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WO2019070669A1 - Détection d'intrusion à des fins de destruction et activation de contamination - Google Patents

Détection d'intrusion à des fins de destruction et activation de contamination Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2019070669A1
WO2019070669A1 PCT/US2018/053914 US2018053914W WO2019070669A1 WO 2019070669 A1 WO2019070669 A1 WO 2019070669A1 US 2018053914 W US2018053914 W US 2018053914W WO 2019070669 A1 WO2019070669 A1 WO 2019070669A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
safeguarded
triggering system
preventative measure
intrusion detection
primary
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/US2018/053914
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English (en)
Inventor
James HARTANTO
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
IH IP Holdings Ltd
Original Assignee
IH IP Holdings Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by IH IP Holdings Ltd filed Critical IH IP Holdings Ltd
Publication of WO2019070669A1 publication Critical patent/WO2019070669A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • E—FIXED CONSTRUCTIONS
    • E05—LOCKS; KEYS; WINDOW OR DOOR FITTINGS; SAFES
    • E05G—SAFES OR STRONG-ROOMS FOR VALUABLES; BANK PROTECTION DEVICES; SAFETY TRANSACTION PARTITIONS
    • E05G1/00—Safes or strong-rooms for valuables
    • E05G1/10—Safes or strong-rooms for valuables with alarm, signal or indicator
    • E—FIXED CONSTRUCTIONS
    • E05—LOCKS; KEYS; WINDOW OR DOOR FITTINGS; SAFES
    • E05G—SAFES OR STRONG-ROOMS FOR VALUABLES; BANK PROTECTION DEVICES; SAFETY TRANSACTION PARTITIONS
    • E05G1/00—Safes or strong-rooms for valuables
    • E05G1/14—Safes or strong-rooms for valuables with means for masking or destroying the valuables, e.g. in case of theft

Definitions

  • This disclosure relates generally to preventing or thwarting reverse engineering, and more specifically to safety measures that are configured to detect intrusion and activate destruction and/or contamination
  • a safeguarded device includes: a primary device; at least one preventative measure; a triggering system operatively coupled to implement the preventative measure; and an intrusion detection system operatively coupled to the triggering system, the intrusion detection system configured to, upon detecting at least one criterion, trigger the triggering system to implement the preventative measure.
  • the at least one preventative measure may include a destructive preventative measure configured to at least damage the primary device when implemented by the triggering system.
  • the destructive preventative measure may include an incendiary device, which may include thermite.
  • the at least one preventative measure may include a contaminating apparatus configured to release at least one contaminant to contaminate the primary device.
  • the at least one preventative measure may include a contaminating apparatus having: multiple chambers each containing a respective contaminant; and multiple valves, each connected to a respective one of the multiple chambers.
  • the intrusion detection system may trigger the triggering system to implement the contaminating apparatus by opening the valves thereby releasing the contaminants into or onto the primary device.
  • the triggering system may implement the contaminating apparatus by opening at least some of the valves simultaneously.
  • the triggering system may implement the contaminating apparatus by opening at least some of the valves in a predetermined order.
  • At least one contaminant may include a corrosive chemical.
  • the corrosive chemical may be an acid, a base, aqua regia, hydrochloric acid, or sodium hydroxide.
  • the at least one contaminant may include an oxidant.
  • the oxidant may include at least one of potassium permanganate, and oxygen.
  • the primary device may be a reactor device where exothermic reactions occur.
  • the reactor device may be an LENR device.
  • Detecting at least one criterion may include detecting that the safeguarded device is being penetrated, entered, opened, or accessed.
  • the safeguarded device may include an interface device for entering codes to confirm authorized entry, access or use of the safeguarded device without prompting the intrusion detection system to trigger the triggering system to implement the preventative measures.
  • the interface device may be configured for use only locally under tactile control.
  • the interface device may be configured to be accessed remotely.
  • the interface device may require an encryption key to confirm authorized entry, access or use of the safeguarded device.
  • the intrusion detection system includes a light sensor, and detecting at least one criterion includes the light sensor detecting light.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic representation of a safeguarded device according to at least one embodiment.
  • FIG. 2 is a further detailed schematic representation of a safeguarded device according to FIG. 1 or another embodiment.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic representation of a primary device and a preventative measure in the form of a contaminating apparatus according to at least one embodiment.
  • a primary device or technology otherwise vulnerable to reverse engineering is equipped or provided with preventative measures so as to be rendered a safeguarded device, which is resistant to reverse engineering.
  • the primary device or technology may be, for example, a commercial or industrial equipment item.
  • the primary device or technology may be for a reactor device where exothermic reactions occur, for example low-energy nuclear reactions (LENR).
  • Preventive measures refer to various inventive apparatus embodiments, mechanism embodiments, system embodiments, and method embodiments as described expressly herein and other embodiments within the scope of these descriptions.
  • any traces left behind after activating a destruction mechanism are to be so little that reverse engineering and deduction of the structure and use of the primary device would be prevented.
  • those in possession of these preventative technologies have the first move, and are able to dictate initial stages, anticipate what reverse engineers would do, and prepare an effective way to block their methods.
  • reverse engineering may occur, because an embodied strategy does not change once a particular safeguarded device is released for use, efforts to reverse engineer a device protected by technologies described herein are at least provided early market protection by slowing the effective entry of products made with any benefits of reverse engineering.
  • intrusion detection technologies include Performance Monitoring and Fault Location (PMFL) technology, sensors, and encryption codes.
  • PMFL technology a device can be monitored remotely. Sensors will help detect an intrusion.
  • Some sensors that can be used are light sensors and proximity sensors.
  • Encryption methods can be deployed, for example in the form of an encryption key that needs to be entered in an input device before access is permitted.
  • damage or destruction of a reactor or other primary device may be triggered upon intrusion.
  • Incendiary materials such as thermite can be used.
  • Thermite can be made by mixing iron oxide with aluminum powder, followed by the addition of sulfur to make the ignition process easier.
  • contamination of a reactor or other primary device may be triggered upon intrusion.
  • contamination any contaminants would need to be properly contained.
  • the contaminants can be placed inside separate chambers, and released when intrusion is detected.
  • Some strategies include using dummy variables to confuse reverse engineers, destroying the primary device by mixing certain chemicals, and introducing contaminants.
  • Anti-intrusion and reverse-engineering technologies if singly implemented, may be defeated or defused. By combining multiple modes of anti-intrusion and reverse-engineering technologies, overcoming them will be made difficult. There are ways to stop such technologies from working, especially when only one piece of technology is used. Thus, implementations described herein are set forth with an understanding of ways to bypass independently applied technologies so as to make such bypassing more difficult.
  • preventative measures to prevent reverse engineering include intrusion detection, optionally followed by destruction and or contamination.
  • solutions and measures within the scope of these descriptions include, for example, PMFL, sensors, and encryption.
  • Destruction and contamination measures can apply a mixture of chemicals. Such measures may be provided in the safeguarded device 100 of FIG. 1.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic representation of a safeguarded device 100 according to at least one embodiment.
  • the safeguarded device 100 includes a primary device 110 equipped or provided with at least one preventative measure 120, which may be a mechanism, apparatus, system, sub- housing or other encapsulation for example.
  • the primary device 100 may be a reactor device where exothermic reactions occur.
  • the at least one preventative measure can be located proximal to, or partially or fully surrounding, the device area, and may be connected to the device.
  • the safeguarded device 100 may include an outer shell 132 that encapsulates both the primary device 110 and some or all of the preventative measure(s) 120.
  • the primary device 110 may also include a shell or proximal encapsulation 112.
  • PMFL In some PMFL implementation, specific lists of criteria would have to be fulfilled to prompt or prevent the triggering of destruction or contamination of the primary device 100. For embodiments in which remote activation can be triggered, communication to and from the safeguarded device 100 are preferred. PMFL facilitates daily monitoring to ensure nothing wrong happens.
  • the easiest sensors to use may be light and or proximity sensors. The activation even for a light sensor would be light, which would be triggered if the sensor is exposed to light. Likewise, a proximity sensor would activate when it notices something being detached from the system, leading to the triggering of destruction or contamination.
  • some of the criteria for intrusion detection would include: determination of whether the primary device 110 is on; determination of whether the safeguarded device 100, including the primary device 110, is at its home base; determination of whether the safeguarded device 100 or primary device 110 are within a predetermined physical range of other onboard or associated devices; determination of whether the safeguarded device 100 and primary device 110 are working properly; and determination of whether the safeguarded device 100 or primary device 110 are being penetrated, entered, opened, or accessed, with reference for example to the outer shell 132 and proximal encapsulation 112 respectively.
  • the determination of whether the safeguarded device 100 or primary device 110 is being penetrated, entered, opened, or accessed includes determination of whether the incident is authorized. Other criteria are within the scope of these descriptions.
  • a signal can be sent periodically, and the loss, interruption or altering of the signal timing pattern or other communication failure can cause triggering of destruction or contamination of the primary device 100. For example, triggering may occur upon failure to communicate a particular number of times or upon not fulfilling a majority of the criteria.
  • the determination of whether the safeguarded device 100 or primary device 110 are within a predetermined physical range of other devices serves as a criterion because the primary device 110 is within the safeguarded device 100 in many embodiments, devices that are components of the safeguarded device 100 should have a predetermined distance between them. If that distance is breached, altered, or exceeded, an assumption that the component devices are out of the product shell is justified. For example the outer shell 132 is likely opened.
  • FIG. 2 is a further detailed schematic representation of a safeguarded device 100 according to FIG. 1 or another embodiment.
  • the primary device 110 is equipped with a destructive preventative measure 120, which includes an incendiary device 122 that damages or destroys the primary device 110 when triggered by intrusion detection.
  • Incendiary materials such as thermite can be used. Thermite could be placed around or within the proximal encapsulation 112 walls of the primary device 110.
  • a triggering system 124 shown operatively coupled to the incendiary device 122 is configured to initiate ignition of the incendiary device 122.
  • the triggering system 124 may be, for example, a match, sparker, or other starting mechanism.
  • the triggering system 124 could be a match connected to a power source that turns on. When a trigger is sent to destroy the primary device 110, the power source turns on, creating a spark on the match, which in turn will ignite the incendiary device.
  • the proximal encapsulation 112 and outer shell 132 serve as a two stage safety and containment system.
  • the incendiary device 122 in such embodiments is a calibrated charge device that produces heat and pressure that is contained safely within the proximal encapsulation 112, destroying only the contents thereof.
  • the outer shell 132 further serves as a reliance back up safety containment vessel.
  • Various incendiary devices having various heat producing properties are within the scope of these descriptions. In some embodiments the incendiary device produces only sufficient heat to damage the primary device 110.
  • the incendiary device 122 may be just a thermal device that releases on environmentally safe amounts of heat so as to, for example, melt, compromise, and/or obfuscate any thermally sensitive components of the primary device.
  • the incendiary device embodiments made available to various users and institutions will vary in compliance with regulatory and licensing requirements and authorities.
  • the triggering system may include any and all of mechanical components, electrical components, optical components, and computer components.
  • the triggering system 124 is operatively coupled to the preventative measure 120 to actuate, activate, engage, power, release or otherwise implement the preventative measure 120.
  • an intrusion detection system 140 operatively coupled to the triggering system
  • the intrusion detection system 140 is or includes a light sensor by which, upon light entering the safeguarded device 100, the incendiary device 122 is ignited via the triggering system 124.
  • the intrusion detection system may include any and all of mechanical components, electrical components, optical components, and computer components.
  • the light sensor may be near the top, edge, extremity, seam or seal of the safe guarded device 100 as represented in FIG. 2.
  • the light sensor can detect visible light since people typically work under lit conditions.
  • One or more light sensors may be included to assure intrusion detection along any edge, seam, seal or surface.
  • the triggering system 124 may or more may not require a power source, as it may be activated and powered by light.
  • a light source 142 is also shown in FIG. 2.
  • the light source 142 maybe be active when the interior of the safeguarded device 100 is accessed or entered such that, even in dark exterior conditions, unauthorized access will trigger the incendiary device 122 by way of the intrusion detection system 140 light sensor by detection of the output of the light source 142.
  • the intrusion detection system 140 may also include or be a proximity sensor configured to detect if anything is disconnected. It can be connected to the important parts of the safeguarded device 100 such as the primary device 110, which may be a reactor, and other things that are considered valuable. Therefore, if one of these parts is removed, the intrusion detection system 140 would emit a signal to destroy the primary device 110.
  • the proximity sensors' data will be relative to each respective part of the safeguarded device 100 to minimize the reading error. However, if the part is being removed, it will automatically trigger the destruction or contamination.
  • An encryption key could be used similar to a banking system where a code is generated and an appropriate response is required within a certain period of time.
  • the code is to be generated remotely and there would be a choice to relay the code to the person opening the device (maintenance worker).
  • a method to ensure safety would be that, even though the code is randomly generated, there cannot be similar codes generated at the same time. So one device's code will never be the same as another.
  • Another possibility is that authorized people will know the key, so they can decode it either by their knowledge or by a device that can help them do that. The first option is better since less people will know the key or how to decode it. If the input code is incorrect for a predetermined number of times, it would activate the destruction or contamination of the reactor.
  • a user interface device 102 is shown in FIG. 2 for use in entering codes or keys to confirm authorize entry, access or use of the safeguarded device without prompting the intrusion detection system 140 to trigger the triggering system 124 to implement the preventative measures 120.
  • the user interface device 102 may include, for example, a keypad, a display, a touch-responsive screen, and other input and output devices including auditory devices.
  • the user interface device 102 may be used only locally under tactile control or may be accessed remotely, for example wirelessly.
  • the user interface device 102 may be configured for access and use by both human operators and automated nearby or remote systems.
  • An encryption key can increase the time for unauthorized entry to occur without detection, since there are many ways to create an encryption key. This can be a big hurdle for reverse engineers because they would need to know the key to decipher the code. If they input the wrong code a predetermined number of times sequentially, then the safeguarded device 100 automatically self- destructs in some embodiments.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic representation of a primary device 110 equipped or provided with a preventative measure 120 in the form of a contaminating apparatus, which includes multiple separate chambers 150a-150f, which store respective contaminants 152a-152f. The number of contaminants and chambers can vary among embodiments.
  • Each chamber 150a-150f is coupled to the primary device 110 through a respective valve 154a-154f, which can be opened when a potential breach of a safeguarded device 100 is detected.
  • the preventative measure 120 of FIG. 2 is in the form of the contaminating apparatus 120 of FIG. 3, and the intrusion detection system 140 (FIG.
  • operatively coupled to the triggering system 124 is configured to actuate, activate, engage, power or otherwise trigger the triggering system so as to implement the contaminating apparatus by opening the valves 154a-154f simultaneously or in any predetermined sequential order or fashion upon unauthorized intrusion or access into the safeguarded device 100, for example by breach or opening of the outer shell 132.
  • the apparatus in at least one embodiment includes a mechanism to detect what is happening and prompt the release of the other contaminants into or upon the primary device 110.
  • contaminants include glycerol and potassium permanganate in separate chambers. These contaminants can combine to react with each other, creating an intense flame or incendiary reaction, destroying everything inside the primary device 110.
  • Other potential contaminants are corrosive chemicals and oxidants.
  • the amount of the contaminants used can be calculated by using mole calculations.
  • the primary device is a reactor device having reactants
  • the contaminants may be in excess compared to the reactants to ensure that the ingredients of the original reactants get destroyed or obfuscated.
  • Corrosive chemicals can destroy prepared reactants, reactive surfaces, and/or fusion reactants. Oxidants can oxidize the reactants, which can stop a reactor if electrochemical reactions are involved.
  • Non-limiting examples of corrosive chemicals include strong acids and bases, aqua regia, hydrochloric acid, sodium hydroxide, etc.
  • Non-limiting examples of oxidants include potassium permanganate, and oxygen, etc.
  • Open air or dirt can also be considered as exposure contaminants that can render a reactor useless.
  • contaminants There are many more possibilities for choosing contaminants, the ones described expressly are just a few.
  • the contaminants may be in liquid or solid form, and they may not mix well inside the reactor device and there could be remnants of each in the chamber, allowing reverse engineers to find out what contaminants were injected.
  • These challenges can be addressed, for example, by using measured amounts of contaminants and applying stoichiometric calculations to determine suitable amounts.
  • Another method to confuse reverse engineers includes the use of dummy variables.
  • the dummy variables can either be inert and do nothing chemically, or be part of the original reactants.
  • the dummy variables that are inert can be placed together in one or more of the contaminant chambers, giving reverse engineers more things to analyze.
  • a dummy variable can be one of the original reactants that start a exothermic reaction so as to disguise the real amounts of reaction materials needed for regular use of the primary device, which is information likely to be sought by reverse engineers.
  • the dummy variables are deployed as stalling techniques.
  • a problem that can arise using PMFL technology comes if communications get blocked such that a PMFL equipped system may not be able to send or receive a destruction command.
  • a PMFL equipped system may not be able to send or receive a destruction command.
  • an unauthorized person could either remove the light sensor in darkness before turning on other lights or work outside the detection range of the light sensor.
  • a proximity sensor there may be many objects inside the product that can cause the proximity sensor to malfunction. Such sensors may not work well after a long time under hot conditions and/or if not charged.

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Abstract

La présente invention concerne un dispositif protégé qui comprend : un dispositif primaire ; au moins une mesure préventive ; un système de déclenchement couplé fonctionnellement afin de mettre en œuvre la mesure préventive ; un système de détection d'intrusion couplé fonctionnellement au système de déclenchement, le système de détection d'intrusion étant conçu pour déclencher, lors de la détection d'au moins un critère, le système de déclenchement afin de mettre en œuvre la mesure préventive. La ou les mesures préventives peuvent comprendre une mesure préventive destructive conçue pour au moins endommager le dispositif primaire lorsqu'elle est mise en œuvre par le système de déclenchement. La mesure préventive destructive peut comprendre un dispositif incendiaire, qui peut comprendre de la thermite. La ou les mesures préventives peuvent comprendre un appareil contaminant conçu pour libérer au moins un contaminant pour contaminer le dispositif primaire.
PCT/US2018/053914 2017-10-04 2018-10-02 Détection d'intrusion à des fins de destruction et activation de contamination Ceased WO2019070669A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

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US201762568023P 2017-10-04 2017-10-04
US62/568,023 2017-10-04

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WO2019070669A1 true WO2019070669A1 (fr) 2019-04-11

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Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO1993002435A1 (fr) * 1991-07-19 1993-02-04 Transalarm Limited Appareil d'invalidation de documents et declencheur destine a le faire fonctionner
US20070229285A1 (en) * 2006-03-15 2007-10-04 Angel Secure Networks, Inc. Secure panel with remotely controlled embedded devices
US20120207261A1 (en) * 2011-02-08 2012-08-16 Noel James L Nuclear Power Facility
US20150027353A1 (en) * 2013-07-26 2015-01-29 Tencate Advanced Armor Usa, Inc. Active safe

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO1993002435A1 (fr) * 1991-07-19 1993-02-04 Transalarm Limited Appareil d'invalidation de documents et declencheur destine a le faire fonctionner
US20070229285A1 (en) * 2006-03-15 2007-10-04 Angel Secure Networks, Inc. Secure panel with remotely controlled embedded devices
US20120207261A1 (en) * 2011-02-08 2012-08-16 Noel James L Nuclear Power Facility
US20150027353A1 (en) * 2013-07-26 2015-01-29 Tencate Advanced Armor Usa, Inc. Active safe

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