WO2011036066A1 - Procédé de prévention d'attaques d'un message de protocole de commande de passerelle multimédia - Google Patents
Procédé de prévention d'attaques d'un message de protocole de commande de passerelle multimédia Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2011036066A1 WO2011036066A1 PCT/EP2010/063311 EP2010063311W WO2011036066A1 WO 2011036066 A1 WO2011036066 A1 WO 2011036066A1 EP 2010063311 W EP2010063311 W EP 2010063311W WO 2011036066 A1 WO2011036066 A1 WO 2011036066A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- media gateway
- attack
- preventing
- token
- module
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Ceased
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
- H04L63/126—Applying verification of the received information the source of the received data
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
Definitions
- the media gateway control (MEGACO) protocol is a main protocol for communication between the media gateway controller and the media gateway. According to the media gateway control protocol, the communications between the media gateway
- authorized media gateway controller sets up a white list of names in advance for storing the network address of every authorized media gateway; then, when the authorized media gateway controller receives a message sent from a media
- the object of the present invention is to provide a method and an
- the communication module 12 is used for receiving media gateway control protocol messages and AP tokens sent by a media gateway controller, or for sending media gateway control protocol messages and AP tokens to a media gateway controller.
- Fig. 2 is a structural diagram of a media gateway
- the executing module 28 is used for executing an operation corresponding to the received media gateway control protocol message when the media gateway controller 20 receives the media gateway control protocol message and the AP token from the media gateway 10 and the attack-preventing module 26 determines that the media gateway 10 is an authorized device.
- Fig. 3 is a flowchart of a method for preventing attacks according to an embodiment of the present invention in the case that a media gateway serves as a sender and a media gateway controller serves as a receiver. As shown in Fig. 3, when the media gateway 10 is to send a media gateway control protocol message XI to the media gateway controller 20 to request the media gateway controller 20 to execute an operation
- the attack-preventing module 16 of the media gateway 10 uses a pre-specified Hash algorithm SF to perform a Hash calculation on the formed string SI, so as to calculate the Hash value HI (step S320) .
- the identifier MGId of the media gateway 10 is the network address and the port number of the media gateway 10
- the attack-preventing module 26 of the media gateway controller 20 can obtain the network address and the port number of the media gateway 10 from the received carrier of the media gateway control protocol message XI .
- the attack-preventing module 16 of the media gateway 10 uses the cipher key K pre-stored in the storage module 14, the
- the attack-preventing module 16 of the media gateway 10 judges whether the calculated Hash value H4 is the same as the Hash value H3 contained in the received AP token, whether the random numbers stored in the storage module 14 do not include the random number contained in the received AP token, and whether the time represented by the latest timestamp stored in the storage module 14 is earlier than the time represented by the timestamp contained in the received AP token (step S460) .
- step S460 If the judgement result of step S460 is negative, i.e. the calculated Hash value H4 is not the same as the Hash value H3 contained in the received AP token, the random numbers stored in the storage module 14 include the random number contained in the received AP token, or the time represented by the latest timestamp stored in the storage module 14 is not earlier than the time represented by the timestamp contained in the received AP token, then the attack-preventing module 16 of the media gateway 10 determines that the media gateway controller 20 is not an authorized device, and the process is ended.
- the AP token comprises the random number R and the timestamp T, and the string used when calculating the Hash value H contained in the AP token
- each of the modules contained in the media gateway 10 and media gateway controller 20 disclosed in each of the above embodiments can be realized by using software, hardware or a combination of them.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
Abstract
La présente invention concerne un procédé de prévention d'attaques d'un message de protocole de commande de passerelle multimédia, le procédé comportant les étapes qui consistent : à calculer la valeur de hachage d'une chaîne désignée en tant que jeton de prévention d'attaques d'un message de protocole de commande de passerelle multimédia devant être envoyé par un premier dispositif (10) à un second dispositif (20), ladite chaîne désignée étant formée par une clé de chiffrement partagée entre ledit premier dispositif (10) et ledit second dispositif (20), un identifiant dudit premier dispositif (10) et dudit second dispositif (20) en tant que dispositif de passerelle multimédia, et ledit message de protocole de commande de passerelle multimédia. Ledit jeton de prévention d'attaques est envoyé conjointement avec ledit message de protocole de commande de passerelle multimédia audit second dispositif (20). Grâce audit procédé, des attaques dirigées contre le protocole de commande de passerelle multimédia peuvent être réduites ou évitées.
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN200910177249.9 | 2009-09-28 | ||
| CN200910177249.9A CN102035801B (zh) | 2009-09-28 | 2009-09-28 | 一种用于防止攻击的方法和装置 |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| WO2011036066A1 true WO2011036066A1 (fr) | 2011-03-31 |
Family
ID=43608633
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| PCT/EP2010/063311 Ceased WO2011036066A1 (fr) | 2009-09-28 | 2010-09-10 | Procédé de prévention d'attaques d'un message de protocole de commande de passerelle multimédia |
Country Status (2)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN102035801B (fr) |
| WO (1) | WO2011036066A1 (fr) |
Cited By (5)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN109120584A (zh) * | 2018-06-19 | 2019-01-01 | 上海交通大学 | 基于UEFI和WinPE的终端安全防范方法及系统 |
| WO2019072314A3 (fr) * | 2018-12-29 | 2019-10-24 | Alibaba Group Holding Limited | Système et procédé de détection d'attaque par réinsertion |
| US10681083B2 (en) | 2018-12-29 | 2020-06-09 | Alibaba Group Holding Limited | System and method for detecting replay attack |
| US10735464B2 (en) | 2018-12-29 | 2020-08-04 | Alibaba Group Holding Limited | System and method for detecting replay attack |
| US11283634B2 (en) | 2018-12-29 | 2022-03-22 | Advanced New Technologies Co., Ltd. | System and method for detecting replay attack |
Families Citing this family (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN102739659B (zh) * | 2012-06-16 | 2015-07-08 | 华南师范大学 | 一种防重放攻击的认证方法 |
| CN103685322B (zh) * | 2013-12-31 | 2016-12-21 | 广州博冠信息科技有限公司 | 传输网络数据包的方法和设备 |
| CN108737326B (zh) * | 2017-04-14 | 2021-03-30 | 北京京东尚科信息技术有限公司 | 用于进行令牌验证的方法、系统、装置及电子设备 |
Citations (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20060200855A1 (en) * | 2005-03-07 | 2006-09-07 | Willis Taun E | Electronic verification systems |
| WO2006124293A2 (fr) * | 2005-05-19 | 2006-11-23 | Metreos Corporation | Serveur mandataire pour telephonie par internet |
| EP1746814A2 (fr) * | 2005-07-20 | 2007-01-24 | Avaya Technology Corp. | Détection, enregistement et prévention d'appels téléphoniques voix sur IP non sollicités ou non désirés, dits "spam over internet telephony" |
Family Cites Families (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN101150405B (zh) * | 2006-09-22 | 2010-10-27 | 华为技术有限公司 | 多播广播业务认证鉴权的方法及系统 |
| CN101534192B (zh) * | 2008-03-14 | 2012-01-11 | 西门子公司 | 一种提供跨域令牌的系统和方法 |
| CN101282222B (zh) * | 2008-05-28 | 2011-09-28 | 胡祥义 | 基于组合对称密钥的数字签名方法 |
-
2009
- 2009-09-28 CN CN200910177249.9A patent/CN102035801B/zh active Active
-
2010
- 2010-09-10 WO PCT/EP2010/063311 patent/WO2011036066A1/fr not_active Ceased
Patent Citations (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20060200855A1 (en) * | 2005-03-07 | 2006-09-07 | Willis Taun E | Electronic verification systems |
| WO2006124293A2 (fr) * | 2005-05-19 | 2006-11-23 | Metreos Corporation | Serveur mandataire pour telephonie par internet |
| EP1746814A2 (fr) * | 2005-07-20 | 2007-01-24 | Avaya Technology Corp. | Détection, enregistement et prévention d'appels téléphoniques voix sur IP non sollicités ou non désirés, dits "spam over internet telephony" |
Non-Patent Citations (1)
| Title |
|---|
| EDUARDO B FERNANDEZ ET AL: "Security Patterns for Voice over IP Networks", COMPUTING IN THE GLOBAL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, 2007. ICCGI 2007. INTE RNATIONAL MULTI-CONFERENCE ON, IEEE, PI, 1 March 2007 (2007-03-01), pages 33 - 33, XP031065568, ISBN: 978-0-7695-2798-7 * |
Cited By (6)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN109120584A (zh) * | 2018-06-19 | 2019-01-01 | 上海交通大学 | 基于UEFI和WinPE的终端安全防范方法及系统 |
| WO2019072314A3 (fr) * | 2018-12-29 | 2019-10-24 | Alibaba Group Holding Limited | Système et procédé de détection d'attaque par réinsertion |
| US10681083B2 (en) | 2018-12-29 | 2020-06-09 | Alibaba Group Holding Limited | System and method for detecting replay attack |
| US10735464B2 (en) | 2018-12-29 | 2020-08-04 | Alibaba Group Holding Limited | System and method for detecting replay attack |
| US11283634B2 (en) | 2018-12-29 | 2022-03-22 | Advanced New Technologies Co., Ltd. | System and method for detecting replay attack |
| US11323475B2 (en) | 2018-12-29 | 2022-05-03 | Advanced New Technologies Co., Ltd. | System and method for detecting replay attack |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN102035801A (zh) | 2011-04-27 |
| CN102035801B (zh) | 2014-05-14 |
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