Opinion: Gofman’s Mossad appointment poses major challenges to Israeli Intelligence
June 19, 2026 8 Comments
The Appointment Process
On 4 December 2025, Netanyahu announced his decision to appoint Gofman as the next director of the Mossad. At that time, Gofman was serving as Netanyahu’s military secretary. Gofman was selected to replace outgoing Mossad Director David Barnea, whose five-year term was scheduled to end in June 2026.
The choice was notable because Gofman came from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) rather than from within the Mossad itself. Reports indicate that Netanyahu bypassed Mossad’s existing leadership, including candidates reportedly favored by outgoing director David Barnea, in selecting Gofman.
Following the announcement, Israeli law required the Advisory Committee for Senior Appointments to review senior security appointments. Chaired by former Supreme Court President Asher Grunis, the committee examined Gofman’s candidacy and approved it in April 2026. After /approval, Netanyahu signed the appointment documents.
Nevertheless, the Committee’s approval did not resolve all disagreements. Gofman’s nomination soon became the subject of legal challenges before Israel’s High Court of Justice. Only after the Court rejected petitions seeking to block the appointment was Gofman able to assume office as Mossad Director in June 2026.
Why Netanyahu Chose Gofman
Supporters of Gofman’s appointment emphasized that, following the outbreak of the Israel-Gaza War in October 2023, Gofman brought extensive military experience and was closely involved in national security decision-making. Netanyahu’s office highlighted Gofman’s wartime operational leadership, his service as military secretary, and his coordination with intelligence agencies, including Mossad. Supporters also emphasized Gofman’s reputation as an unconventional and creative commander. During his military career, Gofman commanded armored formations, led operational units on Israel’s northern and southern fronts, and was wounded while fighting Hamas militants during the attacks of 7 October 2023. His supporters argued that the post-October 7 security environment required fresh thinking and leadership from outside traditional intelligence circles.
Lack of Intelligence Background
The most common criticism of Gofman’s appointment concerned his professional background. Unlike most recent Mossad directors, Gofman had spent his career in the military rather than in intelligence operations. Critics argued that running a global espionage organization requires skills and experience different from those needed to command military units. Several commentators noted that he would be among the few Mossad chiefs appointed without a substantial career in the intelligence service. Supporters countered that the Mossad has historically benefited from leaders with diverse backgrounds and that strategic leadership skills can be transferable across intelligence organizations. His critics emphasize his lack of experience, as four days after his appointment he fired the No. 2 at the Mossad, who had strong credentials and successful experience at the agency. It looks like more senior officials at Mossad may leave the agency, as they are not satisfied with Gofman’s nomination.
Allegations of Political Loyalty
Another major point of contention is Gofman’s close relationship with Netanyahu. As the prime minister’s military secretary, Gofman worked directly alongside Netanyahu and was regarded as a trusted adviser. Some observers stated that his appointment was based on personal loyalty rather than solely on professional considerations, and noted that Netanyahu bypassed candidates favored by the outgoing Mossad leadership.
Some warned that intelligence chiefs should provide independent assessments to political leaders, even when those assessments are unwelcome. Gofman’s nomination was included in a broader discussion about political influence over Israel’s security institutions.
The “Minor Informant” Affair and Legal Challenges
A further complication emerged during scrutiny of Gofman’s tenure as an IDF commander. Critics questioned his involvement in a controversial military operation that used a minor in a sensitive information campaign. This became a focal point during the vetting process and was cited by those challenging his appointment.
Although the advisory committee approved his nomination, the issue caused delays. It also provided grounds for legal petitions.
Gofman’s nomination faced formal legal challenges before the High Court of Justice in Israel. Petitioners argued that aspects of Goffman’s conduct and the appointment process raised concerns regarding standards expected of senior public officials. The litigation delayed the completion of the appointment process and prolonged public debate about the nomination. Ultimately, the High Court rejected the petitions and allowed the appointment to proceed.
Conclusion
Roman Gofman’s appointment as Mossad director illustrates the tensions that frequently accompany senior security appointments in Israel. On the one hand, supporters viewed him as a highly capable commander whose operational experience, creativity, and wartime service made him well-suited to lead the country’s foreign intelligence service. On the other hand, critics questioned his lack of intelligence experience, his close association with Prime Minister Netanyahu, and controversies stemming from allegations of lapses in decision-making and command disputes during his military career.
Despite these challenges, Gofman ultimately secured approval from both the Advisory Committee for Senior Appointments and the High Court of Justice, allowing him to assume leadership of the Mossad in June 2026. His performance as director will be subject to close scrutiny.
► Author: Avner Barnea* | Date: 19 June 2026 | Permalink
* Dr. Avner Barnea is a research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).
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US spy agencies resisting White House plan to create master list of espionage threats
July 1, 2026 by Joseph Fitsanakis Leave a comment
Citing “people familiar with the matter”, the Times said on Monday that the effort to create a master list of foreign spies and Americans who are spying on behalf of foreign intelligence services is being led by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The agency has asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI to provide the names of all individuals who have been found to engage in espionage and are being watched by the Bureau. Likewise, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been asked to provide names of foreign espionage operatives that populate its lists of potential assets—foreign spies who may in time be turned by the CIA.
The master list of spies would potentially allow the entirety of the United States Intelligence Community (IC) to monitor the global activities of these espionage operatives and share information about them in real time. Additionally, the existence of such a list would in theory prevent operational duplication and help deconfliction within the IC when it comes to counterintelligence efforts. The central idea behind the master list dates to National Security Presidential Memorandum – 7, a directive issued by President Donald Trump in October 2017, during his first term in office.
However, senior counterintelligence officials are reportedly concerned that giving the ODNI full access to such a comprehensive master list of espionage threat actors could potentially compromise the integrity of counterintelligence operations. Information about espionage operatives and assets—both current and prospective—is usually protected behind several layers of classification and compartmentalization that shield it even within individual intelligence agencies. Additionally, some of the information relating to these individuals is acquired through counterintelligence activities authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and is thus subject to tight restrictions.
At a deeper level, the resistance of senior counterintelligence officials to surrender sensitive information about espionage to the ODNI reflects years of mutual suspicion and turf wars within the IC. According to the Times, these officials have yet to agree about how such a master list would be constructed, what information it would contain, who should have access to it, and how it should be maintained and updated.
► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 1 July 2026 | Permalink
Filed under Expert news and commentary on intelligence, espionage, spies and spying Tagged with counterintelligence, espionage, intelligence sharing, News, ODNI, turf wars, United States