WO2002056536A1 - Method and system for bonding two bluetooth devices - Google Patents
Method and system for bonding two bluetooth devices Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2002056536A1 WO2002056536A1 PCT/NL2001/000008 NL0100008W WO02056536A1 WO 2002056536 A1 WO2002056536 A1 WO 2002056536A1 NL 0100008 W NL0100008 W NL 0100008W WO 02056536 A1 WO02056536 A1 WO 02056536A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- passkey
- devices
- bluetooth
- user
- bonding
- Prior art date
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 33
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 claims description 26
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 description 7
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 5
- 230000001419 dependent effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000004519 manufacturing process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000003287 optical effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000005236 sound signal Effects 0.000 description 1
Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
- H04L63/0838—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords using one-time-passwords
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/18—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security using different networks or channels, e.g. using out of band channels
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/50—Secure pairing of devices
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/18—Information format or content conversion, e.g. adaptation by the network of the transmitted or received information for the purpose of wireless delivery to users or terminals
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W84/00—Network topologies
- H04W84/18—Self-organising networks, e.g. ad-hoc networks or sensor networks
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
- H04W88/02—Terminal devices
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method for bonding two Bluetooth devices as described in the preamble of claim 1.
- the invention also relates to a system which is suitable for applying the method as described in the preamble of claim 6.
- the Bluetooth technology provides for a short range connection between devices based on 2.4 GHz radio technology.
- the range is about 10 meters and the devices do not have to be in line of sight to communicate.
- the maximum bandwidth for data traffic is 1 Mb per second.
- Bluetooth is operating in the free ISM band, which is also used by many other devices. Bluetooth prevents disturbance by other devices by hopping over 79 frequencies every 1/1600 second.
- the Bluetooth technology has built-in functionality for authentication and encryption. Authentication is used to prevent unwanted access to data and to prevent falsifying of message originator. Encryption is used to prevent eavesdropping.
- LMP link set-up between Bluetooth devices .
- the link-level security mode is based on the concept of link keys. These keys are secret 128 bit random numbers stored individually for each pair of devices in a Bluetooth connection. Each time two Bluetooth devices communicate the link key is used for authentication and encryption. Both devices contain the same link key which is generated locally in each device based on a passkey which is common for both devices or common information derived from such passkey. The link key is kept secret in each device.
- the user puts the devices in a bonding mode upon which the devices ask the user to enter a passkey, which may be selected arbitrarily by the user.
- a passkey which may be selected arbitrarily by the user.
- the device Upon entering the passkey in a device the device will generate a piece of information based on the passkey. The piece of information will be identical for both devices. From then on the two devices are bonded and there is no need to keep the passkey by the user or the devices any longer.
- the passkey based piece of information is used by each device to generate and store a common link key. From that moment on the two devices are paired.
- the Bluetooth devices which are to be bonded are both equipped with display means and manual input means, in particular a keyboard, there will be no difficulty to enter the passkey by a user of the devices for the bonding procedure.
- the device If one device is not equipped with such an input device the device presently needs to contain a factory programmed passkey.
- the passkeys may be default identical for all manufactured devices of a specific type.
- the passkeys may be unique per device.
- a drawback of the first solution of handling a factory programmed passkey is that the Bluetooth security is weakened. Since the value of the passkey is essential for creating the link key and the passkey being identical for all devices of the same type a Bluetooth connection between them cannot be considered secure.
- a drawback of the second solution is that " the manufacturer must maintain a logistic system for handling the many different passkeys, each unique passkey must be communicated to its ultimate user individually, e.g. printed on a box containing a specific Bluetooth device in which the passkey is stored, and the manufacturer must provide a way to restore devices for which the passkey is lost. There must be a support organisation for handling lost passkey requests. Such a logistic and supporting system will be very complex and expensive to maintain. It is an object of the invention to solve the above mentioned drawbacks .
- the device For entering a passkey in a Bluetooth device, the device needs not to be equipped with a keyboard or such type of physical interface, but any other non-radio communication interface can be used.
- non-radio communication interface is part of the device in the first place for normal use of the device.
- the device may present the randomly generated passkey in several ways, such as by transmission of sound or light.
- the manufacturer may make all Bluetooth devices generic. Still, the devices are able to support Bluetooth encryption in a secure way. There are no logistical costs attached to the method. Since the passkey is uniquely generated every time the device needs to be bonded with another device and on demand by a user of the devices, loosing a passkey is not longer an issue and therefore does not impose costs for retrieving same. The above mentioned drawbacks are solved also by a system as described in claim 6.
- fig. 1 shows schematically a system in which a prior art method is applied for entering a passkey into two Bluetooth devices by a user thereof
- figs. 2, 3, 4 and 5 show first to fourth examples respectively of a system according to the invention in which the method according to the invention for entering a passkey into two Bluetooth devices is applied.
- the prior art method shown schematically in fig. 1 is suitably for manually entering a passkey into two Bluetooth devices 1 by a user 2.
- the devices 1 may comprise a display means 3 and an input means 4, such as a keypad.
- the arrows shown in fig. 1-5 indicate the entering or transmission of a passkey.
- Bluetooth devices Although indicated as Bluetooth devices, the devices 1 and those to mention may in fact be larger or complexer pieces of equipment containing a pure Bluetooth device integrated therewith.
- the devices as a whole are called Bluetooth device.
- the user 2 may choose any suitable passkey arbitrarily.
- the user 2 may enter the passkey into both devices 1 by using their input means 4.
- each device 1 will use the passkey to generate a link key which will be identical for both devices 1.
- the devices 1 will check the identity of their link keys by transmitting data which is encrypted by the link key and by analysing a similar received transmission for its validity or identity with the locally stored link key.
- the method exemplified by fig. 2 may be applied for providing a common passkey to two Bluetooth devices, such as devices 1, 5, of which one device 5 does not comprise the input means 4 and possibly not the display means 3 of the device 1. Instead, device 5 is provided with some kind of transmission means 6.
- the transmission means 6 may be an acoustic or optical transducer for transmitting a sound signal or light signal respectively which is discernible by the user 2.
- the light signal may be of any type, such as light flashes or the display of readable characters.
- Bluetooth device 5 contains a random number generator (not shown) for generating a random passkey upon putting the device 5 in bonding mode by user 2.
- Device 5 will transmit the randomly generated passkey, such that the user 2 can hear, read or otherwise discern the passkey. Then, user 2 may enter the passkey discerned from device 5 into the other device 1 in the same way as with the prior art method shown in fig. 1.
- the transmission means 6 of device 5 consist of means which are incorporated in device 5 anyway for normal use of device 5, that is apart from said bonding.
- the method exemplified by fig. 3 differs from the method shown by fig. 2 in that Bluetooth device 5 is replaced by Bluetooth device 8 having transmission means 9, and comprising in addition a reader unit 10.
- Reader unit 10 comprises a sensor 11 which is suitable for sensing a signal transmitted by the transmission means 9 of device 8.
- reader unit 10 comprises transmission means 12 which are suitable for transmitting a signal which is discernible by the user 2, such as a signal transmitted by transmission means 6 of device 5 of fig. 2.
- the transmission means 9 of device 8 of fig. 3 may be of a type which transmits a signal which is undiscernible by user 2. Reader unit 10 may be used to convert a signal transmitted by transmission means 9 into a transmission signal which is discernible by user 2. Yet, the example of fig. 3 is also applicable for a case in which a signal transmitted by transmission means 9 is discernible by user 2, but which is possibly difficult to discern.
- the signal transmitted by transmission means 9 may consist of a series of light flashes with short intervals, while transmission means 12 may provide a converted presentation of a passkey carried by the light flashes, such as a spoken or readable message.
- the method exemplified by fig. 4 differs from the method shown by fig.
- Bluetooth device 1 is replaced by a Bluetooth device 15, which comprises a sensor means 16 instead of the input means 4 of device 1, and reader unit 10 is replaced by a reader unit 18 having sensor means 19 and transmission means 20.
- Reader unit 18 differs from reader unit 10 of fig. 3 basically in that a signal carrying a passkey transmitted by transmission means 20 need not to be discernible by user 2 but must be suitable to be sensed by sensor means 16 of device 15.
- sensor means 16 consist of means which are already present for normal operation of device 15.
- the method exemplified by fig. 5 differs from the method shown by fig. 4 in that Bluetooth device 15 is replaced by Bluetooth device 22 having sensor means 23 which are suitable for sensing a signal carrying a passkey transmitted by transmission means 9 of device 8 directly.
- the user 2 only needs to bring devices 8 and 22 in proper proximity of each other.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/NL2001/000008 WO2002056536A1 (en) | 2001-01-09 | 2001-01-09 | Method and system for bonding two bluetooth devices |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/NL2001/000008 WO2002056536A1 (en) | 2001-01-09 | 2001-01-09 | Method and system for bonding two bluetooth devices |
Related Child Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US12/729,840 Continuation US20100176125A1 (en) | 2003-01-13 | 2010-03-23 | Package |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2002056536A1 true WO2002056536A1 (en) | 2002-07-18 |
Family
ID=19760732
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/NL2001/000008 WO2002056536A1 (en) | 2001-01-09 | 2001-01-09 | Method and system for bonding two bluetooth devices |
Country Status (1)
Country | Link |
---|---|
WO (1) | WO2002056536A1 (en) |
Cited By (23)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2005036487A3 (en) * | 2003-10-09 | 2005-06-16 | Gina Parmar | Personal security system |
CN100384223C (en) * | 2005-01-19 | 2008-04-23 | 英华达(上海)电子有限公司 | The method of digital camera anti-theft using bluetooth technology |
JP2008178092A (en) * | 2006-12-27 | 2008-07-31 | Intel Corp | Method for exchanging strong encryption key between devices using alternative input method in wireless personal area network (wpan) |
US7711861B2 (en) | 2006-08-30 | 2010-05-04 | Microsoft Corporation | Synchronized indicator light for secure connections |
US7783879B2 (en) | 2003-11-20 | 2010-08-24 | Nokia Corporation | Method and device relating to security in a radio communication network |
EP2509276A1 (en) * | 2011-04-05 | 2012-10-10 | F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG | Method for secure transmission of electronic data over a data communication connection between one device and another |
EP2523417A1 (en) * | 2011-05-09 | 2012-11-14 | Kamstrup A/S | Paring of devices using an encryption key |
JP2013214257A (en) * | 2012-04-04 | 2013-10-17 | Hitachi Ltd | Terminal linking system and method therefor |
US8720780B2 (en) | 2009-04-08 | 2014-05-13 | Blackberry Limited | Systems, devices, and methods for displaying a barcode at a computing device |
EP2306692B1 (en) * | 2009-10-02 | 2014-05-21 | BlackBerry Limited | Methods and devices for facilitating bluetooth pairing using a camera as a barcode scanner |
EP2767226A1 (en) * | 2013-02-18 | 2014-08-20 | ARKRAY, Inc. | Medical measurement device and measurement system |
US8879994B2 (en) | 2009-10-02 | 2014-11-04 | Blackberry Limited | Methods and devices for facilitating Bluetooth pairing using a camera as a barcode scanner |
US9105023B2 (en) | 2010-02-26 | 2015-08-11 | Blackberry Limited | Methods and devices for transmitting and receiving data used to activate a device to operate with a server |
US9137659B2 (en) | 2013-04-25 | 2015-09-15 | FusionPipe Software Solutions Inc. | Method and system for decoupling user authentication and data encryption on mobile devices |
EP3012696A1 (en) | 2014-10-24 | 2016-04-27 | Krohne Messtechnik GmbH | Method for connecting a field device with an operating unit, and field device |
EP2422170B1 (en) | 2009-04-21 | 2016-05-11 | Withings | Weighing device and method |
GB2532192A (en) * | 2014-10-29 | 2016-05-18 | Ibm | Secure pairing of personal device with host device |
EP2139274B1 (en) * | 2008-06-27 | 2016-06-01 | BlackBerry Limited | System and method for associating an electronic device with a remote device having a voice interface |
DE102015201117A1 (en) * | 2015-01-23 | 2016-07-28 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Device and method for assigning a first technical device to a second technical device |
US9433023B1 (en) | 2006-05-31 | 2016-08-30 | Qurio Holdings, Inc. | System and method for bypassing an access point in a local area network for P2P data transfers |
US9485804B1 (en) | 2006-06-27 | 2016-11-01 | Qurio Holdings, Inc. | High-speed WAN to wireless LAN gateway |
EP3070603A4 (en) * | 2013-11-15 | 2017-08-16 | Kuang-Chi Intelligent Photonic Technology Ltd. | Method and device for transmitting and receiving instruction information |
US9877652B2 (en) | 2013-02-18 | 2018-01-30 | Arkray, Inc. | Medical measurement device and measurement system |
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2001
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WO1997036422A1 (en) * | 1996-03-28 | 1997-10-02 | Intel Corporation | Controlling vcr by using personal computer |
EP1024626A1 (en) * | 1999-01-27 | 2000-08-02 | International Business Machines Corporation | Method, apparatus, and communication system for exchange of information in pervasive environments |
DE19924232A1 (en) * | 1999-05-27 | 2000-12-07 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Method and device for storing and retrieving PIN codes |
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THE BLUETOOTH FORUM: "Generic Access Profile", BLUETOOTH SPECIFICATION VERSION 1.1, 22 February 2001 (2001-02-22), XP002175814, Retrieved from the Internet <URL:http://www.bluetooth.com/developer/specification/BLUETOOTH_11_Profiles_Book.pdf> [retrieved on 20010824] * |
Cited By (35)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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WO2005036487A3 (en) * | 2003-10-09 | 2005-06-16 | Gina Parmar | Personal security system |
US7783879B2 (en) | 2003-11-20 | 2010-08-24 | Nokia Corporation | Method and device relating to security in a radio communication network |
CN100384223C (en) * | 2005-01-19 | 2008-04-23 | 英华达(上海)电子有限公司 | The method of digital camera anti-theft using bluetooth technology |
US9433023B1 (en) | 2006-05-31 | 2016-08-30 | Qurio Holdings, Inc. | System and method for bypassing an access point in a local area network for P2P data transfers |
US9485804B1 (en) | 2006-06-27 | 2016-11-01 | Qurio Holdings, Inc. | High-speed WAN to wireless LAN gateway |
US7711861B2 (en) | 2006-08-30 | 2010-05-04 | Microsoft Corporation | Synchronized indicator light for secure connections |
US9401902B2 (en) | 2006-12-27 | 2016-07-26 | Intel Corporation | Method for exchanging strong encryption keys between devices using alternate input methods in wireless personal area networks (WPAN) |
EP1940115A3 (en) * | 2006-12-27 | 2009-09-02 | Intel Corporation | A method for exchanging strong encryption keys between devices using alternative input methods in wireless personal area networks (WPAN) |
US8688986B2 (en) | 2006-12-27 | 2014-04-01 | Intel Corporation | Method for exchanging strong encryption keys between devices using alternate input methods in wireless personal area networks (WPAN) |
JP2008178092A (en) * | 2006-12-27 | 2008-07-31 | Intel Corp | Method for exchanging strong encryption key between devices using alternative input method in wireless personal area network (wpan) |
EP2139274B1 (en) * | 2008-06-27 | 2016-06-01 | BlackBerry Limited | System and method for associating an electronic device with a remote device having a voice interface |
US8720780B2 (en) | 2009-04-08 | 2014-05-13 | Blackberry Limited | Systems, devices, and methods for displaying a barcode at a computing device |
US9349088B2 (en) | 2009-04-08 | 2016-05-24 | Blackberry Limited | Systems, devices, and methods for displaying a barcode at a computing device |
EP2422170B1 (en) | 2009-04-21 | 2016-05-11 | Withings | Weighing device and method |
US9185735B2 (en) | 2009-10-02 | 2015-11-10 | Blackberry Limited | Methods and devices for facilitating bluetooth pairing using a camera as a barcode scanner |
EP2306692B1 (en) * | 2009-10-02 | 2014-05-21 | BlackBerry Limited | Methods and devices for facilitating bluetooth pairing using a camera as a barcode scanner |
US8879994B2 (en) | 2009-10-02 | 2014-11-04 | Blackberry Limited | Methods and devices for facilitating Bluetooth pairing using a camera as a barcode scanner |
US9105023B2 (en) | 2010-02-26 | 2015-08-11 | Blackberry Limited | Methods and devices for transmitting and receiving data used to activate a device to operate with a server |
US9055035B2 (en) | 2011-04-05 | 2015-06-09 | Roche Diabetes Care, Inc. | Medical device with secure data transmission |
EP2509276A1 (en) * | 2011-04-05 | 2012-10-10 | F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG | Method for secure transmission of electronic data over a data communication connection between one device and another |
EP2523417A1 (en) * | 2011-05-09 | 2012-11-14 | Kamstrup A/S | Paring of devices using an encryption key |
JP2013214257A (en) * | 2012-04-04 | 2013-10-17 | Hitachi Ltd | Terminal linking system and method therefor |
CN103989456A (en) * | 2013-02-18 | 2014-08-20 | 爱科来株式会社 | Medical measurement device and measurement system |
EP2767226A1 (en) * | 2013-02-18 | 2014-08-20 | ARKRAY, Inc. | Medical measurement device and measurement system |
US9877652B2 (en) | 2013-02-18 | 2018-01-30 | Arkray, Inc. | Medical measurement device and measurement system |
US9137659B2 (en) | 2013-04-25 | 2015-09-15 | FusionPipe Software Solutions Inc. | Method and system for decoupling user authentication and data encryption on mobile devices |
EP3070603A4 (en) * | 2013-11-15 | 2017-08-16 | Kuang-Chi Intelligent Photonic Technology Ltd. | Method and device for transmitting and receiving instruction information |
CN105549549A (en) * | 2014-10-24 | 2016-05-04 | 克洛纳测量技术有限公司 | Method for connecting a field device to an operating unit, and field device |
CN105549549B (en) * | 2014-10-24 | 2020-03-10 | 克洛纳测量技术有限公司 | Method for connecting a field device to an operating unit, and field device |
EP3012696A1 (en) | 2014-10-24 | 2016-04-27 | Krohne Messtechnik GmbH | Method for connecting a field device with an operating unit, and field device |
US9992613B2 (en) | 2014-10-24 | 2018-06-05 | Krohne Messtechnik Gmbh | Method for connecting a field device to an operating unit and a field device |
GB2532192A (en) * | 2014-10-29 | 2016-05-18 | Ibm | Secure pairing of personal device with host device |
US9955518B2 (en) | 2014-10-29 | 2018-04-24 | International Business Machines Corporation | Secure pairing of personal device with host device |
US9603178B2 (en) | 2014-10-29 | 2017-03-21 | International Business Machines Corporation | Secure pairing of personal device with host device |
DE102015201117A1 (en) * | 2015-01-23 | 2016-07-28 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Device and method for assigning a first technical device to a second technical device |
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