WO2013094072A1 - 通信システム及び通信方法 - Google Patents
通信システム及び通信方法 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2013094072A1 WO2013094072A1 PCT/JP2011/079934 JP2011079934W WO2013094072A1 WO 2013094072 A1 WO2013094072 A1 WO 2013094072A1 JP 2011079934 W JP2011079934 W JP 2011079934W WO 2013094072 A1 WO2013094072 A1 WO 2013094072A1
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- Prior art keywords
- message
- communication
- interval
- ecu
- communication interval
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L12/403—Bus networks with centralised control, e.g. polling
- H04L12/4035—Bus networks with centralised control, e.g. polling in which slots of a TDMA packet structure are assigned based on a contention resolution carried out at a master unit
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L2012/40208—Bus networks characterized by the use of a particular bus standard
- H04L2012/40215—Controller Area Network CAN
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/40—Bus networks
- H04L2012/40267—Bus for use in transportation systems
- H04L2012/40273—Bus for use in transportation systems the transportation system being a vehicle
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1408—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic by monitoring network traffic
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a communication system and a communication method in which a plurality of communication devices are connected to a network in a vehicle or the like.
- CAN can easily transmit a message from each ECU to the bus because each ECU that shares the bus, which is a communication line, can send a message on the bus according to each judgment. Therefore, for example, it is possible to connect an unauthorized ECU to a CAN bus and transmit an unauthorized message to the bus. When such an unauthorized message is transmitted, the ECU receiving the unauthorized message There is a risk of processing the message in the same way as a regular message.
- Patent Document 1 a technique for detecting an unauthorized ECU that transmits an unauthorized message has been proposed, and an example thereof is described in Patent Document 1.
- a plurality of ECUs and one gateway are connected to a communication line (communication line) in a vehicle so that they can communicate with each other.
- Each of these ECUs transmits a hash value of data built in itself to the gateway when the ignition switch is turned off.
- the gateway stores the transmitted hash value of each ECU in the EEPROM as comparison data.
- each ECU that has started operating when the ignition switch is turned on transmits the hash value of the data built in itself to the gateway. Accordingly, the gateway compares the newly transmitted hash value with the corresponding comparison data (hash value) stored in the EEPROM for each ECU.
- a vehicle diagnostic device prepared by a manufacturer or a card dealer, a device for updating an ECU program, or the like is connected to the vehicle CAN via a data link connector (DLC) as a connection terminal to the CAN.
- DLC data link connector
- devices and the like prepared by users are often connected to the CAN via the data link connector. For this reason, it is necessary to determine whether or not an unauthorized message is transmitted even for a device or the like prepared by such a user.
- the present invention has been made in view of such circumstances, and an object of the present invention is to provide a communication system and a communication method capable of determining whether the message communicated in the communication system is correct / incorrect with a simple configuration. Is to provide.
- a communication system provided by the present invention is a communication system in which a plurality of communication devices are connected to a communication line so as to be able to communicate messages.
- a communication interval specified in the above is set, a communication device that transmits a message transmits a message based on the specified communication interval, and a communication device that receives the transmitted message.
- the communication interval of the received message is detected, and whether the received message is correct or incorrect is determined based on a comparison between the detected communication interval and the specified communication interval.
- a communication method provided by the present invention is a communication method used in a communication system in which a plurality of communication devices are connected to a communication line so that messages can be communicated.
- a communication device that receives a message is set each time a communication device that sends a message is set based on the set communication interval.
- a communication interval is detected, and whether the received message is correct or incorrect is determined based on a comparison between the detected communication interval and the specified communication interval.
- a communication apparatus that transmits a message and a communication apparatus that receives the message share a communication interval defined for messages communicated between the communication apparatuses.
- the communication device that receives the message can detect the communication interval of the received message, and determine whether the communicated message is correct or incorrect based on a comparison between the detected communication interval and the specified communication interval.
- a communication device that receives a message determines that a message received according to a specified communication interval is a regular message, while a message received outside the specified communication interval is an illegal message. It is determined that As a result, an unauthorized message mixed in the communicated message is discriminated, and the unauthorized message is excluded from the received message. That is, in the communication system, whether the message communicated between the communication devices is correct / incorrect is determined with a simple configuration.
- the communication line is a communication line corresponding to a protocol of the control area network
- the message to be communicated is a message based on the protocol of the control area network
- the message to be transmitted and the message to be received are communicated as messages based on the protocol of the control area network.
- CAN control area network
- a communication device connected to a bus can start communication by self-judgment, that is, each communication device can transmit a message on the bus for its own convenience. You can add communication devices flexibly. For this reason, by making it possible to easily determine whether the message is correct / incorrect, the reliability of the communication system including the CAN system can be improved.
- the specified communication interval is associated with a control area network protocol identifier, and the communication device that transmits the message is based on the control area network protocol identifier assigned to the message. Select the specified communication interval.
- the message communication interval is determined for each message content, that is, for each identifier assigned to each message content in the CAN protocol. For this reason, according to such a configuration, it becomes possible to perform management and selection of the specified communication interval in association with the content of the message.
- the identifier can be recognized by the CAN controller that performs communication processing of a message corresponding to the CAN protocol in the CAN. For this reason, it becomes easy for the CAN controller to select a specified communication interval based on the identifier and transmit a message at the specified communication interval. Thereby, the applicability as a communication system is improved.
- a communication device that receives the message selects a specified communication interval used for determining whether the message is correct or incorrect based on a control area network protocol identifier assigned to the message.
- a specified communication interval is selected based on an identifier that can be recognized by the CAN controller, it is determined whether a message has been received at the specified communication interval, that is, whether the message is correct. / Judgment of fraud can be easily performed.
- a communication interval is defined for each of the plurality of types of messages.
- the specified communication interval is transmitted to the communication device from a communication device that transmits a message.
- the communication device that receives the message has the specified communication interval.
- the communication device that is set as appropriate and receives the same can determine whether the message to be communicated is correct / incorrect based on a specified communication interval. Thereby, the applicability and convenience of this communication system can be improved.
- the specified communication interval can be changed dynamically, security can be improved.
- the communication device is provided with a timer for detecting the communication interval, and the time of the timer is a synchronization message transmitted from one communication device of the plurality of communication devices. Is synchronized in all communication devices.
- the communication interval of the message can be any message communicated between the communication devices. Detection is based on a synchronized timer. As a result, it is expected to improve the accuracy of the comparison result between the detected communication interval and the communication interval defined for the message. Therefore, it is possible to more suitably determine whether the message is correct or illegal by this communication system.
- the synchronization message is transmitted from a communication device that transmits the message.
- the timer of the communication device that receives the message is synchronized with the timer of the communication device that transmits the message, the communication interval of the communicated message is detected with higher accuracy. It is expected. As a result, the correct / incorrect determination of the message by this communication system is made even more favorable.
- the block diagram which shows the schematic structure about one Embodiment which actualized the communication system which concerns on this invention The block diagram which shows schematic structure of the controller shown in FIG.
- the schematic diagram explaining the aspect which the communication system shown in FIG. 1 determines the right / wrong of a message.
- the sequence diagram which shows the aspect in which a communication system communicates a message about other embodiment which actualized the communication system which concerns on this invention.
- FIGS. 1-10 A first embodiment embodying a communication system according to the present invention will be described with reference to FIGS.
- the vehicle 1 includes an in-vehicle network system as a communication system.
- the in-vehicle network system includes first to fourth electronic control units (ECUs) 10 to 13 and a communication bus 15 to which the first to fourth ECUs 10 to 13 are connected.
- the first to fourth ECUs 10 to 13 can exchange (transmit / receive) various information used for control and the like via the communication bus 15.
- the in-vehicle network system is configured as a CAN network to which a CAN (Control Area Network) protocol is applied as a communication protocol.
- CAN Control Area Network
- the specification of the high-speed CAN stipulates that the transmission rate is 500 kbps, the maximum bus length is 40 m, and the maximum number of connected nodes is 16.
- the maximum amount of data that can be transmitted in a data frame used for data transfer, which is a unit of communication in the CAN protocol is 64 bits (8 bytes).
- the communication bus 15 is, for example, a twisted pair cable.
- the communication bus 15 is provided with a data link connector (DLC) 14 as a connection terminal that can connect an external device to the communication bus 15 so as to be communicable.
- DLC data link connector
- the DLC 14 as a regular communication device prepared by a manufacturer or a car dealer, a diagnostic tool 30 for diagnosing a vehicle state or the like, or a regular tool that is a device for updating software of the first to fourth ECUs 10 to 13 31 etc. are wired.
- the diagnostic device 30 diagnoses a vehicle state and the like based on vehicle information and the like from the first to fourth ECUs 10 to 13 collected via the communication bus 15.
- the regular tool 31 can be reprogrammed to update the software stored in the first to fourth ECUs 10 to 13 so as to be updated.
- the user tool 32 can be connected to the DLC 14 as an unauthorized communication device prepared by the user. Since the user tool 32 is, for example, an unauthorized tester or a smartphone, it is not necessarily guaranteed that the communication of the CAN is not adversely affected when connected to the CAN.
- application software such as a speed display arbitrarily selected by the user transmits and receives messages based on the CAN protocol. Since communication using such application software conforms to the CAN protocol, does not cause inconvenience in communication, and does not always include verification of whether a malicious function is included, the communication system cannot send messages. It is necessary to monitor and determine whether the message is correct or incorrect.
- Each of the first to fourth ECUs 10 to 13 is a control device used for various controls of the vehicle 1, and is, for example, an ECU whose control target is a drive system, a traveling system, a vehicle body system, an information equipment system, or the like.
- an ECU for a drive system is an ECU for an engine
- an ECU for a travel system is an ECU for a steering or a brake ECU
- An ECU for a light and an ECU for a window can be mentioned
- an ECU for controlling an information device system includes an ECU for car navigation.
- the number of ECUs connected to the communication bus 15 is not limited to four, and may be three or less or five or more. Since the first to fourth ECUs 10 to 13 have the same structure, the structure of the first ECU 10 will be described below, and the description of the structures of the second to fourth ECUs 11 to 13 will be omitted.
- the first ECU 10 performs a process required for various controls and a communication unit 20 that communicates messages based on the CAN protocol via the communication bus 15, and exchanges communication data with the communication unit 20.
- a processing unit 23 is provided.
- the processing unit 23 is configured to include a microcomputer, and includes a calculation device that performs various processes, and a storage device that holds programs that provide calculation results and various control functions. Then, the processing unit 23 provides the predetermined control function by executing a program that provides the predetermined control function on the arithmetic device.
- various sensors such as a speed sensor and an engine rotation sensor are connected to the processing unit 23 via an input / output interface (not shown) of the first ECU 10, and the processing unit 23 sets the detection value of the sensor at a predetermined interval, For example, detection is performed every 12 msec, every 100 msec, or every 500 msec.
- the processing unit 23 obtains communication data acquired from the communication unit 20 by a message and gives the communication data to be transmitted to the communication unit 20. That is, the processing unit 23 can acquire various data necessary for the control function via the communication bus 15 and can transmit various data to be distributed to other ECUs to the communication bus 15. It is like that.
- the acquired communication data and communication data to be distributed include data based on detection values of various sensors and data based on information from information-related equipment.
- the data length of data based on the detection values of various sensors is often the data length that can be contained in one data frame. Normally, this data transfer is completed by communication of one message, but this message is detected by the sensor. Sent periodically according to the interval. Note that, for convenience of explanation, in the present embodiment, a message that is transmitted periodically with a single message is referred to as a “periodic message”.
- the data length of data based on information from information-related equipment may be longer than the data length that can be contained in one data frame, and the information is divided into a plurality of data, and each divided data is stored.
- the plurality of data frames are sequentially communicated as messages at predetermined intervals.
- messages that sequentially transmit divided data at predetermined intervals are referred to as “continuous messages”. That is, the data transfer by the “continuous message” is completed when all the messages storing the data divided into a plurality of parts are communicated.
- the communication unit 20 is provided with a transceiver 21 and a controller 22.
- the transceiver 21 relays a message based on the CAN protocol between the communication bus 15 and the controller 22. Specifically, the transceiver 21 is communicated on the communication bus 15 by converting the electrical characteristics of the message communicated on the communication bus 15 into an electrical characteristic suitable for the input of the controller 22. A message is input to the controller 22. In addition, the transceiver 21 converts the electrical characteristics of the message input from the controller 22 into electrical characteristics suitable for communication on the communication bus 15, thereby converting the message output from the controller 22 to the communication bus 15. To communicate.
- the controller 22 is a so-called CAN controller that analyzes a received message, acquires communication data included in the message, and based on the communication data input from the processing unit 23, a message corresponding to the communication data. Generate and send. That is, the controller 22 provides communication data included in the message input from the transceiver 21 to the processing unit 23, and outputs a message generated based on the communication data input from the processing unit 23 to the transceiver 21.
- the controller 22 includes a storage area 24 that holds various parameters relating to the determination of whether the message is correct or invalid, a CAN frame monitoring function 26 that monitors the CAN communication state, A control determination function 27 for determining the message communication timing is provided. Further, the controller 22 transmits a message based on the determination of the control determination function 27, a transmission / reception control function 28 for determining whether the received message is correct / incorrect, a timer 29A used for measuring a communication interval, and the like, A synchronization function 29 for ensuring synchronization of the timer 29A is provided.
- the storage area 24 is an area where data secured in a non-volatile memory, a hard disk, or the like can be stored, and various parameters relating to whether the message is correct / incorrect are stored as timing specifications 25. Note that the storage area 24 may hold various parameters of the CAN protocol.
- the timing specification 25 a communication interval specified for a message is held for each message type.
- the message type is distinguished by an identifier (ID) given to the message. Therefore, the timing specification 25 holds the communication interval specified for the message in a manner associated with the identifier. .
- the message identifier “1A0” is associated with the communication interval “12 msec”
- the message identifier “1A1” is associated with the communication interval “500 msec”
- the timing specification 25 includes information required for determining whether the message is correct / invalid, such as the time to start transmitting a message, the condition to stop / pause transmission, the timing to perform synchronous control of the timer, A predetermined range serving as a reference for determining whether the communication interval is correct / incorrect, such as an error range and a margin period, is also held.
- the error range and margin period are set based on tests, experience, simulations, and the like.
- the CAN frame monitoring function 26 calculates a communication interval of messages (frames) transmitted to the communication bus 15 by monitoring messages input from the transceiver 21 and loads on the communication capacity of the communication bus 15. The communication state of the communication bus 15 is grasped based on calculating the state.
- the control determination function 27 determines whether or not the message can be transmitted based on the communication state of the communication bus 15 obtained from the CAN frame monitoring function 26. If the message can be transmitted, the control determination function 27 is stored in the storage area 24. The transmission / reception control function 28 is instructed to transmit a message to be communicated according to the communication interval defined in the timing definition 25. That is, the control determination function 27 suppresses transmission from the controller 22 when a message exceeding a predetermined communication amount flows through the communication bus 15.
- the predetermined communication amount is an amount corresponding to 30 to 40% of the maximum communication capacity of the communication bus 15, but may be smaller than 30% or larger than 40%. Also good.
- control determination function 27 obtains the communication interval defined for the message received by the transmission / reception control function 28 with reference to the timing specification 25 and calculates the communication interval of the received message. Then, the control determination function 27 calculates the difference by comparing the calculated communication interval with the specified communication interval, and when the communication interval difference is within a predetermined error range, the message is a regular message. It is determined that the message exists, and the transmission / reception control function 28 is instructed to process the message as usual. On the other hand, when the difference in the communication interval exceeds a predetermined error range, the control determination function 27 determines that the message is an invalid message and instructs the transmission / reception control function 28 to discard the message. If the communication interval of the received message cannot be calculated, such as when there is only one received message, the correct / invalid determination of the message is temporarily suspended and the received message is held. The transmission / reception control function 28 is instructed to keep it.
- the transmission / reception control function 28 causes the message generated by the controller 22 based on the communication data input from the processing unit 23 to be transmitted via the transceiver 21 in accordance with the instruction of the control determination function 27.
- the transmission / reception control function 28 notifies the control determination function 27 of the identifier of the message to be transmitted, and then transmits the message in accordance with the transmission timing instructed from the control determination function 27 according to the notification. For this reason, the message is transmitted at the communication interval instructed by the control determination function 27, while the message transmission is stopped until the transmission is instructed from the control determination function 27.
- the transmission / reception control function 28 temporarily stores the message together with the identifier and the reception time in the storage area 24 and notifies the control determination function 27 that the message has been received. Then, the received message is processed according to the instruction received from the control determination function 27 in response to this notification. For example, when the transmission / reception control function 28 receives an instruction to process normally from the control determination function 27, the controller 22 analyzes the target message and enables the processing unit 23 to acquire communication data. Further, when the transmission / reception control function 28 receives an instruction to discard the message from the control determination function 27, the transmission / reception control function 28 discards the temporarily retained message from the storage area 24 and discards the message.
- the transmission / reception control function 28 receives an instruction for suspension from the control determination function 27, the transmission / reception control function 28 continues to temporarily hold the message in the storage area 24 and maintains the message. Further, when the message being communicated is a “continuous message”, the transmission / reception control function 28 may stop receiving subsequent messages when an invalid message is detected during data transfer.
- the timer 29A is a so-called clock, and the communication interval of two messages having the same identifier is measured in the range of, for example, several milliseconds to several seconds based on the measured time. Therefore, it is preferable that no error occurs in time with other ECUs that are communicating during measurement of the communication interval. Therefore, the timer 29A can be corrected so that the measured time is synchronized with the master timer set in the communication system.
- the synchronization function 29 has a function of synchronizing the time of the timer 29A with another ECU connected to the communication system.
- the synchronization function 29 includes a master mode that generates a time synchronization message M5 (see FIG. 1) that instructs synchronization timing based on the time of the timer 29A, and a slave mode that synchronizes the timer 29A according to the received time synchronization message M5. It is provided so that it can be selected.
- this synchronization is defined in the CAN protocol and is different from the synchronization performed between the ECUs (nodes) in order to accurately transmit and receive messages (frames).
- the synchronization function 29 of the first ECU 10 is set to the master mode, and the synchronization function 29 generates a time synchronization message M5 every time the timer 29A measures a predetermined period, and sends it to the communication bus 15. Send.
- the time synchronization message M5 is given a predetermined identifier (ID) and includes an elapsed time since the last transmission.
- the synchronization function 29 of the second to fourth ECUs 11 to 13 is set to the slave mode. That is, when the synchronization function 29 of the second to fourth ECUs 11 to 13 receives the time synchronization message M5, the elapsed time of the timer 29A from the “previous time synchronization message M5” to the “current time synchronization message M5” is time-synchronized. It synchronizes with the elapsed time included in the message M5, that is, the time of the timer 29A is corrected.
- the diagnostic device 30, the regular tool 31, and the user tool 32 are provided with a communication unit 20 and a processing unit 40, respectively.
- the communication unit 20 has the same function as the communication unit 20 of the first ECU 10 described above, and enables message communication based on the CAN protocol through the communication bus 15 connected via the DLC 14.
- the timing specification 25 is set in each of the diagnostic device 30, the regular tool 31, and the user tool 32, the specified communication interval held in the timing specification 25, together with the first to fourth ECUs 10 to 13, The diagnostic device 30, the regular tool 31, and the user tool 32 are also shared.
- the processing unit 40 is configured to include a microcomputer having performance capable of performing necessary processing by the diagnostic device 30, the regular tool 31, the user tool 32, and the like. It has a storage device that holds a program for providing a control function. That is, the processing unit 40 has the same function as the processing unit 23 of the first ECU 10 described above, and the predetermined function is provided by executing a program that provides the predetermined function on the arithmetic device.
- the processing unit 40 obtains communication data from the communication unit 20 and gives the communication data to be transmitted to the communication unit 20 in the same manner as the processing unit 23 of the first ECU 10. That is, the processing unit 40 can acquire various data necessary for providing functions via the communication bus 15 and can transmit various data desired to be distributed to other ECUs to the communication bus 15.
- the diagnostic device 30, the regular tool 31, and the user tool 32 can transmit a message to the communication bus 15 in accordance with the communication interval defined for the message, similarly to the first ECU 10 described above. Similarly to the second ECU 11 described above, whether the message received from the communication bus 15 is correct / incorrect can be determined based on the communication interval defined for the message.
- any of the first to fourth ECUs 10 to 13, the diagnostic device 30, the regular tool 31, and the user tool 32 can transmit and receive messages.
- the first ECU 10 will be described below. Only when the second ECU 11 receives the transmitted message will be described.
- the message includes “periodic messages” such as sensor detection values and “continuous messages” such as information from information-related devices.
- the processing for “periodic messages” and “continuous messages” The process is similar. For this reason, the processing for “periodic message” will be mainly described below, and the processing for “continuous message” will be described only for the difference from the processing for “periodic message”.
- the controller 22 acquires a communication interval defined for the message (step S10). Thereafter, a communication interval is secured based on the time measured by the timer 29A (step S11). Specifically, the controller 22 measures the elapsed time from the transmission timing of the message having the same identifier that was transmitted immediately before, and proceeds to the next step until the measured elapsed time becomes equal to the specified communication interval. Wait for. If a message with the same identifier has not been sent before, or if the previous transmission is earlier than the specified communication interval, it is not necessary to secure the specified communication interval, so the process immediately moves to the next step. To do. For example, when the “periodic message” is transmitted for the first time or when the “first message” of the “continuous messages” is transmitted, the process immediately proceeds to the next step.
- the controller 22 transmits a message to be communicated to the communication bus 15 (step S12) and confirms that the message to be communicated remains, that is, whether or not the message to be communicated has ended (step S13). If it is determined that the message to be communicated has ended (YES in step S13), the controller 22 ends the message transmission.
- step S13 the controller 22 returns to step S11 to repeat the above-described steps in order to transmit the next message.
- the message transmission (step S12) is completed once.
- the message transmission (step S12) is not completed once but is performed a plurality of times.
- the controller 22 receives the communicated message (step S20), and calculates a communication interval corresponding to the received message (step S21). ). Then, the controller 22 determines whether or not the calculated communication interval matches the communication interval specified for the communicated message (step S22). Whether the calculated communication interval is compatible with the specified communication interval is determined by including the calculated communication interval within an error range with respect to the specified communication interval.
- step S22 When it is determined that the calculated communication interval matches the specified communication interval (YES in step S22), the controller 22 determines that the received message is a regular message, and normally processes the message as normal. Process (step S23). Then, the message reception ends.
- step S22 when it is determined that the calculated communication interval does not match the specified communication interval (NO in step S22), the controller 22 determines that the received message is an invalid message, and the received message Is discarded (step S24).
- the transmission interval Tc1 corresponding to the prescribed communication interval is set in the first and second ECUs 10 and 11, and the second ECU 11 calculates the reception interval Tc2 as the communication interval calculated from the received message. ing.
- the first message M1 and the second message M2 are messages set with the same identifier.
- the first message M ⁇ b> 1 that is the first message is received by the second ECU 11 via the communication bus 15.
- the second ECU 11 that has received the first message M1 thus stores the reception time together with the identifier of the first message M1. Note that if only one message is received, it is not possible to determine whether the message is correct or incorrect. Therefore, in the case of a “periodic message”, the second ECU 11 discards the message. The second ECU 11 may hold the “periodic message” or use it immediately. On the other hand, in the case of “continuous message”, it is preferable to keep the message because data transfer is not completed unless all messages are received.
- the first ECU 10 that has transmitted the first message M1 waits for transmission of the next second message M2 by the transmission interval Tc1 corresponding to the communication interval defined for the first message M1, and transmits the transmission. As the interval Tc1 elapses, the second message M2 is transmitted. The second message M2 thus transmitted is received by the second ECU 11, and the received time is stored in the received second ECU 11 together with the identifier of the second message M2.
- the second ECU 11 determines the validity of the message M2 based on the reception of the two messages. That is, the second ECU 11 calculates the reception interval Tc2 as the communication interval between messages, and compares the calculated reception interval Tc2 with the transmission interval Tc1 as the specified communication interval. If the difference between the calculated reception interval Tc2 and the specified transmission interval Tc1 is within an error range that is a predetermined range, it is determined that the received second message M2 is a regular message. At this time, it may be determined that the first message M1 is also a regular message. In the case of “periodic message”, the first message M1 may be used if necessary, but is discarded because it is past data. On the other hand, in the case of “continuous message”, since the first message M1 constitutes a part of communication data, the first message M1 is also determined to be a regular message and processed as usual.
- the received second message M2 is determined to be an invalid message.
- the first message M1 is a legitimate message. Cannot be determined.
- the unauthorized tool 33 is connected to the communication bus 15 and the unauthorized tool 33 transmits an unauthorized message Mb3 having the same identifier after the second message M2 transmitted by the first ECU 10. To do.
- the second ECU 11 determines that the unauthorized message Mb3 is an unauthorized message and discards it.
- the first ECU 10 transmits the third message M3 as the transmission interval Tc1 elapses after the second message M2 is transmitted, and the second ECU 11 receives the third message M3 thus transmitted. Is done. Then, the second ECU 11 compares the reception interval Tc2 calculated as the communication interval between messages with the transmission interval Tc1 as the defined communication interval. At this time, since the invalid message Mb3 has been discarded, the reception time of the second message M2 is used to calculate the reception interval. Since the difference between the calculated reception interval Tc2 and the prescribed transmission interval Tc1 is within an error range that is a predetermined range, it is determined that the received third message M3 is a regular message. At the same time, process as usual.
- the communication system including the communication device according to the present embodiment has the effects listed below.
- the first ECU 10 that transmits a message and the second ECU 11 that receives the message share a communication interval defined for messages communicated between the first and second ECUs 10 and 11.
- the second ECU 11 that receives the message detects the communication interval (reception interval Tc2) of the received message, and communicates based on the comparison between the detected communication interval and the specified communication interval (transmission interval Tc1). It is possible to determine whether the message is correct or incorrect.
- the second ECU 11 that receives the message determines that the message received according to the specified communication interval is a regular message, while the message received outside the specified communication interval is an illegal message.
- the unauthorized message (Mb3) mixed in the communicated message is discriminated, so that the unauthorized message (Mb3) is excluded from the received message (M1, M2, Mb3, M3).
- the communication system whether the message communicated among the ECUs 10 to 13, the diagnostic device 30, the regular tool 31, and the user tool 32 is correct / incorrect is determined with a simple configuration.
- Whether the message communicated by the CAN protocol is correct or incorrect can be determined based on the specified communication interval.
- an ECU or the like connected to the communication bus 15 can start communication by self-determination, that is, each ECU or the like can transmit a message on the communication bus for their own convenience.
- the ECU, the user tool 32, the unauthorized tool 33, and the like can be flexibly added to the bus 15. For this reason, by making it possible to easily determine whether the message is correct / incorrect, the reliability of the communication system including the CAN system can be improved.
- the message communication interval is determined for each message content, that is, for each identifier (IC) assigned to each message content in the CAN protocol. I made it correspond.
- the identifier can be recognized in the CAN by the controller 22 that performs message communication processing corresponding to the CAN protocol. For this reason, it becomes easy for the controller 22 to select a specified communication interval based on the identifier, and to transmit a message at the specified communication interval. Thereby, the applicability as a communication system is improved.
- the timer 29A used for detecting the communication interval is synchronized among a plurality of ECUs and the like, the communication interval of the message is synchronized regardless of the message communicated between any of the ECUs and the like. It is detected based on the timer 29A. As a result, it is expected to improve the accuracy of the comparison result between the detected communication interval and the communication interval defined for the message. Therefore, it is possible to more suitably determine whether the message is correct or illegal by this communication system.
- the present invention is not limited to this, and it is also possible to appropriately determine an unauthorized message even when a message is not communicated at a prescribed communication interval.
- the communication bus is used at that timing.
- the message may not be sent due to the above reasons.
- the message cannot be sent in this way, for example, when the first ECU 10 transmits the message, a collision (collision) occurs, and as a result of the arbitration, the first ECU 10 cannot obtain the transmission right and the transmission is stopped. .
- transmission of the second message M2 from the first ECU 10 is slightly delayed.
- an error range in consideration of the occurrence of arbitration for example, a margin period Tm, is set, the second ECU 11 The second message M2 received a little later can be determined as a regular message.
- a collision (collision) occurring in the communication bus is detected from an error frame defined in the CAN protocol, and both the transmission side and the reception side communicate at a transmission interval Tc1 defined from the timing.
- communication may be performed after waiting for the retransmission interval Tr from the same timing.
- the second ECU 11 may add a margin period Tm to the error range in advance or as necessary, or extend the error range by the margin period Tm in advance or as necessary.
- the elapsed time is included in the time synchronization message M5 .
- the present invention is not limited to this, and if the communication cycle of the time synchronization message is predetermined, the elapsed time is included in the message. It does not have to be included. This simplifies the communication system and improves the degree of design freedom.
- the present invention is not limited to this, and the ECUs may synchronize the timers based on monitoring messages periodically transmitted from the transmission / reception control function. This also simplifies the communication system and improves the degree of design freedom.
- the controller 22 is exemplified for the case where the synchronization function 29 is included.
- the present invention is not limited to this, and the timers may not be synchronized as long as the communication interval can be appropriately measured. This simplifies the communication system.
- the unauthorized tool 33 (see FIG. 6) is directly connected to the communication bus 15 is illustrated.
- the present invention is not limited to this, and the unauthorized tool may be connected via the DLC.
- the unauthorized tool may be connected via the DLC.
- the user tool connected to the DLC transmits an unauthorized message as an unauthorized tool, the transmitted unauthorized message can be determined. As a result, the reliability of the communication system is improved.
- an external device is wired to the DLC 14 in the above embodiment, the case where an external device is wired to the DLC 14 is illustrated.
- the present invention is not limited to this, and an external device may be connected to the DLC via wireless communication.
- a wireless communication terminal may be connected to the DLC, a wireless communication device may be provided in the external device, and communication between the DLC and the external device may be performed wirelessly. This makes it possible to determine whether the message is correct / incorrect regardless of the connection mode of the external device to the DLC.
- the message In the above embodiment, the case where there are a “periodic message” such as sensor output and a “continuous message” such as information from the information device is exemplified as the message.
- the present invention is not limited to this, and the same message may be sent multiple times, or all communications by other messages may be temporarily stopped, and reprogramming program data, etc.
- the message may be sent continuously using. That is, regardless of the communication data included in the message, whether the message is communicated a plurality of times with the same identifier can determine whether the message is correct or incorrect by this communication system. As a result, the convenience of the communication system is improved and the applicability is improved.
- the communication interval may be dynamically set in the ECU or the like.
- the first ECU 10 that transmits a message transmits a communication interval defined according to the message to the second ECU 11 that receives the message and dynamically sets the communication interval.
- a communication interval message M6 to which an identifier of the CAN protocol for setting the communication interval is provided, and each ECU or the like receives the communication interval message M6 and responds to the identifier.
- the communication interval may be set.
- a predetermined ECU may transmit the communication interval to the communication destination ECU and dynamically set the communication interval.
- the prescribed communication interval is appropriately set in the ECU that receives the message, and the ECU that receives the message is prescribed. It is possible to determine whether the message to be communicated is correct / incorrect based on the communication interval. Thereby, the applicability and convenience of this communication system can be improved.
- a message transmitted from a legitimate device such as a diagnostic device or a legitimate tool prepared by a manufacturer or card dealer connected to the communication bus via a data link connector is also a message communicated from the device.
- the communication interval defined for the communication can be transmitted to the communication system. As a result, in the communication system, it is possible to determine whether the message is correct / incorrect for a device connected via the data link connector.
- the specified communication interval can be changed dynamically, security can be improved.
- the present invention is not limited to this, and a plurality of communication intervals having rules may be associated with one message identifier.
- the message identifier “1A5” may be set such that two communication intervals “20 msec” and “40 msec” are alternately repeated.
- the communication interval specified for the message may be an interval secured based on the communication cycle, or secured based on a predetermined time.
- the interval may be a predetermined interval or an interval secured based on a predetermined condition. That is, a communication cycle, a time, or a predetermined condition may be set as the communication interval. This makes it possible to increase the types of messages that can be determined to be correct / incorrect.
- the communication interval is specified for the message.
- the present invention is not limited to this, and the communication interval only needs to be determined so as to ensure the security of the message between the ECUs and the like, and the communication interval for the message is defined for each ECU or diagnostic device. You may do it. This simplifies the setting of the communication interval and facilitates the application of the communication system.
- the communication system is mounted on the vehicle 1 .
- the present invention is not limited to this, and a part or all of the communication system may be provided other than the vehicle. As a result, it is possible to determine whether the message is correct / incorrect even for a communication system including a CAN used outside the vehicle, so that the applicability of the communication system can be improved.
- the communication system is a system based on the CAN protocol.
- the present invention is not limited to this, and the communication system is an arbitration for appropriately giving an access right when accessing a communication protocol in which a plurality of communication devices can start communication at an arbitrary timing, for example, a communication line such as a bus.
- the present invention can also be applied to a protocol that performs the above. Thereby, the applicability of such a communication system can be improved.
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Abstract
Description
なお上記実施形態は、以下の態様で実施することもできる。
Claims (10)
- 複数の通信装置がメッセージを通信可能に通信線に接続された通信システムであって、
前記通信装置には、通信されるメッセージに対して規定された通信間隔が設定されており、
メッセージを送信する通信装置はこの規定された通信間隔に基づいてメッセージを送信するものであり、
前記送信されたメッセージを受信する通信装置は、当該受信したメッセージの通信間隔を検出し、この検出した通信間隔と前記規定された通信間隔との比較に基づいて当該受信したメッセージの正/不正を判定する
ことを特徴とする通信システム。 - 前記通信線はコントロールエリアネットワークのプロトコルに対応する通信線であるとともに、前記通信されるメッセージがコントロールエリアネットワークのプロトコルに基づくメッセージである
請求項1に記載の通信システム。 - 前記規定された通信間隔は、コントロールエリアネットワークのプロトコルの識別子に対応付けられており、
前記メッセージを送信する通信装置は、前記メッセージに付与するコントロールエリアネットワークのプロトコルの識別子に基づいて規定された通信間隔を選択する
請求項2に記載の通信システム。 - 前記メッセージを受信する通信装置は、前記メッセージに付与されているコントロールエリアネットワークのプロトコルの識別子に基づいて当該メッセージの正/不正の判定に用いる規定された通信間隔を選択する
請求項3に記載の通信システム。 - 前記通信されるメッセージは複数種類あり、それら複数種類のメッセージの別に通信間隔がそれぞれ規定されている
請求項1~4のいずれか一項に記載の通信システム。 - 前記通信装置には、前記規定された通信間隔がメッセージを送信する通信装置から伝達される
請求項1~5のいずれか一項に記載の通信システム。 - 前記通信装置には前記通信間隔を検出するためのタイマが設けられており、前記タイマの時刻が、前記複数の通信装置のうちの一つの通信装置から送信される同期用のメッセージに基づき全ての通信装置で同期される
請求項1~6のいずれか一項に記載の通信システム。 - 前記同期用のメッセージは、メッセージを送信する通信装置から送信される
請求項7に記載の通信システム。 - 複数の通信装置がメッセージを通信可能に通信線に接続された通信システムに用いられる通信方法であって、
前記通信装置には、通信されるメッセージに対して規定された通信間隔を設定し、
メッセージを送信する通信装置が前記設定された通信間隔に基づいてメッセージを送信する都度、メッセージを受信する通信装置は、当該受信したメッセージの通信間隔を検出し、この検出した通信間隔と前記規定された通信間隔との比較に基づいて当該受信したメッセージの正/不正を判定する
ことを特徴とする通信方法。 - 前記送信するメッセージ、及び受信するメッセージをコントロールエリアネットワークのプロトコルに基づくメッセージとして通信する
請求項9に記載の通信方法。
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| CN201180075622.5A CN103999410B (zh) | 2011-12-22 | 2011-12-22 | 通信系统及通信方法 |
| EP11877833.1A EP2797263B1 (en) | 2011-12-22 | 2011-12-22 | Communication system and communication method |
| US14/366,465 US9225544B2 (en) | 2011-12-22 | 2011-12-22 | Communication system and communication method |
| PCT/JP2011/079934 WO2013094072A1 (ja) | 2011-12-22 | 2011-12-22 | 通信システム及び通信方法 |
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Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN103999410A (zh) | 2014-08-20 |
| EP2797263A1 (en) | 2014-10-29 |
| JP5664799B2 (ja) | 2015-02-04 |
| US9225544B2 (en) | 2015-12-29 |
| US20140328352A1 (en) | 2014-11-06 |
| CN103999410B (zh) | 2017-04-12 |
| EP2797263A4 (en) | 2015-04-29 |
| EP2797263B1 (en) | 2017-03-15 |
| JPWO2013094072A1 (ja) | 2015-04-27 |
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