WO2013127281A1 - Method and system for processing ipv6 stateless address - Google Patents

Abstract

Disclosed are a method and system for processing IPv6 stateless address. The method comprises: pre-selecting security parameters and HASH functions; selecting initial values of the masks and determining, according to stop conditions, final selected values of the masks; and determining final generated address according to the selected parameters. In the invention, the stop conditions in the process of address generation combine the occupied bits of the security parameters and the HASH function identifiers in the address, the final generated address is enabled to include independent HASH function identifiers besides the security parameter identifiers and the first HASH function output, and thus multiple HASH functions can be denoted while the security strength is not lowered; moreover, as the security parameter identifiers, the HASH function identifiers and the first HASH function output can be extracted from the address to be verified, the address verification can be executed based on the HASH functions.

Description

 Method and system for processing IPv6 stateless address

 The present invention relates to the field of communications, and in particular, to a method and system for processing IPv6 (Internet Protocol version 6). Background technique

 IPv6 uses a 128-bit network address, providing ample address space and multiple address generation methods.

 The 128-bit standard IPv6 address in the latest version of the "IPv6 Address Structure" published by the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) in the RFC (Request for Comments) 4291 may be unstructured; It can consist of a subnet prefix and an interface identifier, or in a more complicated case, a global route prefix, a subnet prefix, and an interface identifier. The interface identifier usually follows the format of Modified EUI-64 (modified 64-bit extended extended unique identifier), and the 6-7 bits of the format (from left to right and counted from 0) are "u", "g" respectively. "Sign bit.

 Interface identification can be obtained from the interface of the IEEE (American Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Institute of

Electrical and Electronics Engineers ) EUI-64 address or IEEE MAC address simple conversion generation, or random 64 bits (except "u", "g" flag), for example, RFC4941 proposes that the interface identifier is periodically generated randomly, the purpose is to protect Host privacy.

In order to enhance the security of the protocol, especially to prevent address spoofing, the prior art proposes to bind the public key to the entire IPv6 address, such as the Host Identity Protocol (RFC5201). Furthermore, "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)," (RFC 3972) proposes a method for more securely binding public keys to IPv6 addresses, which has been applied to IPv6 Secure Neighbor Discovery Protocol. (Secure Neighbor Discovery, SEND;), Mobile IP protocol (Mobility in IPv6, MIPv6), Site Multihoming by IPv6 Intermediation (Shim6), etc.

 CGA address configuration process:

 To generate a CGA address, first randomly select an initial value of a modified value with a certain length, and pre-select the security parameter sec (3 bits). The following operations include the following two processes:

 Determining the value of the modified value according to the second hash function output and the stop condition determined by the security parameter separately;

 The first hash function output is determined based on the modifier value and the public key, etc., to determine the value of the final CGA address and associated CGA parameters (often referred to as address parameters).

 The specific address generation steps are shown in Figure 1:

 Step 1A: concatenating the modified value, all bytes 0, public key, and extended field of 9 bytes long; Step 1B: calculating the output after the input of the second hash function HASH2 function 101 in step 1A, wherein the HASH2 function is intercepted The SHA-1 function output by the first 112 bits;

 Step 1C: Check whether the hash output 102 satisfies the stop condition, that is, whether the first 16*sec bit of the output is 0; if the stop condition is satisfied, the number of collisions is 0, and the process proceeds to step 1D; otherwise, the value of the modified value is increased by 1, and continues. Step 1A;

 Step 1D: concatenating the modified value, the subnet prefix, the number of conflicts, the public key, and the extended field; Step 1E: calculating the output of the first hash function HASH1 function 107 in the step 1D, wherein the HASH1 function is before the interception 64 The SHA-1 function output by the bit;

Step 1F: Replace the first 3 bits of the HASH1 output with the value of sec, and set the sixth and seventh ratios of the HASH1 output to 0. As the interface identifier, combine the subnet prefix and the interface identifier into an IPv6 address to check whether there is an address conflict. If there is an address conflict and the number of collisions is less than 3, the number of collisions is increased by 1 to continue with step 1D. If there is no address conflict and the number of collisions is less than 3, the final CGA 114 is determined, including the subnet prefix 113 and the security parameter 111. , fixed flag bit 112, and partial output of HASH1; the subnet prefix, public key, extended field, and finally selected modifier value, number of collisions are written to the data structure of the CGA parameter accompanying the CGA address. CGA address verification process:

 Given a CGA address and its accompanying CGA parameters, the corresponding data is read from the CGA parameters, including the modifier value, subnet prefix, number of collisions, public key, and extended field. If the number of collisions of the CGA parameter is not equal to 0, 1, 2, the verification fails; if the subnet prefix of the CGA parameter is not equal to the first 64 bits of the CGA address, the verification fails; otherwise, the verification continues as follows:

 Calculating the output of the first hash function according to the data read from the CGA parameter, and verifying whether it is consistent with the output of the first hash function in the interface identifier in the CGA address;

 The second hash function output is calculated based on the data read from the CGA parameters and the security parameters in the interface identifier to verify whether the stop condition is satisfied.

 The specific risk certification steps are shown in Figure 1:

 Step 2A: concatenating the modified value, subnet prefix, conflict number, public key, and extended field read from the CGA parameter;

 Step 2B: calculating the output of the first hash function HASH1 function 107 in step 2A, wherein the HASH1 function is the SHA-1 function outputted by the first 64 bits;

 Step 2C: Compare whether the HASH1 output and the interface identifier are the same (ignoring the first 3 bits and the sixth,

7 bits); if different, the verification fails; otherwise, proceed to step 2D to continue verification;

 Step 2D: concatenating the modified value, 0, public key, extended field;

 Step 2E: calculating the output of the second hash function HASH2 function 101 in step 2D, wherein the HASH2 function intercepts the SHA-1 function outputted by the first 112 bits;

 Step 2F: Check if the hash output 102 satisfies the stop condition, that is, whether the first 16*sec bit of the output is 0; if the stop condition is satisfied, the verification is successful, otherwise the verification fails.

In summary, to use the CGA address enhancement protocol security, in addition to replacing the IPv6 address with the CGA address, it is accompanied by sending a CGA parameter, where the CGA parameters include a subnet prefix field, a public key field, an extended field field, Modification value field, collision number field. The resulting CGA is a concatenation of a 64-bit subnet prefix and a 64-bit interface identifier, where the interface identifier is a modifier value field, a subnet prefix field, a collision number field, a public key field, an extension field. The field is input to the first 64 bits of the output of the hash function in the above order, and the 0-2th bit is assigned by sec, and the 6th-7th bit (ie, "u", "g") is assigned a value of 0.

 However, the generation of the existing CGA address only specifies a hash function, that is, the SHA-1 hash function. With the research progress on the hash function, the currently used hash function has a threat of being compromised, so it is proposed An identifier indicating a hash function is added to the CGA address.

 One prior art adds an indication of the hash function used in the extension field of the CGA parameter, but doing so would cause a downgrade attack, ie the CGA address and CGA parameters can be replaced with a hash function with a lower security strength.

 There is also a prior art technique for adding an identifier indicating a hash function used in a CGA address, that is, occupying a number of bits in the remaining 59 bits of the interface identifier except the security parameters sec and "u", "g". The Greek function, such that the output bit number of the hash function in the CGA address is reduced, and the security of the hash function has a positive correlation with the number of output bits, so this prior art will sacrifice the security of the CGA.

 There is also a prior art that uses the 0-2 bit of the interface identifier in the CGA address to represent the hash function. Since these 3 bits are already occupied by the security parameter sec, the three bits have a double meaning, the specific meaning Need to be redefined, the definition of sec=0,l,2 is given in the specification (as shown in Figure 3):

 Sec=0 means that the SHA-1 function is used and the security parameter is 0; sec=l means that the SHA-1 function is used and the security parameter is 1; sec=2 means that the SHA-1 function is used and the security parameter is 2.

 There are only eight combinations of security parameters and hash functions that this technique can represent, which is very limited. It can be seen that it is currently impossible to represent multiple hash functions without reducing the security strength, resulting in the IPv6 address not having hash function agility. Summary of the invention

In view of this, the main object of the present invention is to provide a method and system for processing an IPv6 stateless address, which ensures that the generated address can represent multiple hashes without reducing security strength. The function makes the generated address have hash function agility; even if the hash function used is broken, it can be easily replaced with a more secure hash function.

 In order to achieve the above object, the technical solution of the present invention is achieved as follows:

 A method for processing an IPv6 stateless address, the method comprising:

 Pre-selecting the security parameters and the hash function, selecting the initial value of the modified value and determining the final value of the modified value according to the stopping condition;

 The resulting address is determined based on the above selected parameters.

 The value of the modifier value changes from the initial value until the stop condition is satisfied; the stop condition is related to the second hash function output, the security parameter identifier, and the number of occupied bits of the hash function identifier in the address.

 The finally generated address includes an independent security parameter identifier, a hash function identifier, and a first hash function output. The input applied when calculating the output of the first hash function includes a final value of the modified value.

 The security parameter identification and/or hash function identification, or a combination identification of the security parameter and the hash function, is included in the address parameter accompanying the finally generated address and is not included in the finally generated address.

 The method also includes:

 When the address generated by the risk is generated, the security parameter identifier and the hash function identifier are extracted from the generated address and/or the address parameter accompanying the address, and the first hash function is extracted from the generated address. Output

 Calculating a first hash function output according to the data in the address parameter accompanying the address and the extracted hash function identifier, and verifying whether the first hash function output is consistent with the extracted first hash function output And calculating, according to the data of the address parameter and the extracted security parameter identifier and the hash function identifier, a second hash function output, and verifying whether the second hash function output meets a stop condition.

The method also includes: Before the verification of the address or after the verification is successful, it is determined according to the local security policy whether the security parameter identifier and/or the hash function identifier satisfy the acceptance condition.

 A method for processing an IPv6 stateless address, the method comprising:

 Extracting the security parameter identifier and the hash function identifier from the address to be verified and/or the address parameter accompanying the address, and extracting the first hash function output from the address to be verified;

 Calculating a first hash function output according to the data in the address parameter accompanying the address and the extracted hash function identifier, and verifying whether the first hash function output is consistent with the extracted first hash function output And calculating, according to the data of the address parameter and the extracted security parameter identifier and the hash function identifier, a second hash function output, and verifying whether the second hash function output meets a stop condition.

 The method also includes:

 Before the address verification or after the verification is successful, it is determined according to the local security policy whether the security parameter identifier and/or the hash function identifier satisfy the acceptance condition.

 An IPv6 stateless address processing system, the system comprising a parameter selection unit and an address generation unit; wherein

 The parameter selection unit is configured to pre-select a security parameter and a hash function, select an initial value of the modified value, and determine a final value of the modified value according to the stopping condition;

 The address generating unit is configured to determine a finally generated address according to the parameter selected by the parameter selection unit.

 The value of the modifier value changes from the initial value until the stop condition is satisfied; the stop condition is related to the second hash function output, the security parameter identifier, and the number of occupied bits of the hash function identifier in the address.

 The finally generated address includes an independent security parameter identifier, a hash function identifier, and a first hash function output; and the input applied when calculating the output of the first hash function includes a final value of the modified value.

The security parameter identifier and/or hash function identifier, or a combination of a security parameter and a hash function The identifier is included in the address parameter accompanying the finally generated address and is not included in the finally generated address.

 The system further includes a security policy verification unit for determining whether the security parameter identifier and/or the hash function identifier meets the acceptance condition according to a local security policy before or after the verification of the address.

 An IPv6 stateless address processing system, where the system includes a parameter obtaining unit and an address insurance unit;

 The parameter obtaining unit is configured to extract a security parameter identifier and a hash function identifier from an address to be verified and/or an address parameter accompanying the address, and extract a first hash function output from the address to be verified;

 The address verification unit is configured to calculate a first hash function output according to the data in the address parameter accompanying the address and the extracted hash function identifier, and verify whether the output of the first hash function and the extracted The first hash function output is consistent; and the second hash function output is calculated according to the data of the address parameter and the extracted security parameter identifier and the hash function identifier, and the output of the second hash function is verified to be satisfied. condition.

 The verification unit includes a first verification unit and a second verification unit;

 The first verification unit is configured to calculate a first hash function output according to the data in the address parameter accompanying the address and the extracted hash function identifier, and verify whether the first hash function output is extracted The first hash function output is consistent;

 The second verification unit is configured to calculate a second hash function output according to the data of the address parameter and the extracted security parameter identifier and the hash function identifier, and verify whether the output of the second hash function satisfies a stop condition .

 The first verification unit and the second verification unit are combined or divided.

The system further includes a security policy verification unit, configured to determine whether the security parameter identifier and/or the hash function identifier meets the acceptance condition according to a local security policy before or after the verification of the address. The present invention ensures that the generated address can represent multiple hash functions without reducing security strength, and supports further address verification based on the hash function. DRAWINGS

 1 is a schematic diagram of a generation principle of a prior art CGA;

 2 is a schematic diagram of a verification principle of a prior art CGA;

 3 is a schematic diagram showing a hash function identification and a security parameter in a CGA in the prior art; FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a macro address structure according to an embodiment of the present invention;

 FIG. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of a refinement address according to an embodiment of the present invention; FIG.

 6 is a schematic diagram of a principle for generating an address according to an embodiment of the present invention;

 7 is a schematic diagram of the principle of a dangerous card address according to an embodiment of the present invention;

 8 is a schematic flow chart of generating an address according to an embodiment of the present invention;

 FIG. 9 is a schematic flow chart of verifying an address according to an embodiment of the present invention. detailed description

 When performing address generation, first select the security parameter, the hash function, and select a random value with a certain length as the initial value of the modified value; select other parameters, including the public key, the extended field, and the like;

 The selected parameter is calculated according to the selected hash function, and the second hash function output is checked to check whether the stop condition is satisfied. If not, the modified value is changed until the stop condition is satisfied; wherein the stop condition is identified by the security parameter, the hash function The number of digits in the address is determined together; the modifier value that satisfies the stop condition is the final value of the modifier value;

 Thereafter, the first hash function output is determined according to the modified value and the public key, the extended field, etc., thereby determining the value of the finally generated CGA address and the associated CGA parameter.

The resulting address contains an independent security parameter identifier, a hash function identifier, and a first hash function output. When performing address verification, the security parameter identifier, the hash function identifier, and the first hash function output may be extracted from the address to be verified;

 Then, calculating the first hash function output according to the data read from the CGA parameter and the hash function identifier in the interface identifier, and verifying whether the first hash function output is consistent with the output of the first hash function in the interface identifier;

 And, calculating the second hash function output according to the data read from the CGA parameter and the security parameter identifier and the hash function identifier in the interface identifier, and verifying whether the second hash function output satisfies the stop condition.

 The embodiments of the present invention will be further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

 Referring to FIG. 4, the IPv6 address finally generated by the present invention includes a subnet prefix and an interface identifier, where the interface identifier includes a security parameter identifier, a hash function identifier, a first hash function output, and other contents. The order of the contents of the interface identifier is not limited by this figure.

 Referring to FIG. 5, the first 3 bits in the interface identifier in the CGA 500 are security parameters, and the next 3-5 bits represent the hash function identifier, so the hash function identifies the number of bits n=3, and the 6-7th bit represents "u", "g" flag, the rest is the first hash function output;

 The first 3 bits in the interface identifier in the CGA 501 are security parameters, and the next 3-4 bits represent the hash function identifier, so the hash function identifies the number of bits n=2, and the 6-7 bits represent "u", "g" flag, the rest is the first hash function output;

 The first 2 bits in the interface identifier in the CGA 502 are security parameters, and the next 2-4 bits represent the hash function identifier, so the hash function identifies the number of bits n=3, and the 6-7 bits represent "u", "g" flag, the rest is the first hash function output;

 The first 2 bits in the interface identifier in the CGA 503 are security parameters, and the next 2-3 bits represent the hash function identifier, so the hash function identifies the number of bits n=2, and the 6-7 bits represent "u", "g" flag, the rest is the first hash function output;

The first 3 bits in the interface identifier in the CGA 504 are security parameters, and the next 3rd bit represents the hash function identifier, so the hash function identifies the number of bits n=l, and the 6-7th bits represent "u", "g". " Flag bit, the rest is the first hash function output;

 The order in which the sec, Hid, and first hash function outputs are in the interface identifier is not limited by this figure.

 Referring to Figure 6, the figure takes the hash function identification digit n=3 as an example, and pre-selects the security parameter sec and the hash function identifier Hid;

 The following operations can be performed according to Figure 6:

 Determining the value of the modified value according to the second hash function output and the stop condition determined by the security parameter identifier and the hash function identifier;

 And, the first hash function output is determined based on the modifier value and the public key, etc., to determine the value of the final CGA address and the associated CGA parameter.

 The above operations can be refined into the following steps:

 Step 6A: Same as step 1A in Figure 1, that is, the serialized modified value, the 9-byte 0, the public key, and the extended field;

 Step 6B: Calculate the output after the input of the second hash function HASH2 function in step 6A, wherein the HASH2 function is determined by the pre-selected hash function identifier Hid, and the output bit number of HASH2 depends not only on Hid but also on preselection. The effect of the specified security parameter sec;

 Step 6C: Determine whether the second hash function output 601 satisfies a stop condition, such as before sec, n) whether the bit is 0, and the embodiment takes f (sec, n) = 16 * sec + n, the second hash function The output length of output 601 should not be less than the output value of f ( sec, n ); if the stop condition is met, the number of collisions is 0, go to step 6D; otherwise, increase the value of the modified value by 1, continue to step 6A;

 Step 6D: Same as step 1D in Figure 1, that is, the concatenation modification value, the subnet prefix, the number of collisions, the public key, and the extension field;

Step 6E: The calculation step 6D serially inputs the output of the first hash function HASH1 function, wherein the HASH1 function is determined by the pre-selected hash function identifier Hid, and the output digit of the HASH1 is not less than the security parameter identifier in the interface identifier. The number of bits remaining except the identifier of the "u", "g", and the first hash function of the embodiment is the first 56 bits of the hash function represented by Hid; Step 6F: Serially connect sec (3 bits), hash function identifier Hid (3 bits), "u" and "g" identifiers assigned 0, and connect the 8 bits in the first hash function output. The front of the 604 is used as the interface identifier, and the subnet prefix and the interface identifier are combined into an IPv6 address to check whether there is an address conflict. If there is an address conflict and the number of collisions is less than 3, the number of collisions is increased by 1 to continue with step 6D; The address conflicts and the number of collisions is less than three, then the final CGA 608 is determined to include a subnet prefix 113, a security parameter 111, a fixed flag bit 112, a hash function identifier 606, and a partial output 607 of HASH1. Write the subnet prefix, the public key, the extended field, and the final selected modifier value and the number of collisions to the data structure of the CGA parameter accompanying the CGA address;

 It should be noted that the second hash function output digits may also be added to the content of the CGA parameter to indicate the number of output bits of the second hash function that needs to be intercepted during the verification process.

 Referring to Figure 7, given a CGA and its accompanying CGA parameters, the corresponding data is read from the CGA parameters. If the number of collisions of the CGA parameters is not equal to 0, 1, 2, the verification fails; if the subnet prefix of the CGA parameter is not equal to CGA The first 64 bits, the verification fails; otherwise, continue the verification as follows:

 Calculating the output of the first hash function according to the data read from the CGA parameter and the hash function identifier in the interface identifier, and verifying whether the output of the first hash function is consistent with the output of the first hash function in the interface identifier;

 And, calculating the second hash function output according to the data read from the CGA parameter and the security parameter identifier and the hash function identifier in the interface identifier, and verifying whether the second hash function output satisfies the stop condition.

 The above process can be refined into the following steps:

 Step 7A: Step 2A of Figure 2, that is, tandem modification value, subnet prefix, collision number, public key, and extension field;

Step 7B: The calculation step 7A serially inputs the output of the first hash function HASH1 function, wherein the HASH1 function is determined by the pre-selected hash function identifier Hid, and the output bit number of the HASH1 is not less than the security parameter identifier in the interface identifier, Other than the function identifier, "u", "g" The remaining number of bits, the embodiment takes the first hash function output as the first 56 bits of the hash function represented by Hid;

 Step 7C: Compare whether the HASH1 output 604 and the last 56 bits in the interface identifier are the same; if different, the verification fails; otherwise, the process proceeds to step 7D, and the verification continues;

 Step 7D: Step 2D of Figure 2, that is, serially decorated value, 9 bytes long 0, public key, extended field;

 Step 7E: Calculate the output after the input of the second hash function HASH2 function in step 7D, wherein the HASH2 function is determined by the pre-selected hash function identifier Hid, and the output bit number of HASH2 depends not only on Hid but also on preselection. The effect of the fixed security parameter sec; further, if the content of the CGA parameter includes the second hash function output bit number, the output bit number of the second hash function may be determined by the parameter;

 Step 7F: It is determined whether the second hash function output 601 satisfies a stop condition, such as whether the pre-sec, n) bit is 0. In this embodiment, f (sec, n) = 16 * sec + n, the second hash function is taken. The output length of output 601 should be no less than the output value of f( see n ); if the output of step 7F is "Yes", the risk certificate is successful, otherwise the risk certificate fails.

 As can be seen from the above description, the operation of the present invention for processing an IPv6 stateless address can respectively represent the flows shown in FIG.

 The process shown in Figure 8 includes the following steps:

 Step 810: Pre-select the security parameter and the hash function, select the initial value of the modified value, and determine the final value of the modified value according to the stopping condition.

 Step 820: Determine the finally generated address according to the selected parameters.

 Usually, the final generated address contains an independent security parameter identifier, a hash function identifier, and a first hash function output.

It should be noted that, in step 810, the preparation for generating the address such as the security parameter in advance may be performed by the parameter selection unit, and the specific address generation operation in step 820 may be performed by the address generation unit. The specific functions that these two units can achieve are detailed in the aforementioned technical description. Figure 9 includes the following steps:

 Step 910: Extract the security parameter identifier, the hash function identifier, and the first hash function output from the address to be verified.

 Step 920: Calculate a first hash function output according to the data in the CGA parameter accompanying the address and the extracted hash function identifier, and verify whether the first hash function output and the extracted first hash are The function output is consistent; and the second hash function output is calculated according to the data of the CGA parameter and the extracted security parameter identifier and the hash function identifier, and it is verified whether the second hash function output satisfies the stop condition.

 It should be noted that the extraction operation in step 910 may be performed by the parameter acquisition unit, and the operation of verifying the output of the first hash function in step 920 may be performed by the first verification unit, and the operation of verifying the output of the second hash function may be performed. It is performed by the second verification unit. The specific functions that can be implemented by the three units are described in detail in the foregoing technical description, and are not described herein again. In addition, the first verification unit and the second verification unit may be separately configured or combined. When combining, the first verification unit and the second verification unit may be collectively referred to as an address verification unit.

 In summary, it can be seen that both the method and the system, because the stop condition in the process of generating the address combines the security parameter and the hash function to identify the occupied digits in the address, so that the finally generated address contains the security parameter identifier, the first In addition to the hash function output, it can also contain independent hash function identifiers, so it can represent multiple hash functions without reducing the security strength. In addition, since the security parameter identifier and hash function can be extracted from the address to be verified. The identification, the first hash function output, can therefore perform address verification based on the hash function.

 The above is only the preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the scope of the present invention.

Claims

Claim  A method for processing a state-of-the-art address of a network interconnection protocol, which is characterized in that:  Pre-selecting the security parameters and the hash function, selecting the initial value of the modified value and determining the final value of the modified value according to the stopping condition;  The resulting address is determined based on the above selected parameters.  2. The method of claim 1 wherein  The value of the modifier value changes from the initial value until the stop condition is satisfied; the stop condition is related to the second hash function output, the security parameter identifier, and the number of occupied bits of the hash function identifier in the address.  3. The method of claim 1 wherein:  The finally generated address includes an independent security parameter identifier, a hash function identifier, and a first hash function output. The input applied when calculating the output of the first hash function includes a final value of the modified value.  4. The method of claim 1 wherein:  The security parameter identification and/or hash function identification, or a combination identification of the security parameter and the hash function, is included in the address parameter accompanying the finally generated address and is not included in the finally generated address.  The method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, further comprising:  When the address generated by the risk is generated, the security parameter identifier and the hash function identifier are extracted from the generated address and/or the address parameter accompanying the address, and the first hash function is extracted from the generated address. Output Calculating a first hash function output according to the data in the address parameter accompanying the address and the extracted hash function identifier, and verifying whether the first hash function output is extracted from the first The output of the hash function is consistent; and the output of the second hash function is further calculated according to the data of the address parameter and the extracted security parameter identifier and the hash function identifier, and whether the output of the second hash function satisfies the stop condition.  The method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that the method further comprises:  Before the address verification or after the verification is successful, it is determined according to the local security policy whether the security parameter identifier and/or the hash function identifier satisfy the acceptance condition.  A method for processing an IPv6 stateless address, the method comprising: extracting a security parameter identifier and a hash function identifier from an address to be verified and/or an address parameter accompanying the address, from which the verification is to be performed. Extracting the first hash function output from the address;  Calculating a first hash function output according to the data in the address parameter accompanying the address and the extracted hash function identifier, and verifying whether the first hash function output is consistent with the extracted first hash function output And calculating, according to the data of the address parameter and the extracted security parameter identifier and the hash function identifier, a second hash function output, and verifying whether the second hash function output meets a stop condition.  The method according to claim 7, wherein the method further comprises: determining whether the security parameter identifier and/or the hash function identifier is satisfied according to a local security policy before or after verifying the address. Accept the conditions.  A system for processing an IPv6 stateless address, the system comprising a parameter selection unit and an address generation unit;  The parameter selection unit is configured to pre-select a security parameter and a hash function, select an initial value of the modified value, and determine a final value of the modified value according to the stopping condition;  The address generating unit is configured to determine a finally generated address according to the parameter selected by the parameter selection unit.  10. The system of claim 9 wherein: The value of the modification value changes from the initial value until the stop condition is satisfied; The condition is related to the number of bits occupied by the second hash function output, the security parameter identifier, and the hash function identifier in the address.  11. The system of claim 9 wherein:  The finally generated address includes an independent security parameter identifier, a hash function identifier, and a first hash function output; and the input applied when calculating the output of the first hash function includes a final value of the modified value.  12. The system of claim 9 wherein:  The security parameter identification and/or hash function identification, or a combination identification of the security parameter and the hash function, is included in the address parameter accompanying the finally generated address and is not included in the finally generated address.  The system according to any one of claims 9 to 12, wherein the system further comprises a security policy verification unit, configured to determine the security according to a local security policy before or after verifying the address. The parameter identifier and/or hash function identifies whether the acceptance condition is met.  A system for processing an IPv6 stateless address, the system comprising a parameter obtaining unit and an address verifying unit;  The parameter obtaining unit is configured to extract a security parameter identifier and a hash function identifier from an address to be verified and/or an address parameter accompanying the address, and extract a first hash function output from the address to be verified;  The address verification unit is configured to calculate a first hash function output according to the data in the address parameter accompanying the address and the extracted hash function identifier, and verify whether the output of the first hash function and the extracted The first hash function output is consistent; and the second hash function output is calculated according to the data of the address parameter and the extracted security parameter identifier and the hash function identifier, and the output of the second hash function is verified to be satisfied. condition.  The system according to claim 14, wherein the verification unit comprises a first verification unit and a second verification unit; The first verification unit is configured to: according to data in an address parameter accompanying the address Taking the hash function identifier, calculating a first hash function output, and verifying whether the first hash function output is consistent with the extracted first hash function output;  The second verification unit is configured to calculate a second hash function output according to the data of the address parameter and the extracted security parameter identifier and the hash function identifier, and verify whether the output of the second hash function satisfies a stop condition .  The system according to claim 15, wherein the first verification unit and the second verification unit are combined or divided.  The system according to claim 14, wherein the system further comprises a security policy verification unit, configured to determine the security parameter identifier and/or according to a local security policy before or after the verification of the address. The hash function identifies whether the acceptance condition is met.