WO2001033768A9 - Apparatus and method for secure field upgradability - Google Patents
Apparatus and method for secure field upgradabilityInfo
- Publication number
- WO2001033768A9 WO2001033768A9 PCT/US2000/026275 US0026275W WO0133768A9 WO 2001033768 A9 WO2001033768 A9 WO 2001033768A9 US 0026275 W US0026275 W US 0026275W WO 0133768 A9 WO0133768 A9 WO 0133768A9
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- component
- recited
- communication
- bit string
- enabling functionality
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Ceased
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/002—Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/0618—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation
- H04L9/0637—Modes of operation, e.g. cipher block chaining [CBC], electronic codebook [ECB] or Galois/counter mode [GCM]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method and apparatus for selectively and
- Cryptography is generally defined as the technology of encoding
- cryptography can be used to encrypt a sensitive data file, such as a business plan, so that other parties, such as
- cryptography is a type of cryptography where the sender and receiver both have the same key or similar keys, which are used to decode the encrypted
- public key cryptography is a form of
- the receiver decrypts the messages through use of the private key.
- the private key is generally not revealed to anyone other
- cryptography is symmetric key cryptography, which is often used in computer
- This process has a second advantage, as the manufacturer is then able to offer consumers the option of upgrading their product, without having to physically exchange the hardware for an upgraded model. Rather, the manufacturers can simply enable the desired functions of the hardware in order to upgrade the product.
- this advantage comes with an inherent disadvantage, as a consumer who knows that the product purchased includes disabled upgrades may attempt to enable the additional functionality of the product without the manufacturer's permission, which eliminates or at least reduces the possibility of the manufacturer obtaining compensation for
- a cryptographic method wherein the secure portions of the method, e.g. the relevant keys, are implemented in electronic/computer products.
- Secure for purposes of cryptographic enablement, is generally defined as the point where the cost of obtaining unauthorized access to a component exceeds the cost associated with obtaining authorized access. More particularly, it is an object of the present invention to implement cryptographic functions for enabling functionality of electronic/computer related components, wherein the relevant secure key related information is contained within computer hardware in a non-volatile memory device and not within a purely software driven configuration.
- the present invention provides an apparatus for enabling functionality
- the apparatus includes an identification module
- a host is provided and is in communication with the identification module, and a guess register in
- An encryption module is provided
- a comparator in communication with the encryption module and the hash function module is provided, such that
- the comparator may compare a first bit string to a second bit string to
- the present invention further provides a component for selectively
- the on board memory has a predefined
- a means for determining if the encrypted bit string matches the guess passcode is provided, and a means for determining if the encrypted bit string matches the guess passcode.
- the present invention further provides a method for enabling
- steps of encrypting a first bit string and a second bit string to generate a third bit string calculating a fourth bit string, comparing the fourth bit string to the third bit string, and generating a function enable signal in accordance with the
- the invention also includes an apparatus for enabling functionality of a component, with the apparatus comprising at least one memory, and an encryption module in communication with the at least one memory.
- a host processor is in communication with the at least one memory
- a comparing device is in communication with the encryption module and the at least one memory. The comparing device is configured to compare a guess passcode to a bit string generated by the encryption module in order to generate an enable output.
- the invention also includes a method for enabling functionality of an electronic component, with the method comprising the steps of enabling a first bit string and a second bit string to generate an encrypted bit string, then determining a guess passcode.
- the guess passcode is compared to the encrypted bit string.
- a function enable signal is then generated in accordance with the comparison.
- the invention also includes an apparatus for enabling functionality of a component, with the apparatus comprising a comparing device having at least one input and an output, and a memory for receiving and storing at least one bit string therein.
- the memory has a memory output in communication with the comparing device.
- a guess register is provided for receiving a guess passcode.
- the guess register has a guess passcode input and a guess passcode output.
- the guess passcode output is in communication with the comparing device.
- a host is in communication with the guess register.
- host is configured to receive and transmit the guess passcode to the guess
- the memory includes a physical limitation
- the invention also includes a method for enabling at least one function
- a bit string is then transmitted, composed of the key, to a first
- bit string is then compared to the manufacturer's
- the non-volatile memory is manufactured
- the invention also includes a method for selectively enabling
- the invention also includes an apparatus for enabling functionality of an electronic component, with the apparatus comprising at least one means for storing a bit string, and means for transmitting and receiving information.
- the means for transmitting and receiving information is in communication with the means for storing.
- the means are provided for comparing a predefined bit string with a guess bit string.
- the means for comparing being in communication with the at least one means for storing.
- the means for comparing receives at least two inputs from the at least one means for storing and compares the at least two inputs to determine an enable output for the
- the invention also includes an apparatus for enabling functionality of a component, with the apparatus comprising a random number generating module for generating a random number, and a hash function module in communication with the random number generating module.
- a host is in communication with the random number generating module, and at least one memory is in communication with the host.
- An encryption module is provided, in communication with the at least one memory.
- a comparing device is in communication with the encryption module and the hash function module. The comparing device compares a first bit string to a second bit string to generate a function enable output for the component.
- the invention also includes a component for selectably enabling functionality of an electronic device, with the component including the various means noted above.
- Figure 3 illustrates an exemplary public key encryption enabler
- Figure 4 illustrates an exemplary public key enabler with a random
- the present invention is directed to an apparatus and method for
- components manufactures a component, such as a network switch, for
- the network switch may be a single integrated circuit, or a plurality
- This component could include the basic
- customers are interested in purchasing a network switch with each of the above noted functions, as some customers may desire to purchase a network switch having only the ability to conduct network switching and filtering
- component with only the desired functions includes additional design and manufacturing costs which can be avoided by simply using a previously designed and manufactured component that is capable of at least the desired functions.
- FIG. 1 A first embodiment of the present invention, shown in Figure 1, is configured to minimize the possibility of an unauthorized user being able to "attack" the component and enable the optional functions of the component without true authorization from the manufacturer.
- Figure 1 generally illustrates an exemplary configuration of a function enabler 15 of the present invention.
- the exemplary function enabler 15 is generally positioned on- board the computer or electronic component for which it is configured to enable various functions.
- Function enabler 15 includes a non-volatile memory 16, which may be in the form of a 96 bit unique unpredictable nonvolatile register in the present exemplary configuration.
- Non-volatile memory 16 is generally characterized as a memory and/or register wherein the bits/information contained therein are programmed at the factory and are not visible to the user as a result of a physical limitation implemented at the factory.
- non-volatile memory 16 can be programmed with, for example, a component identification number at the factory. Additionally, non-volatile memory 16 may be programmed with a unique key, which can be used to "unlock” or enable additional functions of the component, if the user inputs a key that corresponds to the unique key programmed at the factory. Non-volatile memory 16 is in communication with an interface 17 through, for example, a one way connection, and therefore, non-volatile memory 16 may send information to interface 17 but not receive information from interface 17 or be modified by input from interface 17.
- Interface 17 is also in communication with a host 18 through, for example, a bi-directional communication.
- An output of interface 17 is in communication with an input of a register 19, which is termed a "guess register" in the present exemplary embodiment.
- An output of guess register 19 is in communication with a first input 20a of a comparator 20.
- a second input 20b is in communication with non-volatile memory 16 through a one-way connection in the direction of comparator 20.
- comparator 20 is in communication with a first input 21a of a multiplexer
- Second input 21 b of multiplexer 21 is in communication with a selection
- Selection circuit 22 includes an OR gate 23 having an inverted
- OR gate 23 is in communication with additional non-volatile logic
- a third input 21c of multiplexer 21 is in communication with
- a bonding option circuit 25 which includes an appropriately sized pull up
- non-volatile memory 16 of function enabler In operation, for example, non-volatile memory 16 of function enabler
- the network switch unique identification number may be a 32 bit identification number or serial number of the network switch. Furthermore, assuming that non-volatile memory 16
- the network switch could be a 64 bit field stored in the register, which is
- network switch desires to enable additional functions of the network switch, the user first must contact the manufacturer, or other party having
- the function of contacting the manufacturer is generally accomplished through host 18, which determines the identification number associated with the component/network switch through communication with non-volatile memory 16 via interface 17. This identification number corresponding to the particular component is then sent to the manufacturer by host 18, for example, with an accompanying request for a password or key corresponding to the requested additional functionality of the network switch.
- the transmission of the request for a password or key also may include an agreement between the user and the manufacturer for the user to compensate the manufacturer for the additional functionality to be enabled in the network switch.
- This compensation arrangement may include a transaction that occurs before the functionality is enabled, or alternatively, a transaction that takes place at the time the password/key is transmitted to the customer.
- the manufacturer receives the request information and determines the appropriate manufacturers key for the particular component and sends this key back to host 18. This entire process of communicating with the manufacturer in order to obtain a key may be undertaken, for example, through an internet connection, a direct dial data connection, or through a voice telephone call, as well as other known communication techniques.
- Register 19 communicates the manufacturers key to the first input 20a of comparator 20.
- non-volatile memory 16 transmits the unique key that was initially stored in non-volatile memory 16 during manufacture of the network switch to the second input 20b of comparator 20.
- Comparator 20, or other suitable device for comparing numbers then compares the manufacturers key received from the guess register 19 to the unique key stored in non-volatile memory 16 to determine if the respective keys match. If the keys match, comparator 20 sends an enable signal to multiplexer 21 through a first input 21 a to multiplexer 21.
- a second input 21 b of multiplexer 21 receives an input from selection circuit 22.
- Selection circuit 22 determines whether multiplexer 21 uses the input from comparator 20 or bonding option circuit 25.
- the additional non-volatile bits 24 may be programmed to a logical "1" and “0" respectively such that the enable signal generated by comparator 20 is selected.
- both additional non-volatile bits 24 may programmed to either logical "1" or "0” such that the enable signal is selected from the bonding option circuit 25. Therefore, the bonding option in conjunction with the selection circuit offers a manufacturer the flexibility to selectively enable functionality of the network switch subsequent to the design phase of manufacturing.
- the present invention contemplates that in order to detect any errors that may have occurred in the process of enablement of a function, host 18 may be used to determine whether the process was success. In particular, host 18 may initiate a testing of the enabled functionality to determine if the enablement process was successful, or alternatively, the output of comparator 20 or multiplexer 21
- function enabler 15 provides the flexibility for manufacturers to selectively enable a single function of a component through a secure key, or alternatively, multiple functions at a time.
- the manufacturer is generally required to closely monitor the design and manufacturing phases of the respective components.
- the manufacturer must generally record each unique manufacturers key programmed into non-volatile memory 16 on every component, so that when individual users contact the manufacturer for permission to enable additional functionality of components in the users system, then the manufacturer can readily provide the correct password or key to be transmitted to guess register 19.
- the manufacturer must generally record each unique manufacturers key programmed into non-volatile memory 16 on every component, so that when individual users contact the manufacturer for permission to enable additional functionality of components in the users system, then the manufacturer can readily provide the correct password or key to be transmitted to guess register 19.
- the manufacturer may simply store an algorithm configured to generate the unique key stored in non-volatile memory 16 during the manufacturing stage. Therefore, in this situation, when the manufacturer receives a request from a host for a manufacturers key, the manufacturer can simply determine an appropriate algorithm to use from the identification number of the component, calculate the key using the appropriate algorithm, and transmit the key to the user for implementation.
- This configuration is desirable, as the memory space required to store each and every key implemented in the manufacturing phase can be substantial, and is avoided by the algorithm approach.
- the manufacturer must also carefully select the key length. If a sufficiently long key length is not selected, then an attacker may simply be able to try all possible key combinations in order to enable the functionality of the component.
- a media access controller is generally programmed at the
- symmetric cipher encryption referred to as symmetric cipher encryption, and is also called secret key
- Figure 2 has certain advantages over the embodiment of Figure 1, the security of secret key/symmetric cryptosystems is dependent upon two things:
- FIG. 2 illustrates an exemplary implementation of symmetric cipher encryption using a secret key and a identification number in the present invention.
- a secret key function enabler 32 includes memory 28, which is not required to be non-volatile memory as used in the previous embodiment.
- Memory 28 is again used to store a component identification number, as discussed above, which may be selected by the user, however, memory 28 does not store a key of any sort in the present exemplary embodiment.
- the identification number which, for example, can be a 32 bit number, is transmitted from memory 28 to a hash function module 29.
- Hash function module 29 is configured to receive the input from memory 28, which is termed a pre-image input, which in the embodiment of Figure 2, represents the component's identification number, and output a hash value.
- hash function module 29 is shown as a one-way hash function module, which is also known generally as a cryptographic compression function, cryptographic contraction function, a cryptographic message digest, and/or a cryptographic checksum.
- a one-way hash function is designed to compute a hash value from pre-image inputs.
- the strength of a one-way hash function is that it is easy to compute a hash value from pre-image inputs, but extremely difficult to compute the pre-image inputs that will computationally hash to a particular hash value.
- a one-way hash function is generally collision free, which indicates that it is difficult to generate different pre-image inputs that will hash to the same hash value.
- a one-way hash function is generally public, and therefore, there is generally very little secrecy to the process. As such, the security of a one-way hash function lies within the "one-way" function characteristics of the hash function and not the availability of the hash function.
- the output of a one-way hash function not dependent upon the input in any discemable way, and therefore, if a single bit in the pre-image changes, then, on average, half of the hash value bits are expected to change. Therefore, even if an attacker is given a hash value, it is computationally unlikely that the attacker will be able to determine the pre-image inputs to a one-way hash function that generate the hash value within a reasonable time period.
- hash function module 29 is an optional feature of the invention, as this module can be removed from the embodiment without substantially degrading the operational characteristics of the invention. Nonetheless, hash function module 29 is implemented in the present exemplary embodiment in order to increase the functional security of the system, as well as allowing the option of reducing the sheer size of the pre-image input. This is a practical decision, however, as pre-image inputs are often lengthy, and therefore, it is often desirable to reduce the bit size of the inputs for encryption. Although a 128 bit field, for
- hash function module 29 may be utilized to reduce the length
- hash function within the embodiment of Figure 2 additionally operates to deter
- an example of the chosen cipher text attack is when an attacker of the component sends dummy cipher text to the manufacturer
- hash value generated by hash function module 29 is transmitted to a symmetric
- cipher encryption module 31 as an input. Another input to a symmetric cipher encryption module 31 is a secret key, which is transmitted to a symmetric
- the symmetric cipher encryption module 31 is termed the clear text.
- the encrypted output of the symmetric cipher encryption module 31 is termed the cipher text.
- encryption module 31 is transmitted to the second input 20b of comparator
- the first input 20a of comparator 20 is in communication with guess
- OR gate 23 which is used to initiate the enabling of the desired functionality.
- a MAC is generally programmed with a unique identification number, which is often the address of the MAC itself. Therefore, the unique identification number stored in memory 28 of the present embodiment can be, for example, a 48 bit MAC address. This 48 bit address may be transmitted as pre-image information to a one-way hash function module 29, for example. The unique identification number is processed by a one-way hash function to generate a hash value of a predetermined length at the output of hash function module 29. This output is then combined with an additional pre-image information in the form of a secret key received from secret key module 30, and received as an input to symmetric cipher encryption module 31.
- the secret key which is generally programmed into the component or MAC at the factory and generally hardcoated, can be, for example, 64 bits long, or another length as required by the user.
- These inputs are processed by symmetric cipher encryption module 31 and encrypted to generate cipher text at the output of the symmetric cipher encryption module 31.
- This cipher text can be transmitted to a second input of comparator 20 for comparison with a "guess passcode" supplied to guess register 19 by the user.
- the process of supplying the guess passcode to guess register 19 generally involves the user contacting the manufacturer or other party having control over passcodes, often through host 18, to obtain a valid passcode to enter into guess register 19.
- this process of contacting the manufacturer may be undertaken via the internet, direct dial communications link, or other communications methods. If the guess passcode matches the cipher text supplied to comparator 20, then an enable signal is generated at the output of comparator 20. This enable signal is
- bonding option circuit 25 Therefore, if either of symmetric cipher encryption module 31 or bonding option circuit 25 yield an enable signal, then the
- Public key configurations generally rely on one key for
- the manufacturer can, for example, keep one of the keys secure within the manufacturing facility, while the second key may be stored on
- host 18 is again in communication with memory 28, which contains an identification number that may correspond to the component to be enabled by public key encryption device 33.
- Memory 28 communicates the component identification number to hash function module 29 as a pre-image input.
- Hash function module 29 which is a necessary component in public key system 31 , unlike secret key function enabler 32, processes the pre-image input and generates a hash value at an output of hash function module 29.
- Figure 3 illustrates hash function module 29 as a module for executing a one way hash function, as this type of function offers greater security against attackers.
- the hash value generated by hash function module 29 is transmitted to the second input 20b of comparator 20.
- host 18 also obtains a guess passcode that is transmitted to guess register 19. This guess passcode, as noted in the previous embodiments, is generally obtained from the manufacturer. The passcode is then transmitted as clear text to public key encryption module 35.
- public key module 34 which contains the previously discussed
- public key for the device therein transmits a public key to public key
- public key encryption module 35 receives both
- This cipher text at the output of public key encryption module 35. This cipher text
- function module 29 representing the identification number of the component.
- comparator 20 determines that these two values match, then an enable signal is output from comparator 20 indicating that public key encryption
- comparator 20 in similar fashion to the previously discussed embodiment,
- Figure 4 utilizes a random sequence generator 36, which is configured to
- the encryption process is unavailable for an attacker to utilize in an attack on the component.
- Figure 4 illustrates the use of a linear feedback
- LFSR shift register
- the exemplary random sequence generator 36 is configured to
- generator is to output a random number for use by the random id based enabler 41. After receiving a run signal and generating the desired random
- the random number is transmitted to the input of hash function
- random sequence generator 36 is received at a first input of NAND gate 38.
- the output of NAND gate 38 is transmitted to an input of linear feedback shift
- LFSR LFSR register
- the output of the series bank of inverters 39 is in communication with a
- LFSR 37 generate a random number at the output of random sequence
- random id based enabler 41 first receives a run signal at
- Hash function module 29 which is once again shown as a one way hash function for exemplary purposes, receives the random number as pre-
- This hash value is communicated to a second input 20b of
- random sequence generator 36 The manufacturer, having the private key
- public key module 34 to generate cipher text at the output of public key
- function module 29 is then transmitted to the first input 20a of comparator 20.
- Comparator 20 compares the calculated cipher text to the hash value generated by hash function module 29. If the cipher text matches the hash value, an enable signal is transmitted from the output of comparator 20 to an
- OR gate 23 Another input of OR gate 23 is again connected to a bonding option circuit 25 to generate a manual override of random id based enabler 41 if required.
- OR gate 23 Upon processing the inputs from comparator 20 and bonding option circuit 25, assuming that at least one of these inputs is a logical high signal, OR gate 23 outputs an enable functionality signal that is used to initialize enablement of the corresponding functionality.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| EP00973385A EP1224766A2 (en) | 1999-10-29 | 2000-10-24 | Apparatus and method for secure field upgradability |
| AU11897/01A AU1189701A (en) | 1999-10-29 | 2000-10-24 | Apparatus and method for secure field upgradability |
Applications Claiming Priority (6)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| US16215799P | 1999-10-29 | 1999-10-29 | |
| US16220999P | 1999-10-29 | 1999-10-29 | |
| US60/162,157 | 1999-10-29 | ||
| US60/162,209 | 1999-10-29 | ||
| US19337800P | 2000-03-21 | 2000-03-21 | |
| US60/193,378 | 2000-03-21 |
Publications (3)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| WO2001033768A2 WO2001033768A2 (en) | 2001-05-10 |
| WO2001033768A3 WO2001033768A3 (en) | 2002-01-10 |
| WO2001033768A9 true WO2001033768A9 (en) | 2002-11-14 |
Family
ID=27388727
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| PCT/US2000/026275 Ceased WO2001033768A2 (en) | 1999-10-29 | 2000-10-24 | Apparatus and method for secure field upgradability |
Country Status (3)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| EP (1) | EP1224766A2 (en) |
| AU (1) | AU1189701A (en) |
| WO (1) | WO2001033768A2 (en) |
Families Citing this family (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US7284127B2 (en) * | 2002-10-24 | 2007-10-16 | Telefonktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) | Secure communications |
| DE102007062915A1 (en) * | 2007-12-21 | 2009-06-25 | Endress + Hauser Process Solutions Ag | Storage programmable control i.e. digitally operated electronic system, operating method for controlling automation system, involves switching functional block at feasible state if external information corresponds to internal information |
| US10453535B2 (en) | 2015-10-26 | 2019-10-22 | Intel Corporation | Segmented erase in memory |
Family Cites Families (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DE1472500A1 (en) | 1965-05-11 | 1969-05-14 | German Gresser | Glare-free headlights |
| DE3620789C2 (en) | 1986-06-20 | 1993-12-23 | Bosch Gmbh Robert | Dimmed automotive headlights |
| JPH05183828A (en) * | 1991-12-27 | 1993-07-23 | Sony Corp | Electronics |
| US5499295A (en) * | 1993-08-31 | 1996-03-12 | Ericsson Inc. | Method and apparatus for feature authorization and software copy protection in RF communications devices |
-
2000
- 2000-10-24 AU AU11897/01A patent/AU1189701A/en not_active Abandoned
- 2000-10-24 EP EP00973385A patent/EP1224766A2/en not_active Withdrawn
- 2000-10-24 WO PCT/US2000/026275 patent/WO2001033768A2/en not_active Ceased
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| EP1224766A2 (en) | 2002-07-24 |
| WO2001033768A3 (en) | 2002-01-10 |
| WO2001033768A2 (en) | 2001-05-10 |
| AU1189701A (en) | 2001-05-14 |
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