WO2021051113A1

WO2021051113A1 - Proving material identity with quantum randomness

Info

Publication number: WO2021051113A1
Application number: PCT/US2020/050795
Authority: WO
Inventors: Gideon Samid
Original assignee: Individual
Current assignee: Individual
Priority date: 2019-09-15
Filing date: 2020-09-15
Publication date: 2021-03-18
Anticipated expiration: 2022-03-15

Abstract

Capturing randomness in the chemical structure of a lump of matter, which then can be easily and quickly measured to read that randomness and thereby recapture it as bit-wise randomness, applicable as (i) a source of randomness, and as (ii) a means to verify the claimed identity of a material article.

Description

Proving Material Identity with Quantum Randomness Financial and General Applications

BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

Constructing a material lump from a set of constituent materials aggregating in distinct volumes such that each volume contains one constituent material, which has properties distinct from the materials in contiguous volumes, and by selecting the contents of these volumes randomly, then the integrated measurement of such properties with regard to the lump as a whole reflects that randomness. Thereby (i) the identity of the lump can be ascertained with such integrated measurement, and (ii) the lump may be regarded as a robust container of random data, expressed off the digital grid (and hence unhackable). The invention specifies particular properties which can be measured non-invasively from outside the lump, and where the properties of each volume affect the reading of the integrated measurement. The proof of identity per easy measurement of the lump can be used to ascertain the validity of minted coins, or the validity of any claimed valuable properly attached to the constructed lump.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

As cyber space proves to be fundamentally vulnerable, despite considerable cryptographic and security efforts, it is necessary to realize that bit-wise data cannot be adequately protected from attack, and hence it is necessary to provide material moorings to cyber ships, which means to express data off the digital grid inherently in a non-hackable lump of matter. Technological options are being developed, this invention is one of them. Anything material, which is manufactured at will, can generally be copied with similar technology, so that the copy will pass as the original. That is how money counterfeiting works, and that is how brand names products are forged, and how fake stuff interferes with good order. We here address this challenge: striving for a technology to construct something material in a way that will make counterfeiting and unauthorized copy infeasible. We denote the fake -resistant article as the identity-verifiable article (IVA).

We argue that if the IVA is built via a formula, a specific manufacturing protocol, then the protocol may be stolen, or may be deduced upon examination of the IVA. That is because the manufacturing protocol contains less data than is needed to define the specific construction details outright. It is therefore important to manufacture the IVA on the basis of randomized input. By its very nature randomized input makes it impossible for one to find a manufacturing short-cut, and use it to duplicate the IVA. This implies that the construction of the IVA may be made as complex as desired, controlling the effort needed to figure out how to duplicate it. In other words, a randomized input will be used in a way that will pass its complexity and unpredictability (randomness) to the manufactured article. We define here the basic methodology for manufacturing an IVA: Input comprised of random data and a set of manufacturing instructions to guide the IVA constructor how to use the random input data in the construction. The random data and the manufacturing instructions are used as input into a manufacturing process that manufactures the IVA. We further require for the manufacturing process to build an IVA such that the identity of the random input into the process will be strongly correlated with some measurable properties of the IVA. These properties must be expressed by values that reflect the IVA as a whole. In other words, if the IVA is seriously deformed, or is broken, or splits, then the reading of the correlated properties will be different. We denote these correlated properties as the Identity-Properties, ID-properties, identity-readings, or ID-reading of the IVA.

We have described here a dynamics whereby random data (RAND) together with a manufacturing protocol (Protocol) are fed into a manufacturing process (MP, the Constructor) which generates an identity-verifiable article (IVA), wherein the identity of the IVA may be established by reading the values of certain properties (ID-properties) with an appropriate reading device (Property Reader, PR). We denote the reading device as the Properties-Reader, or simply the Reader. We denote the measurement of the ID- properties as the Reading, or Measuring process. We denote the set of readings of the ID- properties as the signature of the IVA (Signature).

As described we have the basis for verifying an identity of an IVA. We consider a Claimer holding an IVA claiming it to be a particular IVA, evident in the material expression of the IVA, and claiming this material item to be an IVA identified through its known signature. We then consider a Verifier who is in possession of the signature of the IVA, and who can arrange for reading of the IVA, and reporting the results, the readings. The Verifier then compares these reading to the signature in his or her possession, and if there is an agreement between the signature and the reading then the Verifier agrees with the Claimer and issues a statement of verification of the identity of the claimed IVA. We also consider a situation where two parties A and B, each holds a copy of the same IVA. Each can prove to the other that they hold that copy by comparing the readings of the same ID properties of their respective IVA. It is because the input to manufacturing the IVA is random data, which may be made large enough, to limit the chance for a coincidental match of the many as desired readings of ID properties, that when the readings fit, the identity of the IVA is established with satisfying confidence. We further consider the situation where there are r ID properties. The full signature of the IVA is comprised of the r readings of the r ID properties, but in each instant where a claimer lays a claim for the identity of an article, a different subset of p ID-properties, p < r is being measured and compared to the readings of the same properties as listed in the signature, and on the basis of the accurate reading of these p ID properties, the Verifier will issue his article-verification statement. Suppose we have r=t*p, then the article can be verified t times, each time use a different set of p ID properties. This way a man-in- the-middle that would eavesdrop on the communication between the Claimer and the Verifier will not be in position to exploit remote reading and cheat the Verifier by replaying previous readings. This relates to the case where the readings is carried out at the Claimer side and communicated to the Verifier via a communication channel that may be hacked. One could readily compute the chances for a coincidental duplicate based on the value of p, and the range of possible values for each of the p properties. One could then set it up to comfortable levels. We further distinguish between destructive, Sticky and 'clean' (untraceable) reading modes. In a destructive reading the IVA is deformed, cracked, or broken and even destroyed. In a sticky reading the IVA is not destroyed but there are traces that indicate that reading took place, and a repeat reading of a certain ID property may or may not be feasible. In a clean mode there are no indications that reading of the ID properties took place. Since the IVA is constructed with random feed, then its construction carries with it that randomized nature, and this randomness is further expressed in the signature of the IVA. The IVA thus, may be regarded as a source of randomness. We denote the system and the procedure defined above as the Material Identity- Verification Protocol (MIV - protocol, MIVP) or MIVS (MIV system).

The IVA signature may be (i) hidden, and (ii) exposed. If the MlV-system is such that given the signature it is feasible to construct an IVA which will give the readings of the signature, then the signature should be hidden. Illustration: one constructs a random source to determine that the ratio between gold and silver of a particular piece of jewelry will bel: 0.235. If that ratio is known than a fraudster could melt a piece of jewelry that has that same ratio, and that fraudulent piece of jewelry will pass as the original (assuming in this illustration that the signature is comprised of one property). In this case, this will only work if the ratio gold-silver is kept as a secret. If the signature is exposed, it is necessary for the MIV protocol to be one way. Namely it should be infeasible to construct a fake article that would give the readings of the signature. For example: one builds a piece of jewelry using a randomized mix of gold and silver. A small hole is drilled in the item of jewelry, through which a source of a given range of electromagnetic radiation is placed. In different locations outside the piece of jewelry one measures the radiation that penetrated through the jewelry. The set of such readings comprises the signature of the jewelry IVA. If the gold-silver mix is well randomized it is practically infeasible to use the known readings of the outside radiations, and on its basis construct a piece of jewelry that will give these very readings.

There is of course an enormous advantage to the exposed signature mode since this allows a community where such IVAs are passed around to verify the identity of the passed around IVA.

MIV Protocol Use Cases We identify the following use categories: · 1. Financial Applications · 2. Article Tagging · 3. Cryptographic Applications

Financial Applications

For financial applications we regard the IVA as a "coin". A mint can mint an IVA (a coin) assign it an arbitrary value, V, and pass it on to a trader. The coin will be redeemable per its par value — V. To redeem it, a trader will submit the coin for redemption. The mint will act as the Verifier, assure itself that it is the real coin because its reading will agree with the signature held in confidence perhaps by the mint. The mint will then pay the trader who submitted the coin for redemption, the redemption value, V. (minus any service fee adjustment). The mint may not care who the coin redeemer is, the redemption is per the coin. This implies that the original trader given the coin by the mint could trade it, pass it along, and the recipient will again be able to pass it along as a valuable of the value V, because that is what the mint will credit the redeemer of the coin. Note: we discuss here an IVA issued against a promise to pay an amount of money, but in fact an IVA can be minted to express an obligation to give anything of transactional value, like a stock, a bond or a piece of real estate. In order for a recipient trader to accept the coin as authentic, he may either trust the physical appearance of the coin, (as is the case with ordinary coins), or wish to measure some or all the ID properties versus a known signature, or part thereof. Based on the one-way attribute of the MIV protocol,

(the exposed signature mode), knowledge of the signature cannot be used to manufacture a counterfeit IVA. This implies that the signature may be made public for every prospective payee of the coin to use it to verify the bona fide of the coin. The IVA will then function as a proper customary coin and be passed around and traded like banknotes and metal coins.

The IVA may be qualified coins — minted in conjunctions with a set of condition for redemption (tethered money). Such condition may limit the identities of the redeemer, the timing of redemption, etc. The exposed signature trading mode will reconstitute the legacy cash mode, and it comes very handy in situations of natural or man-made disaster, or emergencies when no network connectivity exists, and all payment options relying on the Internet collapse. Signature Exposure Strategy

In order for the IVA to function as a viable tradable coin it should be necessary for its payee to be able to quickly and conveniently verify the bona fide of the coin. This is done by comparing measurements of the coin to signature data. The signature then may be kept in secret within the mint, and every payee will measure the claimed coin and send the measurement to the Mint to receive a confirmation of its bona fide. The mint will compare the measurements to the signature data to issue its verification statement.

Based on the one-way attribute of the MIV, (the exposed signature mode) the signature may be made public, so any payee will be able to measure a paid coin and compare it to the public signature. This will allow payment without reliance on the Internet.

As described a fraudster could manufacture a counterfeit coin, which does not imitate the structure of the copied coin, but is constructed in such a way as to register the results of the measurements to fit the signature. The higher the value of the coin, the greater the incentive for a fraudster to construct such a counterfeit coin. The way to combat this fraud, is to expose only a fraction of the ID properties to the public, and to keep the remaining data secret. The number of properties that are not publicly disclosed may be made high enough, s, so that each time a prospective payee asks for the mint to verify a claimed coin as payment, the mint identifies a subset of s, say si ID properties for the prospective payee to measure. The mint then verifies this coin to the prospective payee if the prospective payee sends to the mint the readings of those si properties and they match the signature data. Next time a prospective payee asks for verification of the coin identity, the mint will identify another set of ID properties S₂. The mint will use an estimate of how many times, t, a coin of a particular denomination will be transacted within the trading community, and select s such that: S > Si + S₂ + .... S_t

If the number of requests t is too high, and there are no more secret properties left, then the mint so notifies the payee who may reject the coin, and request the payer to redeem it with the mint, namely to physically pass the coin to the mint for redemption, or possibly exchange with a coin of same denomination but with a new set of s undisclosed ID properties values.

Minting Services The IVA may serve as a mint in the context of the BitMint digital money system. The BitMint digital money system uses quantum randomness as raw material to mint its coins, and that randomness is then used to redeem a BitMint digital coin submitted for redemption. Instead of checking the data in a regular database the mint could check the data through readings of the IVA. Namely using the IVA as a source of unhackable randomness. The MIV system could be used as a means of building sub-mints for local use. A bank may purchase from a mint an IVA coin of a value of V=$25,000,000. The coin has c bits in a row, as indicated by a particular order of its ID readings. These c bits may be parceled out as individual BitMint coins to be traded in the bank's environment. These local traders will be reassured that the money they trade, which for all traders amount to the value V of a BitMint coin, will be redeemable and available as long as the physical IVA is in the hands of the bank. The BitMint dispensed coins based on a large denomination IVA may be traded through a blockchain mechanism if so desired. Regular BitMint mint keeps its coin data in a regular database. An IVA BitMint will keep the coin data in the IVA. The database that writes the coin is comprised of high quality random data, which is exactly what the IVA readings are.

Article Tagging

The IVA may be secured within a 'tagged article' (TA), such that it would be infeasible to replace it with another IVA without causing visible damage to the TA. For example the IVA may be fit within a sealed enclosure, SE, such that the seal will have to be broken for the IVA to be replaced, or pulled out. Yet the fitting of the IVA in the TA will not hinder the readings of the ID properties of the IVA. These readings may be compared to a public or secret signature, as the case may be, and when the reading and the signature agree, the TA is regarded as authentic, not a counterfeit.

Cryptographic Applications

Since the manufacturing of the IVA is carried out with randomness as input, it is possible to regard the signature as random data. Randomness is a universal 'fuel' in virtually every cryptographic protocol, and thus, it is possible for some n communication parties, to use n duplicates IVA to mutually authenticate themselves to each other, and then to securely communicate with each other. Authentication: Let Alice and Bob each have a copy of the same IVA, namely they have two IVAs with the same signature. The two IVA were manufactured with the same string of random bits as input, and then that string was erased. Alice will call upon Bob and claim to be Alice. Bob will then randomly select a set of si ID properties, and ask Alice to provide their values. Bob, at his end, will measure the values of the same si ID properties, and then compare his readings to the communication from Alice. If the results agree, Bob will authenticate Alice as the Alice who holds the IVA. Alice and Bob will then exchange roles, and Alice will randomly select different ID properties, S2, to compare her readings of her IVA to the data sent over from Bob. The procedure can readily be extrapolated to a party of n > 2 participants, authenticating themselves to each other. This protocol is best practiced when the holders of the IVA don't keep a regular hackable database with the signature data, but resort to measuring the signature data each time around. Every cryptographic protocol that is based on some shared randomness can be executed with the IVA serving as the source of the shared randomness. A writer of a message within a set of n communicating parties will use a key K to encrypt a message to be read by the parties in the set. The writer will then randomly choose a subset of the signature, s_w ID properties and indicate that the readings of these properties have served to define the cryptographic key used to encrypt her message. If the used cipher is symmetric then all parties extract the shared key from their respective IVA.

Implementation Technology

From a technological standpoint we need to address (i) the construction of the IVA, and (ii) the measurement of the ID properties, and (iii) incorporating the MIVS in the host environment. We discuss a categorical implementation of the MIV on the basis of James Maxwell equations of electromagnetism. The essence of Maxwell (and Faraday) discovery is the complex interaction between electrical charges in motion and electric and magnetic fields. While the charges may be localized, the respective fields are de localized. This implies that a lump of matter containing 'loose electrons' as in metals will be affected by some combination of electrical and magnetic fields, effected from outside that lump, and the impacted 'loose charge' will gain motion, which in turn will generate an electromagnetic disturbance which will interact with the originally applied fields, to combine into a particular electromagnetic field values, which can be reliably measured. In other words, we have here a situation where the internal structure of the lump creates a reading outside the lump which is characteristic of the inner structure of the lump. This reading may be regarded as an ID property of the lump. By applying a variety of instigating combinations of electrical and magnetic fields, the measured lump will respond each time in ways that reflect its structure. By applying r distinct combinations of such instigating electromagnetic combinations, one will measure r distinct readings characteristic of the measured lump. To the extent that the lump was constructed via random data, the readings of the r properties will be randomized too. Similarly this would work with radiation scattering and radioactive processes.

Construction of the IVA

The MIVS may be based on (i) destructive reading, (ii) sticky readings, and (iii) clean reading. The third option is of the higher interest because it can be repeated indefinitely. The idea of the MIVS is to devise a fast and easy reading of a property of a lump of matter (the IVA), and to construct the lump such that the values of such reading will be randomized. The non-destructive reading is taken from outside the IVA, with contact to at most, the surface of the lump, not incurring an invasive drill. It therefore that the chemistry is not nearly as relevant as physics. We are looking into relevant aspects of physics: (i) gravity, (ii) classic, "Maxwellian" electromagnetism, (iii) quantum physics. Gravity can be coupled with buoyancy where the mass, m of a lump and its volume v determines its buoyancy. One could then device a liquid of specific gravity p, such that a particular IVA will be in a balanced floating position. Or one could measure the quantity of a light or heavy material to be attached to the IVA to insure that in given liquid the combined IVA and the attachment will be in perfect float. If the result of such experiment is kept secret, then this reading may qualify to authenticate the identity of an IVA. However, if the result of the experiment is leaked, or hacked, then it would be easy for a fraudster to construct a fake IVA that would pass the buoyancy test. A drawback. One may also note that it is not very easy or very fast to carry out such a test.

Maxwellian IVA methods

James Maxwell and Michael Faraday have shown and specified the remarkable interaction between electrical fields, charged particles and magnetic fields. These interactions may be utilized to impact an IVA with a "Maxwellian Disturbance", let this disturbance interact with the electrical aspects of the probed IVA, and then measure the outcome of this interaction. The specific construction of the IVA will be reflected by the various electromagnetic readings from the ambience of the IVA. We discuss two categories: (i) electromagnetic interference, (ii) electrical measurements. In the first category the reading involves some radiation that interacts with the IVA, and in the second category the reading is carried out through applying potential differences over given points on the surface of the IAV, and then reading the resultant current.

Electro Magnetic Interference The considerations here are like the ones for nuclear radiation. It involves a source of electro magnetic radiation with a certain frequency pattern. The emitted radiation encounters the IVA and reacts according to its structure. Certain detectors strategically placed around the IVA will read the resultant radiation, reflective of the IAV randomized structure. While nuclear radiation is only absorbed or scattered, the electromagnetic situation may involve activated parts within the IAV, which will react as secondary source and will contribute to the resultant reading. Such are ferromagnetic materials randomly distributed within the IAV, and specially placed wires where the probing involves, passing current through them, thereby creating electro magnetic interference, commensurate with the rate in which that induced current changes. By allowing random input to spread quantities of iron, cobalt, and nickel within an IVA, (as an example) the resultant field in the ambience of the IVA will be responsive to that distribution of ferromagnetic elements in the IVA. The radiation may be of any frequency or combination of frequency; it may be a regular source or a laser. It may be singular or plural. The radiation source may indirectly in the form of an alternating current in a strategically placed coil inside or close to the IVA.

Electrical Measurements Electrical measurements are very convenient. The IAV may be fitted with n ports, where a port is a location on the IAV where an electric potential may be applied. Let us apply potential V_p to p ports on the IAV and keep them connected, and apply potential V_q ¹ V_p on q points on the IAV and apply them connected too. We shall assure that: 1 < p < n, and 1 < q < n, and p+q < n. The p points and the q points close a circle and the potential difference: AV = V_p - V_q will generate a current I. The value of I depends on the distribution of material of variant conductivity within the IAV. If these materials of varying conductivity are distributed in random "blocks" within the IAV then the reading of I will be randomized. The ratio r = AV/I will be computed as the resistivity of the IAV under the circumstances of the reading. The number of possible such reading is very high even for a small number of ports, (small n):

The large number of readings is very useful in a protocol where the identification information should be different every time it is communicated in a network, and also very useful when regarding the IAV as a source of shared randomness. The described setting may be made more involved by applying a secondary current between two groups of ports p' and q' which are not part of the p or q ports. That current might make an impact on the readings of the IAV, and thereby supply many more reading values.

Measurement of ID Properties

Measurement of ID properties is carried out via proper detectors. Because the measurements depend on the geometry of the IVA, the positions of the detectors must firmly be established. The measurement of electromagnetic events like radiation intensity and electrical current are analog in nature, and must be mapped to digital readings with great accuracy. This is done according to the specifications outlined in US application #15898876 “Rock of Randomness”.

Environmental Fitting The IVA is often part of a large system. In some implementation security is paramount, and hence the IVA will be fitted in a secure cupboard or box, perhaps with a glass window, visible to all. If used for cryptographic purposes, the IVA may be used as a container of randomness, and as a replacement for bit-wise files which are hackable. In that case the IVA will be fitted into the computing environment for quick and easy reading.

An elaborate environment may be constructed for financial application. In particular we discuss the concept of the Coin Logger.

The Coin Logger The IVA technology may be used to mint coins of any denomination, in particular in large denominations. Using implementation where the signature can be exposed, a payer could convince a payee that the physical coin of ID mark M and denominated at value $X is bona fide, by allowing the payee to fit the coin (the IVA) in a "coin logger" which is loaded with the public ledger issued by the mint, specifying full or part signatures of all relevant circulating coins, or alternatively a coin logger which can communicate live with the mint regarding the readings of each coin minted by that mint, and in particular the coin at hand (marked M). The coin logger will read the coin, and these readings will be compared to the signature to ascertain the validity of the coin.

The coin logger may be a simple yes/no device, just reporting the result of the verification test. But in other versions it may be a “workstation”.

We describe below a coin logger in an advanced mode. It is a unit comprised of: 1. The coin socket 2. The coin ID reader 3. The coin meta data reader 4. Coin Logger Processor 5. Coin Data Display 6. Coin Data input devices.

The coin itself will be fitted (attached to) with an electronic part, the Coin Tracker. The coin tracker will log data relevant to the coin, its history and its disposition, collectively called coin meta data. The coin tracker will be well fitted to the IAV (payload) part of the coin assembly and in fact the IAV part of the coin plus the coin tracker will be regarded as the total coin. The coin tracker will have permanent memory and communication ports. The ports will connect the coin logger to pass information back and forth between the coin logger and the coin handled by it. Each IAV coin will have a visible, hard placed coin identification symbol. This coin ID will be used to compare database signature (indexed by that marked coin ID) to the ID readings of the IVA.

Financial Applications The fact that the IVA coin is physical endows it with the following attributes: (i) it cannot be double spent, (ii) it can be transacted without real time network connectivity. In that respect it is akin to old-fashioned cash. However, the fact that the IAV coin uses randomization technology whereby the infeasibility of counterfeiting can be adjusted to as a high a value as desired, gives it an edge over old-fashioned cash.

But the IVA coin has advantages not found in old-fashioned coins — it has a unique id which can be ascertained remotely. And that unique ID gives it all the power available to digital coins like in nominal BitMint, mainly full range tethering — controlling its disposition to any set of logical terms. This unique remotely verifiable coin ID also allows for the full detailed history of the coin to be logged on the coin itself. This leads to a robust accounting system where all transactions are logged four times: 1. in the books of the payer, 2. in the books of the payee, 3. in the coin itself (meta data), and 4. in the coin-loggers run by the payees. The coin logger can record on the coin submitted to it for verification. So the logger first uses its own database of coin signatures advertised by the mint. Since the coin is physical there is no worry of obsoleteness as is the case with digital coins because if the coin is physically presented and it has the properties indicated by the signature then it must be it. Coin that were redeemed are out of circulation. The coin logger will be loadable with the signature database issued by the mint through a USB stick or other off line means, or it may be WiFi connected and download the signature database from the mint. If the coin is of high value and the payee wants to get more assurances, then the payee will measure a different combination of p and q ports for the recorded resistance and send it to the mint for verification. Or the payee will ask the mint to pick some p ports and q ports to put V_p on all the indicated p ports and to put V_q on all the selected q ports and then measure the resultant current, divide the potential difference to the current to compute the effective resistance under these circumstances, and then send the result (either row analog or modular math integer) to the Mint for verification. Once the coin is verified, the payee coin logger will write its part to the meta data to record the transfer of the coin from the payer to the payee, identify the time of the transaction, and possibly by GPS the location of the transaction. Alternatively the payer will record a statement to willingly pass the coin to the payee. The payer may then cryptographically sign this statement with his private key and offer the public key for the payee and any subsequent coin holder to use to verify the authenticity of the payer’s declaration of transaction. A copy of what is recorded on the coin will be recorded on the respective coin logger. So over time the coin will have a longer and longer trail of meta data indicating its chain of custody, and the coin logger will have a growing list of transactions recorded in it.

For high value coins the protocol might dictate a strict recording of the chain of custody where the payer write that at time certain, and perhaps at location certain it transferred the coin to the payee. This declaration of transfer of the coin is then signed by the payer private key, and the corresponding public key is supplied next to the statement. Or the public key may be found on a public bulletin. Any of the common alternatives to signing with a hash, may be used. At any event anyone examining the coin and its meta data will be reassured that the payer (and no other) have declared that he passed this coin to the payee. The payee, once he becomes a payer and passed the coin further, also writes a payment statement identifying who she passed the coin to, the time, the location — and then it is all signed by her signature. Thereby the coin carries along its entire chain of custody and it is clear who owned the coin from when to when, and to whom it passed. The meta data writing protocol may call for every payer to sign not only her own transactional statement but also to sign the entire train of meta data on the coin. This will bring some layered security to the meta data similar to the security offered by blockchain. Some coins of high denomination might be examined by the mint to insure that the chain of custody is with full integrity otherwise the coin will not be redeemed. This risk then motivates any payee to check for himself or herself that the previous chain of custody is in good order. IVA coins can be issued as bonds, as credit, as stake in real estate, and stocks. Like any coins with identity and value fused together.

Explanation of Drawing

Fig.-l: IVA Manufacturing Scheme The figure depicts the IVA constructor, which is fed by (i) random data, RAND, and by (ii) a construction protocol that guides the IVA constructor how to incorporate the random data pumped into it, and generate a lump of matter, an identity-verifiable article (IVA), where the internal construction of which, is reflective of the random input data. The constructor may be used with the same input a controlled number of times, after which the random input data may be erased, making any further duplication of the IVA infeasible.

Fig-2: Quadruple IVA Chain Accounting

This figure shows how transactions of two IVA coins marked X and Y are recorded four ways. The figures shows that coin X is passed from trader A to trader B. Trader A writes into the meta data of coin X the statement of the transaction: identifying passing X to trader B. The figure shows that the coin as it passed from A to B is marked with the transactional statement A B. In parallel we see at the top of the picture that the coin logger operated by trader B keeps a record of the same transaction. The figure does not show that the logger of trader A marked anything, but the protocol the traders use may require it. It is important for trader B to keep a record of the transaction A B of coin X because coin X may be transferred further but the coin-logger remains in the possession of trader B. The figure shows that trader B then sends the coin X to trader C, after writing on its meta data that it passes the coin to trader C — this statement is then signed by trader B. The writing on the coin X, in the possession of trader B can be done through the coin logger or through other devices. Coin X now carries its history: A B C. When trader C passes coin X to trader E, the meta data on X is growing to A B C E. The figure shows how the loggers of C and E log their respective transactions. The figure also shows that trader D passed coin Y to trader B, and B then passes coin Y to trader E. These transactions are recorded in the books of the five traders — twice, once as expenses and once as income. The transactions are recorded in the coins themselves and the transactions are recorded in the respective coin loggers.

Fig-3 Multi Point Resistance This figure shows an IVA with many ports a particular group of p ports is selected to be applied a potential value of V_p, and a different group of q ports is selected to be fitted with a voltage, potential rating of V_q. The voltate difference AV = V_p - V_q generates a current I that reflects the randomized resistance of the IVA which in turn is reflective of the randomized input that generated the IVA.

Fig-4: Coin Logger This figure shows the face of a coin logger. It show on the right left side of the face of the coin logger box an IVA coin fitted into the socket prepared for it. The coin is being read and verified in this socket, and its meta data is written in that socket. The coin logger face shows a screen to display information regarding the history of the coin and anything else written in the coin meta data. The meta data may contain some tethering information dictating the terms of the coin redemption. The figure also shows a keyboard for the payee to input data to the coin. The figure does not show an optional port for USB or any other physical connector to input meta data to the coin other than through the keyboard. There is also an optional WiFi as shown in the figure. .

Fig-5: coin logger side view : This figure show the coin logger from the side. It depicts the socket where the coin (a) is fitted. The coin is also shown form the side as (b). The bottom of the coin has the electronic meta data add-on part (the coin tracker), indicated as part (f) on the bottom depiction of the coin. The coin tracker fits on the connector part in the coin logger, (e). The keyboard is shown as strip (d).

Fig -6: Coin Logger Anatomy This figure shows the internal functional parts of the coin logger. On the left top one sees the coin with its coin tracker part (a) how they fit into the socket in the coin logger (d) which is fitted with the readers that read the ID properties of the coin to compare with signature data for the coin. The socket also contains the electronic board that connects with the coin tracker and communicates with the coin (b). All the data from the ID readings and the meta data reading is fed to the processor in the heart of the coin logger. The processor is shown connected to a USB port and to a keyboard, as well as to the coin logger memory location and to the coin logger screen.

Claims

What is claimed is:

1. A three-dimensional (3D) electrical device that provides a different measured electrical resistance between any two mutually exclusive groups of points (a group P comprised of p points, and a group Q comprised of q points) on the device, which is marked with a plurality of n points where n > p+q, and where the points in group P are connected to one pole of a battery, and the points in group Q are connected to the opposite pole of the battery, the device comprising: a plurality of 3D blocks, wherein each block of the plurality of 3D blocks has a different electrical conductivity, is made up of one or more materials, and is selected in a random order and connected to a previously selected block of the plurality of 3D blocks to form a larger 3D shape so that a different electrical conductivity is produced between any two groups (P and Q) of mutually exclusive points of the plurality of points on at least one surface of the 3D shape; and a plurality of electrodes placed on the at least one surface of the 3D shape so that each electrode of the plurality of electrodes is connected to a point of the plurality of points in order to enable a measurement of electrical resistance between any two groups of electrodes of the plurality of electrodes.

2. The device of claim 1 wherein the device is manufactured through a manufacturing device which feeds from m constituent materials, each with different value of electrical conductivity, and where the manufacturing device is setting up the dimensions of, each block in the plurality of blocks, and their respective configuration, and where each block is filled with one of the m constituent materials, wherein the selection of the constituent material for each block is determined by a random source.

3. The manufacturing device of claim 2 wherein the manufacturing device is a 3D printer.

4. The device of claim 1 where the device is assigned a device identity, which is also marked (tagged) on the device; and where the device is measured in t different ways, wherein each way is defined by a particular selection of groups P and Q, and each measurement of electrical resistance reflects the randomness used to construct the device, and where the t results of these measurements are published to a community, wherein one member of the community holding such a device can pass it to another member of the community, claiming the device to be authentic per its marked identity tag, and where the recipient of the device will conduct the specified t measurements of the device, and compare the results of these measurements to the published results for that device ID, and if the results agree, the recipient concludes that the tested device is the one so tagged by its manufacturer.

5. The device of claim 1 wherein the device is constructed as an envelope around an electronic data piece, EDP, and wherein the envelope cannot be separated from the EDP without (i) being visibly deformed, and (ii) without affecting the readings of the electrical resistance measurements between points on the device; and wherein upon determining the authenticity of the envelope through t measurements, the trust in the authenticity of the device is extended to the electronic data piece and to the data written there.

6. The device of claim 5 wherein the device is assigned (i) an identity tag, and (ii) a monetary value, which turns the device into a coin, which can be paid with confidence because the payee will measure the coin t times, and accept the coin as authentic if the t measurements agree with the expected measurements which are published by the mint of that coin (the device manufacturer).

7. The device of claim 6, wherein a coin logger is constructed with a place to fit the coin, carry out the t measurements, authenticate the coin, and read the data in the electronic data piece, thereby read coin-related information, in particular terms of trade and redemption of the coin.

8. The device of claim 7, wherein the traders of the coin can write information to the electronic data piece and thereby record among other matters, the chain of custody of the coin.

9. The device of claim 7 where the mint of the coin writes down the identity of the trader to whom the coin is originally passed, and identifies the time of the passing of the coin, as well as the public key of that trader, then signing all this information with its own private key, while publishing its respective public key, and wherein the trader to whom the coin was passed, passes it to a second trader, specifying the time of this second passing of the coin, and indicating the public key of the second trader, then signing the entire chain of transactional data with his private key, which corresponds to the public key identified by the mint, and where the second trader passes the coin to the next trader, indicating the time of passing and the public key of the next trader, then the passing trader signs the entire chain of transactional data with his private key; thereby writing a chain of custody of the coin, identifying who owned the coin and when.

10. The device of claim 5 wherein the EDP is replaced with an article of value, the authenticity of which is accepted when the enveloping device is authenticated, and the envelope may be fitted with a window to allow visual inspection of the authenticated article of value.