US20250293857A1

US20250293857A1 - Encryption Key Distribution System

Info

Publication number: US20250293857A1
Application number: US18/604,415
Authority: US
Inventors: Martin Josef Pagel; Venkata Diwakara Nagu KOTRA
Original assignee: Zoom Communications Inc
Current assignee: Zoom Communications Inc
Priority date: 2024-03-13
Filing date: 2024-03-13
Publication date: 2025-09-18
Also published as: WO2025193707A1

Abstract

Customers of a software platform, such as a unified communications as a service platform, are enabled to control their own encryption keys used to encrypt and decrypt data from various communication services in the software platform. A key connector service is used to coordinate communications with a key management server for generating plaintext keys for data encryption and encrypted keys based on the plain text keys, and with a key broker server for storing and retrieving copies of the encrypted keys. A context identifier may be associated with an encrypted key and used to track which data has been encrypted with an underlying plaintext key. Examples of data encrypted may include conference recordings, webinar recordings, phone call recordings, voicemails, emails, and calendar tokens.

Description

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

This disclosure is best understood from the following detailed description when read in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. It is emphasized that, according to common practice, the various features of the drawings are not to-scale. On the contrary, the dimensions of the various features are arbitrarily expanded or reduced for clarity.
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of an example of an electronic computing and communications system.
FIG. 2 is a block diagram of an example internal configuration of a computing device of an electronic computing and communications system.
FIG. 3 is a block diagram of an example of a software platform implemented by an electronic computing and communications system.
FIG. 4 is a block diagram of an example of a system for distributed encryption key allocation for use in a software platform.
FIG. 5 is a signal flow diagram of an example of an encryption operation using distributed encryption key allocation for use in a software platform.
FIG. 6 is a signal flow diagram of an example of a decryption operation using distributed encryption key allocation for use in a software platform.
FIG. 7 is a flowchart of an example of a technique for encryption using distributed encryption key allocation for use in a software platform.
FIG. 8 is a flowchart of an example of a technique for decryption using distributed encryption key allocation for use in a software platform.
FIG. 9 is a flowchart of an example of a technique for acquiring security parameters from a key management server.
FIG. 10 is a flowchart of an example of a technique for provisioning a key management server for generating data encryption keys for a group of users.
FIG. 11 is a flowchart of an example of a technique for selecting a key management server to supply a data encryption key based on multiple factors.
FIG. 12 is a flowchart of an example of a technique for encrypting data using multiple data encryption keys provided by different key management servers.
FIG. 13 is a flowchart of an example of a technique for encryption using distributed encryption key allocation for use in a software platform.
FIG. 14 is a flowchart of an example of a technique for decryption using distributed encryption key allocation for use in a software platform.
FIG. 15 is a flowchart of an example of a technique for storing encrypted data in a database server selected using a security management policy.
FIG. 16 is a flowchart of an example of a technique for updating a data structure for tracking active encryption keys needed to access encrypted data managed by a platform.
FIG. 17 is a flowchart of an example of a technique for accessing a data structure for tracking active encryption keys to access encrypted data managed by a platform.
FIG. 18 is a flowchart of an example of a technique for using a key management server to decrypt an encrypted kay to recover a data key that can be used for decrypting data.
FIG. 19 is a flowchart of an example of a technique for re-keying a user or group of users that have data encrypted with keys stored by a key broker server.
FIG. 20 is a memory map of an example of a data structure for storing security management policies that can be used to map a request for encryption to key management server to get a key for encryption.
FIG. 21 is a memory map of an example of a data structure for storing a mapping from context identifiers associated with encrypted data managed by a platform to encrypted keys needed to decrypt the data.
FIG. 22 is a block diagram of an example of a system for encryption key management with secure storage in a software platform.
FIG. 23 is a signal flow diagram of an example of an encryption operation using encryption key management with secure storage in a software platform.
FIG. 24 is a signal flow diagram of an example of a decryption operation using encryption key management with secure storage in a software platform.
FIG. 25 is a flowchart of an example of a technique for encryption using encryption key management with secure storage in a software platform.
FIG. 26 is a flowchart of an example of a technique for decryption using encryption key management with secure storage in a software platform.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Enterprise entities rely upon several modes of communication to support their operations, including telephone, email, internal messaging, and the like. These separate modes of communication have historically been implemented by service providers whose services are not integrated with one another. The disconnect between these services, in at least some cases, requires information to be manually passed by users from one service to the next. Furthermore, some services, such as telephony services, are traditionally delivered via on-premises systems, meaning that remote workers and those who are generally increasingly mobile may be unable to rely upon them. One type of system which addresses problems such as these includes a unified communications as a service (UCaaS) platform, which includes several communications services integrated over a network, such as the Internet, to deliver a complete communication experience regardless of physical location.
Customers of a software platform, such as a UCaaS platform, often want to manage their own encryption keys that are used to encrypt communications data stored in the software platform. A user may send and receive information via a number of different communications channels within a software platform. Some of the data from these communication channels is stored for future use by the software platform, for example, recordings of a conference, voicemails, e-mails, collaboration meeting room (CMR) data, webinars, calendar tokens, virtual whiteboards, chat, chat file transfer (e.g., including image sharing), archiving (e.g., archiving for conference, webinar, and phone), short message service (SMS), dashboard and reports (e.g., dashboard for conference, webinar, and phone), or transcripts (e.g., transcripts for conference, webinar, and phone). There is a technical problem to utilize different encryption keys across many channels of communication for different user groups that are provided by servers (e.g., key management servers) associated with those groups of users. Changes to key management servers by various clients can break previously established encryption protocols and make content that has been encrypted unavailable to a user or lead to implementation of improper security protocols.
Implementations of this disclosure may address problems such as these by creating a key broker server that dynamically allocates data encryption keys, which are generated by customer specific or customer controlled key management servers, to various communications services within a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform) as they are needed to encrypt or decrypt communications data of users associated with a customer. A key broker server may be implemented to support a capability for customers to supply and control their own encryption keys (e.g., using a cloud-based management server) for use in the software platform. In some implementations, data encryption keys may be generated and then passed across a trust boundary into a software platform that the customer uses. The system may allow agents that maintain the software and agents of a customer to operate within their own respective trust boundaries. In an example, a system including a key broker server may be used to protect a conference recording using a bring-your-own-key framework for encryption of certain user data in the software platform for secure storage. A conference recording service may query the key broker to request the customer's data key for use with the conference recording. This data key may be generated by a key management server associated with the customer and returned in both encrypted and plaintext forms. The plaintext data key is used to encrypt the conference recording. The encrypted conference recording and encrypted data key are written to disk as a combined unit, while the plaintext data key is not saved and may be deleted from the software platform upon completion of the subject encryption operation.
Customer Master Keys (CMKs) may be used to encrypt data keys. In some implementations, there may be one data key per asset being protected. Symmetric cryptography (e.g., AES-256 GCM) may be used, where the same key is used for both encryption and decryption.
To decrypt an encrypted asset (e.g., a conference recording), the encrypted data key associated with the recording is sent by the recording service to a key broker server. The key broker server maps a request for decryption to an appropriate key management server and forwards that encrypted data key to an implicated customer's key management server to fetch a decrypted, plaintext copy of the data key, which is used to decrypt the encrypted asset for access by authorized customer users. The returned plaintext data key is not stored in non-volatile memory and may be deleted from the UCaaS platform upon completion of the decryption operation.
The pattern of storing the encrypted data key along with the encrypted asset may be referred to as “envelope encryption”. In an example, an Amazon Web Services Key Management Service (AWS KMS) that supports envelope encryption may be used by a customer to supply the needed data keys for its users' data in the software platform. A key broker server may provide a consistent interface to multiple communications services in the software platform for accessing data encryption keys generated by a variety of key management servers associated with different customers.
In some cases, customers may want to completely control access to their data, but still want to rely on a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform) to manage (e.g., space management, backup, and fault tolerance) the storage of their communications data. Some implementations of this disclosure may accordingly allow customers to provide keys to encrypt data before the data is stored in a cloud infrastructure (e.g., provided by a UCaaS platform), while also allowing access to decryption keys so users who need to view or otherwise consume the cloud data can do so without the UCaaS platform needing access to those keys. Access to plaintext data keys used for encryption and/or decryption may be restricted to customer controlled devices, and these plaintext keys may accordingly never need to be shared with the UCaaS platform.
Some implementations may provide advantages over conventional systems, such as enabling customer control of data encryption keys used in a software platform while reducing customer onboarding time and decreasing system down-time caused by errors in retrieving data encryption keys.
To describe some implementations in greater detail, reference is first made to examples of hardware and software structures used to implement distributed encryption key allocation. FIG. 1 is a block diagram of an example of an electronic computing and communications system 100, which can be or include a distributed computing system (e.g., a client-server computing system), a cloud computing system, a clustered computing system, or the like.
The system 100 includes one or more customers, such as customers 102A through 102B, which may each be a public entity, private entity, or another corporate entity or individual that purchases or otherwise uses software services, such as of a UCaaS platform provider. Each customer can include one or more clients. For example, as shown and without limitation, the customer 102A can include clients 104A through 104B, and the customer 102B can include clients 104C through 104D. A customer can include a customer network or domain. For example, and without limitation, the clients 104A through 104B can be associated or communicate with a customer network or domain for the customer 102A and the clients 104C through 104D can be associated or communicate with a customer network or domain for the customer 102B.
A client, such as one of the clients 104A through 104D, may be or otherwise refer to one or both of a client device or a client application. Where a client is or refers to a client device, the client can comprise a computing system, which can include one or more computing devices, such as a mobile phone, a tablet computer, a laptop computer, a notebook computer, a desktop computer, or another suitable computing device or combination of computing devices. Where a client instead is or refers to a client application, the client can be an instance of software running on a customer device (e.g., a client device or another device). In some implementations, a client can be implemented as a single physical unit or as a combination of physical units. In some implementations, a single physical unit can include multiple clients.
The system 100 can include a number of customers and/or clients or can have a configuration of customers or clients different from that generally illustrated in FIG. 1 . For example, and without limitation, the system 100 can include hundreds or thousands of customers, and at least some of the customers can include or be associated with a number of clients.
The system 100 includes a datacenter 106, which may include one or more servers. The datacenter 106 can represent a geographic location, which can include a facility, where the one or more servers are located. The system 100 can include a number of datacenters and servers or can include a configuration of datacenters and servers different from that generally illustrated in FIG. 1 . For example, and without limitation, the system 100 can include tens of datacenters, and at least some of the datacenters can include hundreds or another suitable number of servers. Datacenters may be spread across various geographical locations. In some implementations, the datacenter 106 can be associated or communicate with one or more datacenter networks or domains, which can include domains other than the customer domains for the customers 102A through 102B.
The datacenter 106 includes servers used for implementing software services of a UCaaS platform. The datacenter 106 as generally illustrated includes an application server 108, a database server 110, and a telephony server 112. The servers 108 through 112 can each be a computing system, which can include one or more computing devices, such as a desktop computer, a server computer, or another computer capable of operating as a server, or a combination thereof. A suitable number of each of the servers 108 through 112 can be implemented at the datacenter 106. The UCaaS platform uses a multi-tenant architecture in which installations or instantiations of the servers 108 through 112 is shared amongst the customers 102A through 102B.
In some implementations, one or more of the servers 108 through 112 can be a non-hardware server implemented on a physical device, such as a hardware server. In some implementations, a combination of two or more of the application servers 108, the database server 110, and the telephony server 112 can be implemented as a single hardware server or as a single non-hardware server implemented on a single hardware server. In some implementations, the datacenter 106 can include servers other than or in addition to the servers 108 through 112, for example, a media server, a proxy server, or a web server.
The application server 108 runs web-based software services deliverable to a client, such as one of the clients 104A through 104D. As described above, the software services may be of a UCaaS platform. For example, the application server 108 can implement all or a portion of a UCaaS platform, including conferencing software, messaging software, and/or other intra-party or inter-party communications software. The application server 108 may, for example, be or include a unitary Java Virtual Machine (JVM).
In some implementations, the application server 108 can include an application node, which can be a process executed on the application server 108. For example, and without limitation, the application node can be executed in order to deliver software services to a client, such as one of the clients 104A through 104D, as part of a software application. The application node can be implemented using processing threads, virtual machine instantiations, or other computing features of the application server 108. In some such implementations, the application server 108 can include a suitable number of application nodes, depending upon a system load or other characteristics associated with the application server 108. For example, and without limitation, the application server 108 can include two or more nodes forming a node cluster. In some such implementations, the application nodes implemented on a single application server 108 can run on different hardware servers.
The database server 110 stores, manages, or otherwise provides data for delivering software services of the application server 108 to a client, such as one of the clients 104A through 104D. In particular, the database server 110 may implement one or more databases, tables, or other information sources suitable for use with a software application implemented using the application server 108. The database server 110 may include a data storage unit accessible by software executed on the application server 108. A database implemented by the database server 110 may be a relational database management system (RDBMS), an object database, an Extensible Markup Language (XML) database, a configuration management database (CMDB), a management information base (MIB), one or more flat files, other suitable non-transient storage mechanisms, or a combination thereof. The system 100 can include one or more database servers, in which each database server can include one, two, three, or another suitable number of databases configured as or comprising a suitable database type or combination thereof.
In some implementations, one or more databases, tables, other suitable information sources, or portions or combinations thereof may be stored, managed, or otherwise provided by one or more of the elements of the system 100 other than the database server 110, for example, the client 104 or the application server 108.
The telephony server 112 enables network-based telephony and web communications from and to clients of a customer, such as the clients 104A through 104B for the customer 102A or the clients 104C through 104D for the customer 102B. Some or all of the clients 104A through 104D may be voice over internet protocol (VOIP)-enabled devices configured to send and receive calls over a network 114. In particular, the telephony server 112 includes a session initiation protocol (SIP) zone and a web zone. The SIP zone enables a client of a customer, such as the customer 102A or 102B, to send and receive calls over the network 114 using SIP requests and responses. The web zone integrates telephony data with the application server 108 to enable telephony-based traffic access to software services run by the application server 108. Given the combined functionality of the SIP zone and the web zone, the telephony server 112 may be or include a cloud-based private branch exchange (PBX) system.
The SIP zone receives telephony traffic from a client of a customer and directs same to a destination device. The SIP zone may include one or more call switches for routing the telephony traffic. For example, to route a VOIP call from a first VOIP-enabled client of a customer to a second VOIP-enabled client of the same customer, the telephony server 112 may initiate a SIP transaction between a first client and the second client using a PBX for the customer. However, in another example, to route a VOIP call from a VOIP-enabled client of a customer to a client or non-client device (e.g., a desktop phone which is not configured for VOIP communication) which is not VOIP-enabled, the telephony server 112 may initiate a SIP transaction via a VOIP gateway that transmits the SIP signal to a public switched telephone network (PSTN) system for outbound communication to the non-VOIP-enabled client or non-client phone. Hence, the telephony server 112 may include a PSTN system and may in some cases access an external PSTN system.
The telephony server 112 includes one or more session border controllers (SBCs) for interfacing the SIP zone with one or more aspects external to the telephony server 112. In particular, an SBC can act as an intermediary to transmit and receive SIP requests and responses between clients or non-client devices of a given customer with clients or non-client devices external to that customer. When incoming telephony traffic for delivery to a client of a customer, such as one of the clients 104A through 104D, originating from outside the telephony server 112 is received, a SBC receives the traffic and forwards it to a call switch for routing to the client.
In some implementations, the telephony server 112, via the SIP zone, may enable one or more forms of peering to a carrier or customer premise. For example, Internet peering to a customer premise may be enabled to ease the migration of the customer from a legacy provider to a service provider operating the telephony server 112. In another example, private peering to a customer premise may be enabled to leverage a private connection terminating at one end at the telephony server 112 and at the other end at a computing aspect of the customer environment. In yet another example, carrier peering may be enabled to leverage a connection of a peered carrier to the telephony server 112.
In some such implementations, a SBC or telephony gateway within the customer environment may operate as an intermediary between the SBC of the telephony server 112 and a PSTN for a peered carrier. When an external SBC is first registered with the telephony server 112, a call from a client can be routed through the SBC to a load balancer of the SIP zone, which directs the traffic to a call switch of the telephony server 112. Thereafter, the SBC may be configured to communicate directly with the call switch.
The web zone receives telephony traffic from a client of a customer, via the SIP zone, and directs same to the application server 108 via one or more Domain Name System (DNS) resolutions. For example, a first DNS within the web zone may process a request received via the SIP zone and then deliver the processed request to a web service which connects to a second DNS at or otherwise associated with the application server 108. Once the second DNS resolves the request, it is delivered to the destination service at the application server 108. The web zone may also include a database for authenticating access to a software application for telephony traffic processed within the SIP zone, for example, a softphone.
The clients 104A through 104D communicate with the servers 108 through 112 of the datacenter 106 via the network 114. The network 114 can be or include, for example, the Internet, a local area network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN), a virtual private network (VPN), or another public or private means of electronic computer communication capable of transferring data between a client and one or more servers. In some implementations, a client can connect to the network 114 via a communal connection point, link, or path, or using a distinct connection point, link, or path. For example, a connection point, link, or path can be wired, wireless, use other communications technologies, or a combination thereof.
The network 114, the datacenter 106, or another element, or combination of elements, of the system 100 can include network hardware such as routers, switches, other network devices, or combinations thereof. For example, the datacenter 106 can include a load balancer 116 for routing traffic from the network 114 to various servers associated with the datacenter 106. The load balancer 116 can route, or direct, computing communications traffic, such as signals or messages, to respective elements of the datacenter 106.
For example, the load balancer 116 can operate as a proxy, or reverse proxy, for a service, such as a service provided to one or more remote clients, such as one or more of the clients 104A through 104D, by the application server 108, the telephony server 112, and/or another server. Routing functions of the load balancer 116 can be configured directly or via a DNS. The load balancer 116 can coordinate requests from remote clients and can simplify client access by masking the internal configuration of the datacenter 106 from the remote clients.
In some implementations, the load balancer 116 can operate as a firewall, allowing or preventing communications based on configuration settings. Although the load balancer 116 is depicted in FIG. 1 as being within the datacenter 106, in some implementations, the load balancer 116 can instead be located outside of the datacenter 106, for example, when providing global routing for multiple datacenters. In some implementations, load balancers can be included both within and outside of the datacenter 106. In some implementations, the load balancer 116 can be omitted.
FIG. 2 is a block diagram of an example internal configuration of a computing device 200 of an electronic computing and communications system. In one configuration, the computing device 200 may implement one or more of the client 104, the application server 108, the database server 110, or the telephony server 112 of the system 100 shown in FIG. 1 .
The computing device 200 includes components or units, such as a processor 202, a memory 204, a bus 206, a power source 208, peripherals 210, a user interface 212, a network interface 214, other suitable components, or a combination thereof. One or more of the memory 204, the power source 208, the peripherals 210, the user interface 212, or the network interface 214 can communicate with the processor 202 via the bus 206.
The processor 202 is a central processing unit, such as a microprocessor, and can include single or multiple processors having single or multiple processing cores. Alternatively, the processor 202 can include another type of device, or multiple devices, configured for manipulating or processing information. For example, the processor 202 can include multiple processors interconnected in one or more manners, including hardwired or networked. The operations of the processor 202 can be distributed across multiple devices or units that can be coupled directly or across a local area or other suitable type of network. The processor 202 can include a cache, or cache memory, for local storage of operating data or instructions.
The memory 204 includes one or more memory components, which may each be volatile memory or non-volatile memory. For example, the volatile memory can be random access memory (RAM) (e.g., a DRAM module, such as DDR SDRAM). In another example, the non-volatile memory of the memory 204 can be a disk drive, a solid state drive, flash memory, or phase-change memory. In some implementations, the memory 204 can be distributed across multiple devices. For example, the memory 204 can include network-based memory or memory in multiple clients or servers performing the operations of those multiple devices.
The memory 204 can include data for immediate access by the processor 202. For example, the memory 204 can include executable instructions 216, application data 218, and an operating system 220. The executable instructions 216 can include one or more application programs, which can be loaded or copied, in whole or in part, from non-volatile memory to volatile memory to be executed by the processor 202. For example, the executable instructions 216 can include instructions for performing some or all of the techniques of this disclosure. The application data 218 can include user data, database data (e.g., database catalogs or dictionaries), or the like. In some implementations, the application data 218 can include functional programs, such as a web browser, a web server, a database server, another program, or a combination thereof. The operating system 220 can be, for example, Microsoft Windows®, Mac OS X®, or Linux®; an operating system for a mobile device, such as a smartphone or tablet device; or an operating system for a non-mobile device, such as a mainframe computer.
The power source 208 provides power to the computing device 200. For example, the power source 208 can be an interface to an external power distribution system. In another example, the power source 208 can be a battery, such as where the computing device 200 is a mobile device or is otherwise configured to operate independently of an external power distribution system. In some implementations, the computing device 200 may include or otherwise use multiple power sources. In some such implementations, the power source 208 can be a backup battery.
The peripherals 210 includes one or more sensors, detectors, or other devices configured for monitoring the computing device 200 or the environment around the computing device 200. For example, the peripherals 210 can include a geolocation component, such as a global positioning system location unit. In another example, the peripherals can include a temperature sensor for measuring temperatures of components of the computing device 200, such as the processor 202. In some implementations, the computing device 200 can omit the peripherals 210.
The user interface 212 includes one or more input interfaces and/or output interfaces. An input interface may, for example, be a positional input device, such as a mouse, touchpad, touchscreen, or the like; a keyboard; or another suitable human or machine interface device. An output interface may, for example, be a display, such as a liquid crystal display, a cathode-ray tube, a light emitting diode display, or other suitable display.
The network interface 214 provides a connection or link to a network (e.g., the network 114 shown in FIG. 1 ). The network interface 214 can be a wired network interface or a wireless network interface. The computing device 200 can communicate with other devices via the network interface 214 using one or more network protocols, such as using Ethernet, transmission control protocol (TCP), internet protocol (IP), power line communication, an IEEE 802.X protocol (e.g., Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, or ZigBee), infrared, visible light, general packet radio service (GPRS), global system for mobile communications (GSM), code-division multiple access (CDMA), Z-Wave, another protocol, or a combination thereof.
FIG. 3 is a block diagram of an example of a software platform 300 implemented by an electronic computing and communications system, for example, the system 100 shown in FIG. 1 . The software platform 300 is a UCaaS platform accessible by clients of a customer of a UCaaS platform provider, for example, the clients 104A through 104B of the customer 102A or the clients 104C through 104D of the customer 102B shown in FIG. 1 . The software platform 300 may be a multi-tenant platform instantiated using one or more servers at one or more datacenters including, for example, the application server 108, the database server 110, and the telephony server 112 of the datacenter 106 shown in FIG. 1 .
The software platform 300 includes software services accessible using one or more clients. For example, a customer 302 as shown includes four clients-a desk phone 304, a computer 306, a mobile device 308, and a shared device 310. The desk phone 304 is a desktop unit configured to at least send and receive calls and includes an input device for receiving a telephone number or extension to dial to and an output device for outputting audio and/or video for a call in progress. The computer 306 is a desktop, laptop, or tablet computer including an input device for receiving some form of user input and an output device for outputting information in an audio and/or visual format. The mobile device 308 is a smartphone, wearable device, or other mobile computing aspect including an input device for receiving some form of user input and an output device for outputting information in an audio and/or visual format. The desk phone 304, the computer 306, and the mobile device 308 may generally be considered personal devices configured for use by a single user. The shared device 310 is a desk phone, a computer, a mobile device, or a different device which may instead be configured for use by multiple specified or unspecified users.
Each of the clients 304 through 310 includes or runs on a computing device configured to access at least a portion of the software platform 300. In some implementations, the customer 302 may include additional clients not shown. For example, the customer 302 may include multiple clients of one or more client types (e.g., multiple desk phones or multiple computers) and/or one or more clients of a client type not shown in FIG. 3 (e.g., wearable devices or televisions other than as shared devices). For example, the customer 302 may have tens or hundreds of desk phones, computers, mobile devices, and/or shared devices.
The software services of the software platform 300 generally relate to communications tools, but are in no way limited in scope. As shown, the software services of the software platform 300 include telephony software 312, conferencing software 314, messaging software 316, and other software 318. Some or all of the software 312 through 318 uses customer configurations 320 specific to the customer 302. The customer configurations 320 may, for example, be data stored within a database or other data store at a database server, such as the database server 110 shown in FIG. 1 .
The telephony software 312 enables telephony traffic between ones of the clients 304 through 310 and other telephony-enabled devices, which may be other ones of the clients 304 through 310, other VOIP-enabled clients of the customer 302, non-VOIP-enabled devices of the customer 302, VOIP-enabled clients of another customer, non-VOIP-enabled devices of another customer, or other VOIP-enabled clients or non-VOIP-enabled devices. Calls sent or received using the telephony software 312 may, for example, be sent or received using the desk phone 304, a softphone running on the computer 306, a mobile application running on the mobile device 308, or using the shared device 310 that includes telephony features.
The telephony software 312 further enables phones that do not include a client application to connect to other software services of the software platform 300. For example, the telephony software 312 may receive and process calls from phones not associated with the customer 302 to route that telephony traffic to one or more of the conferencing software 314, the messaging software 316, or the other software 318.
The conferencing software 314 enables audio, video, and/or other forms of conferences between multiple participants, such as to facilitate a conference between those participants. In some cases, the participants may all be physically present within a single location, for example, a conference room, in which the conferencing software 314 may facilitate a conference between only those participants and using one or more clients within the conference room. In some cases, one or more participants may be physically present within a single location and one or more other participants may be remote, in which the conferencing software 314 may facilitate a conference between all of those participants using one or more clients within the conference room and one or more remote clients. In some cases, the participants may all be remote, in which the conferencing software 314 may facilitate a conference between the participants using different clients for the participants. The conferencing software 314 can include functionality for hosting, presenting scheduling, joining, or otherwise participating in a conference. The conferencing software 314 may further include functionality for recording some or all of a conference and/or documenting a transcript for the conference.
The messaging software 316 enables instant messaging, unified messaging, and other types of messaging communications between multiple devices, such as to facilitate a chat or other virtual conversation between users of those devices. The unified messaging functionality of the messaging software 316 may, for example, refer to email messaging which includes a voicemail transcription service delivered in email format.
The other software 318 enables other functionality of the software platform 300. Examples of the other software 318 include, but are not limited to, device management software, resource provisioning and deployment software, administrative software, third party integration software, and the like. In one particular example, the other software 318 can include software for encryption and decryption of data in the software platform 300 using distributed encryption key allocation.
The software 312 through 318 may be implemented using one or more servers, for example, of a datacenter such as the datacenter 106 shown in FIG. 1 . For example, one or more of the software 312 through 318 may be implemented using an application server, a database server, and/or a telephony server, such as the servers 108 through 112 shown in FIG. 1 . In another example, one or more of the software 312 through 318 may be implemented using servers not shown in FIG. 1 , for example, a meeting server, a web server, or another server. In yet another example, one or more of the software 312 through 318 may be implemented using one or more of the servers 108 through 112 and one or more other servers. The software 312 through 318 may be implemented by different servers or by the same server.
Features of the software services of the software platform 300 may be integrated with one another to provide a unified experience for users. For example, the messaging software 316 may include a user interface element configured to initiate a call with another user of the customer 302. In another example, the telephony software 312 may include functionality for elevating a telephone call to a conference. In yet another example, the conferencing software 314 may include functionality for sending and receiving instant messages between participants and/or other users of the customer 302. In yet another example, the conferencing software 314 may include functionality for file sharing between participants and/or other users of the customer 302. In some implementations, some or all of the software 312 through 318 may be combined into a single software application run on clients of the customer, such as one or more of the clients 304 through 310.
FIG. 4 is a block diagram of an example of a system 400 for distributed encryption key allocation for use in a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). The system 400 includes a media server 402 configured to conduct conferences and/or webinars (e.g., using the conferencing software 314) for users of the software platform; a media server 404 configured to conduct phone calls and/or receive voicemails (e.g., using the telephony software 312) for users of the software platform; a calendar server 406 configured to provide calendar services for users of the software platform, including maintaining user calendars and/or calendars for conference rooms or other shared equipment; a key broker server 410 configured to dynamically allocate data encryption keys for users associated with customers of the software platform that are controlled by those customers; and a customer network infrastructure 420, including one or more key management servers 422 configured to generate data encryption keys for users associated with the customer that may be used to encrypt and decrypt data of those users in the software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). In some implementations, the one or more key management servers 422 includes a primary key management server and one or more failover key management servers to improve reliability of the system 400. The key broker server 410 interfaces to the one or more key management servers 422 across a trust boundary 430. In some implementations, the system 400 may be used to implement the technique 700 of FIG. 7 . For example, the technique 700 of FIG. 7 may be implemented by the key broker server 410 and the media server 402, the media server 404, or the calendar server 406. In some implementations, the system 400 may be used to implement the technique 800 of FIG. 8 . For example, the technique 800 of FIG. 8 may be implemented by the key broker server 410 and the media server 402, the media server 404, or the calendar server 406.
The media server 402 is configured to submit encryption and decryption requests 440 to the key broker server 410. Likewise, the media server 404 is configured to submit encryption and decryption requests 442 to the key broker server 410. The calendar server 406 is configured to submit encryption and decryption requests 444 to the key broker server 410. The key broker server 410 is configured to map the requests from the media server 402, the media server 404, and the calendar server 406 to requests for data encryption keys to the one or more key management servers 422 for a customer associated with a user invoking a request for encryption or decryption. Once the appropriate key management server for a request has been identified, the key broker server 410 is configured to submit encryption and decryption requests 450 to the one or more key management servers 422. When the one or more key management servers 422 verify user permissions for the requested encryption or decryption, a data encryption key is returned to the key broker server 410, which in turn relays the data encrypting or decrypting encryption key to the requesting server for use in encrypting or decrypting data.
In some implementations, the system 400 is configured to prevent customers from encrypting and decrypting to a different customer's key by using an account ID unique to each customer. A customer may be enabled to log events in a fine-grained fashion. For example, a customer may be enabled to prevent encryption and decryption events based on asset type, time, and other variables, such as type of asset (e.g., Conference/Webinar recordings vs. Calendar Token), individual assets identified by some characteristics (e.g., prevent decryption of a certain conference recording), or timestamps (e.g., prevent decryption for assets that were created between time X and time Y). In an example, a signal may be sent to a customer that an application programming interface (API) call is being made to the customer not on behalf of a trigger by a customer employee.
Individual assets may be identified based on information about the asset. A conference/webinar may have fields of associated metadata including: Meeting or Webinar, conference identifier, and recording start time. A phone recording/voicemail may have fields of associated metadata including: phone, phone number, and timestamp. Calendar tokens for a conference room may have fields of associated metadata including: calendar token type, unique calendar token identifier, and timestamp. User calendar tokens may have fields of associated metadata including: user calendar type, unique calendar identifier, and timestamp. Examples of use cases of encryption context applied by customer include by asset type, by individual asset, and by timestamp.
The key broker server 410 includes a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214), a processor (e.g., the processor 202), and a memory (e.g., the memory 204). In some implementations, the key broker server 410 includes the computing device 200. In some implementations, the memory stores instructions executable by the processor to receive an encryption request from a first server that includes an identifier for one or more users; select a key management server based on the identifier; transmit, using the network interface, a request for a data encryption key to the selected key management server; receive, using the network interface, a plaintext key and an encrypted key from the key management server; in response to the encryption request, transmit the plaintext key and the encrypted key to the first server; and delete the plaintext key.
In some implementations, the media server 402 is configured to encrypt a recording of a conference conducted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain an encrypted recording and store the encrypted recording with the encrypted key in non-volatile memory. In some implementations, the memory stores instructions executable by the processor to configure the key management server to generate data keys and associate the key management server with a group of one or more users. In some implementations, the memory stores instructions executable by the processor to receive, using the network interface, an encryption algorithm identifier from the key management server; and select an encryption algorithm to be applied with the plaintext key based on the encryption algorithm identifier. In some implementations, the memory stores instructions executable by the processor to receive, using the network interface, a destination address from the key management server; and store the encrypted key and data encrypted with the plaintext key in non-volatile memory at the destination address.
The key broker server may also be configured to facilitate decryption. In some implementations, the memory stores instructions executable by the processor to receive a decryption request from a first server that includes an identifier for one or more users and an encrypted key; select a key management server based on the identifier; transmit a request for a data encryption key to the selected key management server, the request including the encrypted key; receive a plaintext key from the key management server; in response to the decryption request, transmit the plaintext key to the first server; and delete the plaintext key.
In some implementations, the media server 402 is configured to decrypt an encrypted recording of a conference conducted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain a decrypted recording.
FIG. 5 is a signal flow diagram of an example of an encryption operation 500 using distributed encryption key allocation for use in a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). The encryption operation 500 includes signals propagating between servers in a software platform cloud 510 and a customer cloud 520. There may be a trust boundary between the software platform cloud 510 and the customer cloud 520. The software platform cloud 510 includes a key broker server 512 (e.g., the key broker server 410), a media server 514 (e.g., the media server 402), and a database server 516 (e.g., the database server 110). The customer cloud 520 includes a key management server 522 (e.g., the key management server 422), a security server 524 (e.g., an AWS Cloud Watch server), and a log server 526 (e.g., an AWS Cloud Trail server).
At 540, a request for a data key for encryption is sent from the media server 514 to the key broker server 512. The request may include an identifier for a user or group of users associated with the data that media server will encrypt. At 542, a request for a data key for encryption is sent from the key broker server 512 to the key management server 522. The request may include an API call to a key management service of the customer to get a new data key, which may be returned in both plaintext and encrypted forms. The key management server 522 may have been selected by the key broker server 512 based on the identifier that was included in the request at 540. At 544, the key management server 522 sends a message to the log server 526 to log the activity of the request at 542.
At 546, the key management server 522 returns a plaintext key 550 and an encrypted key 552 to the key broker server 512. The key management server 522 may use a CMK to encrypt the data key that is returned in both plaintext and encrypted forms. In some implementations, there is one data key per asset (e.g., a conference recording, a webinar recording, a phone call recording, a voicemail, or an email) being protected. In some implementations, symmetric cryptography (e.g., AES-256 GCM) is used, thus the same key is used for both encryption and decryption. At 554, the key broker server 512 sends a message acknowledging receipt of the plaintext key 550 and the encrypted key 552 to the security server 524. The security server 524 may be configured to issue alerts (e.g., a Cloud Watch alarm) when certain conditions or events are detected. At 556, the key broker server 512 passes the plaintext key 550 and the encrypted key 552 to the media server 514 in response to the request at 540.
At 558, the media server 514 encrypts an asset 560 (e.g., a conference recording) using the plaintext key 550 to obtain an encrypted asset 562. At 570, the media server 514 writes the encrypted asset 562 and the encrypted key 552 to non-volatile memory (e.g., a disk) on the database server 516 as a combined unit, while the plaintext data key is not saved. The plaintext key 550 may be deleted from the software platform cloud 510 after the encryption operation 500 is completed.
FIG. 6 is a signal flow diagram of an example of a decryption operation 600 using distributed encryption key allocation for use in a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). The decryption operation 600 is performed by the same devices shown implementing the encryption operation 500 in FIG. 5 .
At 638, the encrypted key 552 is read from non-volatile memory (e.g., a disk) on the database server 516 by the media server 514 when it prepares to access the encrypted asset 562. At 640, the encrypted key 552 is passed from the media server 514 to the key broker server 512 in a request for decryption. At 642, a request for decryption of the encrypted key 552 is sent from the key broker server 512 to the key management server 522. At 644, the key management server 522 sends a message to the log server 526 to log the activity of the request at 642.
At 646, the key management server 522 returns a plaintext key 550 to the key broker server 512. The plaintext key 550 is a decrypted version of the encrypted key 552. At 654, the key broker server 512 sends a message acknowledging receipt of the plaintext key 550 to the security server 524. The security server 524 may be configured to issue alerts (e.g., a Cloud Watch alarm) when certain conditions or events are detected. At 656, the key broker server 512 passes the plaintext key 550 to the media server 514 in response to the request at 640.
At 658, the encrypted asset 562 is read from non-volatile memory (e.g., a disk) on the database server 516 by the media server 514. At 660, the media server 514 decrypts the encrypted asset 562 using the plaintext key 550 to obtain the asset 560 (e.g., a conference recording). The asset 560 may then be delivered to a user associated with the customer. The plaintext key 550 may be deleted from the software platform cloud 510 after the encryption operation 500 is completed.
To further describe some implementations in greater detail, reference is next made to examples of techniques which may be performed by or using distributed encryption key allocation. FIG. 7 is a flowchart of an example of a technique 700 for encryption using distributed encryption key allocation for use in a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). The technique 700 can be executed using computing devices, such as the systems, hardware, and software described with respect to FIGS. 1-6 . The technique 700 can be performed, for example, by executing a machine-readable program or other computer-executable instructions, such as routines, instructions, programs, or other code. The steps, or operations, of the technique 700 or another technique, method, process, or algorithm described in connection with the implementations disclosed herein can be implemented directly in hardware, firmware, software executed by hardware, circuitry, or a combination thereof.
For simplicity of explanation, the technique 700 is depicted and described herein as a series of steps or operations. However, the steps or operations in accordance with this disclosure can occur in various orders and/or concurrently. Additionally, other steps or operations not presented and described herein may be used. Furthermore, not all illustrated steps or operations may be required to implement a technique in accordance with the disclosed subject matter.
At 702, the technique 700 includes receiving an encryption request from a first server that includes an identifier for one or more users. In some implementations, the first server is part of a UCaaS system configured to support multiple modes of communication via one or more electronic communications networks. The first server may be configured to record or otherwise access communications data for users of a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform) to provide a communications service, such as, recording conference calls, recording webinars, recording phone calls or voicemails, receiving email, or updating calendar information including tokens. In some implementations, the first server is a media server configured to host conference software. Some examples of the first server include the media server 402, the media server 404, the calendar server 406, and an email server. The identifier may specify a single user or a group of users that are associated with a security context. The identifier may include a customer identification number that has been associated with communication data that is to be encrypted. The identifier may include a host email address associated with a conference, a webinar, a phone call, a calendar, or a calendar token from which data is to be encrypted. In some implementations, the identifier includes a telephone number associated with a phone call or voicemail from which data is to be encrypted. In one example, the encryption request may be received using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410).
At 704, the technique 700 includes selecting a key management server based on the identifier. In some implementations, the identifier associated with the data to be encrypted may be mapped to a key management server by matching the identifier to a list of user identifiers associated with a customer of a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). The customer may have one or more key management servers that are configured to issue data encryption keys for its users. In an example, a customer may have multiple key management servers to provide redundancy, reliability, and increased uptime for its cloud infrastructure. A customer's key management servers may be updated or otherwise changed from time to time. A customer may be associated with a security context in the software platform (e.g., as part of the customer configurations 320) that includes a list of one or more key management servers. Lists of active key management servers for various customers may be maintained by a key broker server and updated via a customer configuration interface. Once the identifier has been mapped to a customer, a key management server may be selected from the list of key management servers for that customer based on considerations such as, availability (e.g., current network reachability), customer specified priority in the list, and time of day.
In some implementations, the key management server is selected based on multiple factors. For example, key management server may be selected based on an indication, included in the encryption request, of a type of data to be encrypted and/or based on an indication, included in the encryption request, of a geographic region associated with data to be encrypted in addition to being selected based on the identifier. For example, selecting the key management server may include implementing the technique 1100 of FIG. 11 .
The key management server may have been provisioned and configured by the customer outside of the software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). In some implementations, a customer may request for the software platform to establish a key management server specific to the customer on behalf of the customer. For example, the technique 1000 of FIG. 10 may be implemented by a key broker server to configure a key management server for customer.
At 706, the technique 700 includes transmitting a request for a data encryption key to the selected key management server. In some implementations, the request includes identifying information for a user or group of users associated with a security policy implemented by the selected key management server, such as an Amazon Web Services Identity and Access Management (AWS IAM) policy. For example, the request may include an AWS IAM identity (e.g., user, group of users, or role). In some implementations, the request is for an envelope encryption key. In one example, the encryption request may be transmitted using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410).
At 708, the technique 700 includes receiving a plaintext key and an encrypted key from the key management server. The plaintext key may be a data encryption key that can be directly used to encrypt data using an encryption algorithm. The plaintext key may be a symmetric key that can be used to both encrypt and to decrypt data. In some implementations, the plaintext key may be an asymmetric key that can be used for encryption and is paired with another key for decryption. The key management server may use a CMK to encrypt the plaintext key. In some implementations, the plaintext key is a data key that is unique to the communications data to be encrypted as part of the technique 700. The encrypted key is an encrypted version of the plaintext key. The encrypted key has been encrypted with a separate encryption key retained by the key management server. Thus, the key management server may retain the exclusive capability to decrypt the encrypted data later using the encrypted key, after the plaintext key has been deleted. In some implementations, the encryption algorithm is implied or has been previously specified by communications separate from the request and its response. In some implementations, the encryption algorithm is dynamically specified by the key management server in response to the request. In some examples, an encryption algorithm identifier is received from the key management server and an encryption algorithm to be applied with the plaintext key is selected based on the encryption algorithm identifier. Other security parameters of the encryption and storage of the communications data to be encrypted may be received from the key management server. For example, a destination address may be received from the key management server and the encrypted key and data encrypted with the plaintext key may be stored in non-volatile memory at the destination address (e.g., an address associated with a particular database or file server with technical parameters that has been selected and provisioned for a customer). The technique 700 may include implementing the technique 900 of FIG. 9 . In one example, the plaintext key and the encrypted key may be received using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410).
At 710, the technique 700 includes, in response to the encryption request, transmitting the plaintext key and the encrypted key to the first server. In some implementations, the plaintext key and the encrypted key are relayed to the first server, which will perform the encryption of the communications data, along with other data from the key management server specifying how the data should be encrypted and stored, such as an encryption algorithm identifier and/or a destination address for the encrypted data. In one example, the plaintext key and the encrypted key may be transmitted using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410).
At 712, the technique 700 includes encrypting data using the plaintext key to obtain encrypted data. The data to be encrypted may be of various types of data recorded or maintained in the software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). In some implementations, the technique 700 includes encrypting a recording of a conference conducted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain an encrypted recording. In some implementations, the technique 700 includes encrypting a recording of a phone call conducted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain an encrypted recording. In some implementations, the technique 700 includes encrypting a voicemail received by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain an encrypted recording. In some implementations, the technique 700 includes encrypting a calendar token generated by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain an encrypted token. In some implementations, the technique 700 includes encrypting a recording of a webinar conducted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain an encrypted recording. In some implementations, the technique 700 includes encrypting a virtual whiteboard hosted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain an encrypted data. In some implementations, the technique 700 includes encrypting a chat hosted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain an encrypted data. In some implementations, the technique 700 includes encrypting an archive hosted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain an encrypted data. In some implementations, the technique 700 includes encrypting a SMS message hosted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain an encrypted data. In some implementations, the technique 700 includes encrypting a dashboard hosted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain an encrypted data. In some implementations, the technique 700 includes encrypting a transcript (e.g., a transcript for a conference, a webinar, or a phone call) hosted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain an encrypted data. In some implementations, the data may be encrypted using an encryption algorithm (e.g., AES-256 GCM) specified by an encryption algorithm identifier from the key management server.
In some implementations, the data may be encrypted using multiple encryption keys acquired from different key management servers. In some cases, the multiple key management servers used may be associated with different respective customers of a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). For example, data keys from multiple customers may be used for encryption to facilitate sharing of encrypted data and collaboration between users respectively associated with the different customers. In an example, the data (e.g., a recording of conference) may be encrypted by the first server using a first plaintext key acquired from a first key management server and using a second plaintext key acquired from a second key management server to obtain an encrypted data. For example, the technique 700 may include implementing the technique 1200 of FIG. 12 .
At 714, the technique 700 includes storing the encrypted data with the encrypted key in non-volatile memory (e.g., a hard drive or flash memory). The encrypted data may be of various types. For example, the technique 700 may include storing the encrypted recording (e.g., of a conference, a webinar, a phone call, or a voicemail) with the encrypted key in non-volatile memory. For example, the technique 700 may include storing the encrypted token (e.g., a calendar token) with the encrypted key in non-volatile memory. In some implementations, the encrypted data may be stored in a database or a file server (e.g., the database server 110) by the first server (e.g., the telephony server 112, the media server 402, the media server 404, or the calendar server 406).
At 716, the technique 700 includes deleting the plaintext key. The plaintext key may be deleted from the software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform) altogether. The plaintext key may be deleted by a key broker server that relayed the plaintext key and by the first server that used the plaintext key to perform the encryption. Deleting the plaintext key may help to prevent the encrypted data from being accessed in the future without permission from a key management server of the customer.
FIG. 8 is a flowchart of an example of a technique 800 for decryption using distributed encryption key allocation for use in a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). The technique 800 can be executed using computing devices, such as the systems, hardware, and software described with respect to FIGS. 1-6 . The technique 800 can be performed, for example, by executing a machine-readable program or other computer-executable instructions, such as routines, instructions, programs, or other code. The steps, or operations, of the technique 800 or another technique, method, process, or algorithm described in connection with the implementations disclosed herein can be implemented directly in hardware, firmware, software executed by hardware, circuitry, or a combination thereof.
For simplicity of explanation, the technique 800 is depicted and described herein as a series of steps or operations. However, the steps or operations in accordance with this disclosure can occur in various orders and/or concurrently. Additionally, other steps or operations not presented and described herein may be used. Furthermore, not all illustrated steps or operations may be required to implement a technique in accordance with the disclosed subject matter.
At 802, the technique 800 includes receiving a decryption request from a first server that includes an identifier for one or more users and an encrypted key. In some implementations, the first server is part of a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform) configured to support multiple modes of communication via one or more electronic communications networks. The first server may be configured to record or otherwise access communications data for users of a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform) to provide a communications service, such as, recording conference calls, recording webinars, recording phone calls or voicemails, receiving email, or updating calendar information including tokens. In some implementations, the first server is a media server configured to host conference software. Some examples of the first server include the media server 402, the media server 404, the calendar server 406, and an email server. The identifier may specify a single user or a group of users that are associated with a security context. The identifier may include a customer identification number that has been associated with the encrypted data that is to be decrypted. The identifier may include a host email address associated with the encrypted data or a user invoking the request for decryption. The encrypted key has been stored with the encrypted data and is an encrypted version of the data encryption key that was used to encrypt the encrypted data. In one example, the decryption request may be received using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410).
At 804, the technique 800 includes selecting a key management server based on the identifier. In some implementations, the identifier associated with the encrypted data to be decrypted may be mapped to a key management server by matching the identifier to a list of user identifiers associated with a customer of a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). The customer may have one or more key management servers that are configured to issue data encryption keys for its users. In an example, a customer may have multiple key management servers to provide redundancy, reliability, and increased uptime for its cloud infrastructure. A customer's key management servers may be updated or otherwise changed from time to time. A customer may be associated with a security context in the software platform (e.g., as part of the customer configurations 320) that includes a list of one or more key management servers. Lists of active key management servers for various customers may be maintained by a key broker server and updated via a customer configuration interface. Once the identifier has been mapped to a customer, a key management server may be selected from the list of key management servers for that customer based on considerations such as, availability (e.g., current network reachability), customer specified priority in the list, and time of day.
At 806, the technique 800 includes transmitting a request for a data encryption key to the selected key management server, wherein the request includes the encrypted key. The key management server may have another key, which may be a CMK, which can be used to decrypt the encrypted key that was stored with the encrypted data. In some implementations, the request includes identifying information for a user or group of users associated with a security policy implemented by the selected key management server, such as an AWS IAM policy. For example, the request may include an AWS IAM identity (e.g., user, group of users, or role). In some implementations, the request is for an envelope encryption key. In one example, the encryption request may be transmitted using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410).
At 808, the technique 800 includes receiving a plaintext key from the key management server. The plaintext key may be a decrypted version of the encrypted key that is returned by the key management server after it verifies the permissions associated with the request. The encrypted key may be decrypted by the key management server using a separate encryption key retained by the key management server. In some implementations, the plaintext key may be a symmetric data encryption key that was used to encrypt the encrypted data using an encryption algorithm. In some implementations, the plaintext key may be an asymmetric key that can be used for decryption and is paired with another key that was used for encryption. In some implementations, the plaintext key is a data key that is unique to the encrypted data stored with the encrypted key. In some implementations, the decryption algorithm is implied or has been previously specified by communications separate from the request and its response. In some implementations, the decryption algorithm is dynamically specified by the key management server in response to the request. In some examples, a decryption algorithm identifier is received from the key management server and a decryption algorithm to be applied with the plaintext key is selected based on the decryption algorithm identifier. In one example, the plaintext key may be received using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410).
At 810, the technique 800 includes, in response to the decryption request, transmitting the plaintext key to the first server. In some implementations, the plaintext key is relayed to the first server, which will perform the decryption of the encrypted data, along with other data from the key management server specifying how the data should be decrypted, such a decryption algorithm identifier. In one example, the plaintext key may be transmitted using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410).
At 812, the technique 800 includes decrypting the encrypted data using the plaintext key to obtain decrypted data. The decrypted data may be of various types of data recorded or maintained in the software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). In some implementations, the technique 800 includes decrypting an encrypted recording of a conference conducted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain a decrypted recording. In some implementations, the technique 800 includes decrypting an encrypted recording of a phone call conducted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain a decrypted recording. In some implementations, the technique 800 includes decrypting an encrypted voicemail received by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain a decrypted recording. In some implementations, the technique 800 includes decrypting an encrypted calendar token generated by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain a decrypted token. In some implementations, the technique 800 includes decrypting an encrypted recording of a webinar conducted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain a decrypted recording. In some implementations, the technique 800 includes decrypting an encrypted virtual whiteboard hosted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain decrypted data. In some implementations, the technique 800 includes decrypting an encrypted chat hosted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain decrypted data. In some implementations, the technique 800 includes decrypting an encrypted archive hosted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain decrypted data. In some implementations, the technique 800 includes decrypting an encrypted SMS message hosted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain decrypted data. In some implementations, the technique 800 includes decrypting an encrypted dashboard hosted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain decrypted data. In some implementations, the technique 800 includes decrypting an encrypted transcript (e.g., a transcript for a conference, a webinar, or a phone call) hosted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain decrypted data. In some implementations, the data may be decrypted using a decryption algorithm (e.g., AES-256 GCM) specified by a decryption algorithm identifier from the key management server.
At 814, the technique 800 includes presenting the decrypted data. The decrypted data may be presented in a user interface (e.g., a webpage, a streaming media player, and/or another client application) In some implementations, the decrypted data may be presented by transmitting the decrypted data as part of a graphical user interface using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214). The decrypted data may be transmitted to a device (e.g., the desk phone 304, the computer 306, the mobile device 308, or the shared device 310) that can used by a user to listen to and/or view the content. In some implementations, the decrypted data may be presented by displaying the decrypted data on a local peripheral (e.g., a monitor, a touchscreen, or other display device).
At 816, the technique 800 includes deleting the plaintext key. The plaintext key may be deleted from the software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform) altogether. The plaintext key may be deleted by a key broker server that relayed the plaintext key and by the first server that used the plaintext key to perform the decryption. Deleting the plaintext key may help to prevent the encrypted data from being accessed in the future without permission from a key management server of the customer.
FIG. 9 is a flowchart of an example of a technique 900 for acquiring security parameters from a key management server. The technique 900 can be executed using computing devices, such as the systems, hardware, and software described with respect to FIGS. 1-6 . The technique 900 can be performed, for example, by executing a machine-readable program or other computer-executable instructions, such as routines, instructions, programs, or other code. The steps, or operations, of the technique 900 or another technique, method, process, or algorithm described in connection with the implementations disclosed herein can be implemented directly in hardware, firmware, software executed by hardware, circuitry, or a combination thereof.
For simplicity of explanation, the technique 900 is depicted and described herein as a series of steps or operations. However, the steps or operations in accordance with this disclosure can occur in various orders and/or concurrently. Additionally, other steps or operations not presented and described herein may be used. Furthermore, not all illustrated steps or operations may be required to implement a technique in accordance with the disclosed subject matter.
At 902, the technique 900 includes receiving an encryption algorithm identifier from the key management server. In this manner, the encryption algorithm may be dynamically specified by the key management server in response to a request for encryption. In an example, the encryption algorithm identifier is received by a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410) and relayed to a first server (e.g., the media server 402, the media server 404, or the calendar server 406) that will perform the encryption.
At 904, the technique 900 includes selecting an encryption algorithm to be applied with the plaintext key based on the encryption algorithm identifier. In an example, the encryption algorithm is selected by a first server (e.g., the media server 402, the media server 404, or the calendar server 406) that will perform the encryption.
At 906, the technique 900 includes receiving a destination address from the key management server. For example, the destination address may be an address associated with a particular database or file server with technical parameters that has been selected and provisioned for a customer. The destination address may include a network address or uniform resource locator (URL) and/or a file path or database key value.
At 908, the technique 900 includes storing the encrypted key and data encrypted with the plaintext key in non-volatile memory at the destination address.
FIG. 10 is a flowchart of an example of a technique 1000 for provisioning a key management server for generating data encryption keys a group of users. The technique 1000 can be executed using computing devices, such as the systems, hardware, and software described with respect to FIGS. 1-6 . The technique 1000 can be performed, for example, by executing a machine-readable program or other computer-executable instructions, such as routines, instructions, programs, or other code. The steps, or operations, of the technique 1000 or another technique, method, process, or algorithm described in connection with the implementations disclosed herein can be implemented directly in hardware, firmware, software executed by hardware, circuitry, or a combination thereof.
For simplicity of explanation, the technique 1000 is depicted and described herein as a series of steps or operations. However, the steps or operations in accordance with this disclosure can occur in various orders and/or concurrently. Additionally, other steps or operations not presented and described herein may be used. Furthermore, not all illustrated steps or operations may be required to implement a technique in accordance with the disclosed subject matter.
At 1002, the technique 1000 includes configuring the key management server to generate data keys. A customer may request for a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform) to establish a key management server specific to the customer on behalf of the customer. In some implementations, configuring the key management server includes setting an AWS IAM policy in the key management server.
At 1004, the technique 1000 includes associating the key management server with a group of one or more users. The security policy implemented by the key management server may relate to identities including one or more users of the software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform) associated with the customer. In some implementations, users are associated with an AWS IAM identity (e.g., a user, a group of users, or a role). For example, the association may be established as part of the customer configurations 320.
FIG. 11 is a flowchart of an example of a technique 1100 for selecting a key management server to supply a data encryption key based on a variety of factors. The technique 1100 can be executed using computing devices, such as the systems, hardware, and software described with respect to FIGS. 1-6 . The technique 1100 can be performed, for example, by executing a machine-readable program or other computer-executable instructions, such as routines, instructions, programs, or other code. The steps, or operations, of the technique 1100 or another technique, method, process, or algorithm described in connection with the implementations disclosed herein can be implemented directly in hardware, firmware, software executed by hardware, circuitry, or a combination thereof.
For simplicity of explanation, the technique 1100 is depicted and described herein as a series of steps or operations. However, the steps or operations in accordance with this disclosure can occur in various orders and/or concurrently. Additionally, other steps or operations not presented and described herein may be used. Furthermore, not all illustrated steps or operations may be required to implement a technique in accordance with the disclosed subject matter.
At 1102, the technique 1100 includes selecting the key management server based on an indication, included in the encryption request, of a type of data (e.g., a webinar recording versus a voicemail) to be encrypted. In some implementations, the indication of type of data is a number that is mapped to one of a set of available data types in a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). For example, the set of available data types may include conference, webinar, phone call, voicemail, calendar, calendar token, virtual whiteboards, chat, chat file transfer (e.g., including image sharing), archiving (e.g., archiving for conference, webinar, and phone), SMS, dashboard and reports (e.g., dashboard for conference, webinar, and phone), and transcripts (e.g., transcripts for conference, webinar, and phone).
At 1104, the technique 1100 includes selecting the key management server based on an indication, included in the encryption request, of a geographic region associated with data to be encrypted. In some implementations, the indication of the geographic region is an internet protocol address. In some implementations, the indication of the geographic region is a set of geolocation coordinates. In some implementations, the indication of the geographic region is part of a mailing address associated with a user associated with the data to be encrypted. In some implementations, the indication of the geographic region is a telephone number associated with the data to be encrypted.
FIG. 12 is a flowchart of an example of a technique 1200 for encrypting data using multiple data encryption keys provided by different key management servers. The technique 1200 can be executed using computing devices, such as the systems, hardware, and software described with respect to FIGS. 1-6 . The technique 1200 can be performed, for example, by executing a machine-readable program or other computer-executable instructions, such as routines, instructions, programs, or other code. The steps, or operations, of the technique 1200 or another technique, method, process, or algorithm described in connection with the implementations disclosed herein can be implemented directly in hardware, firmware, software executed by hardware, circuitry, or a combination thereof.
For simplicity of explanation, the technique 1200 is depicted and described herein as a series of steps or operations. However, the steps or operations in accordance with this disclosure can occur in various orders and/or concurrently. Additionally, other steps or operations not presented and described herein may be used. Furthermore, not all illustrated steps or operations may be required to implement a technique in accordance with the disclosed subject matter.
At 1204, the technique 1200 includes selecting a second key management server based on the identifier. In some implementations, the second key management server is associated with a different customer than the first key management server. For example, encryption using multiple data encryption keys controlled by multiple respective customers may enable equitable sharing of data between different groups of users associated with different customers that are collaborating. In an example, a conference between one or more users associated with a first customer and one or more users associated with a second customer may be recorded and the recording may need to be encrypted. In this example, two key management servers that are respectively associated with the first customer and the second customer may be selected to provide data encryption keys. The recording of the conference may then be encrypted with both a first data key from the first key management server and with a second data key from the second key management server. The resulting encrypted data may be stored with encrypted copies of the keys used to encrypt the data, which have been encrypted by these respective key management servers. After the plain text versions of these keys have been deleted from the software platform, decrypting this shared data may require permission from all of the respective key management servers. For example, the recording of the conference may be sequentially encrypted with each of the multiple data encryption keys used.
At 1206, the technique 1200 includes transmitting a request for a data encryption key to the second key management server. In some implementations, the request includes identifying information for a user or group of users associated with a security policy implemented by the second key management server, such as an AWS IAM policy. For example, the request may include an AWS IAM identity (e.g., user, group of users, or role). In some implementations, the request is for an envelope encryption key. In one example, the encryption request may be transmitted using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410).
At 1208, the technique 1200 includes receiving a second plaintext key and a second encrypted key from the second key management server. The second plaintext key may be a data encryption key that can be directly used to encrypt data using an encryption algorithm. The second plaintext key may be a symmetric key that can be used to both encrypt and to decrypt data. In some implementations, the second plaintext key may be an asymmetric key that can be used for encryption and is paired with another key for decryption. The second key management server may use a CMK to encrypt the second plaintext key. In some implementations, the second plaintext key is a data key that is unique to the communications data to be encrypted. The second encrypted key is an encrypted version of the second plaintext key. The second encrypted key has been encrypted with a separate encryption key retained by the second key management server. Thus, the second key management server may retain the capability to prevent decryption of the encrypted data later using the second encrypted key, after the second plaintext key has been deleted. In some implementations, the encryption algorithm is implied or has been previously specified by communications separate from the request and its response. In some implementations, the encryption algorithm to be used with the second plaintext key is dynamically specified by the second key management server in response to the request. In some examples, an encryption algorithm identifier is received from the second key management server and an encryption algorithm to be applied with the second plaintext key is selected based on the encryption algorithm identifier. The technique 1200 may include implementing the technique 900 of FIG. 9 . In one example, the plaintext key and the encrypted key may be received using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410).
At 1210, the technique 1200 includes in response to the encryption request, transmitting the second plaintext key and the second encrypted key to the first server. In some implementations, the second plaintext key and the second encrypted key are relayed to the first server, which will perform the encryption of the communications data, along with other data from the second key management server specifying how the data should be encrypted and stored, such as an encryption algorithm identifier and/or a destination address for the encrypted data. In one example, the second plaintext key and the second encrypted key may be transmitted using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410).
At 1212, the technique 1200 includes encrypting data accessed by the first server using the first plaintext key and using the second plaintext key to obtain an encrypted data. The data to be encrypted may be of various types of data recorded or maintained in the software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). In some implementations, the technique 1200 includes encrypting a recording of a conference conducted by the first server using the first plaintext key and the second plaintext key to obtain an encrypted recording. In some implementations, the technique 1200 includes encrypting a recording of a phone call conducted by the first server using the first plaintext key and the second plaintext key to obtain an encrypted recording. In some implementations, the technique 1200 includes encrypting a voicemail received by the first server using the first plaintext key and the second plaintext key to obtain an encrypted recording. In some implementations, the technique 1200 includes encrypting a calendar token generated by the first server using the first plaintext key and the second plaintext key to obtain an encrypted token. In some implementations, the technique 1200 includes encrypting a recording of a webinar conducted by the first server using the first plaintext key and the second plaintext key to obtain an encrypted recording. In some implementations, the data may be encrypted using an encryption algorithm (e.g., AES-256 GCM) specified by an encryption algorithm identifier from the second key management server. In some implementations, the data accessed by the first server may be sequentially encrypted with each of the multiple data encryption keys used. For example, the data accessed by the first server may be encrypted with the first plaintext key and then the result may be again encrypted using the second plaintext key to obtain the fully encrypted data, where two encryption keys are used. More than two encryption keys may be used to encrypt the data.
At 1214, the technique 1200 includes storing the encrypted data with the first encrypted key and the second encrypted key in non-volatile memory (e.g., a hard drive or flash memory). The encrypted data may be of various types. For example, the technique 1200 may include storing the encrypted recording (e.g., of a conference, a webinar, a phone call, or a voicemail) with the first encrypted key and the second encrypted key in non-volatile memory. For example, the technique 1200 may include storing the encrypted token (e.g., a calendar token) with the first encrypted key and the second encrypted key in non-volatile memory. In some implementations, the encrypted data may be stored in a database or a file server (e.g., the database server 110) by the first server (e.g., the telephony server 112, the media server 402, the media server 404, or the calendar server 406).
At 1216, the technique 1200 includes deleting the second plaintext key. The second plaintext key may be deleted from the software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform) altogether. The second plaintext key may be deleted by a key broker server that relayed the second plaintext key and by the first server that used the second plaintext key to perform the encryption. Deleting the second plaintext key may help to prevent the encrypted data from being accessed in the future without permission from a key management server of the customer associated with the second key management server.
A key broker server may mediate between the various media servers and a key management server by allowing the customer to set up a set of policies which the key broker server may then enforce. The key broker server may also enable changing those policies. In some implementations, assets may be re-encrypted with different keys to implement a new policy. For example, policy decisions may consider attributes such: location, role, or group membership of the content owner or other actors; a data label (e.g., indicating a sensitivity level or type of the content), and, based on such, the key broker server may determine: what key management server type and location to use; what key within a key management server to use; where to direct the media server to store the encrypted data (e.g., an artifact); and/or which data type(s) to encrypt.
A key management server provides encryption keys in response to requests. A key management server may be implemented with specialized hardware or a general-purpose processor. For example, a key management server may be a hardware security module (HSM) in the customer cloud. In some implementations, a key management server may be part of a third-party network infrastructure. Some well-known cloud-based key management servers are provided by, e.g., AWS, OCI, Google, and Azure. In some implementations, a key management server may be internal to platform cloud along with the key broker server, and may be operated by the same network administrator.
Encryption using the techniques described herein may be used to encrypt a variety of types of data. In addition to conference related data, the encryption may be applied to any data or artifact associated with users of UCaaS platform. For example, types of data that may be encrypted for storage may include chat logs and text messages (e.g., SMS messages) and media, search indices, telemetry data, whiteboard content, personal data in Dashboards & Reporting, and/or customer specific configuration data and security tokens.
A key broker server may also facilitate configuration of an application server to store the encrypted data anywhere, including on a database server or a file server in a customer cloud. For example, a key broker server may query a key management server in a customer cloud, get a data key for encryption, and encrypt an artifact. Upon encrypting the artifact, a server in the platform cloud (e.g., the key broker server or a media server) may send the artifact and the accompanying encrypted data key to the customer's cloud storage provider. Once the artifact is stored in a customer-controlled environment, the customer admins can specify permissions on this artifact and select when, how, and by whom the artifact can be decrypted and viewed.
Encrypted keys may be stored by a key broker server-instead of being stored with the encrypted data. In some implementations, a key broker server maintains state to map a context identifier for an artifact of encrypted data to one of its stored encrypted keys at decryption time. The context identifier for an artifact of encrypted data may be unique to that artifact. For example, the key broker server may generate a unique context identifier for an artifact when the request to encrypt the artifact is processed and may return this context identifier as part of a response to the request, along with the requested plaintext key to be used to encrypt the artifact. In some implementations, a unique context identifier for artifact to be encrypted may be generated by the requestor (e.g., a media server) in accordance with a protocol to establish uniqueness, such as by appending a data type code to unique code for an artifact of the data type and/or a timestamp.
Rather than storing the encrypted data key (e.g., a cipherkey) with the artifact, the key broker server can store the encrypted data key and maintain a mapping table of a unique context identifier of the artifact to the encrypted data key. This table may include other metadata such as which key management server and key the data key was encrypted by. This allows the key broker server to query the correct key management server to request a plaintext key for decryption. This also allows the key broker server to support re-keying and deprovisioning workflows, as described next.
Re-keying when user encryption policy changes causes old data keys to be decrypted by an old key management server to obtain the plaintext key, which is then re-encrypted by a new key management server using its own envelope encryption key. The plaintext key stays the same so the stored, encrypted user data doesn't have to be modified. For example, re-keying may be triggered by a migration between key management server products or locations or a key rotation or a key policy change. A customer may decide to rotate their envelope encryption key manually, while keeping the key management server constant. Or they might decide to change their key management server within the same cloud provider or move to a key management server in a different cloud provider or on premises.
In this paragraph, we shall refer to the original envelope encryption key as KMS-1 and the new envelope encryption key as KMS-2. In this example, re-keying may entail decrypting encrypted data keys encrypted using KMS-1 and re-encrypting those data keys with KMS-2. The fact that all data keys used to encrypt data are stored in a key broker server enable efficient conduct this re-keying process without involving the encrypted data maintained by the media servers. During this entire re-keying process, the customer should keep KMS-1 active and accessible by the key broker server. For each encrypted data key in the mapping table affected by the policy change between unique artifact context IDs and encrypted data keys, the key broker server may use KMS-1 to decrypt the data key, then uses KMS-2 to re-encrypt the freshly decrypted data key, and finally updates the row in the mapping table between unique artifact identifiers and data keys with the new encrypted data key. Once the data key has been re-encrypted, the decrypted copy of data key may be deleted to enhance security. After re-keying is completed, the customer may deactivate the old key management server that provided KMS-1 and operate with KMS-2 for future encryption and decryption needs.
For example, re-keying may be triggered by moving from one product line to another, e.g., from using a key management server in a customer cloud to using a key management server in the platform cloud with the key broker server. This enables a customer to seamlessly switch between delegate control of its keys to a platform operator and managing its own encryption keys more directly.
Deprovisioning a user's encryption may include decrypting user data for each of the user's entry in the mapping table, and deleting the associated row from the mapping table. After deprovisioning is completed, the customer may deactivate the key management server if no longer necessary. An alternative approach from deprovisioning may treat deprovisioning as a re-keying, but with a key maintained by a key broker server that is not specific to a particular user or group of user, but rather is available to all users of the system. For example, the data key(s) may be stored in unencrypted form.
In some implementations, a key broker server maintains two data structures, one data structure may track active encrypted keys that encode data keys that have been used to encrypt data stored for users of the platform. For example, the first data structure may be implemented as a lookup table that maps from a context identifier to an applicable encrypted key. The second data structure may be is a policy database. The policy database stores rules or policies that map a request for encryption parameters for an encryption process, such as where to store data, what type of encryption to use, which data types to encrypt. In some implementations, a policy mapping can be considered as a row in a table, where the input parameters of a request for encryption are key fields, and output fields include, e.g., encryption type, a pointer (e.g., a URL) to a key management server, a pointer (e.g., a URL) to a database server data for storage and associated service credentials. For example, a policy may have as input data type, user role/group, explicit key management server hint, etc. An authorized user may specify these inputs to the system via a graphical user interface or an application programming interface.
FIG. 13 is a flowchart of an example of a technique 1300 for encryption using distributed encryption key allocation for use in a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). The technique 1300 can be executed using computing devices, such as the systems, hardware, and software described with respect to FIGS. 1-6 . The technique 1300 can be performed, for example, by executing a machine-readable program or other computer-executable instructions, such as routines, instructions, programs, or other code. The steps, or operations, of the technique 1300 or another technique, method, process, or algorithm described in connection with the implementations disclosed herein can be implemented directly in hardware, firmware, software executed by hardware, circuitry, or a combination thereof.
For simplicity of explanation, the technique 1300 is depicted and described herein as a series of steps or operations. However, the steps or operations in accordance with this disclosure can occur in various orders and/or concurrently. Additionally, other steps or operations not presented and described herein may be used. Furthermore, not all illustrated steps or operations may be required to implement a technique in accordance with the disclosed subject matter.
At 1302, the technique 1300 includes receiving an encryption request from a first server that includes a data type indication and an identifier for one or more users. In some implementations, the first server is part of a UCaaS system configured to support multiple modes of communication via one or more electronic communications networks. The first server may be configured to record or otherwise access communications data for users of a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform) to provide a communications service, such as, recording conference calls, recording webinars, recording phone calls or voicemails, receiving email, or updating calendar information including tokens. In some implementations, the first server is a media server configured to host conference software. Some examples of the first server include the media server 402, the media server 404, the calendar server 406, and an email server. The identifier may specify a single user or a group of users that are associated with a security context. The identifier may include a customer identification number that has been associated with communication data that is to be encrypted. The identifier may include a host email address associated with a conference, a webinar, a phone call, a calendar, or a calendar token from which data is to be encrypted. In some implementations, the identifier includes a telephone number associated with a phone call or voicemail from which data is to be encrypted. The data type indication may be encoded in accordance with a protocol for the key broker server. For example, the data type indication may be a portion of a unique context identifier for artifact of data to be encrypted. In one example, the encryption request may be received using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410).
At 1304, the technique 1300 includes selecting a security management policy from a set of security management policies stored in a data structure (e.g., the data structure 2000) based on the identifier and based on the data type indication. For example, the security management policy may be encoded and stored in the format of the security management policy 2010 of FIG. 20 . In some implementations, the data type indication may indicate a data type for data to be encrypted using a plaintext key is one of conference recording, phone call, voicemail, webinar, calendar token, chat log, text messages, search indices, telemetry data, or whiteboard content. In some implementations, the encryption request includes a role indication for a user associated with the identifier, and the security management policy is selected based on the role indication (e.g., indicating executive, marketing, or information security). In some implementations, the encryption request includes a data label (e.g., a sensitivity level indication), and the security management policy is selected based on the data label. In some implementations, the encryption request includes a location (e.g., a residency or a current geographic location), and the security management policy is selected based on the location.
At 1306, the technique 1300 includes selecting a key management server based on the selected security management policy. In some implementations, the key management server is a cloud server (e.g., an AWS KMS). In some implementations, the key management server is a hardware security module (HSM). For example, the key management server is in a customer cloud. In some implementations, a key management server may be selected from the list of key management servers specified by the security management policy based on considerations such as, availability (e.g., current network reachability), customer specified priority in the list, and time of day. Selecting the key management server may include exchanging messages with intermediary devices in a network (e.g., a domain name server and/or a load balancer).
At 1308, the technique 1300 includes transmitting a request for a data encryption key to the selected key management server. For example, the request may include an AWS IAM identity (e.g., user, group of users, or role). In some implementations, the request is for an envelope encryption key. In one example, the encryption request may be transmitted using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410).
At 1310, the technique 1300 includes receiving a plaintext key and an encrypted key from the key management server. The plaintext key may be a data encryption key that can be directly used to encrypt data using an encryption algorithm. The plaintext key may be a symmetric key that can be used to both encrypt and to decrypt data. In some implementations, the plaintext key may be an asymmetric key that can be used for encryption and is paired with another key for decryption. The key management server may use a CMK to encrypt the plaintext key. In some implementations, the plaintext key is a data key that is unique to the communications data to be encrypted as part of the technique 1300. The encrypted key is an encrypted version of the plaintext key. The encrypted key has been encrypted with a separate encryption key retained by the key management server. Thus, the key management server may retain the exclusive capability to decrypt the encrypted data later using the encrypted key, after the plaintext key has been deleted. In some implementations, the encryption algorithm is implied or has been previously specified by communications separate from the request and its response. In some implementations, the encryption algorithm is dynamically specified by the key management server in response to the request. In some examples, an encryption algorithm identifier is received from the key management server and an encryption algorithm to be applied with the plaintext key is selected based on the encryption algorithm identifier. Other security parameters of the encryption and storage of the communications data to be encrypted may be received from the key management server. For example, a destination address may be received from the key management server and the encrypted key and data encrypted with the plaintext key may be stored in non-volatile memory at the destination address (e.g., an address associated with a particular database or file server with technical parameters that has been selected and provisioned for a customer). The technique 1300 may include implementing the technique 900 of FIG. 9 . In one example, the plaintext key and the encrypted key may be received using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410).
At 1312, the technique 1300 includes in response to the encryption request, transmitting the plaintext key to the first server. In some implementations, the plaintext key are relayed to the first server, which will perform the encryption of the communications data, along with other data from the key management server specifying how the data should be encrypted and stored, such as an encryption algorithm identifier and/or a destination address for the encrypted data. In one example, the plaintext key may be transmitted using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410).
At 1314, the technique 1300 includes deleting the plaintext key. The plaintext key may be deleted from the software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform) altogether. The plaintext key may be deleted by a key broker server that relayed the plaintext key and by the first server that used the plaintext key to perform the encryption. Deleting the plaintext key may help to prevent the encrypted data from being accessed in the future without permission from a key management server of the customer.
FIG. 14 is a flowchart of an example of a technique 1400 for decryption using distributed encryption key allocation for use in a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). The technique 1400 can be executed using computing devices, such as the systems, hardware, and software described with respect to FIGS. 1-6 . The technique 1400 can be performed, for example, by executing a machine-readable program or other computer-executable instructions, such as routines, instructions, programs, or other code. The steps, or operations, of the technique 1400 or another technique, method, process, or algorithm described in connection with the implementations disclosed herein can be implemented directly in hardware, firmware, software executed by hardware, circuitry, or a combination thereof.
For simplicity of explanation, the technique 1400 is depicted and described herein as a series of steps or operations. However, the steps or operations in accordance with this disclosure can occur in various orders and/or concurrently. Additionally, other steps or operations not presented and described herein may be used. Furthermore, not all illustrated steps or operations may be required to implement a technique in accordance with the disclosed subject matter.
At 1402, the technique 1400 includes receiving a decryption request from a first server that includes a context identifier. In some implementations, the first server is part of a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform) configured to support multiple modes of communication via one or more electronic communications networks. The first server may be configured to record or otherwise access communications data for users of a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform) to provide a communications service, such as, recording conference calls, recording webinars, recording phone calls or voicemails, receiving email, or updating calendar information including tokens. In some implementations, the first server is a media server configured to host conference software. Some examples of the first server include the media server 402, the media server 404, the calendar server 406, and an email server. The context identifier may be a unique to an artifact of encrypted data that the first server is trying to access. The context identifier may have been generated for the artifact (e.g., by the key broker server or by a device that requested encryption for the artifact) when a request for encryption of the artifact was processed. In one example, the decryption request may be received using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410).
At 1404, the technique 1400 includes accessing an encrypted key stored in a record associated with the context identifier. The encrypted key may be an encrypted version of the data encryption key that was used to encrypt the encrypted data. For example, the encrypted key stored may be stored in a record (e.g., a row in a lookup table) in the data structure 2100 of FIG. 21 .
At 1406, the technique 1400 includes selecting a key management server based on the record associated with the context identifier. For example, the record may include key management server data that can used to access the key management server, such as, a key management server pointer (e.g., a URL) and/or credentials associated with a private key managed by the key management server. Selecting the key management server may include exchanging messages with intermediary devices in a network (e.g., a domain name server and/or a load balancer).
At 1408, the technique 1400 includes transmitting a request for a data encryption key to the selected key management server, wherein the request includes the encrypted key. The key management server may have another key, which may be a CMK, which can be used to decrypt the encrypted key that was stored with the encrypted data. In some implementations, the request may include an AWS IAM identity (e.g., user, group of users, or role). In some implementations, the request is for an envelope encryption key. In one example, the encryption request may be transmitted using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410).
At 1410, the technique 1400 includes receiving a plaintext key from the key management server. The plaintext key may be a decrypted version of the encrypted key that is returned by the key management server after it verifies the permissions associated with the request. The encrypted key may be decrypted by the key management server using a separate encryption key retained by the key management server. In some implementations, the plaintext key may be a symmetric data encryption key that was used to encrypt the encrypted data using an encryption algorithm. In some implementations, the plaintext key may be an asymmetric key that can be used for decryption and is paired with another key that was used for encryption. In some implementations, the plaintext key is a data key that is unique to the encrypted data stored with the encrypted key. In some implementations, the decryption algorithm is implied or has been previously specified by communications separate from the request and its response. In some implementations, the decryption algorithm is dynamically specified by the key management server in response to the request. In some examples, a decryption algorithm identifier is received from the key management server and a decryption algorithm to be applied with the plaintext key is selected based on the decryption algorithm identifier. In one example, the plaintext key may be received using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410).
At 1412, the technique 1400 includes in response to the decryption request, transmitting the plaintext key to the first server. In some implementations, the plaintext key is relayed to the first server, which will perform the decryption of the encrypted data, along with other data from the key management server specifying how the data should be decrypted, such a decryption algorithm identifier. In one example, the plaintext key may be transmitted using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410).
At 1414, the technique 1400 includes decrypting the encrypted data (e.g., an artifact of encrypted data) using the plaintext key to obtain decrypted data. The decrypted data may be of various types of data recorded or maintained in the software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). In some implementations, the technique 1400 includes decrypting an encrypted recording of a conference conducted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain a decrypted recording. In some implementations, the technique 1400 includes decrypting an encrypted recording of a phone call conducted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain a decrypted recording. In some implementations, the technique 1400 includes decrypting an encrypted voicemail received by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain a decrypted recording. In some implementations, the technique 1400 includes decrypting an encrypted calendar token generated by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain a decrypted token. In some implementations, the technique 1400 includes decrypting an encrypted recording of a webinar conducted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain a decrypted recording. In some implementations, the technique 1400 includes decrypting an encrypted virtual whiteboard hosted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain decrypted data. In some implementations, the technique 1400 includes decrypting an encrypted chat hosted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain decrypted data. In some implementations, the technique 1400 includes decrypting an encrypted archive hosted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain decrypted data. In some implementations, the technique 1400 includes decrypting an encrypted SMS message hosted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain decrypted data. In some implementations, the technique 1400 includes decrypting an encrypted dashboard hosted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain decrypted data. In some implementations, the technique 1400 includes decrypting an encrypted transcript (e.g., a transcript for a conference, a webinar, or a phone call) hosted by the first server using the plaintext key to obtain decrypted data. In some implementations, the data may be decrypted using a decryption algorithm (e.g., AES-256 GCM) specified by a decryption algorithm identifier from the key management server.
At 1416, the technique 1400 includes presenting the decrypted data. The decrypted data may be presented in a user interface (e.g., a webpage, a streaming media player, and/or another client application) In some implementations, the decrypted data may be presented by transmitting the decrypted data as part of a graphical user interface using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214). The decrypted data may be transmitted to a device (e.g., the desk phone 304, the computer 306, the mobile device 308, or the shared device 310) that can used by a user to listen to and/or view the content. In some implementations, the decrypted data may be presented by displaying the decrypted data on a local peripheral (e.g., a monitor, a touchscreen, or other display device).
At 1418, the technique 1400 includes deleting the plaintext key. The plaintext key may be deleted from the software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform) altogether. The plaintext key may be deleted by a key broker server that relayed the plaintext key and by the first server that used the plaintext key to perform the decryption. Deleting the plaintext key may help to prevent the encrypted data from being accessed in the future without permission from a key management server of the customer.
FIG. 15 is a flowchart of an example of a technique 1500 for storing encrypted data in a database server selected using a security management policy. The technique 1500 can be executed using computing devices, such as the systems, hardware, and software described with respect to FIGS. 1-6 . The technique 1500 can be performed, for example, by executing a machine-readable program or other computer-executable instructions, such as routines, instructions, programs, or other code. The steps, or operations, of the technique 1500 or another technique, method, process, or algorithm described in connection with the implementations disclosed herein can be implemented directly in hardware, firmware, software executed by hardware, circuitry, or a combination thereof. For simplicity of explanation, the technique 1500 is depicted and described herein as a series of steps or operations. However, the steps or operations in accordance with this disclosure can occur in various orders and/or concurrently. Additionally, other steps or operations not presented and described herein may be used. Furthermore, not all illustrated steps or operations may be required to implement a technique in accordance with the disclosed subject matter.
At 1502, the technique 1500 includes selecting a database server based on the selected security management policy (e.g., the security management policy 2010). The security management policy may be encoded and stored in a variety of ways. In some implementations, the security management policy is encoded in a policy language (e.g., Rego). For example, the security management policy may be encoded and stored in the data structure 2000 of FIG. 20 . The security management policy key management server data that can be used to access the selected database server. In some implementations, the selected security management policy includes a pointer (e.g., a URL) and credentials that are used to select the database server and store the encrypted data in the selected database server. The credentials may be associated with a user or group of users. Selecting the database server may include exchanging messages with intermediary devices in a network (e.g., a domain name server and/or a load balancer).
At 1504, the technique 1500 includes storing encrypted data, which has been encrypted using the plaintext key, in the selected database server.
FIG. 16 is a flowchart of an example of a technique 1600 for updating a data structure for tracking active encryption keys needed to access encrypted data managed by a platform. The technique 1600 can be executed using computing devices, such as the systems, hardware, and software described with respect to FIGS. 1-6 . The technique 1600 can be performed, for example, by executing a machine-readable program or other computer-executable instructions, such as routines, instructions, programs, or other code. The steps, or operations, of the technique 1600 or another technique, method, process, or algorithm described in connection with the implementations disclosed herein can be implemented directly in hardware, firmware, software executed by hardware, circuitry, or a combination thereof.
For simplicity of explanation, the technique 1600 is depicted and described herein as a series of steps or operations. However, the steps or operations in accordance with this disclosure can occur in various orders and/or concurrently. Additionally, other steps or operations not presented and described herein may be used. Furthermore, not all illustrated steps or operations may be required to implement a technique in accordance with the disclosed subject matter.
At 1602, the technique 1600 includes determining a context identifier based on the encryption request. The context identifier for an artifact of encrypted data may be unique to that artifact. For example, the context identifier may be determined as a context identifier value included in the encryption request that has been generated by the first server. In some implementations, a unique context identifier for artifact to be encrypted may be generated by the requestor (e.g., a media server) in accordance with a protocol to establish uniqueness, such as by appending a data type code to unique code for an artifact of the data type and/or a timestamp. In some implementations, the context identifier is determined based on other fields in the encryption request, such a data type indication, a user identifier, and/or a timestamp. For example, the key broker server may return this context identifier as part of a response to the request, along with the requested plaintext key to be used to encrypt the artifact.
At 1604, the technique 1600 includes storing the encrypted key in a record associated with the context identifier. In some implementations, the record associated with the context identifier is a row in a lookup table with context identifier as its key value. For example, the encrypted key may be stored in a row of the data structure 2100 of FIG. 21 . In some implementations, the record associated with the context identifier includes data identifying the selected key management server.
FIG. 17 is a flowchart of an example of a technique 1700 for accessing a data structure for tracking active encryption keys to access encrypted data managed by a platform. The technique 1700 can be executed using computing devices, such as the systems, hardware, and software described with respect to FIGS. 1-6 . The technique 1700 can be performed, for example, by executing a machine-readable program or other computer-executable instructions, such as routines, instructions, programs, or other code. The steps, or operations, of the technique 1700 or another technique, method, process, or algorithm described in connection with the implementations disclosed herein can be implemented directly in hardware, firmware, software executed by hardware, circuitry, or a combination thereof.
For simplicity of explanation, the technique 1700 is depicted and described herein as a series of steps or operations. However, the steps or operations in accordance with this disclosure can occur in various orders and/or concurrently. Additionally, other steps or operations not presented and described herein may be used. Furthermore, not all illustrated steps or operations may be required to implement a technique in accordance with the disclosed subject matter.
At 1702, the technique 1700 includes receiving a decryption request including a context identifier. The context identifier may be unique for an artifact of encrypted data. For example, the decryption request may be received from a first server. In some implementations, the first server is part of a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform) configured to support multiple modes of communication via one or more electronic communications networks. The first server may be configured to record or otherwise access communications data for users of a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform) to provide a communications service, such as a service for recording conference calls, recording webinars, recording phone calls or voicemails, receiving email, or updating calendar information including tokens. In some implementations, the first server is a media server configured to host conference software. Some examples of the first server include the media server 402, the media server 404, the calendar server 406, and an email server. In one example, the decryption request may be received using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410).
At 1704, the technique 1700 includes accessing the encrypted key in the record associated with the context identifier. In some implementations, the record associated with the context identifier is a row in a lookup table with context identifier as its key value. For example, the encrypted key may be stored in a row of the data structure 2100 of FIG. 21 .
At 1706, the technique 1700 includes determining the plaintext key based on the encrypted key. Determining the plaintext key based on the encrypted key may include decrypting the encrypted key locally or by using a remote key management server to decrypt the encrypted key. For example, the technique 1800 of FIG. 18 may be implemented to determine the plaintext key based on the encrypted key. The plaintext key may be a decrypted version of the encrypted key that is returned by the key management server after it verifies the permissions associated with the request. The encrypted key may be decrypted by the key management server using a separate encryption key retained by the key management server. In some implementations, the plaintext key may be a symmetric data encryption key that was used to encrypt the encrypted data using an encryption algorithm. In some implementations, the plaintext key may be an asymmetric key that can be used for decryption and is paired with another key that was used for encryption. In some implementations, the plaintext key is a data key that is unique to the encrypted data stored with the encrypted key. In some implementations, the decryption algorithm is implied or has been previously specified by communications separate from the request and its response. In some implementations, the decryption algorithm is dynamically specified by the key management server in response to the request. In some examples, a decryption algorithm identifier is received from the key management server and a decryption algorithm to be applied with the plaintext key is selected based on the decryption algorithm identifier.
At 1708, the technique 1700 includes transmitting the plaintext key in response to the decryption request. In some implementations, the plaintext key is relayed to the first server, which will perform the decryption of the encrypted data, along with other data from the key management server specifying how the data should be decrypted, such a decryption algorithm identifier. In one example, the plaintext key may be transmitted using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410).
FIG. 18 is a flowchart of an example of a technique 1800 for using a key management server to decrypt an encrypted kay to recover a data key that can be used for decrypting data. The technique 1800 can be executed using computing devices, such as the systems, hardware, and software described with respect to FIGS. 1-6 . The technique 1800 can be performed, for example, by executing a machine-readable program or other computer-executable instructions, such as routines, instructions, programs, or other code. The steps, or operations, of the technique 1800 or another technique, method, process, or algorithm described in connection with the implementations disclosed herein can be implemented directly in hardware, firmware, software executed by hardware, circuitry, or a combination thereof.
For simplicity of explanation, the technique 1800 is depicted and described herein as a series of steps or operations. However, the steps or operations in accordance with this disclosure can occur in various orders and/or concurrently. Additionally, other steps or operations not presented and described herein may be used. Furthermore, not all illustrated steps or operations may be required to implement a technique in accordance with the disclosed subject matter.
At 1802, the technique 1800 includes transmitting the encrypted key to the selected key management server. The key management server may have another key, which may be a CMK, which can be used to decrypt the encrypted key. In some implementations, the request may include an AWS IAM identity (e.g., user, group of users, or role). In some implementations, the request is for an envelope encryption key. In one example, the encryption key may be transmitted using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410).
At 1804, the technique 1800 includes receiving the plaintext key from the key management server. The plaintext key may be a decrypted version of the encrypted key that is returned by the key management server after it verifies the permissions associated with the request. The encrypted key may be decrypted by the key management server using a separate encryption key retained by the key management server. In some implementations, the plaintext key may be a symmetric data encryption key that was used to encrypt the encrypted data using an encryption algorithm. In some implementations, the plaintext key may be an asymmetric key that can be used for decryption and is paired with another key that was used for encryption. In some implementations, the plaintext key is a data key that is unique to the encrypted data stored with the encrypted key. In some implementations, the decryption algorithm is implied or has been previously specified by communications separate from the request and its response. In some implementations, the decryption algorithm is dynamically specified by the key management server in response to the request. In some examples, a decryption algorithm identifier is received from the key management server and a decryption algorithm to be applied with the plaintext key is selected based on the decryption algorithm identifier. In one example, the plaintext key may be received using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410).
FIG. 19 is a flowchart of an example of a technique 1900 for re-keying a user or group of users that have data encrypted with keys stored by a key broker server. The technique 1900 can be executed using computing devices, such as the systems, hardware, and software described with respect to FIGS. 1-6 . The technique 1900 can be performed, for example, by executing a machine-readable program or other computer-executable instructions, such as routines, instructions, programs, or other code. The steps, or operations, of the technique 1900 or another technique, method, process, or algorithm described in connection with the implementations disclosed herein can be implemented directly in hardware, firmware, software executed by hardware, circuitry, or a combination thereof.
For simplicity of explanation, the technique 1900 is depicted and described herein as a series of steps or operations. However, the steps or operations in accordance with this disclosure can occur in various orders and/or concurrently. Additionally, other steps or operations not presented and described herein may be used. Furthermore, not all illustrated steps or operations may be required to implement a technique in accordance with the disclosed subject matter.
At 1902, the technique 1900 includes receiving a re-keying request. The re-keying request may call for encrypted keys for artifacts that were generated by a previous key management server to be replaced by encrypted keys generated by a next key management server. The re-keying request may be associated with a user or a group of users. For example, the re-keying request may identify a next key management server to be used by a user or a group of users. In some implementations, the re-keying request may be received using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410).
At 1904, the technique 1900 includes determining a set of one or more context identifiers based on the re-keying request, wherein the set of one or more context identifiers includes the context identifier. For example, the set of one or more context identifiers may be associated with a user or a group of users identified by the re-keying request. In some implementations, a list of context identifiers is supplied with or as part of the re-keying request and the set of one or more context identifiers is determined directly from the rekeying request.
At 1906, the technique 1900 includes identifying a next key management server based on the re-keying request. For example, a next key management server may be selected from a list of available key-management servers associated with a user or a group of users associated with the re-keying request. In some implementations, the re-keying request includes identifying information (e.g., a URL and/or credentials) for the next key management server and the next key management server may be identified directly based on the contents of the re-keying request.
At 1908, the technique 1900 includes, responsive to the re-keying request, determining the plaintext key based on the encrypted key using the previous key management server. In some implementations, the previous key management server is associated with a context identifier that has been identified for the re-keying request. For example, the technique 1800 of FIG. 18 may be implemented to determine the plaintext key based on the encrypted key using the previous key management server. The plaintext key may be a decrypted version of the encrypted key that is returned by the previous key management server after it verifies the permissions associated with the request. The encrypted key may be decrypted by the previous key management server using a separate encryption key retained by the previous key management server. In some implementations, the plaintext key may be a symmetric data encryption key that was used to encrypt the encrypted data using an encryption algorithm. In some implementations, the plaintext key may be an asymmetric key that can be used for decryption and is paired with another key that was used for encryption. In some implementations, the plaintext key is a data key that is unique to the encrypted data associated with the encrypted key (e.g., stored with the encrypted key or stored in a table indexed by context identifiers).
At 1910, the technique 1900 includes determining a new encrypted key based on the plaintext key using the next key management server. For example, determining a new encrypted key based on the plaintext key may include transmitting a request for encryption of the plaintext key with the plaintext key to the next key management server. For example, the request may include an AWS IAM identity (e.g., user, group of users, or role). In some implementations, the request is for an envelope encryption of the plaintext key. In one example, the request may be transmitted using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410). For example, determining a new encrypted key based on the plaintext key may include may also include receiving the new encrypted key from the next key management server. In some implementations, the next key management server may use a CMK to encrypt the plaintext key. The new encrypted key is an encrypted version of the plaintext key. The new encrypted key has been encrypted with a separate encryption key retained by the next key management server. Thus, the next key management server may retain the exclusive capability to decrypt the encrypted data later using the new encrypted key, after the plaintext key has been deleted. In one example, the new encrypted key may be received using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410). By basing the new encrypted key on the plaintext key, a re-keying operation can change access control without decrypting and re-encrypted the encrypted data artifacts associated with the one or more context identifiers associated with the rekeying request, which may significantly reduce the delay and computing resources needed to affect a desired change in access control for that data.
At 1912, the technique 1900 includes storing the new encrypted key in a record associated with the context identifier. In some implementations, the record associated with the context identifier is a row in a lookup table with context identifier as its key value. For example, the encrypted key may be stored in a row of the data structure 2100 of FIG. 21 . In some implementations, the record associated with the context identifier includes data identifying the next key management server (e.g., a URL and/or credentials).
At 1914, the technique 1900 includes deleting the encrypted key and the plaintext key. Now that the new encrypted key is in place, the old encrypted key and the plaintext key can be deleted from a system. Going forward, the new encrypted key will be used, with the next key management server, to recover the plaintext key and access the encrypted data associated with the context identifier.
At 1916, the technique 1900 includes, after storing the new encrypted key, transmitting a confirmation message in response to the re-keying request to indicate that re-keying is complete. Once the re-keying is complete, the requesting device may take steps to deprovision (e.g., power down or reconfigure) the previous key management server, which is no longer needed to access the encrypted data associated with the one or more context identifiers identified based on the re-keying request. In one example, the confirmation message may be transmitted using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 410).
FIG. 20 is a memory map of an example of a data structure 2000 for storing security management policies that can be used to map a request for encryption to a key management server to get a key for encryption. The data structure 2000 stores a set of one more security management policies. The data structure 2000 includes one or more security management policies in the format of the security management policy 2010. In this example, the security management policy 2010 is encoded as a row in a table. Each security management policy in the data structure 2000 includes an identifier 2012 for one or more users (e.g., a single user or a group users); one or more datatype indicators 2014 for data to be encrypted; one or more user role indications 2016; one or more data labels 2018 (e.g., indicating a sensitivity level for the data to be encrypted); key management server data 2020 that can be used to access an appropriate key management server to obtain a key for encryption; and database server data 2022 that can be used to access an appropriate database server to store a resulting artifact of encrypted data. The key management server data 2020 includes a key management server pointer 2030 (e.g., a URL) and credentials 2032 associated with a private key managed by the key management server that can be used to generate an encrypted key. The database server data 2022 includes a database server pointer 2040 (e.g., a URL) and credentials 2042 that can be used to access the database server and store the artifact.
In some implementations (not shown in FIG. 20 ), the security management policy 2010 may include fewer fields or additional fields. For example, the security management policy 2010 may include an indication of a location (e.g., a residency or a current geographic location).
FIG. 21 is a memory map of an example of a data structure 2100 for storing a mapping from context identifiers associated with encrypted data managed by a platform to encrypted keys needed to decrypt the data. The data structure 2100 may be a lookup table. The data structure 2100 includes one or more rows in the format of the row 2110. Each row includes a context identifier 2112, an encrypted key 2114, and key management data 2116. Context identifier may be a unique identifier for an artifact of encrypted data (e.g., an encrypted meeting recording) that was encrypted with a plaintext key that was encrypted to determine the encrypted key 2114. The key management data 2116 may be used to access a key management server that can be used to decrypt the encrypted key 2114 to recover the plaintext key that can be used to decrypt the artifact of encrypted data. The key management data 2116 includes a key management server pointer 2130 (e.g., a URL) and credentials 2132 associated with a private key managed by the key management server that can be used to decrypt the encrypted key 2114. The row 2110 is a record associated with the context identifier 2112.
FIG. 22 is a block diagram of an example of a system 2200 for encryption key management with secure storage in a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). The system 2200 includes a customer network infrastructure 2202 with devices connected in one or more local area networks that can communicate via signaling through a wide area network with devices outside of the customer network infrastructure 2202. The customer network infrastructure 2202 includes a key connector server 2210 configured to access data encryption keys for use by multiple client devices with authorized access to the customer network infrastructure 2202, including a first client device 2212 and a second client device 2214. The key connector server 2210 may communicate with an identification provider server 2220 to authenticate requests from the first client device 2212 and/or a second client device 2214. The key connector server 2210 may communicate with a key management server 2230 (e.g., the one or more key management servers 422) to access encryption keys needed to respond to an encryption or decryption request from the first client device 2212 or a second client device 2214. In some implementations, the key connector server 2210 may cache encryption keys to efficiently satisfy repeated requests for encryption or decryption from client devices. The system 2200 includes a platform network infrastructure 2250 with devices connected in one or more local area networks that can communicate via signaling through a wide area network with devices outside of the platform network infrastructure 2250. For example, the platform network infrastructure 2250 may be configured to implement a UCaaS platform (e.g., including the datacenter 106). The platform network infrastructure 2250 includes a database server 2260 configured to store user data (e.g., recordings of meetings or messages), which may be encrypted, and a key broker server 2262 (e.g., the key broker server 410) configured to store encrypted data keys supplied by the key connector server 2210 in association with encrypted data stored in the database server 2260. The key connector server 2210 may communicate with the key broker server 2262 across a trust boundary 2252. For example, the trust boundary 2252 may be enforced using a firewall of the customer network infrastructure 2202 that messages to and from the key connector server 2210 must pass through. For example, the key connector server 2210 may send requests to the key broker server 2262 to store encrypted data keys in association with data stored by the database server 2260 that has been encrypted by the first client device 2212. The key connector server 2210 may also send a request to the key broker server 2262 to retrieve an encrypted data key that can be sent to the key management server 2230 to recover a plaintext data key that a client device can use to decrypt data associated with the encrypted data key. Because the key broker server 2262 never accesses a plaintext data key used to encrypt the encrypted data stored in the database server 2260, the key connector server 2210 is able to maintain exclusive control over access to the encrypted data on the customer side of the trust boundary 2252. For example, the 2200 may be used to implement the encryption operation 2300 of FIG. 23 . For example, the 2200 may be used to implement the decryption operation 2400 of FIG. 24 .
The key connector server 2210 may include a computing device (e.g., the computing device 200) running software for managing client access to encryption keys with storage of encrypted data keys by the key broker server 2262. For example, the key connector server 2210 may include a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214), a processor (e.g., the processor 202), and a memory (e.g., the memory 204). The memory may store instructions executable by the processor to: receive a decryption request, including a context identifier, from the first client device 2212; transmit, using the network interface, a first request, including the context identifier, for an encrypted key stored in a record associated with the context identifier to the key broker server 2262; receive, using the network interface, the encrypted key from the key broker server 2262; transmit, using the network interface, a second request, including the encrypted key, for a data encryption key to a key management server 2230; receive, using the network interface, a plaintext key from the key management server 2230; and transmit the plaintext key to the first client device 2212 in response to the decryption request. For example, the first client device 2212 may use the plaintext key to decrypt an encrypted recording of a conference to obtain a decrypted recording. For example, the first client device 2212 may use the plaintext key to decrypt an encrypted chat message to obtain a decrypted chat message. In some implementations, the first request is transmitted via a wide area network. In some implementations, the first request is transmitted through a firewall. For example, the key connector server 2210 may be configured to implement to technique 2500 of FIG. 25 . For example, the key connector server 2210 may be configured to implement to technique 2600 of FIG. 26 .
The key connector server 2210 may be configured to provide encryption key access to multiple clients authorized to access the customer network infrastructure 2202 and may cache encryption keys in order to efficiently handle repeated requests for encryption and/or decryption from client devices. For example, the memory may store instructions executable by the processor to authenticate the decryption request using the identification provider server 2220 (e.g., using the Oauth 2.0 protocol). The second client device 2214 may need to access data that has been previously encrypted by the first client device 2212. In some implementations, the memory stores instructions executable by the processor to receive a second decryption request from the second client device 2214 that includes the context identifier; and, in response to the second decryption request, transmit the plaintext key to the second client device 2214. For example, the second client device 2214 may be an eDiscovery client for the customer that is configured to access the encrypted files of the customer in the database server 2260 using an archival API. The second client device 2214 may need a copy of the plaintext key that was used to encrypt a file it is retrieving to perform its function. In some implementations, the memory stores instructions executable by the processor to cache the plaintext key on a local device (e.g., in the memory 204). In some implementations, the cache for keys has a 5 minute timeout.
For example, the decrypting of a message may include: 1.) The first client device 2212 authenticates with the key connector server 2210 and with the platform network infrastructure 2250 including the database server 2260; 2.) the first client device 2212 downloads encrypted messages from the database server 2260 (e.g., an Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) server) along with an authorization token, digitally signed by the database server 2260, listing one or more context identifiers a user of the client device 2212 has access to; 3.) the first client device 2212 requests a necessary data key from key connector server 2210 using a context identifier and the authorization token; 4.) after verifying the authorization token, the key connector server 2210 searches a cache of encryption keys from prior requests, if unavailable: 4.a.) the key connector server 2210 retrieves encrypted data keys from the key broker server 2262; 4.b.) the key connector server 2210 passes an encrypted data key for decryption to the key management server 2230; and 5.) the key connector server 2210 passes the plaintext key back to the first client device 2212 and keeps a copy of the plaintext key in cache associated with a context identifier for the messages.
For example, the encrypting and sending of a message may include: 1.) if the first client device 2212 does not have valid encryption data key, the first client device 2212 requests a key from the key connector server 2210; 2.) the key connector server 2210 attempts to find existing key using decryption step 4 described above, if unavailable: 2.a.) the key connector server 2210 obtains a new data key from the key management server 2230; 2.b.) the resulting encrypted data key is passed to the key broker server 2262 for long term storage; 2.c.) the resulting plaintext key is returned to the first client device 2212 and then cached locally by the key connector server 2210; 3.) the first client device 2212 encrypts message and sends the encrypted message to the database server 2260 (e.g., an XMPP server).
FIG. 23 is a signal flow diagram of an example of an encryption operation 2300 using encryption key management with secure storage in a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). The encryption operation 2300 includes signals propagating between servers in a software platform cloud 2310 and a customer cloud 2320. There may be a trust boundary between the software platform cloud 2310 and the customer cloud 2320. The software platform cloud 2310 includes a key broker server 2312 (e.g., the key broker server 2262) and a database server 2316 (e.g., the database server 2260). The customer cloud 2320 includes a key connector server 2322 (e.g., the key connector server 2210) a key management server 2324 (e.g., the key management server 2230), and a client device 2326 (e.g., the first client device 2212).
At 2340, an encryption request for a data key to be used for encryption is sent from the client device 2326 to the key connector server 2322. The request may include an identifier for a user or group of users associated with data that client device 2326 will encrypt. At 2342, a first request for a data encryption key is sent from the key connector server 2322 to the key management server 2324. The request may include an API call to a key management service of the customer to get a new data key, which may be returned in both plaintext and encrypted forms. The key management server 2324 may have been selected by the key connector server 2322 based on the identifier that was included in the request at 2340.
At 2346, the key management server 2324 returns a plaintext key 2350 and an encrypted key 2352 to the key connector server 2322. The key management server 2324 may use a CMK to encrypt the data key that is returned in both plaintext and encrypted forms. In some implementations, there is one data key per asset (e.g., a chat session, a conference recording, a webinar recording, a phone call recording, a voicemail, or an email) being protected. In some implementations, symmetric cryptography (e.g., AES-256 GCM) is used, thus the same key is used for both encryption and decryption of the data. At 2348, the key connector server 2322 sends plaintext key 2350 to the client device 2326 in response to the encryption request at 2340. At 2356, the key connector server 2322 sends a second request, including the encrypted key 2352, to the key broker server 2312 to have the encrypted key 2352 stored in a record associated with a context identifier.
At 2358, the client device 2326 encrypts an asset 2360 (e.g., a conference recording or a chat message) using the plaintext key 2350 to obtain an encrypted asset 2362. At 2370, the client device 2326 writes the encrypted asset 2362 to non-volatile memory (e.g., a disk) on the database server 2316 in a record associated with the context identifier. Thus, the encrypted asset 2362 and the encrypted key 2352 may both be stored in association with the context identifier in the software platform cloud 2310, while the plaintext key 2350 never enters the software platform cloud 2310 and can remain on the customer side of a trust boundary between the two clouds.
FIG. 24 is a signal flow diagram of an example of a decryption operation 2400 using encryption key management with secure storage in a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). The decryption operation 2400 is performed by the same devices shown implementing the encryption operation 2300 in FIG. 23 .
At 2430, an encrypted asset 2462 associated with a context identifier is read from non-volatile memory (e.g., a disk) on the database server 2316 by the client device 2326. In some implementations, after the database server 2316 authenticates a user of the client device 2326, the database server 2316 also provides an authorization token to the client device 2326. The authorization token may be digitally signed by the database server 2316 and list one or more context identifiers that the user has authorization to access.
At 2440, the client device 2326 sends a decryption request that includes the context identifier to the key connector server 2322. The context identifier may be associated with both the encrypted asset 2462 and an encrypted key 2452. In some implementations, the decryption request also includes the authorization token and the key connector server 2322 verifies the authorization token to confirm the user making the decryption request has proper authorization before retrieving the requested data encryption key in response to the decryption request.
At 2442, the key connector server 2322 sends a first request, including the context identifier, for an encrypted key 2452 stored in a record associated with the context identifier to the key broker server 2312. At 2444, the key broker server 2312 sends the encrypted key 2452 to key connector server 2322.
At 2446, the key connector server 2322 sends a second request, including the encrypted key 2452, for a data encryption key to the key management server 2324. At 2448, the key management server 2324 returns a plaintext key 2450 to the key connector server 2322. The plaintext key 2450 is a decrypted version of the encrypted key 2452. At 2454, the key connector server 2322 sends the plaintext key 2450 to the client device 2326 in response to the decryption request at 2440.
At 2458, the client device 2326 decrypts the encrypted asset 2462 using the plaintext key 2450 to obtain the asset 2460 (e.g., a chat session, a conference recording, a webinar recording, a phone call recording, a voicemail, or an email). The asset 2460 may then be delivered to a user associated with the customer (e.g., a user of the client device 2326) in a user interface.
To further describe some implementations in greater detail, reference is next made to examples of techniques for encryption using encryption key management with secure storage in a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). FIG. 25 is a flowchart of an example of a technique 2500 for encryption using distributed encryption key allocation for use in a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). The technique 2500 can be executed using computing devices, such as the systems, hardware, and software described with respect to FIGS. 1-6 and 22-24 . The technique 2500 can be performed, for example, by executing a machine-readable program or other computer-executable instructions, such as routines, instructions, programs, or other code. The steps, or operations, of the technique 2500 or another technique, method, process, or algorithm described in connection with the implementations disclosed herein can be implemented directly in hardware, firmware, software executed by hardware, circuitry, or a combination thereof.
For simplicity of explanation, the technique 2500 is depicted and described herein as a series of steps or operations. However, the steps or operations in accordance with this disclosure can occur in various orders and/or concurrently. Additionally, other steps or operations not presented and described herein may be used. Furthermore, not all illustrated steps or operations may be required to implement a technique in accordance with the disclosed subject matter.
At 2502, the technique 2500 includes receiving an encryption request from a client (e.g., the first client device 2212). In one example, the encryption request may be received using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key connector server (e.g., the key connector server 2210). For example, the key connector server may run software provided by a UCaaS system configured to interface to its key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 2262). In some implementations, the encryption request may be validated using communications with an identification provider server (e.g., the identification provider server 2220) to confirm authorization for a user of the client to access resources of a customer.
At 2504, the technique 2500 includes transmitting a first request for a data encryption key to a key management server (e.g., the key management server 2230). In some implementations, the request includes identifying information for a user or group of users associated with a security policy implemented by the selected key management server, such as an Amazon Web Services Identity and Access Management (AWS IAM) policy. For example, the request may include an AWS IAM identity (e.g., user, group of users, or role). In some implementations, the request is for an envelope encryption key. In one example, the encryption request may be transmitted using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key connector server (e.g., the key connector server 2210).
At 2506, the technique 2500 includes receiving a plaintext key and an encrypted key based on the plaintext key from the key management server. The plaintext key may be a data encryption key that can be directly used to encrypt data using an encryption algorithm. The plaintext key may be a symmetric key that can be used to both encrypt and to decrypt data. In some implementations, the plaintext key may be an asymmetric key that can be used for encryption and is paired with another key for decryption. The key management server may use a CMK to encrypt the plaintext key. In some implementations, the plaintext key is a data key that is unique to the communications data to be encrypted as part of the technique 2500. The encrypted key is an encrypted version of the plaintext key. The encrypted key has been encrypted with a separate encryption key retained by the key management server. Thus, the key management server may retain the exclusive capability to decrypt the encrypted data later using the encrypted key, after the plaintext key has been deleted. In some implementations, the encryption algorithm is implied or has been previously specified by communications separate from the request and its response. In some implementations, the encryption algorithm is dynamically specified by the key management server in response to the first request. In some examples, an encryption algorithm identifier is received from the key management server and an encryption algorithm to be applied with the plaintext key is selected based on the encryption algorithm identifier. Other security parameters of the encryption and storage of the communications data to be encrypted may be received from the key management server. In one example, the plaintext key and the encrypted key may be received using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key connector server (e.g., the key connector server 2210).
At 2508, the technique 2500 includes transmitting a second request, including the encrypted key, to a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 2262) to have the encrypted key stored in a record associated with a context identifier. In some implementations, the context identifier is generated by the key broker server and returned in response to the second request. For example, a key broker server may maintain state to map a context identifier for an artifact of encrypted data to one of its stored encrypted keys at decryption time. The context identifier for an artifact of encrypted data may be unique to that artifact. In some implementations, the context identifier is generated by the client, included in the encryption request, and included in the second request. For example, the client may generate the context identifier in accordance with a protocol to establish uniqueness, such as by appending a data type code to unique code for an artifact of the data type and/or a timestamp. In one example, the second request may be transmitted using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key connector server (e.g., the key connector server 2210). In some implementations, the context identifier is generated by the key connector server. For example, the technique 2500 may further include generating the context identifier, wherein the context identifier is included in the second request; and transmitting the context identifier to the client in response the encryption request. Rather than storing the encrypted data key (e.g., a cipherkey) with the artifact, the key broker server can store the encrypted data key and maintain a mapping table of a unique context identifier of the artifact to the encrypted data key. This table may include other metadata such as which key management server and key the data key was encrypted by. For example, the encrypted key may be stored in a row of the data structure 2100 of FIG. 21 . This allows the key broker server to support re-keying and deprovisioning workflows.
At 2510, the technique 2500 includes transmitting the plaintext key to the client in response to the encryption request. In some implementations, the plaintext key is relayed to the client, which will perform the encryption of the communications data, along with other data from the key management server specifying how the data should be encrypted and stored, such as an encryption algorithm identifier and/or a destination address for the encrypted data. The data to be encrypted may be of various types of data recorded or maintained in the software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). For example, the client may use the plaintext key to encrypt a recording of a conference to obtain an encrypted recording. For example, the client may use the plaintext key to encrypt a chat message to obtain an encrypted chat message. In some implementations, the client sends encrypted data to a database server (e.g., the database server 2260) of a UCaaS system for storage and/or forwarding. The UCaaS system may also include the key broker server. In one example, the plaintext key may be transmitted using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key connector server (e.g., the key connector server 2210).
To further describe some implementations in greater detail, reference is next made to examples of techniques for decryption using encryption key management with secure storage in a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). FIG. 26 is a flowchart of an example of a technique 2600 for decryption using encryption key management with secure storage in a software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). The technique 2600 can be executed using computing devices, such as the systems, hardware, and software described with respect to FIGS. 1-6 and 22-24 . The technique 2600 can be performed, for example, by executing a machine-readable program or other computer-executable instructions, such as routines, instructions, programs, or other code. The steps, or operations, of the technique 2600 or another technique, method, process, or algorithm described in connection with the implementations disclosed herein can be implemented directly in hardware, firmware, software executed by hardware, circuitry, or a combination thereof.
For simplicity of explanation, the technique 2600 is depicted and described herein as a series of steps or operations. However, the steps or operations in accordance with this disclosure can occur in various orders and/or concurrently. Additionally, other steps or operations not presented and described herein may be used. Furthermore, not all illustrated steps or operations may be required to implement a technique in accordance with the disclosed subject matter.
At 2602, the technique 2600 includes receiving a decryption request, including a context identifier, from a client (e.g., the first client device 2212). The context identifier may have been previously generated in association with an artifact of encrypted data (e.g., an encrypted chat message or and encrypted recording of a meeting). The context identifier for an artifact of encrypted data may be unique to that artifact. For example, the context identifier may have been generated the in accordance with a protocol to establish uniqueness, such as by appending a data type code to unique code for an artifact of the data type and/or a timestamp. In one example, the decryption request may be received using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key connector server (e.g., the key connector server 2210). For example, the key connector server may run software provided by a UCaaS system configured to interface to its key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 2262). In some implementations, the encryption request may be validated using communications with an identification provider server (e.g., the identification provider server 2220) to confirm authorization for a user of the client to access resources of a customer. For example, the technique 2600 may include authenticating the decryption request using an identity provider server.
In some implementations, the decryption request includes an authorization token that includes the context identifier and is digitally signed by a server (e.g., the database server 2260) storing encrypted data associated with the context identifier, and the technique 2600 includes verifying the authorization token before transmitting the first request. For example, the authorization token may be generated by the server for the client when the client requests a copy of the artifact of encrypted data from the server. The server may authenticate a user of the client before generating the authorization token. The authorization token may include an identifier of the authorized user and one or more context identifiers that correspond to artifacts of encrypted data the user is authorized to access. The digital signature of the authorization token in the decryption request may be checked to verify that the user should have access to the artifact of encrypted data associated with the context identifier, as precondition to proceeding with the technique 2600 to acquire a data encryption key associated with the context identifier in response to the decryption request.
At 2604, the technique 2600 includes transmitting a first request, including the context identifier, for an encrypted key stored in a record associated with the context identifier to a key broker server (e.g., the key broker server 2262). In one example, the first request may be transmitted using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key connector server (e.g., the key connector server 2210). Rather than storing the encrypted data key (e.g., a cipherkey) with the artifact, the key broker server may store the encrypted data key and maintain a mapping table of a unique context identifier of the artifact to the encrypted data key. This table may include other metadata such as which key management server and key the data key was encrypted by. For example, the encrypted key may be stored in a row of the data structure 2100 of FIG. 21 . The first request may be transmitted across a trust boundary (e.g., the trust boundary 2252). For example, the first request may be transmitted via a wide area network. For example, the first request may be transmitted through a firewall.
At 2606, the technique 2600 includes receiving the encrypted key from the key broker server. the encrypted key may be an encrypted copy of a plaintext key that was used to encrypt the artifact of data associated with the context identifier. In one example, the encrypted key may be received using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key connector server (e.g., the key connector server 2210).
At 2608, the technique 2600 includes transmitting a second request, including the encrypted key, for a data encryption key to a key management server (e.g., the key management server 2230). The encrypted key may have been encrypted by the key management server, which controls the ability to decrypt the encrypted key to recover the data encryption key as a plaintext key. The key management server may have another key, which may be a CMK, which can be used to decrypt the encrypted key. In some implementations, the second request includes identifying information for a user or group of users associated with a security policy implemented by the selected key management server, such as an AWS IAM policy. For example, the second request may include an AWS IAM identity (e.g., user, group of users, or role). In some implementations, the second request is for an envelope encryption key. In one example, the second request may be transmitted using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key connector server (e.g., the key connector server 2210).
At 2610, the technique 2600 includes receiving a plaintext key from the key management server. The plaintext key may be a decrypted version of the encrypted key that is returned by the key management server after it verifies the permissions associated with the request. The encrypted key may be decrypted by the key management server using a separate encryption key retained by the key management server. In some implementations, the plaintext key may be a symmetric data encryption key that was used to encrypt the encrypted data using an encryption algorithm. In some implementations, the plaintext key may be an asymmetric key that can be used for decryption and is paired with another key that was used for encryption. In some implementations, the plaintext key is a data key that is unique to the encrypted data associated with the encrypted key. In some implementations, the decryption algorithm is implied or has been previously specified by communications separate from the second request and its response. In some implementations, the decryption algorithm is dynamically specified by the key management server in response to the request. In some examples, a decryption algorithm identifier is received from the key management server and a decryption algorithm (e.g., AES-256 GCM) to be applied with the plaintext key is selected based on the decryption algorithm identifier. In one example, the plaintext key may be received using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key connector server (e.g., the key connector server 2210).
At 2612, the technique 2600 includes transmitting the plaintext key to the client in response to the decryption request. In some implementations, the plaintext key is relayed to the client, which will perform the decryption of the communications data, along with other data from the key management server specifying how the data should be decrypted, such as an encryption algorithm identifier and/or a destination address for the encrypted data. The data to be decrypted may be of various types of data recorded or maintained in the software platform (e.g., a UCaaS platform). For example, the client may use the plaintext key to decrypt an encrypted recording of a conference to obtain a decrypted recording. For example, the client may use the plaintext key to decrypt an encrypted chat message to obtain a decrypted chat message. In one example, the plaintext key may be transmitted using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214) of a key connector server (e.g., the key connector server 2210).
The technique 2600 may be repeated with additional client devices that have authorization to access resources of the customer including the encrypted data. For example, the technique 2600 may include receiving a second decryption request from a second client (e.g., the second client device 2214) that includes the context identifier; and, in response to the second decryption request, transmitting the plaintext key to the second client. For example, the second client may be an e-discovery agent. In some implementations, plaintext keys may be cached by a device managing access to these keys for a customer (e.g., the key connector server 2210). For example, the technique 2600 may include caching the plaintext key on a local device.
In some implementations, the technique 2600 includes presenting the decrypted data. The decrypted data may be presented in a user interface (e.g., a webpage, a streaming media player, and/or another client application). In some implementations, the decrypted data may be presented by transmitting the decrypted data as part of a graphical user interface using a network interface (e.g., the network interface 214). In some implementations, the decrypted data may be presented by displaying the decrypted data on a local peripheral (e.g., a monitor, a touchscreen, or other display device).
One aspect of this disclosure is a method including receiving a decryption request, including a context identifier, from a client; transmitting a first request, including the context identifier, for an encrypted key stored in a record associated with the context identifier to a key broker server; receiving the encrypted key from the key broker server; transmitting a second request, including the encrypted key, for a data encryption key to a key management server; receiving a plaintext key from the key management server; and transmitting the plaintext key to the client in response to the decryption request. In this aspect, the method may include caching the plaintext key on a local device. In this aspect, the method may include authenticating the decryption request using an identity provider server. In this aspect, the method may include receiving a second decryption request from a second client that includes the context identifier; and, in response to the second decryption request, transmitting the plaintext key to the second client. In this aspect, the second client may be an e-discovery agent. In this aspect, the client may use the plaintext key to decrypt an encrypted recording of a conference to obtain a decrypted recording. In this aspect, the first request may be transmitted via a wide area network. In this aspect, the first request may be transmitted through a firewall. In this aspect, the decryption request may include an authorization token that includes the context identifier and is digitally signed by a server storing encrypted data associated with the context identifier, and the method may include verifying the authorization token before transmitting the first request.
One aspect of this disclosure is a system including a network interface, a processor, and a memory, wherein the memory stores instructions executable by the processor to: receive a decryption request, including a context identifier, from a client; transmit, using the network interface, a first request, including the context identifier, for an encrypted key stored in a record associated with the context identifier to a key broker server; receive, using the network interface, the encrypted key from the key broker server; transmit, using the network interface, a second request, including the encrypted key, for a data encryption key to a key management server; receive, using the network interface, a plaintext key from the key management server; and transmit the plaintext key to the client in response to the decryption request. In this aspect, the memory may store instructions executable by the processor to cache the plaintext key on a local device. In this aspect, the memory may store instructions executable by the processor to authenticate the decryption request using an identity provider server. In this aspect, the memory may store instructions executable by the processor to receive a second decryption request from a second client that includes the context identifier; and, in response to the second decryption request, transmit the plaintext key to the second client. In this aspect, the client may use the plaintext key to decrypt an encrypted recording of a conference to obtain a decrypted recording. In this aspect, the first request may be transmitted via a wide area network. In this aspect, the first request may be transmitted through a firewall. In this aspect, the decryption request may include an authorization token that includes the context identifier and is digitally signed by a server storing encrypted data associated with the context identifier, and the memory may store instructions executable by the processor to verify the authorization token before transmitting the first request.
One aspect of this disclosure is a method including receiving an encryption request from a client; transmitting a first request for a data encryption key to a key management server; receiving a plaintext key and an encrypted key based on the plaintext key from the key management server; transmitting a second request, including the encrypted key, to a key broker server to have the encrypted key stored in a record associated with a context identifier; and transmitting the plaintext key to the client in response to the encryption request. In this aspect, the method may include generating the context identifier, wherein the context identifier is included in the second request; and transmitting the context identifier to the client in response the encryption request. In this aspect, the context identifier may be generated by the key broker server and returned in response to the second request. In this aspect, the context identifier may be generated by the client, included in the encryption request, and included in the second request. In this aspect, the client may use the plaintext key to encrypt a recording of a conference to obtain an encrypted recording.
One aspect of this disclosure is a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, comprising executable instructions that, when executed by a processor, facilitate performance of operations, including receiving a decryption request, including a context identifier, from a client; transmitting a first request, including the context identifier, for an encrypted key stored in a record associated with the context identifier to a key broker server; receiving the encrypted key from the key broker server; transmitting a second request for a data encryption key to a key management server, wherein the second request includes the encrypted key; receiving a plaintext key from the key management server; and transmitting the plaintext key to the client in response to the decryption request. In this aspect, the operations may include caching the plaintext key on a local device. In this aspect, the operations may include authenticating the decryption request using an identity provider server. In this aspect, the operations may include receiving a second decryption request from a second client that includes the context identifier; and, in response to the second decryption request, transmitting the plaintext key to the second client. In this aspect, the second client may be an e-discovery agent. In this aspect, the client may use the plaintext key to decrypt an encrypted recording of a conference to obtain a decrypted recording. In this aspect, the first request may be transmitted via a wide area network. In this aspect, the first request may be transmitted through a firewall. In this aspect, the decryption request may include an authorization token that includes the context identifier and is digitally signed by a server storing encrypted data associated with the context identifier, and the operations may include verifying the authorization token before transmitting the first request.
One aspect of this disclosure is a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, comprising executable instructions that, when executed by a processor, facilitate performance of operations, including receiving an encryption request from a client; transmitting a first request for a data encryption key to a key management server; receiving a plaintext key and an encrypted key based on the plaintext key from the key management server; transmitting a second request, including the encrypted key, to a key broker server to have the encrypted key stored in a record associated with a context identifier; and transmitting the plaintext key to the client in response to the encryption request. In this aspect, the operations may include generating the context identifier, wherein the context identifier is included in the second request; and transmitting the context identifier to the client in response the encryption request. In this aspect, the context identifier may be generated by the key broker server and returned in response to the second request. In this aspect, the context identifier may be generated by the client, included in the encryption request, and included in the second request. In this aspect, the client may use the plaintext key to encrypt a recording of a conference to obtain an encrypted recording.
One aspect of this disclosure is a system including a network interface, a processor, and a memory, wherein the memory stores instructions executable by the processor to: receive an encryption request from a client; transmit a first request for a data encryption key to a key management server; receive a plaintext key and an encrypted key based on the plaintext key from the key management server; transmit a second request, including the encrypted key, to a key broker server to have the encrypted key stored in a record associated with a context identifier; and transmit the plaintext key to the client in response to the encryption request. In this aspect, memory may store instructions executable by the processor to generate the context identifier, wherein the context identifier is included in the second request; and transmit the context identifier to the client in response the encryption request. In this aspect, the context identifier may be generated by the key broker server and returned in response to the second request. In this aspect, the context identifier may be generated by the client, included in the encryption request, and included in the second request. In this aspect, the client may use the plaintext key to encrypt a recording of a conference to obtain an encrypted recording.
The implementations of this disclosure can be described in terms of functional block components and various processing operations. Such functional block components can be realized by a number of hardware or software components that perform the specified functions. For example, the disclosed implementations can employ various integrated circuit components (e.g., memory elements, processing elements, logic elements, look-up tables, and the like), which can carry out a variety of functions under the control of one or more microprocessors or other control devices. Similarly, where the elements of the disclosed implementations are implemented using software programming or software elements, the systems and techniques can be implemented with a programming or scripting language, such as C, C++, Java, JavaScript, assembler, or the like, with the various algorithms being implemented with a combination of data structures, objects, processes, routines, or other programming elements.
Functional aspects can be implemented in algorithms that execute on one or more processors. Furthermore, the implementations of the systems and techniques disclosed herein could employ a number of conventional techniques for electronics configuration, signal processing or control, data processing, and the like. The words “mechanism” and “component” are used broadly and are not limited to mechanical or physical implementations, but can include software routines in conjunction with processors, etc. Likewise, the terms “system” or “tool” as used herein and in the figures, but in any event based on their context, may be understood as corresponding to a functional unit implemented using software, hardware (e.g., an integrated circuit, such as an ASIC), or a combination of software and hardware. In certain contexts, such systems or mechanisms may be understood to be a processor-implemented software system or processor-implemented software mechanism that is part of or callable by an executable program, which may itself be wholly or partly composed of such linked systems or mechanisms.
Implementations or portions of implementations of the above disclosure can take the form of a computer program product accessible from, for example, a computer-usable or computer-readable medium. A computer-usable or computer-readable medium can be a device that can, for example, tangibly contain, store, communicate, or transport a program or data structure for use by or in connection with a processor. The medium can be, for example, an electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, or semiconductor device.
Other suitable mediums are also available. Such computer-usable or computer-readable media can be referred to as non-transitory memory or media, and can include volatile memory or non-volatile memory that can change over time. The quality of memory or media being non-transitory refers to such memory or media storing data for some period of time or otherwise based on device power or a device power cycle. A memory of an apparatus described herein, unless otherwise specified, does not have to be physically contained by the apparatus, but is one that can be accessed remotely by the apparatus, and does not have to be contiguous with other memory that might be physically contained by the apparatus.
While the disclosure has been described in connection with certain implementations, it is to be understood that the disclosure is not to be limited to the disclosed implementations but, on the contrary, is intended to cover various modifications and equivalent arrangements included within the scope of the appended claims, which scope is to be accorded the broadest interpretation so as to encompass all such modifications and equivalent structures as is permitted under the law.

Claims

What is claimed is:

1. A method comprising:

receiving a decryption request, including a context identifier, from a client;

transmitting a first request, including the context identifier, for an encrypted key stored in a record associated with the context identifier to a key broker server;

receiving the encrypted key from the key broker server;

transmitting a second request, including the encrypted key, for a data encryption key to a key management server;

receiving a plaintext key from the key management server; and

transmitting the plaintext key to the client in response to the decryption request.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the decryption request includes an authorization token that includes the context identifier and is digitally signed by a server storing encrypted data associated with the context identifier, and comprising:

verifying the authorization token before transmitting the first request.

3. The method of claim 1, comprising:

caching the plaintext key on a local device.

4. The method of claim 1, comprising:

authenticating the decryption request using an identity provider server.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein the client is a first client, and comprising:

receiving a second decryption request, including the context identifier, from a second client; and

in response to the second decryption request, transmitting the plaintext key to the second client.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein the client uses the plaintext key to decrypt an encrypted recording of a conference to obtain a decrypted recording.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein the first request is transmitted via a wide area network.

8. The method of claim 1, wherein the first request is transmitted through a firewall.

9. A system comprising:

a network interface,

a processor, and

a memory, wherein the memory stores instructions executable by the processor to:

receive a decryption request, including a context identifier, from a client;

transmit, using the network interface, a first request, including the context identifier, for an encrypted key stored in a record associated with the context identifier to a key broker server;

receive, using the network interface, the encrypted key from the key broker server;

transmit, using the network interface, a second request, including the encrypted key, for a data encryption key to a key management server;

receive, using the network interface, a plaintext key from the key management server; and

transmit the plaintext key to the client in response to the decryption request.

10. The system of claim 9, wherein the memory stores instructions executable by the processor to:

cache the plaintext key on a local device.

11. The system of claim 9, wherein the memory stores instructions executable by the processor to:

authenticate the decryption request using an identity provider server.

12. The system of claim 9, wherein the client is a first client, and the memory stores instructions executable by the processor to:

receive a second decryption request, including the context identifier, from a second client; and

in response to the second decryption request, transmit the plaintext key to the second client.

13. The system of claim 9, wherein the client uses the plaintext key to decrypt an encrypted recording of a conference to obtain a decrypted recording.

14. The system of claim 9, wherein the first request is transmitted via a wide area network.

15. The system of claim 9, wherein the first request is transmitted through a firewall.

16. A method comprising:

receiving an encryption request from a client;

transmitting a first request for a data encryption key to a key management server;

receiving a plaintext key and an encrypted key based on the plaintext key from the key management server;

transmitting a second request, including the encrypted key, to a key broker server to have the encrypted key stored in a record associated with a context identifier; and

transmitting the plaintext key to the client in response to the encryption request.

17. The method of claim 16, comprising:

generating the context identifier, wherein the context identifier is included in the second request; and

transmitting the context identifier to the client in response the encryption request.

18. The method of claim 16, wherein the context identifier is generated by the key broker server and returned in response to the second request.

19. The method of claim 16, wherein the context identifier is generated by the client, included in the encryption request, and included in the second request.

20. The method of claim 16, wherein the client uses the plaintext key to encrypt a recording of a conference to obtain an encrypted recording.