WO2011017851A1 - Method for accessing message storage server securely by client and related devices - Google Patents

Abstract

A method for accessing message storage server by a client in the communication network is provided in the invention. The method includes: when the client inquires of the message storage server about the related security ability, the message storage server responds to the client with the response that its security ability is the transport layer security pre-shared key (PSK-TLS) or the authentication and key agreement (AKA); the client and the message storage server negotiate the establishment of the PSK-TLS or the AKA security channel; the PSK-TLS or the AKA security channel is established between the message storage server and the client, and the confidentiality and the integrality of the related authentication communication between the client and the message storage server and the confidentiality and the integrality of the user data are protected through the security channel.

Description

 Method and related device for client secure access to message storage server

 The present invention relates to access by a client to a message storage server in a communication network, and more particularly to how secure access to a message storage server is achieved without a client having a certificate. Background technique

 Converged IP Communications (CPM) provides a convergence of multimedia communication services while efficiently using standardized service functions in existing communication engines such as instant messaging. Storing a message in the message store and forwarding the message to the user later is one of the primary services provided by the CPM.

 Take IMAP4 (version 4 of the Internet Information Access Protocol) as an example. This protocol is a standard protocol for accessing e-mail from a remote server. It is a client/server model protocol. Two security mechanisms for IMAP4 are currently defined in RFC2060. The first is SASL (Simple Authentication and Security Layer) as defined by RFC2222, and the second is Username/Password in plain text form. These two security mechanisms only provide authentication from the client to the message storage server. In addition, username/password and message communication can easily be tampered with and eavesdropped.

 A security solution to protect users' access to the media storage server has been defined in IETF RFC2595 and RFC3501. However, only Transport Layer Security (TLS) is used for these solutions. As defined in RFC 2595 and RFC 3501, TLS is a supplement to simple authentication (only the SASL mechanism or the configured plaintext username/password authentication mechanism). In this way, IMAP4 can be protected from eavesdropping and fraudulent attacks when authenticating, especially when using plaintext username/password authentication.

In order to establish a TLS connection, the user's certificate is required (of course, the user may not use the certificate, but the user cannot be authenticated at this time, and it is difficult to ensure that the TLS connection is secure). In other words, only users with certificates can securely access the message store server. But the purpose Most of the former mobile phone users do not have a certificate. Therefore, for users who do not have a certificate, especially for a general mobile phone user, secure access to the message storage server becomes a problem.

 Therefore, there is a need to provide a secure solution for accessing a message storage server for users without certificates, particularly mobile phone users. Summary of the invention

 It is an object of the present invention to provide an optional security solution that enables mobile phone users to securely access a message storage server. At the same time, existing security mechanisms for the underlying wireless network will be reused and integrated.

 In order to enable users without certificates to access the message storage server in a secure manner, for IMAP4, the applicant recommends using PSK-TLS (Transport Layer Security Pre-Shared Key Agreement) or AKA (Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol) negotiation.

 The pre-shared key PSK is a symmetric key that is pre-shared between communication participants. PSK-TLS has made some modifications to the existing TLS so that both parties can establish a TLS connection using a pre-shared symmetric key or certificate. That is, in this case, one of the communicating parties can use the pre-shared symmetric key and the other party can use the digital certificate or both of the communicating parties use the pre-shared symmetric key to establish the TLS connection. The AKA protocol is a protocol for authentication and key agreement in a mobile communication network. The concept and principle can be applied to a UMTS network, called UMTS AKA. The same concept/principle can be reused for the IP multimedia core network subsystem. , known as IMS AKA.

 In one aspect, the present invention provides a method for a client to access a message storage server in a communication network, the method comprising:

 When the client queries the security capability associated with the message storage server, the message storage server replies with a response to the security layer of the transport layer security pre-shared key PSK-TLS or authentication and key agreement AKA;

The client and the message storage server negotiate to establish a PSK-TLS or AKA security Full channel;

 A PSK-TLS or AKA security channel is established between the message storage server and the client, and the confidentiality and integrity of the associated authentication communication between the client and the message storage server is protected via the secure channel.

 According to an embodiment of the present invention, the establishing, by the client, the PSK-TLS or the AKA secure channel by the message storage server includes: the client sending a request for establishing a PSK-TLS or AKA secure channel to the message storage server, and The message storage server replies to the client with a response to begin establishing a PSK-TLS or AKA secure channel.

 When the AKA protocol is employed, the service GPRS support node SGSN or the serving call session control function included in the client and the communication network according to an embodiment of the present invention is included.

The S-CSCF performs two-way authentication and shares security parameters related to the user. Further, the service GPRS support node SGSN or service call session control function

The S-CSCF authenticates the message storage server and sends the user-related security parameters to the message storage server. Thus, the user-related security parameters can be used to protect authentication process information and user data trust between the client and the message storage server,

 When the PSK-TLS protocol is employed, an embodiment according to the present invention includes a digital certificate of a client authentication message storage server, the message storage server obtaining user-related authentication information from a network-side functional entity and the message storage server from the client The user's authentication information is directly obtained and the above two types of authentication information are compared and verified.

 In another aspect, the present invention also provides a client in a communication network and a message storage server.

 The implementation and deployment of the solution of the present invention is very easy due to the reuse and integration of existing security mechanisms for the underlying/carrier layer wireless network. DRAWINGS

Other objects and advantages of the present invention will become apparent by reference to the following description taken in conjunction with the drawings. More clear and easy to understand, in the drawing:

 1 shows a schematic diagram of a client secure access message storage server in accordance with the mechanism of the present invention;

 2 is a flow chart of establishing an AKA secure channel between a client and a message storage server in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention;

 3 is a flow diagram of establishing a PSK-TLS secure channel between a client and a message storage server in accordance with another embodiment of the present invention. detailed description

 The flowchart of Figure 1 shows a schematic diagram of a client secure access to a message storage server in accordance with the mechanism of the present invention. In the solution according to the present invention, it is considered to add two types of secure channels, namely PSK-TLS secure channel and AKA secure channel, based on the original only providing TLS secure channel.

In step 101, the client pre-accesses the message store server, and the message store server notifies the client that the relevant service is ready. Next in step 102, the client queries the message storage server for security capabilities. As described in step 103, the message storage server replies to the client with a response of STARTPSKTLS/STARTAKA, LOGINDISABLED, that is, needs to establish a PSK-TLS or AKA secure channel, and prohibits the login using the plaintext username/password at this time. Then in step 104, the client can send a request to the message storage server to establish a PSK-TLS or AKA secure channel. In step 105, the message storage server replies to the client with an immediate response to establish a PSK-TLS or AKA secure channel. In step 106, the client and the message storage server begin to establish a PSK-TLS or AKA secure channel. The specific process of how to establish a secure channel according to the mechanism of the present invention will be described in detail below according to the flow of FIG. 3 and FIG. 4 below. After the PSK-TLS or AKA secure channel is established, the confidentiality protection and integrity protection of the associated authentication communication between the client and the message storage server is provided by the PSK-TLS or AKA channel. According to RFC3501, this secure channel is mainly used to enhance the client. The security of the authentication process with the message storage server. After the authentication process ends, the user's subsequent communication data may not be protected by confidentiality. According to the solution, if the user has the requirement and the message server side also supports, the PSK-TLS/AKA secure channel of the solution can be reused to protect the confidentiality of the user communication data.

 More specifically, in step 107, the client queries the message storage server for its security capabilities. In step 108, the message storage server replies to the client with a response whose authentication capability is authenticated using plaintext authentication. Next, the client sends the plaintext username/password to the message storage server, step 109. After the message storage server is successfully authenticated, an OK response is sent to the client, indicating that the verification is successful, and the state of the user is changed from the unauthenticated state to the authenticated state, that is, step 110. Thus, in the next step 111, the client accesses the service of the message storage server, and of course the access of the client needs to be controlled by the set authority of the message storage server. According to the solution, if the user has a request and the server server also supports, the PSK-TLS or AKA security channel of the solution can be reused to protect the confidentiality of the user communication data.

 2 is a flow diagram of establishing an AKA secure channel between a client and a message storage server in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. The AKA procedure mentioned in the present invention may be IMS AKA, UMTS AKA, CDMA2000 AKA, and the corresponding standards can be found in 3GPP TS 33.102, 3GPP TS 33.203, 3GPP2 S.R0032.

 In step 201, the client sends a request to the message storage server to establish an AKA secure channel. In step 201, the message storage server replies to the client to establish an AKA secure channel.

According to the specification 3GPP TS33.102 or 3GPP TS33.203, the client performs the UMTS AKA or IMS AKA procedure with the Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) / Serving Call Session Control Function (S-CSCF) and the Home Subscriber Server (HSS). The result of this process is that the client and the SGSN/S-CSCF perform mutual authentication, and the user-related security parameters are shared between the client and the SGSN/S-CSCF, for example, at least one pair is used for Confidentiality protection and full protection key (CryptoKey, IntegrityKey), steps 203 shows this process.

 In step 204, the SGSN/S-CSCF authenticates the message storage server. If the IMS AKA process is used, the S-CSCF sends the user's security parameters (such as CryptoKey, IntegrityKey) to the message storage server through the standard interface ISC according to the relevant policy. In the case of UMTS AKA, there is currently no standard interface for the SGSN to send relevant security parameters to the message storage server, but in theory it is possible to reuse the Gp/Gn interface to send relevant security parameters to the message storage server. At this point, there is a shared security parameter (such as CryptoKey, IntegrityKey) between the client and the message storage server, and the client and the message storage server are indirect two-way authentication because the client and the SGSN/S-CSCF are both-way authenticated. The SGSN/S-CSCF will authenticate the message storage server.

 In the next step 205, the client and the message storage server protect the IMAPv4 authentication information and user data information between the client and the message storage server according to the shared security parameters (such as CryptoKey, IntegrityKey).

 The flowchart of Figure 3 shows a flow chart for establishing a PSK-TLS security channel between the client and the message storage server. For the establishment of the PSK-TLS secure channel, there are many ways to negotiate the pre-shared key PSK. One possible way is to use the General Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA), which is a mobile communication network defined by 3GPP. A lightweight security infrastructure that provides unified key agreement services for application layer services. For details, see 3GPP TS33.220.

As shown in step 301, the client sends a request to the message storage server to establish a PSK-TLS secure channel. In step 302, the message storage server replies to the client to establish a PSK-TLS secure channel, and the message storage server also sends its digital certificate to the client. In step 303, the client verifies the digital certificate of the message store server. In step 304, according to the specification 3GPP TS 33.220, a shared key K_MessageStorage can be generated between the client and the BSF (Boot Service Function). In step 305, the client sends a message to the message storage server, the message containing the address or identifier of the BSF, the identity information of the user, and the authentication information (eg, the authentication credential generated by the shared key K_MessageStorage) Wait. In step 306, the message storage server obtains user-related authentication information, such as K_MessageStorage, from the BSF according to the address or identifier of the BSF. The message storage server then performs a comparison verification based on the user authentication information obtained from the BSF and the user authentication information obtained from the client. The interface Zn between the message storage server and the BSF has a standard definition. Finally, in step 307, after the message storage server successfully verifies, an OK message is sent back to the client, indicating that the PSK-TLS secure channel is established. Thereafter, IMAPv4 authentication information and user data information between the client and the message storage server can be secured by confidentiality based on the key derived from K_MessageStorage.

 Thus, according to different embodiments of the present invention, both the client and the message storage server use the negotiated key or the client uses the key and the message storage server uses the digital certificate. When the client does not have the certificate, the same can be used. Securely access the message store server.

 Corresponding to the interaction method described in the present invention, the present invention also provides a client in a communication network and a message storage server.

 According to an embodiment of the present invention, the client includes an inquiry device for inquiring about a security capability related to the message storage server, and the client further includes:

 a secure channel negotiation device, configured to receive, when receiving, from the message storage server, a security capability of the message storage server, a transport layer secure pre-shared key PSK-TLS or an authentication and key agreement AKA response, and the message storage The server negotiates to establish a PSK-TLS or AKA secure channel;

 A secure channel establishing means for establishing a PSK-TLS or AKA secure channel with the message storage server to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the associated authentication communication between the client and the message storage server via the secure channel.

 According to an embodiment of the invention, the secure channel negotiation means is configured to send a request to establish a PSK-TLS or AKA secure channel to the message storage server and to receive a response from the message storage server to initiate establishment of a PSK-TLS or AKA secure channel .

According to an embodiment of the present invention, when the AKA protocol is applied, the secure channel is built The device is configured to perform two-way authentication with the serving GPRS support node SGSN or the serving call session control function S-CSCF in the communication network, and share security parameters related to the user. The security parameter is sent to the message storage server after authenticating the service GPRS support node SGSN or the serving call session control function S-CSCF to the message storage server. In this way, the security process can be used to protect authentication process information and user data information between the client and the message storage server.

 According to an embodiment of the present invention, when the PSK-TLS protocol is applied, the secure channel establishing means is configured to verify a digital certificate of the message storage server, generate a shared key with the boot service function BSF, and The message storage server sends the authentication information, so that the message storage server obtains the user-related authentication information from the boot service function BSF and the message storage server obtains the user's relevant authentication information from the client and compares and verifies the above two types of authentication information. .

 In an embodiment of the invention, the message storage server comprises:

 a security capability replying device, configured to: when the client queries the security capability related to the message storage server, replies to the client with the security capability of the transport layer security pre-shared key PSK-TLS or authentication and key agreement AKA Answer

 a secure channel negotiation device, configured to negotiate with the client to establish a PSK-TLS or AKA secure channel;

 A secure channel establishing means for establishing a PSK-TLS or AKA security channel with the client to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the associated authentication communication between the client and the message storage server via the secure channel.

 According to an embodiment of the invention, the secure channel negotiation device is configured to: receive a request to establish a PSK-TLS or AKA secure channel from the client and reply to the client to start establishing a PSK-TLS or AKA secure channel Answer.

According to an embodiment of the present invention, when the AKA protocol is used, the secure channel establishing means is configured to: verify, by the message storage server, the QoS support node SGSN or the serving call session control function S-CSCF, and from the Service GPRS support node The SGSN or Serving Call Session Control Function S-CSCF receives user-related security parameters. According to an embodiment of the present invention, when the PSK-TLS protocol is used, the secure channel establishing means is configured to: obtain user-related authentication information from the client, and obtain a user from a boot service function B SF of the communication network Relevant authentication information and comparison verification of the above two types of authentication information.

 It should be noted that in the embodiment of the present invention, the modification of the hardware architecture is not involved. Therefore, the implementation of the above-mentioned client and message storage server does not have any particular difficulty for those skilled in the art. Therefore, the description of them is also modular.

 Although the invention has been described in connection with the embodiments, the invention is not limited to any embodiments. The scope of the invention is defined by the claims, and includes various alternatives, modifications and equivalents. Therefore, the scope of the invention should be determined by the scope of the appended claims.

Claims

Rights request  A method for a client to access a message storage server in a communication network, the method comprising:  And when the client queries the security capability related to the message storage server, the message storage server replies with a response of the security layer to the transport layer security pre-shared key PSK-TLS or the authentication and key agreement AKA;  The client negotiates with the message storage server to establish a PSK-TLS or AKA security channel;  Establishing a PSK-TLS or AKA secure channel between the message storage server and the client, and protecting confidentiality and integrity of the associated authentication communication between the client and the message storage server and user data via the secure channel Confidentiality and integrity.  2. The method of claim 1, wherein establishing an AKA secure channel between the message storage server and the client comprises serving a GPRS support node SGSN or a serving call session at the client and the communication network The control function S-CSCF performs two-way authentication and shares the security parameters related to the user.  3. The method according to claim 2, further comprising the serving GPRS support node SGSN or the Serving Call Session Control Function S-CSCF authenticating the message storage server and transmitting the user related security parameters to the message Storage server.  4. The method of claim 2 or 3, further comprising protecting authentication process information and user data information between the client and the message storage server using the user related security parameters.  The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein establishing a PSK-TLS secure channel between the message storage server and the client comprises: the client verifying a digital certificate of a message storage server, the message The storage server obtains user-related authentication information from the client, obtains user-related authentication information from the guiding service function BSF of the communication network, and compares and verifies the above two types of authentication information. 6. A client accessing a message storage server in a communication network, the client The query device includes a security capability for inquiring about a message storage server, and the client further includes:  a secure channel negotiation device, configured to receive, when receiving, from the message storage server, a security capability of the message storage server, a transport layer secure pre-shared key PSK-TLS or an authentication and key agreement AKA response, and the message storage The server negotiates to establish a PSK-TLS or AKA secure channel;  a secure channel establishing device, configured to establish a PSK-TLS or AKA secure channel with the message storage server, so as to protect confidentiality and integrity of the related authentication communication and user data between the client and the message storage server via the secure channel Confidentiality and integrity.  7. The client according to claim 6, wherein the secure channel establishing means is configured to perform mutual authentication between a serving GPRS support node SGSN or a serving call session control function S-CSCF in the communication network. And sharing security parameters related to the user, the security parameters being sent to the message storage after authenticating the message storage server by the serving GPRS support node SGSN or the serving call session control function S-CSCF server.  The client according to claim 6 or 7, wherein the secure channel establishing means is configured to: verify a digital certificate of the message storage server and send authentication information to the message storage server, so that the message storage server The user-related authentication information is obtained from the boot service function BSF in the communication network, and the message storage server obtains the user's relevant authentication information from the client and compares and verifies the above two types of authentication information.  9. A message storage server accessed by a client in a communication network, the message storage server comprising:  a security capability replying device, configured to: when the client queries the security capability related to the message storage server, replies to the client with the security capability of the transport layer security pre-shared key PSK-TLS or authentication and key agreement AKA Answer a secure channel negotiation device, configured to negotiate with the client to establish a PSK-TLS or AKA secure channel; a secure channel establishing device, configured to establish a PSK-TLS or AKA secure channel with the client, so as to protect confidentiality and integrity of related authentication communication between the client and the message storage server and confidentiality of user data via the secure channel Sex and integrity.  10. The message storage server according to claim 9, wherein the secure channel establishing means is configured to: the message storage server is authenticated by a serving GPRS support node SGSN or a serving call session control function S-CSCF, and from the The serving GPRS support node SGSN or the serving call session control function S-CSCF receives user-related security parameters, wherein the security parameters are in the client and the serving GPRS support node SGSN or the serving call session control function S in the communication network - Two-way verification between CSCFs is obtained in a shared manner.  11. The message storage server according to claim 10, wherein the secure channel establishing means is configured to: obtain user-related authentication information from the client, and obtain a user from the communication service function BSF of the communication network Relevant authentication information and comparison verification of the above two types of authentication information.