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WO2020073124A1 - Procédé et système pour clés publiques à usage unique pour registre public - Google Patents

Procédé et système pour clés publiques à usage unique pour registre public Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2020073124A1
WO2020073124A1 PCT/CA2019/051439 CA2019051439W WO2020073124A1 WO 2020073124 A1 WO2020073124 A1 WO 2020073124A1 CA 2019051439 W CA2019051439 W CA 2019051439W WO 2020073124 A1 WO2020073124 A1 WO 2020073124A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
transaction
account
computing device
public
purpose string
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/CA2019/051439
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English (en)
Inventor
Daniel Richard L. Brown
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
BlackBerry Ltd
Original Assignee
BlackBerry Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by BlackBerry Ltd filed Critical BlackBerry Ltd
Priority to CA3111033A priority Critical patent/CA3111033A1/fr
Priority to ES19871914T priority patent/ES2985270T3/es
Priority to EP24167401.9A priority patent/EP4407477B1/fr
Priority to EP19871914.8A priority patent/EP3834118B1/fr
Priority to KR1020217008767A priority patent/KR102823702B1/ko
Priority to CN201980066178.7A priority patent/CN112823350B/zh
Publication of WO2020073124A1 publication Critical patent/WO2020073124A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

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    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3239—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD
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Definitions

  • the present disclosure relates to public ledgers including blockchain, and in particular relates to transaction security for public ledgers.
  • a ledger is a record of transactions between accounts.
  • a public ledger makes the ledger public in the sense that all transactions are available to the public.
  • a public ledger system is pseudonymous if the account numbers are traceable, but do not identify individuals by name. Pseudonymous, as used herein, means that the while transactions associated with an account number can be traced, the account numbers themselves cannot necessarily be associated with a particular person.
  • a public ledger cryptocurrency is a digital currency that uses cryptography to mark transactions.
  • an account number may be a public key, and a transaction may contain a digital signature.
  • the public ledger can be used by a cryptocurrency recipient to confirm that the account holder has enough funds in an account before entering into a transaction. This may help to avoid a double spending by a cryptocurrency sender.
  • each account holder normally has a private key, which is used to sign transactions.
  • the private key is often stored in a module called a digital wallet on a computing device.
  • a thief may invade the device storing the digital wallet and extract an account holder’s private signing key. The thief can then transfer funds of the account holder into other accounts.
  • Every recipient should first inspect the public ledger to see if the said sender possesses sufficient funds.
  • This inspection of the public ledger gives an honest recipient a limited opportunity to counter some forms of theft and fraud.
  • the checking of the public ledger may allow an honest recipient to trace where funds have travelled.
  • An honest recipient may be able to detect that the cryptocurrency in question has followed a suspicious path. For example, if the funds originate from an account whose funds have been reported stolen, and honest recipient can refuse to receive the funds and may report an attempted transaction to authorities.
  • Figure 1 is a block diagram of an example computing system that can be used for public ledger cryptography transactions
  • Figure 2 is a process diagram showing a process for creation of public and private keys tied to a message in an Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
  • Figure 3 is a process diagram showing a process for verification that a message is tied to a public key
  • Figure 4 is a process diagram showing a generalized process for creation of public and private keys tied to a message
  • Figure 5 is a process diagram showing a process for verification that a message is tied to a public key
  • Figure 6 is a dataflow diagram showing the use of a purpose string to vet a transaction in a public ledger cryptography system.
  • Figure 7 is a block diagram of a simplified computing device capable of being used with the methods and systems herein according to one embodiment.
  • the present disclosure provides a method at a computing device in a public ledger cryptography system, the method comprising: creating a purpose string, the purpose string defining transaction parameters for an account within the public ledger cryptography system; using the purpose string to create a private key and associated public key for an account within the public ledger cryptography system; and providing the purpose string for use in verification of a transaction from the account within the public ledger cryptography system.
  • the present disclosure further provides a computing device in a public ledger cryptography system, the computing device comprising: a processor; and a communications subsystem, wherein the computing device is configured to: create a purpose string, the purpose string defining transaction parameters for an account within the public ledger cryptography system; use the purpose string to create a private key and associated public key for an account within the public ledger cryptography system; and provide the purpose string for use in verification of a transaction from the account within the public ledger cryptography system.
  • the present disclosure further provides a computer readable medium for storing instruction code which, when executed by a processor of a computing device in a public ledger cryptography system, cause the computing device to: create a purpose string, the purpose string defining transaction parameters for an account within the public ledger cryptography system; use the purpose string to create a private key and associated public key for an account within the public ledger cryptography system; and provide the purpose string for use in verification of a transaction from the account within the public ledger cryptography system.
  • a public ledger is a ledger which is publicly viewable.
  • a public ledger cryptocurrency is Bitcoin, which uses blockchain technology to authenticate the public ledger. This process is known as mining, and mostly decentralizes the authority of the public ledger.
  • a public ledger cryptography system is described.
  • the public ledger may, for example, be used for cryptocurrency.
  • the cryptocurrency used with the embodiments herein may be, for example, Bitcoin.
  • the present disclosure is not limited to Bitcoin and any suitable cryptocurrency may be used.
  • Cryptocurrency may be used in a variety of computing environments.
  • One example computing environment is shown with regard to Figure 1.
  • a computing device 110 belongs to a user with funds on a public ledger.
  • computing device 110 may include a processor 112 and a communications subsystem 114, where the processor and communications subsystem cooperate to perform the methods described herein.
  • Computing device 110 may further include a memory 116, which may be used to store the data or programmable logic.
  • the programmable logic may be executed by processor 112.
  • programmable logic may be provided to computing device 110 through communications subsystem 114.
  • the computing device 110 includes a digital wallet 118, which may store the private key for funds within the public ledger.
  • the public key for the user of computing device 110 associated with the private key stored in digital wallet 118 may allow for the funds to be used with the public ledger.
  • the private key is stored in the digital wallet 118, which provides for security to store such private key.
  • Digital wallet 118 may be any data structure or logical structure used to store the private key and associated data.
  • digital wallet 1 18 is implemented in software and hardware, or may be implemented in specifically designed hardware, that stores information that allows an individual to make electronic commerce transactions.
  • the digital wallet may be provided utilizing dedicated hardware devices, such as a hardware security module.
  • the digital wallet 118 may include memory that is dedicated to the digital wallet, and may be internal or external to computing device 110.
  • Computing device 110 may communicate, for example, through a network
  • computing device 110 may communicate with a certificate authority 130 which may be used to generate and authenticate certificates for the computing device, including certificates for the public ledger in some cases.
  • network 120 may be used for computing device 110 to
  • a public ledger or block chain 140 which may be stored on a plurality of computers and be distributed in some cases.
  • network 120 may be used to communicate with a receiving entity such as a vendor 150.
  • Vendor 150 may include a computing device configured to perform the embodiments herein, including communication with computing device 110 and the public ledger / blockchain 140, as well as verification as described below.
  • the vendor 150 may be providing goods or services in exchange for the cryptocurrency associated with digital wallet 118.
  • computing device 110 may be proximate to a vendor 150 and in this case communication directly between the computing device 110 and vendor 150 is possible.
  • Bitcoin itself does not provide any means to issue a theft report. There is no current mechanism within the public ledger to flag stolen Bitcoins.
  • an honest vendor can examine suspicious transactions or use theft reports to detect fraudulent transactions. An honest vendor can therefore refuse to enter into new transactions that would that they believe may involve stolen funds or be otherwise fraudulent. The honest vendor can even review or trace through past transactions to measure what percentage of funds in an account are suspicious or fraudulent.
  • a thief’s efforts to circumvent the fraud detection system is called laundering.
  • a thief may transfer a large amount of the victim’s funds to his or her own account. The thief would then try to spend this amount before the victim issues a theft report (which flags the funds in the thief’s account as stolen).
  • a fraud detection system may therefore be designed to suspect funds spent too soon after a large transfer.
  • a thief might also try to make many small transfers in a short amount of time to multiple accounts. This type of activity may again be flagged as suspicious.
  • authorities may attempt to physically apprehend the people spending the funds, for example, by offering to make a personal transaction with the thief.
  • Proof of generation allows for the binding of a message to a public key.
  • the public key can then be verified against the message to ensure the public key is associated with the message. This is, for example, described in US Patent Number 9,240,884, January 19, 2016, to Brown.
  • proof of generation is used to generate a public key with an attached message.
  • proof of generation when the public key is generated, a message is bound to the public key. The binding of this message to the public key can be verified by anybody.
  • the binding is unique, in that it is impossible to have two different messages bound to a public key. Even a malicious entity generating the private key and public key cannot create two different messages bound to the same public key.
  • a public key with a proof of generation message can be used just like any public key and has no limitations other than being bound to a single proof of generation message.
  • a proof of generation public key can be used for digital signatures and for key exchange, or for any other kind of public key cryptography.
  • Proof of generation can be either authenticated or unauthenticated, as explained below.
  • the bound message is in some way authenticated.
  • the bound message can contain a digital signature of a certification authority, or some other trusted party.
  • the proof of generation is authenticated due to the participation of the certification authority.
  • a public key can be reconstructed from implicit certificates. Further, anybody can create an implicit certificate, from which a public key can be reconstructed. However, the only way someone can know the private key for a reconstructed public key is if they participated with the certification authority in the creation of the public/private key pair. Therefore, for implicit certificates to provide full security, including proof of generation, the owner of the reconstructed public key must somehow prove possession of the corresponding private key. This proof of possession is typically demonstrated by signing a message or decrypting a ciphertext. In the context of proof of generation, the proof of generation is not completed until the proof of possession is provided. Up until proof of possession, the security is deemed implicit.
  • Figure 2 shows a method for generating public and private keys utilizing a message m in an Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA).
  • EDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
  • a message digest e is calculated using a hash function on message m.
  • the function hash is a cryptographic hash function that gives an integer result.
  • s is an integer in the interval [0, n-1 ], and is preferably random.
  • the value k ⁇ s an integer chosen at random in the interval [0, n-1 ].
  • the value n is the size of the field for the cryptography.
  • the value r is an integer value corresponding to an elliptic curve point R, where R is referred to as the signature ephemeral public key and k is referred to as the ephemeral private key.
  • a computing device may verify that the public key is generated based on the message m.
  • the process starts at block 310 and proceeds to block 312 in which the verifying computing device receives the public key Q and the message m.
  • the process then proceeds to block 314.
  • R) then r’can be computed as r’ Flash
  • the verifier could then compare r’and rat block 316, and if the two match, this indicates that the public key was generated using the message m.
  • FIG. 4 In another embodiment, shown with Figure 4, a more general method which does not necessarily use elliptic curve cryptography is provided.
  • the process of Figure 4 starts at block 410 and proceeds to block 412 in which an integer value k is selected.
  • the value k is an integer in the range [0, n-1 ]-
  • Such public and private keys can then be used for a public ledger cryptography system.
  • a verifier can verify that the public key is bound to the message m utilizing the process of Figure 5.
  • the process of Figure 5 starts at block 510 and proceeds to block 512 in which the verifier receives a hashed exponential triple ( m,R,Q ).
  • a“purpose string” that is used as part of the message to generate the public key.
  • a purpose string identifies the purpose of the account within the public ledger.
  • An honest recipient of funds can ask an alleged account holder for the purpose string in some cases.
  • the purpose string may be volunteered by the alleged account holder.
  • the purpose string may be made available through a public database, or through the ledger itself.
  • the purpose string is used as a prevention against fraud and is set at the time the account is created, prior to any fraud occurring.
  • proof of generation is used to provide a purpose for the account.
  • the purpose may then be verified during a transaction on the public ledger.
  • the message to which a public key is bound is re-designated to be a purpose string.
  • the purpose string can include arbitrary data. Specific content of the purpose string is discussed below.
  • a process is provided on how to use a purpose string in the context of cryptocurrency.
  • Alice uses her public key with another honest party Bob
  • the other party Bob can request to see the purpose string.
  • Alice can then provide the purpose string and Bob can inspect the purpose string.
  • Bob honors the purpose string, ensuring the transaction conforms to the details contained in the purpose string.
  • One key property of the purpose string is that there can be at most one purpose string per public key. This property is a consequence of the proof generation method as described above. It is infeasible to generate the same public key with two different purpose strings.
  • the purpose string can be kept private between Alice and Bob, if desired.
  • the purpose string can be kept public, such as in a public database,
  • a public key can be used without a purpose string.
  • the purpose string if originated from an unauthenticated proof-of- generation method, can be common to many different public key, so does not establish uniqueness of the public key
  • the customer computing device 610 may attempt the transaction using a public ledger, as shown with message 620 between the customer and vendor 612.
  • Message 620 may be sent, for example, over a network, or may be based on a short-range communication between the customer computing device 610 and a computing device for the vendor 612.
  • the vendor 612 may then verify that the customer associated with computing device 610 has sufficient funds, as shown at block 622.
  • the verification at block 622 may query the ledger to ensure that sufficient funds are associated with customer 610.
  • the computing device of vendor 612 may then request the purpose string for the account, as shown with message 630.
  • message 630 in the embodiment of Figure 4 is sent to the customer computing device 610.
  • the computing device of vendor 612 may then verify that the public key associated with the customer, as shown at block 640.
  • the verification may be done in accordance with Figure 3 or Figure 5 above, for example. This ensures that the public key is associated with the purpose string that was provided in message 632.
  • the computing device of vendor 612 may attempt to verify the transaction at block 650. Verifying the transaction means that the transaction falls within the boundaries of the purpose string.
  • the vendor may then permit or deny the transaction, as shown with message 660.
  • the permitting or denying may be done automatically at a computing device in some embodiments. In the other embodiments, the permitting or denying may be based on user input to a computing device based on information presented at the computing device.
  • a message 660 may be sent immediately after block 640, denying the transaction.
  • the computing device of vendor 612 may refer to the public ledger to see how many transactions have occurred from such account and see whether the current transaction would exceed the transaction limit within the purpose string.
  • the computing device of vendor 612 may verify that the amount of the transfer proposed is below the value in the purpose string.
  • the purpose string may have a specific format which would facilitate the parsing of the purpose string by a computing device associated with the vendor 612, thereby enabling the computing device to perform the verification at block 640.
  • natural language processing may be utilized to find limitations within the purpose string.
  • the purpose string may provide a way to add transaction limitations to public ledger cryptocurrency.
  • the purpose string may only permit a transaction when the account holder is physically present and not on-online.
  • the purpose string may contain geographic boundaries for where the transaction can occur. Therefore, the funds may only be used within the such geographic area, such as a city, province, state or country.
  • the transaction may be required to be performed in a public place. Therefore, a positioning system associated with the computing device of the vendor 612 may determine whether the device is in a public space or private space and therefore allow or deny the transaction.
  • the purpose string may contain an identifier for a customer.
  • the purpose string includes data that can be used to identify the true account holder.
  • the data may be in a form that allows the honest recipient to verify the identification.
  • the purpose string may provide the name of the true account holder, in text form.
  • an honest vendor may have some means to verify the name of the person attempting to perform the transaction.
  • the vendor may know the account holder, for example through a pre-existing relationship.
  • the honest recipient or vendor may request to see other authenticated forms of identification, such as a driver's license or passport.
  • the honest recipient may check the name on the official document to find whether it matches the name in the purpose string.
  • the strength of identification depends on the strength of the official document or existing relationship.
  • the purpose sting may be data that provides biometric data such as an image of the true account holder.
  • the honest recipient may compare the image in the purpose string to an image of the alleged account holder. For example, this may be used when transactions are done in person, or using a webcam, among other options.
  • biometric data such as a fingerprint, voice pattern, among other options.
  • the purpose string may contain an image of an account holders driver's license. This might include an image of the true account holder, the handwritten signature of the holder, among other information. This information can then be matched against the actual driver's license, as well as a direct image of the alleged account holder and the alleged account holder’s signature.
  • the purpose string is authenticated by a certification authority.
  • the underlying proof of generation method could be an implicit certificate, or the purpose could contain a message similar to a traditional public key certificate.
  • the certification authority verifies the identity of the true account holder at the time of the account creation.
  • the certification authority verifies the identity of the true account holder at the time of the account creation.
  • the purely digital information that is usually used for authentication might have been compromised.
  • one or more purpose strings may be embedded in the message that is used to generate a public key. The use of such purpose string may then allow a recipient to screen a transaction prior to allowing the transaction to proceed.
  • Examples can further include fixed or mobile user equipments, such as internet of things (loT) devices, endpoints, home automation devices, medical equipment in hospital or home environments, inventory tracking devices, environmental monitoring devices, energy management devices, infrastructure management devices, vehicles or devices for vehicles, fixed electronic devices, among others.
  • LoT internet of things
  • endpoints home automation devices
  • medical equipment in hospital or home environments inventory tracking devices
  • environmental monitoring devices energy management devices
  • infrastructure management devices vehicles or devices for vehicles, fixed electronic devices, among others.
  • Vehicles includes motor vehicles (e.g., automobiles, cars, trucks, buses, motorcycles, etc.), aircraft (e.g., airplanes, unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned aircraft systems, drones, helicopters, etc.), spacecraft (e.g., spaceplanes, space shuttles, space capsules, space stations, satellites, etc.), watercraft (e.g., ships, boats, hovercraft, submarines, etc.), railed vehicles (e.g., trains and trams, etc.), and other types of vehicles including any combinations of any of the foregoing, whether currently existing or after arising.
  • motor vehicles e.g., automobiles, cars, trucks, buses, motorcycles, etc.
  • aircraft e.g., airplanes, unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned aircraft systems, drones, helicopters, etc.
  • spacecraft e.g., spaceplanes, space shuttles, space capsules, space stations, satellites, etc.
  • watercraft e.g., ships, boats, hovercraft, submarines, etc
  • device 710 includes a processor 720 and a communications subsystem 730, where the processor 720 and communications subsystem 730 cooperate to perform the methods of the embodiments described above.
  • Communications subsystem 720 may, in some embodiments, comprise multiple subsystems, for example for different radio technologies.
  • Processor 720 is configured to execute programmable logic, which may be stored, along with data, on device 710, and shown in the example of Figure 7 as memory 740.
  • Memory 740 can be any tangible, non-transitory computer readable storage medium.
  • the computer readable storage medium may be a tangible or in transitory/non-transitory medium such as optical (e.g., CD, DVD, etc.), magnetic (e.g., tape), flash drive, hard drive, or other memory known in the art.
  • device 710 may access data or programmable logic from an external storage medium, for example through communications subsystem 730.
  • Communications between the various elements of device 710 may be through an internal bus 760 in one embodiment. However, other forms of communication are possible.
  • the server may also provision or indicate a data for content delivery network (CDN) to await download by the electronic device at a later time, such as a subsequent activity of electronic device.
  • CDN content delivery network
  • data may be sent directly from the server, or other infrastructure, such as a distributed infrastructure, or a CDN, as part of or separate from the system.
  • storage mediums can include any or some combination of the following: a semiconductor memory device such as a dynamic or static random access memory (a DRAM or SRAM), an erasable and programmable read-only memory (EPROM), an electrically erasable and programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) and flash memory; a magnetic disk such as a fixed, floppy and removable disk; another magnetic medium including tape; an optical medium such as a compact disk (CD) or a digital video disk (DVD); or another type of storage device.
  • a semiconductor memory device such as a dynamic or static random access memory (a DRAM or SRAM), an erasable and programmable read-only memory (EPROM), an electrically erasable and programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) and flash memory
  • a magnetic disk such as a fixed, floppy and removable disk
  • another magnetic medium including tape an optical medium such as a compact disk (CD) or a digital video disk (DVD); or another type of storage device.
  • CD compact disk
  • DVD

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Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé au niveau d'un dispositif informatique dans un système de cryptographie de registre public, le procédé comprenant la création d'une chaîne d'objectifs, la chaîne d'objectifs définissant des paramètres de transaction pour un compte dans le système de cryptographie de registre public ; l'utilisation de la chaîne d'objectifs afin de créer une clé privée et une clé publique associée pour un compte dans le système de cryptographie de registre public ; et la fourniture de la chaîne d'objectifs pour l'utilisation dans la vérification d'une transaction d'un compte dans le système de cryptographie de registre public.
PCT/CA2019/051439 2018-10-12 2019-10-09 Procédé et système pour clés publiques à usage unique pour registre public Ceased WO2020073124A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (6)

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CA3111033A CA3111033A1 (fr) 2018-10-12 2019-10-09 Procede et systeme pour cles publiques a usage unique pour registre public
ES19871914T ES2985270T3 (es) 2018-10-12 2019-10-09 Método y sistema para claves públicas de un solo propósito para los libros de registro público
EP24167401.9A EP4407477B1 (fr) 2018-10-12 2019-10-09 Procédé et système pour clés publiques à usage unique pour registres publics
EP19871914.8A EP3834118B1 (fr) 2018-10-12 2019-10-09 Procédé et système pour clés publiques à usage unique pour registre public
KR1020217008767A KR102823702B1 (ko) 2018-10-12 2019-10-09 공개 원장용의 단일 목적 공개 키를 위한 방법 및 시스템
CN201980066178.7A CN112823350B (zh) 2018-10-12 2019-10-09 用于针对公共账本的单目的公钥的方法和系统

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US16/158,971 2018-10-12
US16/158,971 US11263630B2 (en) 2018-10-12 2018-10-12 Method and system for single purpose public keys for public ledgers

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EP4407477B1 (fr) 2025-08-13
KR102823702B1 (ko) 2025-06-20
EP3834118B1 (fr) 2024-05-08
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US20220147986A1 (en) 2022-05-12
US11263630B2 (en) 2022-03-01
CN112823350A (zh) 2021-05-18
KR20210075076A (ko) 2021-06-22
EP4407477A2 (fr) 2024-07-31
ES2985270T3 (es) 2024-11-04
EP4407477C0 (fr) 2025-08-13
EP3834118C0 (fr) 2024-05-08
CA3111033A1 (fr) 2020-04-16
US20200118130A1 (en) 2020-04-16
CN112823350B (zh) 2025-01-03
EP3834118A4 (fr) 2021-09-15
EP3834118A1 (fr) 2021-06-16

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