[go: up one dir, main page]

WO2001029791A1 - Carte a puce perfectionnee et procede permettant d'interagir avec celle-ci - Google Patents

Carte a puce perfectionnee et procede permettant d'interagir avec celle-ci Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2001029791A1
WO2001029791A1 PCT/EP1999/007991 EP9907991W WO0129791A1 WO 2001029791 A1 WO2001029791 A1 WO 2001029791A1 EP 9907991 W EP9907991 W EP 9907991W WO 0129791 A1 WO0129791 A1 WO 0129791A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
section
memory
chip card
mailbox
transaction
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/EP1999/007991
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Siegfried E. Wilhelm
Jay Yun
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
TRESOR TV PRODUKTIONS GmbH
Original Assignee
TRESOR TV PRODUKTIONS GmbH
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by TRESOR TV PRODUKTIONS GmbH filed Critical TRESOR TV PRODUKTIONS GmbH
Priority to PCT/EP1999/007991 priority Critical patent/WO2001029791A1/fr
Publication of WO2001029791A1 publication Critical patent/WO2001029791A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/355—Personalisation of cards for use
    • G06Q20/3552—Downloading or loading of personalisation data
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/357—Cards having a plurality of specified features
    • G06Q20/3576—Multiple memory zones on card

Definitions

  • the present invention is related to an improved chipcard for use with e-commerce or e-purse applications.
  • the increasing number of users and providers as well as the vastly growing volume of business carried out via the in- ternet or other networks demands the provision of mechanisms that ascertain secure identification, authorisation, and payment on both the user's or customers and the provider's side.
  • one or both parties 's banks are also involved in the purchase of a certain product or servide.
  • the security systems employed by existing chip cards are based on complicated security key schemes where an individual key of a chipcard works together with a master key at a host computer.
  • This scheme has a number of inherent pro- blems.
  • the key system (keys plus de/encryption software) may be so complicated that it may require the main part of the memory and of the computing capacity of the chip card.
  • the main problem of these know chip cards is, however, that when the master key is no longer secret, the entire scheme is compromised. Also, when the individual key becomes known to unauthorized persons, transactions with the specific chip card may no longer be secure.
  • the object of the invention is to overcome the deficiencies and drawbacks of currently available chip card protection schemes described above and to provide a chip card protection scheme that provides for secure transactions and for a more versatile use of one chip card by different service providers.
  • a chip card for carrying out secure transactions e.g. between a computer of a service provider and a user terminal receiving the chip card
  • the chip card comprising a processor unit adapted to communicate with a memory provided in the chip card and containing software and data to carry out transactions between the chip card and an external computer via an input/output interface provided in the chip card, wherein the memory is divided in to several sections, the size of each of the sections being defined and controlled by the software, the access via the input/output interface to each of the memory sections being controlled by the software, a first section of the memory being accessible via the input/output interface by the processor unit or the external source (e.g.
  • a second section of the memory being provided to write a software program or data from the first section to the second section of the memory upon a command entered by a user of the chip card
  • a third section of the memory being provided to write a software program or data from the first section or the second section to the third section of the memory upon a command entered via the input/output interface by an external source.
  • This unique design of a chip card provides for an enhanced versatility in the use of the chip card since different service providers can implement their own security system (de/encryption software and keys etc.) in the chip card of a user. Effectively, the user does not require several chip cards to carry out transactions with different service providers.
  • a user having a first bank account in a first bank and a second bank account in a second bank could effect a very fast money transfer from the first to the second bank account by carrying out a first secure transaction of a certain amount of money from the first bank account under the security scheme of the first bank into a mailbox in the chipcard and by carrying out a second secure transaction of this amount of money from the mailbox in the chipcard under the security scheme of the second bank into the second bank account.
  • the first section of memory is divided into a predefined number of mailboxes, the size of each mailbox being defined by the external source or by the software.
  • the size and structure e.g. beginning, free space and end of each mailbox
  • pointers under the control of the external source or the software of the processor unit. This allows for a efficient use of the mailboxes and the memory space allocated to each one of them.
  • the mailboxes are prepared for holding one or more de/en- cryption keys, transaction codes, immediately executable or encrypted software programs or data.
  • the encrypted software programs or data contained in a mailbox in the first secti- on is transferred and decrypted into the second memory section under control of the external source.
  • a service provider can implement a security mechanism in the chip card that is unknown to other service providers and also not accessible to the user of the chip card.
  • the chip card can be "universal chip card” instead of the user requiring a multitude of chip cards, one for each service provider.
  • the service provi- der ' s host computer must provide a software program that is executable by the microprocessor unit. Either this software program is actual (executable) machine code, or it is writ- ten in a meta language (Java® or the like) that can be interpreted by an interpreter program maintained in the microprocessor unit's memory.
  • encrypted software programs or data contained in a mailbox in the first memory section is transferred and decrypted into the second section under control of the user.
  • the invention teaches to transfer and decrypt saime into the third section under control of the external source.
  • This third section is re- served for software programs or data that not, under any circumstances, be accessed by the user (via the microprocessor unit). To accomplish this, the access to this memory area is only possible if a certain pass word or signal combination is present at the input/output interface. This pass word in combination with the transfer software present in the first section will provide the right address to reach this third secion.
  • each mailbox is provided with one de/encryption key and a transaction code for being used in one de/encryption-transaction process by using a software program contained in the first, second or third memory section. It is also possible to carry out both functions of the de/encryption key and the transaction code with one and the same key/code. This reduces the memory space requirement in each mailbox.
  • a typical chip card there are e.g in the order of 100 mailboxes.
  • the external host computer of the service provider uses the contents of one mailbox to establish the connection (i.e. the transaction code) and to de/encrypt data (i.e. the key) .
  • One or more of the mailboxes are provided with de/encryp- tion keys and transaction codes being identical to de/encryption keys and transaction codes held in a memory device having the same mailbox structure provided in an external host computer.
  • the host computer randomly generates the de/encryption keys and transaction codes to be stored in each mailbox of the chip card as well as in the corresponding memory device (RAM, EEPROM, disk or the like) so that the contents of the mailbox of the chip card and the contents in the correspondig memory device in the host computer are exactly the same.
  • a de/encryption-transaction process between the external host computer and the chip card is only carried out after a comparison of transaction codes in a specific mailbox held in the memory device provided in the external host computer and in the corresponding mailbox in the first memory section carried out under control of a software program stored in the second or third memory section shows identity of the two transaction codes.
  • the bank's host computer In order to e.g. access the own bank account via an internet connection (through a chip card terminal on the user's side), the bank's host computer requests that the user's chip card sends the transaction code of a certain mailbox in the chip card. If this transaction code matches the transaction code of the corresponding mailbox in the bank's host computer, the transaction may commence. Depending on the nature of the transaction (account information, money transfer to another account, etc.) the required information will be en/decrypted in a manner that the respective keys in the mutual mailboxes can be used to de/encrypt the transmitted information.
  • the de/encryp- tion-transaction process between the external host computer and the chip card utilizing a de/encryption key and a transaction code stored in first respective mailboxes is only carried out after the external host computer has delivered a transaction code from a second of its mailboxes to the chip card for comparison with the transaction code in the corresponding second mailbox of the chip card, and the comparison process executed under control of a software pro- gram stored in the second or third memory section shows identity of the two transaction codes.
  • the actual transaction will thus only be carried out, when the service provider's host will - in advance or after the chip card has done so - provide the (partial) contents of a one mailbox that can be compared to the corresponding contents of the respective mailbox of the chip card.
  • the actual transaction will then be car- ried out using the de/encryption key and a transaction code of an other mailbox.
  • the service provider's host computer can create a new set of de/encryption keys and a transaction codes and transfer these into the mailboxes in the chip card (and it's own memory device) via the network (in a encrypted format) or by a terminal provided in the service provider's premises.
  • the transfer of the de/encryption keys and a transaction codes into the mailbox of the chip card may be secured by a separate (e.g. the last available) decryption key and a transaction code that will be used once all others have been used.
  • This last mailbox may also contain an automatic request command to be sent to the service provider's host computer to refill all the mailboxes with new de/encryption keys and transaction codes.
  • the service provider's host computer requests to be provided with the transaction code in a first maibox of the chip card.
  • the chip card requests to see the transaction code in the se- cond mailbox in the host computer's second memory in order to compare ist with the transaction code in the second mailbox in ist own memory. If theses two transaction codes match, the chip card will send out the transaction code of the first mailbox as initially requested by the host compu- ter.
  • the host computer will, at the end of or during the transacti- on, additionally submit new de/encryption keys and transaction codes.
  • the host computer can either use the same de/encryption key as the one used for the transaction or use the de/encryption key of the first mail- box.
  • the only drawing shows a schematic drawing of a chip card according to the invention mounted in an end user device (like a mobile telephone) communicating with one or more host computers of various service providers.
  • a chip card 10 for carrying out secure transactions is pro- vided in a handheld mobile telephone or a so-called intelligent telephone connected to the fixed telephone network, e.g. the internet.
  • the telephone - as far as its structure is relevant for the present invention - is conventional and therefore not further described here.
  • the chip card 10 comprises a processor unit ⁇ P connected to a bus system.
  • a memory RAM/EEPROM provided in the chip card 10 is connected to the bus system and contains software and data to carry out transactions between the chip card and an external host computer (service provider 1 .. n) via an input/output interface (input/output) also connected to the processor unit ⁇ P (via the bus system) .
  • the software in the memory RAM/EEPROM is contains an operating system to perform the basic functions reading writing data from/to memory section in the chip card, de/encrypting data received/sent via the input/output interface (input/ output) or between various sections of the memory as described in more detail hereinunder, etc.
  • Another part of memory provided in the chip card 10 is divided in to several sections (A, B, C) . These three sections are EEPROMs to allow for a versatile reading/permanent writing/overwriting of programs or data in these sections. The size of each of the sections is defined and controlled by the software.
  • a main distinction between the three memory section is the way they can be accessed.
  • the access via the input/output interface to each of the memory sections (A, B, C 7) is controlled by the software. Therefore, a command to read or write a certain number of bytes into a certain memory section is implemented as follows: CommandType, Source, Destination, # Bytes; with Com- mandType ⁇ Read, Write ⁇ , Source ⁇ I/O, Sectionl, Section2 , Section3 ⁇ , Destination ⁇ I/O, Sectionl, Section2, Section3 ⁇ , and # Bytes ⁇ 1 ... FFFFh ⁇ .
  • Such a command received by the the operating system of the processor unit via the in- put/output interface is the translated into the respective read/write commands to access the respective memory section with the correct physical address.
  • the operating system maintains tables of contents for each of the memory sections in order to allocate and identify the appropriate physical memory location (s) for the contents to be read or written.
  • the first section of the memory (A) is accessible via the input/output interface by the processor unit ( ⁇ P) or the external source without any restrictions in order to read/ write a software program or data from/to the first section of the memory.
  • the second section of the memory data can only be accessed by a restriced set of transfer commands. More specifically, it is only possible to write a software program or data from the first section to the second section of the memory upon a command entered by a user of the chip card via the input/output interface. To achieve this, the operating system checks whether the Destination argument in the command described above is "B". If this is the case, Sources other than A or I/O are prohibited. This ascertains that e.g. a user can only directly enter simple commands rather than execute complex transfer procedures by which a program could be entered and executed. Hence, a user or an unauthorized person can not write directly into the second memory section.
  • de/encryption software provided by a certain service provider in the first memory section can be stored under the control (by a simple transfer command) of the user.
  • the user can decide whether he/she wants to make use of the services provided by a certain service provider by transferring (or not) the software program provi- ded by the service provider in the first memory section.
  • the third section of the memory C can only be accessed in an even more restricted manner. More precisely, it is only possible to write a software program or data from the first section A or the second section B to the third section of the memory C upon a command entered by an external source via the input/output interface (I/O) . This allows for the software program provided by an external service provider to use memory space that can not be monitored by others.
  • the first section of memory is divided into a predefined number of mailboxes.
  • the fisrt section is divided into a matrix of n*m, the size of each mailbox being defined by the external source or by the software.
  • the size of each of the mailboxes and their total number can be changed dynamically by changing the pointers to the beginning or the end of the memory area defining a certain mailbox. This is carried out under control of the operating software.
  • the mailboxes in the first memory section are prepared for holding one or more de/encryption keys, transaction codes, immediately executable or encrypted software programs or data. To allow for this, the size of the mailboxes must be adapted accordingly by setting the pointers appropriately.
  • Encrypted software programs or data contained in a mailbox in the first section are decrypted and transferred into the second memory section under control of the the host computer of the external service provider.
  • this key should not be stored as such in one of the mailboxes of the first me- mory section. Rather, this key should have been part of a software program transferred from a mailbox in the first emory section to the second memory section in a previous transfer step.
  • the encrypted software programs or data con- tained in a mailbox in the first memory section can also be transferred and decrypted into the second section under a control command entered by the user via the input/output interface.
  • each mailbox is provided with one de/encryption key and a transaction code, for being used in one de/encryption-transaction process by using a software program contained in the first, second or third memory section.
  • the mailboxes are provided with de/encryption keys (PINs) and transaction codes (TANs) being identical to de/encryption keys and transaction codes held in a memory device having the same mailbox structure provided in an external host computer of the respective service provider.
  • PINs de/encryption keys
  • TANs transaction codes
  • a de/encryption-transaction process between the external host computer of the service provider and the chip card is only carried out after a co - parison of transaction codes in a specific mailbox held in the memory device provided in the external host computer and in the corresponding mailbox in the first memory section carried out under control of a software program stored in the second or third memory section shows identity of the two transaction codes.
  • a de/encryption-transaction process between the external host computer and the chip card utilizing a de/encryption key and a transaction code stored in first respective mailboxes is only carried out after the external host computer has delivered a transaction code from a second of its mailboxes to the chip card for comparison with the transaction code in the corresponding second mailbox of the chip card, and the comparison process executed under control of a software program stored in the second or third memory section shows identity of the two transaction codes.
  • Another application is a product or ware tag containing the chip card according to the invention in which all persons or entities that produce, wrap, pack, transport, handle, sell, buy, store, distribute, or resell the product can write information into certain areas of the mailboxes.
  • An important aspect, however is the fact that the writer of the information can decide which portions of the information can be accessed (read) and/or changed (deleted, over- written) by all or some subsequent persons or entities coming into contact with the respective product.
  • the following example shows the versatility and usefulness of the invention in this field:
  • a chip card according to the invention is attached to the cardbox containing an electronic product like a video cassette recorder (VCR) at the end of the manufacturing process.
  • VCR video cassette recorder
  • the manufacturer puts the product name, product number, production date, revision level etc. into a mailbox in the first memory section of the chip card in an unencrypted format. This data may be read by every person subsequently coming into contact with this product. Additionally, the manufacturer puts the name of the first person (dealer) and the price of this product charged by the manufacturer to this dealer into the first section of the memory in an unencrypted format.
  • a command is entered by the manufacturer via the input/output interface of the chip card to write this data (the name of the dealer and the price of this product charged by the manufacturer to this dealer) from the first section to the second section of the memory.
  • This portion of the data can be read by the dealer only, since the dealer has knowledge of the de/encryption key.
  • This first dealer writes - in the same way as the manufacturer - additional data (price charged by the first dea- ler to the retail dealer, next receiver, date of shipment etc.) into the memory that can only be read by the subsequent receiver (retail dealer) .
  • this retail dealer as well as the first reader, can also read the contents of the mailbox in the first memory section of the chip card in unencrypted format.
  • This (vertical) chain of dealers can be longer, whereby each member in the chain can hide his predecessors to the subsequent members by sharing the key to this data only with his immediate successor.
  • the prize for which a dealer at a certain level in the chain bought the product from his predecessor is not accessible by subsequent members of the chain.
  • the number of these products is also stored in the chip card.
  • the number is stored in a manner that it can be overwritten by a new number each time one or more items are taken out of the container by a person who is au- thorized - i.e. has the access key - to change the number.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne une carte à puce permettant d'effectuer des transactions en toute sécurité, comprenant une unité de traitement destinée à communiquer avec une mémoire située dans la carte à puce et contenant un logiciel et des données permettant d'effectuer des transactions entre la carte à puce et un ordinateur externe via une interface d'entrée/sortie de la carte à puce. La mémoire est divisée en plusieurs sections, la dimension de chacune desdites sections étant définie et réglée par ledit logiciel et l'accès via l'interface d'entrée/sortie à chacune des sections de mémoire étant commandé par le logiciel. Une première section de la mémoire est accessible via l'interface d'entrée/sortie par ladite unité de traitement ou ladite source externe sans aucune restriction pour la lecture/écriture d'un programme logiciel ou de données. Une deuxième section de la mémoire est destinée à l'écriture d'un programme logiciel ou de données de la première section de la mémoire en réponse à la commande faite par l'utilisateur de la carte à puce via l'interface d'entrée/de sortie. Une troisième section de la mémoire est destinée à l'écriture d'un programme logiciel ou de données de la première section ou de la deuxième section de la mémoire en réponse à une commande faite par une source externe via l'interface d'entrée/de sortie.
PCT/EP1999/007991 1999-10-21 1999-10-21 Carte a puce perfectionnee et procede permettant d'interagir avec celle-ci Ceased WO2001029791A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/EP1999/007991 WO2001029791A1 (fr) 1999-10-21 1999-10-21 Carte a puce perfectionnee et procede permettant d'interagir avec celle-ci

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/EP1999/007991 WO2001029791A1 (fr) 1999-10-21 1999-10-21 Carte a puce perfectionnee et procede permettant d'interagir avec celle-ci

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2001029791A1 true WO2001029791A1 (fr) 2001-04-26

Family

ID=8167471

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/EP1999/007991 Ceased WO2001029791A1 (fr) 1999-10-21 1999-10-21 Carte a puce perfectionnee et procede permettant d'interagir avec celle-ci

Country Status (1)

Country Link
WO (1) WO2001029791A1 (fr)

Cited By (8)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP3387882B2 (ja) 2000-03-01 2003-03-17 荒川化学工業株式会社 シラン変性ポリアミドイミド樹脂、その樹脂組成物及びその製造方法。
JP2003140972A (ja) * 2001-11-08 2003-05-16 Nec Corp プログラム実行装置及びプログラム実行方法並びにそれを用いた携帯端末及び情報提供システム
WO2006038103A1 (fr) * 2004-10-09 2006-04-13 Axalto S.A Systeme et procede de mise a jour de code apres emission au moyen d'un code naturel integre
WO2006066604A1 (fr) * 2004-12-22 2006-06-29 Telecom Italia S.P.A. Procede et systeme de controle d'acces et de protection des donnees dans des memoires numeriques, memoire numerique apparentee et programme informatique correspondant
EP2083355A1 (fr) * 2008-01-25 2009-07-29 THOMSON Licensing Cartouche de logiciel protégé contre la copie
WO2009074686A3 (fr) * 2007-12-13 2009-12-10 Thomson Licensing Cartouche logicielle interdite à la copie
EP1744251A4 (fr) * 2004-04-01 2010-04-14 Toshiba Kk Systeme et procede d'ouverture de session
DE102008051869A1 (de) * 2008-10-16 2010-04-29 Vodafone Holding Gmbh Chipkarte mit implementiertem Befehlssatz

Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4211919A (en) * 1977-08-26 1980-07-08 Compagnie Internationale Pour L'informatique Portable data carrier including a microprocessor
EP0193635A1 (fr) * 1985-03-07 1986-09-10 Omron Tateisi Electronics Co. Système pour carte à mémoire
US5682027A (en) * 1992-10-26 1997-10-28 Intellect Australia Pty Ltd. System and method for performing transactions and a portable intelligent device therefore
US5963980A (en) * 1993-12-07 1999-10-05 Gemplus Card International Microprocessor-based memory card that limits memory accesses by application programs and method of operation

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4211919A (en) * 1977-08-26 1980-07-08 Compagnie Internationale Pour L'informatique Portable data carrier including a microprocessor
EP0193635A1 (fr) * 1985-03-07 1986-09-10 Omron Tateisi Electronics Co. Système pour carte à mémoire
US5682027A (en) * 1992-10-26 1997-10-28 Intellect Australia Pty Ltd. System and method for performing transactions and a portable intelligent device therefore
US5963980A (en) * 1993-12-07 1999-10-05 Gemplus Card International Microprocessor-based memory card that limits memory accesses by application programs and method of operation

Cited By (14)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP3387882B2 (ja) 2000-03-01 2003-03-17 荒川化学工業株式会社 シラン変性ポリアミドイミド樹脂、その樹脂組成物及びその製造方法。
JP2003140972A (ja) * 2001-11-08 2003-05-16 Nec Corp プログラム実行装置及びプログラム実行方法並びにそれを用いた携帯端末及び情報提供システム
EP1311134A3 (fr) * 2001-11-08 2003-11-05 Nec Corporation Procédé d'exécution de programme dans un système de service et appareil d'exécution de programme associé
US7228435B2 (en) 2001-11-08 2007-06-05 Nec Corporation Program executing method in service system and program executing apparatus for the same
EP1744251A4 (fr) * 2004-04-01 2010-04-14 Toshiba Kk Systeme et procede d'ouverture de session
WO2006038103A1 (fr) * 2004-10-09 2006-04-13 Axalto S.A Systeme et procede de mise a jour de code apres emission au moyen d'un code naturel integre
WO2006066604A1 (fr) * 2004-12-22 2006-06-29 Telecom Italia S.P.A. Procede et systeme de controle d'acces et de protection des donnees dans des memoires numeriques, memoire numerique apparentee et programme informatique correspondant
US8789195B2 (en) 2004-12-22 2014-07-22 Telecom Italia S.P.A. Method and system for access control and data protection in digital memories, related digital memory and computer program product therefor
CN101896885B (zh) * 2007-12-13 2013-05-29 汤姆森许可贸易公司 复制保护软件卡盒
WO2009074686A3 (fr) * 2007-12-13 2009-12-10 Thomson Licensing Cartouche logicielle interdite à la copie
CN101896885A (zh) * 2007-12-13 2010-11-24 汤姆森许可贸易公司 复制保护软件卡盒
EP2083355A1 (fr) * 2008-01-25 2009-07-29 THOMSON Licensing Cartouche de logiciel protégé contre la copie
DE102008051869B4 (de) * 2008-10-16 2014-05-15 Vodafone Holding Gmbh Chipkarte mit implementiertem Befehlssatz
DE102008051869A1 (de) * 2008-10-16 2010-04-29 Vodafone Holding Gmbh Chipkarte mit implementiertem Befehlssatz

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US6145739A (en) System and method for performing transactions and an intelligent device therefor
US6385729B1 (en) Secure token device access to services provided by an internet service provider (ISP)
US7730311B2 (en) Key transformation unit for a tamper resistant module
US6282649B1 (en) Method for controlling access to electronically provided services and system for implementing such method
CN102067184B (zh) 安全移动环境中访问应用的方法
EP0706692B1 (fr) Systeme de transaction hote - utilisateur
AU724768B2 (en) Smart card reader having multiple data enabling storage compartments
US7996326B2 (en) Financial card system, communications device, authentication terminal, authentication method, and program
US6367016B1 (en) Method for controlling access to electronically provided services and system for implementing such method
EP2255340B1 (fr) Procédé et dispositifs pour installer et accéder à des applications mifare liées
US7350717B2 (en) High speed smart card with flash memory
US20020029254A1 (en) Method and system for managing personal information
US20040199787A1 (en) Card device resource access control
EP1515282A2 (fr) Dispositif de stockage et système d'accès
US20020070976A1 (en) Selectively disclosing and teaching previously unused features in a multi-function system
JP2002518727A (ja) ソフトウェア製品の実行の制御方法
WO2001029791A1 (fr) Carte a puce perfectionnee et procede permettant d'interagir avec celle-ci
JPH11154184A (ja) 情報流通安全管理方法及びシステム
EP1443440A1 (fr) Systeme permettant d'effectuer des transactions electroniques
US8635459B2 (en) Recording transactional information relating to an object
KR20010036485A (ko) 스마트 카드에 의한 온라인 결제 장치 및 방법
JP7442910B1 (ja) 情報処理装置、情報処理システム、情報処理方法および情報処理プログラム
JP2877316B2 (ja) 取引処理装置
JP6407333B2 (ja) 書換装置及びプログラム
JP2001290895A (ja) コンテンツ提供システム

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
AK Designated states

Kind code of ref document: A1

Designated state(s): JP KR US

AL Designated countries for regional patents

Kind code of ref document: A1

Designated state(s): AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU MC NL PT SE

121 Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application
DFPE Request for preliminary examination filed prior to expiration of 19th month from priority date (pct application filed before 20040101)
122 Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase