US20130111128A1 - Method for implementing and application of a secure processor stick (SPS) - Google Patents
Method for implementing and application of a secure processor stick (SPS) Download PDFInfo
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- US20130111128A1 US20130111128A1 US13/722,577 US201213722577A US2013111128A1 US 20130111128 A1 US20130111128 A1 US 20130111128A1 US 201213722577 A US201213722577 A US 201213722577A US 2013111128 A1 US2013111128 A1 US 2013111128A1
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F12/00—Accessing, addressing or allocating within memory systems or architectures
- G06F12/14—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory
- G06F12/1408—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory by using cryptography
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F12/00—Accessing, addressing or allocating within memory systems or architectures
- G06F12/14—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W80/00—Wireless network protocols or protocol adaptations to wireless operation
- H04W80/06—Transport layer protocols, e.g. TCP [Transport Control Protocol] over wireless
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2212/00—Indexing scheme relating to accessing, addressing or allocation within memory systems or architectures
- G06F2212/10—Providing a specific technical effect
- G06F2212/1052—Security improvement
Definitions
- the invention relates to running secure processes or applications in a secure environment on a secure processor stick for display on a PC without using or leaving traces in the PC memory.
- USB devices like secure token may perform cryptography, secure key generation and storage.
- secure tokens still require the application to be run on the PC with the plan information and data to access this feature and this leave the plain information and data before encryption vulnerable to attack.
- IBM's USB secure stick the Zone Trusted Information Channel
- SSL secure socket layer
- the application is still using the host PC memory and leaves a memory trace on the host PC that is vulnerable to a virus or spyware attack.
- Penprotect software for a host PC uses encryption to protect files within a USB flash drive, flash memory, or USB stick. But Penprotect software does not protect the encrypted files once they are decrypted and running on the host PC. Furthermore, the same encrypted files stored in the USB memory stick require Penprotect software to be installed on another PC before they can be accessed, so the encrypted files are not portable.
- Livetoken is a USB drive with a Linux OS and a secure chip installed on it to store the keys and passwords.
- Livetoken's design requires the host PC to be rebooted to run the OS on the USB drive.
- the Linux OS is very dependent on the host PC hardware configuration, and will not work on any other host PC.
- U3 technology from Sandisk allows a portable application in a USB flash drive to be used only on a Windows XP or Windows Vista PC. This provides only application portability, but not security for the application and data execution on the host PC because U3 technology uses the host PC memory to execute the portable application. This leaves the U3 technology open for attack from a virus or spyware.
- SPS secure processor stick
- the SPS may provide a secure processing environment in any computer environment, including but not limited to an unsecured environment like a virus infected system or a cyber café.
- the secure application to be run securely is executed in the SPS's processor and memory; it does not make use of the host PC memory and does not leave any memory traces in the host PC.
- FIG. 1 illustrates a schematic diagram showing the interface between the SPS and the host PC according to an embodiment of the invention
- FIG. 2 illustrates a block diagram showing the software stack for the SPS according to an embodiment of the invention
- FIG. 3 illustrates a block diagram showing the software stack for transferring the virtual screen on the secure process stick to the host PC according to an embodiment of the invention
- FIG. 4 illustrates a block diagram showing the block diagram for web connectivity or network applications according to an embodiment of the invention.
- FIG. 5 illustrates a block diagram showing how a modular PC system using standard USB devices can be built according to an embodiment of the invention.
- an example of a secure processor stick 103 may interface with a PC 100 via a USB port 104 .
- the PC may be a laptop, palmtop, netbook, notebook, desktop, or any other general-purpose computer having a port capable of interfacing with an SPS.
- the secure processor stick 103 may display a virtual display 102 on the PC screen 101 .
- the connection to the host PC 100 may be made by USB 104 , firewire, or any network connection to the host PC 100 .
- SPS network connectivity may be provided by the host PC 100 through a TCP/IP bridge on the USB port 104 where the SPS 103 accesses the network using VPN, SSL or encryption.
- the UI/Display for the SPS OS and application may be displayed as a window on the host PC screen 101 in a window 102 .
- the screen/UI may be transferred from a virtual screen bitmap in the SPS 103 to the host PC 100 window via USB 104 .
- the process/application running on the SPS 103 may not leave raw data on the host PC 100 , and there may not be a memory trace on the host PC 100 from the application/process running.
- a firewall on the SPS 103 may restrict the access only to a VPN or secure host.
- a host PC 100 may have no access to the SPS files or data.
- the data and files on the SPS 103 may be secure and may be encrypted using a smart chip for added security.
- the SPS 103 may be the size of a USB flash drive and can be easily kept by the owner at all times for portability and security.
- Linux version 2.6.28.2 may be used as the OS for the SPS 103
- an ARM 9 processor may be used as the SPS processor.
- An NXP LPC3131 development board may be used for the components in the SPS 103 .
- the USB port 104 may be used as the interface between the ARM 9 processor and the host PC 100 as shown in FIG. 1 .
- the USB on the SPS 103 may be a composite USB device with both a CD-ROM component, which may install the PC application, and a CDC Ethernet class component, which may facilitate communication between the ARM 9 processor and the virtual display, input devices, and networking of the host PC 100 .
- FIG. 2 illustrates the software stack for the SPS 103 .
- the SPS 103 may contain only the processor, a memory, and a smart chip 208 .
- the smart chip 208 may be used to store the key and the data encryption algorithm.
- an SPS application 201 and encryption and tunneling software 202 may interface with a network port 204 , a virtual display and virtual input 205 , and input/output 206 via an operating system 203 .
- the smart chip 208 may interface directly with the input/output 206 to ensure encrypted data transmission.
- a composite USB device 214 may connect the SPS 103 with the PC 100 .
- the network port 204 may contain a firewall.
- the network port 204 may communicate with the PC 100 via the composite USB device 214 via TCP/IP 217 .
- the virtual display and virtual input 205 may communicate with the PC 100 via the composite USB device 214 via a virtual display and virtual input packet 216 , respectively.
- the host PC virtual screen application 207 may communicate with the PC 100 via the composite USB device 214 via a USB CD-ROM image 215 .
- the PC operating system 212 may direct the PC input devices 213 to transmit data via the composite USB device 214 to the virtual input 205 on the SPS 103 .
- the PC operating system 212 may direct the PC network software and/or hardware 210 to transmit and receive data via the composite USB device 214 to and from the TCP/IP 217 on the SPS 103 .
- the PC operating system 212 may direct the virtual screen application 211 to receive data via the composite USB device 214 from the host PC virtual screen application 217 on the SPS 103 .
- the SPS 103 may not contain a display, so there may be a need to display the UI for the OS 203 and the application 201 running on it. This may be accomplished by opening a window 102 in the host PC 100 to display the display buffer of the SPS screen. This process is covered and explained by patent U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/386,211 for “System and Method for Implementing a Remote Display Using a Virtualization Technique,” which is incorporated fully by reference herein.
- FIG. 3 illustrates one embodiment of the software stack for transferring the virtual screen on the secure process stick 103 to the PC 100 using an application. In this way, only display pixels may be transferred from the SPS 103 to the host PC's Virtual Display Device slave application 211 without necessarily communicating other information or data to the host PC 100 .
- FIG. 3 illustrates a prototype setup of the virtual display on the SPS 103 interfacing with a PC 100 .
- the software on the SPS 103 may exist in layers, with a Virtual Display Device protocol master 301 and an application 201 interfacing through a runtime environment 302 a graphic engine layer 303 , and an operating system 203 with a high speed data interface device driver 304 and a virtual display device core 305 .
- the high speed data interface device driver 304 may communicate with the PC 100 using the USB hardware 306 via the USB connection 310 .
- the PC 100 may have a virtual display device slave application 307 that runs on an operating system 212 .
- the operating system 212 may interface with a USB driver 308 have a USB device 309 that communicates with the SPS 103 .
- the virtual display device slave application 307 may receive display information from the virtual display device protocol master 301 via the USB connection 310 .
- the SPS 103 may establish network access with a network bridge between the host PC network 210 to the outside world through a USB CDC/Ethernet port. There may be a firewall on the front end of the SPS network port 204 to block direct access of the file system or data on the SPS OS 203 . To enhance security, the SPS 103 may only access the outside world via a VPN or other encrypted server. In this way, the host PC 100 may not have access to any unencrypted data from the SPS 103 passing through its network port.
- the primary use of the smart chip 208 may be to store keys or passwords used by the SPS 103 .
- the smart chip 208 may also contain the encryption and decryption algorithm used for the data/file system and network access.
- the host PC 100 may run an operating system 212 such as Windows XP, Windows Vista, or a Mac OS, but is not limited to these operating systems.
- the SPS 103 may be in a USB form factor. In another aspect, this USB SPS 103 may be connected to any USB port 104 on a host PC that may even be booted up.
- the SPS 103 may be a composite USB device containing a CDC/Ethernet class component and a CD-ROM component. The application stored in the CD-ROM component 207 may auto-run when the SPS 103 is connected to the host PC 100 .
- This application 207 may open up a window 102 on the host PC screen 101 and set up the network bridge 217 between the host PC 100 and the SPS 103 .
- the SPS OS 203 may show the boot up screen for the SPS 103 in the window 102 on the host PC screen 101 .
- Matchbox may be used as the desktop GUI 302 on the SPS 103 .
- Password challenges may function as a process for login to gain access to the SPS 103 .
- the host PC mouse cursor and keyboard input 213 may be transferred to the SPS OS 203 to navigate and launch a program in the SPS file system.
- a network connection to the outside world may be established either via VPN or an encrypted link to a secure server.
- a web browser or application may use the secure network to communicate with the outside world.
- the host PC 100 may see the SPS 103 as a network device, but the SPS device 103 will be blocked by a firewall on the SPS network connection 204 . No files or data may be transferred between the SPS 103 and the host PC 100 with a firewall enabled on the SPS network connection 204 .
- the SPS 103 may enable TV, digital photo frame, or other display device 401 functionality with web connectivity or a network application like email, messaging applications, and even games with or without the smart chip 208 .
- the SPS 103 may communicate with a display device 401 via a USB hub 407 on the display device 401 . This may be accomplished by implementing the VDD Slave for the SPS display 404 and displaying it on the display device 402 .
- Input from the user may be accomplished by receiving IR remote instructions via a remote sensor 406 , where a VID protocol slave application 405 sends the instructions of the IR remote to the SPS OS 203 .
- Network connectivity may be achieved using a wireless, Ethernet, or USB device connection 403 , but is not limited to these.
- a USB network device may only require a standard driver to be installed in the SPS OS 203 .
- FIG. 4 illustrates the block diagram for web connectivity or network applications.
- FIG. 5 illustrates how a modular PC system 500 using standard USB devices can be built.
- a Linux OS may be installed, requiring standard Linux drivers for the USB devices to make them work together as a modular PC 500 .
- the SPS 103 may be the USB host device.
- the SPS 103 may connect to a USB hub 407 .
- the USB hub 407 may be connected to a network device 403 , a keypad 505 , a mouse 504 , other USB devices 503 , and a USB connection to a display 502 .
- the USB connection to a display 502 may join a monitor 501 to the SPS 103 via the USB hub 407 .
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- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
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- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
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Abstract
Systems and methods for implementing a secure processor stick are described. In one aspect, the system for implementing a secure processor stick with a computer, the system comprising: a secure processor stick, including: a processor; a memory coupled to said processor; a smart chip coupled to said processor, said smart chip storing data for implementing a secure environment; and an operating system adapted to run on said memory and said processor, wherein said operating system is adapted to provide a secure environment for display on a computer using said data.
Description
- This application claims priority to U.S. Provisional Patent Applications Ser. Nos. 61/206,454, 61/206,453, and 61/206,427, filed Jan. 30, 2009, and U.S. Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. 61/206,797, filed Feb. 4, 2009, the disclosures of which are incorporated herein by reference. This application also claims priority to U.S. patent applications Ser. Nos. 12/386,208, 12/386,210, 12/386,211, 12/386,212 and 12/386,213, filed Apr. 14, 2009, the disclosures of which are incorporated herein by reference.
- The invention relates to running secure processes or applications in a secure environment on a secure processor stick for display on a PC without using or leaving traces in the PC memory.
- In the present PC environment, viruses, spyware and malware may be present in PCs, which may compromise valuable data or transactions. USB devices like secure token may perform cryptography, secure key generation and storage. However, secure tokens still require the application to be run on the PC with the plan information and data to access this feature and this leave the plain information and data before encryption vulnerable to attack.
- IBM's USB secure stick, the Zone Trusted Information Channel, has an on-board processor used to create a secure socket layer (“SSL”) channel, but not for running a secure application. The application is still using the host PC memory and leaves a memory trace on the host PC that is vulnerable to a virus or spyware attack.
- Penprotect software for a host PC uses encryption to protect files within a USB flash drive, flash memory, or USB stick. But Penprotect software does not protect the encrypted files once they are decrypted and running on the host PC. Furthermore, the same encrypted files stored in the USB memory stick require Penprotect software to be installed on another PC before they can be accessed, so the encrypted files are not portable.
- Livetoken is a USB drive with a Linux OS and a secure chip installed on it to store the keys and passwords. However, Livetoken's design requires the host PC to be rebooted to run the OS on the USB drive. Furthermore, the Linux OS is very dependent on the host PC hardware configuration, and will not work on any other host PC.
- U3 technology from Sandisk allows a portable application in a USB flash drive to be used only on a Windows XP or Windows Vista PC. This provides only application portability, but not security for the application and data execution on the host PC because U3 technology uses the host PC memory to execute the portable application. This leaves the U3 technology open for attack from a virus or spyware.
- This disclosure describes a secure processor stick (“SPS”) for use with a computer. The SPS may provide a secure processing environment in any computer environment, including but not limited to an unsecured environment like a virus infected system or a cyber café. The secure application to be run securely is executed in the SPS's processor and memory; it does not make use of the host PC memory and does not leave any memory traces in the host PC.
- Features and other aspects of embodiments of the present invention are explained in the following description taking in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, wherein:
-
FIG. 1 illustrates a schematic diagram showing the interface between the SPS and the host PC according to an embodiment of the invention; -
FIG. 2 illustrates a block diagram showing the software stack for the SPS according to an embodiment of the invention; -
FIG. 3 illustrates a block diagram showing the software stack for transferring the virtual screen on the secure process stick to the host PC according to an embodiment of the invention; -
FIG. 4 illustrates a block diagram showing the block diagram for web connectivity or network applications according to an embodiment of the invention; and -
FIG. 5 illustrates a block diagram showing how a modular PC system using standard USB devices can be built according to an embodiment of the invention. - Various embodiments of the present invention will now be described in greater detail with reference to the drawings.
- As shown in
FIG. 1 , an example of asecure processor stick 103 may interface with a PC 100 via aUSB port 104. As used herein, the PC may be a laptop, palmtop, netbook, notebook, desktop, or any other general-purpose computer having a port capable of interfacing with an SPS. Once connected, thesecure processor stick 103 may display avirtual display 102 on thePC screen 101. The connection to the host PC 100 may be made byUSB 104, firewire, or any network connection to the host PC 100. SPS network connectivity may be provided by the host PC 100 through a TCP/IP bridge on theUSB port 104 where the SPS 103 accesses the network using VPN, SSL or encryption. The UI/Display for the SPS OS and application may be displayed as a window on thehost PC screen 101 in awindow 102. The screen/UI may be transferred from a virtual screen bitmap in theSPS 103 to the host PC 100 window viaUSB 104. The process/application running on the SPS 103 may not leave raw data on the host PC 100, and there may not be a memory trace on thehost PC 100 from the application/process running. A firewall on the SPS 103 may restrict the access only to a VPN or secure host. A host PC 100 may have no access to the SPS files or data. The data and files on the SPS 103 may be secure and may be encrypted using a smart chip for added security. The SPS 103 may be the size of a USB flash drive and can be easily kept by the owner at all times for portability and security. - Linux version 2.6.28.2 may be used as the OS for the SPS 103, and an ARM 9 processor may be used as the SPS processor. An NXP LPC3131 development board may be used for the components in the
SPS 103. TheUSB port 104 may be used as the interface between the ARM 9 processor and the host PC 100 as shown inFIG. 1 . The USB on the SPS 103 may be a composite USB device with both a CD-ROM component, which may install the PC application, and a CDC Ethernet class component, which may facilitate communication between the ARM 9 processor and the virtual display, input devices, and networking of the host PC 100. -
FIG. 2 illustrates the software stack for the SPS 103. The SPS 103 may contain only the processor, a memory, and asmart chip 208. Thesmart chip 208 may be used to store the key and the data encryption algorithm. Within the SPS 103, anSPS application 201 and encryption andtunneling software 202 may interface with anetwork port 204, a virtual display andvirtual input 205, and input/output 206 via anoperating system 203. Thesmart chip 208 may interface directly with the input/output 206 to ensure encrypted data transmission. Acomposite USB device 214 may connect the SPS 103 with the PC 100. Thenetwork port 204 may contain a firewall. Thenetwork port 204 may communicate with the PC 100 via thecomposite USB device 214 via TCP/IP 217. The virtual display andvirtual input 205 may communicate with the PC 100 via thecomposite USB device 214 via a virtual display andvirtual input packet 216, respectively. The host PCvirtual screen application 207 may communicate with the PC 100 via thecomposite USB device 214 via a USB CD-ROM image 215. On the PC 100, the PCoperating system 212 may direct thePC input devices 213 to transmit data via thecomposite USB device 214 to thevirtual input 205 on theSPS 103. In another aspect, the PCoperating system 212 may direct the PC network software and/orhardware 210 to transmit and receive data via thecomposite USB device 214 to and from the TCP/IP 217 on the SPS 103. In another aspect, the PCoperating system 212 may direct thevirtual screen application 211 to receive data via thecomposite USB device 214 from the host PCvirtual screen application 217 on the SPS 103. - The
SPS 103 may not contain a display, so there may be a need to display the UI for theOS 203 and theapplication 201 running on it. This may be accomplished by opening awindow 102 in thehost PC 100 to display the display buffer of the SPS screen. This process is covered and explained by patent U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/386,211 for “System and Method for Implementing a Remote Display Using a Virtualization Technique,” which is incorporated fully by reference herein.FIG. 3 illustrates one embodiment of the software stack for transferring the virtual screen on thesecure process stick 103 to thePC 100 using an application. In this way, only display pixels may be transferred from theSPS 103 to the host PC's Virtual DisplayDevice slave application 211 without necessarily communicating other information or data to thehost PC 100. -
FIG. 3 illustrates a prototype setup of the virtual display on theSPS 103 interfacing with aPC 100. The software on theSPS 103 may exist in layers, with a Virtual DisplayDevice protocol master 301 and anapplication 201 interfacing through a runtime environment 302 agraphic engine layer 303, and anoperating system 203 with a high speed datainterface device driver 304 and a virtualdisplay device core 305. The high speed datainterface device driver 304 may communicate with thePC 100 using theUSB hardware 306 via theUSB connection 310. ThePC 100 may have a virtual displaydevice slave application 307 that runs on anoperating system 212. Theoperating system 212 may interface with aUSB driver 308 have aUSB device 309 that communicates with theSPS 103. In one embodiment, the virtual displaydevice slave application 307 may receive display information from the virtual displaydevice protocol master 301 via theUSB connection 310. - When the mouse is clicked on the virtual display from the
SPS window 102, the mouse and keyboard input may be automatically transferred to theOS 203 running on theSPS 103. The mouse cursor movement may be locked within the window of thevirtual screen 102. The cursor and keyboards may be released back to other host PC programs or thehost PC OS 212 by hitting the Escape key. This process is covered and explained by patent U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/386,210 for “System and Method for Implementing a Remote Input Device Using Virtualization Techniques for a Wireless Device,” which is incorporated fully by reference herein. - The
SPS 103 may establish network access with a network bridge between thehost PC network 210 to the outside world through a USB CDC/Ethernet port. There may be a firewall on the front end of theSPS network port 204 to block direct access of the file system or data on theSPS OS 203. To enhance security, theSPS 103 may only access the outside world via a VPN or other encrypted server. In this way, thehost PC 100 may not have access to any unencrypted data from theSPS 103 passing through its network port. - The primary use of the
smart chip 208 may be to store keys or passwords used by theSPS 103. Thesmart chip 208 may also contain the encryption and decryption algorithm used for the data/file system and network access. - The
host PC 100 may run anoperating system 212 such as Windows XP, Windows Vista, or a Mac OS, but is not limited to these operating systems. In one aspect of the present invention, theSPS 103 may be in a USB form factor. In another aspect, thisUSB SPS 103 may be connected to anyUSB port 104 on a host PC that may even be booted up. TheSPS 103 may be a composite USB device containing a CDC/Ethernet class component and a CD-ROM component. The application stored in the CD-ROM component 207 may auto-run when theSPS 103 is connected to thehost PC 100. Thisapplication 207 may open up awindow 102 on thehost PC screen 101 and set up thenetwork bridge 217 between thehost PC 100 and theSPS 103. TheSPS OS 203, may show the boot up screen for theSPS 103 in thewindow 102 on thehost PC screen 101. Matchbox may be used as thedesktop GUI 302 on theSPS 103. Password challenges may function as a process for login to gain access to theSPS 103. The host PC mouse cursor andkeyboard input 213 may be transferred to theSPS OS 203 to navigate and launch a program in the SPS file system. A network connection to the outside world may be established either via VPN or an encrypted link to a secure server. A web browser or application may use the secure network to communicate with the outside world. Thehost PC 100 may see theSPS 103 as a network device, but theSPS device 103 will be blocked by a firewall on theSPS network connection 204. No files or data may be transferred between theSPS 103 and thehost PC 100 with a firewall enabled on theSPS network connection 204. - The
SPS 103 may enable TV, digital photo frame, orother display device 401 functionality with web connectivity or a network application like email, messaging applications, and even games with or without thesmart chip 208. In one embodiment, theSPS 103 may communicate with adisplay device 401 via aUSB hub 407 on thedisplay device 401. This may be accomplished by implementing the VDD Slave for theSPS display 404 and displaying it on thedisplay device 402. Input from the user may be accomplished by receiving IR remote instructions via aremote sensor 406, where a VIDprotocol slave application 405 sends the instructions of the IR remote to theSPS OS 203. Network connectivity may be achieved using a wireless, Ethernet, orUSB device connection 403, but is not limited to these. A USB network device may only require a standard driver to be installed in theSPS OS 203.FIG. 4 illustrates the block diagram for web connectivity or network applications. - Another application of the
SPS 103 may be to build amodular PC 500 using standard USB devices.FIG. 5 illustrates how amodular PC system 500 using standard USB devices can be built. A Linux OS may be installed, requiring standard Linux drivers for the USB devices to make them work together as amodular PC 500. In this aspect, theSPS 103 may be the USB host device. In one embodiment, theSPS 103 may connect to aUSB hub 407. In further embodiments, theUSB hub 407 may be connected to anetwork device 403, akeypad 505, amouse 504,other USB devices 503, and a USB connection to adisplay 502. The USB connection to adisplay 502 may join amonitor 501 to theSPS 103 via theUSB hub 407. - Although a particular embodiment has been described, this was for the purpose of illustrating, but not limiting, the invention. Various alternative embodiments, which will come readily to the mind of the person skilled in the art, are within the scope of the invention as defined by the appended claims.
Claims (2)
1-28. (canceled)
29. A system for implementing a secure processor stick with a computer, the system comprising:
a secure processor stick, including:
a processor;
a memory coupled to said processor;
a smart chip coupled to said processor, said smart chip storing data for implementing a secure environment; and
an operating system adapted to run on said memory and said processor, wherein said operating system is adapted to provide a secure environment for display on a computer using said data.
Priority Applications (3)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| US13/722,577 US20130111128A1 (en) | 2009-01-30 | 2012-12-20 | Method for implementing and application of a secure processor stick (SPS) |
| US13/788,027 US8694695B2 (en) | 2009-01-30 | 2013-03-07 | System and method for remotely operating a wireless device using a server and client architecture |
| US14/246,167 US9414433B2 (en) | 2009-01-30 | 2014-04-07 | System and method for remotely operating a wireless device using a server and client architecture |
Applications Claiming Priority (8)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| US20645409P | 2009-01-30 | 2009-01-30 | |
| US12/386,212 US8396992B2 (en) | 2009-01-30 | 2009-04-14 | System and method for virtualizing the peripherals in a terminal device to enable remote management via removable portable media with processing capability |
| US12/386,208 US8442509B2 (en) | 2009-01-30 | 2009-04-14 | System and method for managing a wireless device from removable media with processing capability |
| US12/386,210 US20100199008A1 (en) | 2009-01-30 | 2009-04-14 | System and method for implementing a remote input device using virtualization techniques for wireless device |
| US12/386,213 US8254903B2 (en) | 2009-01-30 | 2009-04-14 | System and method for remotely operating a wireless device using a server and client architecture |
| US12/386,211 US8477082B2 (en) | 2009-01-30 | 2009-04-14 | System and method for implementing a remote display using a virtualization technique |
| US12/660,723 US8341087B2 (en) | 2010-03-03 | 2010-03-03 | Method for implementing and application of a secure processor stick (SPS) |
| US13/722,577 US20130111128A1 (en) | 2009-01-30 | 2012-12-20 | Method for implementing and application of a secure processor stick (SPS) |
Related Parent Applications (1)
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| US12/660,723 Continuation US8341087B2 (en) | 2009-01-30 | 2010-03-03 | Method for implementing and application of a secure processor stick (SPS) |
Related Child Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| US13/788,027 Continuation US8694695B2 (en) | 2009-01-30 | 2013-03-07 | System and method for remotely operating a wireless device using a server and client architecture |
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| US20130111128A1 true US20130111128A1 (en) | 2013-05-02 |
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| US12/660,723 Expired - Fee Related US8341087B2 (en) | 2009-01-30 | 2010-03-03 | Method for implementing and application of a secure processor stick (SPS) |
| US13/722,577 Abandoned US20130111128A1 (en) | 2009-01-30 | 2012-12-20 | Method for implementing and application of a secure processor stick (SPS) |
| US13/788,027 Expired - Fee Related US8694695B2 (en) | 2009-01-30 | 2013-03-07 | System and method for remotely operating a wireless device using a server and client architecture |
| US14/246,167 Expired - Fee Related US9414433B2 (en) | 2009-01-30 | 2014-04-07 | System and method for remotely operating a wireless device using a server and client architecture |
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Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| US9414433B2 (en) | 2016-08-09 |
| US20130185351A1 (en) | 2013-07-18 |
| US20140223033A1 (en) | 2014-08-07 |
| CN102195966A (en) | 2011-09-21 |
| US8694695B2 (en) | 2014-04-08 |
| US20110219148A1 (en) | 2011-09-08 |
| US8341087B2 (en) | 2012-12-25 |
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Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
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| STCB | Information on status: application discontinuation |
Free format text: ABANDONED -- FAILURE TO RESPOND TO AN OFFICE ACTION |