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WO2000054230A1 - Method and configuration for protecting data on a smart card - Google Patents

Method and configuration for protecting data on a smart card Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2000054230A1
WO2000054230A1 PCT/EP2000/001453 EP0001453W WO0054230A1 WO 2000054230 A1 WO2000054230 A1 WO 2000054230A1 EP 0001453 W EP0001453 W EP 0001453W WO 0054230 A1 WO0054230 A1 WO 0054230A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
power supply
smart card
computer chip
contacts
dpa
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/EP2000/001453
Other languages
German (de)
French (fr)
Inventor
Siegfried Köppen
Original Assignee
Deutsche Telekom Ag
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Deutsche Telekom Ag filed Critical Deutsche Telekom Ag
Publication of WO2000054230A1 publication Critical patent/WO2000054230A1/en

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
    • G06F21/75—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information by inhibiting the analysis of circuitry or operation
    • G06F21/755—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information by inhibiting the analysis of circuitry or operation with measures against power attack
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
    • G06F21/77—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in smart cards
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
    • G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
    • G06K19/073—Special arrangements for circuits, e.g. for protecting identification code in memory
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
    • G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
    • G06K19/073—Special arrangements for circuits, e.g. for protecting identification code in memory
    • G06K19/07309—Means for preventing undesired reading or writing from or onto record carriers
    • G06K19/07363—Means for preventing undesired reading or writing from or onto record carriers by preventing analysis of the circuit, e.g. dynamic or static power analysis or current analysis
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/0806—Details of the card
    • G07F7/0813—Specific details related to card security
    • G07F7/082—Features insuring the integrity of the data on or in the card
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2207/00—Indexing scheme relating to methods or arrangements for processing data by operating upon the order or content of the data handled
    • G06F2207/72—Indexing scheme relating to groups G06F7/72 - G06F7/729
    • G06F2207/7219—Countermeasures against side channel or fault attacks

Definitions

  • the invention relates to the field of data protection on a smart card.
  • the aim of the present invention is to ensure that the effects of the computer chip on the external contacts of the smart card cannot be evaluated.
  • the object is achieved in that interference from the computer chip during the calculation of the confidential data is largely prevented by decoupling from the external supply voltage in terms of the power supply and in addition a concealment of impulses which still occur can be used.
  • the decoupling of the power supply is achieved by an integrated battery which is buffered in smartcard normal operation via the external supply voltage (for example 5 V) and galvanically isolates the computer chip from the rest of the circuit when calculating confidential data.
  • the internal battery is separated by software using a micro relay or an electronic switch. Since the internal battery is disconnected from the external supply voltage during the calculation of the confidential data, a DPA is not possible (see Fig. 1). It is state of the art to integrate a battery into a smart card (see headquartered No. 4 of January 21, 1999).
  • a DC stabilization can also be integrated, which decouples the computer chip from the rest of the circuit in terms of power supply by converting the voltage, for example from 5 V to 1.2 V (see FIG. 2).
  • the stabilization circuit At the input terminals of the stabilization circuit, no repercussions due to different current consumption (characteristic impulses) of the computer chip must be measurable.
  • the stabilization circuit can be controlled by an electronic switch in order to selectively or randomly supply the computer chip with its supply voltage.
  • An integrated capacitor supplies the energy in the switch-off gaps. This means that impulses that can still be measured can also be obscured via the terminals of the external power supply (smart card contacts).
  • a decoupling of the power supply for the computer chip from the rest of the circuit can also be achieved by a high-frequency switching power supply which is integrated instead of the battery or DC voltage stabilization (see FIG. 3).
  • the switched voltage conversion can e.g. from 5 V to 1.2 V.
  • At the input terminals of the switched-mode power supply no effects due to different current consumption (characteristic impulses) of the active computer chip must be measurable.
  • the switched voltage conversion can optionally be controlled by an electronic switch in order to optionally or randomly supply the computer chip with the supply voltage.
  • An integrated capacitor supplies the energy in the switch-off gaps. This means that obfuscation can still take place via the external terminals of the external power supply.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
  • Mathematical Physics (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Credit Cards Or The Like (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

Inferences to the processed data of the internal microchip can be effected on the contacts of the external power supply for a smart card by using appropriate measuring techniques - Differential Power Analysis (DPA). In order prevent misusage of smart cards, the DPA has to be effectively disabled. The invention permits a disabling of a DPA by decoupling the power supply voltage for the active computer chip from the external power supply for the smart card during calculation of confidential data. The technical solution can be attained by means of an integrated battery, a direct current stabilization, or by an integrated HF switched-mode power supply unit. When using direct current stabilization or an HF switched-mode power supply unit, the power supply voltage for the active computer chip can be conducted over a randomly controlled electronic switch so that the pulses still to be measured on the smart card contacts are additionally concealed.

Description

Verfahren und Anordnung für den Schutz der Daten auf einer SmartcardMethod and arrangement for protecting data on a smart card
Beschreibungdescription
Die Erfindung betrifft das Gebiet des Schutzes der Daten auf einer Smartcard.The invention relates to the field of data protection on a smart card.
Nach dem Stand der Technik ist bekannt, daß an den Kontakten der Stromversorgung einer Smartcard mit Hilfe geeigneter Meßtechnik und Meßverfahren Rückschlüsse auf die verarbeiteten Daten des internen Mikrochips gezogen werden können. Besonders bei der Berechnung kryptografischer Algorithmen ist eine DPA "Differential Power Analysis" durch Hacker leicht möglich (siehe www.ciyptography.con /dpa/technical/index.html - Autor Paul Kocher).According to the prior art, it is known that the contacts of the power supply of a smart card can be used to draw conclusions about the processed data of the internal microchip using suitable measuring technology and measuring methods. A DPA "Differential Power Analysis" by hackers is easily possible, especially when calculating cryptographic algorithms (see www.ciyptography.con /dpa/technical/index.html - author Paul Kocher).
Mit der vorliegenden Erfindung soll erreicht werden, daß Rückwirkungen vom Rechnerchip an den äußeren Kontakten der Smartcard nicht auswertbar sind.The aim of the present invention is to ensure that the effects of the computer chip on the external contacts of the smart card cannot be evaluated.
Die Aufgabe wird dadurch gelöst, daß Rückwirkungen vom Rechnerchip während der Berechnung der vertraulichen Daten durch stromversorgungsmäßige Entkoppelung von der externen Versorgungsspannung weitestgehend verhindert werden und zusätzlich eine Verschleierung noch auftretender Impulse angewendet werden kann.The object is achieved in that interference from the computer chip during the calculation of the confidential data is largely prevented by decoupling from the external supply voltage in terms of the power supply and in addition a concealment of impulses which still occur can be used.
Im einfachsten Fall wird die stromversorgungsmäßige Entkoppelung durch eine integrierte Batterie erreicht, die im Smartcard-Normalbetrieb über die externe Versorgungsspannung (z.B. 5 V) gepuffert wird und bei der Berechnung vertraulicher Daten den Rechnerchip galvanisch von der übrigen Schaltung abtrennt. Die Abtrennung der internen Batterie erfolgt softwaregesteuert über ein Mikrorelais oder einen elektronischen Schalter. Da die interne Batterie während der Berechnung der vertraulichen Daten von der externen Versorgungsspannung abgetrennt wird, ist eine DPA nicht möglich (siehe Fig. 1). Es ist Stand der Technik, eine Batterie in eine Smartcard zu integrieren (siehe Wirtschaftswoche Nr. 4 vom 21.01.1999). Anstelle der internen Batterie kann auch eine Gleichspannungsstabilisierung integriert werden, die durch Spannungsumsetzung, z.B. von 5 V auf 1,2 V, den Rechnerchip von der übrigen Schaltung stromversorgungsmäßig entkoppelt (siehe Fig. 2). An den Eingangsklemmen der Stabilisierungsschaltung dürfen keine Rückwirkungen durch unterschiedliche Stromaufnahme (charakteristische Impulse) des Rechnerchips meßbar sein.In the simplest case, the decoupling of the power supply is achieved by an integrated battery which is buffered in smartcard normal operation via the external supply voltage (for example 5 V) and galvanically isolates the computer chip from the rest of the circuit when calculating confidential data. The internal battery is separated by software using a micro relay or an electronic switch. Since the internal battery is disconnected from the external supply voltage during the calculation of the confidential data, a DPA is not possible (see Fig. 1). It is state of the art to integrate a battery into a smart card (see Wirtschaftswoche No. 4 of January 21, 1999). Instead of the internal battery, a DC stabilization can also be integrated, which decouples the computer chip from the rest of the circuit in terms of power supply by converting the voltage, for example from 5 V to 1.2 V (see FIG. 2). At the input terminals of the stabilization circuit, no repercussions due to different current consumption (characteristic impulses) of the computer chip must be measurable.
Optional kann die Stabilisierungsschaltung durch einen elektronischen Schalter gesteuert werden, um wahlweise oder zufallsgesteuert den Rechnerchip seine Versorgungsspannung zu liefern. In den Ausschaltlücken liefert ein integrierter Kondensator die Energie. Somit kann zusätzlich eine Verschleierung eventuell noch über die Klemmen der externen Stromversorgung (Smartcardkontakte) meßbarer Impulse erfolgen.Optionally, the stabilization circuit can be controlled by an electronic switch in order to selectively or randomly supply the computer chip with its supply voltage. An integrated capacitor supplies the energy in the switch-off gaps. This means that impulses that can still be measured can also be obscured via the terminals of the external power supply (smart card contacts).
Eine stromversorgungsmäßige Entkoppelung für den Rechnerchip von der übrigen Schaltung kann auch durch ein hochfrequentes Schaltnetzteil erreicht werden, das anstelle der Batterie oder Gleichspannungsstabilisierung integriert wird (siehe Fig. 3). Die geschaltete Spannungswandlung kann z.B. von 5 V auf 1,2 V erfolgen. An den Eingangsklemmen des Schaltnetzteils dürfen keine Rückwirkungen durch unterschiedliche Stromaufnahme (charakteristische Impulse) des aktiven Rechnerchips meßbar sein.A decoupling of the power supply for the computer chip from the rest of the circuit can also be achieved by a high-frequency switching power supply which is integrated instead of the battery or DC voltage stabilization (see FIG. 3). The switched voltage conversion can e.g. from 5 V to 1.2 V. At the input terminals of the switched-mode power supply, no effects due to different current consumption (characteristic impulses) of the active computer chip must be measurable.
Die geschaltete Spannungswandlung kann optional durch einen elektronischen Schalter gesteuert werden, um wahlweise oder zufallsgesteuert den Rechnerchip die Versorgungspannung zu liefern. In den Ausschaltlücken liefert ein integrierter Kondensator die Energie. Somit kann eine Verschleierung eventuell doch noch über die externen Klemmen der externen Stromversorgung zu messenden Impulse erfolgen. Hier erfolgt eine doppelte Verschleierung, denn der geschaltete Spannungswandler arbeitet vorzugsweise mit einer höheren Frequenz als die Taktfrequenz des Rechnerchips. The switched voltage conversion can optionally be controlled by an electronic switch in order to optionally or randomly supply the computer chip with the supply voltage. An integrated capacitor supplies the energy in the switch-off gaps. This means that obfuscation can still take place via the external terminals of the external power supply. There is a double concealment here because the switched voltage converter preferably works at a higher frequency than the clock frequency of the computer chip.

Claims

Patentansprüche (3) Claims (3)
1. Verfahren für den Schutz der Daten auf einer Smartcard, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß eine Auswertbarkeit der vom Rechnerchip berechneten vertraulichen Daten an den1. A method for protecting the data on a smart card, characterized in that an evaluation of the confidential data calculated by the computer chip to the
Kontakten für die externe Stromversorgung - Differential Power Analysis - dadurch verhindert wird, daß die Versorgungsspannung für den aktiven Rechnerchip während der Berechnung der vertraulichen Daten von der externen Stromversorgung entkoppelt wird, und daß zusätzlich eine Verschleierung der an den äußeren Smartcardkontakten noch auftretenden Impulse angewendet werden kann.Contacts for the external power supply - differential power analysis - this prevents the supply voltage for the active computer chip from being decoupled from the external power supply during the calculation of the confidential data, and in addition a concealment of the pulses still occurring on the outer smart card contacts can be used .
2. Anordnung für den Schutz der Daten auf einer Smartcard, dadurch gekennzeichn t, daß für die Entkoppelung der Versorgungsspannung für den aktiven Rechnerchip von der externen Stromversorgung während der Berechnung der vertraulichen Daten durch folgende Bauteile erfolgen kann a) integrierte Batterie b) Gleichspannungsstabilisierung c) integriertes HF-Schaltnetzteil.2. Arrangement for protecting the data on a smart card, characterized in that the following components can be used for decoupling the supply voltage for the active computer chip from the external power supply during the calculation of the confidential data: a) integrated battery b) DC voltage stabilization c) integrated RF switching power supply.
3. Anordnung nach Anspruch 2, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß bei Verwendung von Gleichspannungsstabilisierung oder integriertem HF-Schaltnetzteil die Spannungszuführung zum aktiven Rechnerchip über einen zufallsgesteuerten elektronischen Schalter erfolgen kann und dadurch zusätzlich eine Verschleierung der an den äußeren Smartcardkontakten noch zu messenden Impulse erreicht wird. 3. Arrangement according to claim 2, characterized in that when using DC stabilization or integrated RF switching power supply, the voltage supply to the active computer chip can be done via a randomly controlled electronic switch and thereby additionally obscuring the pulses still to be measured on the outer smart card contacts is achieved.
PCT/EP2000/001453 1999-03-09 2000-02-23 Method and configuration for protecting data on a smart card WO2000054230A1 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

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DE19911673A DE19911673A1 (en) 1999-03-09 1999-03-09 Method and arrangement for protecting data on a smart card
DE19911673.3 1999-03-09

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Cited By (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP1107191A1 (en) * 1999-12-09 2001-06-13 Pitney Bowes Inc. System and method for suppressing conducted emissions by a cryptographic device comprising an integrated circuit
US6594760B1 (en) 1998-12-21 2003-07-15 Pitney Bowes Inc. System and method for suppressing conducted emissions by a cryptographic device
US6766455B1 (en) 1999-12-09 2004-07-20 Pitney Bowes Inc. System and method for preventing differential power analysis attacks (DPA) on a cryptographic device
FR2851065A1 (en) * 2003-02-06 2004-08-13 Samsung Electronics Co Ltd MICROPROCESSOR CARDS HAVING PROTECTION CIRCUITS THAT PREVENT POWER ANALYSIS ATTACKS, AND METHODS OF OPERATING SAME
GB2467406A (en) * 2009-02-03 2010-08-04 Univ Michigan Isolation circuitry for hiding a power consumption characteristic of an associated processing circuit

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DE10054970A1 (en) * 2000-11-06 2002-05-23 Infineon Technologies Ag Method for controlling the charging and discharging phases of a backup capacitor
FR2822988B1 (en) * 2001-04-02 2003-08-15 Oberthur Card Syst Sa METHOD FOR PROTECTING AN ELECTRONIC ENTITY WITH A MICROCIRCUIT AND ELECTRONIC ENTITY PROVIDED WITH SUCH PROTECTION
FR2844896A1 (en) * 2002-09-19 2004-03-26 St Microelectronics Sa Power supply method for an asynchronous calculation or processing element, e.g. for use in authorization circuits, to prevent attacks based on power analysis, whereby the power supply to the calculation element is randomly varied
NL1022868C2 (en) * 2003-03-07 2004-09-09 Q Mat Advanced Composites Tech System for tracing containers for transporting air cargo, container and support device for use therein.
DE10347301B4 (en) * 2003-10-08 2007-12-13 Infineon Technologies Ag Circuit with a bus with multiple receivers
EP2693680B1 (en) * 2011-03-31 2015-12-09 IUCF-HYU (Industry-University Cooperation Foundation Hanyang University) Apparatus safe from power consumption analysis attack for encrypting and method for operating same

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Cited By (8)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6594760B1 (en) 1998-12-21 2003-07-15 Pitney Bowes Inc. System and method for suppressing conducted emissions by a cryptographic device
US6748535B1 (en) 1998-12-21 2004-06-08 Pitney Bowes Inc. System and method for suppressing conducted emissions by a cryptographic device comprising an integrated circuit
EP1107191A1 (en) * 1999-12-09 2001-06-13 Pitney Bowes Inc. System and method for suppressing conducted emissions by a cryptographic device comprising an integrated circuit
US6766455B1 (en) 1999-12-09 2004-07-20 Pitney Bowes Inc. System and method for preventing differential power analysis attacks (DPA) on a cryptographic device
FR2851065A1 (en) * 2003-02-06 2004-08-13 Samsung Electronics Co Ltd MICROPROCESSOR CARDS HAVING PROTECTION CIRCUITS THAT PREVENT POWER ANALYSIS ATTACKS, AND METHODS OF OPERATING SAME
GB2467406A (en) * 2009-02-03 2010-08-04 Univ Michigan Isolation circuitry for hiding a power consumption characteristic of an associated processing circuit
US7880339B2 (en) 2009-02-03 2011-02-01 The Regents Of The University Of Michigan Isolation circuitry and method for hiding a power consumption characteristic of an associated processing circuit
GB2467406B (en) * 2009-02-03 2013-05-29 Univ Michigan Isolation circuitry and method for hiding a power consumption characteristic of an associated processing circuit

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