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WO2013050296A1 - Method for securely downloading access keys using a mobile device - Google Patents

Method for securely downloading access keys using a mobile device Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2013050296A1
WO2013050296A1 PCT/EP2012/069114 EP2012069114W WO2013050296A1 WO 2013050296 A1 WO2013050296 A1 WO 2013050296A1 EP 2012069114 W EP2012069114 W EP 2012069114W WO 2013050296 A1 WO2013050296 A1 WO 2013050296A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
mobile device
remote server
contactless card
chip
card
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/EP2012/069114
Other languages
French (fr)
Inventor
Michel Betirac
Original Assignee
Ethertrust
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Ethertrust filed Critical Ethertrust
Priority to EP12766091.8A priority Critical patent/EP2764670A1/en
Publication of WO2013050296A1 publication Critical patent/WO2013050296A1/en

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/355—Personalisation of cards for use
    • G06Q20/3552—Downloading or loading of personalisation data
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/606—Protecting data by securing the transmission between two devices or processes
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/78—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure storage of data
    • G06F21/79—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure storage of data in semiconductor storage media, e.g. directly-addressable memories
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
    • G06Q20/327—Short range or proximity payments by means of M-devices
    • G06Q20/3278—RFID or NFC payments by means of M-devices
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/352—Contactless payments by cards
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3829—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction involving key management
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00857—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys where the code of the data carrier can be programmed
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/30—Security of mobile devices; Security of mobile applications
    • H04W12/35—Protecting application or service provisioning, e.g. securing SIM application provisioning
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2115—Third party
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00857—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys where the code of the data carrier can be programmed
    • G07C2009/00865—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys where the code of the data carrier can be programmed remotely by wireless communication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/80—Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of telecommunications.
  • the present invention relates more particularly to a method for securely downloading access keys by means of a mobile device.
  • the present invention relates to a global architecture for performing identity management or access codes in RFID cards, for example of the "mifare” type (technology company NXP) or type ISO14443, completely secure manner.
  • the present invention is based on three main components: a contactless card with dual RFID interface, a mobile device, preferably of the "smartphone” type that can integrate a NFC reader ("Near Field Communication”) and a remote server to manage Mutual Transport Layer Security (TLS) authentication.
  • NFC reader Near Field Communication
  • TLS Mutual Transport Layer Security
  • contactless cards whether as loyalty cards, parking cards, transport cards (prepaid cards ...), hotel rooms, etc. These numerous cases of use lead irremediably to a multiplication of them in the personal effects of their carriers. A majority of these contactless cards are actually based on the same technology: Mifare or ISO14443 technology.
  • Mifare and / or ISO 14443 compliant cards are NFC (Near Field Communication) type contactless cards that can be broadly divided into two sub-categories: standard Mifare type cards and type cards Mifare or ISO14443 with dedicated microcontrollers.
  • Standard Mifare cards are essentially application storage components or access rights with limited computational capability. They generally comprise one or four kilobytes of E 2 PROM type memory organized in 16 or 40 sectors composed of 4 blocks of 16 bytes each. Read or write accesses to these blocks (except block 0) are controlled by a key pair that each sector individually holds in its last block. Block 0 contains the identity of the card as well as the manufacturer's data and can not be accessed in writing.
  • the new generation of Mifare uses another cryptographic protocol that relies on the hash of a triple-DES made from the secret key pair associated with each sector.
  • this new protocol does not guarantee an optimal security because due to the small size of the Hash (48 bytes), one can incidentally find the pair of keys associated with a sector by brute force in 28 tests.
  • RFID technology in particular NFC, on which contactless cards (for example Mifare type) rely is a type of high-frequency wireless communication for communicating short-range NFC device with another NFC device, or with a RFID-type contactless chip.
  • the NFC technology implements in particular the ISO / IEC 14443-1 to 4 standard defined to implement RFID-type contactless cards at a frequency of 13.56 MHz; and it was mainly developed to allow mobile phones to integrate two types of functionalities RFID (for example of the NFC type): an "RFID card reader"functionality; and sometimes the phone also incorporates the "RFID card” feature.
  • portable terminals such as, for example, “smartphones” or tablets and NFC-type applications
  • portable terminals “as a” RFID card “with keys in the manner of RFID cards Mifare type. This configuration, however, poses a major problem:
  • Mifare card in a context of physical access, such as that of a lock, and specifically that of a hotel room, that It is organized around three main components: a programming software, a reader belonging to the physical access system (for example an access lock) and the client's Mifare card.
  • the RFID card for example of the Mifare type
  • the RFID card is accessed in writing by a reader in which the card programming software is executed, the access rights are calculated by the latter and then downloaded as data into a card.
  • sector of the RFID card for example of the Mifare type
  • the access rights are calculated by the latter and then downloaded as data into a card.
  • the present invention aims at providing a method for securely and remotely downloading access keys in a contactless card, for example but not exclusively of the Mifare type, by means of a mobile device, for example of the " smartphone ".
  • the present invention relates, in its most general sense, to a communication method implementing a mobile device, a contactless card and a remote server, characterized in that it comprises the following steps: ⁇ selection by a user on said mobile device of an application dedicated to downloading access codes when said user places said contactless card within reach of said mobile device; detecting a chip of said contactless card by said mobile device using said application selected by the user; connecting said mobile device to said chip of said contactless card on a secure interface; establishing a connection by said mobile device between said chip of said contactless card and said remote server; authenticating the validity of a key of said chip of said contactless card by said remote server; verification of the identity of said remote server by said chip of said contactless card; said application of said mobile device serving as a communication relay for the secure tunnel directly established between said remote server and a secure application of said contactless card; calculating cryptographic blocks by said chip of said contactless card and transferring said cryptographic blocks to said mobile device; transmitting a request from said application of said mobile device to
  • said mobile device is a mobile phone.
  • said mobile device is a mobile phone type "smartphone”.
  • said mobile device is a touch pad.
  • said contactless card is a RFID-type card ("Radio Frequency Identification”).
  • the connection of said mobile device to said chip of said contactless card on a secure interface is performed in NFC ("Near Field Communication").
  • said secure interface is an EAP-TLS type interface ("Extensible Authentication Protocol / Transport Layer Security").
  • the transmission of a request from said application of said mobile device to a page of said remote server is performed using the SSL ("Secure Socket Layer”) or TLS ("Transport Layer Security”) protocol.
  • the verification by said remote server of the access rights linked to said contactless card is achieved by retrieving the public encryption key from said contactless card through an SSL ("Secure Socket Layer”) or TLS ("Transport”) connection. Layer Security ”) previously established, and said remote server matches said public encryption key to its equivalent stored in a database.
  • said chip of said contactless card then uses an API ("Programming Interface” or “Application Programming Interface”) of the "Mifare” type to access its "Mifare” interface in writing and write the value of the key. session in one of the appropriate blocks reserved for the "Mifare” application.
  • said method further comprises a step of mutual authentication between said remote server and a secure element.
  • said secure element is a SIM card of said mobile device.
  • said method further comprises a step of mutual authentication between a secure element of said mobile device and said chip of said contactless card.
  • said secure element is a SIM card of said mobile device.
  • FIG. 1 represents the various components used in the process according to the present invention
  • Figure 2 illustrates the different steps of the process according to the present invention.
  • FIG. 1 represents the various components implemented in the method according to the present invention: a contactless card 11 comprising a chip 21 and communicating with a mobile device 10 comprising an application 20, said mobile device 10 communicating with a remote server
  • FIG. 2 illustrates the different steps of the method according to the present invention: selection by a user on said mobile device 10 of an application 20 dedicated to downloading access codes CAi, CA 2 , CA n when said user places said card without contact 1 1 within range of said mobile device 10; detecting a chip 21 of said non-contact card 1 1 by said mobile device 10 with the aid of said application selected by the user; connecting said mobile device 10 to said chip 21 of said contactless card 1 1 on a secure interface 22; establishing a connection by said mobile device 10 between said chip 21 of said contactless card 11 and said remote server 12; authentication of the validity of a key of said chip 21 of said contactless card 1 1 by said remote server 12; verification of the identity of said remote server 12 by said chip 21 of said contactless card 1 1; said application 20 of said mobile device 10 serving as a communication relay for the secure tunnel directly established between said remote server 12 and a secure application 23 of said contactless card 1 1; calculating cryptographic blocks by said chip 21 of said contactless card 11 and transferring said cryptographic blocks to said mobile device
  • application is understood to mean a software application.
  • This application is active but neutral from a security point of view. It does not modify the cryptographic blocks transmitted by the chip, but only transfers them. It plays the role of a relay, literally accepted in the field of telecommunications.
  • chip By chip is meant a microcontroller with a set of applications.
  • SSL / TLS Secure Socket Layer / Transport Layer Security.
  • Cryptographic protocol standardized by NETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) allowing to exchange data in a secure way by guaranteeing their integrity, the confidentiality and non-repudiation of the exchange as well as the authentication of the two terminals in case of mutual authentication (for example with the EAP-TLS protocol).
  • This protocol can be divided into two distinct phases: the authentication phase of one or both communicating entities, then the encrypted data transmission phase.
  • RFID Radio Frequency Identification.
  • Non-contact integrated circuit identification technology incorporating or connected to an antenna, generally based on cards, tags or tags, the information or data being transmitted by magnetic induction radio frequencies initiated by an appropriate reader and then identified and read by this latest.
  • NFC Near Field Communication. Short-range, low-power wireless communication protocol based on RFID technology, except that the exchange of information between two NFC machines can be two-way whereas in the case of RFID only the chip transmits information to the reader .
  • the technology on which the present invention is based is based on the idea that contactless cards, especially "Mifare” cards, can be programmed by NFC readers contained in mobile devices, for example of the "smartphone” type. , allowing users to directly download their specific access rights in their contactless card, preferably Mifare, without having to obtain new rights and new cards by the institutions concerned.
  • This architecture is based on a secure connection 22, preferably of the EAP-TLS type, via a mobile device 10 preferably of the "smartphone” NFC type between a chip 21, preferably with a dual RFID interface, of a contactless card 11 , and a remote server 12 able to load an activation key in the chip 21, the key needed to obtain access specific, for example access to a hotel room.
  • the card 1 1, preferably dual interface, contains according to one embodiment two types of technologies corresponding to each of these interfaces: Mifare technology, on the one hand and embedded "EAP-TLS" battery technology, on the other hand go.
  • the mobile device 10 is a "smartphone", that is to say a mobile phone with advanced multimedia features, and that the contactless card 1 1 is an RFID interface card.
  • the contactless card 1 1 is an RFID interface card.
  • other mobile devices and other types of cards can be implemented in the method according to the present invention.
  • the secure connection 22 EAP-TLS and the transfer of data in the chip 21 proceeds according to the following scenario:
  • the user is invited to select on his Smartphone 10 an application 20 dedicated to downloading specific access codes CAi, CA 2 , CA n (typically those for the opening of a hotel room), when it places a contactless card with dual RFID interface 1 1 within range thereof.
  • the Smartphone 1 1 detects an RFID chip 21 of said contactless card with dual RFID interface 1 1 using the application 20 selected by the user then connects in NFC to the RFID chip 21 on its interface EAP- TLS 22.
  • the application "EAP-TLS stack" is activated while the mobile application 20 of the Smartphone 10 establishes a connection between the RFID chip 1 1 and the remote key server 12.
  • the mobile application 20 of the Smartphone 10 serves as a relay between the remote key server 12 and the application "EAP-TLS stack" by being responsible for redistributing the exchanges to the remote. one or the other of the two communicating entities.
  • the remote key server 12 authenticates the validity of the identity of the RFID chip 21, and the RFID chip 21 verifies the identity of the server 12.
  • the mobile application 20 of the Smartphone 10 sends a request (for example in http) SSL on a page (for example php) of the remote key server 12 to retrieve an access key for the RFID chip 21.
  • the remote key server 12 verifies the access rights of the holder of the RFID card 1 1 by retrieving the public encryption key thereof through the SSL connection previously established. It matches this public encryption key to its equivalent stored in a database and checks credits or access to which the holder of the RFID card 1 1 is entitled.
  • this container includes the access key which will be written in one of the blocks of a Mifare application of the RFID chip 21 and which is encrypted by the public encryption key of the certificate of the "EAP-TLS stack" of the RFID chip 21.
  • This container also includes a signature of this encryption enabling the RFID chip 21 to check the good validity of this container.
  • the remote server 12 sends its response (for example http) in which the "key container" is located, to the smartphone 10 always via the SSL connection previously established.
  • response for example http
  • the Smartphone 10 repatriates the "key container" on the interface of the EAP-TLS stack of the RFID chip 21.
  • the RFID chip 21 verifies the signature of the "key container" and once the operation is successful, it decrypts the value of the access key using its own private encryption key. • The RFID chip then uses a Mifare API to access its Mifare Write interface and write the value of the session key in one of the appropriate blocks reserved for the Mifare application.
  • a secure element such as that constituting in part the chip 21
  • the Smartphone 10 which, in other embodiments, may be a digital tablet or other mobile device ); this can be for example, but not limited to, a SIM card.
  • the present invention provides a secure way to remotely download access keys in a contactless card, preferably of the "Mifare” type via a mobile device, preferably of the "Smartphone” type, and can be extended by considering that the dual interface chip could be embedded (in the form of a USIM card for example) in the Smartphone.

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Abstract

The present invention relates to a communication method, implementing a mobile device (10), a contactless card (11), and a remote server (12), for securely and remotely downloading access keys to said contactless card (11) using said mobile device (10). The method according to the present invention uses asymmetric cryptography methods, the data being encrypted with a public encryption key of said contactless card (11), and said public encryption key being exported by said remote server (12), a mutual authentication being carried out between said contactless card (11) and the remote server (12). A data structure (24) constructed by the remote server (12) includes, before transmission, the encryption of said data structure (24) using the public key of the certificate of the EAP-TLS stack installed on the RFID chip (21) and a signature.

Description

PROCEDE DE TELECHARGEMENT SECURISE DE CLES D'ACCES AU MOYEN D'UN DISPOSITIF MOBILE  METHOD FOR SECURELY DOWNLOADING ACCESS KEYS USING A MOBILE DEVICE
Domaine de l'invention Field of the invention
La présente invention se rapporte au domaine des télécommunications. The present invention relates to the field of telecommunications.
La présente invention se rapporte plus particulièrement à un procédé de téléchargement sécurisé de clés d'accès au moyen d'un dispositif mobile. The present invention relates more particularly to a method for securely downloading access keys by means of a mobile device.
La présente invention concerne une architecture globale permettant de réaliser une gestion des identités ou des codes d'accès dans des cartes RFID, par exemple de type «mifare» (technologie de la société NXP) ou de type ISO14443, de façon totalement sécurisée. La présente invention s'appuie sur trois composants principaux : une carte sans contact à interface RFID duale, un dispositif mobile, de préférence de type «smartphone» pouvant intégrer un lecteur NFC («Near Field Communication») et un serveur distant permettant de gérer une authentification TLS («Transport Layer Security») mutuelle. The present invention relates to a global architecture for performing identity management or access codes in RFID cards, for example of the "mifare" type (technology company NXP) or type ISO14443, completely secure manner. The present invention is based on three main components: a contactless card with dual RFID interface, a mobile device, preferably of the "smartphone" type that can integrate a NFC reader ("Near Field Communication") and a remote server to manage Mutual Transport Layer Security (TLS) authentication.
Etat de la technique State of the art
Les utilisateurs font face à un déploiement croissant de cartes sans contact, que ce soit en tant que cartes de fidélité, cartes de parking, de transport (cartes prépayées ...), de chambre d'hôtel, etc. Ces nombreux cas d'utilisation conduisent irrémédiablement à une multiplication de celles-ci dans les effets personnels de leurs porteurs. Une majorité de ces cartes sans contact reposent en fait sur la même technologie : la technologie Mifare ou ISO14443. Users are facing a growing deployment of contactless cards, whether as loyalty cards, parking cards, transport cards (prepaid cards ...), hotel rooms, etc. These numerous cases of use lead irremediably to a multiplication of them in the personal effects of their carriers. A majority of these contactless cards are actually based on the same technology: Mifare or ISO14443 technology.
Les cartes Mifare et/ou conformes au standard ISO 14443 sont des cartes sans contact de type NFC («Near Field Communication») que l'on peut globalement distinguer en deux sous-catégories : les cartes de type Mifare standard et les cartes de type Mifare ou ISO14443 à microcontrôleurs dédiées. Les cartes Mifare standard sont essentiellement des composants de stockage d'applications ou de droits d'accès à capacité computationnelle limitée. Elles comportent généralement un ou quatre kilo octets de mémoire de type E2PROM, organisée en 16 ou 40 secteurs composés de 4 blocs de 16 octets chacun. Les accès en lecture ou en écriture à ces blocs (à l'exception du bloc 0) sont contrôlés par une paire de clés que chaque secteur contient individuellement dans son dernier bloc. Le bloc 0 contient l'identité de la carte ainsi que les données du fabricant et ne peut être accédé en écriture. Mifare and / or ISO 14443 compliant cards are NFC (Near Field Communication) type contactless cards that can be broadly divided into two sub-categories: standard Mifare type cards and type cards Mifare or ISO14443 with dedicated microcontrollers. Standard Mifare cards are essentially application storage components or access rights with limited computational capability. They generally comprise one or four kilobytes of E 2 PROM type memory organized in 16 or 40 sectors composed of 4 blocks of 16 bytes each. Read or write accesses to these blocks (except block 0) are controlled by a key pair that each sector individually holds in its last block. Block 0 contains the identity of the card as well as the manufacturer's data and can not be accessed in writing.
Typiquement, l'utilisation de ces cartes ou composants se fait à l'aide d'opérations en lecture/écriture réalisées sur ces secteurs par des lecteurs ou des serrures d'accès physiques possédant ce type de lecteurs. Ces cartes sont peu coûteuses mais posent un problème de sécurité : leur protocole de sécurité, Crypto_1 , n'implémente pas totalement la norme ISO 14443 et est connu pour avoir été cassé récemment. A l'heure actuelle, on est capable de retrouver les clés contenues dans les secteurs en moins d'une seconde.  Typically, the use of these cards or components is done using read / write operations performed on these sectors by readers or physical access locks having this type of readers. These cards are inexpensive but pose a security problem: their security protocol, Crypto_1, does not fully implement ISO 14443 and is known to have been broken recently. At the moment, we are able to find the keys contained in the sectors in less than a second.
La nouvelle génération de Mifare utilise un autre protocole cryptographique qui repose sur le hash d'un triple-DES effectué à partir de la paire de clés secrètes associée à chaque secteur. Toutefois, ce nouveau protocole ne garantit pas une sécurité optimale puisqu'en raison de la faible taille du Hash (48 octets), on peut incidemment retrouver la paire de clés associée à un secteur par force brute en 2 8 essais.  The new generation of Mifare uses another cryptographic protocol that relies on the hash of a triple-DES made from the secret key pair associated with each sector. However, this new protocol does not guarantee an optimal security because due to the small size of the Hash (48 bytes), one can incidentally find the pair of keys associated with a sector by brute force in 28 tests.
La technologie RFID, en particulier NFC, sur laquelle s'appuient les cartes sans contact (par exemple de type Mifare) est un type de communication sans fil à haute fréquence permettant de faire communiquer à courte portée un appareil NFC avec un autre appareil NFC, ou bien avec une puce sans contact de type RFID. La technologie NFC implémente notamment la norme ISO/CEI 14443-1 à 4 définie pour implémenter les cartes sans contact de type RFID à une fréquence de 13.56 MHz; et elle a été principalement développée pour permettre aux téléphones portables d'intégrer deux types de fonctionnalités RFID (par exemple de type NFC) : une fonctionnalité «lecteur de carte RFID» ; et parfois le téléphone intègre également la fonctionnalité «carte RFID». RFID technology, in particular NFC, on which contactless cards (for example Mifare type) rely is a type of high-frequency wireless communication for communicating short-range NFC device with another NFC device, or with a RFID-type contactless chip. The NFC technology implements in particular the ISO / IEC 14443-1 to 4 standard defined to implement RFID-type contactless cards at a frequency of 13.56 MHz; and it was mainly developed to allow mobile phones to integrate two types of functionalities RFID (for example of the NFC type): an "RFID card reader"functionality; and sometimes the phone also incorporates the "RFID card" feature.
Avec l'émergence des dispositifs mobiles de type objets portables ayant un accès Internet (« terminaux portables »), tels, par exemple, les «Smartphones» ou les tablettes et des applications de type NFC, certaines architectures reposent sur l'utilisation des « terminaux portables » en tant que «carte RFID» à clés à la manière des cartes RFID de type Mifare. Cette configuration pose toutefois un problème majeur : With the emergence of mobile devices of the portable object type having Internet access ("portable terminals"), such as, for example, "smartphones" or tablets and NFC-type applications, certain architectures rely on the use of "mobile devices". portable terminals "as a" RFID card "with keys in the manner of RFID cards Mifare type. This configuration, however, poses a major problem:
· Dans le cas de l'utilisation d'un composant RFID pour gérer plusieurs applications, la multiplication des applications propriétaires pouvant accéder en lecture et en écriture au contenu de la «carte RFID» pose la question de la confidentialité et de la gestion de la mémoire et des accès à celle-ci, sachant que les registres de la gestion mémoire d'une carte type Mifare sont partagés par l'ensemble des applications pouvant accéder à la carte.  · In the case of using an RFID component to manage multiple applications, the proliferation of proprietary applications that can read and write to the content of the "RFID card" raises the issue of privacy and management of memory and access to it, knowing that the memory management registers of a Mifare type card are shared by all the applications that can access the card.
De façon plus spécifique, si l'on considère l'utilisation typique d'une carte Mifare dans un contexte d'accès physique, tel par exemple celui d'une serrure, et à titre spécifique celle d'une chambre d'hôtel, celle-ci s'articule autour de trois composants principaux : un logiciel de programmation, un lecteur appartenant au système d'accès physique (par exemple une serrure d'accès) et la carte Mifare du client. More specifically, if we consider the typical use of a Mifare card in a context of physical access, such as that of a lock, and specifically that of a hotel room, that It is organized around three main components: a programming software, a reader belonging to the physical access system (for example an access lock) and the client's Mifare card.
De manière générale, la carte RFID, par exemple de type Mifare, est accédée en écriture par un lecteur dans lequel est exécuté le logiciel de programmation de carte, les droits d'accès sont calculés par ce dernier puis téléchargés sous forme de données dans un secteur de la carte RFID (par exemple de type Mifare) en la cryptant optionnellement à l'aide de la paire de clefs de ce secteur.  In general, the RFID card, for example of the Mifare type, is accessed in writing by a reader in which the card programming software is executed, the access rights are calculated by the latter and then downloaded as data into a card. sector of the RFID card (for example of the Mifare type) by optionally encrypting it with the help of the pair of keys of this sector.
Lorsque la carte est présentée devant la serrure de contrôle d'accès, celle-ci a été programmée pour fonctionner avec l'application téléchargée dans la carte RFID (typiquement Mifare), la «serrure» accède donc en lecture au secteur qui lui est imparti et valide l'accès si l'application contenue dans la carte correspond à ce que le programme attend. L'art antérieur connaît, par la demande internationale N° WO 2010/048350 (Wouter Habraken), un procédé et un système mettant en œuvre une carte à puce et un réseau de communication. When the card is presented in front of the access control lock, it has been programmed to work with the application downloaded to the RFID card (typically Mifare), the "lock" therefore reads the sector assigned to it. and validate the access if the application contained in the card corresponds to what the program is waiting for. The prior art knows, by the international application No. WO 2010/048350 (Wouter Habraken), a method and a system implementing a smart card and a communication network.
L'art antérieur connaît également, par la demande de brevet américain N° US 2004/250066 (IBM), un système et des procédés de transaction de données de carte à puce fournissant des niveaux élevés de sécurité de stockage et de transmission. The prior art also discloses, by US Patent Application No. 2004/250066 (IBM), a smart card data transaction system and methods providing high levels of storage and transmission security.
Toutefois, ces deux documents de l'art antérieur décrivent des solutions mettant en œuvre des clés de chiffrement secrètes en chiffrement symétrique, contrairement à la présente invention, qui met en œuvre des clés publiques et des méthodes de chiffrement asymétriques. However, these two documents of the prior art describe solutions implementing secret encryption keys in symmetric encryption, unlike the present invention, which implements asymmetric public keys and encryption methods.
De plus, dans ces deux documents de l'art antérieur, il n'y a pas d'authentification mutuelle entre la carte et le serveur.  Moreover, in these two documents of the prior art, there is no mutual authentication between the card and the server.
Exposé de l'invention Presentation of the invention
La présente invention vise à proposer un procédé permettant de télécharger de façon sécurisée et à distance des clés d'accès dans une carte sans contact, par exemple mais non exclusivement de type Mifare, au moyen d'un dispositif mobile, par exemple de type «smartphone». The present invention aims at providing a method for securely and remotely downloading access keys in a contactless card, for example but not exclusively of the Mifare type, by means of a mobile device, for example of the " smartphone ".
A cet effet, la présente invention concerne, dans son acception la plus générale, un procédé de communication mettant en œuvre un dispositif mobile, une carte sans contact et un serveur distant, caractérisé en ce qu'il comporte les étapes suivantes : · sélection par un utilisateur sur ledit dispositif mobile d'une application dédiée au téléchargement de codes d'accès lorsque ledit utilisateur place ladite carte sans contact à portée dudit dispositif mobile ; détection d'une puce de ladite carte sans contact par ledit dispositif mobile à l'aide de ladite application sélectionnée par l'utilisateur ; connexion dudit dispositif mobile à ladite puce de ladite carte sans contact sur une interface sécurisée ; établissement d'une connexion par ledit dispositif mobile entre ladite puce de ladite carte sans contact et ledit serveur distant ; authentification de la validité d'une clé de ladite puce de ladite carte sans contact par ledit serveur distant ; vérification de l'identité dudit serveur distant par ladite puce de ladite carte sans contact ; ladite application dudit dispositif mobile servant de relais de communication pour le tunnel sécurisé directement établi entre ledit serveur distant et une application sécurisée de ladite carte sans contact ; calcul de blocs cryptographiques par ladite puce de ladite carte sans contact et transfert desdits blocs cryptographiques audit dispositif mobile ; transmission d'une requête de ladite application dudit dispositif mobile sur une page dudit serveur distant afin de récupérer une clé d'accès pour ladite puce de ladite carte sans contact ; vérification par ledit serveur distant des droits d'accès liés à ladite carte sans contact ; en fonction des droits d'accès, construction par ledit serveur distant d'une structure de données chiffrées contenant une clé d'accès et une signature cryptographique ; transmission par ledit serveur distant audit dispositif mobile d' réponse contenant ladite structure de données ; • encapsulation de ladite structure de données (24) dans un élément sécurisé ; For this purpose, the present invention relates, in its most general sense, to a communication method implementing a mobile device, a contactless card and a remote server, characterized in that it comprises the following steps: · selection by a user on said mobile device of an application dedicated to downloading access codes when said user places said contactless card within reach of said mobile device; detecting a chip of said contactless card by said mobile device using said application selected by the user; connecting said mobile device to said chip of said contactless card on a secure interface; establishing a connection by said mobile device between said chip of said contactless card and said remote server; authenticating the validity of a key of said chip of said contactless card by said remote server; verification of the identity of said remote server by said chip of said contactless card; said application of said mobile device serving as a communication relay for the secure tunnel directly established between said remote server and a secure application of said contactless card; calculating cryptographic blocks by said chip of said contactless card and transferring said cryptographic blocks to said mobile device; transmitting a request from said application of said mobile device to a page of said remote server to retrieve an access key for said chip of said contactless card; verification by said remote server of access rights related to said contactless card; according to the access rights, construction by said remote server of an encrypted data structure containing an access key and a cryptographic signature; transmission by said remote server to said mobile response device containing said data structure; Encapsulating said data structure (24) in a secure element;
• transmission dudit dispositif mobile à ladite carte sans contact de ladite structure de données ; · vérification par ladite puce de ladite carte sans contact de la signature comprise dans ladite structure de données et déchiffrement de la valeur de la clé d'accès à l'aide d'une clé de chiffrement privée ; et • transmitting said mobile device to said contactless card of said data structure; · Verification by said chip of said contactless card of the signature included in said data structure and decryption of the value of the access key using a private encryption key; and
• utilisation par ladite puce de ladite carte sans contact de la valeur de la clé d'accès pour une application ; • use by said chip of said contactless card of the value of the access key for an application;
• ledit procédé mettant en œuvre des méthodes de cryptographie asymétrique, les données étant chiffrées avec une clé de chiffrement publique de ladite carte sans contact et ladite clé de chiffrement publique étant exportée par ledit serveur distant, une authentification mutuelle étant réalisée entre ladite carte sans contact et ledit serveur distant. Said method implementing asymmetric cryptographic methods, the data being encrypted with a public encryption key of said contactless card and said public encryption key being exported by said remote server, mutual authentication being performed between said contactless card; and said remote server.
Selon un mode de réalisation, ledit dispositif mobile est un téléphone mobile. According to one embodiment, said mobile device is a mobile phone.
De préférence, ledit dispositif mobile est un téléphone mobile de type «smartphone». Preferably, said mobile device is a mobile phone type "smartphone".
Selon un mode de réalisation, ledit dispositif mobile est une tablette tactile. According to one embodiment, said mobile device is a touch pad.
Avantageusement, ladite carte sans contact est une carte de type RFID («Radio Frequency Identification»). De préférence, la connexion dudit dispositif mobile à ladite puce de ladite carte sans contact sur une interface sécurisée est réalisée en NFC («Near Field Communication»). Advantageously, said contactless card is a RFID-type card ("Radio Frequency Identification"). Preferably, the connection of said mobile device to said chip of said contactless card on a secure interface is performed in NFC ("Near Field Communication").
Avantageusement, ladite interface sécurisée est une interface de type EAP- TLS («Extensible Authentication Protocol / Transport Layer Security»). Advantageously, said secure interface is an EAP-TLS type interface ("Extensible Authentication Protocol / Transport Layer Security").
Selon un mode de réalisation, la transmission d'une requête de ladite application dudit dispositif mobile sur une page dudit serveur distant est réalisée au moyen du protocole SSL («Secure Socket Layer») ou TLS («Transport Layer Security»). According to one embodiment, the transmission of a request from said application of said mobile device to a page of said remote server is performed using the SSL ("Secure Socket Layer") or TLS ("Transport Layer Security") protocol.
Avantageusement, la vérification par ledit serveur distant des droits d'accès liés à ladite carte sans contact est réalisée en récupérant la clé de chiffrement publique de ladite carte sans contact grâce à une connexion SSL («Secure Socket Layer») ou TLS («Transport Layer Security») préalablement établie, et ledit serveur distant fait correspondre ladite clé de chiffrement publique à son équivalent stocké dans une base de données. Advantageously, the verification by said remote server of the access rights linked to said contactless card is achieved by retrieving the public encryption key from said contactless card through an SSL ("Secure Socket Layer") or TLS ("Transport") connection. Layer Security ") previously established, and said remote server matches said public encryption key to its equivalent stored in a database.
Selon un mode de réalisation, ladite puce de ladite carte sans contact utilise ensuite une API (interface de programmation ou «Application Programming Interface») de type «Mifare» pour accéder à son interface «Mifare» en écriture et inscrire la valeur de la clé de session dans un des blocs appropriés et réservés à l'application «Mifare». Selon une variante, ledit procédé comporte en outre une étape d'authentification mutuelle entre ledit serveur distant et un élément sécurisé. According to one embodiment, said chip of said contactless card then uses an API ("Programming Interface" or "Application Programming Interface") of the "Mifare" type to access its "Mifare" interface in writing and write the value of the key. session in one of the appropriate blocks reserved for the "Mifare" application. According to a variant, said method further comprises a step of mutual authentication between said remote server and a secure element.
Selon un mode de réalisation, ledit élément sécurisé est une carte SIM dudit dispositif mobile. Selon une variante, ledit procédé comporte en outre une étape d'authentification mutuelle entre un élément sécurisé dudit dispositif mobile et ladite puce de ladite carte sans contact. According to one embodiment, said secure element is a SIM card of said mobile device. According to a variant, said method further comprises a step of mutual authentication between a secure element of said mobile device and said chip of said contactless card.
Selon un mode de réalisation, ledit élément sécurisé est une carte SIM dudit dispositif mobile. According to one embodiment, said secure element is a SIM card of said mobile device.
Brève description des dessins Brief description of the drawings
On comprendra mieux l'invention à l'aide de la description, faite ci-après à titre purement explicatif, d'un mode de réalisation de l'invention, en référence aux Figures dans lesquelles : The invention will be better understood by means of the description, given below purely for explanatory purposes, of one embodiment of the invention, with reference to the figures in which:
« la Figure 1 représente les différents composants mis en œuvre dans le procédé selon la présente invention ; et • la Figure 2 illustre les différentes étapes du procédé selon la présente invention. Description détaillée des modes de réalisation de l'invention  FIG. 1 represents the various components used in the process according to the present invention; and Figure 2 illustrates the different steps of the process according to the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE EMBODIMENTS OF THE INVENTION
La Figure 1 représente les différents composants mis en œuvre dans le procédé selon la présente invention : une carte sans contact 1 1 comportant une puce 21 et communiquant avec un dispositif mobile 10 comportant une application 20, ledit dispositif mobile 10 communiquant avec un serveur distantFIG. 1 represents the various components implemented in the method according to the present invention: a contactless card 11 comprising a chip 21 and communicating with a mobile device 10 comprising an application 20, said mobile device 10 communicating with a remote server
12. 12.
La Figure 2 illustre les différentes étapes du procédé selon la présente invention : sélection par un utilisateur sur ledit dispositif mobile 10 d'une application 20 dédiée au téléchargement de codes d'accès CAi, CA2, CAn lorsque ledit utilisateur place ladite carte sans contact 1 1 à portée dudit dispositif mobile 10 ; détection d'une puce 21 de ladite carte sans contact 1 1 par ledit dispositif mobile 10 à l'aide de ladite application 20 sélectionnée par l'utilisateur ; connexion dudit dispositif mobile 10 à ladite puce 21 de ladite carte sans contact 1 1 sur une interface sécurisée 22 ; établissement d'une connexion par ledit dispositif mobile 10 entre ladite puce 21 de ladite carte sans contact 1 1 et ledit serveur distant 12 ; authentification de la validité d'une clé de ladite puce 21 de ladite carte sans contact 1 1 par ledit serveur distant 12 ; vérification de l'identité dudit serveur distant 12 par ladite puce 21 de ladite carte sans contact 1 1 ; ladite application 20 dudit dispositif mobile 10 servant de relais de communication pour le tunnel sécurisé directement établi entre ledit serveur distant 12 et une application sécurisée 23 de ladite carte sans contact 1 1 ; calcul de blocs cryptographiques par ladite puce 21 de ladite carte sans contact 1 1 et transfert desdits blocs cryptographiques audit dispositif mobile 10 ; transmission d'une requête de ladite application 20 dudit dispositif mobile 10 sur une page dudit serveur distant 12 afin de récupérer une clé d'accès pour ladite puce 21 de ladite carte sans contact 1 1 ; vérification par ledit serveur distant 12 des droits d'accès liés à ladite carte sans contact 1 1 ; en fonction des droits d'accès, construction par ledit serveur distant 12 d'une structure de données 24 chiffrées contenant une clé d'accès et une signature cryptographique ; transmission par ledit serveur distant 12 audit dispositif mobile 10 d'une réponse contenant ladite structure de données 24 ; encapsulation de ladite structure de données 24 dans un élément sécurisé ; transmission dudit dispositif mobile 10 à ladite carte sans contact 1 1 de ladite structure de données 24 ; vérification par ladite puce 21 de ladite carte sans contact 1 1 de la signature comprise dans ladite structure de données 24 et déchiffrement de la valeur de la clé d'accès à l'aide d'une clé de chiffrement privée ; et utilisation par ladite puce 21 de ladite carte sans contact 1 1 de la valeur de la clé d'accès pour une application ; ledit procédé mettant en œuvre des méthodes de cryptographie asymétrique, les données étant chiffrées avec une clé de chiffrement publique de ladite carte sans contact 1 1 et ladite clé de chiffrement publique étant exportée par ledit serveur distant 12, une authentification mutuelle étant réalisée entre ladite carte sans contact 1 1 et ledit serveur distant 12. FIG. 2 illustrates the different steps of the method according to the present invention: selection by a user on said mobile device 10 of an application 20 dedicated to downloading access codes CAi, CA 2 , CA n when said user places said card without contact 1 1 within range of said mobile device 10; detecting a chip 21 of said non-contact card 1 1 by said mobile device 10 with the aid of said application selected by the user; connecting said mobile device 10 to said chip 21 of said contactless card 1 1 on a secure interface 22; establishing a connection by said mobile device 10 between said chip 21 of said contactless card 11 and said remote server 12; authentication of the validity of a key of said chip 21 of said contactless card 1 1 by said remote server 12; verification of the identity of said remote server 12 by said chip 21 of said contactless card 1 1; said application 20 of said mobile device 10 serving as a communication relay for the secure tunnel directly established between said remote server 12 and a secure application 23 of said contactless card 1 1; calculating cryptographic blocks by said chip 21 of said contactless card 11 and transferring said cryptographic blocks to said mobile device 10; transmitting a request from said application 20 of said mobile device 10 to a page of said remote server 12 in order to retrieve an access key for said chip 21 of said contactless card 11; verification by said remote server 12 access rights related to said contactless card 1 1; depending on the access rights, construction by said remote server 12 of an encrypted data structure 24 containing an access key and a cryptographic signature; transmitting by said remote server 12 to said mobile device 10 a response containing said data structure 24; encapsulating said data structure 24 in a secure element; transmitting said mobile device 10 to said contactless card 11 of said data structure 24; verification by said chip 21 of said contactless card 11 of the signature included in said data structure 24 and decryption of the value of the access key using a private encryption key; and use by said chip 21 of said contactless card 1 1 of the value of the access key for an application; said method implementing asymmetric cryptographic methods, the data being encrypted with a public encryption key of said contactless card 11 and said public encryption key being exported by said remote server 12, mutual authentication being performed between said card contactless 1 1 and said remote server 12.
Au sens de la présente invention, on entend par application 20 une application logicielle. Cette application est active mais neutre du point de vue de la sécurité. Elle ne modifie pas les blocs cryptographiques transmis par la puce, mais ne fait que les transférer. Elle joue le rôle d'un relais, au sens propre admis dans le domaine des télécommunications. Within the meaning of the present invention, application is understood to mean a software application. This application is active but neutral from a security point of view. It does not modify the cryptographic blocks transmitted by the chip, but only transfers them. It plays the role of a relay, literally accepted in the field of telecommunications.
Par puce, on entend un microcontrôleur avec un ensemble d'applications. By chip is meant a microcontroller with a set of applications.
Dans la description qui suit, on entend par «SSL/TLS», «RFID» et «NFC» les éléments suivants : SSL/TLS : Secure Socket Layer / Transport Layer Security. Protocole cryptographique standardisé par NETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) permettant d'échanger des données de façon sécurisée en garantissant leur intégrité, la confidentialité et la non répudiation de l'échange ainsi que l'authentification des deux terminaux en cas d'authentification mutuelle (par exemple avec le protocole EAP-TLS). Ce protocole peut se découper en deux phases distinctes: la phase d'authentification d'une ou des deux entités communicantes, puis la phase de transmission de données chiffrées. RFID : Radio Frequency Identification. Technologie d'identification sans contact de circuits intégrés intégrant ou connectés à une antenne, reposant généralement sur des cartes, tags ou étiquettes, les informations ou données étant transmises par des fréquences radio à induction magnétique initiées par un lecteur approprié puis identifiées et lues par ce dernier. In the description that follows, the term "SSL / TLS", "RFID" and "NFC" means the following elements: SSL / TLS: Secure Socket Layer / Transport Layer Security. Cryptographic protocol standardized by NETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) allowing to exchange data in a secure way by guaranteeing their integrity, the confidentiality and non-repudiation of the exchange as well as the authentication of the two terminals in case of mutual authentication ( for example with the EAP-TLS protocol). This protocol can be divided into two distinct phases: the authentication phase of one or both communicating entities, then the encrypted data transmission phase. RFID: Radio Frequency Identification. Non-contact integrated circuit identification technology incorporating or connected to an antenna, generally based on cards, tags or tags, the information or data being transmitted by magnetic induction radio frequencies initiated by an appropriate reader and then identified and read by this latest.
NFC : Near Field Communication. Protocole de communication sans fil à courte portée et faible consommation reposant sur la technologie RFID à la différence près que les échanges d'information entre deux machines NFC peuvent être à double sens alors que dans le cas de RFID seule la puce transmet des informations au lecteur. NFC: Near Field Communication. Short-range, low-power wireless communication protocol based on RFID technology, except that the exchange of information between two NFC machines can be two-way whereas in the case of RFID only the chip transmits information to the reader .
La technologie, sur laquelle s'appuie la présente invention, repose sur l'idée que les cartes sans contact, notamment les cartes «Mifare», peuvent être programmées par des lecteurs NFCs contenus dans des dispositif mobiles, par exemple de type «smartphone», permettant ainsi aux utilisateurs de télécharger directement leurs droits d'accès spécifiques dans leur carte sans-contact, de préférence Mifare, sans avoir à obtenir de nouveaux droits et de nouvelles cartes par les établissements concernés. Cette architecture repose sur une connexion sécurisée 22, de préférence de type EAP-TLS, via un dispositif mobile 10 de préférence de type «smartphone» NFC entre une puce 21 , de préférence à interface RFID duale, d'une carte sans contact 1 1 , et un serveur distant 12 à même de charger une clé d'activation dans la puce 21 , clé nécessaire à l'obtention d'un accès spécifique, par exemple l'accès à une chambre d'hôtel. La carte 1 1 , de préférence à interface duale, contient selon un mode de réalisation deux types de technologies correspondant à chacune de ces interfaces : la technologie Mifare, d'une part et la technologie «pile EAP-TLS» embarquée, d'autre part. The technology on which the present invention is based is based on the idea that contactless cards, especially "Mifare" cards, can be programmed by NFC readers contained in mobile devices, for example of the "smartphone" type. , allowing users to directly download their specific access rights in their contactless card, preferably Mifare, without having to obtain new rights and new cards by the institutions concerned. This architecture is based on a secure connection 22, preferably of the EAP-TLS type, via a mobile device 10 preferably of the "smartphone" NFC type between a chip 21, preferably with a dual RFID interface, of a contactless card 11 , and a remote server 12 able to load an activation key in the chip 21, the key needed to obtain access specific, for example access to a hotel room. The card 1 1, preferably dual interface, contains according to one embodiment two types of technologies corresponding to each of these interfaces: Mifare technology, on the one hand and embedded "EAP-TLS" battery technology, on the other hand go.
Dans le mode de réalisation qui est décrit ci-dessous, on considérera que le dispositif mobile 10 est un «Smartphone», c'est-à-dire un téléphone mobile disposant de fonctionnalités multimédia avancées, et que la carte sans contact 1 1 est une carte à interface RFID. Toutefois, d'autres dispositifs mobiles et d'autres types de cartes peuvent être mis en œuvre dans le procédé selon la présente invention. In the embodiment which is described below, it will be considered that the mobile device 10 is a "smartphone", that is to say a mobile phone with advanced multimedia features, and that the contactless card 1 1 is an RFID interface card. However, other mobile devices and other types of cards can be implemented in the method according to the present invention.
Dans un mode de réalisation, la connexion sécurisée 22 EAP-TLS et le transfert des données dans la puce 21 se déroule suivant le scénario suivant : In one embodiment, the secure connection 22 EAP-TLS and the transfer of data in the chip 21 proceeds according to the following scenario:
• L'utilisateur est invité à sélectionner sur son Smartphone 10 une application 20 dédiée au téléchargement de codes d'accès spécifiques CAi, CA2, CAn (typiquement ceux pour l'ouverture d'une chambre d'hôtel), au moment où il place une carte sans contact à interface RFID duale 1 1 à la portée de celui-ci. • The user is invited to select on his Smartphone 10 an application 20 dedicated to downloading specific access codes CAi, CA 2 , CA n (typically those for the opening of a hotel room), when it places a contactless card with dual RFID interface 1 1 within range thereof.
• Le Smartphone 1 1 détecte une puce RFID 21 de ladite carte sans contact à interface RFID duale 1 1 à l'aide de l'application 20 sélectionnée par l'utilisateur puis se connecte en NFC à la puce RFID 21 sur son interface EAP-TLS 22.  • The Smartphone 1 1 detects an RFID chip 21 of said contactless card with dual RFID interface 1 1 using the application 20 selected by the user then connects in NFC to the RFID chip 21 on its interface EAP- TLS 22.
· L'application «pile EAP-TLS» est activée pendant que l'application mobile 20 du Smartphone 10 établit une connexion entre la puce RFID 1 1 et le serveur de clés distant 12.  · The application "EAP-TLS stack" is activated while the mobile application 20 of the Smartphone 10 establishes a connection between the RFID chip 1 1 and the remote key server 12.
• Durant la première phase de l'authentification EAP-TLS, l'application mobile 20 du Smartphone 10 sert de relais entre le serveur de clés distant 12 et l'application «pile EAP-TLS» en se chargeant de redistribuer les échanges à l'une ou à l'autre des deux entités communicantes. Durant la phase d'authentification, le serveur de clés distant 12 authentifie la validité de l'identité de la puce RFID 21 , et la puce RFID 21 vérifie l'identité du serveur 12. During the first phase of the EAP-TLS authentication, the mobile application 20 of the Smartphone 10 serves as a relay between the remote key server 12 and the application "EAP-TLS stack" by being responsible for redistributing the exchanges to the remote. one or the other of the two communicating entities. During the authentication phase, the remote key server 12 authenticates the validity of the identity of the RFID chip 21, and the RFID chip 21 verifies the identity of the server 12.
Une fois cette première phase d'authentification mutuelle réussie, les blocs cryptographiques calculés à l'issue de celle-ci par la puce RFID 21 , sont rapatriés sur le Smartphone 10 qui assurera la deuxième phase du protocole EAP-TLS (i.e. celle d'échange de données cryptées).  Once this first phase of successful mutual authentication, the cryptographic blocks calculated at the end of it by the RFID chip 21, are repatriated to the Smartphone 10 which will provide the second phase of the EAP-TLS protocol (ie that of encrypted data exchange).
L'application mobile 20 du Smartphone 10 envoie une requête (par exemple en http) SSL sur une page (par exemple php) du serveur de clés distant 12 en vue de récupérer une clé d'accès pour la puce RFID 21 . The mobile application 20 of the Smartphone 10 sends a request (for example in http) SSL on a page (for example php) of the remote key server 12 to retrieve an access key for the RFID chip 21.
Le serveur de clés distant 12 vérifie quels sont les droits d'accès du porteur de la carte RFID 1 1 en récupérant la clé de chiffrement publique de celle-ci grâce à la connexion SSL préalablement établie. Il fait correspondre cette clé de chiffrement publique à son équivalent stockée dans une base de donnée et vérifie les crédits ou accès auxquels le porteur de la carte RFID 1 1 a droit.  The remote key server 12 verifies the access rights of the holder of the RFID card 1 1 by retrieving the public encryption key thereof through the SSL connection previously established. It matches this public encryption key to its equivalent stored in a database and checks credits or access to which the holder of the RFID card 1 1 is entitled.
En fonction des droits d'accès de l'utilisateur, il construit une structure de donnée 24 définie en tant que «conteneur de clé», ce conteneur comprend la clé d'accès qui sera écrite dans un des blocs d'une application Mifare de la puce RFID 21 et qui est chiffrée par la clé de chiffrement publique du certificat de la «pile EAP-TLS» de la puce RFID 21 . Ce conteneur comprend également une signature de ce chiffrement permettant à la puce RFID 21 de vérifier la bonne validité de ce conteneur.  According to the access rights of the user, he constructs a data structure 24 defined as a "key container", this container includes the access key which will be written in one of the blocks of a Mifare application of the RFID chip 21 and which is encrypted by the public encryption key of the certificate of the "EAP-TLS stack" of the RFID chip 21. This container also includes a signature of this encryption enabling the RFID chip 21 to check the good validity of this container.
Le serveur distant 12 envoie sa réponse (par exemple http) dans laquelle se trouve le «conteneur de clé», au Smartphone 10 toujours via la connexion SSL préalablement établie.  The remote server 12 sends its response (for example http) in which the "key container" is located, to the smartphone 10 always via the SSL connection previously established.
Le Smartphone 10 rapatrie le «conteneur de clé» sur l'interface de la pile EAP-TLS de la puce RFID 21 .  The Smartphone 10 repatriates the "key container" on the interface of the EAP-TLS stack of the RFID chip 21.
La puce RFID 21 vérifie la signature du «conteneur de clé» et une fois l'opération réussie, elle déchiffre la valeur de la clé d'accès à l'aide de sa propre clé de chiffrement privée. • La puce RFID utilise ensuite une API Mifare pour accéder à son interface Mifare en écriture et inscrire la valeur de la clé de session dans un des blocs appropriés et réservés à l'application Mifare. Dans le cadre de la présente invention, un élément sécurisé (tel celui constituant en partie la puce 21 ) peut être également porté par le Smartphone 10 (qui, dans d'autres modes de réalisation, peut être une tablette numérique ou un autre dispositif mobile) ; cela peut être par exemple, mais de manière non limitative, une carte SIM. The RFID chip 21 verifies the signature of the "key container" and once the operation is successful, it decrypts the value of the access key using its own private encryption key. • The RFID chip then uses a Mifare API to access its Mifare Write interface and write the value of the session key in one of the appropriate blocks reserved for the Mifare application. In the context of the present invention, a secure element (such as that constituting in part the chip 21) may also be carried by the Smartphone 10 (which, in other embodiments, may be a digital tablet or other mobile device ); this can be for example, but not limited to, a SIM card.
Ainsi, la présente invention propose une façon sécurisée de télécharger à distance des clés d'accès dans une carte sans contact, de préférence de type «Mifare» via un dispositif mobile, de préférence de type «Smartphone » et pourra être étendu en considérant que la puce à interface duale pourrait être embarquée (sous la forme d'une carte USIM par exemple) dans le Smartphone. Thus, the present invention provides a secure way to remotely download access keys in a contactless card, preferably of the "Mifare" type via a mobile device, preferably of the "Smartphone" type, and can be extended by considering that the dual interface chip could be embedded (in the form of a USIM card for example) in the Smartphone.
L'invention est décrite dans ce qui précède à titre d'exemple. Il est entendu que l'homme du métier est à même de réaliser différentes variantes de l'invention sans pour autant sortir du cadre du brevet. The invention is described in the foregoing by way of example. It is understood that the skilled person is able to realize different variants of the invention without departing from the scope of the patent.

Claims

REVENDICATIONS
Procédé de communication mettant en œuvre un dispositif mobile (10), une carte sans contact (1 1 ) comportant une puce (21 ), et un serveur distant (12), caractérisé en ce qu'il comporte les étapes suivantes : Communication method implementing a mobile device (10), a contactless card (1 1) comprising a chip (21), and a remote server (12), characterized in that it comprises the following steps:
• sélection par un utilisateur sur ledit dispositif mobile (10) d'une application (20) dédiée au téléchargement de codes d'accès (CAi, CA2, CAn) lorsque ledit utilisateur place ladite carte sans contact (1 1 ) à portée dudit dispositif mobile (10) ; Selection by a user on said mobile device (10) of an application (20) dedicated to downloading access codes (CAi, CA 2 , CA n ) when said user places said contactless card (1 1) within range said mobile device (10);
• détection de ladite puce (21 ) de ladite carte sans contact (1 1 ) par ledit dispositif mobile (10) à l'aide de ladite application (20) sélectionnée par l'utilisateur ; connexion dudit dispositif mobile (10) à ladite puce (21 ) de ladite carte sans contact (1 1 ) sur une interface sécurisée (22) ; établissement d'une connexion par ledit dispositif mobile (10) entre ladite puce (21 ) de ladite carte sans contact (1 1 ) et ledit serveur distant (12) ; authentification de la validité d'une clé de ladite puce (21 ) de ladite carte sans contact (1 1 ) par ledit serveur distant (12) ; vérification de l'identité dudit serveur distant (12) par ladite puce (21 ) de ladite carte sans contact (1 1 ) ; ladite application (20) dudit dispositif mobile (10) servant de relais de communication pour le tunnel sécurisé directement établi entre ledit serveur distant (12) et une application sécurisée (23) de ladite carte sans contact (1 1 ) ; calcul de blocs cryptographiques par ladite puce (21 ) de ladite carte sans contact (1 1 ) et transfert desdits blocs cryptographiques audit dispositif mobile (10) ; • transmission d'une requête de ladite application (20) dudit dispositif mobile (10) sur une page dudit serveur distant (12) afin de récupérer une clé d'accès pour ladite puce (21 ) de ladite carte sans contact (1 1 ) ; Detecting said chip (21) of said non-contact card (11) by said mobile device (10) by means of said application (20) selected by the user; connecting said mobile device (10) to said chip (21) of said non-contact card (1 1) on a secure interface (22); establishing a connection by said mobile device (10) between said chip (21) of said contactless card (1 1) and said remote server (12); authenticating the validity of a key of said chip (21) of said contactless card (1 1) by said remote server (12); verifying the identity of said remote server (12) by said chip (21) of said non-contact card (1 1); said application (20) of said mobile device (10) serving as a communication relay for the secure tunnel directly established between said remote server (12) and a secure application (23) of said non-contact card (11); calculating cryptographic blocks by said chip (21) of said contactless card (11) and transferring said cryptographic blocks to said mobile device (10); Transmitting a request from said application (20) of said mobile device (10) to a page of said remote server (12) in order to retrieve an access key for said chip (21) of said contactless card (1 1) ;
• vérification par ledit serveur distant (12) des droits d'accès liés à ladite carte sans contact (1 1 ) ; en fonction des droits d'accès, construction par ledit serveur distant (12) d'une structure de données (24) chiffrées contenant une clé d'accès et une signature cryptographique; transmission par ledit serveur distant (12) audit dispositif mobile (10) d'une réponse contenant ladite structure de données (24) ; encapsulation de ladite structure de données (24) dans un élément sécurisé ; transmission dudit dispositif mobile (10) à ladite carte sans contact (1 1 ) de ladite structure de données (24) ; • verification by said remote server (12) access rights related to said contactless card (1 1); according to the access rights, construction by said remote server (12) of an encrypted data structure (24) containing an access key and a cryptographic signature; transmitting by said remote server (12) to said mobile device (10) a response containing said data structure (24); encapsulating said data structure (24) in a secure element; transmitting said mobile device (10) to said non-contact card (1 1) of said data structure (24);
• vérification par ladite puce (21 ) de ladite carte sans contact (1 1 ) de la signature comprise dans ladite structure de données (24) et déchiffrement de la valeur de la clé d'accès à l'aide d'une clé de chiffrement privée ; et · utilisation par ladite puce (21 ) de ladite carte sans contact (1 1 ) de la valeur de la clé d'accès pour une application ; • verification by said chip (21) of said contactless card (1 1) of the signature included in said data structure (24) and decryption of the value of the access key using an encryption key private; and · use by said chip (21) of said contactless card (1 1) of the value of the access key for an application;
• ledit procédé mettant en œuvre des méthodes de cryptographie asymétrique, les données étant chiffrées avec une clé de chiffrement publique de ladite carte sans contact (1 1 ) et ladite clé de chiffrement publique étant exportée par ledit serveur distantSaid method implementing asymmetrical cryptographic methods, the data being encrypted with a public encryption key of said contactless card (1 1) and said public encryption key being exported by said remote server
(12), une authentification mutuelle étant réalisée entre ladite carte sans contact (1 1 ) et ledit serveur distant (12). (12), mutual authentication being performed between said contactless card (1 1) and said remote server (12).
2. Procédé de communication selon la revendication 1 , caractérisé en ce que ledit dispositif mobile (10) est un téléphone mobile. 2. Communication method according to claim 1, characterized in that said mobile device (10) is a mobile phone.
Procédé de communication selon la revendication 2, caractérisé en ce que ledit dispositif mobile (10) est un téléphone mobile de type «smartphone». Communication method according to claim 2, characterized in that said mobile device (10) is a mobile phone type "smartphone".
Procédé de communication selon la revendication 1 , caractérisé en ce que ledit dispositif mobile (10) est une tablette tactile. Communication method according to claim 1, characterized in that said mobile device (10) is a touch pad.
Procédé de communication selon l'une des revendications 1 à 4, caractérisé en ce que ladite carte sans contact (1 1 ) est une carte de type RFID («Radio Frequency Identification»). Communication method according to one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that said contactless card (1 1) is a card type RFID ("Radio Frequency Identification").
Procédé de communication selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que la connexion dudit dispositif mobile (10) à ladite puce (21 ) de ladite carte sans contact (1 1 ) sur une interface sécurisée (22) est réalisée en NFC («Near Field Communication»). Communication method according to any one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the connection of said mobile device (10) to said chip (21) of said contactless card (1 1) on a secure interface (22) is made of NFC ("Near Field Communication").
Procédé de communication selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que ladite interface sécurisée (22) est une interface de type EAP-TLS («Extensible Authentication Protocol / Transport Layer Security»). Communication method according to any one of the preceding claims, characterized in that said secure interface (22) is an EAP-TLS type interface ("Extensible Authentication Protocol / Transport Layer Security").
Procédé de communication selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que la transmission d'une requête de ladite application (20) dudit dispositif mobile (10) sur une page dudit serveur distant (12) est réalisée au moyen du protocole SSL («Secure Socket Layer») ou TLS («Transport Security Layer»). Communication method according to any one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the transmission of a request from said application (20) of said mobile device (10) to a page of said remote server (12) is performed by means of the SSL protocol ("Secure Socket Layer") or TLS ("Transport Security Layer").
9. Procédé de communication selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que la vérification par ledit serveur distant (12) des droits d'accès liés à ladite carte sans contact (1 1 ) est réalisée en récupérant la clé de chiffrement publique de ladite carte sans contact9. A communication method according to any one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the verification by said remote server (12) access rights linked to said contactless card (1 1) is achieved by recovering the encryption key of said contactless card
(1 1 ) grâce à une connexion SSL («Secure Socket Layer») ou TLS («Transport security Layer») préalablement établie, et en ce que ledit serveur distant (12) fait correspondre ladite clé de chiffrement publique à son équivalent stocké dans une base de données. (1 1) using a SSL ("Secure Socket Layer") or TLS ("Transport Security Layer") connection previously established, and in that said remote server (12) matches said public encryption key to its equivalent stored in a database.
10. Procédé de communication selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que ladite puce (21 ) de ladite carte sans contact (1 1 ) utilise ensuite une API (interface de programmation ou «Application Programming Interface») de type «Mifare» pour accéder à son interface «Mifare» en écriture et inscrire la valeur de la clé de session dans un des blocs appropriés et réservés à l'application «Mifare». 10. The communication method as claimed in claim 1, wherein said chip of said contactless card then uses an API of the type Mifare "to access its interface" Mifare "in writing and register the value of the session key in one of the appropriate blocks and reserved for the application" Mifare ".
1 1 . Procédé de communication selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce qu'il comporte en outre une étape d'authentification mutuelle entre ledit serveur distant (12) et un élément sécurisé. 1 1. Communication method according to any one of the preceding claims, characterized in that it further comprises a mutual authentication step between said remote server (12) and a secure element.
12. Procédé de communication selon la revendication 1 1 , caractérisé en ce que ledit élément sécurisé est une carte SIM dudit dispositif mobile (10). 12. The communication method according to claim 1 1, characterized in that said secure element is a SIM card of said mobile device (10).
13. Procédé de communication selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1 à 10, caractérisé en ce qu'il comporte en outre une étape d'authentification mutuelle entre un élément sécurisé dudit dispositif mobile (10) et ladite puce (21 ) de ladite carte sans contact (1 1 ). 13. The communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 10, characterized in that it further comprises a mutual authentication step between a secure element of said mobile device (10) and said chip (21) of said card without contact (1 1).
14. Procédé de communication selon la revendication 13, caractérisé en ce que ledit élément sécurisé est une carte SIM dudit dispositif mobile (10). 14. The communication method according to claim 13, characterized in that said secure element is a SIM card of said mobile device (10).
PCT/EP2012/069114 2011-10-05 2012-09-27 Method for securely downloading access keys using a mobile device WO2013050296A1 (en)

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US9882902B2 (en) 2013-11-01 2018-01-30 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Apparatus and method for secure provisioning of a communication device
TWI560578B (en) * 2013-11-26 2016-12-01 Chunghwa Telecom Co Ltd
US9729526B2 (en) 2013-11-27 2017-08-08 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Apparatus and method for secure delivery of data from a communication device
US9560025B2 (en) 2013-11-27 2017-01-31 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Apparatus and method for secure delivery of data from a communication device
US9413759B2 (en) 2013-11-27 2016-08-09 At&T Intellectual Property I, Lp Apparatus and method for secure delivery of data from a communication device
US10476859B2 (en) 2014-05-01 2019-11-12 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Apparatus and method for managing security domains for a universal integrated circuit card
US9967247B2 (en) 2014-05-01 2018-05-08 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Apparatus and method for managing security domains for a universal integrated circuit card
EP3761248A1 (en) * 2019-07-03 2021-01-06 Mastercard International Incorporated Transaction device management
FR3110748A1 (en) * 2020-05-20 2021-11-26 D-Home Smaart Programming of premises access badges.
FR3110747A1 (en) * 2020-05-20 2021-11-26 D-Home Smaart Programming of premises access badges by mobile terminal.
US12314796B2 (en) 2020-08-17 2025-05-27 Mastercard International Incorporated Card reader, smart card and method for processing a transaction
US12380431B2 (en) 2021-05-24 2025-08-05 Mastercard International Incorporated Systems, methods and computer program products for asynchronous authentication of digital wallet based payment transactions
US12288213B2 (en) 2022-03-16 2025-04-29 Mastercard International Incorporated Systems, methods and computer program products for secure contactless payment transactions

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FR2981239A1 (en) 2013-04-12
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