.

In order to accurately read the authentication information from the authentication chip, reading restriction is performed using a mark for alignment, a moving direction reading start/end line, an end instruction line, and a mark for a synchronization signal.

In addition to the partial mounting of the authentication chip on the certificate, the entire surface of the certificate can be used as the authentication chip.

In this case, the items described in the warranty surface are used for the reading restriction.

The position of the storage medium attached to the certificate may be the inside of the certificate, in addition to the surface of the certificate.

For reading the authentication chip, there are a method using a camera and a method not using a camera.

The combination of the light source and the camera in case of using the camera comprises: a method of using a white light source and a color camera, a method of simultaneously irradiating a light source and a color camera using RGB, and a method of sequentially irradiating a light source and a monochrome camera using RGB.

In a method of not using a camera, comprising: a method of reading while stopping using a light-receiving element matrix having the same area as that of the authentication chip, a method of reading while moving using a light-receiving element matrix having the same width as that of the authentication chip, and a method of reading while scanning by a single light-receiving element.

As the scanning method, in addition to mechanical scanning, methods of manufacturing a cylindrical parabolic mirror and a polygonal mirror are also advantageous.

The authentication information of the authentication chip is generally read as analog information, and must be converted into digital data for subsequent processing. The authentication chip is divided into a plurality of areas which are repeated, except by a normal analog/digital conversion process, and reading is performed by calculating the amount of information contained in each divided area.

In the manufacture of a certificate on which an authentication chip is mounted, authentication information is formed on a whole of a certificate original plate having an area corresponding to a plurality of certificates, and then the certificate original plate is cut into the size of the certificate.

The authentication information may be formed on the entire surface of the certificate or may be formed on a part of the certificate.

The method can also be applied to the manufacture of an authentication chip mounted on a warranty.

ADVANTAGEOUS EFFECTS OF INVENTION

By decrypting encrypted digital data stored in a storage medium attached to a certified object and comparing the decrypted digital data with digital data read from an authentication chip attached to a certificate, it is possible to judge that the certified object is genuine if the correspondence between the certificate and the certified object is confirmed, and to judge that the certified object is not genuine if the correspondence is not confirmed.

Even if encrypted digital data stored in a storage medium attached to a certified object is read, the encrypted digital data cannot be decrypted without a key used for encryption and compared with authentication information of an authentication chip. Therefore, only an authorized person who knows the key can confirm the authenticity of the certified object. In other words, a person who cannot confirm the authenticity of the certified object is not an authorized person.

When the key used for encrypting the encrypted digital data stored in the storage medium is incorrect, even if an authorized person wants to decrypt the encrypted digital data with the correct key, the encrypted digital data cannot be decrypted correctly. Thus, a person knowing the correct key can prove that an item using an improper key is a counterfeit.

Even when the encrypted digital data is attached to the certificate, the authenticity of the certificate can be confirmed.

Further, when information that cannot be copied is recorded on the certification and the encrypted digital data is attached to the certificate, the authenticity of the certificate and the certification can be confirmed with each other, thereby making confirmation of the authenticity more strict.

By adopting a structure in which the certificate and the certified object are integrated, it is possible to discriminate the authenticity of a card that is often forged, such as a bank card or a credit card.

Drawings

Fig. 1 shows example 1 of a certificate and a certified object using 1 key.

Fig. 2 is a diagram for explaining the process of discriminating between authenticity and a certificate and an object to be authenticated in example 1.

Fig. 3 is an example 2 of a certificate and a certified object using 2 keys.

Fig. 4 is a diagram for explaining the authentication process using the certificate and the object to be certified in example 2.

Fig. 5 is example 3 of a certificate and certified object using 2 keys.

Fig. 6 is a diagram for explaining the authentication process using the certificate and the object to be certified in example 3.

FIG. 7 shows example 4 of a certificate and a certified product using the certificate data.

Fig. 8 is an explanatory view of the authentication process using the certificate and the object to be certified in example 4.

Fig. 9 shows example 5 of the certificate and the certified product using the hash value.

Fig. 10 is an explanatory view of the authentication process using the certificate and the object to be certified in example 5.

Fig. 11 shows example 6 of the certificate and the certified product using the electronic signature.

Fig. 12 is an explanatory view of the authentication process using the certificate and the object to be certified in example 6.

FIG. 13 shows an embodiment of the configuration of the authentication chip and the confirmation chip

Fig. 14 shows an authentication chip of example 1 using metal particles dispersed in a transparent medium.

Fig. 15 is example 2 of an authentication chip using a fibrous sheet dispersed in a transparent medium.

Fig. 16 is example 3 of a single color embossed hologram authentication chip that is regularly arranged and formed by chance.

Fig. 17 is an explanatory diagram of a method of regularly arranging and forming a monochrome embossed hologram authentication chip based on random numbers.

Fig. 18 is embodiment 4 of a monochrome embossed hologram authentication chip formed by chance configuration.

Fig. 19 is an embodiment 5 of a multi-color embossed hologram authentication chip formed by accidental deployment.

FIG. 20 shows an authentication chip of example 6 using fluorescent plasmids dispersed in a transparent medium.

FIG. 21 shows an authentication chip of example 7 using radioactive plasmid particles dispersed in a medium.

Fig. 22 is embodiment 8 of the authentication chip using a monochrome structural color chip by chance configuration.

Fig. 23 is embodiment 9 of an authentication chip using regularly arranged monochrome structural color patches.

Fig. 24 is an embodiment 10 of an authentication chip utilizing multi-color structural color chips by chance configuration.

Fig. 25 is embodiment 11 of the structural color authentication chip formed by coating.

Fig. 26 is an embodiment 12 of a multi-color structural color authentication chip formed with dispersed droplets.

Fig. 27 is an embodiment of a position alignment mark.

Fig. 28 shows a certificate authority embodiment 1 partially serving as an authentication chip.

Fig. 29 shows a certificate authority example 2 in which an authentication chip is provided on the entire surface.

Fig. 30 shows a certificate authority example 3 in which an authentication chip is provided over the entire surface.

Fig. 31 shows a certificate authority example 4 in which the entire surface is an authentication chip.

Fig. 32 shows a certificate authority example 5 in which the entire surface is an authentication chip.

Fig. 33 shows a certificate authority example 6 in which the entire surface is an authentication chip.

FIG. 34 shows an embodiment of a warranty 10 having a storage medium

Fig. 35 is a warranty embodiment 2 with a preservation medium.

Fig. 36 shows embodiment 1 of a reading apparatus using a video camera.

Fig. 37 shows embodiment 2 of a reading apparatus using a video camera.

Fig. 38 shows embodiment 3 of the reading apparatus using a video camera.

Fig. 39 shows embodiment 4 of a reading apparatus using a video camera.

Fig. 40 shows embodiment 1 of the reading apparatus without using a video camera.

Fig. 41 shows embodiment 2 of the reading apparatus without using a camera.

Fig. 42 shows embodiment 3 of the reading apparatus without using a video camera.

Fig. 43 shows embodiment 4 of the reading apparatus without using a video camera.

Fig. 44 is an explanatory diagram of the reading method.

Fig. 45 is a diagram for specifically explaining the reading method of fig. 44.

Fig. 46 is a more specific explanatory diagram of the reading method of fig. 44.

Fig. 47 shows a manufacturing method of the certificate example 1.

Fig. 48 shows a manufacturing method of the certificate example 2.

Fig. 49 shows a manufacturing method of the certificate example 3.

Fig. 50 shows a method of manufacturing the certificate of example 4.

Fig. 51 shows a method for manufacturing the certificate in example 5.

Fig. 52 shows a method of manufacturing the certificate example 6.

[ description of main element symbols ]

1. 5, 11, 21, 31, 36 certificate

2. 6, 12, 22, 32, 37 attested objects

3. 7, 13, 14, 23, 33, 38, 101, 103, 105, 107, 109, 111, 120, 130, 140, 145, 150, 180, 185, 190, 195, 200, 210, 222, 227, 231, 236, 241, 252, 253, 262 authentication chip

4. 8, 9, 15, 16, 24, 26, 34, 39, 102, 104, 106, 108, 110, 112, 253, 254 validation chip

25 certificate number

121. 131, 143, 155, 161, 181 transparent resin

122 metal particles

132 fiber sheet

141. 147, 152, 153, 154, 187 holes

142. 171, 188, 186, 196, 201 resin

144. 148, 156, 157, 158 protrusions

146. 151 base body

162 fluorescent particle

172 radioactive plasmid

182. 191, 192, 193 structural color sheet

197. 202 resin, etc

211 position alignment mark

212 moving direction read start line

213 moving direction reading finishing line

214. 215 end indicator line

216 marks for synchronizing signals

217 authenticating the information carrier

220. 225, 230, 235, 240, 245, 250 warranty

221. 251, 226 substrate

223. 247, 252 face plate

224 text message

238. 243 reading frame

246 resin or the like

253. 254 confirmation chip

260 card body

261 card substrate

263 card upper surface plate

264. 265, 273 light source

266. 270, 271, 272 video camera

267 red LED

268 Green LED

269 blue LED

275 matrix of light receiving and emitting elements

276 light receiving and emitting element

278 red light receiving and emitting element array

279 green array of light-receiving elements

280 blue light receiving and emitting element array

281 light-receiving element

285 cylindrical paraboloid reflector

286 light passing through the hole

287 light-receiving and emitting element

288 polygonal mirror

289. 290 semi-cylindrical paraboloid reflector

300. 305, 310, 315 original plate

302. 306, 321, 327 certificate-preserving base plate with authentication information

303 information carrier

306. 311, 316, 326 warranty substrate

307 authenticate the chip.

Detailed Description

The following describes embodiments of the invention related to the present application.

In the illustrated embodiment, a cryptographic technique is used, and therefore the cryptographic technique will be briefly described. Practical cryptographic systems are roughly classified into a Secret-key Cryptosystem (Secret-key Cryptosystem) and a Public-key Cryptosystem (Public-key Cryptosystem), and either of these systems can be utilized in the inventions related to the present application.

According to "secret key generation " in japan electronics and information communications society, a process of encrypting (encrypting) a plaintext message M (message) using a key K (key) to obtain enCrypted digital data (enCrypted-data) C is represented as C (K, M), and a process of decrypting (decrypting) the enCrypted digital data C using the key K to obtain a plaintext message is represented as M (D (K, C).

In this manner, a process of obtaining encrypted digital data "Cs" by encrypting plaintext digital data "M" using a common key (Secret-key) Ks of a Secret key cryptosystem is expressed as Cs ═ E (Ks, M), and a process of obtaining plaintext digital data "M" by decrypting the encrypted digital data "Cs" using the common key Ks is expressed as M ═ D (Ks, Cs).

Further, a process of obtaining encrypted digital data "Cp" by encrypting plaintext digital data "M" using a Public key (Public-key) Kp of a Public-key cryptosystem is represented by Cp ═ E (Kp, M), and a process of obtaining plaintext digital data "M" by decrypting the encrypted digital data "Cp" using a Private key (Private-key) Kv is represented by M ═ D (Kv, Cp).

Further, a process of encrypting plaintext digital data "M" using a private key Kv of a public key cryptosystem to obtain encrypted digital data Cv is represented as Cv (E (Kv, M)), and a process of decrypting the encrypted digital data "Cv" using a public key Kp to obtain digital data "a" is represented as a (a) D (Kp, Cv). The digital signature is performed in this manner.

The discrimination body used for discriminating the authenticity of the object to be authenticated and the process of discriminating the authenticity will be described with reference to fig. 1 to 14.

< determination means and determination Process example 1>

Basic example 1 for judging the authenticity of a certified material will be described with reference to fig. 1 and 2. Fig. 1 shows components for authentication, and fig. 2 shows a process for authenticating the authenticity using these components.

(a) Reference numeral 1 in (a) denotes a certificate used for authentication, and reference numeral 2 in (b) denotes a certified product such as a product to be authenticated.

The certificate 1 is provided with an authentication chip 3 inseparably from the certificate body, and the authentication chip 3 is created by a person (authorized person) having the authority to perform the certification, for example, a vendor. The authentication chip 3 stores therein authentication information "a" that cannot be copied, such as an artifact metrics (artifact metrics). The certificate 1 is issued by an authority.

The certification target 2 is provided with a verification chip 4 inseparably, and encrypted authentication data "C" obtained by encrypting digital data of the authentication information "a" of the authentication chip 3 with a key "K" of an authorized user is stored in the verification chip 4.

The authenticity discrimination process is explained by fig. 2.

(1) An authentication chip 3 storing authentication information "a" which cannot be copied is produced.

Examples of the configuration of the authentication chip 3 will be described with reference to fig. 14 to 26.

(2) The certificate 2 with the authentication chip is obtained by attaching the authentication chip 3 to the certificate body in a non-separable configuration.

(3) The authentication information "a" is read.

When the authentication information "a" is analog information, the authentication information is digitized to obtain authentication data.

In order to accurately read the authentication information "a", it is preferable to read the authentication information "a" after the authentication chip 3 is mounted on the certificate 1.

(4) The authentication data "a" is encrypted with the key "K" of the authority to obtain encrypted authentication data "C".

(5) The encrypted authentication data "C" is stored in the verification chip 4, and the verification chip 4 is inseparably attached to the certified object main body 2.

(6) When the authenticity of the object 2 to be certified is discriminated, the authentication information "a" of the authentication chip 3 attached to the certificate 1 is first read. The digitization is performed in the case where the authentication information "a" is analog information.

(7) On the other hand, the encrypted authentication data "C" stored in the verification chip 4 attached to the object 2 to be certified is read.

(8) The encrypted authentication data "C" is decrypted using the key of the authorized person, and the authentication data "a'" in plain text is obtained.

(9) The authentication data "a'" of the certified object 2 decrypted from the confirmation chip 4 and the data obtained from the authentication information "a" of the certificate 1 are compared.

As a result, if they match, the combination of the authentication chip 3 of the certificate 1 and the confirmation chip 4 of the object 2 is judged to be valid, and the object is judged to be genuine.

If the two are different, the combination of the authentication chip 3 of the certificate 1 and the confirmation chip 4 of the object 2 is judged to be improper, and the object is judged not to be a genuine product.

In the case where a certificate on which an authentication chip is mounted and a certification target on which a confirmation chip is mounted are integrated, the validity of the certificate (certification target) can be certified.

In the present embodiment, the data "a" read from the authentication chip 3 and the certification data "a'" decrypted from the verification chip 3 are compared, but conversely, the encrypted authentication data "C" obtained by encrypting the authentication data "a" read from the authentication chip 3 and the encrypted authenticity verification data "C" read from the verification chip 4 may be compared.

In order to realize a mounting structure in which the authentication chip and the confirmation chip cannot be separated, there are methods such as an integral structure and welding. Further, the authentication chip and the confirmation chip may be not mounted on the certification target but information may be recorded in the certificate or the certification target itself.

As a storage medium for the encrypted authentication data "C" for confirming the chip, an optical read/write unit such as a barcode or a 2-dimensional barcode, a magnetic write unit, an RFID tag, or the like can be used.

As the verification chip, an IC chip using an element to which an inherent ID is given at the manufacturing stage is used, and the inherent ID is incorporated into the certification data, whereby the duplication of the verification chip 4 becomes impossible.

The key is stored in advance in a DRAM of a device for performing authentication, and when the device is powered off due to damage or theft, the key stored in the DRAM disappears, thereby preventing the key from being stolen.

These matters are common to the other embodiments, and the explanation thereof will be omitted because it is complicated to explain again the other embodiments.

< determination means and determination Process example 2>

If the certificate is not genuine, the certified item is not genuine. Next, embodiment 2 capable of confirming the authenticity of the certificate will be explained.

Fig. 3 shows components for authentication, and fig. 4 shows a process for authenticating the authenticity using these components.

In fig. 3, (a) shows a certificate 5 referred to for authentication, and (b) shows a target object 6 to be authenticated, such as a product.

The certificate 5 is provided with an authentication chip 7 and a confirmation chip 8 which are manufactured by an authorized person and cannot be separated from each other.

The authentication chip 7 stores authentication information "a" that cannot be copied, such as an artifact gauge.

The verification chip 8 stores encrypted verification data "C1" obtained by encrypting the digital data of the authentication information "a" with the 1 st key "K1" of the authorized user.

A confirmation chip 9 is inseparably attached to the certified object 6, and the confirmation chip 9 stores: the encrypted confirmation data "C2" obtained by encrypting the digital data of the certification information "a" using the 2 nd key "K2" of the authorized person.

It is preferable that the 1 st key "K1" and the 2 nd key "K2" are different, but the use of the same key can simplify the structure.

The process shown in fig. 4 is explained next.

(1) An authentication chip 7 storing authentication information "a" which cannot be copied is created.

(2) The authentication information "a" is read.

When the authentication information "a" is analog information, the authentication information is digitized to obtain authentication data.

In order to accurately read the authentication information "a", it is preferable to read the authentication information "a" after the authentication chip 7 is mounted on the certificate 5.

(3) The authentication information "a" is encrypted with the 1 st key "K1" of the authorized person to obtain encrypted confirmation data "C1", and the encrypted confirmation data "C1" is stored in the confirmation chip 8.

(4) The authentication chip 7 storing the authentication information "a" and the confirmation chip 8 storing the encrypted confirmation data "C1" are attached to the body of the certificate 5 in a configuration that cannot be separated.

(5) On the other hand, the authentication information "a" is encrypted with the 2 nd key "K2" of the authorized person to obtain the 2 nd encrypted confirmation data "C2", which is stored in the confirmation chip 9.

At this time, the 1 st key "K1" and the 2 nd key "K2" may use different keys or use the same key.

(6) The confirmation chip 9 storing the encrypted certification data "C2" is attached to the body 6 of the certified object in a non-detachable configuration.

(7) To discriminate the authenticity of the object to be authenticated 6, the authenticity of the certificate 5 is first discriminated.

The encrypted confirmation data "C1" is read from the confirmation chip 8 on the certificate 5.

(8) The encrypted confirmation data "C1" is decrypted with the 1 st key "K1" of the authority to obtain the decrypted confirmation data "a 1'".

(9) The authentication data "a" of the authentication chip 7 on the certificate 5 is read.

(10) The decrypted decryption confirmation data "a 1'" and the authentication data "a" are compared.

As a result, if they match, the combination of the authentication chip 7 and the confirmation chip 8 is judged to be valid, and the certificate 5 is judged to be genuine.

If the two are different, the combination of the authentication chip 7 and the confirmation chip 8 is judged to be improper, and the non-genuine product of the certificate 5 is judged.

Then, the authenticity of the certified object is discriminated.

(11) In order to discriminate the authenticity of the object to be authenticated 6, the encrypted certification data "C2" stored in the verification chip 9 is read.

(12) The encrypted confirmation data "C2" is decrypted with the 2 nd key "K2" of the authorized person to obtain the plaintext certification data "a 2'".

(13) The certification data "a 2'" of the confirmation chip 8 and the authentication data "a" of the authentication chip 7 are compared.

As a result, if they match, the combination of the authentication chip 7 of the certificate 5 and the confirmation chip 9 of the certified object 6 is judged to be valid, and the certified object 6 is judged to be a genuine object.

If the two are different, the combination of the authentication chip 7 of the certificate 5 and the confirmation chip 9 of the certified object 6 is judged to be improper, and the non-genuine product of the certified object 6 is judged.

The authentication chip, the confirmation chip, and the specific matters related to the confirmation chip are the same as those in embodiment 1, and therefore, the descriptions thereof are omitted.

Note that, since the same matters as those in embodiment 1 are related to encryption, an encryption process, and key management, descriptions thereof are omitted.

< determination means and determination Process example 3>

In order to more strictly perform the authentication judgment, example 3 in which the certificate and the object to be authenticated mutually authenticate each other is explained with reference to fig. 5 and 6. Fig. 5 shows components for authentication, and fig. 6 shows a process for authenticating using these components.

In fig. 5, (a) shows a certificate 11 referred to for authentication, and (b) shows a target object 12 to be authenticated, such as a product.

In the certificate 11, the 1 st authentication chip 13 is not separately mounted. The 1 st authentication chip 13 stores 1 st authentication information "a 1" that cannot be copied, such as an artifact gauge.

The 2 nd authentication chip 14 is mounted on the object 12 without being separated. The 2 nd authentication chip 14 stores 1 st authentication information "a 2" that cannot be copied, such as an artifact gauge.

The certificate 11 is further provided with a2 nd confirmation chip 15 inseparably, and the 2 nd confirmation chip 15 stores: the digitalized data "M2" of the 2 nd certification information "a 2" of the certified object 12 is encrypted with the 1 st encrypted certification data "C2" after the key "K2" of the authority.

The 1 st confirmation chip 16 is further inseparably mounted on the certified object 12, and the 1 st confirmation chip 16 stores: the digitalized data "M1" of the 1 st certification information "a 1" of the certificate 11 is encrypted with the 1 st encrypted certification data "C1" encrypted with the key "K1" of the authority.

It is preferable that the 1 st key "K1" and the 2 nd key "K2" are different, but the use of the same key can simplify the structure.

The following describes the authentication process shown in fig. 6.

(1) The 2 nd authentication chip 14 storing the 2 nd authentication information "a 2" which cannot be copied is created.

(2) Read 2 nd authentication information "A2"

If the 2 nd authentication information "a 2" is analog image information, it is digitized into the 2 nd authentication data "M2".

(3) The 2 nd certification information "a 2" is encrypted with the 2 nd key "K2" of the authority person to obtain the 2 nd encrypted certification data "C2", and is stored in the 2 nd verification chip 15.

(4) The 1 st authentication chip 13 storing the 1 st authentication information "a 1" which cannot be copied is created.

(5) Read 1 st authentication information "A1"

When the 1 st authentication information "a 1" is analog image information, digitization is performed.

(6) The 1 st certification data "A1" is encrypted with the 1 st key "K1" of the authorized person to obtain the 1 st encrypted certification data "C1", and is stored in the 1 st verification chip 16.

At this time, the 1 st key "K1" and the 2 nd key "K2" may use different keys or use the same key.

(7) The 2 nd authentication chip 14 and the 1 st confirmation chip 16 are mounted on the object 12 in a non-separable structure.

(8) The 1 st authentication chip 13 and the 2 nd confirmation chip 15 are mounted on the certificate 11 in a non-separable configuration.

(9) In order to discriminate the authenticity of the object 12, the 1 st encrypted certification data "C1" stored in the 1 st confirmation chip 16 attached to the object 12 is read first.

(10) Next, the 1 st encrypted certification data "C1" is decrypted with the 1 st key "K1" of the authorized person, and the 1 st certification data "a 1'" in plain text is obtained.

(11) On the other hand, the 2 nd authentication information "a 2" of the 1 st authentication chip 13 mounted on the certificate 11 is read.

The digitization is performed in the case where the first authentication information "a 1" is analog image information.

(12) Next, the 2 nd encrypted certification data "C2" is decrypted with the 2 nd key "K2" of the authorized person, and the 2 nd certification data "a 2'" in plain text is obtained.

(13) The 1 st authentication information "a 1" of the 1 st authentication chip 13 mounted on the certificate 11 is read.

(14) The 2 nd authentication information "a 2" of the 2 nd authentication chip 14 mounted on the certified object 12 is read.

(15) The 1 st certification information "a 1" of the certificate 11 and the decrypted 1 st certification data "a 1 '" of the certified are compared, and the 2 nd certification information "a 2" of the certified 12 and the decrypted 2 nd certification data "a 2'" of the certificate are compared.

As a result, if they match, the combination of the 1 st authentication chip 13 of the certificate 11 and the 1 st verification chip 16 of the certified object 12 and the combination of the 2 nd authentication chip 14 of the certified object 12 and the 1 st verification chip 16 of the certified object 12 are judged to be valid, and the certified object is judged to be genuine.

If the two are different, the combination of the 1 st authentication chip 13 of the certificate 11 and the 1 st confirmation chip 16 of the certified object 12 and the combination of the 2 nd authentication chip 14 of the certified object 12 and the 1 st confirmation chip 16 of the certified object 12 are judged to be improper, and the non-authentic certified object is judged.

The authentication chip, the confirmation chip, and the specific matters related to the confirmation chip are the same as those in embodiment 1, and therefore, the description thereof is omitted.

Note that, since the same matters as those in embodiment 1 are related to encryption, an encryption process, and key management, descriptions thereof are omitted.

< determination means and determination Process example 4>

The certificate is typically provided with a number assigned by the authority.

The corresponding relationship between the certification target object and the certificate can be discriminated by recording the certificate number in the certification target object, but when the certificate number is clearly displayed in the certification target object, forgery of the certification target object becomes easy. In order to cope with this problem, in the embodiment described below, a certificate number chip storing an encrypted certificate number is attached to an object to be certified.

Fig. 7 and 8 show an example using a certificate number assigned to a certificate.

Fig. 7 shows components for authentication, and fig. 8 shows a process for authenticating using these components.

In fig. 7, (a) shows a certificate 21 referred to for authentication, and (b) shows a target object 22 to be authenticated, such as a product.

The certificate 21 is not separately provided with the authentication chip 23, and is not separately provided with a unique certificate number 25 given by an authorized person.

The authentication chip 7 stores authentication information "a" that cannot be copied, such as an artifact gauge.

A confirmation chip 24 is inseparably attached to the object 22, and the confirmation chip 24 stores: the authentication information "a" stored in the authentication chip 7 of the certificate 21 is encrypted with the encrypted certificate data "C" encrypted with the 2 nd key "K2" of the authorized person.

An encrypted certificate number chip 26 is inseparably attached to the object 22, and the encrypted certificate number chip 26 stores: the certificate number 25 is encrypted with an encrypted certificate number "Cn" encrypted by the authority 1 st key "K1".

It is preferable that the 1 st key "K1" and the 2 nd key "K2" are different, but the use of the same key can simplify the structure.

In addition, the confirmation chip 24 and the encrypted certificate number chip 26 may be formed as one chip, and the certificate data "C" and the certificate number may be combined and encrypted.

The authentication process shown in fig. 8 will be described next.

(1) An authentication chip 23 storing authentication information "a" which cannot be copied is created.

(2) A certificate sheet 21 to which a certificate number 25 that cannot be changed is assigned is prepared.

(3) The authentication chip 23 is inseparably attached to the main body of the certificate paper 21 to which the certificate number 25 is given.

(4) The authentication information "a" is read.

When the authentication information "a" is analog information, digitization is performed.

In order to accurately read the authentication information "a", it is preferable to read the authentication chip 23 after mounting it on the certificate paper 1.

(5) The certification information "a" is encrypted with the 1 st key "K1" of the authorized person to create a confirmation chip 24 storing encrypted certification data "C", and the certificate number 25 is encrypted with the 2 nd key "K2" of the authorized person to create an encrypted certificate number chip 26 storing an encrypted certificate number "Cn".

(6) The verification chip 24 and the certificate number chip 26 are mounted on the subject body 22 in a non-separable configuration.

The storage medium for the encrypted certification data "C" may be an appropriate means such as an optical read/write method such as a barcode or a 2-dimensional barcode, a magnetic write method, and an IC chip.

(7) When the authenticity of the object 22 is discriminated, the encrypted certification data "C" stored in the verification chip 24 of the object 22 and the encrypted certificate number "Cn" stored in the encrypted certificate number chip 26 are read.

(8) The encrypted certification data "C" is decrypted with the 1 st key "of the authorized person to obtain the certification data" a ' "in plain text, and the encrypted certification number" Cn "is decrypted with the 2 nd key" K2 "of the authorized person to obtain the certification data" a ' "in plain text and the certification number" n ' "in plain text.

(9) On the other hand, the authentication information "a" and the certificate number 25 of the authentication chip 23 attached to the certificate 21 are read.

The authentication information "a" is digitized in the case of analog information.

(10) The certification data "a '" of the object to be certified 22 and the authentication data "a" of the certificate 21 are compared, and the certificate number "N'" decrypted from the encrypted certificate number chip 26 and the certificate number "N" of the certificate 21 are compared.

If the combination of the certificate and the object is identical, the combination of the certificate and the object is judged to be valid, and the object is judged to be a genuine product.

If any of the two are different, the combination of the certificate and the object is judged to be improper, and the object is judged not to be genuine.

The authentication chip, the confirmation chip, and the specific matters related to the confirmation chip are the same as those in embodiment 1, and therefore, the description thereof is omitted.

Note that, since the same matters as those in embodiment 1 are related to encryption, an encryption process, and key management, descriptions thereof are omitted.

< determination means and determination Process example 5>

If the IC chip is used as the confirmation chip mounted on the certified object, large data can be used, but when other barcodes, 2-dimensional barcodes, magnetic recording, or the like are used, it is difficult to store large data.

In embodiment 5, if a Hash Algorithm such as MD5(Message Digest 5), SAH-1(Secure Hash Algorithm-1), SAH-2, or the like of the Hash Algorithm is used, the falsification of the original data is surely reflected to the Hash value regardless of how large the data can be converted into a 16-bit Hash value. This can be used without increasing the amount of data stored in the server and the amount of communication. To reduce the burden of encryption/decryption, the amount of stored data is reduced by using a hash algorithm.

Fig. 9 and 10 show an example of reducing data to be attached to a certificate.

Fig. 9 shows components for authentication, and fig. 10 shows a process for authenticating by using these components.

In fig. 9, (a) shows a certificate 31 referred to for authentication, and (b) shows a certified product 32 to be subjected to authentication such as a product.

The certificate 31 is provided with an authentication chip 33 which is not separately provided.

The authentication chip 33 stores authentication information "a" that cannot be copied, such as an artifact gauge.

A certification hash value chip 34 is inseparably attached to the certification target 32, and the hash value chip 34 stores: the authentication information "a" stored in the authentication chip 33 is hashed (hash), and the hash value is encrypted with the key "K" of the authorized person to obtain an encrypted certification hash value "Ch".

The following describes the authentication process shown in fig. 10.

(1) An authentication chip 33 storing authentication information "a" which cannot be copied is created.

(2) The authentication chip 33 is mounted on the main body of the certificate 32 in a non-separable configuration.

(3) The authentication information "a" is read.

When the authentication information "a" is analog information, digitization is performed.

In order to correctly read the authentication information "a", it is preferable to read the authentication information after the authentication chip 33 is mounted on the certificate 32.

(4) The authentication information "a" is hashed in one direction, and the hash value is converted to a hash value "H".

(5) The hash value "H" is encrypted with the key "K" of the authorized person to obtain the encrypted certification hash value "Ch".

(6) The encrypted certification hash value "Ch" is stored in the certification hash chip 34, and the certification hash chip 34 is mounted on the subject to be certified 32 in an inseparable configuration.

(7) When the authenticity of the object to be certified 32 is discriminated, the encrypted certification hash value "Ch" is read from the encryption verification chip 33 of the object to be certified 32.

(8) And decrypting the encrypted certificate hash value "Ch" by using the key "K" of the authority to obtain a hash value "H'".

(9) The authentication information "a" is read from the authentication chip 33 of the certificate 31.

(10) The authentication information "a" is hashed in one direction, and the hash value is converted to a hash value "H".

(11) The certification hash value "H'" decrypted from the certification hash value chip 34 is compared with the hash value "H" of the authentication information obtained from the authentication chip 33 of the certificate.

As a result, if they match, the combination of the authentication chip 33 of the certificate 31 and the confirmation chip 34 of the certified object 32 is judged to be valid, and the certified object is judged to be genuine.

If the two are different, the combination of the authentication chip 33 of the certificate 31 and the confirmation chip 34 of the certified object 32 is judged to be improper, and the certified object is judged to be not genuine.

< determination means and determination Process example 6>

In the technique of applying the hash value utilized in the discrimination means and the discrimination process embodiment 5, there is a digital signature.

The digital signature is obtained by encrypting a directional hash value of the signed data with a private key known only to the signer and providing the encrypted data together with the signed data.

When the authenticity of the data is confirmed, the encrypted hash value is decrypted by the public key of the signer, the data is hashed, if the decrypted hash value is consistent with the hash value obtained by hashing the data, the data is confirmed to be genuine data which is not tampered, and if the decrypted hash value is inconsistent with the hash value, the data is confirmed to be improper data which is subject to tampering.

Moreover, the signer cannot claim that the data confirmed as genuine is inappropriate.

The authenticity judgment is made reliable by replacing the hash value shown in the judging means and the judging process example 5 with a digital signature.

Fig. 11 and 12 show an embodiment using a digital signature.

Fig. 11 shows components for authentication, and fig. 12 shows a process for authenticating using these components.

In fig. 11, (a) shows a certificate 36 referred to for authentication, and (b) shows a certified product 37 to be authenticated such as a product.

The certificate 36 is not separately provided with an authentication chip 38 for creating an authorized person.

Authentication information "a" that cannot be copied, such as an artifact metric, is stored in the authentication chip 38.

A confirmation chip 39 is inseparably attached to the certification 37, and the confirmation chip 39 stores: the certification digital signature "S" is obtained by hashing the certification information "a" stored in the certification chip 38 and encrypting the hash value with the authorized person' S private key "Kv".

The authentication process shown in fig. 12 will be described.

(1) An authentication chip 38 storing authentication information "a" that cannot be copied is created.

(2) The authentication chip 38 is mounted to the main body of the certificate 36 in a non-separable configuration.

(3) The authentication information "a" is read.

When the authentication information "a" is analog information, digitization is performed.

In order to correctly read the authentication information "a", it is preferable to read the authentication information "a" after the authentication chip 38 is mounted on the certificate 36.

(4) The authentication information "a" is hashed in one direction and hashed into a hash value "H".

(5) The hash value "H" is encrypted with the authorized person' S private key "Kv" to obtain the certification digital signature "S".

(6) The certification digital signature "S" is stored in the verification chip 39, and the verification chip 39 is mounted on the certified object body 37 in a non-detachable configuration.

(7) When the authenticity of the object to be certified 37 is discriminated, the certification digital signature "S'" is read from the verification chip 39 of the object to be certified 37.

(8) The certification digital signature "S '" is decrypted with the public key "Kb" of the authority to obtain the hash value "H'".

(9) The authentication information "a" is read from the authentication chip 38 of the certificate 36.

(10) The authentication information "a" is hashed into a hash value "H".

(11) The hash value "H'" obtained from the certification digital signature of the verification chip 39 of the certified object 37 is compared with the hash value "H" of the authentication information obtained from the authentication chip 38 of the certificate 36.

As a result, if they match, the combination of the authentication chip 38 of the certificate 36 and the confirmation chip 39 of the certified object 37 is judged to be valid, and the certified object is judged to be genuine.

Further, since the authorized person cannot claim that the certified product is not a genuine product, the authorized person cannot deny his or her responsibility even if there is a defective product.

If the two are different, the combination of the authentication chip 38 of the certificate 36 and the confirmation chip 39 of the object 37 is judged to be improper, and the object is judged to be non-genuine.

< authentication chip and confirmation chip mounting embodiment >

The certification 5 shown in fig. 3, the certification 11 and the certification object 12 shown in fig. 5, and the certification object 22 shown in fig. 7 are mounted with an authentication chip and a confirmation chip.

Fig. 13 shows an example in which the authentication chip and the confirmation chip are mounted on the certificate and/or the certified object.

In the figure, the characters shown by solid lines are data stored in the upper chip, and the characters shown by open circles are data stored in the lower chip.

(a) The most basic configuration is shown, and the authentication chip 101 storing the authentication data "a" and the verification chip 102 storing the encrypted certification data "C" are arranged side by side separately.

In the configuration shown in (b), the authentication chip 103 storing the authentication data "a" is mounted in a superimposed manner on the IC chip 104 as the confirmation chip storing the encrypted certification data "C".

The authentication data of the authentication chip 103 may be stored in the package of the IC chip 104 by means of printing or the like.

In the configuration shown in (C), the authentication chip 105 storing the 1 st authentication data "a 1" and the confirmation chip 106 storing the 2 nd encrypted certification data "C2" are arranged in parallel with each other on the certification, and the authentication chip 107 storing the 2 nd authentication data "a 2" and the confirmation chip 108 storing the 1 st encrypted certification data "C1" are arranged in parallel with each other on the certification.

In the configuration of the certificate shown in (d), the authentication chip 109 storing the 1 st authentication data "a 1" is mounted in a superimposed manner on the IC chip 110 as the confirmation chip storing the 2 nd encrypted certificate data "C2".

In the configuration of the certification target, the authentication chip 111 storing the 2 nd authentication data "a 2" is mounted in a superposed manner on the IC chip 112 as the confirmation chip storing the 1 st encrypted certification data "C1".

The authentication data of the authentication chip can be stored in the package of the IC chip by means of printing or the like.

An example of an authentication chip storing an authentication information carrier carrying authentication information that cannot be copied will be described with reference to fig. 14 to 30.

In these drawings, (a) is an overall view, and (b) and (c) are sectional views.

An authentication chip that cannot be copied or forged for use in authentication will be described with reference to fig. 14 to 26.

< example 1 of authentication chip >

The authentication chip 120 shown in fig. 14(a) and (b) is an example in which metal particles are used as an authentication information carrier, and the metal particles 122 are dispersed and arranged in the transparent resin 121 by a method such as dispersion, as shown in the cross section in (b).

Since the arrangement position of the metal particles 122 as the authentication information carrier in the transparent resin 121 is a three-dimensional arrangement position by chance, the copying of the authentication information is impossible.

< example 2 of authentication chip >

The authentication chip 130 shown in fig. 15(a) and (b) is an example in which a fiber sheet is used as an authentication information carrier, and the fiber sheet 132 is dispersed and arranged in the transparent resin 131 by a method such as scattering, as shown in the cross section in (b).

Since the arrangement position of the fiber sheet 132 as the authentication information carrier in the transparent resin 131 is a three-dimensional arrangement position by chance, the copying of the authentication information is impossible.

The authentication chip shown in fig. 16 to 19 is an example in which a molded hologram is used as an authentication information carrier.

In the embossed hologram, only light incident on the edge of the hole having a depth corresponding to 1/4 wavelengths formed by embossing is selectively prevented from being emitted.

< example 3 of authentication chip >

As shown in the cross section of (b), the authentication chip 140 shown in fig. 16(a) and (b) fills the holes 141 formed in a regular array with a resin 142 or the like by means of spraying or the like, thereby allowing the upper edges and the bottoms of the unfilled holes to function as an embossed hologram. 143 is a transparent resin covering the whole.

Further, the position of the edge of the hole 141 of the authentication information carrier is occasionally caused, and when the amount of the resin 142 to be spread is insufficient or excessive, the edge of the hole cannot function as a hologram for incident light, and therefore cannot function as authentication information even when copying is performed.

A method of obtaining authentication information of an embossed hologram using a computer is described with reference to fig. 17.

In the authentication embossed hologram chip, 1024 pieces of 2-value data formed in an embossed hologram are arranged in a matrix of 32 × 32, and in the figure, a part where 2-value data "0" is written is indicated by a blank space and a part where 2-value data "1" is written is indicated by a dot.

The 2-value data obtained by detecting radiation emitted by nuclear decay of a radioactive substance is generally supplied as a 16-digit number, and the 1024 (bit) 2-value data is a 256-bit 16-digit number.

When a 16-ary number of 256 digits is replaced with a 2-ary number of 4 digits and arranged in a matrix of 32 columns and 32 rows, the pattern of the embossed hologram shown in the drawing can be obtained.

By replacing the number with a 4-ary number by the same method, a pattern of a black-red-green-blue 4-color embossed hologram can be obtained.

< authentication chip example 4>

In the authentication chip 145 shown in fig. 18, the upper edge and the bottom of the holes or projections formed in an irregular arrangement function as an embossed hologram.

In the authentication chip whose cross section is shown in (b), the holes 147 are formed in an irregular arrangement on the upper surface of the base 146 by etching, thereby forming the end edges of the embossed hologram, and in the authentication chip whose cross section is shown in (c), the protrusions 148 are formed on the base 146 by spreading, thereby forming the upper end edges of the embossed hologram. 143 is a transparent resin covering the whole.

Further, the position of the hole 147 of the authentication information carrier or the edge of the projection 148 of the authentication information carrier is accidental, and the embossed hologram has a three-dimensional structure, so that the authentication information does not function even if the copy using the photograph is performed.

< authentication chip example 5>

In the authentication chip 150 shown in fig. 19, since the depth of the hole or the height of the protrusion is different, it functions as an embossed hologram with respect to light having a plurality of wavelengths.

In the cross section shown in (b), the upper edge of the embossed hologram is formed by forming the holes 152, 153, 154 having different depths in the base 151, and in the cross section shown in (c), the upper edge of the embossed hologram is formed by forming the protrusions 155, 156, 157 having different heights in the base 151. 143 is a transparent resin covering the whole.

The position and depth of the edge of the hole 147 to be the authentication information carrier or the position and height of the edge of the protrusion 145 to be the authentication information carrier are incidental, and such an embossed hologram has a three-dimensional structure, and therefore copying with a photograph is impossible.

< authentication chip example 6>

Fig. 20 shows an example of an authentication chip using phosphor particles as an authentication information carrier.

In the authentication chip 160 shown in (a), as shown in the cross section in (b), the fluorescent substance particles 162 are dispersed and arranged in the transparent resin 161, and by appropriately selecting the fluorescent substance material, a plurality of fluorescent colors can be obtained.

The arrangement position of the fluorescent substance plasmid 162 as the authentication information carrier in the transparent resin 161 and the arrangement position of the obtained fluorescent color are three-dimensional by chance, and therefore, the complexity of the authentication information is impossible.

< authentication chip embodiment 7>

Fig. 21 shows an authentication chip using radioactive plasmids as an authentication information carrier.

In the authentication chip 170 shown in (a), as shown in the cross section in (b), radioactive plasmids 172 are dispersed and arranged in a resin 171.

Since the position of the radioactive plasmid 172 as the authentication information carrier in the transparent resin 171 is a three-dimensional position by chance, the complexity of the authentication information is not possible.

Fig. 22 to 26 show an authentication chip using a structural color developing body as an authentication information carrier.

The structural color and the embossed hologram are phenomena that appear by interference of light in a colorless and transparent medium, but the embossed hologram is caused by a phenomenon that light is not emitted by interference at an edge, and the structural color is a phenomenon that specific light is strongly emitted by interference in a plane, and the phenomena to be observed are different.

The structural color is different in that the path length is different even if the structural color is the same structural color piece when the incident angle of light is different, and thus different structural colors appear. Therefore, it is impossible to falsely produce the same structural color.

< authentication chip embodiment 8>

In the authentication chip 180 shown in fig. 22(a), as shown in the cross section of fig. 22 (b), the structural color sheet 182 is disposed in a transparent resin 181 in a dispersed manner, and the structural color sheet 182 has a structure in which a film is attached to a resin sheet.

< authentication chip example 9>

In the authentication chip 185 shown in fig. 23(a), as shown in (b), the holes 187 formed in a regular array and having a depth of about 1/4 of the wavelength of light to be used are filled with a resin 188 or the like, and thereby the structural color is developed by the filled resin 188 and/or the resin 186 covering the whole.

< authentication chip embodiment 10>

In the authentication chip 190 shown in fig. 24(a), as shown in (b), structural color sheets 191, 192, 193 having a plurality of thicknesses are dispersed in a transparent resin. The structural color shows different structural colors according to the thickness of the structural color sheet.

< authentication chip embodiment 11>

In the authentication chip 195 shown in fig. 25(a), a material 197 such as a solidified resin is formed in an amorphous state after being applied with fluidity, and the entire surface is covered with a resin 196.

In the case of the present construction, the structural color developed is entirely due to the fact.

< authentication chip embodiment 12>

In the authentication chip 200 shown in fig. 26(a), instead of the structural color sheet, a material 202 such as a resin is formed in a droplet form, and the entire surface is covered with a resin 201, and the material 202 has fluidity and is sprayed, and solidified as shown in (b).

In the case of the present structure, the structural color developed is caused by chance at all.

< example of read Limit >

Fig. 27 shows an example configuration for correctly reading the authentication chip.

In order to accurately read the authentication chip, it is preferable to form the alignment mark 211 in the authentication chip 210 in advance. The number of the alignment marks 211 is 1 in the simplest case, and a plurality of the alignment marks are provided in order to more reliably perform alignment. Further, the position alignment mark is useful not only for linear reading but also for planar reading using an imaging device.

In order to perform reading more reliably, some kind of mark, for example, a moving direction reading start line 212 and a moving direction reading end line 213, and end indicator lines 214 and 215 are provided at the reading start position and the reading end position of the authentication chip, in combination with the alignment mark 211.

In order to perform reliable reading of information on the authentication chip, it is necessary to synchronize the movements of the authentication chip and the reading device. Therefore, if the mark 216 for the synchronization signal is formed on the authentication chip, the movement of the reading device and the reading of the mark can be performed simultaneously.

These marks for the read start/end line and/or the synchronization signal can also be used for signal normalization in signal processing. The alignment mark, the start/end line reading mark, and/or the synchronization signal reading mark can be formed by an appropriate printing unit such as an inkjet printer, for example.

In this figure, 217 is an authentication information carrier composed of a fiber sheet, a die-cast hologram, a fluorescent substance plasmid, a radioactive substance plasmid, a structural color developing body, and the like.

Example of certificate Structure

Fig. 28 to 33 show an example of the mounting structure of the authentication chip in the certificate of authenticity in which only the authentication chip shown in fig. 13 is mounted.

The authentication chips shown in these figures use a structural color sheet as the authentication information carrier, but other authentication chips shown in fig. 14 to 21 can also be applied.

< warranty Structure example 1>

In fig. 28, (a) is an overall view of the certificate of authenticity with the authentication chip mounted thereon, and (b) is a sectional view thereof.

The authentication chip 222 is mounted in a non-detachable manner on the center of the surface plate 223 to which the substrate 221 of the certificate 220 is attached. When the authentication chip 222 needs to be protected, a protective plate for covering the entire structure is further provided. On the surface of the certificate, character information 224 indicating that the certificate is a certificate is described.

In the mounting structure shown here, the small authentication chip 222 is embedded in the center of the surface plate 223, but the mounting position and the size of the authentication chip are not limited to this example, and various positions can be adopted.

While the certificate of fig. 28 has a small authentication chip 222 embedded in the center of a surface plate 223, the certificate of fig. 29 to 33 has an authentication information carrier disposed over the entire surface thereof, and the entire surface of the certificate, that is, the certificate itself, serves as the authentication chip. Therefore, the counterfeit and alteration of the warranty are impossible.

< warranty Structure example 2>

In fig. 29, (a) is an overall view of the warranty, and (b) is a sectional view thereof.

The certificate 225 is configured such that an authentication chip 227 is non-detachably mounted on the entire surface of the substrate 226. When the authentication chip 227 needs to be protected, a protective plate for covering the entire device is further provided. On the surface of the certificate, character information 224 indicating that the certificate is a certificate is described.

In reading the authentication information, the entire surface of the authentication chip 227 including the character information 224 is set as a target of reading.

In fig. 30 to 33, the cross-sectional views are not shown.

< warranty Structure example 3>

The certificate of authenticity 230 shown in fig. 30 is configured such that an authentication chip 231 is non-detachably mounted on the entire surface of the substrate, as in the certificate of authenticity shown in fig. 29. In the case where the authentication chip 231 needs to be protected, a protective plate is further provided to cover the entire structure. On the surface of the certificate 230, character information 224 indicating that it is a certificate is described. The difference from fig. 28 is that the character information 224 is described in the block 232 in a state distinguishable from the information of the authentication chip. Thus, their boundaries are bounded by the role of the end indicator lines 214 and 215 shown in FIG. 27.

In this case, the entire text information 224 or the inside of the portion where the text information 224 is described is not included in the reading of the authentication information.

< warranty Structure example 4>

The certificate of authenticity 235 shown in fig. 31(a) is configured such that the authentication chip 236 is non-detachably mounted on the entire surface of the substrate, as in the certificate of authenticity shown in fig. 29. In the case where the authentication chip 236 needs to be protected, a protective plate covering the entire structure is further provided.

On the surface of the certificate 235, character information 224 indicating that the certificate is a certificate is described. The lower end of the character string described in the upper part and the upper end of the character string described in the lower part have functions of end indication lines 214 and 215 shown in fig. 27, and the front end and the rear end of the character string have functions of a read start line 212 and a read end line 213 shown in fig. 27.

Although the reading frame 238 corresponding to the end indication lines 214 and 215, the reading start line 212, and the reading end line 213 is shown in the figure, it is not shown in practice.

Note that, as in the case shown in fig. 30, the character information 224 may be described so as to be distinguishable from the information of the authentication chip.

In reading the authentication information, the inside of the reading frame 238, which does not include the character information 224, is a target of reading. (b) The authentication information to be read in (a) is shown.

< warranty Structure example 5>

The certificate of authenticity 240 shown in fig. 32(a) is configured such that an authentication chip 241 is non-detachably mounted on the entire surface of the substrate, as in the certificate of authenticity shown in fig. 29. When the authentication chip 241 needs to be protected, a protective plate for covering the entire structure is further provided.

On the surface of the certificate 240, character information 224 indicating that the certificate is a certificate is described. The upper end of the character string described above and the upper end of the character string described below have the functions of the end indication lines 214 and 215 shown in fig. 27, and the front end and the rear end of the character string have the functions of the read start line 212 and the read end line 213 shown in fig. 27.

Although the reading frame 243 corresponding to the end indicating lines 214 and 215, the reading start line 212, and the reading end line 213 is shown in the figure, it is not shown in practice.

As in the case shown in fig. 30, the character information 242 may be described so as to be distinguishable from the information of the authentication chip.

In reading the authentication information, the entire reading frame 243 including the character information 242 is a target of reading. (b) The authentication information to be read in (a) is shown.

< warranty Structure example 6>

In a warranty 245 shown in fig. 33, a material 246 such as a resin which has fluidity and is applied and then cured is formed irregularly, and the whole is covered with the resin.

When the resin covering the entire structure needs to be protected, a protective plate is further provided to cover the entire structure. The surface of the certificate is recorded with character information 224 indicating that the certificate is a certificate.

The structural color developed in the case of the present structure is entirely incidental.

Fig. 34 and 35 show an example of the mounting structure of the authentication chip and the confirmation chip in the certificate of which confirmation data is mounted, in addition to the authentication chip shown in fig. 3 and 5.

Since the authentication information to be read is the same as the certificate of fig. 28 to 33, the description thereof is omitted.

When the encrypted confirmation data is correctly decrypted, the authentication information of the authentication chip corresponds to the encrypted confirmation data. Thus, by using the validation data, the validity of the warranty itself can be certified.

< warranty Structure example 7>

In fig. 34, (a) is an overall view of the warranty, and (b) is a sectional view.

The certificate 250 is configured such that an authentication chip 253 and a confirmation chip 254, such as a color 2-dimensional barcode, storing data obtained by digitizing and encrypting authentication information of the authentication chip 253 are non-detachably attached to the center of a surface plate 252 attached to a substrate 251. When the authentication chip 253 and the confirmation chip 254 need to be protected, a protective plate covering the whole is further provided.

The surface of the certificate is recorded with character information 224 indicating that the certificate is a certificate.

In the mounting structure shown here, the authentication chip 253 and the confirmation chip 254 are mounted on the central portion of the surface plate 247, but the mounting position and the size of the authentication chip are not limited to this example, and various positions can be adopted.

< warranty Structure example 8>

In fig. 35, (a) is an overall view of the warranty, and (b) is a sectional view.

The certificate 250 is configured such that an authentication chip 252 is detachably mounted on the entire surface of the substrate 251. When the authentication chip 252 needs to be protected, a protective plate for covering the entire structure is further provided. The surface of the certificate is recorded with character information 224 indicating that the certificate is a certificate.

A confirmation chip 253 as an IC chip or the like is mounted at an appropriate position on the substrate 251.

Reading device

The reading apparatus is explained by fig. 36 to 43.

The authentication information carrier used for the authentication chip can be detected optically. Since the light source and the detection light are the simplest structural color developing bodies, the authentication chip will be described using the structural color developing bodies as the authentication information carriers, and the other authentication information carriers will be described only with respect to the differences from the case of using the structural color developing bodies.

In these figures, 260 denotes a card body, 261 denotes a card substrate, 263 denotes a card upper surface plate, and 262 denotes an authentication chip.

< example 1 of reading apparatus >

Fig. 36 shows a reading apparatus using an imaging apparatus which is the most basic configuration as a method of reading an authentication chip as a surface.

264 and 265 are white light sources for illuminating the authentication chip 262, and 266 is a camera for photographing.

As a camera for photographing, for example, a color camera such as a CCD camera can be used, and in this case, a white LED is used as a light source for illumination.

The type of light source is not limited to the white LED, and other suitable light sources may be used. The number is not limited to 1, and a plurality of the number may be used.

White LEDs are configured to obtain approximately white light by a combination of ultraviolet LEDs and phosphors of R (Red) G (Green) B (Blue), a combination of LEDs of RGB colors, or a combination of Blue LEDs and yellow phosphors, while color cameras are configured to perform color separation using color filters.

Therefore, the optical detection using the combination of the white LED and the color camera is limited to the optical detection that can be detected by the combination of the emission color and the color camera.

In the case of using an embossed hologram as the authentication information carrier, a laser element is preferably used as the light source.

In the case of using a fluorescent substance as the authentication information carrier, it is preferable to use a UVLED as the light source.

When a radioactive substance is used as the authentication information carrier, the authentication chip is brought into close contact with the fluorescent plate without using a light source, and light emission due to radiation is detected.

When the card 260 is placed in the reader and then is stopped, the authentication chip 262 is illuminated by the illumination light sources 264 and 265, and the camera 266 captures an image to read the authentication information of the authentication chip 262.

< example 2 of reading apparatus >

Fig. 37 shows a reading apparatus embodiment 2 as a modified embodiment of the reading apparatus shown in fig. 36.

In this reading apparatus embodiment 2, instead of the white LED, a red LED267, a green LED268, and a blue LED269 are used to obtain white light, and a color camera or a monochrome camera 270 is used.

The light source is not limited to 3 types of red, green, and blue LEDs. In addition, the arrangement position and the number of LEDs can be determined as appropriate.

In the reading apparatus embodiments 1 and 2, the detection area is not limited to the light irradiation area, but the detection area may be not limited to the light irradiation area.

< example 3 of reading apparatus >

Fig. 38 shows a reading apparatus embodiment 3 as a modified embodiment of the reading apparatus shown in fig. 37.

In this reading apparatus, a monochrome camera 271 is used instead of the color camera 270.

The light source is not limited to 3 types of red, green, and blue LEDs. In addition, the arrangement position and the number of LEDs can be determined as appropriate.

It is also possible to use a color sequential system in which the LEDs emit light at different times and alternately emit light.

In the reading apparatus embodiments 1 and 2, the detection area is not limited to the light irradiation area, but the detection area may be not limited to the light irradiation area.

< example 4 of reading apparatus >

Fig. 39 shows a reader having a different concept from the reader shown in fig. 36 to 39.

The authentication information of the authentication chip has a three-dimensional structure. Therefore, different information can be obtained by photographing from different directions.

In this reading apparatus, a light source 272 and 2 cameras 273 and 274 for photographing are used.

The light source 272 includes a white diode shown in fig. 36, or LEDs such as red LEDs, green LEDs, and blue LEDs used in fig. 37 and 28, and the arrangement location, type, and number thereof may be determined as appropriate.

< example 5 of reading apparatus >

Fig. 40 shows a reader that reads an authentication chip directly as a surface.

In the figure, (a) is a diagram showing a schematic configuration of a detection unit of the card authentication reading device, and (b) is an enlarged view showing a correspondence relationship between the card and the planar card authentication reading device.

In the figure, reference numeral 275 denotes a light receiving/emitting element matrix in which light receiving/emitting elements 276 covering the size of the shielding authentication chip 262 are arranged in a planar manner, and the light receiving/emitting elements 276 are configured by combining a light source configured by a red LED, a green LED, a blue LED, and the like, and a small-sized light detecting element such as a light emitting diode, a phototransistor, a CCD, a CMOS, and the like.

The types and number of light sources are not limited to 3 types of red LEDs, green LEDs, and blue LEDs.

In the case of using an embossed hologram as the authentication information carrier, a laser element is preferably used as the light source.

In the case of using a fluorescent substance as the authentication information carrier, it is preferable to use a UVLED as the light source.

When a radioactive substance is used as the authentication information carrier, the authentication chip is brought into close contact with the fluorescent plate without using a light source, and light emission due to radiation is detected.

When the card 260 is placed in the reader and then stopped, the authentication chip 262 is positioned below the planar light receiving and emitting element matrix 275. In such a state, the light-receiving and light-emitting elements constituting the light-receiving and light-emitting element matrix 275 arranged in a planar manner detect light reflected from the structural color developing body arranged in the authentication chip 262, and read the authentication information of the authentication chip 262.

Since the pattern of the obtained electric signal depends on the arrangement state of the structural color display, each authentication chip 262, that is, each card 26 is authenticated by comparing the information.

The accuracy of reading the arrangement pattern of the structural color display bodies in the authentication chip 262 depends on the resolution of the light receiving and emitting element matrix 275 arranged in a planar manner.

Further, by adopting a color sequential method in which the light emitting elements sequentially emit light for each color, the number of light detecting elements can be greatly reduced.

< example 6 of reading apparatus >

Fig. 41 shows a reader that reads the surface of the authentication chip as a set of lines.

In the figure, (a) is a diagram showing a schematic configuration of a detection unit of an authentication chip reading device, and (b) is a diagram showing a correspondence relationship between a card and a linear light detection device.

In a housing having a length slightly longer than the width of the authentication chip 262 in the moving direction, there are housed: an array of red light-receiving elements 278, an array of green light-receiving elements 279, and an array of blue light-receiving elements 280.

These red light receiving element array 278, green light receiving element array 279, and blue light receiving element array 280 are merely examples, and may be any other color combination.

In the case of using an embossed hologram as the authentication information carrier, a laser element is preferably used as the light source.

In the case of using a fluorescent substance as the authentication information carrier, it is preferable to use 1 line of UVLEDs as the light source.

When a radioactive substance is used as the authentication information carrier, the authentication chip is brought into close contact with the fluorescent plate without using a light source, and light emission due to radiation is detected.

Unlike the reading apparatus shown in fig. 36 to 40, in the reading apparatus of embodiment 5, the authentication information on the authentication chip 262 is read during the loading operation of the loading and reading apparatus, not when the loading and reading apparatus is stopped after being loaded.

The card 260 passes under the arrays 278, 279, 280 of light-receiving elements when placed in the reading device. At this time, the array of light receiving and emitting elements arranged in a linear shape detects light reflected by the structural color display body arranged in the authentication chip 262, and an electric signal generated with the movement of the authentication chip 262 is detected in an analog continuous manner for each of the light detecting elements, in a digital discontinuous manner for each of the light detecting elements, or scanned like a facsimile or a scanner to form one image, and authentication information of the authentication chip 262 is read.

The accuracy of reading the arrangement pattern of the structural color manifestation in the authentication chip 262 depends on the resolution of the light-receiving element matrices 278, 279, 280.

Further, by adopting a color sequential method in which the light emitting elements sequentially emit light for each color, the number of light detecting elements can be greatly reduced.

< example 7 of reading apparatus >

Fig. 42 shows a reading apparatus that reads a surface as a set of dots

In the figure, (a) is an explanatory diagram of a schematic configuration of a relationship between a card and an authentication chip reading device, and (b) is an explanatory diagram of a reading method.

In the figure, 281 is a light-receiving and emitting element, and the light-receiving and emitting element 281 moves in a direction orthogonal to the insertion direction of the card 260.

The movement in the direction orthogonal to the insertion direction of the card 260 can be appropriately used by: the linear motion is based on a simulated linear motion of a rotational motion with 1 point as a fulcrum, a linear motion resulting from conversion from a rotational motion to a linear motion, a linear motion resulting from a linear motor, or the like.

< example 8 of reading apparatus >

Fig. 43 shows a reading apparatus having a novel structure.

The optical scanning unit of the reading apparatus is used in a laser printer or the like, and reflects a laser beam by a rotating polygon-cylindrical mirror (polygon mirror). The scanning unit can perform optical scanning only by the rotational movement of the polygon mirror.

As means for obtaining a parallel beam, a paraboloid is used in a reflecting telescope and a parabolic antenna.

(a) Showing the relationship of the parabolic surface to the parallel rays. In the figure, X represents an X axis, Y represents a Y axis orthogonal to the X axis, and O represents an origin. P is a parabola represented by Y-X2. The focal point F of the parabola is located at a position where X is 0 and Y is-1/4, and when a straight line parallel to the Y axis is folded back on the parabola P, all the points are focused on the focal point F. In contrast, when a straight line with the focus F as a base point is folded back on the parabola P, it becomes parallel to the Y axis.

(b) A basic structure of a reading apparatus to which this principle is applied is shown.

In the figure, numeral 285 denotes a mirror having a paraboloid, and is formed in a cylindrical shape having a length in a direction perpendicular to the paper surface. Further, a light passing hole 286 through which light passes is formed at a position corresponding to the origin of (a). At the focal point of the cylindrical parabolic mirror 285, there are disposed: a polygonal mirror (polygon mirror) 288 having a rotation axis parallel to the extending direction axis thereof and having a polygonal reflecting surface. Reference numeral 287 denotes a light-receiving/emitting element, and 262 denotes an authentication chip to be read.

Light emitted from the light receiving and emitting element 287 in parallel to the Y axis of (a) and indicated by a solid line passes through the light passing hole 286 and enters the polygon mirror 288 disposed at the focal point of the cylindrical parabolic mirror 285. The light incident on the polygon mirror 288 is incident on the cylindrical parabolic mirror 285 as the polygon mirror 288 rotates, is reflected in a direction parallel to the Y axis, and is incident on the authentication chip 262.

Light emitted from the authentication chip 262 in parallel with the Y axis of (a) and indicated by a solid line is reflected by the cylindrical parabolic mirror 285 and incident on the polygon mirror 288 disposed at the focal point. The light incident on the polygon mirror 285 is reflected, and enters the light receiving/emitting element 287 through the light passing hole 286. On the other hand, light reflected from the authentication chip 262 in a direction different from the Y axis does not enter the polygon mirror 288 even if it is reflected by the cylindrical parabolic mirror 285.

As can be understood from this description, only light parallel to the Y axis out of the light reflected from the authentication chip 262 enters the polygon mirror 285, and therefore, by selecting light entering the light receiving element by rotating the polygon mirror 285, the light reflection state of the authentication chip 262 can be known.

In the reading device shown in (b), the light emitted from the authentication chip at a portion corresponding to the back side of the polygon mirror 285 as viewed from the light-receiving element 287 side cannot be read. Although necessary information or unnecessary information can be written in this portion, the portion corresponding to the back side of the polygon mirror 285 does not exist and all written information can be read with the configurations shown in (c) and (d).

(c) The basic structure for this is shown, using half of a half-cylinder parabolic mirror. In the figure, reference numeral 289 denotes a mirror having a paraboloid, and a half cylinder having a length in a direction perpendicular to the paper surface is formed only by a portion where X in (a) is negative. In this case, the light-passing hole formed in the (b) th step is not formed because it is not necessary. Further, at the focal point of the half cylindrical half parabolic mirror 289: a polygon mirror (polygon mirror) 288 having a rotation axis parallel to the extending direction axis of the semi-cylindrical semi-parabolic mirror 289 and having a polygonal reflecting surface. Reference numeral 287 denotes a light-receiving/emitting element, and 262 denotes an authentication chip.

Light emitted from the light receiving and emitting element 287 in parallel to the Y axis of (a) and indicated by a solid line enters the polygon mirror 288 disposed at the focal point of the semi-cylindrical parabolic mirror 289. The light incident on the polygon mirror 288 is incident on the semi-cylindrical half-parabolic mirror 289 as it rotates, reflected in a direction parallel to the Y axis, and incident on the authentication chip 262.

The light reflected from the authentication chip 262 in parallel with the Y axis of (a) is reflected by the semi-cylindrical half-parabolic mirror 289 and incident on the polygon mirror 288 disposed at the focal point. The light incident on the polygon mirror 288 is reflected and enters the light receiving/emitting element 287.

In this reading apparatus, since the authentication chip 262 corresponding to the portion on the back side of the polygon mirror 288 is only the end portion when viewed from the light receiving and emitting element 287, the influence of the portion that cannot be read is small.

Further, as shown in (d), by adopting a configuration in which the center portion of the semi-cylindrical parabolic mirror 290 is offset by a smaller number, the unreadable portion by the polygon mirror 288 does not exist at all, and thus information written in all the portions of the authentication chip 262 can be read.

Method for judging authenticity

The authentication determination method will be described with reference to fig. 44 to 46 by taking the case of using the reading apparatus of fig. 36 as an example.

The authentication information carriers used in the authentication chip are all optically detectable. Regarding the light source and the detection light, the structural color developing body is the simplest. Therefore, a case where the structural color developing body is used as the authentication information carrier in the authentication chip will be described.

The diagram of fig. 44, labeled w (white), is an example of an authentication chip photographed using a combination of a white LED and a color camera, in which structural color visualizations of all colors of R, G, B are detected.

Below this, R, G, B shows the structural color display body of each color, which is color-separated by the color filter of the camera.

In fig. 45 and 46, reference numeral W, R, G, B corresponds to W, R, G, B in fig. 44, and each image is divided into 4, and the 1 st quadrant is assigned the number 1, the 2 nd quadrant is assigned the number 2, the 3 rd quadrant is assigned the number 3, and the 4 th quadrant is assigned the number 4.

The differentiation method can also adopt diagonal line differentiation or further subdivision according to requirements.

In this method, not the pattern of the distinguished image but the average light amount of the structural colors therein, that is, the total light amount, is detected.

In the figure, "-a" represents the total light quantity of the color light in the entire authentication chip (All), "-T" represents the total light quantity of the color light in the upper half (Top) of the authentication chip, "-B" represents the total light quantity of the color light in the lower half (Bottom) of the authentication chip, "-R" represents the total light quantity of the color light in the Right half (Right) of the authentication chip, "-L" represents the total light quantity of the color light in the Left half (Left) of the authentication chip, "-1" - "4" represents the total light quantity of the color light in each quadrant of the authentication chip.

In this case, there are 9 pieces of total light amount information for R, G, B colors, respectively, and 27 pieces of total light amount information are obtained.

The authenticity of the authentication chip is judged by comparing the total light amount information obtained from the authentication chip at the time of manufacture of the authentication chip and stored with the total light amount information obtained at the time of detection by the authentication chip.

The white color obtained with a white LED is simulated (pseudo-white), and the white color detected with a color camera is also simulated due to the use of a color filter.

Therefore, the detection of light by the combination of the white LED and the color camera is limited to the detection by the combination of the light-emitting color and the color camera, and therefore, it is necessary to pay attention to what white LED is used and what color camera is used.

In order to satisfy the strict requirements of the color to be used, it is preferable to use the color information based on physical color information, that is, wavelength, rather than visual color information.

As the LED for the illumination light source, an ultraviolet LED or an infrared LED is used in addition to the visible light LED, and combined or selectively used to make improper reading difficult.

Further, it is also possible to use laser light sources of different wavelengths, use a nonlinear element, and use light of frequencies obtained as a difference or a sum of frequencies.

Other elements that can be used for determination include: the maximum luminance value in each region, the number of pixels whose luminance is greater than the predetermined value, the total number of bright pixels, the contour length of the bright pixels, the characteristics of the bright pixels, the center of gravity of the dispersed bright points, the peak value position and the peak value of a histogram of a vertical and horizontal direction histogram of a 2-valued image, a histogram of each pixel in which luminance information is weighted, and the like.

Method for making insurance certificate

A method of manufacturing a certificate of authenticity with authentication information attached thereto will be described with reference to fig. 47 to 52.

< method for producing certificate example 1>

Fig. 47 shows a method for manufacturing a certificate in which an information carrier is arranged on the entire surface as shown in fig. 29 to 35.

This manufacturing method is also applicable to the case of manufacturing the authentication chip 222 shown in fig. 28.

Denoted in (a) by 300 is a master having an area of 16 certificates of security.

On the original plate 300 an information carrier 303 is spread.

The original plate 300 on which the information carrier 303 is scattered is cut as shown in (b), and the certificate substrate 302 with the authentication information is obtained.

The certificate substrate 302 is subjected to printing, embossing, or the like to obtain a certificate.

Since the information carriers 303 are scattered on the original board 300, the distribution thereof is determined by chance.

In the case where the information carrier to be distributed is an information carrier having a three-dimensional structure as shown in fig. 14 to 25, and particularly a hologram or a structural color using an optical interference as shown in fig. 16 to 26, it is impossible to reproduce the information carrier by using a photograph or the like, and only transfer is possible but not possible in order to obtain the same distribution.

The cut substrate can be made small to form an authentication chip.

< method for producing certificate example 2>

Fig. 48 shows a method for manufacturing a certificate of authenticity in which an authentication chip is locally arranged as shown in fig. 28.

A master having an area of 16 certificates of security denoted by 305 in (a).

The original plate 305 is partially coated with an information carrier by using a mask or the like to obtain a certificate original plate with an authentication chip 307, and the original plate is cut as shown in (b) to obtain a certificate substrate 306 with the authentication chip 307.

The certificate is obtained by printing, embossing, or the like on the certificate substrate 306.

In the case where the information carrier to be distributed is an information carrier having a three-dimensional structure as shown in fig. 14 to 25, and particularly a hologram or a structural color using an optical interference as shown in fig. 16 to 26, it is impossible to reproduce the information carrier by using a photograph or the like, and only transfer is possible but not possible in order to obtain the same distribution.

< method for producing certificate example 3>

Fig. 49 shows a method for manufacturing a certificate in which the arrangement of the information carrier is fixed and only the information of the information carrier is determined by chance.

Indicated at 310 in (a) is a master having an area of 16 certificates of authenticity. Holes as shown in fig. 16 or 22 are regularly arranged on the entire surface of the certificate original plate 310.

A light-transmitting uncured resin is spread on the original plate and cured to obtain a certificate original plate with authentication information, and the original plate is cut as shown in (b) to obtain a certificate substrate 311 with authentication information.

The certificate is obtained by performing printing, embossing, or the like on the certificate substrate 311.

< method for producing certificate of example 4>

Fig. 50 shows another method for manufacturing the certificate shown in fig. 49.

Denoted 315 in (a) is a master having an area of 16 certificates of authenticity. The certificate authority plate 315 has holes as shown in fig. 16 or 22 regularly arranged on the entire surface except for the holes corresponding to the outermost periphery of the certificate authority.

Light-transmitting uncured resin is spread on the original plate and cured. Thus, a certificate original plate with authentication information is obtained, and the original plate is cut as shown in (b), thereby obtaining a certificate substrate 321 with authentication information.

The certificate is obtained by performing printing, embossing, or the like on the certificate substrate 316.

< method for producing certificate example 5>

Fig. 51 shows a method for manufacturing the certificate of fig. 49 according to still another embodiment.

Denoted 320 in (a) is a master having an area of 16 certificates of security. The security certificate original plate 315 is regularly provided with holes as shown in fig. 16 or 23 on the entire security certificate surface.

A non-curable resin is injected into or masked (masking) a hole corresponding to the outermost periphery of the certificate.

A light-transmitting uncured resin is spread on the original plate and cured to obtain a certificate original plate with authentication information, and the original plate is cut as shown in (b) to obtain a certificate substrate 321 with authentication information.

The certificate is obtained by performing printing, embossing, or the like on the certificate substrate 321.

< method for producing certificate of example 6>

Fig. 52 shows a method for manufacturing a certificate in which the information carrier is arranged on the entire surface as shown in fig. 35.

This manufacturing method is also applicable to the case where the authentication chip 195 shown in fig. 25 is manufactured.

Indicated at 325 in (a) is a master having an area of 16 certificates.

A light-transmitting uncured resin 326 is spread or applied on the original plate, and cured to obtain a certificate original plate with authentication information, and the original plate is cut as shown in (b) to obtain a certificate substrate 327 with authentication information.

The certificate substrate 326 is subjected to printing, embossing, or the like to obtain a certificate.

Since the uncured resin 326 is spread or coated on the original plate 325, the shape thereof is determined by chance.

The shape of the resin to be spread or applied cannot be copied by a photograph or the like, and only transfer printing is performed to obtain the same distribution, but transfer printing is not performed at all.

Therefore, since the hologram or the structural color using the optical interference shown in fig. 16 to 26 is very effective, the forgery or alteration of the certificate itself is impossible.

Industrial applicability of the invention

The above-described discrimination of authenticity by the combination of the certificate and the certified object is effective in the verification of the counterfeit and the identification of the stolen goods.

Further, the function of verifying the authenticity of the certificate itself is utilized, and thus the function is effectively exerted in the authenticity judgment of a card for judging the authenticity of the card itself such as a bank card or a credit card.

The claims (modification according to treaty clause 19)

(after modification) a method for discriminating between genuineness and falseness, wherein,

consisting of a set of a certificate and a certified object;

an authentication chip is inseparably installed on the certificate, and the authentication chip stores the 1 st authentication information which cannot be copied;

a storage medium storing 1 st encrypted 1 st authentication information obtained by encrypting the 1 st authentication information with a1 st key of an authorized person is inseparably attached to the certified object;

reading the 1 st authentication information and the 1 st encrypted 1 st authentication information;

decrypting the 1 st encrypted 1 st authentication information using the 1 st key of the authority;

and comparing the read 1 st authentication information with the decrypted 1 st encrypted 1 st authentication information to confirm the corresponding relationship between the certificate and the certified object.

(modified) the authenticity discrimination method according to claim 1, wherein the certificate and the object to be certified are integrated.

(modified) the authenticity discrimination method according to claim 1, wherein the certificate and the object to be certified are of different bodies.

(modified) the authenticity discriminating method according to claim 1, wherein,

a storage medium is further inseparably attached to the certificate, and the storage medium stores: 2 nd encrypted 1 st authentication information obtained by encrypting the 1 st authentication information by using the 2 nd key of the authority;

further, reading the 2 nd encrypted 1 st authentication information;

decrypting the 2 nd encrypted 1 st authentication information using the 2 nd key of the rightful person;

comparing the 1 st authentication information of the certificate with the decrypted 2 nd encrypted 1 st authentication information;

thereby confirming the correspondence between the certificate and the certified object.

(modified) the method according to claim 4, wherein the 1 st key and the 2 nd key are the same key.

(modified) the method according to claim 4, wherein the 1 st key and the 2 nd key are different keys.

(modified) the authenticity discrimination method according to claim 1, wherein,

further, a storage medium is inseparably attached to the certified object, and the storage medium stores: authentication information No. 2 that cannot be copied;

further, a storage medium is inseparably attached to the certificate, and the storage medium stores: 2 nd encrypted 2 nd authentication information obtained by encrypting the 2 nd authentication information by using the 2 nd key of the authority;

decrypting the 2 nd encrypted 2 nd authentication information using the 2 nd key;

decrypting the 1 st encrypted 1 st authentication information using the 1 st key;

comparing the 1 st authentication information with the decrypted 1 st encrypted 1 st authentication information;

comparing the 2 nd authentication information with the decrypted 2 nd encrypted 2 nd authentication information;

thereby confirming the correspondence between the certificate and the certified object.

(modified) the authenticity discriminating method according to claim 7, wherein the 1 st authentication information and the 2 nd authentication information are the same authentication information.

(modified) the method according to claim 8, wherein the 1 st key and the 2 nd key are different keys.

(modified) the method according to claim 8, wherein the 1 st key and the 2 nd key are the same key.

(modified) the authenticity discriminating method according to claim 7, wherein the 1 st authentication information and the 2 nd authentication information are different authentication information.

(modified) the authenticity discrimination method according to claim 11, wherein the 1 st key and the 2 nd key are different keys.

(modified) the authenticity discrimination method according to claim 11, wherein the 1 st key and the 2 nd key are the same key.

(modified) a certificate of authenticity in which an authentication chip is inseparably mounted, the authentication chip storing: authentication information that cannot be copied.

(modified) the warranty of claim 14 wherein the authentication chip is part of the warranty surface.

(modified) the warranty of claim 14 wherein the authentication chip is the entirety of the warranty surface.

(deletion)

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(deletion)

24. A method for reading authentication information, wherein,

dividing an authentication information plane of an authentication chip into a plurality of planes;

further dividing the plurality of surfaces into a plurality of surfaces, respectively;

repeating the dividing;

detecting the colors of the plurality of divided surfaces;

the authentication information plane is read by the detected color.

(as modified) a method of manufacturing a certificate, wherein,

preparing a master plate having an area with a plurality of certificates;

spreading an authentication information carrier over the entire surface of the original plate;

cutting the original plate on which the authentication information carrier is scattered to obtain a certificate substrate;

and processing the certificate substrate into a certificate.

26. A method of manufacturing a certificate, wherein,

preparing a master plate having an area with a plurality of certificates;

distributing authentication information carriers on the defined surface of the original plate;

cutting a master plate having a limited surface on which the authentication information carrier is scattered to obtain a certificate substrate;

and processing the certificate substrate into a certificate.

27. A method of manufacturing a certificate, wherein,

preparing a master plate having an area with a plurality of certificates;

coating an authentication information carrier film on the entire surface of the original plate;

cutting the original plate coated with the authentication information carrier film to obtain a certificate substrate;

and processing the certificate substrate into a certificate.

Claims (27)

1. A method for discriminating between true and false, wherein,

consisting of a set of a certificate and a certified object;

the certificate has 1 st authentication information which cannot be copied;

the certified substance has: encrypting the authentication information by using the 1 st secret key of the authority;

reading the 1 st authentication information;

decrypting the encrypted 1 st authentication information using the 1 st key of the rightful person;

and comparing the read 1 st authentication information with the decrypted encrypted 1 st authentication information to confirm the corresponding relationship between the certificate and the certified object.

2. The authenticity discriminating method according to claim 1, wherein the certificate and the object to be certified are integrated.

3. The authenticity discriminating method according to claim 1, wherein the certificate and the object to be certified are of different bodies.

4. The method according to claim 1, wherein the authentication information is stored in a memory,

the certificate further comprises: encrypted 1 st authentication information obtained by encrypting the 1 st authentication information using the 2 nd key of the authorized person;

decrypting the encrypted 1 st authentication information using the 2 nd key of the rightful person;

comparing the 1 st authentication information of the certificate with the decrypted encrypted 1 st authentication information;

thereby confirming the correspondence between the certificate and the certified object.

5. The method according to claim 4, wherein the 1 st key and the 2 nd key are the same key.

6. The method according to claim 4, wherein the 1 st key and the 2 nd key are different keys.

7. The method according to claim 1, wherein the authentication information is stored in a memory,

the certified substance has: authentication information No. 2 that cannot be copied;

the certificate has: encrypted 2 nd authentication information obtained by encrypting the 2 nd authentication information using the 2 nd key of the authority;

the certified substance has: encrypted authentication information obtained by encrypting the 1 st authentication information by using the 1 st key of the authority;

decrypting the encrypted 2 nd authentication information using the 2 nd key;

decrypting the encrypted 1 st authentication information using the 1 st key;

comparing the 1 st authentication information with the decrypted encrypted 1 st authentication information;

comparing the 2 nd authentication information with the decrypted encrypted 2 nd authentication information;

thereby confirming the correspondence between the certificate and the certified object.

8. The authenticity discriminating method according to claim 7, wherein the 1 st authentication information and the 2 nd authentication information are the same authentication information.

9. The method according to claim 8, wherein the 1 st key and the 2 nd key are different keys.

10. The method according to claim 8, wherein the 1 st key and the 2 nd key are the same key.

11. The authenticity discriminating method according to claim 7, wherein the 1 st authentication information and the 2 nd authentication information are different authentication information.

12. The method according to claim 11, wherein the 1 st key and the 2 nd key are different keys.

13. The method according to claim 12, wherein the 1 st key and the 2 nd key are the same key.

14. A warranty in which an authentication chip having 1 st authentication information that cannot be copied is inseparably mounted.

15. A warranty according to claim 14 wherein the authentication chip is part of the surface of the warranty.

16. A warranty according to claim 14 wherein the authentication chip is the entirety of the warranty surface.

17. A warranty wherein there are inseparably installed: the authentication chip includes an authentication chip having 1 st authentication information which cannot be copied, and encrypted 2 nd authentication information obtained by encrypting the 2 nd authentication information.

18. The authenticity discriminating method according to claim 17, wherein the 1 st authentication information and the 2 nd authentication information are the same authentication information.

19. A warranty according to claim 18 wherein said 1 st key and said 2 nd key are different keys.

20. A warranty according to claim 18 wherein said 1 st key and said 2 nd key are the same key.

21. A warranty according to claim 17 wherein said 1 st authentication information and said 2 nd authentication information are different authentication information.

22. A warranty according to claim 21 wherein said 1 st key and said 2 nd key are different keys.

23. A warranty according to claim 22 wherein said 1 st key and said 2 nd key are the same key.

24. A method for reading authentication information, wherein,

dividing an authentication information plane of an authentication chip into a plurality of planes;

further dividing each of the plurality of faces into a plurality of faces;

repeating the dividing;

detecting the colors of the plurality of divided surfaces;

the authentication information plane is read by the detected color.

25. A method of manufacturing a certificate, wherein,

preparing a master plate having an area with a plurality of certificates;

spreading an authentication information carrier over the entire surface of the original plate;

cutting the original plate with the distributed authentication information carrier to obtain a certificate substrate;

and processing the certificate substrate into a certificate.

26. A method of manufacturing a certificate, wherein,

preparing a master plate having an area with a plurality of certificates;

distributing authentication information carriers on the defined surface of the original plate;

cutting a master plate having a limited surface on which the authentication information carrier is scattered to obtain a certificate substrate;

and processing the certificate substrate into a certificate.

27. A method of manufacturing a certificate, wherein,

preparing a master plate having an area with a plurality of certificates;

coating an authentication information carrier film on the entire surface of the original plate;

cutting the original plate coated with the authentication information carrier film to obtain a certificate substrate;

and processing the certificate substrate into a certificate.