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WO2000072200A1 - Procede et appareil pour la securite des fichiers - Google Patents

Procede et appareil pour la securite des fichiers Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2000072200A1
WO2000072200A1 PCT/US2000/014055 US0014055W WO0072200A1 WO 2000072200 A1 WO2000072200 A1 WO 2000072200A1 US 0014055 W US0014055 W US 0014055W WO 0072200 A1 WO0072200 A1 WO 0072200A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
file
files
identification data
operating system
user
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/US2000/014055
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English (en)
Inventor
George Friedman
Robert Phillip Starek
Michael J. Moorman
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Infraworks Corp
Original Assignee
Infraworks Corp
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Infraworks Corp filed Critical Infraworks Corp
Priority to AU51531/00A priority Critical patent/AU5153100A/en
Publication of WO2000072200A1 publication Critical patent/WO2000072200A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • G06F21/6281—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database at program execution time, where the protection is within the operating system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2141—Access rights, e.g. capability lists, access control lists, access tables, access matrices
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2149—Restricted operating environment

Definitions

  • the present invention relates in general to the field of electronic systems, and more specifically to a method and apparatus for securing computer files.
  • booty is less in the value of the hardware than in the value of the confidential business and personal information contained in the computer' s memory (i.e. , the "C" drive) .
  • encryption packages are .useful in increasing security of files, it is advantageous to have additional or replacement security devices to limit file access and enhance security.
  • Windows 95/98 and NT 4.0 allows the users to render files technically invisible or non-manipulative, i.e., placed in a "write only" mode, these safeguards can be easily defeated by even the casual user.
  • a robust, flexible system for providing increased levels of security for files is needed.
  • a method and apparatus for providing various levels of security.
  • the apparatus of the invention provides for a virtual cloaker driver which is operative w th the computer' s file system to prevent the file rrom being opened, deleted, renamed and even lasted in the file directory.
  • the user may see the hidden or cloaked files but is not able to open it or manipulate its content. Thus, file access is prohibited.
  • the user may see the file as listed in the directory, and have restricted access to the file contents.
  • the file access may be restricted by the type of application requesting a file access as well as by the procedure within the requesting application.
  • a word processing application may have access to the file for all purposes except deleting the file, and other applications may be denied access altogether.
  • the invention is intimately connected to the file structure of the computer. All information in most computer system environments are organized into files. Those files are accessed, deleted, printed, copied, moved and, above all, opened, through calls to the file system generated through the operating system by applications and users. All access to files using the key board takes place through the file system.
  • the file system responds to requests from the user through a series of file calls. These file calls are commands designed to manage files and they can be viewed ' from a variety of perspectives.
  • a single "open" call made by the user at the next logical layer down consists of perhaps ten individual calls. At the next layer down these calls disaggregate into many more and at the next layer down break up into a series of hexadecimal calls which the machine translates directly into physical operations .
  • the virtual cloaker driver operating in accordance with the principles of the invention is a virtual filter driver that loads into memory when the computer boots up.
  • the driver can be configured to detect and respond to different calls in different ways.
  • the cloaker driver detects all calls intended to "see" the file in the directory structure, to open it or to manipulate it in any way. When it detects these file specific calls, it essentially cancels them. Thus, when the user opens the computer' s directory, she will not be able to see the file name listed. She is also unable to manipulate such files.
  • the cloaker driver can provide access to the file for specific processes or programs.
  • a file invisible to every other program might be readable in Acrobat or Word.
  • capabilities are added that permit only certain actions or manipulations to take place.
  • the uses of the cloaker driver are several: Computers that have multiple users can create password protected file systems that are invisible to other users but visible to the authorized user, and can do this without creating complex disk partitions. Encryption packages can include invisibility options, increasing the security of the information by maintaining absolute secrecy as to the information' s existence.
  • a technical advantage of the present invention is the interception of file system cal*ls such that supplemental file management processes can be performed in a manner transparent not only to the user but also to the operating system.
  • Another technical advantage of the present invention is that supplemental file management is performed in real-time on an ongoing basis transparently to the user of the system.
  • FIGURE 1 is a diagram of the cloaker driver inserted to intercept calls from the file system in accordance with the principles of the invention
  • FIGURE 2 is a flowchart of an embodiment of the invention in which call processing is performed on a selected type of call coming down the chain from the file system manager and returns coming up the chain to the file system manager;
  • FIGURE 3 is a diagram of the file system logical layers of the WINDOWS 95 operating system
  • FIGURE 4 is a diagram of a typical file system request chain within the file system logical layers of the WINDOWS 95 operating system
  • FIGURES 5A-5G are flowcharts of the processing call and return routines of FIGURE 2.
  • FIGURE 1 is a block diagram of one embodiment of ⁇ system for hiding or cloaking files by monitoring file system calls.
  • the system includes an operating system (OS) layer 10 and an application layer 12.
  • operating system layer 10 is WINDOWS 95 although Windows 98, NT, a Unix based system or indeed any operating system which allows entry points into the file system control may also utilize the same principles of the various embodiments of the invention.
  • Operating system 10 includes a file system 14 (e.g., an installable file system, IFS) that handles calls from applications in application layer 12.
  • IFS installable file system
  • device drivers become a device in operating system 10
  • applications in application layer 12 use devices to perform tasks through a defined application program interface (API) .
  • API application program interface
  • high level cloaker application 16 is associated with a cloaker driver 18.
  • cloaker application 16 and cloaker driver 18 can be components delivered by one software vendor and can cooperate to perform functions, such as a hiding or cloaking files as described below.
  • Cloaker driver 18 operates to monitor and react to calls passing through file system 14.
  • other high level applications 19 can be present in application layer 12 and can send calls through file system 14. Such calls may originate, for example, from a word processing or other applications or from within the Windows file manager environment.
  • File system calls of interest here are associated with commands "open”, “find first”, “find next”, “delete", end "rename". For ease of description,?
  • Each media device 20 e.g., hard disk drive, ZIP drive, floppy drive, tape drive, writeable CD ROM drive or other fixed or removable storage media
  • a low level driver 22 that handles the interface with media device 20.
  • cloaker or monitor driver 18 obtains and analyzes each call passing through file system 14.
  • Cloaker driver 18 can gain access to file system calls, for example, by plugging into file system 14 as a device driver without actually being associated with a particular device. Using this access, cloaker driver 18 can assess whether the call originated from cloaker application 16 or other applications 19 and whether the call is a call of interest, e.g., an "open", "find first”, “find next”, “delete”, or "rename”. Cloaker driver 18 can also decide whether to pass the call on to driver 22 associated with media device 20 or to reject or abort the call or to change the return variable or generate a return variable without passing the call down to subsequent layers. By such operations, the cloaker driver 18 is able to hide files from the user in such a manner that they are completely invisible and will not be found from any application or Windows system command.
  • the cloaker application 16 is implemented to permit the user to cloak or hide files.
  • Running the cloaker application permits the user to select desired files for cloaking and then to apply the cloaking operation to such files which is done by passing the selected file names to the cloaker driver 18 so that they may be added to a lookup table or database within the cloaker driver 18.
  • the user is asked to select a password prior to initiating the cloaking process and only the use of this password permits the user to de-cloak the previously cloaked files.
  • the password would be different from the Windows user password. In this manner two or more users could use the same computer hardware but have access to, and indeed even know of the existence of, different subsets of the stored files.
  • the files cloaked can be encrypted automatically after (or before) the file names are added to the cloaker driver' s lookup table or database. After entering of the' correct password, the encrypted file is decrypted upon file opening and encrypted again upon file closing. The cloaked file will remain encrypted when closed until it is no longer desired to be cloaked.
  • the authorized user removes the cloaking using the cloaker application 16, as performed by removing the file name from the cloaker driver lookup table or database, the file will be automatically decrypted.
  • the cloaker application and cloaker driver may affect the encryption and decryption processes and the above description is merely one implementation.
  • FIGURE 2 is a flowchart of an embodiment of a method according to the present invention for monitoring file system calls to a file system structure of an operating system and for controlling the original call or returned variables.
  • the method of FIGURE 2 is implemented by the virtual cloaker software driver 18 with the purpose of hiding or cloaking files that may be stored on media device 20.
  • the method of FIGURE 2 can be implemented using a vendor supplied driver (VSD) executing within the installable file system (IFS) of WINDOWS 95.
  • VSD vendor supplied driver
  • IFS installable file system
  • a file system call is intercepted.
  • the file system call is intended to perform some function with respect: to data stored on a media device 20 but' is intercepted before being able to complete that function.
  • the calls of interest would consist of any calls that could find or identify a file which the user or a previous user cloaked.
  • cloaking a file is rendered invisible from both the user's perspective and the operating system' s perspective and can' t be accessed, changed, modified, deleted, listed or even found by the operating system.
  • calls of interest would include "open”, “find first”, “find next”, “delete”, and "rename”.
  • the call attempting to perform some action with reference to the cloaked file or its returned variable is controlled so as to hide or cloak the file.
  • control may include generating a return variable such as an error code or other actions as explained below in relation to FIGURE 5. If such a call is not identified in step 112, then in step 114, the original call is passed on through the file system. If the call should be processed, i.e., it is one of the calls of interest, then in step 116, some type of call processing is performed to ensure that the cloaked file is not made known to the user.
  • step 116 the call processing of step 116 can be accomplished transparently both to the user and to the calling system application. After the call processing, the call is returned, in step 116
  • FIGURE 3 is a diagram of file system logical layers of the WINDOWS 95 installable file system (IFS) 14.
  • IFS installable file system
  • the installable file system is made up -' " of thirty two logical layers, each containing one or more virtual devices through which block-device requests pass. For typical hardware, most of the logical layers are empty. For example, for hard disk drives, a file system request (or call) will usually only pass through about five virtual devices on the way to the hardware.
  • FIGURE 4 is a diagram of a typical file system request chain or path within the file system logical layers of the WINDOWS 95 operating system.
  • a typical path begins at the IFS manager 122 and moves to the file system driver 124.
  • the request then moves to a type specific driver 126 and, in this case, to the vendor supplied cloaker driver 18.
  • the request falls to a port driver 22 and to the media drive 20 (e.g., hard drive or other storage device) .
  • the request returns up the chain to the calling system application.
  • the numbers on the lefthand side represent the layers of abstraction with the smallest numbers representing higher layers of abstraction.
  • the topmost layer is the entry point to the file system. Higher numbers are closer to the hardware, and the highest number (bottom layer) represents the virtual devices that access the hardware directly.
  • An input/output (I/O) supervisor (IOS) manages requests as they pass through the file system hierarchy.
  • Each virtual device on the chain can select requests based on the logical or physical drive to which the request is directed. The devices can also view the result of a request as it passes back up the chain to the application.
  • the virtual device drivers (VxDs) on the chain can service requests themselves and not pass them to lower levels, or tehey can generate requests themselves.
  • the IFS manager layer manages high-level I/O requests from applications. It takes a call directed at a specific logical drive and passes it down the correct call-down chain to the appropriate volume tracker, file system driver (FSD), and so on.
  • Volume trackers work with groups of devices with identical removability rules. For example, a CD-ROM volume tracker ensures that a CD with a file system on it is in the drive before it will allow any requests to pass through to lower layers.
  • File system drivers (FSDs) work with all devices of a particular type, such as hard disks or CD-ROM devices. They take incoming logical requests generated by the IFS manager and translate them into physical requests to pass to lower levels. In addition, FSDs can initiate logical error recovery for devices such as disks.
  • Type specific drivers work with all devices of a particular type. They take a logical request generated by an FSD and translate it into a physical sector request. They generally reside in the same layer as their corresponding FSDs, but are lower in the chain. SCSI-izers are next in the chain and are used because SCSI devices require more complex request packets than other devices such as the more prevalent IDE/ESDI devices. SCSI-izers take a general physical request and create a SCSI Request Block (SRB) that contains detailed, SCSI-specific information about the request such as the Logical Unit Number (LUN) and Target (SCSI targets can have up to seven LUNs hanging off them) .
  • SRB SCSI Request Block
  • Vendor supplied drivers VSDs
  • VSDs Vendor supplied drivers
  • Conventional uses include: block- device monitors, low-level secondary disk caches (caching in flash memory, for example) , data encryption, and RAID disk management.
  • SCSI port drivers take incoming requests and determine which SCSI miniport driver should field them. Multiple SCSI types can be loaded onto the same system, each of which may require a custom SCSI miniport driver. The SCSI port driver is also in charge of initializing the miniport drivers.
  • SCSI miniport drivers MPDs are the hardware drivers for SCSI devices. They manage the interrupt and I/O port-level interaction with the device to carry out requests from above. They can also perform adapter-specific error recovery.
  • Port drivers (for non-SCSI hardware) carry out analogous functions as the SCSI port and miniport ' drivers. They provide 32-bit disk access interacting directly with the hardware to perform I/O.
  • the real mode mapper (RMM) is used in certain situations where WINDOWS 95 can not provide a port drive. With the introduction of plug-and-play BIO'S, and by including many hardware specific port drivers, WINDOWS 95 can usually provide 32- bit access for most disk hardware. However, Windows 95 might be run on an older personal computer with esoteric hardware, so it must make allowances for the case where it can not provide a port driver to handle disk I/O in protected mode.
  • a system might also use real-mode disk driver software that provides functionality not available in the WINDOWS 95 protected mode counterpart.
  • the last entry on the chain of protected mode virtual device drivers is an RMM instead of a port driver.
  • RMMs call down to a real mode driver to perform hardware I/O and return results up the file system chain.
  • Real mode drivers are hardware drivers required by the hardware or software configuration of a particular system. However, use of real mode drivers is discouraged because performance can suffer (due to the overhead of transitions from protected to real mode and slower execution in real mode) , but makes allowances for them for flexibility and backward compatibility.
  • VSD virtual supplies driver
  • a vendor supplied driver is used to intercept file system
  • FIGURE 2 The above calls are then identified, in step 112, as ones for which call processing will be performed per step 116.
  • FIGURES 5A-5G are flowcharts of one embodiment of call interception and processing applicable to processing the calls and returns of the "open", “find first”, “find next”, “delete”, and "rename” calls.
  • File system call interception is done in step 210.
  • the call is evaluated to see if it is the type of call of interest. This evaluation is performed in steps 212 through 220.
  • step-* " 212 the cloaker driver determines if the call is an "open” call; in step 214 if the call is a "find first” call; in step 216 if the call is a "find next” call; in step 218 if the call is a "delete” call; and in step 220 if the call is a "rename” call. Any “no” determination moves down the flowchart 212-220. If none of the calls are of a type of interest, the call is forwarded to the next layer in step 222A, and the call is thus passed on without modification by the cloaker driver 18. If in step 212, the call is determined to be the "open” call, the file name is examined to determine if the file is cloaked.
  • the cloaker driver 18 looks up the file name in a lookup table or database to see if the file has been previously cloaked. If the file is not cloaked, the cloaker driver 18 sends the call to the next layer in step 222A. If the file is cloaked, the cloaker driver 18 generates return variable in step 232 which passes to the file system manager and ultimately indicates to the user that the file is not found or some error has taken place. For example, the cloaker driver 18 can sets the error code to a value of 2 indicating a "file not found” message and sets the return variable to "-1" to indicate a failure of the call execution.
  • the cloaker driver 18 sets the file handle to NULL which indicates to the IFS manager that the handle does not exist.
  • the net result of step 232 is not only to prevent the file from opening, but to indicate to the user that the file itself is not existent in the system.
  • any attempt to access the file using the "open" command is defeated by returning the null handle and error messages per step 232.
  • Step 214 examines the "find fi'rst" call. If this call is found, it is passed down the system layers and upon return, the retrieved file name is examined in step 242 to see if the request has targeted a cloaked file.
  • step 222B If it is not cloaked, the driver proceeds to step 222B and passes the call directly up the chain to the IFS manager. If in step 242 the file is a cloaked file, the cloaker driver 18 proceeds to step 244 and executes a "find next" function. Upon return in step 246, the return variables are examined to see again if the targeted file is cloaked. If it is not cloaked, the program proceeds to step 222B as before. If the targeted file is cloaked, the program loops back to step 244 to again execute another "find next' function. In this manner, the name and even the existence of the cloaked file is kept hidden from the user, and only the first found non-cloaked file will be displayed to the user.
  • step 216 A similar procedure as outlined above is performed for the "find next" call.
  • the call is passed down the chain in step 250 to return the file name, and if the name examined in step 252 corresponds to a cloaked file, another "find next" call is passed down the chain in step 254 without permitting the return of the first file name to the IFS manager.
  • the return of this "find next” function is examined in step 256, and if it does not point to a cloaked file, the program proceeds to step 222B to pass the return to the IFS manager. If the return identifies a cloaked file in step 256, the program loops again to step 254 to generate yet another "find next” function. In this manner, the find next function never identifies to the OS the identity of a cloaked file.
  • the "find first” and “find next” calls are typically used to list directories and thus he procedures outlined in the flowcharts effectively hides any cloaked files by preventing them from ever being displayed on a directory listing.
  • Step 218 examines the "delete" call. If this call is found, a determination is made in step 260 as to whether or not the targeted file is cloaked. If the file is not cloaked, step 222A is performed to pass the call down to the next layer. If the targeted file is cloaked, an error message "file not found" is displayed by setting the error code to 2, by setting the return code to -1 indicate a failure and returning control back to the file system manager. In this manner, the user is not able to delete the targeted file and indeed, the system acts as if the file doesn't even exist - exactly the desired outcome to cloak a file.
  • step 220 the "rename" call is examined. If this call is found, the cloaker driver 18 proceeds to step 270 to determine if the targeted file is cloaked. If the file is not cloaked, the call is passed down to the next layer in step 222A. If the file is cloaked, a return variable is generated in step 272 to set the error code to 2 and to return -1 as done in set 262.
  • the monitoring of the file calls and returns as indicated above is performed by the cloaker driver 18.
  • the files and returns are part of an "IFS request packet" with the request traveling down from the IFS manager to the lower level drivers and the return or return variables inserted into the packet and sent up the chain toward the IFS manager from the lower level drivers .
  • FIGURES 5A- 5G essentially prevents the user of the operating system from learning of the very existence of any files which are cloaked.
  • the file is said to be access-prohibited.
  • the user is denied effective access to the file in that the user can only learn of existence of the file by viewing the file name in a directo y listing.
  • the directory listing is not password protected, but access beyond viewing the file is password protected so as to permit only the person with access authorization to access the files.
  • the cloaked file in this embodiment is preferably encrypted to ensure that the file content remains unavailable.
  • Such an embodiment has application in permitting anyone to screen computers or memory devices searching for sensitive files without fearing that the sensitive files will be accessible to the screening operator.
  • the implementation of the above embodiment of the invention merely requires one to remove the find open and find next calls in steps 214 and 216 respectively. In this manner directory listing will be possible but open, delete and rename processes will not be permitted.
  • Yet another embodiment of the invention utilizes permissions or restrictions applicable to a given process or application and to selected procedures within the application.
  • the file is said to be use-restricted. For example, one may utilize this embodiment of the invention to permit a word processing program to read a file and otherwise edit and copy a file but not to delete a file.
  • the monitoring system of FIGURES 5A- 5G would be modified to remove all call monitoring except for the delete call monitoring in steps 218, 260, 222A and 262.
  • An added logical inquiry would determine if the monitored call or request packet contained a designated word processing application such as Word. If the cloaker driver determined that the requesting application was Word, and that a delete call was send from the file system manager, then the sequence would branch to the delete monitoring steps 218, 260, 222A and 262. In this manner, the embodiment of the invention does not cloak a file but rather restricts use of the file at least as to one feature the would normally be available in a given application.
  • the cloaker application 16 permits the user to select (de-select) which files are to be stored in (removed from) the database or lookup table of the cloaker driver 18.
  • the cloaker application 16 also presents a user interface for insertion of user passwords, encryption options an other types of permissions applicable in the cloaked, access-prohibited and use-restricted modes of operation.
  • the cloaker application initially list all the . ⁇ files in a selected directory and permits the user to highlight those files which are desired to be cloaked. The highlighting effectively selects the files to be cloaked.
  • the user By entering the selection (pressing enter or an "o.k.” command in a dialog box) the user causes the selected files to be stored in the cloaker driver database or lookup table.
  • the user preferably is required to enter a password so that the user will be able to de-cloak the file at a later time or add new files to be cloaked.
  • the password may be entered initially but may alternatively be entered after file selection, but at any rate is entered before the execution of the driver program which monitors the calls from the file system manager.
  • the user re-enters her password which is recognized by the cloaker application which then extracts the file names listed in the cloaker driver database (or lookup table) so they may be displayed preferably during a normal list directory command.
  • Files which are cloaked are distinguished in the directory listing as by highlighting or other means so the user will know which files to de-select thereby removing them from the database or lookup table and thus de-cloaking them. At the same time other files may be selected for cloaking, access prohibition and/or use-restriction.
  • the modes of cloaking, access prohibition and use- restriction may be selected for each file using dialog boxes or other inputs from the GUI of the cloaker application.
  • the program flow executes each mode on a per file basis. Thus files A and B may be cloaked, file C may be access prohibited and files D and E use- restricted. Initial selections of the mode/file combinations are made by the user during a file/mode selection process using the application program.
  • the files to be hidden need not be selected by the user of the operating system, but could be pre-selected by a third party vendor selling some application for installation on the operating system.
  • the third party vendor may want to keep certain data or .exe files from being accidentally deleted by the user of the operating system and yet have these files available for access by the application.
  • application X may contain files Y and Z which the vendor desires to be cloaked, i.e., rendered invisible to the operating system, except if application X desires access.
  • application X contains a cloaker driver which cloakes files Y and Z from the operating system except as to application X. This operation is essentially a use-restriction of the files Y and Z.
  • application X tries to access files Y and Z
  • the operating system is able to provide full access and use permissions through the file manager. If the user tries to gain access of any kind outside of application X, such actions are negated and the operating system acts as if the files do not exist (i.e., they can not be found)..
  • One application other than preventing accidental deletion cf a file by the user is to prohibit file copying by the user. Such application is important in many applications such as the internet distribution of audio and video content files. In this case application A can "play" the cloaked file because application A has use permissions.
  • the user is not able to otherwise manipulate the file (move, copy, rename, delete, list directory) through the file system manager of the operating system.
  • the cloaker driver may be utilized to give the user certain use permissions other than through application A, as for example the list directory and delete commands but prohibit other commands to prevent duplication or retransmission of the file over the internet .
  • the cloaker drive of the various embodiments of the invention may be downloaded to the user via the internet or provided to the user via CD.
  • the program is stored on a server memory and downloaded in the normal course of e-commerce.
  • cloaking or hiding a file prevents the file from being listed on a directory listing and otherwise prevents the operating system of a computing device from accessing the file.
  • the file may not be opened, deleted, renamed or otherwise accessed from the file system of the computer operating system.
  • the cloaker driver identifies calls from and returns to the file manager wherein at least of the calls and returns is associated with a specific file identification data such as the file name. This association may be a direct reference to the name in the call or return packet or an indirect reverence to pointers which in turn identify the file name or identification data so as to uniquely identify the file.
  • the operations to be negated may be uniquely associated with a specific file whose identification rnayvbe checked against the cloaker driver database or lookup table so as to apply the negation only to those files which are selected to be cloaked, access-prohibited or use-restricted.
  • the invention has applicability to any computing device including appliances where a file system is controlled by an operating system. Appliances running the Microsoft CE operating system may also make use of the invention as for example in set-top boxes and a multitude of small appliances including personal data assistants.
  • Such devices all have operating systems -' " controlling file storage and retrieval and the cloaker driver may effectively be used to cloak such files or provide access prohibition or use restrictions or any combination of these modes on a file by file basis just as in the case of a PC or laptop computer. Indeed, in many circumstances, it is envisioned that a PC or laptop computer will be able to connect up to such appliances so file cloaking, access prohibition and use restrictions are desirable and useful enhancements to the system operation.
  • the term "computing device” as utilized in the appended claims is intended to cover all such data processing devices, PDA's, appliances and indeed any computing apparatus that has a file system and an operating system.
  • the primary purpose of the cloaker application program is to act as a GUI interface to the user for input of the passwords, encryption options, file/mode selections as explained above.
  • the primary purpose of the cloaker driver is to monitor and process calls from and returns to the file system manager.
  • a device I/O controller interfaces between the application program and the driver.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Bioethics (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Databases & Information Systems (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Information Retrieval, Db Structures And Fs Structures Therefor (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention porte sur un procédé et un appareil destinés à assurer la protection des fichiers informatiques en les masquant. Un pilote (22) de dispositif virtuel surveille les appels provenant du gestionnaire de fichiers et les lui renvoie afin d'identifier toutes références relatives à des fichiers qui ont été antérieurement enregistrées dans la base de données ou table de consultation du pilote (22), ce dernier (22) modifiant les appels ou renvois de manière efficace afin de rendre les fichiers invisibles. L'utilisateur ne peut par conséquent pas ouvrir le fichier ou le manipuler d'une manière ou d'une autre, et ne peut non plus le voir dans un annuaire. L'utilisateur ne peut ainsi connaître l'existence du fichier masqué (16). La sélection des fichiers pour leur stockage dans la base de données ou table de consultation du pilote (22) est protégée par un mot de passe, ce qui permet que l'utilisateur autorisé puisse annuler la sélection ou le masquage des fichiers ultérieurement, si souhaité. Le procédé et l'appareil de cette invention permettent également un usage restrictif des fichiers par la surveillance du type de processus identifié dans l'appel et par le type d'action ou procédure au sein du processus à réaliser. Ainsi, seuls les programmes (19) d'application sélectionnés peuvent accéder à un fichier stocké dans la base de données ou table de consultation du pilote (22), et seules certaines procédures dans les applications sélectionnées peuvent être réalisées. Par exemple, un programme de traitement de texte peut avoir accès à un fichier (12), mais n'est pas autorisé à réaliser une fonction de suppression.
PCT/US2000/014055 1999-05-21 2000-05-18 Procede et appareil pour la securite des fichiers Ceased WO2000072200A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
AU51531/00A AU5153100A (en) 1999-05-21 2000-05-18 Method and apparatus for securing files

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US31580299A 1999-05-21 1999-05-21
US09/315,802 1999-05-21

Publications (1)

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Cited By (12)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US7016920B2 (en) * 2001-05-25 2006-03-21 International Business Machines Corporation Method for tracking relationships between specified file name and particular program used for subsequent access in a database
EP1677227A2 (fr) 2004-12-28 2006-07-05 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha Appareil de traitement d'images et procédé de commande
EP1584024A4 (fr) * 2003-01-06 2007-11-28 John Alan Hensley Repertoire de demarrage d'urgence protege et cache
EP1736874A3 (fr) * 2005-06-08 2009-02-25 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Appareil et procédé de gestion de fichier
WO2009009719A3 (fr) * 2007-07-11 2009-03-12 Citrix Systems Inc Procédés et systèmes permettant de fournir un niveau d'accès à un dispositif informatique
EP2241987A3 (fr) * 2009-02-25 2011-07-06 Comodo Security Solutions, Inc. Procédé et système pour la suppression sécurisée d'informations d'un ordinateur
EP2390812A1 (fr) * 2010-05-24 2011-11-30 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Method and apparatus for controlling objects of a user interface
WO2015017587A1 (fr) 2013-07-30 2015-02-05 FSLogix, Inc. Gestion de configurations de terminaux informatiques
US8984636B2 (en) 2005-07-29 2015-03-17 Bit9, Inc. Content extractor and analysis system
CN106709327A (zh) * 2016-12-07 2017-05-24 深圳市君格科技有限公司 一种应用隐藏的方法及其移动终端
CN107230484A (zh) * 2017-06-22 2017-10-03 北京众谊越泰科技有限公司 一种可隐藏指定文件及文件夹的方法
CN114048469A (zh) * 2022-01-10 2022-02-15 荣耀终端有限公司 目录操作管理方法、电子设备及可读存储介质

Citations (3)

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US5544360A (en) * 1992-11-23 1996-08-06 Paragon Concepts, Inc. Method for accessing computer files and data, using linked categories assigned to each data file record on entry of the data file record
US5809230A (en) * 1996-01-16 1998-09-15 Mclellan Software International, Llc System and method for controlling access to personal computer system resources
US5832527A (en) * 1993-09-08 1998-11-03 Fujitsu Limited File management system incorporating soft link data to access stored objects

Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5544360A (en) * 1992-11-23 1996-08-06 Paragon Concepts, Inc. Method for accessing computer files and data, using linked categories assigned to each data file record on entry of the data file record
US5832527A (en) * 1993-09-08 1998-11-03 Fujitsu Limited File management system incorporating soft link data to access stored objects
US5809230A (en) * 1996-01-16 1998-09-15 Mclellan Software International, Llc System and method for controlling access to personal computer system resources

Cited By (18)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US7016920B2 (en) * 2001-05-25 2006-03-21 International Business Machines Corporation Method for tracking relationships between specified file name and particular program used for subsequent access in a database
EP1584024A4 (fr) * 2003-01-06 2007-11-28 John Alan Hensley Repertoire de demarrage d'urgence protege et cache
EP1677227A2 (fr) 2004-12-28 2006-07-05 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha Appareil de traitement d'images et procédé de commande
EP1677227A3 (fr) * 2004-12-28 2007-12-12 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha Appareil de traitement d'images et procédé de commande
US8176075B2 (en) 2004-12-28 2012-05-08 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha Device, data processing method, and program
EP1736874A3 (fr) * 2005-06-08 2009-02-25 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Appareil et procédé de gestion de fichier
US8984636B2 (en) 2005-07-29 2015-03-17 Bit9, Inc. Content extractor and analysis system
WO2009009719A3 (fr) * 2007-07-11 2009-03-12 Citrix Systems Inc Procédés et systèmes permettant de fournir un niveau d'accès à un dispositif informatique
EP2259181A1 (fr) * 2007-07-11 2010-12-08 Citrix Systems, Inc. Procédés et systèmes permettant de fournir un niveau d'accès à un dispositif informatique
EP2241987A3 (fr) * 2009-02-25 2011-07-06 Comodo Security Solutions, Inc. Procédé et système pour la suppression sécurisée d'informations d'un ordinateur
EP2390812A1 (fr) * 2010-05-24 2011-11-30 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Method and apparatus for controlling objects of a user interface
WO2015017587A1 (fr) 2013-07-30 2015-02-05 FSLogix, Inc. Gestion de configurations de terminaux informatiques
EP3028155A4 (fr) * 2013-07-30 2017-02-22 FSLogix Inc. Gestion de configurations de terminaux informatiques
US20180307860A1 (en) * 2013-07-30 2018-10-25 FSLogix, Inc. Managing configurations of computing terminals
CN106709327A (zh) * 2016-12-07 2017-05-24 深圳市君格科技有限公司 一种应用隐藏的方法及其移动终端
CN107230484A (zh) * 2017-06-22 2017-10-03 北京众谊越泰科技有限公司 一种可隐藏指定文件及文件夹的方法
CN114048469A (zh) * 2022-01-10 2022-02-15 荣耀终端有限公司 目录操作管理方法、电子设备及可读存储介质
CN114048469B (zh) * 2022-01-10 2022-06-14 荣耀终端有限公司 目录操作管理方法、电子设备及可读存储介质

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