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WO2009115997A2 - Method and system for ensuring integrity of a contactless card emulating device - Google Patents

Method and system for ensuring integrity of a contactless card emulating device Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2009115997A2
WO2009115997A2 PCT/IB2009/051145 IB2009051145W WO2009115997A2 WO 2009115997 A2 WO2009115997 A2 WO 2009115997A2 IB 2009051145 W IB2009051145 W IB 2009051145W WO 2009115997 A2 WO2009115997 A2 WO 2009115997A2
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
contactless card
secure element
authenticating
card emulating
nfc frontend
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/IB2009/051145
Other languages
French (fr)
Other versions
WO2009115997A3 (en
Inventor
Felix Marx
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
NXP BV
Original Assignee
NXP BV
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by NXP BV filed Critical NXP BV
Publication of WO2009115997A2 publication Critical patent/WO2009115997A2/en
Publication of WO2009115997A3 publication Critical patent/WO2009115997A3/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
    • G06Q20/327—Short range or proximity payments by means of M-devices
    • G06Q20/3278—RFID or NFC payments by means of M-devices
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31—User authentication
    • G06F21/34—User authentication involving the use of external additional devices, e.g. dongles or smart cards
    • G06F21/35—User authentication involving the use of external additional devices, e.g. dongles or smart cards communicating wirelessly
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/06187—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code with magnetically detectable marking
    • G06K19/06206—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code with magnetically detectable marking the magnetic marking being emulated
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
    • G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
    • G06Q20/322—Aspects of commerce using mobile devices [M-devices]
    • G06Q20/3226—Use of secure elements separate from M-devices
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
    • G06Q20/322—Aspects of commerce using mobile devices [M-devices]
    • G06Q20/3229—Use of the SIM of a M-device as secure element
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0492—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload by using a location-limited connection, e.g. near-field communication or limited proximity of entities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0853—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for ensuring integrity of a contactless card emulating device.
  • the invention further relates to a system for ensuring integrity of a contactless card emulating device.
  • contactless card emulating functionality is increasingly implemented into mobile electronic devices (e.g. mobile phones, PDAs, etc.).
  • Said contactless card emulating functionality can e.g. integrated by means of contactless card emulating devices in a well known Near Field Communication (NFC) frontend device of the mobile electronic devices.
  • NFC Near Field Communication
  • the contactless card emulating functionality is implemented by means of so called “secure elements” which are also used for encryption purposes of the contactless card emulating devices.
  • Said secure elements can be integrated e.g. in a SIM-card, an SD-card or other electronic memory devices.
  • a legitimation problem can arise in that said contactless card emulating devices are not legitimated, e.g. clones which are not allowed to be operated without an expressive permission of a licensor or licensee.
  • a method for ensuring the integrity of a contactless card emulating deivices wherein the card emulating device is arranged in an NFC frontend device and/or in a secure element, wherein the secure element is galvanically connected to the NFC frontend device and wherein an authenticating procedure for the contactless card emulating device is performed between the NFC frontend device and the secure element.
  • the contactless card emulating device is a certified and not a cloned one.
  • the contactless card emulating device is a cloned one
  • the contactless card emulating procedure by means of said cloned device is disabled.
  • a user or distributor of cloned contactless card emulating devices derives thus no benefit from the usage or distribution of said unlegitimated devices.
  • the authenticating procedure is performed between specific authenticating means which are arranged on the NFC frontend device and/or on the secure element.
  • specific authenticating means which are as such well known in the art, a very comfortable way of ensuring the integrity of a contactless card emulating device is provided.
  • a preferred embodiment of the inventive method provides, that in a case, that no authenticating means is assigned to the contactless card emulating device, the contactless card emulating device is disabled from performing the contactless card emulating procedure.
  • an easy implementable method for disabling not allowed card emulating devices is provided.
  • the authenticating means are based on a comparison of unique identifier ranges which are able to be handled by the NFC frontend device.
  • a legalized owner of rights on the contactless card emulating devices e.g. licensor
  • a supply chain of the contactless card emulating devices in the market is able to control a supply chain of the contactless card emulating devices in the market.
  • the authenticating procedure uses not standardized, proprietary data.
  • imitators of the contactless card emulating devices to place their unlegitimated devices in the market.
  • the object of the invention is further solved by a system for ensuring integrity of a contactless card emulating device comprising an NFC frontend device and a secure element, wherein the contactless card emulating device is arranged in the NFC frontend device and/or in the secure element, wherein the secure element is galvanically connected to the NFC frontend device, and wherein an authenticating procedure is performable between the NFC frontend device and the secure element.
  • Figure 1 shows in principle a mobile phone with different possibilities to integrate contactless card functionality into the mobile phone
  • FIG. 2 shows in principle an embodiment of the invention
  • Figure 3 shows in principle a use case of the invention.
  • FIG. 1 shows in principle a mobile phone 100 with well known Near Field Communication (NFC) functionality.
  • the mobile phone 100 comprises an NFC frontend device 10 and a host controller 30 for controlling the NFC frontend device 10.
  • An antenna 20 is galvanically connected to the NFC frontend device 10 in order to provide an air interface to another NFC- or RFID device.
  • the mobile phone 100 comprises contactless card emulating functionality.
  • Contactless card emulating functionality means that a device can emulate a contactless smart card functionality (e.g. payment and/or ticketing applications).
  • the contactless card emulating functionality requires dedicated encryption algorithms to ensure an integrity of the data.
  • the contactless card emulating and the encryption functionalities are handled in a so called "secure element" 40.
  • Said secure element 40 is an integrated electronic circuitry which is especially safe against cloning and counterfeiting.
  • Figure 1 shows different possibilities to implement the contactless card emulating functionality into the mobile phone 100, indicated via dotted lines to the NFC frontend device 10.
  • Figure 1 shows a SIM module 50, which is connectable to the NFC frontend device 10 and into which the contactless card emulating functionality can be integrated by means of the secure element 40.
  • the secure element 40 can also be integrated into an SD card 60 which is also connectable to the NFC frontend device 10. Legitimation problems could arise when the devices for performing the contactless card emulating functionality are counterfeited and/or cloned.
  • FIG. 2 shows in principle an embodiment of a system according to the invention.
  • the figure shows in principle a galvanic connection 70 between the NFC frontend device 10 and the secure element 40, the secure element 40 being integrated into a SIM module 50.
  • the galvanic connection between the NFC frontend device 10 and the secure element 40 can e.g. be formed as a single wire connection 70. Needless to say, that also alternative kinds of galvanic connections between the NFC frontend device 10 and the secure element 40 are imaginable.
  • Both the NFC frontend device 10 and the secure element 40 have card emulating devices 12 implemented.
  • Both card emulating devices 12 have dedicated corresponding encrypting devices 13.
  • the card emulating devices 12 on the NFC frontend device 10 and on the SIM module 50 have authenticating means 11, 41.
  • first authenticating means 11 are assigned to the card emulating means 12 on the NFC frontend device 10 and second authenticating means 41 are assigned to the card emulating device 12 on the SIM module 50.
  • the first and second authenticating means 11, 41 can be based on a simple comparison of unique identifier (UID) ranges which are processable by the NFC frontend device 10.
  • UID unique identifier
  • An alternative option is a dedicated secret authentication method using proprietary, e.g. not standardized commands/information.
  • an authentication method based on symmetric or asymmetric encryption algorithms is possible. Said mentioned methods as such are numerous and are well known in the art and are therefore not further described hereinafter.
  • the first and second authentication means 11, 41 decide which of the card emulating devices 12 are to be used for the performance of the contactless card emulating functionality of the mobile phone 100.
  • FIG 3 shows in principle a use case of the invention.
  • the SIM module 50 contains a card emulating device 12 and an assigned corresponding encrypting device 13 but no assigned corresponding second authenticating means 41.
  • the authenticating procedure as described above on the basis of figure 2 will fail. Therefore, the card emulating device 12 on the SIM module 50 is identified as a not legitimated card emulating device 12 (e.g. a clone) and will therefore be disabled from performing the contactless card emulating functionality on the mobile phone 100. It is thus advantageously very comfortable to exclude not legitimated entities of the card emulating devices 12 from performing the contactless card emulating functionality on the mobile phone 100.
  • An enhanced security level of the contactless card emulating devices 12 results by performing the inventive method with the inventive system.
  • the invention is based on a trust logic which ensures that the entities containing the contactless card emulating functionality are provided by trusted partners and/or licensers.
  • the invention is not limited to a single card emulating device 12 on a single secure element 40. Rather, the invention can also be performed with several secure elements 40, wherein all or several of the secure elements 40 contain card emulating devices 12. By means of the method according to the invention, all card emulating devices 12 which do not comply with the authenticating method can be disabled from performing the contactless card emulating functionality.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Coupling Device And Connection With Printed Circuit (AREA)
  • Credit Cards Or The Like (AREA)
  • Telephone Function (AREA)

Abstract

Method for ensuring an integrity of a contactless card emulating device (12), wherein the card emulating device (12) is arranged in an NFC frontend device (10) and/or in a secure element (40),wherein the secure element (40) is galvanically connected to the NFC frontend device (10), and wherein an authenticating procedure for the contactless card emulating device (12) is performed between the NFC frontend device (10) and the secure element (40).

Description

Method and system for ensuring integrity of a contactless card emulating device
FIELD OF THE INVENTION The invention relates to a method for ensuring integrity of a contactless card emulating device.
The invention further relates to a system for ensuring integrity of a contactless card emulating device.
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
Nowadays, contactless card emulating functionality is increasingly implemented into mobile electronic devices (e.g. mobile phones, PDAs, etc.). Said contactless card emulating functionality can e.g. integrated by means of contactless card emulating devices in a well known Near Field Communication (NFC) frontend device of the mobile electronic devices. Usually, the contactless card emulating functionality is implemented by means of so called "secure elements" which are also used for encryption purposes of the contactless card emulating devices. Said secure elements can be integrated e.g. in a SIM-card, an SD-card or other electronic memory devices. A legitimation problem can arise in that said contactless card emulating devices are not legitimated, e.g. clones which are not allowed to be operated without an expressive permission of a licensor or licensee.
OBJECT AND SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
It is therefore an object of the invention to provide a method and a system for an enhanced security level of contactless card emulating devices.
In order to achieve the object defined above, a method for ensuring the integrity of a contactless card emulating deivices is provided wherein the card emulating device is arranged in an NFC frontend device and/or in a secure element, wherein the secure element is galvanically connected to the NFC frontend device and wherein an authenticating procedure for the contactless card emulating device is performed between the NFC frontend device and the secure element. Thus, it can advantageously be verified that the contactless card emulating device is a certified and not a cloned one. In a case that the contactless card emulating device is a cloned one, the contactless card emulating procedure by means of said cloned device is disabled. A user or distributor of cloned contactless card emulating devices derives thus no benefit from the usage or distribution of said unlegitimated devices.
In a preferred embodiment of the inventive method, the authenticating procedure is performed between specific authenticating means which are arranged on the NFC frontend device and/or on the secure element. Thus, by implementing specific authenticating means which are as such well known in the art, a very comfortable way of ensuring the integrity of a contactless card emulating device is provided.
A preferred embodiment of the inventive method provides, that in a case, that no authenticating means is assigned to the contactless card emulating device, the contactless card emulating device is disabled from performing the contactless card emulating procedure. Thus, an easy implementable method for disabling not allowed card emulating devices is provided.
In a further preferred embodiment of the method according to the invention, the authenticating means are based on a comparison of unique identifier ranges which are able to be handled by the NFC frontend device. Thus, a legalized owner of rights on the contactless card emulating devices (e.g. licensor) is able to control a supply chain of the contactless card emulating devices in the market.
In a further preferred embodiment of the method according to the invention, the authenticating procedure uses not standardized, proprietary data. Thus, it is advantageously complicated for imitators of the contactless card emulating devices to place their unlegitimated devices in the market.
The object of the invention is further solved by a system for ensuring integrity of a contactless card emulating device comprising an NFC frontend device and a secure element, wherein the contactless card emulating device is arranged in the NFC frontend device and/or in the secure element, wherein the secure element is galvanically connected to the NFC frontend device, and wherein an authenticating procedure is performable between the NFC frontend device and the secure element.
The aspects defined above and further aspects of the invention are apparent from exemplary embodiments to be described hereinafter and are explained with reference to these exemplary embodiments.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
The invention will be described in more detail hereinafter with reference to exemplary embodiments. However, the invention is not limited to these exemplary embodiments. Figure 1 shows in principle a mobile phone with different possibilities to integrate contactless card functionality into the mobile phone;
Figure 2 shows in principle an embodiment of the invention; and
Figure 3 shows in principle a use case of the invention.
DESCRIPTION OF EMBODIMENTS
Figure 1 shows in principle a mobile phone 100 with well known Near Field Communication (NFC) functionality. To provide said functionality, the mobile phone 100 comprises an NFC frontend device 10 and a host controller 30 for controlling the NFC frontend device 10. An antenna 20 is galvanically connected to the NFC frontend device 10 in order to provide an air interface to another NFC- or RFID device. Furthermore, the mobile phone 100 comprises contactless card emulating functionality. Contactless card emulating functionality means that a device can emulate a contactless smart card functionality (e.g. payment and/or ticketing applications). The contactless card emulating functionality requires dedicated encryption algorithms to ensure an integrity of the data. In the mobile environment, the contactless card emulating and the encryption functionalities are handled in a so called "secure element" 40. Said secure element 40 is an integrated electronic circuitry which is especially safe against cloning and counterfeiting.
Figure 1 shows different possibilities to implement the contactless card emulating functionality into the mobile phone 100, indicated via dotted lines to the NFC frontend device 10. Figure 1 shows a SIM module 50, which is connectable to the NFC frontend device 10 and into which the contactless card emulating functionality can be integrated by means of the secure element 40. Alternatively, the secure element 40 can also be integrated into an SD card 60 which is also connectable to the NFC frontend device 10. Legitimation problems could arise when the devices for performing the contactless card emulating functionality are counterfeited and/or cloned.
Figure 2 shows in principle an embodiment of a system according to the invention. The figure shows in principle a galvanic connection 70 between the NFC frontend device 10 and the secure element 40, the secure element 40 being integrated into a SIM module 50. The galvanic connection between the NFC frontend device 10 and the secure element 40 can e.g. be formed as a single wire connection 70. Needless to say, that also alternative kinds of galvanic connections between the NFC frontend device 10 and the secure element 40 are imaginable. Both the NFC frontend device 10 and the secure element 40 have card emulating devices 12 implemented. Both card emulating devices 12 have dedicated corresponding encrypting devices 13. The card emulating devices 12 on the NFC frontend device 10 and on the SIM module 50 have authenticating means 11, 41. In more detail, first authenticating means 11 are assigned to the card emulating means 12 on the NFC frontend device 10 and second authenticating means 41 are assigned to the card emulating device 12 on the SIM module 50.
Now, in order to verify an integrity of the card emulating devices 12, an authenticating procedure takes place between the first and second authenticating means 11 , 41 via the single wire connection 70. To this end, the first and second authenticating means 11, 41 can be based on a simple comparison of unique identifier (UID) ranges which are processable by the NFC frontend device 10. An alternative option is a dedicated secret authentication method using proprietary, e.g. not standardized commands/information. Alternatively, also an authentication method based on symmetric or asymmetric encryption algorithms is possible. Said mentioned methods as such are numerous and are well known in the art and are therefore not further described hereinafter. After having performed the authentication, the first and second authentication means 11, 41 decide which of the card emulating devices 12 are to be used for the performance of the contactless card emulating functionality of the mobile phone 100.
Figure 3 shows in principle a use case of the invention. In this use case, the SIM module 50 contains a card emulating device 12 and an assigned corresponding encrypting device 13 but no assigned corresponding second authenticating means 41. As a result of the absence of the second authenticating means 41, the authenticating procedure as described above on the basis of figure 2 will fail. Therefore, the card emulating device 12 on the SIM module 50 is identified as a not legitimated card emulating device 12 (e.g. a clone) and will therefore be disabled from performing the contactless card emulating functionality on the mobile phone 100. It is thus advantageously very comfortable to exclude not legitimated entities of the card emulating devices 12 from performing the contactless card emulating functionality on the mobile phone 100. An enhanced security level of the contactless card emulating devices 12 results by performing the inventive method with the inventive system. Summarizing, the invention is based on a trust logic which ensures that the entities containing the contactless card emulating functionality are provided by trusted partners and/or licensers.
It has to be mentioned that the invention is not limited to a single card emulating device 12 on a single secure element 40. Rather, the invention can also be performed with several secure elements 40, wherein all or several of the secure elements 40 contain card emulating devices 12. By means of the method according to the invention, all card emulating devices 12 which do not comply with the authenticating method can be disabled from performing the contactless card emulating functionality. Although exemplary embodiments of the invention have been disclosed, it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various changes and modifications can be made which will achieve some of the advantages of the invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention. Such modifications to the inventive concept are intended to be covered by the appended claims in which the reference signs shall not be construed as limiting the scope of the invention. Further, in the description and the appended claims the meaning of "comprising" is not to be understood as excluding other elements or steps. Furthermore, "a" or "an" does not exclude a plurality, and a single device or other units may fulfill the functions of several means recited in the claims.

Claims

1. Method for ensuring an integrity of a contactless card emulating device (12), wherein the card emulating device (12) is arranged in an NFC frontend device (10) and/or in a secure element (40), wherein the secure element (40) is galvanically connected to the NFC frontend device (10), and wherein an authenticating procedure for the contactless card emulating device (12) is performed between the NFC frontend device (10) and the secure element (40).
2. Method according to claim 1, wherein the authenticating procedure is performed between authenticating means (11, 41) being arranged on the NFC frontend device (10) and/or on the secure element (40).
3. Method according to claim 2, wherein in a case, that no authenticating means (11, 41) is assigned to the contactless card emulating device (12), the contactless card emulating device (12) is disabled from performing the contactless card emulating procedure.
4. Method according to claim 3, wherein the authenticating means (11, 41) are based on a comparison of unique identifier ranges which are able to be handled by the NFC frontend device (10).
5. Method according to any of the claims 1 to 4, wherein the authenticating procedure is based on symmetric or asymmetric encryption algorithms.
6. Method according to any of the claims 1 to 5, wherein the authenticating procedure uses not standardized, proprietary data.
7. System for ensuring an integrity of a contactless card emulating device (12) comprising an NFC frontend device (10) and a secure element (40), wherein the contactless card emulating device (12) is arranged in the NFC frontend device (10) and/or in the secure element (40), wherein the secure element (40) is galvanically connected to the NFC frontend device (10), and wherein an authenticating procedure is performable between the NFC frontend device (10) and the secure element (40).
8. System according to claim 7, wherein the authenticating procedure is performable with authenticating means (11, 41), the authenticating means (11, 41) being arrangeable in the NFC frontend device (10) and/or in the secure element (40).
9. System according to claim 8, wherein the galvanic connection between the NFC frontend device (10) and the secure element (40) is formed as a single wire connection (70).
10. System according to claim 9, wherein the authenticating procedure is performable via the single wire connection (70).
11. System according to any of the claims 7 to 10, wherein the secure element (40) is arrangeable in a SIM card (50) or in a SD card (60).
12. System according to any of the claims 7 to 11, wherein the system comprises a multiplicity of secure elements (40), wherein the authenticating procedure is performable between the NFC frontend device (10) and at least one of the multiplicity of the secure elements (40).
13. Mobile phone (100), comprising a system according to any of the claims 7 to 12.
PCT/IB2009/051145 2008-03-19 2009-03-18 Method and system for ensuring integrity of a contactless card emulating device Ceased WO2009115997A2 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP08102759.1 2008-03-19
EP08102759 2008-03-19

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WO2009115997A3 WO2009115997A3 (en) 2010-05-06

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Cited By (17)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
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CN101916351A (en) * 2010-06-29 2010-12-15 北京握奇数据系统有限公司 Smart card multi-protocol adaptive method and smart card
FR2957440A1 (en) * 2010-03-09 2011-09-16 Proton World Int Nv PROTECTION OF A SECURITY MODULE IN A TELECOMMUNICATION DEVICE COUPLED TO AN NFC CIRCUIT
WO2013050112A1 (en) * 2011-10-07 2013-04-11 Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh Marking insecure data by means of an nfc module
WO2013053430A1 (en) * 2011-10-13 2013-04-18 Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh Data exchange block for protecting a near field communication
GB2498172A (en) * 2011-12-01 2013-07-10 Cambridge Silicon Radio Ltd Near-field communication equipped device
US9179301B2 (en) 2010-08-31 2015-11-03 Proton World International N.V. Protection of a communication channel of a telecommunication device coupled to an NFC circuit against misrouting
US9185561B2 (en) 2010-03-09 2015-11-10 Proton World International N.V. Protection against rerouting in an NFC circuit communication channel
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