HK1145160A

HK1145160A - Authenticity validation subject, authenticity validation chip reader, and authenticity judging method

Info

Publication number: HK1145160A
Application number: HK10111363.4A
Authority: HK
Inventors: 小松信明; 南条真一郎
Original assignee: 国际先端技术综合研究所株式会社
Priority date: 2007-05-14
Filing date: 2008-05-14
Publication date: 2011-04-08

Description

Authentication object, authentication chip reading device, and authentication determination method

Technical Field

The present invention relates to a structure of an object that is easy to forge and requires authentication, such as an authentication card, paper money, and securities, and a method for authenticating the object.

Background

Today, a large number of cards are circulated in a card society, and cards related to owner's property such as cash cards for banks and credit cards for credit card companies, cards related to identification such as prepaid cards and driver's licenses which are securities, health insurance cards, and passports are used.

Many of cards relating to property and cards as securities write necessary information in a magnetic stripe provided on a front surface or a back surface, and perform various processes by reading magnetic information from the magnetic stripe using an Automatic device such as an ATM (Automatic Teller Machine) or a manual reading device.

Fig. 1(a) shows an example of a cash card used in the current cash card processing flow. In this figure, reference numeral 1 denotes a cash card body made of plastic or the like, and a magnetic stripe 2 in which information is recorded and an arrow 3 indicating the insertion direction of the cash card are formed on the front side. Although not shown in the drawings, necessary items are disclosed as embossed characters.

Since information written in a magnetic stripe is easily read using a device called a splitter (skimmer), a counterfeit card is often produced and damaged by the use of the counterfeit card.

As a countermeasure, use of an IC card incorporating a semiconductor memory instead of a magnetic card has been widely used in the industries such as banking and credit cards.

However, even such an IC card can read information stored in the memory, and cannot be said to be absolutely secure when time-consuming forgery is performed. Further, IC cards are very expensive compared to magnetic cards, and rapid popularization is not expected.

In the case of bank cash cards, it is sufficient to use the card only in 1 country, but in the case of credit cards, it is necessary to use the card also in foreign countries, and it is difficult to replace all credit cards used in the world as magnetic cards with IC cards of uniform specifications.

Further, since information such as the owner's name is provided for embossing cash cards and credit cards and is also used for magnetic information, embossed information becomes a clue to the production of counterfeit cards.

In the case where these magnetic cards or IC cards are lost or stolen, the owner can easily detect this fact, but in the case where the owner returns to the hand after the theft, particularly in the case where the owner returns without detecting the theft, damage due to the use of the counterfeit card is likely to occur.

As means for judging whether or not a card user is legitimate, instead of preventing illegal use of forgery of a card, a password composed of 4-digit numbers has been used so far. This password often uses analogized numbers, which have produced much damage until now. Recently, not only the secret code but also the secret code has been secretly viewed by means of a secret photograph or the like, and it has become extremely difficult to prevent illegal use of the secret code.

In order to prevent damage caused by counterfeit cards, biometric authentication (biometrics) technology using pattern recognition technology is partially used. Typical biometric authentication techniques include iris authentication, fingerprint authentication, palm print authentication, finger vein authentication, palm vein authentication, and hand back vein authentication, and authentication other than iris authentication includes contact type and non-contact type, but all of them require pattern registration in advance, and require time and effort for pattern registration and authentication, which increases the operation cost.

In the case of the contact type, since direct contact with the detection device is required, there is a problem that a feeling of hygiene or physiological aversion is generated. Further, in other cases, such as when the authentication portion is damaged, or when the authentication portion is lost in the worst case, biometric authentication cannot be performed. Further, since only partial authentication is performed in authentication, it cannot be said that it is a perfect measure.

Further, the biometric authentication system that can be used only by the card owner himself or herself cannot be realized even if the card processing is requested to the agent for card processing because of the time of card use or the card processing apparatus is not at hand, which is inconvenient for the user.

As one means for preventing forgery, credit cards, prepaid cards, banknotes, securities, and the like are provided with embossed holograms (embossed holograms) in which projections and depressions are formed in plastic. Since such an embossed hologram is extremely difficult to copy, it is practically impossible to forge cards with an embossed hologram, but in the current mode of use, a person reads the embossed hologram at a glance, and thus a card or the like can be forged and used using a similar embossed hologram.

Fig. 1(b) shows an example of a credit card with a hologram for authenticating a card authenticity by a sense organ. In this figure, reference numeral 1 denotes a credit card body made of plastic or the like, and a magnetic stripe 2 in which information is recorded and an arrow 3 indicating the insertion direction of a cash card are formed on the front side of the credit card body. Although not shown in the drawings, necessary items are described as embossed characters.

Although the cash card 1 is inserted into the terminal position with the portion marked with the arrow 3 as the tip, a pseudo authentication chip 4 formed by, for example, an embossed hologram is mounted near the tip.

In the case of a credit card, unlike a cash card, a magnetic stripe is provided on the back surface of the card, but the direction of insertion of the card into the terminal device is the same, and therefore, the direction of reading the magnetic information of the credit card is as a result opposite to that of the cash card.

The authentication chip 4 is not read by the card terminal device by visually and organoleptically confirming the exemplified pattern "a" by an operator who inserts the card into the terminal device. The sensory authentication is not reliable, but exhibits a great effect in 1 screening because the authentication varies depending on the ability of the individual to be authenticated and also varies depending on the authentication environment, psychological state, physical condition, and the like even in the same person.

The authentication using the auxiliary device is performed by using a magnifying device such as a fine line, a special line, a minute character, a special shaped screen (screen), or the like, a magnifying glass, or a special filter that causes optical interference. Specifically, materials having specific optical characteristics such as a light-emitting substrate, a light-emitting laminated film, a light-emitting ink, a thermochromic ink, and a photochromic ink are mixed into a substrate, a laminated film, and an ink, and auxiliary devices such as a specific optical filter and an ultraviolet lamp are used.

In the authentication by mechanical processing, the authenticity is authenticated by mechanically detecting the characteristics of the material, and the detection target is detection of magnetic and optical characteristics. Specifically, there are some that mix a light emitting material or a magnetic material into a substrate, a laminated film, ink, or the like, and use a detection device, and there are some that magnetically or optically give coded specific information by OCR characters or magnetic barcodes, and use a magnetic/optical detection device.

As an authentication technique based on a mechanical process, an artifact measurement system (artifact-metric system) having an artifact randomly arranged in a medium instead of information unique to a living body is shown in "finance and artifact measurement" japan bank finance institute (http:// www.imes.boj.or.jp/japan/jdps/2004/04-J-12. pdf) and "the sixth information security workshop" a pattern of an artifact measurement in the financial field "(http:// www.imes.boj.or.jp/japan/kinyu/2004/kk 23-2-6. pdf).

In the artifact measurement, a pattern formed by chance such as a light reflection pattern of a granular object, a transmitted light pattern of an optical fiber, a parallax image pattern of a polymer fiber, an image pattern of a fiber, a magnetic pattern of a magnetic fiber, a randomly recorded magnetic pattern, a random magnetic pattern of a magnetic stripe, a random charge amount pattern of a memory cell, a resonance pattern of a conductive fiber, and a resonance pattern of a vibration seal (vibrating seal) is used.

Among the items to be used illegally or counterfeited, there are "card description information" given when a card is issued to a user and "card body information" given in a card manufacturing process. (refer to "forgery prevention technical Manual for associated IC card face" provincial financial office of finance (http:// www.npb.go.jp/ja/info/ichb. pdf))

The card entry information is information printed/attached to the card body when the card is issued to the user, and corresponds to information on the issuance, such as holder information and expiration date. Tampering, which is a typical method of unauthorized use, is a behavior of rewriting all or part of the description information of the card description information, and is performed by erasing the regular information and adding the unauthorized information.

The card body information is information which the card itself has after removing the card-describing information from the issued card, and is information attached to the card body such as the physical shape of the card, the background pattern given mainly in the pre-printing process, the base printing layer, and the protective layer laminate.

Counterfeiting is an illegal act on a card body by copying or simulating a figure, a pattern, or the like, which is information attached to the card body, and creating a similar-looking card, and specifically, the figure, the pattern, or the like, attached to the face of a genuine card is read, processed, corrected, or the like by a scanner or the like, and then is performed by a printer or the like. In the technology of anti-counterfeit measures for card bodies, there are many combinations of printing methods, inks, and printing patterns, and there is no decisive technology only in terms of printing technology.

Authentication methods for authenticating forgery are roughly classified into methods using sense, auxiliary tools, and mechanical processing.

In the authentication by sense, the authentication is authenticated by human senses such as visual sense and tactile sense, and the authentication is based on a color and a watermark (water mark) of a main body in the visual sense, a hologram which changes a given pattern, color, or the like by changing an angle of view, a sensing of a concave-convex shape given in the tactile sense, a sensing of a texture of a card main body, or the like. Specifically, there are a method in which authentication is visually easily performed because copying and copying are difficult such as a trademark, a special font, a copy prevention line, a special color ink, a hologram, an optically variable material, a latent image pattern, and the like, and a method in which authentication is visually performed by applying a finger feel such as embossing, unevenness, or perforation.

Fig. 2 shows a conventional example of a card mounted with an artifact-measuring chip using metal particles, disclosed in japanese patent application laid-open No. 10-44650, in which (a) is an overall view, (b) is a cross-sectional view, and (c) is an enlarged view of the card.

The card 1 is formed by laminating a thin-plate-shaped artificial object measuring chip 4 as a translucent resin mixed with metal particles 5 on a light-impermeable card base 7 having an opening 8 for an authentication chip formed therein, forming an opening at the same position as the opening formed in the card base 7, and laminating a magnetic stripe 2 and an opaque card surface plate 6 having an arrow 3 indicating an insertion direction thereon.

Since the metal particles 5 do not have any regularity and are three-dimensionally mixed into the translucent resin, the arrangement pattern of the metal particles 5 observed through the openings is unique to each artifact measurement chip 4. In this case, the light transmitted through the artifact measurement chip 4 is photographed through the opening, and the arrangement pattern of the metal particles 5 is observed, whereby the individual artifact measurement chips 4, that is, the cards are authenticated.

Fig. 3 shows another conventional example of a card mounted with an artifact measurement chip using fibers disclosed in japanese patent application laid-open No. 2003-29636. In this figure, (a) is an overall view, (b) is a cross-sectional view, and (c) is an enlarged view of the artifact metrology chip.

The card is an artificial object measuring chip 8 formed by three-dimensionally mixing a mesh member 9 and short fibers 10 into a transparent resin, which is an opening of a light-impermeable card base 1, and a magnetic stripe 2 and an arrow 3 indicating an insertion direction are formed on the surface of the card base 1. In the artifact-metrology chip 8, an interference pattern is created by the pattern of mesh members 9 and the short fibers 10.

This interference pattern is unique to each of the artifact measurement chips 8, i.e., cards, and in this case, the authentication pattern of the artifact measurement chip 8 of the card authentication chip is photographed by transmitted light or reflected light, thereby performing card authentication.

Mechanical reading of a pattern such as biometrics or artifact measurement is generally performed by reading with an imaging device and performing authentication by a pattern recognition technique. There is a possibility of forgery using the copy technique.

Fig. 4 shows the basic construction of a card provided with a monochrome embossed hologram chip proposed by the present applicant.

(a) The detection signal is output from the embossed hologram chip, and the detection signal is output from the embossed hologram chip.

In this card 11, a surface plate 13 is mounted on a card base 14 which is opaque to light, and an embossed hologram chip 12 is attached to this portion. The surface plate 13 is formed with a magnetic stripe 2 and an arrow 3.

(c) Showing the basic construction of an embossed hologram chip.

The embossed hologram chip substrate 15 is provided with recesses 16 having a depth of 1/4 wavelength of incident light and flat portions 17 in which no recesses are formed. The hologram chip substrate 15 and the concave portion 16 are embossed, and a reflective layer 19 of metal or the like is formed thereon. Further, 18 is a protective covering.

According to (d), the function of the embossed hologram chip is explained.

Light having a wavelength λ incident through the protective cover 18 is reflected by the flat bottom of the flat portion 17 and the concave portion 16, and light having a wavelength λ indicated by a solid arrow is detected outside.

At the edge of the recess 16, the light reflected at the upper end and the light reflected at the lower end are offset by 180 ° in phase, and therefore light of the wavelength λ shown by the broken-line arrow is not detected to the outside.

As shown in (e), the reflected light detection signal sinks (dip) at the boundary between the flat portion 17 and the concave portion 16, and this sink is generated 2 times for 1 concave portion 16. This makes it possible to reliably detect the recess 16.

In the case of CD, the laser used is an infrared laser with λ 780nm, and λ/4 195 nm. In the case of DVD, a red laser with λ 650nm, and λ/4 151.25nm, is used. In the case of the next-generation DVD, use of a blue-violet laser beam having λ 405nm, an ultraviolet laser beam having λ 351nm, or a far-ultraviolet laser beam having λ 266nm was studied, and λ/4, that is, the depths of pits (pits) were 101.25nm, 87.75nm, and 66.5nm, respectively.

Fig. 5 shows an authentication card proposed heretofore by the present applicant in PCT/JP 2006/325226. In this figure, (a) is a view of the card from above, (b) is a sectional view thereof, and (c) is an enlarged view of the sectional view. In these figures, 31 denotes a card body having a magnetic stripe 2 and an arrow 3 indicating an insertion direction, and an authentication chip 32 is stacked on a card substrate 35, and a surface plate 34 is further stacked on the authentication chip 32.

The substrate 35 is a synthetic resin plate used for a thick plate such as a cash card or a thin plate used for a prepaid card, which has been widely used conventionally.

The authentication chip 32 is made of synthetic resin, and the fluorescent substance plasmid 33 is uniformly mixed in the entire synthetic resin plate.

Fig. 6 shows an authentication card proposed heretofore in PCT/JP2006/325227 by the present applicant. In this figure, (a) is a view of the card from above, (b) is a sectional view thereof, and (c) is an enlarged view of the sectional view. In these figures, reference numeral 41 denotes a card body having a magnetic stripe 2 and an arrow 3 indicating an insertion direction, and an authentication chip 42 and a surface plate 45 are laminated on a substrate 44. Further, another surface plate may be laminated on the authentication chip 42 and the surface plate 45.

Reference numeral 84 denotes a surface plate, and other surface plates may be further laminated on the authentication chip 62 and the surface plate 64.

The card substrate 44 is a thick synthetic resin plate used for a conventionally widely used cash card or the like, or a thin synthetic resin plate used for a prepaid card or the like. The surface plate 45 is made of synthetic resin, and an opening into which the authentication chip 42 is fitted is formed in the central portion. The material of the surface plate 45 may be a radiation-transmitting material or a radiation-shielding material, or both. The surface plate laminated on the authentication chip 42 and the surface plate 45 made of synthetic resin is made of a radiation transmitting material.

The authentication chip 42 has an opening area and a thickness to be fitted to the surface plate 45, and radioactive plasmid 43 is mixed therein. Radioactive plasmid as a natural radioactive plasmid, there are²³²Th、²³⁵U、²³⁸U and the like, and alpha-emitting substances,⁴⁰K、²¹⁰beta-emitting materials such as Pb, etc., usable as artificial radioactive plasmids²⁴¹Am、²⁴⁴Cm, etc. of the alpha-ray emitting substance,⁶⁰Co、⁹⁰Sr、¹³⁷a beta-ray emitting substance such as Cs,²²Na、⁵¹Cr、⁵⁴Mn、⁵⁷Co、⁶⁰Co、¹³³Ba、²⁴¹am, and the like.

In view of the problem of irradiation with radiation, it is preferable to avoid the use of gamma-emitting substances as much as possible because the distance of arrival is long and shielding is difficult. In addition, when particles of a non-radioactive substance, which is an isotope of a radioactive substance, are also mixed, the mixed state of the radioactive plasmid can be confirmed only by the radiation detection apparatus. The synthetic resin mixed with the radioactive plasmid is preferably a material that is not altered by radiation.

Japanese patent application laid-open No. 2004-171109 discloses an authentication device having a metal thin sheet (lame) embedded in a base material having high light transmittance and reflecting light. This authentication apparatus randomly embeds cylindrical, quadrangular, and quadrangular pyramid-shaped metal flakes, which reflect light at their surfaces, in the interior of a transparent resin.

Patent document 1: japanese laid-open patent publication No. 10-44650

Patent document 2: japanese patent laid-open publication No. 2003-29636

Patent document 3: japanese patent laid-open publication No. 2004-171109

Non-patent document 1: "finance and artifact measurement" Japanese Bank finance research institute (http:// www.imes.boj.or.jp/Japanese/jdps/2004/04-J-12.pdf)

Non-patent document 2: "6 th information safety workshop," artifact metrics in finance field "pattern (http:// www.imes.boj.or.jp/Japanese/kinyu/2004/kk23-2-6.pdf)

Non-patent document 3: 'forgery prevention technical manual for associated IC card face' financial province printing office (http:// www.npb.go.jp/ja/info/ichb. pdf)

Disclosure of Invention

Problems to be solved by the invention

In view of these circumstances, the present application has a first object to provide a structure of an authentication chip having an authentication pattern that cannot be reproduced and copied.

In addition, the present application provides a method for manufacturing an authentication chip having an authentication pattern that cannot be copied.

Further, the present application has a third object to provide a means for reading an authentication pattern that cannot be copied.

In addition, the present application has a fourth object to provide a means for proving that an authentication pattern is genuine.

Means for solving the problems

In order to solve the first problem, the present application provides an invention relating to a structure of an authentication chip that exhibits a structural color of: the light incident on the light-transmitting medium is a structural color that becomes stronger when the phases of the light reflected on the surface thereof and the light reflected on the back surface passing therethrough coincide, and weaker when the phases differ by the reverse wavelength.

In order to solve the second problem, the present application provides an invention relating to a method of manufacturing an authentication chip that exhibits a structural color.

In order to solve the third problem, the present application provides an invention relating to a scheme for reading authentication information from an authentication chip that displays a structural color and a scheme for verifying the validity of the authentication information.

In order to solve the fourth problem, the present application provides an invention relating to a scheme in which a creator of an authentication chip verifies the authenticity of the authentication chip by encrypting information of the authentication chip.

Effects of the invention

The authenticity verification chip has a structural color generator which is formed by chance and cannot be copied, and it is impossible to forge a card having the authenticity verification chip.

Drawings

Fig. 1 is an explanatory diagram of a conventional cash card and credit card.

Fig. 2 shows an example of a conventional card for measuring artifacts (metrics) using metal particles.

Fig. 3 is an example of a conventional card for measuring an artifact using a fiber sheet.

Fig. 4 is an example of a card mounted with the embossed hologram authentication chip of the prior invention.

Fig. 5 is a card mounted with the authentication chip of the prior invention.

Fig. 6 is a card mounted with the authentication chip of the prior invention.

Fig. 7 is an explanatory diagram of the principle of structural color expression.

Fig. 8 is an explanatory view of another principle of developing structural colors.

Fig. 9 is an embodiment of a card mounted with a structural color authenticity verification chip based on the principle of fig. 7.

Fig. 10 is an enlarged explanatory view of the structural color authentication chip.

Fig. 11 is a manufacturing method embodiment of a structural color authentication chip.

Fig. 12 is an embodiment of a method of manufacturing a card mounting a structural color authentication chip.

Fig. 13 is an example of the configuration of the structural color authentication chip based on the principle of fig. 7.

Fig. 14 is an embodiment of an authentication chip based on the principle of fig. 8.

Fig. 15 is another embodiment of the authentication chip based on the principle of fig. 8.

Fig. 16 is another other embodiment of the authentication chip based on the principle of fig. 8.

Fig. 17 is still another embodiment of the authentication chip based on the principle of fig. 8.

Fig. 18 is an example of a card mounted with a structural color authenticity verification chip of another configuration based on the principle of fig. 8.

Fig. 19 is an explanatory diagram illustrating a principle of developing structural colors of the structural color authentication chip of fig. 18.

Fig. 20 is an enlarged cross-sectional view of the structural color authentication chip of fig. 19.

Fig. 21 is an enlarged cross-sectional view of a color authentication chip having a different structure from that of fig. 20.

Fig. 22 is an embodiment of an authentication chip having another configuration based on the principle of fig. 8.

FIG. 23 is an enlarged cross-sectional view of the structural color chip of FIG. 22.

FIG. 24 is an enlarged cross-sectional view of a structural color chip of the other structure of FIG. 22.

Fig. 25 shows an example of a card on which an authentication chip having regularly arranged structural color development bodies is mounted.

Fig. 26 is an enlarged cross-sectional view of an authentication chip having a structural color developing body of another structure.

Fig. 27 is a schematic explanatory view of the structure of the structural color developing body of fig. 25 and the structural color developing body of fig. 26.

Fig. 28 shows an example of a card on which an authentication chip having a structural color developing body of another structure arranged regularly is mounted.

Fig. 29 is an explanatory diagram of an authentication chip configured based on random numbers.

Fig. 30 is an example of a position alignment mark.

Fig. 31 is an embodiment of a reading apparatus using an image pickup apparatus.

Fig. 32 is another embodiment of a reading apparatus using an image pickup apparatus.

Fig. 33 is an embodiment of a reading apparatus using reading elements arranged in a matrix.

FIG. 34 is an embodiment of a reading apparatus using read elements arranged in an array.

FIG. 35 is an embodiment of a reading apparatus using a single reading element.

Fig. 36 is an explanation of an authentication chip reading apparatus configured by combining a parabolic mirror and a polygonal mirror (polygon mirror).

Fig. 37 is an embodiment of a reading method.

Fig. 38 is a specific explanation of the reading method of fig. 37.

Fig. 39 is a more detailed illustration of the read method of fig. 37.

Fig. 40 shows an example of a card on which the authentication chip and the authentication chip are mounted.

Fig. 41 is a flow of authentication verification of the card of fig. 40.

Fig. 42 shows another example of a card on which the authentication chip and the authentication chip are mounted.

Fig. 43 is a flow of authentication of the card of fig. 42.

Fig. 44 shows another example of a card on which the authentication chip and the authentication chip are mounted.

Fig. 45 is a flow of authentication of the card of fig. 44.

Fig. 46 shows still another example of a card on which the authentication chip and the authentication chip are mounted.

Fig. 47 is a flow of authentication of the card of fig. 46.

FIG. 48 is a flow chart of a method of securing reads.

Description of the reference numerals

1,21, 24, 11, 31, 41, 61, 81, 101, 111, 131, 151, 191, 194, 196, 198: card with a detachable cover

2: magnetic bar code (magnetic stripe)

3: arrow head

4,8, 12, 21, 25, 65, 78, 82, 102, 112, 132, 140, 153, 192: true and false authentication chip

5: metal particles

6,13, 34, 45, 64, 84, 104, 113, 133, 154: surface plate

7,14, 35, 44, 63, 85, 105, 114, 134, 152: substrate

9: grid

10: fiber sheet

50, 53, 57, 68, 69, 74, 75, 83, 90, 94, 103, 118, 127, 135: light-transmitting medium

51, 54, 58, 59, 91, 95: incident surface

52, 55, 56, 60, 92, 96: reflecting surface

65, 77, 78, 82, 102, 112, 132: light-transmitting synthetic resin

22, 66, 73, 74, 75: structural color chip

67: reflective layer

70: bottom part

79: boundary surface

93, 125, 129: synthetic resin

121, 124: chip substrate

117: pit

141: alignment mark

142: moving direction read start line

143: moving direction reading finishing line

144, 145: end indicating line

146: synchronization mark

191, 196, 198: card body

155, 156: illumination light source

157: color camera

151：R-LED

152：G-LED

153：B-LED

164: black and white camera

166: matrix of light receiving and emitting elements

171: red light receiving and emitting element array

172: green light receiving and emitting element array

173: blue light receiving and emitting element array

174: luminous element (light emitting/detecting element)

181, 185, 186: semi-cylindrical semi-paraboloid reflector

182: light passing hole (light hole)

184: multi-facet mirror

183: light receiving and emitting element

Detailed Description

The following describes embodiments of the invention relating to the present application.

< authentication chip >

The principle of the appearance of the structural colors is explained with reference to fig. 7.

A "hologram" or a raw material just called "hologram" to visualize a structural color (iridescence) is already marketed. The hologram is not a hologram, but an uncolored transparent body appears to be colored by light interference as in the case of the hologram.

In the embodiments described below, a structural color developing body such as a hologram is referred to as a structural color patch.

In this figure, 50 is placed at an absolute refractive index of n₀Of the media (2), a thin layer of a light-transmitting medium having a thickness d, for example, a PET resin, having an absolute refractive index n₁. Further, 51 is an incident surface of the translucent medium 50, and 52 is a reflection surface.

The reflecting surface 52 may be a reflecting film made of metal or the like.

As shown in (a), from an absolute refractive index of n₀Is perpendicularly incident to a medium having an absolute refractive index n₁The wavelength of the incident surface 51 of the light-transmitting medium 50 is λ₁Part of the incident light of (3) is reflected by the incident surface 51 of the medium having a different refractive index, and the other part of the incident light enters the translucent medium 50.

In addition, the wavelength λ₁Is made of light ofThe optical media 50 is incident at a normal angle, i.e., an incident angle θ of 0 °, and is thus represented by a slight angle in the illustrated relationship.

The light incident on the translucent medium 50 is reflected at the exit end face 52 by the difference in refractive index of the medium, and has a refractive index n₁The translucent medium 50 is irradiated to an absolute refractive index n₀In the medium of (1).

In this case, when m is a positive integer, d ═ m +1/2) λ is satisfied₁2n is lambda₁When the condition is 2dn/(m +1/2), the phase of the light reflected by the incident surface 51 and the phase of the light transmitted through the translucent medium 50 and reflected by the reflecting surface 52 become the same as shown in (a). N is a relative refractive index, and n is n₁/n₀。

As a result, the wavelength λ₁The emission of light becomes strong.

As shown in (b), when d ═ m +1/2) λ is satisfied₂2n is lambda₂When the condition is 2dn/m, the phase of the light reflected by the incident surface 51 and the phase of the light transmitted through the translucent medium 50 and reflected by the reflecting surface 52 are different by a half wavelength and cancel each other out.

As a result, the wavelength λ₂The emission of light becomes weak.

As shown in (c), at θ other than 0 °_iThe light incident obliquely at the incident angle of (1) is refracted at an angle of (theta) on the incident surface 51_rRefraction at an angle of incidence θ_iAngle of refraction theta_rWith respect to the relative refractive index n, is in_i/sin θ_rA relationship of n. According to this relationship, at an incident angle θ_iIncident light is refracted at an angle theta_rIncident on the reflecting surface 52 at a reflection angle theta_rIs reflected and then exits at an exit angle theta_iAnd exits from the entrance surface 51.

At an angle of incidence theta_iIncident on the incident surface 51 and having a refraction angle theta_rThe wavelength of refraction is λ₃When m is a positive integer, d ═ m +1/2) λ is satisfied₃/2ncosθ_rI.e. lambda₃＝2dncosθ_rIf the condition is (m +1/2), incident surface 51 reflects at angle θ_iThe phase and phase of the reflected light are reflected by the reflecting surface 52 after passing through the translucent medium 50, refracted from the incident surface 51, and emitted at the emission angle θ_iThe phases of the emitted light become the same.

As a result, the wavelength λ₃The emission of light becomes strong.

As shown in (d), at a wavelength of λ₄At an angle of incidence theta_iIncident on the incident surface 51 at a refraction angle theta_rIn the case of refraction, when d ═ m +1/2 λ is satisfied₄/2ncosθ_rI.e. lambda₄＝2dncosθ_rIn the condition of/m, the incident surface 51 reflects at the angle θ_iThe phase of the reflected light and the phase of the light transmitted through the translucent medium 50, reflected by the reflection surface 52, refracted from the incidence surface 51, and emitted at the emission angle θ_iThe phase of the outgoing light differs by half a wavelength.

As a result, the wavelength λ₄The emission of light becomes weak.

The wavelength λ of the light thus selected₃Or light λ not emitted₄Depending on the angle of refraction theta_rCosine "cos θ of_r". Angle of reflection theta_rDependent on the angle of incidence theta_iDue to the angle of incidence theta_iVaries steplessly between 0 ° and 90 °, so that the wavelength of the light selected to be emitted as shown in (a) and (c) or the light not emitted as shown in (c) and (d) also varies steplessly.

The color developed in this way is called structural color, and is a complex color by a multilayer structure, and is present in many natural places such as feathers of birds, wings of beetles, scale powder of butterflies, and inner surfaces of shellfish.

The principle of developing different structural colors by the light-transmitting media having different thicknesses will be described with reference to fig. 8.

For simplicity of description, only the case where the incident light is incident perpendicularly to the light-transmissive medium will be described here.

In the light-transmitting medium 53 shown in (a), the incident surface 54 is a flat surface, and the reflecting surfaces are concave-convex surfaces 55 and 56.

(b) The light-transmitting medium 57 is shown with the incident surface thereof being concave-convex surfaces 58, 59 and the reflecting surface 60 being a flat surface.

The reflective surfaces 55, 56, and 60 may be reflective films made of metal or the like.

The absolute refractive index of the light-transmitting medium 53 is n₁For absolute refractive index of n₀Has a relative refractive index n. In addition, it has a non-uniform thickness, with a thickness d₁Has a thickness of d₂Part (c) of (a).

The light-transmitting medium 53 has a flat front surface 54 and a back surface having a thickness d₁Portion 55 and a thickness d₂Portion 56 of (a).

The thickness of the translucent medium 53 is d₁Portion 55 of (2) satisfying d₁＝(m+1/2)λ₂Light of/2 n, i.e. wavelength λ₂＝2d₁The phase of light reflected by the front surface 54 is the same as the phase of light transmitted through the light-transmitting medium 53 and reflected by the rear surface 55 under the condition of n/(m + 1/2). Here, m is an arbitrary integer.

As a result, the wavelength λ₂The emission of light becomes strong.

In addition, d is satisfied₁＝(m+1/2)λ₁2n, i.e. wavelength λ₁＝2d₁The phase of light reflected by the front end surface 54 differs by a half wavelength from the phase of light transmitted through the translucent medium 53 and reflected by the rear surface 55 under the condition of n/m.

As a result, the wavelength λ₁The emission of light becomes weak.

The thickness of the translucent medium 53 is d₂Condition (2) satisfies d₂＝(m+1/2)λ₁The light of/2 n satisfies the wavelength of lambda₁＝2d₂Light of n/(m +1/2) condition, surface sideThe phase of the light reflected by the surface 56 is the same as the phase of the light transmitted through the translucent medium 53 and reflected by the surface 56 on the back side.

As a result, the wavelength λ₁The emission of light becomes strong.

In addition, d is satisfied₂＝(m+1/2)λ₂2n, i.e. wavelength λ₂＝2d₂The phase of light reflected by the front surface 54 differs by half a wavelength from the phase of light transmitted through the translucent medium 53 and reflected by the rear surface 56 under the condition of n/m.

As a result, the wavelength λ₂The light emission becomes weak.

This phenomenon is a principle of a phenomenon that various colors are visible on colorless and transparent soap bubbles in the air or a colorless and transparent oil film on the water surface.

The thickness of the translucent medium 57 is d₁Condition (2) satisfies d₁＝(m+1/2)λ₁2n, i.e. wavelength λ₁＝2d₁The light of the condition of n/m has a phase difference of a half wavelength between the light reflected by the front surface 58 and the light transmitted through the translucent medium 57 and reflected by the rear surface 60.

As a result, the wavelength λ₁The emission of light becomes weak.

In addition, d is satisfied₁＝(m+1/2)λ₂The light of/2 n satisfies the wavelength of lambda₂＝2d₁The phase of light reflected by the front surface 58 is the same as the phase of light transmitted through the light-transmitting medium 57 and reflected by the rear surface 60 under the condition of n/(m + 1/2).

As a result, the wavelength λ₂The emission of light becomes strong.

The thickness of the translucent medium 57 is d₂Condition (2) satisfies d₂＝(m+1/2)λ₁The wavelength of the light/2 n satisfies lambda₁＝2d₂The light under the condition of n/(m +1/2) is transmitted through the light-transmitting medium 57, reflected by the front surface 59, and reflected by the back surface 60Become the same.

As a result, the wavelength λ is detected₁Of (2) is detected.

In addition, d is satisfied₂＝(m+1/2)λ₂2n, i.e. wavelength λ₂＝2d₂The light of the condition of n/m has a phase difference of a half wavelength between the light reflected by the front surface 59 and the light transmitted through the transparent medium 57 and reflected by the rear surface 60.

As a result, the wavelength λ is not detected₂Of (2) is detected.

It is apparent that in the explanation of the mechanism of the structural colors of fig. 7 and 8, the detected light is only incident light and does not detect non-incident light.

Examples

Authentication chip

< example 1>

Fig. 9 shows an authentication chip as example 1.

This authentication chip uses only the vertically incident light as shown in fig. 7(a) and (b).

In the figure, (a) is a view of the authenticity verification card viewed from above, (b) is a sectional view thereof, (c) is an enlarged view of the sectional view, and (d) is a structural example of the structural color chip. In these figures, 61 is a card body having a magnetic stripe 2 and an arrow 3 showing an insertion direction, and an authentication chip 62 is laminated on a card substrate 63. Reference numeral 64 denotes a surface plate, and other surface plates may be further laminated on the authentication chip 62 and the surface plate 64.

The substrate 63 is a synthetic resin plate of a thick plate used for a cash card or the like which has been used in a large amount in the related art, or a synthetic resin plate of a thin plate used for a prepaid card or the like which is generally opaque.

In order to protect the authentication chip 62, a hard cover (cover) made of glass or the like may be provided.

Note that the items shown in fig. 9(a) and (b) are also common to the following description of the embodiments, and therefore, in order to avoid complication, the description will be omitted when unnecessary.

The authentication chip 62 is made of synthetic resin, and structural color chips 66 having different thicknesses are arranged parallel to, i.e., horizontally to, the surface of the authentication chip 62, and the entire surface is fixed by a translucent synthetic resin 65.

As shown in (d), the color sheet 66 is formed of light transmitting media 68 and 69 made of PET resin or the like formed on both surfaces of the reflective layer 67, and has a plurality of thicknesses as shown in (e), (f), and (g). The thickness may be made different from the thickness of the light-transmitting media 68 and 69 sandwiching the reflective layer 67, as shown in (d).

In the structural color sheet 66 having such a structure, light reflected by the upper surface of the light-transmitting medium 68 interferes with light incident on the light-transmitting medium 68 and reflected by the light-reflecting layer 67, and is emitted more or less strongly than other light according to the processes shown in fig. 7(a), (b) and 8, so that light included in the incident light is selected and a structural color is developed.

The detection of the state of the emitted light becomes easier by making the upper surface of the card substrate 63, which the structural color chip 66 contacts, black, which is light absorbing.

In addition, when incident light on the surface of the light-transmissive synthetic resin 65 is reflected and interferes with the detection of the structural color, the surface of the light-transmissive synthetic resin 65 is subjected to an anti-gloss (anti-luster) process or an antireflection film is formed.

The structural color developed by the vertically incident light corresponds to λ of fig. 8₁～λ₂And corresponds to the number of kinds of thicknesses of the light transmissive media 68 and 69.

Since the mixing position of the structural color patch 66 is determined by chance, the arrangement pattern obtained as a result is infinitely variable.

In order to manufacture the authentication chip, the structural color chips 66 shown in (e) to (g) are appropriately dispersed as shown in fig. 10 at 22, and the entire chip is fixed by the light-transmitting resin 65, whereby the authentication chip 21 can be individually manufactured.

As shown in fig. 11(a), a plurality of authentication chips 21 in which structural color chips 22 shown in (b) are dispersed may be simultaneously manufactured by dispersing structural color chips on a large substrate 20 from which a plurality of authentication chips can be cut, fixing the entire substrate with a translucent resin, and then cutting the substrate individually.

As another manufacturing method, as shown in fig. 12(a), structural color chips may be scattered only on a portion to be the authentication chip 25 of the substrate 23 having a size of a plurality of cards 24 to be authenticated, and the cards 24 having the authentication chip may be cut out.

< example 2>

Fig. 13 shows an authentication chip as example 2.

The authentication chip utilizes the incident light of (c) and (d) at λ in addition to the normal incident light shown in fig. 7(a) and (b)₃Or λ₄Oblique incident light is shown.

While the structural color chip 66 is disposed only horizontally in the authentication chip 62 of example 1, the structural color chip 66 is disposed in various postures in the authentication chip 71 of example 2. Therefore, in the authentication chip 62 of embodiment 1, the structural color piece 66 having a plurality of thicknesses is required to obtain light of a plurality of colors, but in the authentication chip 71 of embodiment 2, the thickness of the structural color piece 66 required may be a single thickness.

In the authentication chip 71, the same emission as that shown in fig. 7(a) and (b) is performed on the incident light to the structural color chip arranged horizontally, as in the case of example 1, and the incident light to the structural color chip arranged obliquely enters the structural color chip obliquely, and the emission is performed as shown in fig. 7(c) and (d).

By normal incidenceThe structured color exhibited by the light corresponds to λ of FIG. 7₁Or λ₂And corresponds to the number of thickness types of the light transmissive media 68 and 69.

The structural color which can be displayed by obliquely incident light is shown by the refraction angle theta in FIG. 7_r(incident Angle θ)_i) Corresponding to λ₃Or λ₄And exist indefinitely.

The mixing position of the structural color patch 66 is determined by chance, and as a result, the arrangement pattern obtained changes steplessly, and thus is infinite.

The upper surface of the card substrate 63 in contact with the structural color sheet 66 is made light-absorbing black, and the surface of the light-transmitting synthetic resin 65 is subjected to a matte finish or an antireflection film is formed, as in the case of example 1.

In order to manufacture the authentication chip of example 2, the method shown in fig. 10 and 11 with respect to example 1 may be used, and in order to manufacture a card having the authentication chip, the method shown in fig. 12 with respect to example 1 may be used.

In this case, the structural color chips also include slanted.

< example 3>

Fig. 14 shows an authentication chip according to embodiment 3.

While the cards of example 1 shown in fig. 9 and example 2 shown in fig. 13 use structural color chips formed of PET resin or the like sandwiching a light reflection layer, in example 3, the structural color chips are formed by light-transmitting media having different thicknesses without a light reflection layer.

In the authentication chip 72 shown in fig. (a), structural color plates 73 as light-transmitting media having different thicknesses as shown at 74 and 75 in (b) are scattered on the bottom 70, and the entire chip is covered with the light-transmitting resin 65.

Part of the light incident on the structural color chip 73 is reflected by the surface thereof, and part of the light incident on the structural color chip 73 is reflected by the surface opposite to the reflection surface and is emitted from the incidence surface.

As a result, in the authentication chip 72, the light reflected by the upper surface of the structural color chip 73 interferes with the light incident on the structural color chip 73 and reflected by the bottom surface thereof, and the light included in the incident light is selected to develop the structural color.

A reflective layer of metal or the like may also be formed on the bottom portion 70.

The upper surface of the card substrate with which the structural color chip 72 is in contact is made light-absorbing black, and the surface of the light-transmitting synthetic resin 65 is subjected to a matte finish or an antireflection film is formed, as in the case of example 1.

In order to manufacture the authentication chip 72, the structural color sheet 73 is appropriately dispersed, and the entire body is fixed with the light-transmitting resin 65, and the authentication chip is manufactured individually.

Further, the authenticity verification chip can be manufactured by appropriately spreading the structural color sheet 73 on a large surface from which a plurality of authenticity verification chips can be cut, fixing the whole with the light-transmitting resin 65, and then cutting out the whole.

In order to manufacture the authentication chip of example 3, the method shown in fig. 10 and 11 with respect to example 1 may be adopted, and in order to manufacture a card having the authentication chip, the method shown in fig. 12 with respect to example 1 may be adopted.

< example 4>

Fig. 15 shows an authentication chip according to example 4.

Unlike the authentication chips of examples 1 to 3, the authentication chip 76 of example 4 is formed of 2 layers of the translucent resin as a whole. These 2 layers optically function as 1 layer.

(a) The authentication chip 76 is shown in which a structural color patch 73 as light-transmitting media 74, 75 having different thicknesses is spread on a flat light-transmitting synthetic resin 77 constituting the bottom portion, and a light-transmitting resin 78 having the same optical characteristics as the light-transmitting synthetic resin 77 constituting the bottom portion is entirely covered thereon.

The boundary surface 79 between the light-transmitting synthetic resin 77 and the light-transmitting resin 78 is made of a synthetic resin having the same optical characteristics, and thus does not have an optical effect.

In the authentication chip 76 thus constructed, the light-transmitting synthetic resins 77 and 78 sandwiching the structural color sheet 73 exhibit an absolute refractive index n as shown in FIG. 7₀The same function as in the medium (3), a part of the light incident on the structural color sheet 73 is reflected by the surface thereof, a part of the light is incident on the structural color sheet 73, and the surface of the structural color sheet 73 in contact with the translucent synthetic resin 77 is reflected as a reflection surface and emitted from the incidence surface.

As a result, in the authentication chip 76, the light reflected by the upper surface of the structural color chip 73 interferes with the light incident on the structural color chip 73 and reflected by the bottom surface thereof, and the light included in the incident light is selected to develop the structural color.

The upper surface of the card substrate with which the authentication chip 76 is in contact is made light-absorbing black, and the surface of the light-transmitting synthetic resin 78 is subjected to a matte finish or an antireflection film, as in example 1.

In order to manufacture the authentication chip 76, the structural color patch 73 is appropriately dispersed on the translucent synthetic resin 77, and the entire surface thereof is fixed with the translucent resin 78, thereby manufacturing the authentication chip individually.

Alternatively, the translucent synthetic resin 77 may be temporarily provided on a surface having a size that allows a plurality of authentication chips to be cut out, structural color patches 73 may be appropriately spread thereon by the method shown in fig. 10 and 11 in example 1, and the entire surface may be fixed with the translucent resin 78 and then cut out individually.

Further, a card having an authentication chip can be manufactured by the method shown in fig. 12 in example 1.

< example 5>

Fig. 16 shows an authentication chip according to example 5.

The authenticity verification chip can be applied to the normal incident light shown in FIG. 7(a) and (b) and also to the normal incident light shown in (c) and (d) at λ₃Or at λ₄Oblique incident light is shown.

While the structural color chip 73 is disposed only horizontally in the authentication chips 72 and 76 of examples 3 and 15, the structural color chip 81 is disposed in various postures in the authentication chip 80 of example 5 in fig. 16. Therefore, although the structural color patches 73 having a plurality of thicknesses are required to obtain a plurality of colors of light in the authentication chips 71 of examples 3 and 4, the structural color patches 73 required in the authentication chip 80 of example 5 may have a single thickness.

In the authentication chip 80, the same emission as in fig. 7(a) and (b) is performed for the incident light to the structural color chip arranged horizontally as in example 1, but the incident light to the structural color chip arranged obliquely enters the structural color chip obliquely, and the emission as shown in fig. 7(c) and (d) is performed.

The structural color developed by the normally incident light corresponds to λ of FIG. 7₁Or λ₂And corresponds to the number of kinds of inclination of the light-transmissive medium 73. Therefore, the structural color that can be expressed by obliquely incident light is shown at the refraction angle θ in fig. 7_r(incident Angle θ)_i) Corresponding to λ₃Or λ₄It is infinite.

Since the mixing position of the structural color patch 73 is determined by chance, the arrangement pattern obtained as a result is infinitely variable because the arrangement pattern can be obtained without any step.

The upper surface of the card substrate with which the structural color chip 73 is in contact is made light-absorbing black, and the surface of the light-transmitting synthetic resin is subjected to a matte finish or an antireflection film is formed, as in the case of example 1.

In order to manufacture the authentication chip 80, the structural color piece 73 is also appropriately dispersed in an inclined manner on the bottom portion 70, and the entire portion is fixed by the translucent resin 65.

The authentication chip 80 may be manufactured individually as described above, but the structural color piece 73 may be appropriately dispersed in a slant manner on a large surface from which a plurality of authentication chips can be cut, and the entire piece may be fixed with the light-transmitting resin 65 and then cut out individually.

Further, according to the manufacturing method shown in fig. 12, the authentication chip may be formed directly on the authentication card.

< example 6>

Fig. 17 shows an authentication chip as example 6.

Unlike the authentication chip of example 5, the authentication chip 86 of example 6 is formed of 2 layers of a translucent resin, the entire part of which is fixed. These 2 layers optically function as 1 layer.

The authentication chip 86 has a structural color patch 73 of the same thickness and a light-transmitting resin 78 having the same optical characteristics as the light-transmitting synthetic resin 77 constituting the bottom portion, spread over the flat light-transmitting synthetic resin 77 constituting the bottom portion, and entirely covers the top thereof.

The boundary surface 79 between the light-transmitting synthetic resin 77 and the light-transmitting resin 78 is made of synthetic resin having the same optical characteristics, and thus does not exhibit optical effects.

In the authentication chip thus configured, the translucent synthetic resins 77 and 78 sandwiching the structural color sheet 73 exhibit an absolute refractive index n as shown in FIG. 7₀The same function as in the medium (3), part of the light incident on the structural color sheet 73 is reflected by the surface thereof, part of the light is incident on the structural color sheet 73, the surface of the structural color sheet 73 in contact with the translucent synthetic resin 77 is reflected by the reflecting surface, and the light is emitted from the incident surface。

As a result, in the authentication chip 86, the light reflected by the upper surface of the structural color chip 73 interferes with the light that enters the structural color chip 73 and is reflected by the bottom surface thereof, and the light included in the incident light is selected to develop the structural color.

The upper surface of the card substrate with which the authentication chip 86 is in contact is made light-absorbing black, and the surface of the light-transmitting synthetic resin 78 is subjected to a matte finish or an antireflection film is formed, as in the case of example 1.

In order to manufacture the authentication chip 86, the structural color patch 73 is appropriately dispersed on the temporarily provided translucent synthetic resin 77, and the entire surface thereof is fixed with the translucent resin 78, thereby being manufactured individually.

Alternatively, the authenticity verification chip may be manufactured by once providing the translucent synthetic resin 77 on a surface having a size allowing a plurality of authenticity verification chips to be cut out, appropriately spreading the structural color patch 73 thereon, fixing the whole with the translucent resin 78, and then cutting out the chips individually.

< example 7>

Fig. 18 shows an authentication card according to example 7 to which the principle shown in fig. 8 is applied.

In the figure, (a) is a view of the authentication card viewed from above, (b) is a cross-sectional view thereof, and (c) is an enlarged view of the cross-sectional view. In these figures, 81 is a card body having a magnetic stripe 2 and an arrow 3 showing an insertion direction, and an authentication chip 82 is laminated on a card substrate 85. Reference numeral 84 denotes a surface plate, and another surface plate may be further laminated on the authentication chip 82 and the surface plate 84.

The substrate 85 is a synthetic resin plate of a thick plate used for a cash card or the like which has been used in a large amount in the related art, or a synthetic resin plate of a thin plate used for a prepaid card or the like which is generally opaque.

Unlike the authentication chips of examples 1 and 2, the authentication chip 82 uses a light-transmitting resin film 83 applied appropriately instead of a hologram, and the resin 83 does not have a uniform thickness but has a non-uniform thickness distribution.

In order to protect the authentication chip 82, a hard cover made of glass or the like may be provided.

Referring to fig. 19, a principle of obtaining a structural color by using a light-transmissive medium having a non-uniform thickness instead of the structural color sheet will be described.

In the example shown in (a), the translucent resin used is the portion shown by 90, and in the example shown in (b), the translucent resin used is the portion shown by 94.

And 75 is a reflective layer.

For simplicity of description, only the case where incident light is incident perpendicularly to the translucent medium will be described here.

In the translucent medium 90 shown in (a) in this figure, the incident surface 91 is a curved surface, and the reflecting surface 92 is a flat surface. The light-transmitting medium 90 is formed by a suitable method such as coating or thermal spraying.

The reflecting surface 92 may be a reflecting film made of metal or the like.

The absolute refractive index of the light-transmitting medium 90 is n₁Relative as the absolute refractive index n₀Has a relative refractive index n. The reflecting surface 92 of the light transmitting medium 90 is flat, but the distance from the incident surface 91, that is, the thickness is not uniform, and the thickness is d₁、d₂、d₃、d₄Part (c) of (a).

(b) In the light-transmitting medium 94, the incident surface 95 is a flat surface, and the reflecting surface 96 is a curved surface.

The base 93 having such a curved surface is formed by a suitable method such as coating or thermal spraying using a suitable material. A light-transmitting medium 94 is obtained by applying a light-transmitting medium on this base 93 to make the surface flat.

The reflecting surface 96 may be a reflecting film made of metal or the like.

The reflection surface 96 may be obtained by making the refractive indices of the base 93 and the translucent medium 94 different from each other.

The absolute refractive index of the light-transmitting medium 94 is n₁Relative as the absolute refractive index n₀Has a relative refractive index n. The incident surface 95 of the light-transmitting medium 94 is flat, but the distance from the reflecting surface 96, i.e., the thickness, is not uniform, but has a thickness d₁、d₂、d₃、d₄Part (c) of (a).

The light-transmitting media 90 and 94 having such a structure can perform the same function as the light-transmitting media 53 and 57 described with reference to FIG. 8, and λ₁、λ₂、λ₃、λ₄Is emitted either strongly or weakly.

As described with reference to fig. 7, the light incident obliquely passes through the reflection angle θ_rSatisfies the condition of 2dncos theta_rThe light of the condition of/(m +1/2) is strongly emitted and satisfies λ 2dncos θ_rThe condition of/m is selected so that light is emitted weakly.

When the angle of reflection theta_rCos10 degree is approximately equal to 0.94 degree when the angle is 10 degrees, and the reflection angle theta is_rCos20 degree is approximately equal to 0.935 when the angle is 20 degree, and the reflection angle theta is_rAt 30 °, cos30 ° is approximately equal to 0.921, and the influence of the reflection angle on the wavelength of the structural color to be developed is small to be almost negligible, and depends mainly on the thickness of the light-transmitting medium.

< example 8>

Fig. 20 shows a specific configuration of the authentication chip shown in fig. 18 as example 8.

Unlike the authentication chips of examples 1 to 6, the authentication chip of example 8 does not use a structural color sheet, but instead coats the light-transmissive medium 83 with an appropriate thickness on the substrate 85 as shown in fig. 18, and the light-transmissive medium 83 is not uniform but non-uniform in thickness and is covered with the light-transmissive resin 82.

Since the thickness of the applied light-transmitting medium 83 is not uniform and the distribution is determined by chance, the pattern and wavelength of the structural color due to the thickness distribution change without any step.

The upper surface of the card substrate 85, which is in contact with the authentication chip, is made light-absorbing black, and the surface of the light-transmitting synthetic resin 82 is subjected to a matte finish or an antireflection film is formed, as in the case of example 8.

The authentication chip having such a structure can be obtained by appropriately applying the light-transmitting medium 83 to the substrate 85.

The authenticity verification chip having such a structure can also be obtained by using a structure in which both surfaces are flat, etching the back surface with some device to form irregularities, and combining the irregularities with the light-transmissive medium 83.

Alternatively, the light-transmitting medium may be produced by coating a large surface with the light-transmitting medium and then cutting out the medium.

< example 9>

Fig. 21 shows another specific configuration of the authentication chip shown in fig. 18 as example 9.

The authentication chip of example 9 is different from the authentication chip of example 8 in that a flat light-transmissive synthetic resin 86 constituting the bottom is placed on a substrate 85 shown in fig. 18, a light-transmissive medium 83 is coated on the light-transmissive synthetic resin 86 at an appropriate thickness, the light-transmissive medium 83 has a nonuniform pressure distribution due to non-uniform thickness, and the light-transmissive resin 82 is covered thereon.

In the authentication chip thus configured, the light-transmitting synthetic resins 86 and 82 sandwiching the light-transmitting medium 102 exhibit the absolute refractive index n shown in fig. 7₀The same function as in the medium (3), a part of the light incident on the light-transmitting medium 83 is reflected by the surface thereof, a part of the light is incident on the light-transmitting medium 83, and the surface of the light-transmitting medium 83 in contact with the light-transmitting synthetic resin 86 is reflected as a reflecting surface and emitted from the incident surface.

As a result, in this authentication chip, the light reflected by the upper surface of the light-transmissive medium 83 interferes with the light incident on the light-transmissive medium 83 and reflected by the bottom surface thereof, and the light included in the incident light is selected to develop the structural color.

Since the distribution of the thickness of the applied light-transmitting medium 83 is determined by chance, the pattern and the wavelength of the structural color due to the thickness distribution change without any step.

Alternatively, the light-transmitting medium may be coated on a large surface and then cut out separately.

< example 10>

Fig. 22 shows an authentication chip according to example 10.

While the translucent media of examples 7 to 9 were formed on the entire surface of the authentication chip, in this example, the "structural color" generators were present in a scattered state in the same manner as the structural color chip of example 3 shown in fig. 14. This structure can be obtained by dispersing the translucent medium material in the form of drops.

In the figure, (a) is a view of the authentication card viewed from above, (b) is a sectional view thereof, and (c) is an enlarged view of the sectional view. In these figures, reference numeral 101 denotes a card body having a magnetic stripe 2 and an arrow 3 indicating an insertion direction, and an authentication chip 102 is laminated on a card substrate 105. Reference numeral 104 denotes a surface plate, and another surface plate may be further laminated on the authentication chip 102 and the surface plate 104.

The substrate 105 is a synthetic resin plate of a thick plate used for a cash card or the like which has been used in a large amount in the related art, or a synthetic resin plate of a thin plate used for a prepaid card or the like which is generally opaque.

Unlike the authentication chips of embodiments 1 and 2, the authentication chip 102 does not use a hologram but uses a resin 104 that is suitably dispersed, and the resin 104 does not have a uniform thickness but has a non-uniform thickness and a non-uniform distribution.

< example 11>

Fig. 23 shows an authentication chip according to example 11.

While the light-transmitting media of examples 9 and 10 are formed on the entire surface of the authentication chip, the authentication chip of example 11 has a "structural color" appearing body in a dispersed state in the same manner as the authentication chip of example 2 shown in fig. 13 and the authentication chip of example 3 shown in fig. 14. Such a structure can be obtained by dispersing the raw material of the light-transmissive medium in a droplet shape.

The authentication chip is formed by spreading a translucent medium 103 in the form of a droplet of translucent medium material on a card substrate 105, and covering the entire card substrate with a translucent synthetic resin 102.

Since the distribution and thickness of the dispersed light-transmitting medium 103 are determined by chance, the arrangement pattern and wavelength of the structural color due to the distribution and thickness change without any step.

The authenticity verification chip having such a structure can be obtained by appropriately dispersing a raw material of a light-transmissive medium in a droplet shape.

Alternatively, the translucent medium may be produced by spreading a droplet-shaped translucent medium material over a large surface and then cutting out the material individually.

Alternatively, the authentication chip may be formed directly on the authentication card by the manufacturing method shown in fig. 12.

< example 12>

Fig. 24 shows an authentication chip according to example 12.

Unlike in example 11, the authentication chip of example 12 shown in fig. 24 is configured such that the entire fixing translucent resin is composed of 2 layers. In addition, the 2 layers optically function as 1 layer.

The authentication chip is formed by dispersing a transparent medium 112 on a flat transparent synthetic resin 106 disposed on a card substrate 105. The light-transmitting medium 112 is not uniform but has a non-uniform thickness and distribution, and is covered with the light-transmitting resin 102.

The boundary surface between the light-transmissive synthetic resin 106 and the light-transmissive resin 102 is made of synthetic resin having the same optical characteristics, and therefore does not have an optical effect.

In the authentication chip thus configured, the translucent synthetic resins 106 and 102 sandwiching the translucent medium 103 exhibit an absolute refractive index n as shown in fig. 7₀The same function as that of the medium (2), part of the light incident on the translucent medium 112 is reflected by the surface thereof, and part of the light entersThe light enters the translucent medium 103, and the surface of the translucent medium 103 in contact with the translucent synthetic resin 106 serves as a reflection surface, reflects the light, and is emitted from the incident surface.

As a result, in this authentication chip, light reflected by the upper surface of the light-transmissive medium 103 interferes with light that enters the light-transmissive medium 103 and is reflected by the bottom surface thereof, and light included in the incident light is selected to develop a structural color.

Since the thickness distribution of the applied light-transmitting medium 103 is determined by chance, the pattern and wavelength of the structural color due to the thickness distribution change without any step.

The upper surface of the card substrate with which the authentication chip is in contact is made light-absorbing black, and the surface of the light-transmitting synthetic resin 102 is subjected to a matte finish or an antireflection film is formed, as in the case of the above-described embodiment.

In order to manufacture the authentication chip, the translucent medium 103 is appropriately dispersed on the translucent synthetic resin 106 temporarily provided, and the entire surface thereof is fixed with the translucent resin 102, thereby manufacturing the authentication chip individually.

< example 13>

Fig. 25 shows pits of structural colors as the authentication chip of example 13.

In the above-described embodiment, the structural color developing bodies are irregularly arranged. However, the structural color developing bodies may be arranged regularly as in the embossed hologram shown in fig. 4.

In fig. 25, (a) is a view of the authentication card viewed from above, (b) is a cross-sectional view thereof, (c) is an enlarged cross-sectional view of the authentication chip, and (d) is a further enlarged cross-sectional view.

In these figures, 111 is a card body having a magnetic stripe 2 and an arrow 3 showing an insertion direction, and an authentication chip 112 is laminated on a card substrate 114.

The card substrate 114 is a synthetic resin plate that is generally opaque and is used for a thick plate such as a cash card that has been used in a large amount in the related art, or a thin plate used for a prepaid card.

In order to protect the authentication chip 112, a hard cover made of glass or the like may be provided.

Many pits 117 are regularly arranged on the chip substrate 115 of the authentication chip 112, and the pits 117 are filled with different amounts of the light-transmitting medium 118, whereby structural color developers having different thicknesses are regularly arranged.

The wavelength λ of the structural color detected by the authentication chip 112 is determined by the thickness of the light-transmitting medium 118 filled in the pit 117.

Such a structure can be obtained by spreading a raw material of a light-transmitting medium on the chip base 114 where the regularly arranged pits 117 are formed.

< example 14>

Fig. 26 shows a structural color pit of example 14.

This embodiment is a modification of embodiment 13, and a filling resin 120 is appropriately filled and arranged in the recesses 117 regularly arranged on the chip substrate 114, and a light-transmitting medium 118 is filled thereon.

The structural color detected by the authentication chip is determined by the thickness of the light-transmitting medium 118.

A reflective layer may be formed between the filler resin 120 and the light-transmitting medium 118, but this reflective layer is not essential, and a reflector formed by making the refractive indices of the filler resin 120 and the light-transmitting medium 118 different from each other may be used.

Such a structure can be obtained by filling a suitable resin in a scattering manner on the authenticity verification chip on which the pits are formed, and embedding a light-transmitting medium material thereon.

In addition to the individual production, the filling resin 120 may be spread over a large surface on which the pits are formed, filled with the translucent medium material, and then cut out individually.

< example 15>

Fig. 27 shows 2 structures of structural color pits in example 15.

(a) The authentication chip 121 is shown with a light-transmissive medium 123 disposed in regularly arranged recesses 122.

The structural color detected by the authentication chip 121 is determined by the thickness d of the light-transmitting medium 123_aAnd (6) determining.

Such a configuration can be obtained by spreading a light-transmissive medium material on the authenticity verification chip formed with the pits.

(b) The authentication chip 124 is shown in which a suitable resin is disposed in regularly arranged pits, and a light-transmissive medium 127 is disposed thereon.

The structural color detected by the authentication chip 124 is determined by the thickness d of the light-transmitting medium 123_bAnd (6) determining.

< example 16>

Fig. 28 shows a structure in which a regular arrangement as example 16 is adopted.

In fig. 28, (a) is a view of the authentication card viewed from above, (b) is a cross-sectional view thereof, (c) is an enlarged cross-sectional view of the authentication chip, and (d) is a further enlarged cross-sectional view.

In these figures, 131 is a card body having a magnetic stripe 2 and an arrow 3 showing an insertion direction, and an authentication chip 132 is laminated on a card substrate 134.

The card substrate 134 is a synthetic resin plate of a thick plate used for a cash card or the like which has been used in a large amount in the related art, or a synthetic resin plate of a thin plate used for a prepaid card or the like which is generally opaque.

In order to protect the authentication chip 132, a hard cover made of glass or the like may be provided.

A plurality of pits 135 having different depths are regularly arranged on the chip substrate 132 of the authentication chip 132, and the pits 137 are filled with a light-transmitting medium, whereby structural color-developing bodies having different thicknesses are regularly arranged.

The wavelength λ of the structural color detected by the authentication chip 132 is determined by the thickness of the translucent medium filled in the pit 135.

Such a structure is obtained by forming pits of different depths regularly by means of etching or the like, and filling the formed pits with a light-transmitting medium.

Alternatively, the authentication chip may be manufactured by forming pits with different depths regularly on a large surface by etching or the like, filling the pits with the light-transmitting medium material, and then cutting out the authentication chip individually.

< example 17>

A method of obtaining an authentication chip using a random number as example 17 is described with reference to fig. 29.

The random number obtained in the form of 2 or 16 can be easily replaced with 4 or 8. Generally, a color is represented by replacing 4 colors of 3 colors of RGB with black, that is, 4-ary colors.

In order to obtain such an appropriate structural color, the thickness of the light-transmissive medium of the pits is controlled, thereby obtaining a structural color of 4 colors or more.

The thickness control of the light-transmissive medium can be performed by a suitable printing device such as an ink jet printer.

The use of 2-ary random numbers and 4-ary random numbers is described in detail in the prior applications of the present inventors, i.e., international patent application JP2006/325224, international patent application JP2006/325225, international patent application JP2006/325226, and international patent application JP 2006/325227.

< example 18>

Fig. 30 shows a configuration for accurately reading the authentication chip in example 18.

The physical specifications of the cash card and the credit card are strictly regulated from the viewpoint of versatility, and therefore, the parts provided thereon must also be strictly in conformity with the physical specifications. There is still a possibility that deformation is caused by overuse or the like.

In order to prevent this, it is preferable that the authentication chip has a registration mark 141 as shown in fig. 30. The alignment mark may be 1 in the simplest case, but a plurality of alignment marks are provided to ensure more reliable alignment. The alignment mark is used not only for linear reading but also for planar reading using an imaging device.

In order to perform reading more reliably, the positioning mark is used in combination with the reading start position and the reading end position of the authentication chip, and some kind of mark such as a moving direction reading start line 142 and a moving direction reading end line 143 is provided, and end indication lines 144 and 145 are further provided.

Since the information on the authentication chip is read by the relative movement between the authentication chip and the reading device, the authentication chip and the reading device need to be moved in synchronization with each other for reliable reading. Therefore, by forming the mark 146 for the synchronization signal on the authentication chip in advance, the mark can be read and the movement of the reader can be synchronized.

These reading start/end lines and/or synchronizing signals may be marked for signal normalization in signal processing. The alignment mark, the reading start/stop line, and/or the synchronization signal mark are each formed of a fluorescent substance, and can be formed by an appropriate printing device such as an ink jet printer.

Reading device

The reading of the authentication chip using the structural color will be described with reference to fig. 31 to 39.

< example 19>

Fig. 31 shows an example of an imaging device having the most basic configuration in which a method of reading with an authentication chip as a surface is used in example 19.

In the figure, 151 denotes a card body, 152 denotes a card substrate, 154 denotes a card top panel, 153 denotes an authentication chip, 155 and 156 denote illumination light sources for photographing the authentication chip 153, and 157 denotes a camera for photographing.

When the card 151 is taken in by the reader and stops, the authentication chip 153 is illuminated by the illumination light source 153 and photographed by the camera 157.

As the camera for photographing, a color camera such as a CCD camera is used, and in this case, a white LED is used as a light source for illumination.

In addition, the kind and number of the light sources are not limited to the white LED one.

The white LED is a nearly white light obtained by a combination of an ultraviolet LED and phosphors of r (red), g (green), b (blue), RGB LEDs, or a combination of a blue LED and a yellow phosphor, and the color is separated by a color filter in a color camera.

Therefore, the light detection by the combination of the white LED and the color camera is limited to the detection by the combination of the luminescent color change and the color filter.

< example 20>

Fig. 32 shows a modification of example 19 as example 20.

In this reader, the white LED is replaced with a red LED161, a green LED162, and a blue LED163, and the color camera is replaced with a monochrome camera 164.

The types and the number of the light sources are not limited to three types, i.e., red LEDs, green LEDs, and blue LEDs.

When a monochrome camera is used, the LEDs do not emit light simultaneously, but use a color sequential method of alternately emitting light.

This reduces the necessity of paying attention to which white LED is used and which color camera is used.

In example 18 and example 19, the light irradiation region is not limited and the detection region is limited, but the light irradiation region may be limited and the detection region is not limited.

In addition, a photodiode or a phototransistor may be used instead of the camera in the structural color detection.

< example 21>

Fig. 33 shows a reader device in which an authentication chip is directly read as a surface in example 21.

In this figure, (a) is a schematic configuration diagram of a detection unit of the card authentication reading device, and (b) is an enlarged view showing a correspondence relationship between the card and the planar card authentication reading device.

In (a), 151 is a card body, 152 is a substrate, 154 is a card top panel, and 153 is an authentication chip.

The reference numeral 166 denotes a light-receiving element matrix in which light-receiving elements 167 each composed of a combination of a light source, such as a red LED, a green LED, or a blue LED, and a small-sized light-detecting element, such as a photodiode, a phototransistor, a CCD, or a CMOS, and a light-receiving element, each having a size in which the authentication chip 153 is covered and hidden, are arranged in a planar manner.

In (b), a plurality of structural color patches 148 are dispersed on the authentication chip 153, and alignment marks 147 are formed. The light-receiving element 167 of the light-receiving element matrix 168 faces the authentication chip 153.

When the card 151 is taken in by the reader and stopped, the authentication chip 153 is positioned below the planar light-receiving/emitting element matrix 166. In this state, the light-receiving and light-emitting elements constituting the light-receiving and light-emitting element matrix 166 arranged in a planar manner detect light reflected from the structural color developing body arranged in the authentication chip 153 illustrated in (b), and the presence position of the structural color developing body is read as an electrical signal.

Since the pattern of the acquired electrical signal depends on the arrangement of the structural color display, the authentication chips 153, that is, the cards 151 are authenticated by comparing this information.

The accuracy of reading the arrangement pattern of the structural color display bodies in the authentication chip 153 depends on the resolution of the light-receiving/emitting element matrix 156 arranged in a planar manner.

Further, by adopting a color sequential method of sequentially emitting light from the light emitting elements for each color, the number of light detecting elements can be greatly reduced.

< example 22>

Fig. 34 shows a reader that reads a surface of an authentication chip as an aggregate of lines in example 22.

In this figure, (a) is a schematic configuration diagram of a detection unit of the authentication chip reading apparatus, and (b) is a diagram of a correspondence relationship between a card and a linear light detection device.

The card 151 in this figure is the same as that shown in embodiment 20, and thus the description thereof is omitted.

In (a), a red light-receiving/emitting element array 171, a green light-receiving/emitting element array 172, and a blue light-receiving/emitting element array 173 are housed in a housing having a length slightly longer than the width of the authentication chip 153 in the moving direction.

The red light-receiving and emitting element array 171, the green light-receiving and emitting element array 172, and the blue light-receiving and emitting element array 173 are examples, and it is needless to say that any other combination of colors may be used.

Unlike the authentication chip reading device shown in embodiment 18, embodiment 19, or embodiment 20, in the authentication chip reading device of embodiment 21, the arrangement of the structural color developing bodies in the read authentication chip 153 is not displayed in the card 151 after the card is taken into and stopped by the card reading device but in the taking operation into the card reading device.

When the card 151 is loaded into the card reading device, it passes under the light receiving/emitting element arrays 171, 172, 173. At this time, the array of linearly arranged light receiving and emitting elements detects light reflected by the structural color developing body arranged in the authentication chip 153, and the electric signal generated by the movement of the authentication chip 153 is simulated continuously for each light detecting element or digitally discretely for each light detecting element, or scanned by a facsimile machine, a scanner, or the like to create 1 image, and the authentication chip 153 is authenticated to authenticate the card 151.

The pattern of the obtained information depends on the arrangement of the structural color developing bodies, and thus the authentication chips 153, that is, the cards 151 are authenticated by comparing the information.

The accuracy of reading the arrangement pattern of the structural color developing bodies in the authentication chip 153 depends on the resolution of the light-receiving/emitting element arrays 171, 172, and 173.

< example 23>

Fig. 35 shows a reader of an authentication chip that reads an aggregate of dots on a surface in example 23.

In this figure, (a) is a schematic configuration diagram of the relationship between the card and the authentication chip reading device, and (b) is an explanatory diagram of the reading method.

In the figure, 151 is a card body, 152 is a substrate, 154 is a card top panel, 153 is an authentication chip, 154 is a light-receiving and emitting element, and the light-receiving and emitting element 154 moves in a direction orthogonal to the direction in which the card 151 is taken in.

The movement in the direction orthogonal to the card 151 taking-in direction may be a suitable method such as a substantially linear motion of a rotational motion with 1 point as a fulcrum, a linear motion converted from a rotational motion to a linear motion, or a linear motion by a linear motor or the like.

< example 24>

Fig. 36 shows an authentication chip reading apparatus of a new configuration according to example 24.

In the reading device, a laser beam printer for an optical scanning device or the like is used to reflect a laser beam by a rotating polygonal columnar mirror (polygon mirror). This scanning device can perform optical scanning only by the rotational movement of the polygon mirror.

As a means for obtaining the parallel beam, a paraboloid may be used for a reflecting telescope and a parabolic antenna.

(a) Showing the relationship of the paraboloid to the parallel rays. In this figure, X represents an X axis, Y represents a Y axis orthogonal to the X axis, and O is the origin. P is such as to represent Y ═ X²The parabola of (c). In this parabola, the focal point F is located at a position where X is 0 and Y is-1/4, and when a straight line parallel to the Y axis is folded back on the parabola P, all the points are focused on the focal point F. Conversely, when a straight line with the focus F as a base point is folded back on the parabola P, the straight line is parallel to the Y axis.

(b) A basic configuration of a reading apparatus to which this principle is applied is shown.

In this figure, 181 is a mirror having a paraboloid, and is formed in a half-cylinder shape having a length in a direction perpendicular to the paper surface. Further, a light passing hole (light hole)182 for passing light is formed at a position corresponding to the origin of (a). A polygon mirror (polygon mirror) 184 having a rotation axis parallel to the extending direction axis of the semi-cylindrical parabolic mirror 181 and a polygon reflecting surface is disposed at the focal point of the semi-cylindrical parabolic mirror 181. Further, 183 is a light-receiving element, and 183 is an authentication chip to be read.

Light emitted from the light receiving and emitting element 183 in parallel with the Y axis of (a) and indicated by a solid line passes through the light transmitting hole 182 and enters the polygon mirror 184 disposed at the focal point of the semi-cylindrical parabolic mirror 181. The light incident on the polygon mirror 184 enters the semi-cylindrical parabolic mirror 181 as the polygon mirror 184 rotates, is reflected in a direction parallel to the Y axis, and enters the authentication chip 153.

Light indicated by a solid line emitted from the authentication chip 153 in parallel with the Y axis of (a) is reflected by the semi-cylindrical parabolic mirror 181 and enters the polygon mirror 184 disposed at the focal point. The light incident on the polygon mirror 184 is reflected, passes through the light-passing hole 182, and enters the light-receiving element 183. On the other hand, light reflected from the authentication chip 153 in a direction different from the Y axis does not enter the polygon mirror even if it is reflected by the semi-cylindrical parabolic mirror 181.

As described above, since only light parallel to the Y axis among the light reflected from the authentication chip 153 is incident on the polygon mirror 184, the light incident on the light-receiving/emitting element is selected by rotating the polygon mirror 184, and the light reflection state of the authentication chip 153 can be known.

In the reading device shown in (b), the light emitted from the authentication chip of the portion in contact with the back side of the polygon mirror 181 when viewed from the light-receiving and light-emitting element 183 cannot be read. In this portion, necessary information or unnecessary information may not be written, but if the configurations shown in (c) and (d) are adopted, all written information can be read without a portion in contact with the back side of the polygon mirror 184.

(c) The basic configuration is shown, and half of a half cylindrical parabolic mirror is used. In this figure, 185 is a mirror having a paraboloid, and X of (a) is formed in a half-cylinder shape having a length in a direction perpendicular to the paper surface by a negative portion only. In this case, the light passing hole 182 as formed in (b) is not formed because it is not necessary. A polygon mirror (polygon mirror) 184 having a rotation axis parallel to the extending direction axis of the semi-cylindrical parabolic mirror 185 and a polygon reflecting surface is disposed at the focal point of the semi-cylindrical semi-parabolic mirror 185. Further, 183 is a light-receiving element, and 153 is an authentication chip.

Light emitted from the light receiving and emitting element 183 in parallel to the Y axis of (a) and indicated by a solid line enters the polygon mirror 184 disposed at the focal point of the semi-cylindrical parabolic mirror 185. The light incident on the polygon mirror 184 is incident on the semi-cylindrical parabolic mirror 185 and reflected as the polygon mirror 184 rotates, and is reflected in a direction parallel to the Y axis and incident on the authentication chip 153.

The light reflected from the authentication chip 153 in parallel with the Y axis of (a) is reflected by a semi-cylindrical parabolic mirror 185 and enters a polygon mirror 184 disposed at the focal point. The light incident on the polygon mirror 184 is reflected and incident on the light receiving and emitting element 183.

In this reading apparatus, when viewed from the light receiving and emitting element 183, the authentication chip 153 is only an end portion of a portion that is in contact with the back side of the polygon mirror 185, and therefore the influence of a portion that cannot be read is small.

Further, as shown in (d), by further reducing the center of the semi-cylindrical parabolic mirror 185 and adopting an offset (offset) configuration, the portion that cannot be read by the polygon mirror 184 can be completely eliminated, and information written in all portions of the authentication chip 153 can be read.

Method for judging authenticity

< example 25>

Referring to fig. 37 to 39, an authentication determination method used in the example of the reading apparatus of fig. 31 as example 25 will be described.

In fig. 31, a diagram w (white) shows an example of the authentication chip 153 that performs imaging by a combination of a white LED and a color camera, and detects R, G, B structural color developers of all colors.

Below this, R, G, B shows the state of the structural color display of each color obtained by color separation by the color filter of the camera.

In these figures, W, R, G, B corresponds to W, R, G, B in fig. 31, and each image is divided into 4 parts and assigned with numbers, that is, 1 in quadrant 1, 2 in quadrant 2, 3 in quadrant 3, and 4 in quadrant 4.

In addition to the division method, division based on diagonal lines, further subdivision, or the like may be performed as necessary.

The pattern of the image divided in this way is not detected, but the average light amount of the structural colors therein, i.e., the total light amount, is detected.

In this figure, "-a" is the total light quantity of the color light of the entire authentication chip (All), "-T" is the total light quantity of the color light of the upper half (Top) of the authentication chip, "-B" is the total light quantity of the color light of the lower half (Bottom) of the authentication chip, "-R" is the total light quantity of the color light of the Right half (Right) of the authentication chip, "-L" is the total light quantity of the color light of the Left half (Left) of the authentication chip, "-1" to "-" 4 "are the total light quantities of the color light of the quadrants of the authentication chip.

Thus, information on the total light amount of R, G, B with 9 colors and 27 counts can be obtained.

The authenticity of the card, i.e., the authenticity verification chip, is determined by comparing the total light amount information acquired and stored from the authenticity verification chip at the time of card manufacturing with the total light amount information acquired from the authenticity verification chip at the time of card use.

The white color obtained by the white LED is approximately white, and the white color detected by the color camera is also approximately white due to the use of the color filter.

Therefore, the light detection using the combination of the white LED and the color camera is limited to the detection using the combination of the emission color and the color filter, and it is necessary to pay attention to which white LED or which color camera is used.

In order to satisfy the strictness of the color used, it is preferable that the color information is not visually perceived but utilized according to the wavelength which is physical color information.

As the LED for the illumination light source, an ultraviolet LED or an infrared LED may be used in addition to the visible LED, and the combination or selective use thereof makes illegal reading more difficult.

Further, laser light sources having different wavelengths may be used, and a nonlinear element may be used to use light that is a difference in the number of vibrations or a sum of the obtained numbers of vibrations.

In addition, elements that can be used for determination include: the maximum luminance value in each area, the number of pixels (pixels) having a luminance greater than a predetermined value, the number of sets of bright pixels, the contour length of the bright pixels, the feature of the bright pixels, the center of gravity of the dispersed bright points, the peak position and peak value of the histogram of the vertical and horizontal direction histograms of the 2-valued images, and the histogram of each pixel weighted for luminance information.

Certificate of authenticity certification chip

With reference to fig. 40 to 47, a description will be given of a card configuration for certifying the validity of the card itself by the card and a configuration of the determination procedure.

< example 26>

Fig. 40 and 41 show an authentication procedure in example 26.

Fig. 40 shows the structure of the card, and a process of verifying the validity of the card itself will be described with reference to fig. 41.

The card body 191 is provided with an Authentication chip 192 for storing card Authentication information "a" (Authentication) such as an artifact amount, and an Authentication proof chip 192 for encrypting the digitized data "M" (Message) of the Authentication information "a" to obtain encrypted data "C" and storing the encrypted data "C", and is mounted in a structure that cannot be separated from the card body.

The authentication chip 192 and the authentication chip 192 may be disposed at their respective positions as shown in the figure, or may be disposed adjacent to each other or integrally disposed.

Referring to fig. 41, the functions of the authentication chip 192 and the authentication chip 193 in the card body 191 shown in fig. 40 will be described. In the figure, (1) to (5) are descriptions of the case where the card issuer creates the card, and (6) to (10) are descriptions of the case where the user uses the card for the terminal device such as the ATM.

(1) An authentication chip 192 storing authentication information "A" is created.

Since the artifact measurement amounts are completely different from each other, the authenticity verification chip 192 having the artifact measurement amount is completely different from each other. In particular, the replication of artifact metrics with 3-dimensional configurations is impossible and cannot be forged.

(2) The information of the authentication chip 192 is read in an analog or digital manner. In order to read the card correctly, it is preferable to read the card after the authentication chip 192 is attached to the card 191 main body.

(3) The read analog image of the authentication chip 192 is digitized into digital data "M". Moreover, when the data stored in the read authentication chip 192 is digital data, it is not necessary to digitize the data.

(4) The digital data "M" is encrypted to obtain encrypted data "C".

As the encryption system, a Secret-key encryption system (Secret-key encryption system) or a Public-key encryption system (Public-key encryption system) can be used.

The encryption key used in the Secret key encryption system (Secret-key Cryptosystem) is called a Secret key (Secret-key), but in recent years, with the spread of public key encryption systems, there are many people who call a Private key (Private-key) used in a public key encryption system as a Secret key (Secret-key), and it may be called a Common key (Common-key) to avoid confusion.

According to the "modern Encryption theory" of the electronic information and communications society, a process of encrypting (encrypting) a message M (message) with an Encryption key K (key) to obtain enCrypted data (enCrypted-data) C is expressed as C (K, M), and a process of decrypting (decrypting) the enCrypted data C with the Encryption key K to obtain decrypted data is expressed as M (D (K, C).

Here, according to this method, a process of obtaining encrypted data "Cs" by encrypting the digitized data "M" with the secret key Ks of the secret key encryption system is represented as Cs ═ E (Ks, M), and a process of obtaining digital data "M" by decrypting the encrypted data "Cs" with the secret key Ks is represented as M ═ D (Ks, Cs).

A process of obtaining the encrypted data "Cp" by encrypting the digitized data "M" with the public key Kp of the public key encryption system is denoted as Cp ═ E (Kp, M), and a process of obtaining the digital image data M by decrypting the encrypted data "Cp" with the private key Kv is denoted as M ═ D (Kv, Cp). The distribution (transmission) of the encryption key is performed in this manner.

A process of encrypting digital data "M" with a private key Kv of a public key encryption system to obtain encrypted data Cv is denoted as Cv (E (Kv, M)), and a process of decrypting the encrypted data "Cv" with a private key Kp to obtain digital data "a" is denoted as a (D (Kp, Cv). Digital signing is done in this manner.

(5) The encrypted data "Cs", "Cp", or "Cv" is recorded/saved in the certification chip 193, and is mounted in a configuration that cannot be separated from the card body 191. The encrypted data can be recorded/stored by an optical reading/recording method such as a barcode or a 2-dimensional barcode, or by magnetic recording.

When the card body 191 is an IC card mounted with an IC chip, the encrypted data may be stored in the IC chip. As the inseparable structure, a single-piece structure, welding, or the like can be used. Further, the encrypted data may be recorded in the card itself without mounting the authentication chip on the card.

(6) When the card is used, the encrypted data "C" stored in the authentication chip 193 is read.

(7) The encrypted data "C" is decrypted using a prescribed encryption algorithm and encryption key to obtain decrypted data "M".

(8) At the same time, the information "a" of the authentication chip 192 is read. The reading device is generally a multi-purpose camera, but a reading head, a scanner, or the like other than the camera may be used.

(9) The read information "a '" of the authentication chip is digitized to obtain digital data "M'".

(10) The decrypted data "M" is compared with the digitized data "M'". If they are the same, the combination of the authentication chip 192 and the authentication chip 193 is judged to be valid, and if they are not the same, the combination of the authentication chip 192 and the authentication chip 193 is judged to be invalid, and the card is judged to be illegal. In this way, the authenticity of the authentication chip 192 is verified by the authentication chip 193 existing on the card together.

In this embodiment, the data "M '" read from the authentication chip 192 is compared with the data "M" decrypted from the authentication chip 193, but the encrypted data "C '" obtained by encrypting the data "M '" read from the authentication chip 192 may be inversely compared with the encrypted data "C" read from the authentication chip 192.

The data of the authentication chip 193 is encrypted. The encryption system may be any one of a secret key (or common key) encryption system using a single encryption key and a public key system using 2 encryption keys. In the public key system, a key used for encryption and decryption may be any one of a combination of a public key and a private key (secret key) or a combination of a private key and a public key.

When the user passes the card for the terminal device, the encryption key for decryption is used, and the storage place of the encryption key may be the server or the terminal device. If the encryption key is stored in the server and the authentication of the card is required, the security is high on-line by transmitting the necessary encryption key to the terminal device each time. If the encryption key is stored in the terminal device, the authentication of the card can be performed only by the terminal device in an off-line state. However, if the terminal device is stolen, the encryption key is also stolen. In order to avoid this, if the encryption key is stored in advance in the DRAM in the terminal device, and the encryption key stored in the DRAM disappears when the terminal device is broken or stolen and the power supply is turned off, the encryption key can be prevented from being stolen.

In the case where data stored for verifying the authenticity of the card is transmitted from the server of the host computer to the terminal device and the authenticity is authenticated on the terminal device side, or the read data of the card is transmitted to the server and the authenticity is authenticated on the server side, the amount of data stored in the server and the amount of communication data are large because the digital data from the authenticity authentication chip 192 is large.

As a countermeasure against this, for example, when the Hash algorithms such as MD5(Message Digest 5), SAH-1(Secure Hash Algorithm-1), SAH-2, and the like, which are representative Hash algorithms, are used, the Hash values can be converted into 16 bytes regardless of the size of data, and the falsification of the original data is inevitably reflected in the Hash values. This feature can prevent an increase in the amount of data stored in the server and the amount of communication data. In order to reduce the amount of encryption/decryption operations, a hash algorithm is used.

< example 27>

Fig. 42 and 43 show an example of certification of the card itself using a hash algorithm as the embodiment 27.

Fig. 42 shows the structure of the card, and a process of verifying the validity of the card itself will be described with reference to fig. 43.

The card main body 194 is provided with an Authentication chip 192 and an Authentication chip 195 in a structure inseparable from the card main body, the Authentication chip 192 stores card Authentication information "a" (Authentication) such as an artifact measurement, and the Authentication chip 195 hashes digitized data "M" (Message) of the Authentication information "a" into a hash value "I", encrypts the hash value "I" into encrypted data "Ch", and stores the encrypted data "Ch". The authentication chip 192 and the authentication chip 194 may be disposed at their respective positions as shown in fig. 42, or may be disposed adjacent to or integrally with each other.

Referring to fig. 43, the functions of the authentication chip 192 and the authentication chip 195 on the card body 194 shown in fig. 42 will be described. In the figure, (1) to (6) are descriptions of card creation by a card issuer, and (7) to (18) are descriptions of a case where a user uses a card for a terminal device such as an ATM.

Since the artifact measurement amounts are completely different from each other, the authenticity verification chip 192 having the artifact measurement amount is completely different. In particular, artifact metrics with 3-dimensional configurations cannot be reproduced and cannot be forged.

(2) The information of the authentication chip 192 is read in an analog or digital manner. In order to correctly read the card, it is preferable to read the card after the authentication chip 192 is mounted on the card 193.

(3) The read analog image of the authentication chip 192 is digitized into digital data "M", and the data stored in the read authentication chip 192 is not required to be digitized when the data is digital data.

(4) The digitized data "M" is hashed to obtain a hash value "H". The hash value obtained when hashing by the widely used MD5 algorithm is 16 bytes (128 bits).

(5) The hash value "H" is encrypted to obtain encrypted data "Ch". As the encryption system, a Secret-key encryption system (Secret-key encryption system) or a Public-key encryption system (Public-key encryption system) can be used.

(6) The encrypted data "Ch" is recorded/stored in the authentication chip 195 and is mounted in a structure inseparable from the card body 194. The encrypted data can be recorded/stored by an appropriate method such as an optical reading/recording method such as a barcode or a 2-dimensional barcode, or a magnetic recording method.

When the card body 194 is an IC card mounted with an IC chip, the encrypted data may be stored in the IC chip. As the inseparable structure, a single-piece structure, welding, or the like can be used. Further, the chip may not be mounted and may be recorded in the card itself.

(7) The encrypted data "Ch" stored in the authentication chip 195 is read when the card is used.

(8) The encrypted data "Ch" is decrypted using a prescribed encryption algorithm and encryption key to obtain decrypted data "H".

(9) At the same time, the information "a" of the authentication chip 192 is read.

The reading device is generally a multi-purpose camera, and a reading head, a scanner, or the like other than the camera may be used.

(10) The read information "a '" of the authentication chip is digitized to obtain digital data "M'".

(11) The digital data "M '" is hashed to obtain a hash value "H'".

(12) The decrypted data "H" and the hash value "H'" are compared.

If they are the same, the combination of the authentication chip 192 and the authentication chip 195 is judged to be valid, and if they are not, the combination of the authentication chip 192 and the authentication chip 195 is judged to be invalid, i.e., the card is judged to be illegal. In this way, the authenticity of the authentication chip 192, that is, the authenticity of the card body 184 is verified by the authentication chip 195 which is present on the card together with the authentication chip 192.

In this embodiment, the hash value "H '" obtained by hashing the data "M '" read from the authentication chip 192 is compared with the hash value "H" obtained by decrypting the encrypted hash value "Ch" read from the authentication chip 195, but it may be configured to compare the encrypted hash value "Ch '" obtained by encrypting the hash value "H '" obtained by hashing the data "M '" read from the authentication chip 192 with the encrypted data "Ch" read from the authentication chip 195, in the opposite manner.

The encryption system, the method of using the encryption key, and the method of managing the encryption key used in this embodiment are the same as those in the above embodiments, and the description thereof will be omitted here.

The authentication information may not be read due to a broken or contaminated authentication chip. When this happens, even if the card is a legitimate card, it cannot be used. Next, a configuration for preventing this will be described.

< example 28>

Fig. 44 and 45 show a card authenticity proving example using a card ID as example 28. Fig. 44 shows a card, and fig. 45 shows a function of verifying the authenticity of the authentication chip by the authentication chip.

The card body 196 is provided with an Authentication chip 192 and an Authentication chip 197 in a structure inseparable from the card body, the Authentication chip 192 stores card Authentication information "a" (Authentication) such as an artifact measurement, and the Authentication chip 197 adds information such as a card ID to digitized data "M" (Message) of the Authentication information "a" as ID addition data "I", encrypts the ID addition data "I" to form encrypted data "Ci", and stores the encrypted data "Ci". The authentication chip 192 and the authentication chip 196 may be disposed at their respective positions as shown in the figure, or may be disposed adjacent to each other or integrally disposed.

Referring to fig. 45, the functions of the authentication chip 192 and the authentication chip 186 on the card body 196 shown in fig. 44 will be described. In this figure, (1) to (6) are descriptions of card creation by a card issuer, and (7) to (12) are descriptions of the case where a user uses a card for a terminal device such as an ATM.

The authenticity verification chips 192 having the artifact measurement are completely different because the artifact measurements are different from each other. In particular, artifact metrics with 3-dimensional configurations are not reproducible and cannot be forged.

(2) The information of the authentication chip 192 is read in an analog or digital manner. In order to correctly read the card, it is preferable to read the card after the authentication chip 192 is attached to the card 196.

(4) The digitized data "M" is added with data such as a card ID to obtain ID addition data "I".

(5) The ID appended data "I" is encrypted to obtain encrypted data "Ci". As the encryption system, a Secret-key encryption system (Secret-key encryption system) or a Public-key encryption system (Public-key encryption system) can be used.

(6) The encrypted data "Ci" is recorded/stored in the authentication chip 197 and is mounted in a structure inseparable from the card body 195. For recording/storing of encrypted data, suitable methods such as optical reading/recording methods such as bar codes and 2-dimensional bar codes, and magnetic recording can be used.

When the card 196 is an IC card having an IC chip mounted thereon, the encrypted data may be stored in the IC chip. As the inseparable structure, a method such as an integral structure or welding may be employed. In addition, the chip may not be mounted but may be recorded in the card itself.

(7) The encrypted data "Ci" stored in the authentication chip 197 is read when the card is used.

(8) The encrypted data "Ci" is decrypted using a prescribed encryption algorithm and encryption key to obtain decrypted data "I".

(9) At the same time, the information "a" of the authentication chip 192 is read. The reading device is generally a multi-purpose camera, and a reading head, a scanner, or the like may be used in addition to the camera.

(10) The read information "a '" of the authentication chip 192 is digitized to obtain digital data "M'".

(11) The digital data "M '" is added with data such as a card ID to obtain ID added data "I'".

(12) The decrypted data "I" and the ID additional data "I'" are compared. If they are the same, the combination of the authentication chip 192 and the authentication chip 197 is judged to be valid, and if they are not, the combination of the authentication chip 192 and the authentication chip 197 is judged to be invalid, that is, the card is judged to be illegal.

In this way, the authenticity of the authentication chip 192 is verified by the authentication chip 197 which is present on the card.

The data recorded in the authentication chip 197 is encrypted by adding an ID to data based on the information of the authentication chip 192. In order to confirm the validity of the authentication chip 192, it is necessary to add an ID to the data acquired from the authentication chip 197 before comparing the data. By keeping the ID secret, it is impossible for a person who does not know the ID to perform encryption and decryption to obtain the encryption key.

In this embodiment, the data "I '" obtained by digitizing the digital data "M '" obtained by reading the information "a '" from the authentication chip 192 and adding the card information is compared with the data "I" obtained by decrypting the encrypted data "Ci" read from the authentication chip 197. However, the digital data "M" obtained by removing the card information from the data "I" obtained by decrypting the data "Ci" read from the authentication chip 197 may be compared with the digital data "M '" obtained by digitizing the information "a'" read from the authentication chip 192.

The card having both the authentication chip and the authenticity proving chip is managed by the user. The authentication information to be encrypted is present in a bare state on the authentication chip, and the encrypted data of the authentication information is present on the authentication chip. In such a situation, when the card falls into the hands of a malicious person, or in the case where the user is a malicious person, the encryption is interpreted to cause the encryption key to leak. The following describes a configuration for avoiding this.

< example 30>

Fig. 46 and 47 show an example of authentication using an electronic watermark as example 30.

Fig. 46 shows a card, and fig. 47 shows a process of verifying the authenticity of the authentication chip by the authentication chip.

The card 198 is provided with an Authentication chip 192 and an Authentication chip 199 in a structure inseparable from the card body, the Authentication chip 192 stores card Authentication information "a" (Authentication) such as an artifact measurement, and the Authentication chip 199 adds an electronic watermark (Water Marking) to digitized data "M" (Message) of the Authentication information "a" as data "W" with an electronic watermark, encrypts the data "W" with an electronic watermark into encrypted data "Cw", and stores the encrypted data "Cw". The authentication chip 192 and the authentication chip 199 may be disposed at their respective positions as shown in the figure, or may be disposed adjacent to or integrally with each other.

Referring to fig. 47, the functions of the authentication chip 192 and the authentication chip 199 in the card body 198 shown in fig. 46 will be described. In the figure, (1) to (6) are descriptions of card creation by a card issuer, and (7) to (12) are descriptions of a case where a user uses a card for a terminal device such as an ATM.

The authenticity verification chips 192 having the artifact measurement are completely different because the artifact measurements are different from each other. In particular, the replication of artifact metrics with 3-dimensional configurations is not possible and thus cannot be forged.

(2) The information of the authentication chip 192 is read in an analog or digital manner. In order to correctly read the card, it is preferable to read the card after the authentication chip 192 is attached to the card 198.

(4) The digital data "M" is added with an electronic watermark to obtain data "W" with the electronic watermark.

(5) The data "W" with the electronic watermark is encrypted to obtain encrypted data "Cw".

(6) The encrypted data "Cw" is recorded/stored in the authentication chip 199 to be mounted in a structure inseparable from the card body 198. The encrypted data can be recorded/stored by an appropriate method such as an optical reading/recording method such as a barcode or a 2-dimensional barcode, or a magnetic recording method.

When the card body 198 is an IC card having an IC chip mounted thereon, the encrypted data may be stored in the IC chip. The inseparable structure may be an integral structure or may be formed by welding or the like. Further, the chip may not be mounted and may be recorded in the card itself.

(7) The encrypted data "Cw" stored in the authentication chip 199 is read when the card is used.

(8) The encrypted data "Cw" is decrypted using a prescribed encryption algorithm and encryption key to obtain decrypted data "W".

(9) At the same time, the information "a" of the authentication chip 192 is read. The reading device is generally a multi-purpose camera, but a reading head, a scanner, or the like may be used in addition to the camera.

(11) An electronic watermark is added to the digital data "M '" to obtain electronic watermark added data "W'".

(12) The decrypted data "W" is compared with the hash value "W'". If they are the same, the combination of the authentication chip 192 and the authentication chip 199 is judged to be valid, and if they are not, the combination of the authentication chip 192 and the authentication chip 199 is judged to be invalid.

In this way, the authenticity of the authentication chip 192 is verified by the authentication chip 199 which is present on the card.

The data recorded in the authentication chip 199 is data obtained by adding an electronic watermark to data based on the information of the authentication chip 192 and encrypting the data. In order to confirm the validity of the authentication chip 192, an electronic watermark needs to be added to the data acquired from the authentication chip 192 before data comparison. By keeping the electronic watermark secret, it is impossible for a person who does not know the electronic watermark to perform encryption and decryption to obtain the encryption key.

In this embodiment, the data "W '" obtained by digitizing the information "a '" read from the authentication chip 192 into the digital data "M '" and adding the electronic watermark is compared with the data "W" obtained by decrypting the encrypted data "Cw" read from the authentication chip 199. Conversely, the digital data "M" obtained by removing the card information from the data "W" obtained by decrypting the data "Cw" read by the authentication chip 199 may be compared with the digital data "M '" obtained by digitizing the information "a'" obtained from the authentication chip 192.

The encryption system, the method of using the encryption key, and the method of managing the encryption key used in this embodiment are the same as those described above, and further description thereof will be omitted.

The above-described example of the certification chip is a basic structure shown in example 28, and a hash algorithm is added in example 29, an ID of a card or the like is added in example 30, and an electronic watermark is added in example 31, thereby increasing the difficulty of forgery.

These addition techniques are not limited to the individual addition, but may be a combination of a plurality of techniques, that is, a combination of a hash algorithm and an ID of a card or the like, a combination of a hash algorithm and an electronic watermark, a combination of an ID of a card or the like and an electronic watermark, or a combination of a hash algorithm and an ID of a card or the like and an electronic watermark.

< example 31>

Fig. 48 shows an example of the authentication in example 31.

The embodiments of the present invention include the configurations of the authentication chips shown in examples 1 to 17, the configurations of the reading devices shown in examples 18 to 25, and the configurations of the determination methods shown in examples 26 to 30.

In the authentication certificates of the authentication chips described in examples 26 to 30, whether or not the authentication chip is legitimate is determined by comparing the read information of the authentication chip with the encrypted information of the authentication chip.

In this case, the information of the authentication chip is easily observed, but how the information is actually read and how the read information is determined needs to be kept secret.

Therefore, if information on the authenticity verification, such as the information on the authenticity verification and how to read the information, is stored in the authenticity proving chip in an encrypted manner, the authenticity verification can be more secure.

(1) Information on the authenticity certification information such as the type of the authenticity certification information and the arrangement of the authenticity certification information, and information on the reading of the wavelength of the light source used for the reading, etc. are encrypted and stored in the authenticity proving chip. The authentication chip may be any of the authentication chips described in examples 27 to 30.

(2) And reading and decrypting the information of the authenticity proving chip.

(3) The information on the authentication chip and the information read by the authentication chip are read out from the decrypted information.

(4) And reading the authenticity authentication chip by using the taken-out information.

(5) And comparing the read information of the authenticity certification chip with the authenticity certification chip information stored in the authenticity certification chip to judge the authenticity of the authenticity certification chip.

Information read by the authentication chip can be encrypted with a public key without requiring a large amount of data.

Industrial applicability of the invention

The card having the card identifier and the authenticity verification chip described above can be used for bank cash cards, credit cards, prepaid cards, point cards, securities, ID cards, access cards, certificates, and the like.

These can also be used for labels which lose their authentication force when removed, for example, manufacturer authentication labels which are inseparably attached to goods or the like, foot rings which are inseparably placed to protect animals or the like, and the like.

At this time, if the electronic signature is used, the signer cannot deny the signature content.

The above-described applications can be applied to an authentication chip other than a color chip, for example, an authentication chip based on an embossed hologram chip, a phosphor chip, or a radioactive substance chip.

Claims

1. An object to be authenticated for authentication, wherein an authentication chip including a structural color developing body that develops a structural color pattern that identifies an inherent unreproducible structural color pattern of the object is provided to the object so as to be inseparable from the object.

2. The authentication object according to claim 1, further comprising an inseparable authentication chip storing authentication information for authenticating the authentication chip.

3. The authentication object according to claim 2, wherein the authentication information is encrypted authentication information obtained by encrypting authentication information obtained based on the structural color pattern.

4. The authentication object according to claim 3, wherein the encrypted authentication information is encrypted hash authentication information obtained by encrypting a hash value of the authentication information obtained based on the structural color pattern.

5. The authentication object according to claim 3, wherein the encrypted authentication information is encrypted identification information obtained by encrypting identification information addition information obtained by adding identification information of the object to the authentication information, and the authentication information is added to the encrypted identification information.

6. The authentication object according to claim 3, wherein the encrypted authentication information is encrypted watermark-added authentication information obtained by encrypting watermark-added authentication information obtained by adding a watermark to the authentication information.

7. The authentication object according to claim 3, 4, 5, or 6, wherein the encrypted authentication information is encrypted using a common key of a common key system managed by an issuer of the authentication object.

8. The authentication object according to claim 3, 4, 5, or 6, wherein the encrypted authentication information is encrypted using a secret key of a public key system managed by an issuer of the authentication object.

9. The authentication object according to claim 3, 4, 5 or 6, wherein the encrypted authentication information is encrypted using a public key of a public key system managed by an issuer of the authentication object.

10. The authentication object according to claim 1, wherein the structural color developing body is a light-transmitting resin mixed with a structural color sheet.

11. The authentication object according to claim 1, wherein the structural color developing body is a light-transmitting resin film having a non-uniform thickness.

12. The authentication object according to claim 1, wherein the structural color developing body is a dispersed light-transmissive resin droplet.

13. The authentication object according to claim 1, wherein the structural color developing body is a light-transmitting resin having a non-uniform thickness, and the light-transmitting resin is dispersed in pits having a uniform depth formed in the authentication chip.

14. The authentication object according to claim 1, wherein the structural color developing bodies are light-transmitting resins dispersed in pits formed in the authentication chip and having different depths.

15. The authentication object according to claim 1, wherein the structural color developing body is a light-transmitting resin filled in pits regularly formed in the authentication chip and having a uniform depth, based on a 4-ary random number.

16. The authentication object according to claim 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 or 15, wherein the authentication chip has a hard cover member such as glass for protecting the authentication chip.

17. The authentication object according to claim 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 or 15, wherein an upper surface of the card substrate with which the authentication chip is in contact is light-absorbing black.

18. The object of claim 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 or 15, wherein a surface of the light-transmissive resin is subjected to a matte finish.

19. The object of claim 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 or 15, wherein an antireflection film is formed on the light-transmissive resin.

20. The authentication object according to claim 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 or 15, wherein the authentication chip is a portion cut out from a large original plate.

21. An authentication chip reading device for reading an authentication chip having a structural color pattern attached to an object to be authenticated, the authentication chip reading device comprising: a white light emitting diode for illuminating the authenticity verification chip, and a color camera for photographing the illuminated authenticity verification chip.

22. An authentication chip reading device for reading an authentication chip having a structural color pattern attached to an object to be authenticated, the authentication chip reading device comprising: a red light emitting diode, a green light emitting diode, and a blue light emitting diode for illuminating the authentication chip, and a color camera for photographing the illuminated authentication chip.

23. An authentication chip reading device for reading an authentication chip having a structural color pattern attached to an object to be authenticated, the authentication chip reading device comprising: a red light emitting diode, a green light emitting diode, and a blue light emitting diode for illuminating the authenticity verification chip in sequence, and a black-and-white camera for photographing the illuminated authenticity verification chip in sequence.

24. An authentication chip reading device for reading an authentication chip having a structural color pattern attached to an object to be authenticated, the authentication chip reading device comprising: and a matrix of light receiving and emitting elements having the same area as the authenticity verification chip.

25. An authentication chip reading device for reading an authentication chip having a structural color pattern attached to an object to be authenticated, the authentication chip reading device comprising: a moving mechanism of the authenticity verification chip, and a light receiving and emitting element array having the same width as the authenticity verification chip.

26. An authentication chip reading device for reading an authentication chip having a structural color pattern attached to an object to be authenticated, the authentication chip reading device comprising: a moving mechanism of the authenticity verification chip, and a light receiving and emitting element movable in a width direction of the authenticity verification chip.

27. An authentication chip reading device for reading an authentication chip having a structural color pattern attached to an object to be authenticated, the authentication chip reading device comprising: the authentication chip includes a moving mechanism of the authentication chip, a parabolic cylindrical reflecting mirror, a polygon mirror, and an incident light receiving and emitting element, wherein a rotation axis of the polygon mirror is disposed at a focal point of the reflecting mirror, and the light receiving and emitting element is disposed behind the reflecting mirror.

28. The structural color pattern reading apparatus according to claim 27, wherein the paraboloid is a full paraboloid, a light passing hole is formed in a center of the reflector, and the light receiving and emitting element is disposed behind the reflector.

29. The constructed color pattern read device of claim 27, wherein said paraboloid is a half paraboloid.

30. The structural color pattern reading apparatus of claim 27, wherein the paraboloid is a paraboloid smaller than a half paraboloid, and the polygon mirrors are disposed in an offset manner.

31. A structural color pattern reading method is a method for reading a structural color pattern of an authenticity certification chip, wherein the structural color pattern reading method comprises the following steps:

dividing the structural color pattern surface of the authenticity identification chip into a plurality of surfaces,

each of the plurality of surfaces is further divided into a plurality of surfaces,

the division is repeated and the result is,

the structural colors of the divided surfaces are detected,

and judging the pattern surface of the structural color through the detected structural color.

32. A method for determining authenticity, wherein,

in order to create an object to be authenticated,

an authentication chip storing authentication information which cannot be copied is created,

the authenticity certification information of the authenticity certification chip is read,

digitizing the authenticity certification information to obtain digital authenticity certification information,

encrypting the digital authentication information to obtain encrypted digital authentication information,

storing the encrypted digital authenticity certification information in an authenticity proving chip,

in order to determine the authenticity of the authentication object,

reading the encrypted digital authenticity certification information stored in the authenticity proving chip,

decrypting the encrypted digital authentication information to obtain decrypted digital authentication information,

reading the authenticity certification information of the authenticity certification chip,

digitalizing the authenticity certification information to obtain digital authenticity certification information,

comparing the digital authentication information with the decrypted digital authentication information,

thereby, the authenticity of the authentication object is determined.

33. A method for determining authenticity, wherein,

in order to create an object to be authenticated,

the authentication information is digitized as digital authentication information,

the digital authentication information is hashed to obtain hashed authentication information,

encrypting the hash authenticity certification information to obtain encrypted hash authenticity certification information,

storing the encrypted hash authenticity certification information in an authenticity proving chip,

in order to determine the authenticity of the authentication object,

reading the encrypted hash authenticity certification information stored in the authenticity certification chip,

decrypting the encrypted hash authenticity certification information to obtain decrypted hash authenticity certification information,

comparing the hash authenticity certification information with the decrypted hash authenticity certification information,

thereby, the authenticity of the authentication object is determined.

34. A method for determining authenticity, wherein,

in order to create an object to be authenticated,

adding authentication information to the digital authentication information and the object identification information to obtain object identification information,

the object identification information is encrypted with the authentication information to obtain encrypted object identification information with the authentication information,

the authentication information added to the identification information of the encrypted object is stored in the authenticity proving chip,

in order to determine the authenticity of the authentication object,

reading the encrypted object identification information stored in the authentication chip and adding authentication information,

the authentication information added to the identification information of the encrypted object is decrypted to obtain the identification information of the decrypted object and the authentication information added thereto,

the authentication information is added to the decryption object identification information to obtain decryption authenticity authentication information,

comparing the digital authentication information with the decrypted authentication information,

thereby, the authenticity of the authentication object is determined.

35. A method for determining authenticity, wherein,

in order to create an object to be authenticated,

in order to determine the authenticity of the authentication object,

the encrypted object identification information and authentication information are decrypted to obtain decrypted object identification information and authentication information,

comparing the authentication information added to the object identification information with the authentication information added to the object identification information to be decrypted,

thereby, the authenticity of the authentication object is determined.

36. A method for determining authenticity, wherein,

in order to create an object to be authenticated,

adding watermark to the digital authenticity certification information to obtain watermark-added digital authenticity certification information,

encrypting the watermark-attached digital authenticity authentication information to obtain encrypted watermark-attached digital authenticity authentication information,

the encrypted watermark and the digital authenticity certification information are stored in an authenticity proving chip,

in order to determine the authenticity of the authentication object,

reading the encrypted watermark and the digital authenticity certification information stored in the authenticity proving chip,

decrypting the encrypted watermark and appended digital authenticity certification information to obtain decrypted watermark and appended digital authenticity certification information,

removing the watermark from the decrypted watermark and the digital authenticity certification information to obtain decrypted digital authenticity certification information,

digitizing the read authenticity certification information to obtain digital authenticity certification information,

thereby, the authenticity of the authentication object is determined.

37. A method for determining authenticity, wherein,

in order to create an object to be authenticated,

in order to determine the authenticity of the authentication object,

comparing the watermark-appended digital authenticity authentication information with the decrypted watermark-appended digital authenticity information,

thereby, the authenticity of the authentication object is determined.