US12041444B2 - Authentication using wireless sensing - Google Patents
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- US12041444B2 US12041444B2 US17/446,839 US202117446839A US12041444B2 US 12041444 B2 US12041444 B2 US 12041444B2 US 202117446839 A US202117446839 A US 202117446839A US 12041444 B2 US12041444 B2 US 12041444B2
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
- H04W12/69—Identity-dependent
- H04W12/79—Radio fingerprint
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/50—Secure pairing of devices
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
- H04W12/65—Environment-dependent, e.g. using captured environmental data
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
- H04W12/66—Trust-dependent, e.g. using trust scores or trust relationships
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
- H04W12/68—Gesture-dependent or behaviour-dependent
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
- H04W4/38—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for collecting sensor information
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
- H04W12/065—Continuous authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
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- H04W4/80—Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication
Definitions
- a user can use an electronic device to perform various tasks, including tasks at the electronic device or tasks that involve accessing a remote site (e.g., a website, an application server, a database server, a storage server, etc.).
- a remote site e.g., a website, an application server, a database server, a storage server, etc.
- the user can be authenticated before access of the electronic device is granted to the user.
- Examples of such authentication include an authentication based on receipt of a user credential (e.g., a user identifier and password, a certificate, a token, etc.), an authentication based on receipt of biometric information from a biometric reader (e.g., a fingerprint reader, an iris scanner, a camera, etc.), and so forth.
- a biometric reader e.g., a fingerprint reader, an iris scanner, a camera, etc.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram of an example arrangement including a Zero Trust system, an end point device, a wireless node, and a target object, according to some implementations of the present disclosure.
- FIG. 4 is a block diagram of a system according to some examples.
- Zero Trust is a security term stating that no entity should be trusted. When applied to information and communications technology, this means that every connection to a specific device or network (both internal and external) should be verified (authenticated). Verification can range from an initial verification when a connection is established or verification performed on a continuous basis.
- a benefit of Zero Trust is that a network that has been previously secured behind a perimeter fence (e.g., a virtual private network or VPN) can dispense with having to set up the VPN connection and authenticate directly with servers or services both on premises and in the cloud.
- a perimeter fence e.g., a virtual private network or VPN
- DISA Defense Information Systems Agency
- An end point device can include a smartphone, a desktop computer, a notebook computer, a tablet computer, a vehicle, or another electronic device.
- An example of a security hardware is a biometric reader that can be included in the end point device or connected over a link (wired link or wireless link) to the end point device.
- a biometric reader can include a fingerprint reader, an iris scanner, a camera, and so forth.
- Another example of a security hardware is a proximity sensor to detect a proximity of a user (or users) to an end point device.
- Adding security hardware to an end point device to support multi-factor authentication can add to the overall cost of the end point device.
- a biometric reader, a proximity sensor, or other security hardware may work properly only when the end point device is oriented in a certain way with respect to a user (e.g., a camera has to face a user, a biometric reader has to be oriented so that the pertinent part of the user can be captured, etc.). If the security hardware does not have the proper orientation, then the security hardware may not operate properly.
- an end point device using Zero Trust security does not have a standardized interface between a security end point application and a wireless sensor, which can provide biometric information based on the end point device's environment.
- the standardized interface can be used for starting, stopping, and continuous monitoring of an environment of an end point device using a wireless sensor.
- the Zero Trust system 104 can be separate from the end point device 102 , but is connected to the end point device 102 over a link 106 .
- the link 106 can be a wired link or a wireless link.
- the Zero Trust system 104 can be part of a cloud, a server, and so forth.
- the Zero Trust system 104 can be part of the end point device 102 .
- the Zero Trust system 104 can include a program executable in the end point device 102 .
- the environment in which the end point device 102 is located includes a wireless node 108 .
- the wireless node 108 can include an access point (AP).
- An AP is a wireless access network node that allows an electronic device to establish a connection with the AP to perform communications over the WLAN.
- wireless nodes can be employed, including a wireless node that is part of a cellular access network (e.g., a fifth generation or 5G cellular network, a fourth generation or 4G cellular network, etc.), a wireless node that performs communications using BLUETOOTH signals, a wireless node that performs communications using ZIGBEE signals, a wireless node that performs communications using Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) signals, and so forth.
- a wireless node that is part of a cellular access network e.g., a fifth generation or 5G cellular network, a fourth generation or 4G cellular network, etc.
- BLUETOOTH signals e.g., a wireless node that performs communications using BLUETOOTH signals
- ZIGBEE signals e.g., ZIGBEE signals
- DSRC Dedicated Short Range Communications
- a “wireless node” can refer to any electronic device that is able to perform wireless communications. Although the wireless node 108 is shown as being outside of the end point device 102 , in other examples, the wireless node 108 can be part of the end point device 102 . For example, the wireless node 108 can include a WLAN controller (or another type of network interface controller) within the end point device.
- a WLAN controller or another type of network interface controller
- the wireless node 108 (or multiple wireless nodes 108 ) can be used as wireless sensors to perform wireless sensing 112 of a target object 114 .
- the target object 114 can be a user or a group of users. In other examples, the target object 114 can be a different physical object that is to be authenticated before access is granted of the end point device 102 . The authentication is based on the wireless sensing 112 performed by the wireless node(s) 108 .
- the wireless node 108 can provide two roles: 1) support communications between an end point device (e.g., 102 ) and a network, such as a WLAN or another type of network, and 2) perform wireless sensing of the target object 114 for authenticating the target object 114 .
- the standardized interface 110 can be between the internal wireless node 108 and another entity (e.g., a program or a hardware device) in the end point device 102 .
- a wireless sensing system including the wireless node 108 (or multiple wireless nodes 108 ), zero or more wireless stations (STAs), sensing protocols that govern wireless transmissions and wireless receptions, and so forth, can be used to perform authentication, such as Zero Trust authentication.
- the wireless sensing system can leverage use of an AP, a WLAN controller, or any other type of wireless node that is already present in an environment in which the end point device 102 is located.
- Information from the wireless sensing system is used to provide environmental data input to a Zero Trust system 104 through the standardized interface 110 .
- the wireless sensor (implemented with the wireless node 108 ) provides data to the end point device 102 about the local radio environment.
- the wireless sensor can provide an extra source of biometric information to the end point device 102 .
- the wireless node 108 e.g., an AP that is able to perform radio communications
- the wireless sensor can act as a single source for authorization/deauthorization and other operations in the Zero Trust system 104 , or can be one of multiple factors used in a security algorithm.
- the Zero Trust system 104 can build up a pattern of wireless sensor information collected using one or more wireless nodes 108 .
- the pattern of wireless sensor information can be compared against a security threshold, which could then trigger re-authentication or can be used to determine no authentication is required (e.g., for simple IoT devices).
- the pattern of wireless sensor information can be used to recognize a regular user of the end point device 102 , detect that a user has moved away from the end point device 102 for greater than a specified amount of time, and so forth.
- an existing wireless system e.g., a WLAN system, a BLUETOOTH system, etc.
- an existing wireless system e.g., a WLAN system, a BLUETOOTH system, etc.
- an existing wireless system e.g., a WLAN system, a BLUETOOTH system, etc.
- can operate in a wireless sensing mode through the standardized interface 110 ), such as when the Zero Trust system 104 requests to perform a radio environment check.
- a key press may allow the Zero Trust system 104 to activate the WLAN radio (e.g., of the AP or a WLAN controller) as a wireless sensor for a time duration to determine the biometrics of a user. This information is then fed back into the Zero Trust system 104 to determine if the user is allowed to utilize the end point device 102 .
- the WLAN radio e.g., of the AP or a WLAN controller
- the sense indication is sent (at 204 ) by the Zero Trust system 104 to the end point device 102 , which sends (at 206 ) the sense indication to the wireless node 108 through the standardized interface 110 (e.g., an API).
- the standardized interface 110 e.g., an API
- the sense indication is sent on a periodic basis by the Zero Trust system 104 . In other examples, the sense indication is sent by the Zero Trust system 104 in response to a different event.
- the wireless node 108 performs wireless sensing (at 208 ), such as by transmitting wireless signals and receiving wireless signals.
- the transmitted wireless signals may be affected by the target object 114 in the environment 202 .
- the target object 114 may absorb wireless signals and/or reflect wireless signals in various directions.
- the wireless node 108 can collect information that is based on how wireless signals are affected (absorbed and/or reflected) by the target object 114 .
- WLAN communications use wireless signals of relatively short wavelengths (e.g., corresponding to 2.4 gigahertz (GHz) to 5 GHz).
- the WLAN signals can be used as radar signals, and transmitted WLAN signals can be compared to returned WLAN signals (as affected by the target object 114 ) to determine characteristics of a physical environment around the wireless node 108 .
- the IEEE 802.11 bf amendment enables WLAN sensing measurements to be obtained using transmissions that are requested, unsolicited, or both.
- MAC Medium Access Control
- Measurement information acquired by the wireless node 108 based on the wireless sensing is sent (at 210 ) by the wireless node 108 to the end point device 102 through the standardized interface 110 (e.g., an API).
- the end point device 102 then sends (at 212 ) the measurement information to the Zero Trust system 104 .
- the Zero Trust system 104 creates a security update message based on the measurement information received by the Zero Trust system 104 from the end point device 102 .
- the Zero Trust system 104 sends (at 214 ) the security update message to the end point device 102 .
- the security update message can cause the end point device 102 to perform a security action, e.g., allow access of the end point device 102 by the target object 114 based on the security update message indicating that the target object 114 has been authenticated in response to the measurement information.
- the security update message can be in the form of security information that indicates whether or not authentication of the target object 114 was successful.
- the end point device 102 may be able to assess itself, by determining whether a security update is to be performed based on the measurement information.
- FIG. 2 refers to an example in which a security check is initiated by the Zero Trust system 104 , either periodically or in response to an event.
- FIG. 3 shows another example in which passive sensing is used.
- the wireless node 108 performs passive wireless sensing (at 302 ) of the environment 202 .
- the wireless node 108 may be in a passive listen mode.
- the passive wireless sensing is performed by the wireless node 108 without being requested by the Zero Trust system 104 (or another authentication system).
- the passive wireless sensing can be based on analyzing characteristics of wireless signals that are used as part of normal data or control communications.
- the Zero Trust system 104 can initiate a re-check of the environment 202 , using messaging 308 , 310 , 312 , 314 , 316 , and 318 , which are similar to messaging 204 , 206 , 208 , 210 , 212 , and 214 of FIG. 2 .
- a new use case and requirements for “Wi-Fi Sensing for Zero Trust” are added to the features of the IEEE 802.11 bf amendment.
- the MAC/SME (station management entity) layer of the 802.11 bf amendment can be updated to provide frames and an API to allow Zero Trust applications within a WLAN device (or network to which WLAN devices are attached) to request the transmission and reception of WLAN sensing communications.
- API standards are developed (e.g., open standards) for Zero Trust networks and systems, then an interface to the lower level 802.11 MAC layer may be developed in 802.11.
- WLAN sensing devices may also be possible for WLAN sensing devices to store (cache) previous sensing measurements and for this information to also be accessible to Zero Trust applications.
- Two modes of operation may be provided: a continuous mode, and a scheduled or on-demand mode.
- a continuous mode an end point device is continually monitored for Zero Trust security (e.g., the end point device is being used in public) and so sensing continuously operates.
- sensing is scheduled to operate for a short period on a scheduled basis to re-check the Zero Trust status.
- the Zero Trust system may explicitly send a command to the end point device to perform sensing.
- the wireless sensing system can be used to determine whether there is an environmental emergency in a space.
- the output of the wireless sensing system can be fed into a crisis communications system, which can send a notification of the emergency. This can lead to mass notifications and situational awareness.
- the wireless sensing system can be used to detect health issues with a user, such as the regular user of an end point device. Deviations from historical movement patterns of a user may be indicative of a health issue, such as a concussion, a muscle injury, a bone injury, a stroke, a change in heart function, and so forth.
- the wireless sensing system can monitor for a change in a user's movement pattern, and can inform the user to seek assessment from a medical professional.
- the Zero Trust system continues to operate despite the change in the user's behavior.
- the authentication performed by the Zero Trust system can have multiple factors. One way to have more than one factor is that the single WLAN-based sensing system measures more than one biometric feature.
- WLAN sensing information e.g., according to IEEE 802.11 bf
- other information from WLAN systems may also contribute to a Zero Trust solution.
- other information include antenna and power characteristics (a range of power of signals from the antenna, a range of frequencies of the antenna, etc.), which can provide a fingerprint of very precise manufacturing differences between individual devices.
- Authentication of the target object 114 e.g., a user, an electronic device, etc.
- the other information can include a history of Service Set Identifier (SSID) and MAC address use and how often they change (this is another example of a fingerprint).
- the historical information including SSID and MAC address use (and their frequency of change) can be compared to a current SSID and MAC address use, and a deviation may indicate that the target object 114 should not be authenticated.
- the other information can include how many users use a same end point device. Historical information can be stored regarding a quantity of users that have previously used the end point device, and a current quantity of users using the end point device can be compared to the historical quantity of users-a deviation in the quantities can indicate that the target object 114 should not be authenticated.
- the foregoing additional information can be used as factors in a multi-factor authentication system at a server. These can also be used as factors in an end point detection and response (EDR) system embedded within end point devices.
- EDR end point detection and response
- the system 400 further includes a non-transitory machine-readable or computer-readable storage medium 404 storing wireless sensing monitoring machine-readable instructions 406 executable on the one or more hardware processors 402 to perform various tasks.
- the wireless sensing monitoring machine-readable instructions 406 are executable to receive information based on wireless sensing performed using wireless signals of a wireless interface of a wireless node (e.g., 108 in FIG. 1 ).
- the wireless interface e.g., a radio interface, such as a WLAN radio interface, a cellular radio interface, a BLUETOOTH interface, etc.
- the wireless node communicates data over a wireless connection established with another wireless device.
- the wireless sensing monitoring machine-readable instructions 406 are executable to perform authentication in response to the received information.
- the information includes biometric information of a user, and the authentication relates to the user based on the biometric information.
- the wireless sensing monitoring machine-readable instructions 406 are executable to store a pattern of wireless sensing information, and initiate a process to perform the authentication based on the pattern of wireless sensing information.
- the pattern of wireless sensing information is based on a motion of a user.
- the pattern of wireless sensing information is based on a biometric feature (e.g., face, eyes, and/or other physical features) of a user.
- the example implementations may remove the need for a user to manually enter their credentials for electronic device use, such as when the user has been separated from the electronic device for a short time.
- the electronic device may be able to power down when a user is not detected.
- the example implementations may improve the strength of security when an electronic device is moving between different network types (e.g., wired to wireless, a cellular network to a WLAN). Additional security checks can be made when a user is entering a banking or payment application on a device.
- network types e.g., wired to wireless, a cellular network to a WLAN.
- the proposed system can be used to enable basic presence detection without additional hardware and physical design complexity to add such hardware sensors to the front of a device.
- the system can also be used to add more complex presence detection such as identifying a user without expensive high definition camera and other hardware.
- the system also enables more flexibility in the product design because the WLAN or other wireless sensing antennas can be inside the device and work regardless of device orientation, while presence sensors and cameras have to be mounted on the front of a product and pointed at the user at a specific angle.
- a storage medium can include any or some combination of the following: a semiconductor memory device such as a dynamic or static random access memory (a DRAM or SRAM), an erasable and programmable read-only memory (EPROM), an electrically erasable and programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) and flash memory or other type of non-volatile memory device; a magnetic disk such as a fixed, floppy and removable disk; another magnetic medium including tape; an optical medium such as a compact disk (CD) or a digital video disk (DVD); or another type of storage device.
- a semiconductor memory device such as a dynamic or static random access memory (a DRAM or SRAM), an erasable and programmable read-only memory (EPROM), an electrically erasable and programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) and flash memory or other type of non-volatile memory device
- a magnetic disk such as a fixed, floppy and removable disk
- another magnetic medium including tape an optical medium such as a compact disk (CD) or a
- the instructions discussed above can be provided on one computer-readable or machine-readable storage medium, or alternatively, can be provided on multiple computer-readable or machine-readable storage media distributed in a large system having possibly plural nodes.
- Such computer-readable or machine-readable storage medium or media is (are) considered to be part of an article (or article of manufacture).
- An article or article of manufacture can refer to any manufactured single component or multiple components.
- the storage medium or media can be located either in the machine running the machine-readable instructions, or located at a remote site from which machine-readable instructions can be downloaded over a network for execution.
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Abstract
Description
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- Never Trust, Always Verify—All users and devices are treated as untrusted. Every device, user, application workload, or data flow is authenticated and explicitly authorized to the least privilege required using dynamic security policies.
- Assume Breach—Consciously operate and defend resources with the assumption that an adversary has a presence within an environment. Deny by default, heavily scrutinize requests for access, users, devices and data flows. All traffic is logged and inspected.
- Verify Explicitly—All resources are consistently accessed in a secure manner using multiple attributes (dynamic and static) to derive confidence levels for contextual access to resources.
Claims (23)
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| CA3130056A CA3130056A1 (en) | 2020-09-10 | 2021-09-07 | Authentication using wireless sensing |
| CN202111057737.3A CN114258021A (en) | 2020-09-10 | 2021-09-09 | Authentication using wireless sensing |
| EP21196115.6A EP3968682A1 (en) | 2020-09-10 | 2021-09-10 | Authentication using wireless sensing |
| US18/757,913 US20240349051A1 (en) | 2020-09-10 | 2024-06-28 | Authentication using wireless sensing |
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| US17/446,839 US12041444B2 (en) | 2020-09-10 | 2021-09-03 | Authentication using wireless sensing |
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| US12445842B2 (en) * | 2022-11-14 | 2025-10-14 | Honeywell International Inc. | Apparatuses, computer-implemented methods, and computer program products for managing access of wireless nodes to a network |
| US12477331B2 (en) | 2023-05-17 | 2025-11-18 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Continuous multi-factor authentication using wireless sensing data |
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| EP3968682A1 (en) | 2022-03-16 |
| US20240349051A1 (en) | 2024-10-17 |
| CA3130056A1 (en) | 2022-03-10 |
| CN114258021A (en) | 2022-03-29 |
| US20220078610A1 (en) | 2022-03-10 |
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