WO2009103364A1 - Method for the access-related or communication-related random encryption and decryption of data - Google Patents
Method for the access-related or communication-related random encryption and decryption of data Download PDFInfo
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- WO2009103364A1 WO2009103364A1 PCT/EP2008/065655 EP2008065655W WO2009103364A1 WO 2009103364 A1 WO2009103364 A1 WO 2009103364A1 EP 2008065655 W EP2008065655 W EP 2008065655W WO 2009103364 A1 WO2009103364 A1 WO 2009103364A1
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/0618—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a method for encrypting and decrypting data of all kinds, in which the data is encrypted and decrypted to secure its integrity and / or authenticity and to keep the contents of the data confidential with a random key.
- Symmetric encryption methods also called secret-key methods, work with keys that are known at the location of the encryption and at the location of the decryption.
- the symmetric methods include the cryptographic methods DES, triple-DES and AES.
- DES cryptographic methods
- Triple-DES triple-DES
- AES AES
- each 64-bit long plaintext blocks are subjected to a key-independent input permutation.
- Each permuted 64-bit plaintext block is then split into a left and right 32-bit block.
- a function is applied to the left 32-bit block, the result of which is exclusive or linked to the right 32-bit block. The result of this link becomes the new 32-bit block.
- the former left 32-bit block becomes the right 32-bit block.
- the two 32-bit blocks are merged and subjected to a re-permutation.
- the function used in the DES method works on each round with a left 32-bit block that is first permuted and expanded to 48-bits. He then ⁇ follows an exclusive OR operation with a 48-bit long partial keys.
- the 48-bit block is divided into 8 blocks of 6 bit, which are transformed via substitution boxes 8 in eight 4-bit Ausga ⁇ review.
- the eight output values represent the 32-bit output value of the DES function.
- the DES method generates from a 56-bit key Permutation and shift operations the subkeys required for the 16 rounds.
- Triple DES is based on the more ⁇ multiple use of DES algorithm.
- the Rijndael AES method is a block cipher like the DES. Like almost all block cipher Rijndael, the AES encrypted data in multiple iden ⁇ table running laps, another part is key in each round are used.
- Asymmetric encryption also known as public key cryptography, is based on a public key and a first function for encryption and on a private key and a second function for decryption. Both functions are in a defined relationship to each other.
- the method according to the invention belongs to the symmetrical method.
- the object of the invention is to provide a method that clear data encrypts with each new encryption with in place, immediately before encryption newly generated random key, the decryption of the cipher data only for the authorized access independent of the location of the encryption and the key data Generates random data from multiple independent random number generators.
- FIG. 1 shows by way of example a unit (1.0) for implementing the method according to the invention.
- the unit (1.0) contains a communication-executing module (1.1), an encrypting and / or decrypting module (1.2), Ethernet interfaces (1.3), (1.4), (1.5) and (1.6), the switch (1.7 ), (1.8).
- the Mo ⁇ dul (1.1), embedded PC 1 includes at least a serial In ⁇ terface (1.9), the Ethernet interfaces (1.10), (1.11) and the ports (1.14), (1.15).
- the module (1.2), Embedded PC2 comprises at least the ports (1.14), (1.15), a biometric sensor (1.16) and a serial interface (1.17).
- the module (1.2) switches the switch (1.7) via the port (1.12) and the switch (1.8) via the port (1.13).
- the unit (1.0) is connected to the Internet via the Ethernet interface (1.3). To implement redundant networks, the Ethernet interface (1.4) is available.
- the Ethernet interface (1.5) is connected to egg ⁇ nem not shown home PC.
- the unit (1.0) is connected to a security intranet via the Ethernet interface (1.6).
- the modules (1.1) and (1.2) of the unit (1.0) are connected by their separate ports (1.14) and (1.15) mitein ⁇ other. Via the separate port (1.14) and / or the separate port (1.15), the module (1.1) provides the module (1.2) with the encrypted and / or unencrypted data.
- the module (1.2) provides the decrypted and / or encrypted data for the module (1.1).
- at least one random reference date is unmanipulable and secretly stored for randomly predetermined time periods.
- the module (1.2) is connected to a card device, not shown. A person authenticates himself by z. B. her fingerprint in connection with her person assigned, not shown security card. The module (1.2) authenticates the personzugeord ⁇ designated security card.
- Figure 2 shows a first embodiment of the erfindungsge ⁇ MAESSEN method. Shown are a permutation date (2.1), a separate random reference date (2.2), a random number (2.3), another permutation date (2.4), a PI permutation module (2.5), a packet permutation date (2.6), a re-packet permu date (2.7), a re-permutation date (2.8), a random key date (2.9), exclusive or shortcuts (2.10), (2.14), switch (S 1 , S 2B , S 2P , S 3 ), memory blocks ( 2.12), (2.15), (2.17), (2.19), permutation and re-permutation modules (2.13), (2.16), (2.18), plain data (2.11) and cipher editors (2.20). Encryption and decryption take place in the two stages shown (2.21) and (2.22). Here, stage (2.21) identifies bit-related operations and stage (2.22) packet-related operations.
- the separate random reference data (2.2) is read from the non Darge ⁇ put in force for a time range random reference data through the locked and decrypting module (1.2).
- the information about the location of the extraction of the separate random reference date, the permutation date (2.1), the random number (2.3) and the permutation date (2.4) are generated at the encryption location in the module (1.2) with a random generator of the module (1.2), not shown.
- the permutation date (2.1) contains eight 16-byte partial permutation data. Each byte of 128 bytes indicates the location of a bit in the permutated or non-permuted 128-bit block (B-bit block).
- the position of the byte in the permutation data (2.1) indicates the location of a bit in the non-permuted or in the permutated 128-bit long Block.
- the generation of the values of a permutation byte (PBj) preferably takes place by random draws of numbers from a sequence of numbers 0 to 127. Each draw may be a valid draw or invalid draw. A draw of a number is valid if and only if the drawn number value does not match the place index j of the permutation byte PBj in the permutation date
- the permutation date (2.4) has a word width of 24 bits. Three bits each characterize the position of a partial permutation date in the packet permutation date (2.6). The value of three bits indicates the location of a Supplementpermutationsdatums in the parcel permu ⁇ tationsdatum (2.6) or a Supplementpermutationsdatums in permu ⁇ tationsdatum (2.1). The location of three bits in the 24 bit long permutation (2.4) denotes the location of a Supplementpermuta ⁇ tion datums in the permutation (2.4) or Supplementpermutationsda ⁇ tums in the parcel permutation (2.6). The three bits are carried out analogously to the number generation described in the previous section.
- the package permutation date (2.6) therefore consists of 128
- the 128-bit random key (2.9) is taken from the separate 128-bit random reference data (2.2) and the 128-bit random number (2.3) determined by exclusive-OR operation (2.10).
- Clay data (2.11) is decomposed into 128-bit blocks (2.12).
- 128Bit block (2.12) is used with the permutation and re-
- the encrypted bit-permissible clear data blocks are repermutated bit by bit in the re / permutation module (2.16) and combined into 1024 byte blocks (2.17).
- Each 64-bit packet of the 1024-byte block (2.17) is permuted packet by packet in the M-bit packet (re) permutation module (2.18) depending on the packet permeation date (2.6).
- All permutated 1024-byte blocks (2.19) then give the cipher franchises (2.20).
- the decisions ⁇ development of the cipher data (2.20) is carried out in the reverse order of encryption. Instead of the permutations, re-permutations occur and permutations occur instead of the re-permutations.
- the switches (S 2B , S 2P ) are then in position 2 and switch (S 3 ) in position 1. The changeover is made with the date US 1 .
- Figure 3 shows a second embodiment of the erfindungsge ⁇ MAESSEN method. This variant embodiment differs from the first embodiment only in that the random key from the second ⁇ bitpermut faced plain data block is not the previous encrypted data block bitpermutATOR clear but the previous repermutiere encrypted bitper ⁇ mutated plain data block.
- Figure 4 a third embodiment of the method according ⁇ invention is shown.
- the key control data (4.3) are zugsdatum information about the Keyring ⁇ sellfiten the applicable key, the key repeat counts, encryption and / or the Ableseort of sepa ⁇ advise random reference data with respect to the global Zufallsbe-.
- a key repetition number indicates the number of repeated applications of a key on the plain data.
- the Permuta ⁇ tion date (4.4) is identical in content to the permutation (2.1) of the first and second embodiment of the invention shown SEN method. From the permutation date (4.4), the re-permutation date (4.5) is determined.
- the separate random reference data (4.1) is read from the random reference date (not shown) valid for a time range by the encrypting and decrypting module (1.2). The information about the location of the removal of the separate random reference data, to ⁇ number of cases (4.2), the key control data (4.3) and the permutation (4.4) duls (at the location of the encryption in the module (1.2) with a not shown random number generator of the Mo- 1.2) generated.
- Each at a data encryption used random keys (4.6) is generated from the separate link Zufallsbe ⁇ zugsdatum and at least one 128Bit long random number (4.2) by means of EXCLUSIVE-OR.
- the length of the separate random reference datum may be equal to or less than the length of the random number. If the lengths of the sepa- rate randomness datum and the random number in the exclusive-or-join are unequal, the smaller size will be repeated. applying applied.
- ⁇ code encryption key used so generated is greater than the length of the separate random reference data at one of the separate To ⁇ case, the reference date, and at least a random number, a key data the sum of the lengths, the length of the key data is equal to the sum of length of all at a data encryption used key is.
- Each key used in a data encryption is then taken from the key date depending on the key control date (4.3).
- the clear data is decomposed into bit blocks. Each bit block is subjected to a bit permutation. The bit-permuted clear data are combined into new variable bit blocks, the length of a variable bit block (4.11) being equal to the key length.
- the bit-sparse clear bit data of the variable bit block is exclusive-or-linked to the random key selected by the switch (4.12). The results are in bit block (4.14) Wuge ⁇ stores, subject to re permutation and as Chiffreda- th (4.16) output. Decryption is done like encryption.
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Abstract
Description
Verfahren zur Zugriffs- und kommunikationsbezogenen Zufallsver- und Entschlüsselung von Daten Method for access and communication-related randomization and decryption of data
Die vorliegende Erfindung betrifft ein Verfahren zur Ver- und Entschlüsselung von Daten aller Art, bei dem die Daten zur Sicherung ihrer Integrität und/oder Authentizität und zur Geheimhaltung der Dateninhalte mit einem Zufallsschlüssel ver- und entschlüsselt werden.The present invention relates to a method for encrypting and decrypting data of all kinds, in which the data is encrypted and decrypted to secure its integrity and / or authenticity and to keep the contents of the data confidential with a random key.
Bekannt sind symmetrische und asymmetrische Ver- und Entschlüs¬ selungsverfahren. Symmetrische Verschlüsselungsverfahren, auch Secret- Key- Verfahren benannt, arbeiten mit Schlüsseln, die am Ort der Verschlüsselung und am Ort der Entschlüsselung bekannt sind. Zu den symmetrischen Verfahren zählen die kryptografi- sehen Verfahren DES, Triple- DES und AES. Beim DES- Verfahren werden je 64-Bit lange Klartextblöcke einer schlüsselunabhängigen Eingangspermutation unterworfen. Jeder permutierte 64-Bit Klartextblock wird anschließend in einen linken und rechten 32- Bit Block aufgeteilt. Auf den linken 32-Bit Block wird eine Funktion angewendet, deren Ergebnis mit dem rechten 32-Bit Block exklusiv- oder verknüpft wird. Das Ergebnis dieser Verknüpfung wird zum neuen 32-Bit Block. Der ehemals linke 32-Bit Block wird zum rechten 32-Bit Block. Nach 16 solcher Runden werden die beiden 32-Bit Blöcke zusammengefügt und einer Re- Permutation unterworfen. Die im DES- Verfahren verwendete Funktion arbeitet in jeder Runde mit einem linken 32-Bit Block, der zunächst permutiert und auf 48-Bit ausgedehnt wird. Danach er¬ folgt eine Exklusiv- Oder- Verknüpfung mit einem 48-Bit langen Teilschlüssel. Der 48-Bit Block wird in 8 Blöcke zu je 6Bit aufgeteilt, die über 8 Substitutionsboxen in acht 4-Bit Ausga¬ bewerte transformiert werden. Die acht Ausgabewerte stellen den 32-Bit langen Ausgabewert der DES- Funktion dar.Are known symmetric and asymmetric encryption and Entschlüs ¬ selungsverfahren. Symmetric encryption methods, also called secret-key methods, work with keys that are known at the location of the encryption and at the location of the decryption. The symmetric methods include the cryptographic methods DES, triple-DES and AES. In the DES method, each 64-bit long plaintext blocks are subjected to a key-independent input permutation. Each permuted 64-bit plaintext block is then split into a left and right 32-bit block. A function is applied to the left 32-bit block, the result of which is exclusive or linked to the right 32-bit block. The result of this link becomes the new 32-bit block. The former left 32-bit block becomes the right 32-bit block. After 16 such rounds, the two 32-bit blocks are merged and subjected to a re-permutation. The function used in the DES method works on each round with a left 32-bit block that is first permuted and expanded to 48-bits. He then ¬ follows an exclusive OR operation with a 48-bit long partial keys. The 48-bit block is divided into 8 blocks of 6 bit, which are transformed via substitution boxes 8 in eight 4-bit Ausga ¬ review. The eight output values represent the 32-bit output value of the DES function.
Das DES- Verfahren generiert aus einem 56Bit-Schlüssel durch Permutations- und Verschiebeoperationen die für die 16 Runden erforderlichen Teilschlüssel. Triple- DES basiert auf die mehr¬ fache Anwendung vom DES- Algorithmus. Das AES- Verfahren von Rijndael ist wie das DES ein Blockchiffre. Wie fast alle Block- chiffre verschlüsselt das Rijndael- AES Daten in mehreren iden¬ tisch ablaufenden Runden, wobei in jeder Runde ein anderer Teilschlüssel zur Anwendung kommt.The DES method generates from a 56-bit key Permutation and shift operations the subkeys required for the 16 rounds. Triple DES is based on the more ¬ multiple use of DES algorithm. The Rijndael AES method is a block cipher like the DES. Like almost all block cipher Rijndael, the AES encrypted data in multiple iden ¬ table running laps, another part is key in each round are used.
Asymmetrische Verschlüsselung, auch Public- Key- Kryptografie genannt, basiert auf einen öffentlichen Schlüssel und einer ersten Funktion für die Verschlüsselung und auf einen privaten Schlüssel und einer zweiten Funktion für die Entschlüsselung. Beide Funktionen stehen in einer definierten Beziehung zueinander .Asymmetric encryption, also known as public key cryptography, is based on a public key and a first function for encryption and on a private key and a second function for decryption. Both functions are in a defined relationship to each other.
Die bekannten obigen Verfahren leiden unter dem Schlüsselverteilungsproblem. Jede P2P- Kommunikation benötigt den Vorabaustausch eines Schlüssels.The known methods above suffer from the key distribution problem. Every P2P communication requires the pre-exchange of a key.
Aus DE 101 04 307 Al ist ein Verfahren und eine Anordnung zur Datenverschlüsselung bekannt, bei dem das Schlüsselaustauschproblem durch die Schlüsselübertragung in relativer Form gelöst ist. Klartextdaten werden in Datenverschlüsselungsmodule mit einem Zufallsschlüssel verschlüsselt. In Datenflechtmodule wer- den in den Daten Zusatzinformationen eingeflochten. Die verschlüsselten und geflochtenen Daten werden dann über Bit- Byte- permutationsmodule und Paketpermutationsmodule vermischt. Zu¬ fallsschlüssel und andere Informationen werden in relativer Form vom Ort der Verschlüsselung zum Ort der Entschlüsselung übertragen. Zufallsschlüssel und die Permutationsdaten werden in Zufallsgeneratoren des Senders erzeugt. Zur Erzeugung echter Zufallszahlen ist diese Lösung nachteilig. Ein weiterer Nachteil dieser Lösung ist der hohe Aufwand bei der Bit-Byte und Paketpermutation .From DE 101 04 307 Al a method and an arrangement for data encryption is known in which the key exchange problem is solved by the key transfer in relative form. Plain text data is encrypted in data encryption modules with a random key. In data braid modules, additional information is interlaced in the data. The encrypted and braided data is then mixed via bit byte permutation modules and packet permutation modules. To ¬ case key and other information is transmitted in relative form from the place of encryption to the place of decryption. Random key and the permutation data are generated in random number generators of the transmitter. To generate true random numbers, this solution is disadvantageous. Another disadvantage of this solution is the high complexity of the bit byte and packet permutation.
Das erfindungsgemäße Verfahren gehört zu den symmetrischen Verfahren . Die Aufgabe der Erfindung besteht darin, ein Verfahren zuschaf- fen, dass Klardaten bei jeder neuen Verschlüsselung mit am Ort, unmittelbar vor der Verschlüsselung neu generierten Zufallsschlüssel verschlüsselt, die Entschlüsselung der Chiffrendaten nur für den Zugriffsberechtigten unabhängig vom Ort der Verschlüsselung ermöglicht und die Schlüsseldaten aus Zufallsdaten mehrerer unabhängiger Zufallsgeneratoren generiert.The method according to the invention belongs to the symmetrical method. The object of the invention is to provide a method that clear data encrypts with each new encryption with in place, immediately before encryption newly generated random key, the decryption of the cipher data only for the authorized access independent of the location of the encryption and the key data Generates random data from multiple independent random number generators.
Erfindungsgemäß wird die Aufgabe durch die in den Ansprüchen dargestellte Lehre gelöst. Im Folgenden wird die Erfindung ex¬ emplarisch anhand der Figuren 1 bis 4 näher erläutert.According to the invention the object is achieved by the teaching presented in the claims. In the following the invention is explained in more detail with reference ex ¬ emplarisch of Figures 1 to. 4
Figur 1 zeigt beispielhaft eine Einheit (1.0) zur Realisierung des erfindungsgemäßen Verfahrens. Die Einheit (1.0) beinhaltet ein die Kommunikation ausführendes Modul (1.1), ein ver- und/oder entschlüsselndes Modul (1.2), Ethernet- Schnittstellen (1.3), (1.4), (1.5) und (1.6), die Switch (1.7), (1.8) . Das Mo¬ dul (1.1), Embedded PC 1, enthält mindestens ein serielles In¬ terface (1.9), die Ethernet- Schnittstellen (1.10), (1.11) und die Ports (1.14), (1.15) . Das Modul (1.2), Embedded PC2, um- fasst mindestens die Ports (1.14), (1.15), ein Biometrie- Sen¬ sor (1.16) und ein serielles Interface (1.17) . Das Modul (1.2) schaltet über den Port (1.12) den Switch (1.7) und über den Port (1.13) den Switch (1.8) . Die Einheit (1.0) ist über die Ethernet- Schnittstelle (1.3) mit dem Internet verbunden. Zur Realisierung redundanter Netze ist die Ethernet- Schnittstelle (1.4) vorhanden. Die Ethernet- Schnittstelle (1.5) ist mit ei¬ nem nicht dargestellten Home- PC verbunden. Über die Ethernet- Schnittstelle (1.6) steht die Einheit (1.0) mit einem Security Intranet in Verbindung. Die Module (1.1) und (1.2) der Einheit (1.0) sind durch ihre separaten Ports (1.14) und (1.15) mitein¬ ander verschaltet. Über den separaten Port (1.14) und/oder den separaten Port (1.15) stellt das Modul (1.1) dem Modul (1.2) die verschlüsselten und/oder unverschlüsselten Daten zur Verfü- gung. Über den separaten Port (1.15) und/oder den separaten Port (1.14) stellt das Modul (1.2) die entschlüsselten und/oder verschlüsselten Daten für das Modul (1.1) bereit. Im Modul (1.2) ist für zufällig vorbestimmte Zeitbereiche mindestens ein Zufallsbezugsdatum unmanipulierbar und geheim gespeichert. Zur Authentisierung und Authentifizierung ist das Modul (1.2) mit einem nicht dargestellten Kartengerät verbunden. Eine Person authentisiert sich durch z. B. ihren Fingerabdruck in Verbindung mit ihrer personzugeordneten, nicht dargestellten Sicherheitskarte. Das Modul (1.2) authentifiziert die personzugeord¬ nete Sicherheitskarte.FIG. 1 shows by way of example a unit (1.0) for implementing the method according to the invention. The unit (1.0) contains a communication-executing module (1.1), an encrypting and / or decrypting module (1.2), Ethernet interfaces (1.3), (1.4), (1.5) and (1.6), the switch (1.7 ), (1.8). The Mo ¬ dul (1.1), embedded PC 1 includes at least a serial In ¬ terface (1.9), the Ethernet interfaces (1.10), (1.11) and the ports (1.14), (1.15). The module (1.2), Embedded PC2, comprises at least the ports (1.14), (1.15), a biometric sensor (1.16) and a serial interface (1.17). The module (1.2) switches the switch (1.7) via the port (1.12) and the switch (1.8) via the port (1.13). The unit (1.0) is connected to the Internet via the Ethernet interface (1.3). To implement redundant networks, the Ethernet interface (1.4) is available. The Ethernet interface (1.5) is connected to egg ¬ nem not shown home PC. The unit (1.0) is connected to a security intranet via the Ethernet interface (1.6). The modules (1.1) and (1.2) of the unit (1.0) are connected by their separate ports (1.14) and (1.15) mitein ¬ other. Via the separate port (1.14) and / or the separate port (1.15), the module (1.1) provides the module (1.2) with the encrypted and / or unencrypted data. Via the separate port (1.15) and / or the separate port (1.14), the module (1.2) provides the decrypted and / or encrypted data for the module (1.1). In the module (1.2) at least one random reference date is unmanipulable and secretly stored for randomly predetermined time periods. For authentication and authentication, the module (1.2) is connected to a card device, not shown. A person authenticates himself by z. B. her fingerprint in connection with her person assigned, not shown security card. The module (1.2) authenticates the personzugeord ¬ designated security card.
Figur 2 zeigt eine erste Ausführungsvariante des erfindungsge¬ mäßen Verfahrens. Dargestellt sind ein Permutationsdatum (2.1), ein separates Zufallsbezugsdatum (2.2), eine Zufallszahl (2.3), ein weiteres Permutationsdatum (2.4), ein PI- Permutationsmodul (2.5), ein Paket-Permutationsdatum (2.6), ein Re-Paket- Permu- tationsdatum (2.7), ein Re-Permutationsdatum (2.8), ein Zufallsschlüsseldatum (2.9), Exklusiv- oder- Verknüpfungen (2.10), (2.14), Switch (S1, S2B, S2P, S3) , Speicherblöcke (2.12), (2.15), (2.17), (2.19), Permutation und Re-Permutationsmodule (2.13), (2.16), (2.18), Klardaten (2.11) und Chiffredaten (2.20) . Die Verschlüsselung und Entschlüsselung erfolgt in den zwei dargestellten Stufen (2.21) und (2.22) . Dabei kennzeichnet die Stufe (2.21) bitbezogene Operationen und die Stufe (2.22) paketbezogene Operationen.Figure 2 shows a first embodiment of the erfindungsge ¬ MAESSEN method. Shown are a permutation date (2.1), a separate random reference date (2.2), a random number (2.3), another permutation date (2.4), a PI permutation module (2.5), a packet permutation date (2.6), a re-packet permu date (2.7), a re-permutation date (2.8), a random key date (2.9), exclusive or shortcuts (2.10), (2.14), switch (S 1 , S 2B , S 2P , S 3 ), memory blocks ( 2.12), (2.15), (2.17), (2.19), permutation and re-permutation modules (2.13), (2.16), (2.18), plain data (2.11) and cipher editors (2.20). Encryption and decryption take place in the two stages shown (2.21) and (2.22). Here, stage (2.21) identifies bit-related operations and stage (2.22) packet-related operations.
Das separate Zufallsbezugsdatum (2.2) wird aus dem nicht darge¬ stellten für einen Zeitbereich geltenden Zufallsbezugsdatum durch das ver- und entschlüsselnde Modul (1.2) abgelesen. Die Information über den Ort der Entnahme des separaten Zufallsbezugsdatums, das Permutationsdatum (2.1), die Zufallszahl (2.3) und das Permutationsdatum (2.4) werden am Ort der Verschlüsselung im Modul (1.2) mit einem nicht dargestellten Zufallsgenerator des Moduls (1.2) generiert. Das Permutationsdatum (2.1) enthält acht 16Byte lange Teilpermutationsdaten. Jedes Byte der 128Bytes gibt den Ort eines Bits im permutierten oder nicht permutierten 128Bit langen Block (B-Bit-Block) an. Die Lage des Bytes im Permutationsdatum (2.1) kennzeichnet den Ort eines Bits im nicht permutierten oder im permutierten 128Bit langen Block. Die Generierung der Werte eines Permutationsbytes (PBj) erfolgt vorzugsweise durch zufällige Ziehungen von Zahlen aus einer Zahlenfolge 0 bis 127. Jede Ziehung kann eine gültige Ziehung oder ungültige Ziehung sein. Eine Ziehung einer Zahl ist genau dann gültig, wenn der gezogene Zahlenwert ungleich dem Ortindex j des Permutationsbytes PBj im PermutationsdatumThe separate random reference data (2.2) is read from the non Darge ¬ put in force for a time range random reference data through the locked and decrypting module (1.2). The information about the location of the extraction of the separate random reference date, the permutation date (2.1), the random number (2.3) and the permutation date (2.4) are generated at the encryption location in the module (1.2) with a random generator of the module (1.2), not shown. The permutation date (2.1) contains eight 16-byte partial permutation data. Each byte of 128 bytes indicates the location of a bit in the permutated or non-permuted 128-bit block (B-bit block). The position of the byte in the permutation data (2.1) indicates the location of a bit in the non-permuted or in the permutated 128-bit long Block. The generation of the values of a permutation byte (PBj) preferably takes place by random draws of numbers from a sequence of numbers 0 to 127. Each draw may be a valid draw or invalid draw. A draw of a number is valid if and only if the drawn number value does not match the place index j of the permutation byte PBj in the permutation date
PI ={PB0, PB127} ist. Bei gültiger Ziehung wird der gezogenePI = {PB0, PB127}. If the drawing is valid, the drawn one will be drawn
Zahlenwert an der Stelle des Ortindexes des Permutationsbytes in das Permutationsdatum PI übernommen. Bei ungültiger Ziehung ist der gezogene Zahlenwert gleich dem Ortindex j des Permuta¬ tionsbytes PBj. Er wird dann vor der nächsten Ziehung der Zahlenfolge zurückgegeben.Numerical value taken at the location of the location index of the permutation byte in the permutation date PI. If an invalid drawing the drawn number equal to the value of j Ortindex Permuta ¬ tion bytes PBj is. He will then be returned before the next draw of the sequence.
Das Permutationsdatum (2.4) besitzt eine Wortbreite von 24Bit. Je drei Bits charakterisieren die Stellung eines Teilpermutati- onsdatums im Paket- Permutationsdatum (2.6) . Der Wert dreier Bits gibt den Ort eines Teilpermutationsdatums im Paket- Permu¬ tationsdatum (2.6) oder eines Teilpermutationsdatums im Permu¬ tationsdatum (2.1) an. Die Lage dreier Bits im 24Bit langem Permutationsdatum (2.4) kennzeichnet den Ort eines Teilpermuta¬ tionsdatums im Permutationsdatum (2.4) oder Teilpermutationsda¬ tums im Paket- Permutationsdatum (2.6) . Die drei Bits werden analog der im vorangegangenen Abschnitt beschriebenen Zahlenge- nerierung vorgenommen.The permutation date (2.4) has a word width of 24 bits. Three bits each characterize the position of a partial permutation date in the packet permutation date (2.6). The value of three bits indicates the location of a Teilpermutationsdatums in the parcel permu ¬ tationsdatum (2.6) or a Teilpermutationsdatums in permu ¬ tationsdatum (2.1). The location of three bits in the 24 bit long permutation (2.4) denotes the location of a Teilpermuta ¬ tion datums in the permutation (2.4) or Teilpermutationsda ¬ tums in the parcel permutation (2.6). The three bits are carried out analogously to the number generation described in the previous section.
Das Paket-Permutationsdatum (2.6) besteht demzufolge aus 128The package permutation date (2.6) therefore consists of 128
Byte. Jedes Byte der 128 Bytes des Paket-PermutationsdatumsByte. Each byte of the 128 bytes of the packet permutation date
(2.6) gibt den Ort eines M-Bit-Paketes im permutierten oder nicht permutierten N-Byte-Block an. Die Lage des Bytes im Pa- ket-Permutationsdatum (2.6) kennzeichnet den Ort eines M-Bit- Paketes im nicht permutierten oder permutierten N-Byte-Block an .(2.6) indicates the location of an M-bit packet in the permuted or non-permuted N-byte block. The location of the byte in the packet permutation data (2.6) indicates the location of an M-bit packet in the non-permuted or permuted N-byte block.
Für das gewählte Ausführungsbeispiel ist B=128, M=64 und N=1024.For the chosen embodiment, B = 128, M = 64 and N = 1024.
Der 128Bit-lange Zufallsschlüssel (2.9) wird aus dem separaten 128Bit-langen Zufallsbezugsdatum (2.2) und der 128Bit-langen Zufallszahl (2.3) durch Exklusiv- Oder- Verknüpfung (2.10) bestimmt .The 128-bit random key (2.9) is taken from the separate 128-bit random reference data (2.2) and the 128-bit random number (2.3) determined by exclusive-OR operation (2.10).
Klardaten (2.11) werden in 128Bit-Blöcke (2.12) zerlegt. JederClay data (2.11) is decomposed into 128-bit blocks (2.12). Everyone
128Bit-Block (2.12) wird mit dem Permutation- und Re-128Bit block (2.12) is used with the permutation and re-
Permutationsmodul (2.13) unter Nutzung des PermutationsdatumsPermutation module (2.13) using the permutation date
(2.1) bitweise permutiert. Nach erfolgter Bitpermutation wird der erste bitpermutierte Block der Klardaten mit dem 128Bit- langen Zufallsschlüssel (2.9) exklusiv- oder- verknüpft. Nach erfolgter Verschlüsselung des ersten bitpermutierten Blocks schaltet das Switch (S1) mit Hilfe des Umschaltdatums US2 in die Stellung 2, so dass jeder weitere bitpermutierte Block als Zu¬ fallsschlüssel die verschlüsselten, bitpermutierten Klardaten des vorangegangenen Blocks verwendet.(2.1) permuted bitwise. After the bitpermutation has taken place, the first bitpermutated block of the plain data is exclusively-or-linked with the 128-bit random key (2.9). After encryption of the first bitpermutierten block switches the switch (S 1 ) using the switching date US 2 in the position 2, so that each further bitpermutierte block used as ¬ case key the encrypted, bitpermutierten clear data of the previous block.
Die verschlüsselten bitpermutierten Klardatenblöcke werden im Re-/ Permutationsmodul (2.16) bitweise repermutiert und zu 1024Byte- Blöcke (2.17) zusammengefasst . Je 64Bit- Pakete des 1024Byte- Blockes (2.17) werden in Abhängigkeit vom Paketpermu- tationsdatum (2.6) im M-Bit-Paket- (Re) -Permutationsmodul (2.18) paketweise permutiert. Alle permutierten 1024- Byte- Blöcke (2.19) ergeben dann die Chiffredaten (2.20) . Die Entschlüsse¬ lung der Chiffredaten (2.20) wird in umgekehrter Reihenfolge der Verschlüsselung vorgenommen. Anstelle der Permutationen treten Re- Permutationen und anstelle der Re- Permutationen treten Permutationen. Die Switch (S2B, S2P) befinden sich dann in Stellung 2 und Switch (S3) in Stellung 1. Die Umschaltung wird mit dem Datum US1 vorgenommen.The encrypted bit-permissible clear data blocks are repermutated bit by bit in the re / permutation module (2.16) and combined into 1024 byte blocks (2.17). Each 64-bit packet of the 1024-byte block (2.17) is permuted packet by packet in the M-bit packet (re) permutation module (2.18) depending on the packet permeation date (2.6). All permutated 1024-byte blocks (2.19) then give the cipher franchises (2.20). The decisions ¬ development of the cipher data (2.20) is carried out in the reverse order of encryption. Instead of the permutations, re-permutations occur and permutations occur instead of the re-permutations. The switches (S 2B , S 2P ) are then in position 2 and switch (S 3 ) in position 1. The changeover is made with the date US 1 .
Figur 3 zeigt eine zweite Ausführungsvariante des erfindungsge¬ mäßen Verfahrens. Diese Ausführungsvariante unterscheidet sich zur ersten Ausführungsvariante nur darin, dass der Zufalls¬ schlüssel ab den zweiten bitpermutierten Klardatenblock nicht der vorangegangene verschlüsselte bitpermutierte Klardatenblock sondern der vorangegangene repermutierte verschlüsselte bitper¬ mutierte Klardatenblock ist. In Figur 4 ist eine dritte Ausführungsvariante des erfindungs¬ gemäßen Verfahrens gezeigt. Dargestellt sind ein separates Zu¬ fallsbezugsdatum (4.1), eine Zufallszahl (4.2), ein Schlüsselsteuerdatum (4.3), ein Permutationsdatum (4.4), ein Re- Permutationsdatum (4.5), ein Zufallsschlüsseldatum oder mehrere Zufallsschlüsseldaten (4.6), Exklusiv- Oder- Verknüpfungen (4.7), (4.13), Klardaten (4.8), Speicherblöcke (4.9), (4.11), (4.14), ein Bitpermutationsmodul (4.10), ein Switch (4.12), ein Re- Permutationsmodul (4.15) und Chiffredaten (4.16) .Figure 3 shows a second embodiment of the erfindungsge ¬ MAESSEN method. This variant embodiment differs from the first embodiment only in that the random key from the second ¬ bitpermutierten plain data block is not the previous encrypted data block bitpermutierte clear but the previous repermutierte encrypted bitper ¬ mutated plain data block. In Figure 4 a third embodiment of the method according ¬ invention is shown. Shown are a separate To ¬ case reference datum (4.1), a random number (4.2), a key control data (4.3), a permutation (4.4), a Re permutation (4.5), a random key date or more random key data (4.6), EXCLUSIVE-OR Shortcuts (4.7), (4.13), plain data (4.8), memory blocks (4.9), (4.11), (4.14), a bit permutation module (4.10), a switch (4.12), a re-permutation module (4.15) and cipher editors (4.16 ).
Das Schlüsselsteuerdatum (4.3) gibt Auskunft über die Schlüs¬ sellängen der anzuwendenden Schlüssel, die Schlüsselwiederholzahlen, Verschlüsselungsart und/oder den Ableseort des sepa¬ raten Zufallsbezugsdatums in Bezug auf das globale Zufallsbe- zugsdatum.The key control data (4.3) are zugsdatum information about the Keyring ¬ sellängen the applicable key, the key repeat counts, encryption and / or the Ableseort of sepa ¬ advise random reference data with respect to the global Zufallsbe-.
Eine Schlüsselwiederholzahl gibt die Anzahl der wiederholten Anwendungen eines Schlüssels auf die Klardaten an. Das Permuta¬ tionsdatum (4.4) ist Inhaltsgleich dem Permutationsdatum (2.1) der ersten und zweiten Ausführungsvariante des erfindungsgemä¬ ßen Verfahrens. Aus dem Permutationsdatum (4.4) wird das Re- Permutationsdatum (4.5) bestimmt. Das separate Zufallsbezugsda¬ tum (4.1) wird aus dem nicht dargestellten für einen Zeitbereich geltenden Zufallsbezugsdatum durch das ver- und ent- schlüsselnde Modul (1.2) abgelesen. Die Information über den Ort der Entnahme des separaten Zufallsbezugsdatums, die Zu¬ fallszahl (4.2), das Schlüsselsteuerdatum (4.3) und das Permutationsdatum (4.4) werden am Ort der Verschlüsselung im Modul (1.2) mit einem nicht dargestellten Zufallsgenerator des Mo- duls (1.2) generiert. Jeder bei einer Datenverschlüsselung benutzte Zufallsschlüssel (4.6) wird aus dem separaten Zufallsbe¬ zugsdatum und aus mindestens einer 128Bit- langen Zufallszahl (4.2) durch Exklusiv- Oder- Verknüpfung generiert. Dabei kann die Länge des separaten Zufallsbezugsdatums gleich oder un- gleich der Länge der Zufallszahl sein. Bei Ungleichheit der Längen des separaten Zufallsbezugsdatums und der Zufallszahl in der Exklusiv- Oder- Verknüpfung wird die kleinere Größe wieder- holend angewandet . Ist die Summe der Längen aller bei einer Da¬ tenverschlüsselung benutzten Schlüssel größer als die Länge des separaten Zufallsbezugsdatums, so werden aus dem separaten Zu¬ fallsbezugsdatum und aus mindestens einer Zufallszahl ein Schlüsseldatum generiert, wobei die Länge des Schlüsseldatums gleich der Summenlänge aller bei einer Datenverschlüsselung benutzten Schlüssel ist. Jeder bei einer Datenverschlüsselung verwendete Schlüssel wird dann dem Schlüsseldatum in Abhängigkeit des Schlüsselsteuerdatums (4.3) entnommen.A key repetition number indicates the number of repeated applications of a key on the plain data. The Permuta ¬ tion date (4.4) is identical in content to the permutation (2.1) of the first and second embodiment of the invention shown SEN method. From the permutation date (4.4), the re-permutation date (4.5) is determined. The separate random reference data (4.1) is read from the random reference date (not shown) valid for a time range by the encrypting and decrypting module (1.2). The information about the location of the removal of the separate random reference data, to ¬ number of cases (4.2), the key control data (4.3) and the permutation (4.4) duls (at the location of the encryption in the module (1.2) with a not shown random number generator of the Mo- 1.2) generated. Each at a data encryption used random keys (4.6) is generated from the separate link Zufallsbe ¬ zugsdatum and at least one 128Bit long random number (4.2) by means of EXCLUSIVE-OR. In this case, the length of the separate random reference datum may be equal to or less than the length of the random number. If the lengths of the sepa- rate randomness datum and the random number in the exclusive-or-join are unequal, the smaller size will be repeated. applying applied. Is all Since ¬ code encryption key used so generated is greater than the length of the separate random reference data at one of the separate To ¬ case, the reference date, and at least a random number, a key data the sum of the lengths, the length of the key data is equal to the sum of length of all at a data encryption used key is. Each key used in a data encryption is then taken from the key date depending on the key control date (4.3).
Bei einer Verschlüsselung werden die Klardaten in Bitblöcke zerlegt. Jeder Bitblock wird einer Bitpermutation unterworfen. Die bitpermutierten Klardaten werden zu neuen variablen Bitblöcken zusammengefasst , wobei die Länge eines variablen Bitblo- ckes (4.11) gleich der Schlüssellänge ist. Die bitpermutierten Klardaten des variablen Bitblockes werden mit dem durch den Switch (4.12) ausgewählten Zufallsschlüssel exklusiv- oderverknüpft. Die Ergebnisse werden im Bitblock (4.14) zwischenge¬ speichert, einer Re- Permutation unterworfen und als Chiffreda- ten (4.16) ausgegeben. Die Entschlüsselung erfolgt wie die Verschlüsselung. In the case of encryption, the clear data is decomposed into bit blocks. Each bit block is subjected to a bit permutation. The bit-permuted clear data are combined into new variable bit blocks, the length of a variable bit block (4.11) being equal to the key length. The bit-sparse clear bit data of the variable bit block is exclusive-or-linked to the random key selected by the switch (4.12). The results are in bit block (4.14) zwischenge ¬ stores, subject to re permutation and as Chiffreda- th (4.16) output. Decryption is done like encryption.
Claims
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| EP08872640A EP2253098A1 (en) | 2008-02-22 | 2008-11-17 | Method for the access-related or communication-related random encryption and decryption of data |
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2008
- 2008-02-22 DE DE102008010789A patent/DE102008010789B4/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2008-11-17 JP JP2010547059A patent/JP2011512562A/en not_active Withdrawn
- 2008-11-17 EP EP08872640A patent/EP2253098A1/en not_active Withdrawn
- 2008-11-17 WO PCT/EP2008/065655 patent/WO2009103364A1/en not_active Ceased
- 2008-11-17 US US12/918,502 patent/US20110085663A1/en not_active Abandoned
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| EP1223707A1 (en) * | 1999-10-20 | 2002-07-17 | Fujitsu Limited | Variable length key encrypting system |
| DE10104307A1 (en) * | 2001-01-26 | 2001-12-06 | Werner Rozek | Data encoding method for communication system has random key number used for encoding data provided by transmitted relative position information for associated point and defined reference point |
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| "Chapter 7: Block Ciphers ED - MENEZES A; OORSCHOT VAN P; VANSTONE S", 1 October 1996, HANDBOOK OF APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY; [CRC PRESS SERIES ON DISCRETE MATHEMATICES AND ITS APPLICATIONS], CRC PRESS, BOCA RATON, FL, US, PAGE(S) 223 - 282, XP001525007 * |
Cited By (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN113378206A (en) * | 2021-07-09 | 2021-09-10 | 中诚信征信有限公司 | Software authorization encryption method, software authorization decryption method, software authorization encryption device, software authorization decryption device and software authorization decryption system |
| CN113378206B (en) * | 2021-07-09 | 2023-11-28 | 中诚信征信有限公司 | Software authorization encryption method, software authorization decryption method, device and system |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| US20110085663A1 (en) | 2011-04-14 |
| EP2253098A1 (en) | 2010-11-24 |
| DE102008010789A1 (en) | 2009-09-03 |
| JP2011512562A (en) | 2011-04-21 |
| DE102008010789B4 (en) | 2010-09-30 |
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