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WO2018211790A1 - Ecu (unité de commande électronique) - Google Patents

Ecu (unité de commande électronique) Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2018211790A1
WO2018211790A1 PCT/JP2018/008882 JP2018008882W WO2018211790A1 WO 2018211790 A1 WO2018211790 A1 WO 2018211790A1 JP 2018008882 W JP2018008882 W JP 2018008882W WO 2018211790 A1 WO2018211790 A1 WO 2018211790A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
data
ecu
received
cpu
time
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/JP2018/008882
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English (en)
Japanese (ja)
Inventor
浩介 中園
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Bosch Corp
Original Assignee
Bosch Corp
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Bosch Corp filed Critical Bosch Corp
Priority to CN201880047811.3A priority Critical patent/CN110915170B/zh
Priority to DE112018002549.7T priority patent/DE112018002549T5/de
Priority to JP2019519078A priority patent/JP6838147B2/ja
Publication of WO2018211790A1 publication Critical patent/WO2018211790A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L12/00—Data switching networks
    • H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
    • H04L12/40—Bus networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H04W12/121—Wireless intrusion detection systems [WIDS]; Wireless intrusion prevention systems [WIPS]
    • H04W12/122—Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
    • H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
    • H04W4/48—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P] for in-vehicle communication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L12/00—Data switching networks
    • H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
    • H04L12/40—Bus networks
    • H04L2012/40208—Bus networks characterized by the use of a particular bus standard
    • H04L2012/40215—Controller Area Network CAN
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L12/00—Data switching networks
    • H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
    • H04L12/40—Bus networks
    • H04L2012/40267—Bus for use in transportation systems
    • H04L2012/40273—Bus for use in transportation systems the transportation system being a vehicle

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to an ECU, and is particularly suitable for application to an ECU disposed on an in-vehicle network.
  • CAN network In recent years, an in-vehicle network (CAN network) using a communication standard called CAN (Controller Area Network) has become widespread.
  • This CAN network is configured by connecting a plurality of electronic control units (ECUs) installed in a vehicle and a communication bus (CAN bus) using CAN.
  • the ECU can communicate (CAN communication) with other ECUs via the CAN bus.
  • the CAN bus is provided with a data link connector (DLC) while connecting the ECUs so that they can communicate with each other.
  • DLC data link connector
  • OBD On Board Diagnostics
  • Incorrect data is transmitted from a device connected to the DLC by wire to the CAN bus, or when a device capable of wireless communication is connected to the DLC and transmitted wirelessly to the CAN bus via this device. You could think so.
  • Patent Document 1 the difference between the previous transmission timing and the current transmission timing is calculated as the transmission cycle for the data transmitted to the CAN bus, and this transmission cycle is stored in advance as an invalid data determination.
  • a technique for determining the currently transmitted data as illegal data is disclosed.
  • one ECU can monitor the CAN bus, and can detect and invalidate this before another ECU completes reception of illegal data.
  • unauthorized data with the same ID and different ID as the legitimate data enters the CAN bus, and all the ECUs connected to the in-vehicle network are prevented from impersonation attacks that cause malfunction of the ECUs connected to the CAN bus. It can be defended.
  • Patent Document 1 requires an additional device for constantly monitoring data transmitted to the CAN bus. Specifically, in addition to a normal communication line that connects the ECU and the CAN bus, an additional communication line that connects the ECU and the CAN bus in parallel with this is further required. Further, additional processing such as processing for constantly monitoring data on the CAN bus, processing for determining whether or not the data is illegal, and invalidation processing when the data is illegal is required.
  • the present invention has been made in consideration of the above points, and proposes an ECU that can realize security protection while avoiding the complexity and cost increase of an in-vehicle network.
  • the CPU (100) of the ECU (10) is properly connected via the communication bus (20).
  • the data (D1) After receiving the data (D1), the data (D2 to D8) having the same ID as the regular data (D1) is received, and the number of times the data (D2 to D8) having the same ID is received within a certain period is determined in advance. If it is equal to or greater than the specified number of times (DC), it is determined that the state is abnormal, and a transition is made to a safe control state.
  • DC specified number of times
  • FIG. 1 is an overall configuration diagram of an in-vehicle network. It is an internal block diagram of ECU. It is a flowchart of a reception process. It is a conceptual diagram of a reception process.
  • FIG. 1 shows the overall configuration of the in-vehicle network N1 in the vehicle 1.
  • the in-vehicle network N1 is a network using a communication standard called CAN (Controller Area Network), and includes an electronic control unit (ECU) 10 and a CAN bus 20.
  • ECU electronice control unit
  • the ECU 10 is a control device that controls various operations of the vehicle 1.
  • the ECU 10 includes a CPU (Central Processing Unit), a RAM (Random Access Memory), a ROM (Read Only Memory), an input / output interface, and the like.
  • Each ECU 10 is connected to a CAN bus 20.
  • the ECUs 10 are connected to each other via the CAN bus 20 so as to communicate with each other.
  • the ECU 10 As the ECUs 10 connected to the CAN bus 20, the ECU 10 called an engine ECU comprehensively controls the operation of the vehicle 1. Therefore, in the present embodiment, by applying the present invention to this engine ECU, it is intended to realize security protection especially for control related to traveling.
  • the CAN bus 20 is a communication bus using CAN, and connects the ECUs 10 so that they can communicate with each other.
  • the CAN bus 20 includes a data link connector (DLC) 30.
  • the DLC 30 is a connection connector for connecting the scan tool 40 to the CAN bus 20 by wire or wireless.
  • a fault code generated by a self-diagnosis function (OBD: On Board Diagnostics) provided in the ECU 10 can be read.
  • OBD On Board Diagnostics
  • the service engineer can specify the failure location of the vehicle 1 with reference to the failure code displayed on the display screen of the scan tool 40.
  • illegal data is transmitted to the CAN bus 20 from the outside of the vehicle 1 via the DLC 30.
  • the illegal data here refers to data that is at least transmitted to the CAN bus 20 at a different timing from the regular data.
  • the ID of one regular data is “1” and is transmitted to the CAN bus 20 every “100 ms”
  • the data transmitted to the CAN bus 20 every “120 ms” is “1”.
  • it is handled as invalid data.
  • data with different IDs, or data with different contents even if the IDs are the same are naturally invalid data.
  • the ECU 10 connected to the CAN bus 20 receives this and performs arithmetic processing.
  • the engine ECU receives illegal data and performs arithmetic processing, there is a possibility that control relating to traveling may become impossible.
  • the ECU 10 even if unauthorized data is transmitted to the CAN bus 20, the ECU 10 excludes the unauthorized data from the target of the arithmetic processing, and only the regular data is the target of the arithmetic processing. Like to do. If the number of times that the ECU 10 receives illegal data via the CAN bus 20 increases, it is determined that this is an abnormal state and a safe control state is entered.
  • the safe control state includes a state where the engine is stopped (a state where the engine is stopped), a state where reception of data from the CAN bus 20 is refused, a state where the vehicle shifts to a limp home mode which maintains traveling with the minimum gear stage, etc. There is.
  • FIG. 2 shows the internal configuration of the ECU 10.
  • the ECU 10 includes a memory such as a RAM and a ROM (not shown), an input / output interface, and a CPU 100.
  • the CPU 100 includes programs or memories such as a data transmission / reception unit 101, a reception data monitoring unit 102, a CAN buffer 103, a control determination unit 104, and a calculation unit 105.
  • the data transmitting / receiving unit 101 receives normal or illegal data D0 to D8 from the CAN bus 20 and outputs them to the received data monitoring unit 102. Further, the data transmitting / receiving unit 101 transmits operation results D21 and D22 for the regular data among these data D0 to D8 or fail-safe data D23 for shifting to a safe control state to the CAN bus 20.
  • the calculation results D21 and D22 and fail-safe data D23 are then used for operations of other ECUs 10 and other devices.
  • the other ECU 10 or another device receives the fail safe data D23, safe control is executed regardless of the operation of the driver.
  • the received data monitoring unit 102 When the received data monitoring unit 102 receives regular or illegal data D0 to D8 from the data transmitting / receiving unit 101, the received data monitoring unit 102 outputs these data to the CAN buffer 103 and counts the number of times these data D0 to D8 are received. It is determined whether or not the state is abnormal.
  • the received data monitoring unit 102 when the received data monitoring unit 102 receives one regular data D0 as a reference, it outputs this to the CAN buffer 103 and starts a timer T held in the CPU 100 to count the time. Start.
  • the received data monitoring unit 102 refers to the specified time DT associated in advance for each ID, and outputs the received data D0 to D8 to the CAN buffer 103 until the specified time DT elapses.
  • the counter C counts the number of times these data D0 to D8 are received. That is, the reception data monitoring unit 102 counts the number of data receptions per unit time.
  • the reception data monitoring unit 102 refers to a predetermined number of times DC, and determines whether or not the number of receptions counted by the counter C is equal to or greater than the number of times DC. When the number of receptions exceeds the specified number of times DC, the reception data monitoring unit 102 determines that the state is abnormal. The reception data monitoring unit 102 outputs a monitoring result indicating an abnormal state to the control determination unit 104.
  • the CAN buffer 103 is a memory for storing data waiting for arithmetic processing. Based on the monitoring result from the received data monitoring unit 102, the control determination unit 104 determines whether the data stored in the CAN buffer 103 is to be calculated or excluded from the calculation target. Then, the control determination unit 104 outputs the determination result to the calculation unit 105.
  • the calculation unit 105 Based on the determination result from the control determination unit 104, the calculation unit 105 receives the data received within a predetermined time (within the window) after the lapse of the specified time DT among the data D0 to D8 stored in the CAN buffer 103. Calculation processing is performed to generate calculation results D21 and D22. Alternatively, the fail-safe data D23 is generated by excluding the calculation target.
  • the arithmetic unit 105 receives the data D0 for the data with the ID “1”. Thereafter, the data received in the window of 100 ms to 110 ms or 95 ms to 105 ms is arithmetically processed to generate arithmetic results D21 and D22.
  • the operation unit 105 excludes the data D0 to D8 stored in the CAN buffer 103 from the operation target, and generates fail-safe data D23 for shifting to a safe control state.
  • the calculation unit 105 outputs the generated calculation results D21 and D22 or fail-safe data D23 to the data transmission / reception unit 101.
  • FIG. 3 shows a flowchart of reception processing in the present embodiment.
  • the reception process is started from the time when the counter C is activated by the CPU 100 of the ECU 10, and is continuously executed thereafter.
  • the start timing of the counter C is assumed to be when the ECU 10 is powered on, but is not necessarily limited thereto.
  • the CPU 100 starts the counter C and starts counting the number of receptions (S1). Thereafter, when the CPU 100 receives one regular data from the CAN bus 20 (S2), it starts the timer T and starts counting time (S3).
  • the CPU 100 Since the CPU 100 has started the timer T and has received regular data in step S2, the CPU 100 counts up the number of receptions i by +1 (S4). Then, the CPU 100 determines whether or not the number of receptions i is i ⁇ the specified number of times DC (S5).
  • step S5 when it is determined that the specified number of times DC is “6”, the number of receptions i is “1” at the time when one regular data is received, so that the number of receptions i ⁇ the specified number of times DC, In step S5, a negative result is obtained.
  • the CPU 100 When the CPU 100 obtains a negative result in the determination at step S5 (S5: N), it outputs the received regular data to the CAN buffer 103 (S6). Then, the CPU 100 determines whether there is other received data after starting the timer T (S7). When the CPU 100 obtains a positive result in the determination at step S7 (S7: Y), the CPU 100 proceeds to step S4 and repeats the above processing.
  • step S7 the CPU 100 starts counting at the specified time DT associated with the ID of the regular data received at step S2, and at step S3. Referring to the count time, it is determined whether or not the count time has passed the specified time DT (S8).
  • step S8 When the CPU 100 obtains a negative result in the determination at step S8 (S8: N), the CPU 100 proceeds to step S4 until the count time passes the specified time DT, and repeats the above processing.
  • the CPU 100 obtains a positive result in the determination at step S5 (S5: Y), it determines that the state is abnormal (S9). And CPU100 transfers to a safe control state (S10), and complete
  • the CPU 100 obtains a positive result in the determination at step S8 (S8: Y), it stops and restarts the counter C, thereby resetting the number of counts and restarting counting the number of receptions (S12). ).
  • the CPU 100 determines whether data stored in the CAN buffer 103 is received within a predetermined time (in the window) after the lapse of the specified time DT (S13).
  • FIG. 4 shows a conceptual diagram of the reception process described in FIG. Hereinafter, the processing of the data D0 to D8 will be described along the time series.
  • the received data monitoring unit 102 starts the timer T and refers to the specified time DT. Further, the number of receptions of the counter C is incremented by +1.
  • the data D0 is output to the CAN buffer 103.
  • the data D0 stored in the CAN buffer 103 is calculated by the control determination unit 104 and then processed by the calculation unit 105. As a result, a calculation result D21 is generated.
  • the received data monitoring unit 102 monitors the received data. Specifically, time is counted by the timer T, and the number of receptions is counted by the counter C. Here, since only the data D0 is received, the number of receptions is one.
  • the data D1 is then output to the CAN buffer 103, and after being determined as a calculation target by the control determination unit 104, is calculated by the calculation unit 105. As a result, a calculation result D22 is generated.
  • the received data is monitored again.
  • a plurality of illegal data D2 to D7 are received during this period.
  • the monitoring result from the received data monitoring unit 102 is output to the control determining unit 104, and the data received thereafter by the control determining unit 104 is excluded from the calculation processing target.
  • the second window W is set here. As described above, the window W is periodically provided every time the specified time DT elapses.
  • the number of receptions of data having the same ID as data D0 among the data received thereafter is counted and within a certain period. If the number of receptions does not reach the specified number of times DC, the data D1 received thereafter is processed, and if the number of receptions exceeds the specified number of times DC, it is determined that the state is abnormal, and a safe control state is entered. I tried to do it.
  • the timer T is started when the regular data D0 is received, the number of times of reception of the data received until the count time exceeds the specified time DT, and the number of received times is the specified number of times DC. If the number of receptions reaches the specified number of times DC, the regular data D8 is excluded from the computation processing target. Instead, fail-safe data D23 is generated, and based on this, a safe control state is entered.
  • the ID and the specified time DT are associated with each other in advance, but in addition to this, the specified time DT and the window width (the time between time t1 and t3 in FIG. 4) are It is good also as matched.
  • the specified time DT is “99 ms” and the window width is “10 ms”
  • the specified time DT is “50 ms” and the window width is “5 ms” may be associated in advance. That is, the window width may be variable according to the number of receptions per unit time.
  • the data having a large number of receptions per unit time can be made shorter by making the window width short so that illegal data can be easily excluded from the processing target. Therefore, security protection can be realized more reliably.
  • the number of receptions is once reset when the count time exceeds the specified time DT.
  • the present invention is not limited to this, and may not be reset until the total number of receptions reaches the specified number of times DC. Good. That is, after the counter C starts counting the number of times of reception, the number of times of reception may be reset when the total number of times of reception of data received outside the window W provided periodically reaches the specified number of times DC. .
  • the processing can be simplified. Further, even if the illegal data is not received to the extent that it is determined to be abnormal, it can be determined that it is abnormal if it is regularly received.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Small-Scale Networks (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne une ECU (unité de commande électronique) qui peut assurer la protection et la sécurité tout en évitant une augmentation de la complexité et du coût d'un réseau embarqué. Une ECU (10) connectée à un bus CAN (20) est caractérisée en ce qu'une unité centrale (UC) (100) de l'ECU (10) reçoit des données normales (D1) via le bus de communication (20), puis reçoit des données (D2-D8) pour lesquelles l'ID est identique aux données normales (D1), et si le nombre de fois où des données (D2-D8) avec l'ID identique sont reçues dans une certaine période est supérieur à un nombre prescrit prédéterminé de fois (DC), détermine que l'état est anormal et passe à un état de commande sûr.
PCT/JP2018/008882 2017-05-18 2018-03-08 Ecu (unité de commande électronique) Ceased WO2018211790A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN201880047811.3A CN110915170B (zh) 2017-05-18 2018-03-08 Ecu
DE112018002549.7T DE112018002549T5 (de) 2017-05-18 2018-03-08 Elektronisches Steuergerät
JP2019519078A JP6838147B2 (ja) 2017-05-18 2018-03-08 Ｅｃｕ

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
JP2017-099285 2017-05-18
JP2017099285 2017-05-18

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WO2018211790A1 true WO2018211790A1 (fr) 2018-11-22

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PCT/JP2018/008882 Ceased WO2018211790A1 (fr) 2017-05-18 2018-03-08 Ecu (unité de commande électronique)

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JP (1) JP6838147B2 (fr)
CN (1) CN110915170B (fr)
DE (1) DE112018002549T5 (fr)
WO (1) WO2018211790A1 (fr)

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CN111596570A (zh) * 2020-05-26 2020-08-28 陈媛芳 车辆can总线仿真与攻击系统及方法
CN115309132A (zh) * 2021-05-06 2022-11-08 三菱电机株式会社 控制系统

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP2020092333A (ja) * 2018-12-05 2020-06-11 株式会社デンソー ネットワークスイッチおよび回線監視装置
WO2020116235A1 (fr) * 2018-12-05 2020-06-11 株式会社デンソー Dispositif de surveillance de ligne et commutateur réseau
CN113169908A (zh) * 2018-12-05 2021-07-23 株式会社电装 线路监视装置和网络交换机
CN113169908B (zh) * 2018-12-05 2022-07-22 株式会社电装 线路监视装置和网络交换机
JP7211051B2 (ja) 2018-12-05 2023-01-24 株式会社デンソー ネットワークスイッチおよび回線監視装置
CN111596570A (zh) * 2020-05-26 2020-08-28 陈媛芳 车辆can总线仿真与攻击系统及方法
CN111596570B (zh) * 2020-05-26 2023-09-12 杭州电子科技大学 车辆can总线仿真与攻击系统及方法
CN115309132A (zh) * 2021-05-06 2022-11-08 三菱电机株式会社 控制系统
CN115309132B (zh) * 2021-05-06 2025-08-12 三菱电机株式会社 控制系统

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