Information Processing

 Caption: NSA Director Rogers describes to Congress how little privacy Americans have from government surveillance. 

I believe that if the full story is told about Obama-era political spying, Admiral Mike Rogers (former head of NSA) will emerge as a hero. Sources say Rogers has been cooperating with the ongoing Durham investigation. Look for significant developments in the case as we approach the 2020 election...

Below is a Rogers timeline covering illegal spying using NSA data. This illegal use of data is a matter of record -- undisputed, but also largely unreported. The FISC (FISA court) report on this illegal use of data appeared in April 2017; the author is Rosemary Collyer, the head FISA judge. The report was originally classified Top Secret but was later declassified and released with redactions. Collyer uses the phrase "institutional lack of candor" when referring to behavior of federal agencies in their dealings with FISC over this issue.

Just this week, Collyer ordered the FBI to report on its abuse of FISA in surveillance of the Trump campaign, as documented in the Horowitz DOJ IG report.

More background on the earlier abuses here:

The court learned in October 2016 that analysts ... were conducting prohibited database searches “with much greater frequency than had previously been disclosed to the court.” The forbidden queries were searches of Upstream Data using US-person identifiers. The report makes clear that as of early 2017 NSA Inspector General did not even have a good handle on all the ways that improper queries could be made to the system.

Timeline:

November 2015-April 2016 – The FBI and DOJ’s National Security Division (NSD) uses private contractors to access raw FISA information using “To” and “From” FISA-702(16) & “About” FISA-702(17) queries.

February 2016 NYT reports: Obama Administration Set to Expand Sharing of Data That N.S.A. Intercepts "The new system would permit analysts at other intelligence agencies to obtain direct access to raw information from the N.S.A.’s surveillance to evaluate for themselves."

March 2016 – NSA Director Rogers becomes aware of improper access to raw FISA data.

April 2016 – Rogers orders the NSA compliance officer to run a full audit on 702 NSA compliance.

April 18 2016 – Rogers shuts down FBI/NSD contractor access to the FISA Search System.

Mid-October 2016 – DNI Clapper submits a recommendation to the White House that Director Rogers be removed from the NSA.

October 20 2016 – Rogers is briefed by the NSA compliance officer on the Section 702 NSA compliance audit and “About” query violations.

October 21 2016 – Rogers shuts down all “About Query” activity. Rogers reports the activity to DOJ and prepares to go before the FISA Court.

October 21 2016 – DOJ & FBI seek and receive a Title I FISA probable cause order authorizing electronic surveillance on Carter Page from the FISC. At this point, the FISA Court is unaware of the Section 702 violations.

October 24 2016 – Rogers verbally informs the FISA Court of Section 702(17) violations.

October 26 2016 – Rogers formally informs the FISA Court of 702(17) violations in writing.

November 17 2016 (morning) – Rogers travels to meet President-Elect Trump and his Transition Team in Trump Tower. Rogers does not inform DNI James Clapper.

November 17 2016 (evening) – Trump Transition Team announces they are moving all transition activity to Trump National Golf Club in New Jersey.

Parts of the timeline are from this 2018 article, which contains much more background. However, note that the events listed above are almost entirely a matter of public record now.

The 2017 FISC report does not reveal the exact nature of the abuses of NSA surveillance data, only that the abuses occurred, and in large volume. However, Rogers' behavior suggests very strongly that some of the abuses involved spying on political opposition.

Key issues:

Who were the FBI/DOJ contractors making the illegal queries? (Fusion GPS? Opposition research firms?)

Note that Upstream Data includes intercepts from the internet backbone -- essentially ALL of our communications pass through such channels and are potentially stored at NSA data centers.

Did FBI seek the Carter Page FISA warrant because earlier (illegal) access to NSA data was interrupted by Rogers?

What did Rogers reveal to the Trump transition team that caused them to move operations from Trump Tower to a golf course in New Jersey?

FBI had access not just to ongoing communications, but stored past communications (within "two hops") of Carter Page and other Trump campaign staff. They must have known very early on (it is suggested, by early 2017) that there was no Russian collusion. So what was the purpose of the Mueller investigation?

I believe Durham's investigation will be able to address many of these questions, although results may be classified and not shared with the public.

More fun facts: (Note I've always thought NSA the most competent and least political among CIA, FBI, NSA.)

James Clapper was the architect of the Russia Report – Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections. It was used to push the entire Russia Narrative...

The report was technically created by a joint effort between the CIA (former Director John Brennan), FBI (former Director James Comey) and the NSA (current Director Mike Rogers) – and assembled by the DNI (former Director James Clapper).

The joint report contains one significant caveat:

CIA and FBI have high confidence in this judgment; NSA has only moderate confidence.

Rogers stated in Senate hearing testimony that his confidence did not reach even this threshold: "I wouldn’t call it a discrepancy, I’d call it an honest difference of opinion between three different organizations and in the end I made that call.…It didn’t have the same level of sourcing and the same level of multiple sources."

Bongino (former federal agent and TV/podcast personality) gives a very clear and entertaining overview of Spygate: the illegal use of government surveillance powers against an opposition political candidate (Donald Trump). I agree with Bongino that this is the biggest political scandal in the modern era, orders of magnitude beyond Watergate. But because the story is complicated and has been largely covered up (as much as possible) by the media, few people understand what actually happened. You can get the gist of it in 20 minutes from the video. (Real content starts @6min or so.)

As Bongino states, the factual claims in his talk can all be sourced from reporting by "mainstream" news outlets such as CNN, NYTimes, WSJ, or from government documents such as the declassified (2017) FISC report on abuses of surveillance powers. But you will not find them all in one place as you do in the video (or on my blog).

See Deep State Update (May 2018):

It's been clear for well over a year now that the Obama DOJ-FBI-CIA used massive surveillance powers (FISA warrant, and before that, national security letters and illegal contractor access to intelligence data) against the Trump campaign. In addition to SIGINT (signals intelligence, such as email or phone intercepts), we now know that HUMINT (spies, informants) was also used.

Until recently one could still be called a conspiracy theorist by the clueless for stating the facts in the paragraph above. But a few days ago the NYTimes and WaPo finally gave up (in an effort to shape the narrative in advance of DOJ Inspector General report(s) and other document releases that are imminent) and admitted that all of these things actually happened. The justification advanced by the lying press is that this was all motivated by fear of Russian interference -- there was no partisan political motivation for the Obama administration to investigate the opposition party during a presidential election.

If the Times and Post were dead wrong a year ago, what makes you think they are correct now?

It's been clear for well over a year now that the Obama DOJ-FBI-CIA used massive surveillance powers (FISA warrant, and before that, national security letters and illegal contractor access to intelligence data) against the Trump campaign. In addition to SIGINT (signals intelligence, such as email or phone intercepts), we now know that HUMINT (spies, informants) was also used.

Until recently one could still be called a conspiracy theorist by the clueless for stating the facts in the paragraph above. But a few days ago the NYTimes and WaPo finally gave up (in an effort to shape the narrative in advance of DOJ Inspector General report(s) and other document releases that are imminent) and admitted that all of these things actually happened. The justification advanced by the lying press is that this was all motivated by fear of Russian interference -- there was no partisan political motivation for the Obama administration to investigate the opposition party during a presidential election.

If the Times and Post were dead wrong a year ago, what makes you think they are correct now?

Here are the two recent NYTimes propaganda articles:

F.B.I. Used Informant to Investigate Russia Ties to Campaign, Not to Spy, as Trump Claims

Code Name Crossfire Hurricane: The Secret Origins of the Trump Investigation

Don't believe in the Deep State? Here is a 1983 Times article about dirty tricks HUMINT spook Stefan Halper (he's the CIA-FBI informant described in the recent articles above). Much more at the left of center Intercept.

Why doesn't Trump just fire Sessions/Rosenstein/Mueller or declassify all the docs?

For example, declassifying the first FISA application would show, as claimed by people like Chuck Grassley and Trey Gowdy, who have read the unredacted original, that it largely depends on the fake Steele Dossier, and that the application failed to conform to the required Woods procedures.

The reason for Trump's restraint is still not widely understood. There is and has always been strong GOP opposition to his candidacy and presidency ("Never Trumpers"). The anti-Trump, pro-immigration wing of his party would likely support impeachment under the right conditions. To their ends, the Mueller probe keeps Trump weak enough that he will do their bidding (lower taxes, help corporations and super-wealthy oligarchs) without straying too far from the bipartisan globalist agenda (pro-immigration, anti-nativism, anti-nationalism). If Trump were to push back too hard on the Deep State conspiracy against him, he would risk attack from his own party.

I believe Trump's strategy is to let the DOJ Inspector General process work its way through this mess -- there are several more reports coming, including one on the Hillary email investigation (draft available for DOJ review now; will be public in a few weeks), and another on FISA abuse and surveillance of the Trump campaign. The OIG is working with a DOJ prosecutor (John Huber, Utah) on criminal referrals emerging from the investigation. Former Comey deputy Andrew McCabe has already been referred for possible criminal charges due to the first OIG report. I predict more criminal referrals of senior DOJ/FBI figures in the coming months. Perhaps they will even get to former CIA Director Brennan (pictured at top), who seems to have lied under oath about his knowledge of the Steele dossier.

Trump may be saving his gunpowder for later, and if he has to expend some, it will be closer to the midterm elections in the fall.


Note added: For those who are not tracking this closely, one of the reasons the Halper story is problematic for the bad guys is explained in The Intercept:

... the New York Times reported in December of last year that the FBI investigation into possible ties between the Trump campaign and Russia began when George Papadopoulos drunkenly boasted to an Australian diplomat about Russian dirt on Hillary Clinton. It was the disclosure of this episode by the Australians that “led the F.B.I. to open an investigation in July 2016 into Russia’s attempts to disrupt the election and whether any of President Trump’s associates conspired,” the NYT claimed.

But it now seems clear that Halper’s attempts to gather information for the FBI began before that. “The professor’s interactions with Trump advisers began a few weeks before the opening of the investigation, when Page met the professor at the British symposium,” the Post reported. While it’s not rare for the FBI to gather information before formally opening an investigation, Halper’s earlier snooping does call into question the accuracy of the NYT’s claim that it was the drunken Papadopoulos ramblings that first prompted the FBI’s interest in these possible connections. And it suggests that CIA operatives, apparently working with at least some factions within the FBI, were trying to gather information about the Trump campaign earlier than had been previously reported.

Hmm.. so what made CIA/FBI assign Halper to probe Trump campaign staffers in the first place? It seems the cover story for the start of the anti-Trump investigation needs some reformulation...

Anyone who is paying attention knows that the Obama FBI/DOJ used massive government surveillance powers against the Trump team during and after the election. A FISA warrant on Carter Page (and Manafort and others?) was likely used to mine stored communications of other Trump team members. Hundreds of "mysterious" unmasking requests by Susan Rice, Samantha Powers, etc. were probably used to identify US individuals captured in this data.

I think it's entirely possible that Obama et al. thought they were doing the right (moral, patriotic) thing -- they really thought that Trump might be colluding with the Russians. But as a civil libertarian and rule of law kind of guy I want to see it all come to light. I have been against this kind of thing since GWB was president -- see this post from 2005!

My guess is that NSA is intercepting and storing big chunks of, perhaps almost all, US email traffic. They're getting almost all metadata from email and phone traffic, possibly much of the actual voice traffic converted to text using voice recognition. This used to be searchable only by a limited number of NSA people (although that number grew a lot over the years; see 2013 article and LOVEINT below), but now available to many different "intel" agencies in the government thanks to Obama.

Situation in 2013: https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=207195207

(Note Title 1 FISA warrant grants capability to look at all associates of target... like the whole Trump team.)

Obama changes in 2016: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/us/politics/obama-administration-set-to-expand-sharing-of-data-that-nsa-intercepts.html

NYT: "The new system would permit analysts at other intelligence agencies to obtain direct access to raw information from the N.S.A.’s surveillance to evaluate for themselves. If they pull out phone calls or email to use for their own agency’s work, they would apply the privacy protections masking innocent Americans’ information... ” HA HA HA I guess that's what all the UNmasking was about...

More on NSA capabilities: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LOVEINT (think how broad their coverage has to be for spooks to be able to spy on their wife or girlfriend)

See also FISA, EO 12333, Bulk Collection, and All That.

Wikipedia: William Edward Binney[3] is a former highly placed intelligence official with the United States National Security Agency (NSA)[4] turned whistleblower who resigned on October 31, 2001, after more than 30 years with the agency.

He was a high-profile critic of his former employers during the George W. Bush administration, and later criticized the NSA's data collection policies during the Barack Obama administration. 

From the transcript of Binney's talk:

07:45
ways that they basically collect data
07:48
first it's they use the corporations
07:50
that run the fiber-optic lines and they
07:53
get them to allow them to put taps on
07:55
them and I'll show you some of the taps
07:57
where they are and and if that doesn't
07:59
work they use the foreign government to
08:00
go at their own telecommunications
08:02
companies to do the similar thing and if
08:04
that doesn't work they'll tap the line
08:06
anywhere they can get to it and they
08:08
won't even know it you know the
08:09
government's know that communications
08:11
companies will even though they're
08:12
tapped so that's how they get into it
08:14
then I get into fiber lines and this is
08:17
this is a the prism program ...

that was published
08:30
out of the Snowden material and they've
08:32
all focused on prism well prism is
08:36
really the the minor program I mean the
08:40
major program is upstream that's where
08:42
they have the fiber-optic taps on
08:43
hundreds of places around in the world
08:45
that's where they're collecting off the
08:47
fiber lined all the data and storing it

2016 FISC reprimand of Obama administration. The court learned in October 2016 that analysts at the National Security Agency were conducting prohibited database searches “with much greater frequency than had previously been disclosed to the court.” The forbidden queries were searches of Upstream Data using US-person identifiers. The report makes clear that as of early 2017 NSA Inspector General did not even have a good handle on all the ways that improper queries could be made to the system. (Imagine Snowden-like sys admins with a variety of tools that can be used to access raw data.) Proposed remedies to the situation circa-2016/17 do not inspire confidence (please read the FISC document).

I hope this scandal will focus additional attention on massive bulk collection and preservation of private communications of US citizens by NSA.

Media discussion continues to focus on "unmasking" = dissemination of identities of US individuals. However, I have yet to see discussion of whether someone like Rice could order specific database searches (e.g., by NSA, of preserved records) on a specific individual to acquire intercepts such as voice transcripts, emails, etc. It doesn't seem to become an unmasking until that information is distributed in the form of an intelligence report (or, is such a request automatically an unmasking?). The search results alone constitute an invasion of individual privacy. It is unclear to me who has access to such results, and under what conditions the searches can be requested. There are well known instances of NSA employees abusing these powers: see LOVEINT. Could the White House order something similar without a record trail? (See excerpt added below.)

Bloomberg: Susan Rice Sought Names in Trump Intel, Says Eli Lake

Former national security adviser Susan Rice made multiple requests for the identities of people connected to the transition team of Donald Trump contained in raw intelligence reports, according to U.S. officials familiar with the matter. Bloomberg View columnist Eli Lake has the details.

From Nunes, Trump, Obama and Who Watches the Watchers?, this is the legal standard that the Susan Rice unmaskings will be judged by:

Section VI: ... An IC element may disseminate U.S. person information "derived solely from raw SIGINT" under these procedures ... if ... the information is “necessary to understand the foreign intelligence or counterintelligence information,”

Richard Haas notes that this kind of activity on the part of Susan Rice and NSC staff is only justifiable under "extraordinary circumstances"!



Added (from comments):

The Observer: ... In addition, Rice didn’t like to play by the rules, including the top-secret ones. On multiple occasions, she asked the NSA to do things they regarded as unethical and perhaps illegal. When she was turned down — the NSA fears breaking laws for any White House, since they know they will be left holding the bag in the end — Rice kept pushing.

As a longtime NSA official who experienced Rice’s wrath more than once told me, “We tried to tell her to pound sand on some things, but it wasn’t allowed—we were always overruled.” On multiple occasions, Rice got top Agency leadership to approve things which NSA personnel on the front end of the spy business refused. This means there may be something Congress and the FBI need to investigate here.

...

John Schindler is a security expert and former National Security Agency analyst and counterintelligence officer. A specialist in espionage and terrorism, he’s also been a Navy officer and a War College professor. He’s published four books and is on Twitter at @20committee.

Some basic questions for the experts:

1. To what extent does EO12333 allow surveillance of US individuals without FISA warrant?

2. To what extent are US voice conversations recorded via bulk collection (and preserved for, e.g., 5 or more years)? The email answer is clear ... But now automated voice recognition and transcription make storage of voice conversations much more scalable.

3. To what extent do Five Eyes intel collaborators have direct access to preserved data?

4. Are "experts" and media pundits and Senators even asking the right questions on this topic? For example, can stored bulk-collected voice data from a US individual be accessed by NSA without FISA approval by invoking 12333? How can one prevent a search query on stored data from producing results of this type?

See, e.g., Overseas Surveillance in an Interconnected World (Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law), ACLU.org, and Executive Order 12333 (epic.org):

EPIC has tracked the government's reliance on EO 12333, particularly the reliance on Section 1:12(b)(13), which authorizes the NSA to provide "such administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions described in sections (1) through (12) above, including procurement." This provision appears to have opened the door for the NSA's broad and unwarranted surveillance of U.S. and foreign citizens.

Executive Order 12333 was signed by President Ronald Reagan on December 4, 1981. It established broad new surveillance authorities for the intelligence community, outside the scope of public law. EO 12333 has been amended three times. It was amended by EO 13284 on January 23, 2003 and was then amended by EO 13555 on August 27, 2004. EO 13555 was subtitled "Strengthened Management of the Intelligence Community" and reflected the fact that the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) now existed as the head of the intelligence community, rather than the CIA which had previously served as the titular head of the IC. EO 13555 partially supplemented and superseded EO 12333. On July 30, 2008, President George W. Bush signed EO 13470, which further supplemented and superseded EO 12333 to strengthen the role of the Director of National Intelligence.

Since the Snowden revaluations there has been a great deal of discussion regarding the activities of the IC community, but relatively little attention has been paid to EO 12333. EO 12333 often serves an alternate basis of authority for surveillance activities, above and beyond Section 215 and 702. As Bruce Schneier has emphasized, "Be careful when someone from the intelligence community uses the caveat "not under this program," or "not under this authority"; almost certainly it means that whatever it is they're denying is done under some other program or authority. So when[NSA General Counsel Raj] De said that companies knew about NSA collection under Section 702, it doesn't mean they knew about the other collection programs." Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, has said in August 2013 that, "The committee does not receive the same number of official reports on other NSA surveillance activities directed abroad that are conducted pursuant to legal authorities outside of FISA (specifically Executive Order 12333), but I intend to add to the committee's focus on those activities." In July 2014, a former Obama State Department official, John Napier Tye, wrote an Op-Ed in the Washington Post calling for greater scrutiny of EO 12333. Tye noted that "based in part on classified facts that I am prohibited by law from publishing, I believe that Americans should be even more concerned about the collection and storage of their communications under Executive Order 12333 than under Section 215."

Tye in the WaPo:

... [EO 12333] authorizes collection of the content of communications, not just metadata, even for U.S. persons. Such persons cannot be individually targeted under 12333 without a court order. However, if the contents of a U.S. person’s communications are “incidentally” collected (an NSA term of art) in the course of a lawful overseas foreign intelligence investigation, then Section 2.3(c) of the executive order explicitly authorizes their retention. It does not require that the affected U.S. persons be suspected of wrongdoing and places no limits on the volume of communications by U.S. persons that may be collected and retained.

[ E.g., NSA could "incidentally" retain the email of a US individual which happens to be mirrored in Google or Yahoo data centers outside the US, as part of bulk collection for an ongoing (never ending) foreign intelligence or anti-terrorism investigation... ]

“Incidental” collection may sound insignificant, but it is a legal loophole that can be stretched very wide. Remember that the NSA is building a data center in Utah five times the size of the U.S. Capitol building, with its own power plant that will reportedly burn $40 million a year in electricity.

See also Mining your data at NSA (source of image at top).

UPDATE: EO12333 + Obama OKs unprecedented sharing of this info as he leaves office = recent leaks? Note the use of the term "incidentally" and the wide dissemination (thanks to Obama policy change as he left office).

WSJ: ... “I recently confirmed that on numerous occasions the intelligence community incidentally collected information about U.S. citizens involved in the Trump transition,” Mr. Nunes said, reading a brief statement to reporters on Capitol Hill on Wednesday afternoon. “Details about U.S. persons associated with the incoming administration—details with little or no apparent foreign intelligence value—were widely disseminated in intelligence community reporting.”

... Mr. Nunes added that it was “possible” the president himself had some of his communication intercepted, and has asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Agency and other intelligence agencies for more information.

The change put in place as Obama left office is probably behind the large number of circulating reports that feature "incidentally" captured communications of the Trump team. The NYTimes article below is from February.

NYTimes: ... Until now, National Security Agency analysts have filtered the surveillance information for the rest of the government. They search and evaluate the information and pass only the portions of phone calls or email that they decide is pertinent on to colleagues at the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies. And before doing so, the N.S.A. takes steps to mask the names and any irrelevant information about innocent Americans.

The new system would permit analysts at other intelligence agencies to obtain direct access to raw information from the N.S.A.’s surveillance to evaluate for themselves. If they pull out phone calls or email to use for their own agency’s work, they would apply the privacy protections masking innocent Americans’ information — a process known as “minimization” — at that stage, Mr. Litt said.

... FISA covers a narrow band of surveillance: the collection of domestic or international communications from a wire on American soil, leaving most of what the N.S.A. does uncovered. In the absence of statutory regulation, the agency’s other surveillance programs are governed by rules the White House sets under a Reagan-era directive called Executive Order 12333.

... [it is unclear what] rules say about searching the raw data using names or keywords intended to bring up Americans’ phone calls or email that the security agency gathered “incidentally” under the 12333 surveillance programs ...

It appears that the number of individuals allowed to search bulk, incidentally collected data has been enlarged significantly. Who watches these watchers? (There must now be many thousands...)

Sophos: ... Patrick Toomey, a lawyer for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), put it in an interview with the New York Times, 17 intelligence agencies are now going to be “rooting… through Americans’ emails with family members, friends and colleagues, all without ever obtaining a warrant”.

The new rules mean that the FBI, the CIA, the DEA, and intelligence agencies of the US military’s branches and more, will be able to search through raw signals intelligence (SIGINT): intercepted signals that include all manner of people’s communications, be it via satellite transmissions, phone calls and emails that cross network switches abroad, as well as messages between people abroad that cross domestic network switches.

NYBooks: ... In an interview about Citizenfour with the New Yorker reporter Jane Mayer, Snowden has said that his action seemed to him necessary because the American officials charged with the relevant oversight had abdicated their responsibility. He meant that President Obama, Attorney General Eric Holder, and the intelligence committees in the House of Representatives and the Senate had utterly failed to guard against extraordinary abuses of the public trust under the pretext of national security. Nor had they undertaken the proper work of setting limits to government spying on Americans consistent with the spirit of the First Amendment and the letter of the Fourth Amendment.

...Snowden is often called a “fanatic” or a “zealot,” a “techie” or a “geek,” by persons who want to cut him down to size. Usually these people have not listened to him beyond snippets lasting a few seconds on network news. But the chance to listen has been there for many months, in two short videos by Poitras on the website of The Guardian, and more recently in a full-length interview by the NBC anchorman Brian Williams. The temper and penetration of mind that one can discern in these interviews scarcely matches the description of fanatic or zealot, techie or geek.

An incidental strength of Citizenfour is that it will make such casual slanders harder to repeat. Nevertheless, they are likely to be repeated or anyway muttered in semiprivate by otherwise judicious persons who want to go on with their business head-down and not be bothered. It must be added that our past politics give no help in arriving at an apt description of Snowden and his action. The reason is that the world in which he worked is new. Perhaps one should think of him as a conscientious objector to the war on privacy — a respectful dissident who, having observed the repressive treatment endured by William Binney, Thomas Drake, and other recent whistle-blowers, does not recognize the constitutional right of the government to put him in prison indefinitely and bring him to trial for treason. ...

What seems most remarkable in that hotel room in Hong Kong is Snowden’s freedom from anxiety. He is fearful, yes ... He knows that he is at risk of being subjected to “rendition” or worse. But there is no theatrical exaggeration here, and no trace of self-absorption. He has made his commitment and that is that. ...

... [Snowden] realizes that if he keeps his identity a secret, the government will rally all its powers and those of the media to convert the treacherous and hidden leaker into the subject of the story. His intuition is that the best way to counter such a distraction will be to make the story personal right away, but to render the personal element dry and matter-of-fact. He will do this in the most unobtrusive and ordinary manner. He will simply admit that he is the person and spell out the few relevant facts about his life and work.

The undeclared subject of Citizenfour is integrity—the insistence by an individual that his life and the principle he lives by should be all of a piece.

Sisu is a Finnish term loosely translated into English as strength of will, determination, perseverance, and acting rationally in the face of adversity. However, the word is widely considered to lack a proper translation into any other language. Sisu contains a long-term element; it is not momentary courage, but the ability to sustain an action against the odds. Deciding on a course of action and then sticking to that decision against repeated failures is sisu. It is similar to equanimity, except the forbearance of sisu has a grimmer quality of stress management than the latter.

Pessimism of the Intellect, Optimism of the Will.

Anyone care to make predictions?

Alternet: ... According to The Sunday Times of London, Glenn Greenwald will publish the names of Americans targeted by the NSA.

“One of the big questions when it comes to domestic spying is, ‘Who have been the NSA’s specific targets?’” he told the Times. “Are they political critics and dissidents and activists? Are they genuinely people we’d regard as terrorists? What are the metrics and calculations that go into choosing those targets and what is done with the surveillance that is conducted? Those are the kinds of questions that I want to still answer.”

Greenwald has promised that this will be the “biggest” revelation of the nearly two million classified files he received from Edward Snowden, and that “Snowden’s legacy would be ‘shaped in large part’ by this ‘finishing piece’ still to come.” In a May interview with GQ, Greenwald spoke of this “finale:”

"I think we will end the big stories in about three months or so [June or July 2014]. I like to think of it as a fireworks show: You want to save your best for last. There's a story that from the beginning I thought would be our biggest, and I'm saving that. The last one is the one where the sky is all covered in spectacular multicolored hues. This will be the finale, a big missing piece. Snowden knows about it and is excited about it."

You'd have to be very naive to think that national intelligence agencies don't have dedicated hacking and information security penetration operations. In fact, if the US lacked this capability our spymasters would be derelict in their duty. Most of the complaining about foreign hacking or signals intelligence is just playing to (the dumb or naive part of) the domestic audience.

It was always amusing to play spot the Fed at Def Con ;-)

The manpower necessary to practice traditional SIGINT can be found in well-defined places -- you need people with CS, EE, Physics and Math backgrounds. For crypto you need very smart guys with math ability. But hacking/cracking involves a certain obsessive-compulsive personality component: you have to focus really hard on ugly bits of (often poorly designed) code and immerse yourself in the inelegant details. There's also an associated anti-authoritarian streak, which clashes with the nature of government service. So it's challenging for the spooks to recruit and retain hacker/cracker talent. The suits coexist uneasily with the "wild-type" found at places like Def Con. (Did I ever mention I almost accepted a summer job offer from the Institute for Defense Analysis after I graduated from Caltech? That's yet another story ...)

Here's something about TAO ("Tailored Access Operations"!), within the NSA.

Foreign Policy: ... By the time Obama became president of the United States in January 2009, TAO had become something akin to the wunderkind of the U.S. intelligence community. "It's become an industry unto itself," a former NSA official said of TAO at the time. "They go places and get things that nobody else in the IC [intelligence community] can."

Given the nature and extraordinary political sensitivity of its work, it will come as no surprise that TAO has always been, and remains, extraordinarily publicity shy. Everything about TAO is classified top secret codeword, even within the hypersecretive NSA. Its name has appeared in print only a few times over the past decade, and the handful of reporters who have dared inquire about it have been politely but very firmly warned by senior U.S. intelligence officials not to describe its work for fear that it might compromise its ongoing efforts. According to a senior U.S. defense official who is familiar with TAO's work, "The agency believes that the less people know about them [TAO] the better."

The word among NSA officials is that if you want to get promoted or recognized, get a transfer to TAO as soon as you can. The current head of the NSA's SIGINT Directorate, Teresa Shea, 54, got her current job in large part because of the work she did as chief of TAO in the years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, when the unit earned plaudits for its ability to collect extremely hard-to-come-by information during the latter part of George W. Bush's administration. We do not know what the information was, but sources suggest that it must have been pretty important to propel Shea to her position today. But according to a recently retired NSA official, TAO "is the place to be right now."

There's no question that TAO has continued to grow in size and importance since Obama took office in 2009, which is indicative of its outsized role. In recent years, TAO's collection operations have expanded from Fort Meade to some of the agency's most important listening posts in the United States. There are now mini-TAO units operating at the huge NSA SIGINT intercept and processing centers at NSA Hawaii at Wahiawa on the island of Oahu; NSA Georgia at Fort Gordon, Georgia; and NSA Texas at the Medina Annex outside San Antonio, Texas; and within the huge NSA listening post at Buckley Air Force Base outside Denver.

The problem is that TAO has become so large and produces so much valuable intelligence information that it has become virtually impossible to hide it anymore. The Chinese government is certainly aware of TAO's activities. The "mountains of data" statement by China's top Internet official, Huang Chengqing, is clearly an implied threat by Beijing to release this data. Thus it is unlikely that President Obama pressed President Xi too hard at the Sunnydale summit on the question of China's cyber-espionage activities. As any high-stakes poker player knows, you can only press your luck so far when the guy on the other side of the table knows what cards you have in your hand.

I voted twice for Obama, and always despised Bush-Cheney. But I can't disagree with Cheney's remarks below.

New Yorker: After Barack Obama was elected to his first term as President but before he took the oath of office, Vice-President Dick Cheney gave an exit interview to Rush Limbaugh. Under George W. Bush, Cheney was the architect, along with his legal counsel, David Addington, of a dramatic expansion of executive authority—a power grab that Obama criticized, fiercely, on the campaign trail, and promised to “reverse.” But when Limbaugh inquired about this criticism Cheney swatted it aside, saying, “My guess is that, once they get here and they’re faced with the same problems we deal with every day, they will appreciate some of the things we’ve put in place.”

See also Making Alberto Gonzales Look Good.

Almost every technical endeavor, from finance to high energy physics to biology to internet security to spycraft, is either already or soon to be drowning in Big Data. This is an inevitable consequence of exponential Moore's Laws in bandwidth, processing power, and storage, combined with improved "sensing" capability. The challenge is extracting meaning from all that data.

My impression is that the limiting factor at the moment is the human brainpower necessary to understand the idiosyncrasies of the particular problem, and, simultaneously, develop the appropriate algorithms. There are simply not enough people around who are good at this; it's not just a matter of algorithms, you need insight into the specific situation. Of equal importance is that the (usually non-technical) decision makers who have to act on the data need to have some rough grasp of the strengths and limitations of the methods, so as not to have to treat the results as coming from a black box.

To give you my little example of big data, on my desk (in Oakland, not in Eugene) I have stacks of terabyte drives with copies of essentially every Windows executable (program that runs on a flavor of Windows) that has appeared on the web in the past few years (about 5 percent of this is malware; also stored in our data is what each executable does once it's installed). Gathering this data was only modestly hard; analyzing it in a meaningful way is a lot harder!

NY Review of Books: On a remote edge of Utah's dry and arid high desert, where temperatures often zoom past 100 degrees, hard-hatted construction workers with top-secret clearances are preparing to build what may become America's equivalent of Jorge Luis Borges's "Library of Babel," a place where the collection of information is both infinite and at the same time monstrous, where the entire world's knowledge is stored, but not a single word is understood. At a million square feet, the mammoth $2 billion structure will be one-third larger than the US Capitol and will use the same amount of energy as every house in Salt Lake City combined.

Unlike Borges's "labyrinth of letters," this library expects few visitors. It's being built by the ultra-secret National Security Agency—which is primarily responsible for "signals intelligence," the collection and analysis of various forms of communication—to house trillions of phone calls, e-mail messages, and data trails: Web searches, parking receipts, bookstore visits, and other digital "pocket litter." Lacking adequate space and power at its city-sized Fort Meade, Maryland, headquarters, the NSA is also completing work on another data archive, this one in San Antonio, Texas, which will be nearly the size of the Alamodome.

Just how much information will be stored in these windowless cybertemples? A clue comes from a recent report prepared by the MITRE Corporation, a Pentagon think tank. "As the sensors associated with the various surveillance missions improve," says the report, referring to a variety of technical collection methods, "the data volumes are increasing with a projection that sensor data volume could potentially increase to the level of Yottabytes (1024 Bytes) by 2015."[1] Roughly equal to about a septillion (1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000) pages of text, numbers beyond Yottabytes haven't yet been named. Once vacuumed up and stored in these near-infinite "libraries," the data are then analyzed by powerful infoweapons, supercomputers running complex algorithmic programs, to determine who among us may be—or may one day become—a terrorist. In the NSA's world of automated surveillance on steroids, every bit has a history and every keystroke tells a story.

... Where does all this leave us? Aid concludes that the biggest problem facing the agency is not the fact that it's drowning in untranslated, indecipherable, and mostly unusable data, problems that the troubled new modernization plan, Turbulence, is supposed to eventually fix. "These problems may, in fact, be the tip of the iceberg," he writes. Instead, what the agency needs most, Aid says, is more power. But the type of power to which he is referring is the kind that comes from electrical substations, not statutes. "As strange as it may sound," he writes, "one of the most urgent problems facing NSA is a severe shortage of electrical power." With supercomputers measured by the acre and estimated $70 million annual electricity bills for its headquarters, the agency has begun browning out, which is the reason for locating its new data centers in Utah and Texas. And as it pleads for more money to construct newer and bigger power generators, Aid notes, Congress is balking.

The issue is critical because at the NSA, electrical power is political power. In its top-secret world, the coin of the realm is the kilowatt. More electrical power ensures bigger data centers. Bigger data centers, in turn, generate a need for more access to phone calls and e-mail and, conversely, less privacy. The more data that comes in, the more reports flow out. And the more reports that flow out, the more political power for the agency.

Rather than give the NSA more money for more power—electrical and political—some have instead suggested just pulling the plug. "NSA can point to things they have obtained that have been useful," Aid quotes former senior State Department official Herbert Levin, a longtime customer of the agency, "but whether they're worth the billions that are spent, is a genuine question in my mind."

Based on the NSA's history of often being on the wrong end of a surprise and a tendency to mistakenly get the country into, rather than out of, wars, it seems to have a rather disastrous cost-benefit ratio. Were it a corporation, it would likely have gone belly-up years ago. The September 11 attacks are a case in point. For more than a year and a half the NSA was eavesdropping on two of the lead hijackers, knowing they had been sent by bin Laden, while they were in the US preparing for the attacks. The terrorists even chose as their command center a motel in Laurel, Maryland, almost within eyesight of the director's office. Yet the agency never once sought an easy-to-obtain FISA warrant to pinpoint their locations, or even informed the CIA or FBI of their presence.

But pulling the plug, or even allowing the lights to dim, seems unlikely given President Obama's hawkish policies in Afghanistan. However, if the war there turns out to be the train wreck many predict, then Obama may decide to take a much closer look at the spy world's most lavish spender. It is a prospect that has some in the Library of Babel very nervous. "It was a great ride while it lasted," said one.

Let me get this straight. Because there are a lot of Arab-Americans in Detroit, a routine search by an NSA employee could dredge up some communication or transaction of mine with an entity in Detroit, even if it has no connection to a suspected terrorist? Whatever happened to my privacy rights?

Oh, I forgot, they went away thanks to the never ending "war" on terror, which is, apparently, more of a threat to our way of life than facing down a technologically advanced nuclear adversary with thousands of warheads and delivery systems. I had more legal protections of my privacy during the cold war than I do now. See earlier comments here, here and here.

Posted in 2005: ...You might argue that Al Qaeda is more dangerous than the USSR and eastern bloc, with their hundreds of ICBMs and thousands of nuclear warheads, but you'd be crazy. Let me offer the following analogy. While walking home you are confronted by a man with a loaded shotgun. By staring him down and pointing out that you yourself are armed, you avoid having your head blown off. Continuing on your way home, a small dog bites your ankle. Is the dog really a greater threat, just because it bit you, than the guy with the shotgun? If not, why should we allow Bush to unilaterally claim greater security powers than Reagan or Carter had? (Indeed, contravening the existing FISA law of 1978.)

The fact that the NSA has the capability to, e.g., pull up my past internet searches and email traffic, means that the telcos are turning over gigantic amounts of data on each of us to NSA for storage and indexing. The article below states that they don't generally have access to the content of email messages. However, this does not imply that they don't store the content (the text part of the message is a trivial amount of data, not much larger on average than the header information), just that they need a higher level of (FISA?) approval before looking more deeply at the communications. So, if you ever need to recover some lost email that you sent, you could always check with the NSA as a last resort!

WSJ: ...According to current and former intelligence officials, the spy agency now monitors huge volumes of records of domestic emails and Internet searches as well as bank transfers, credit-card transactions, travel and telephone records. The NSA receives this so-called "transactional" data from other agencies or private companies, and its sophisticated software programs analyze the various transactions for suspicious patterns. Then they spit out leads to be explored by counterterrorism programs across the U.S. government, such as the NSA's own Terrorist Surveillance Program, formed to intercept phone calls and emails between the U.S. and overseas without a judge's approval when a link to al Qaeda is suspected.

The NSA's enterprise involves a cluster of powerful intelligence-gathering programs, all of which sparked civil-liberties complaints when they came to light. They include a Federal Bureau of Investigation program to track telecommunications data once known as Carnivore, now called the Digital Collection System, and a U.S. arrangement with the world's main international banking clearinghouse to track money movements.

The effort also ties into data from an ad-hoc collection of so-called "black programs" whose existence is undisclosed, the current and former officials say. Many of the programs in various agencies began years before the 9/11 attacks but have since been given greater reach. Among them, current and former intelligence officials say, is a longstanding Treasury Department program to collect individual financial data including wire transfers and credit-card transactions.

It isn't clear how many of the different kinds of data are combined and analyzed together in one database by the NSA. An intelligence official said the agency's work links to about a dozen antiterror programs in all.

...the systems then can track all domestic and foreign transactions of people associated with that item -- and then the people who associated with them, and so on, casting a gradually wider net. An intelligence official described more of a rapid-response effect: If a person suspected of terrorist connections is believed to be in a U.S. city -- for instance, Detroit, a community with a high concentration of Muslim Americans -- the government's spy systems may be directed to collect and analyze all electronic communications into and out of the city.

The haul can include records of phone calls, email headers and destinations, data on financial transactions and records of Internet browsing. The system also would collect information about other people, including those in the U.S., who communicated with people in Detroit.

The information doesn't generally include the contents of conversations or emails. But it can give such transactional information as a cellphone's location, whom a person is calling, and what Web sites he or she is visiting. For an email, the data haul can include the identities of the sender and recipient and the subject line, but not the content of the message.