[go: up one dir, main page]

TWI434565B - 密鑰保護機制 - Google Patents

密鑰保護機制 Download PDF

Info

Publication number
TWI434565B
TWI434565B TW096143280A TW96143280A TWI434565B TW I434565 B TWI434565 B TW I434565B TW 096143280 A TW096143280 A TW 096143280A TW 96143280 A TW96143280 A TW 96143280A TW I434565 B TWI434565 B TW I434565B
Authority
TW
Taiwan
Prior art keywords
key
masked
secret key
result
check code
Prior art date
Application number
TW096143280A
Other languages
English (en)
Other versions
TW200830832A (en
Inventor
Michel Douguet
Vincent Dupaquis
Original Assignee
Inside Secure
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Inside Secure filed Critical Inside Secure
Publication of TW200830832A publication Critical patent/TW200830832A/zh
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of TWI434565B publication Critical patent/TWI434565B/zh

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/065—Encryption by serially and continuously modifying data stream elements, e.g. stream cipher systems, RC4, SEAL or A5/3
    • H04L9/0656—Pseudorandom key sequence combined element-for-element with data sequence, e.g. one-time-pad [OTP] or Vernam's cipher
    • H04L9/0662—Pseudorandom key sequence combined element-for-element with data sequence, e.g. one-time-pad [OTP] or Vernam's cipher with particular pseudorandom sequence generator
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/002—Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms
    • H04L9/004—Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms for fault attacks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/04—Masking or blinding
    • H04L2209/046—Masking or blinding of operations, operands or results of the operations
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/12—Details relating to cryptographic hardware or logic circuitry
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/34—Encoding or coding, e.g. Huffman coding or error correction

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Description

密鑰保護機制
本發明係關於可抵抗差異過失分析或過失插入攻擊以保護秘密密鑰之完整性的密碼編譯系統。
使用以秘密密鑰為基礎之演算法時，可能需要一過失插入保護機制。此一機制係一安全的用以保護秘密密鑰以防與密鑰操控有關之差異過失分析的方法。差異過失分析係一強制產生瞬變硬體過失及所得計算錯誤(例如在一密鑰排程演算法或上一加密輪回之執行期間)以便擷取密碼編譯密鑰資訊之密碼編譯攻擊。此過失分析係可應用於公用密鑰與秘密密鑰密碼編譯系統兩者，包括智慧卡上之抗篡改裝置。例如，Eli Biham與Adi Shamir在「Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems」(密碼學進展－CRYPTO ‘97，LNCS 1294，第513至525頁(Springer－Verlag,1997))中說明似DES密碼上之差異過失分析攻擊。
目前可用保護機制係離線實施且並不適於所有應用。例如，現有機制不會為會話密鑰(其係需要時產生而非提前產生)提供保護。
Hagai Bar－E1等人在「The Sorcerer’s Apprentice Guide to Fault Attacks」(2004年6月30日在意大利佛羅倫薩之密碼學過失偵測與容錯研討會上所發佈之離散技術白皮書)(密碼學e印歸檔(eprint.iacr.org)報告2004/100；此外，CiteSeer文章705084)中說明各種在電子密碼編譯電路上實施此類過失攻擊之方法，並提出許多對策。該等對策在不能複製相同過失之假設下主要涉及引入冗餘，其中重算運算並比較結果。所得系統可能會較慢且較不有效，但其係讓步為安全成本之部分。
尋求更有效的用於保護秘密密鑰完整性之對策。
本發明係一種密碼編譯方法，其在於一密碼編譯應用程式中使用一秘密密鑰之前驗證該秘密密鑰之完整性。特定言之，使用原始未遮罩密鑰所獲得之一加密結果之一加總檢查碼係在隨後採用一已遮罩密鑰解密該結果時用作一有效資料驗證簽章。
硬體密碼編譯系統中保護秘密密鑰完整性之方法(不然該硬體密碼編譯系統會遭受過失攻擊)包含：使用秘密密鑰以自已知資料獲得並保存一加密結果且亦獲得並保存該加密結果之一加總檢查碼，然後遮罩該秘密密鑰。隨後欲在一密碼編譯應用程式中使用該已遮罩密鑰時，首先檢查該密鑰之完整性。特定言之，採用該已遮罩密鑰解密該已保存加密結果。若比較時發現該解密結果不等於有效資料，則該完整性檢查失效，將與該已遮罩密鑰有關之所有資料從該系統消除並用旗標標記一過失插入。
若該解密結果確實等於有效資料，則該已遮罩密鑰之完整性已得以認證且可用於該密碼編譯系統中。
本發明之密鑰保護方法可於其中運作的一範例性硬體環境可包括一硬體亂數產生器(RNG)、一用於安全密鑰儲存之隨機存取記憶體(RAM)或非揮發性記憶體(例如，快閃EPROM)、一微處理器或微控制器及某一用以儲存一程式之記憶體。此外，該硬體可能包括一用於計算以秘密密鑰為基礎之演算法(DES、AES等)之硬體共處理器。此一共處理器(若存在的話)將處理一以XOR為基礎密鑰解遮罩機制：Real_Key：＝Masked_Key XOR Masking_Value，及同樣地Masked_Key：＝Real_Key XOR Masking_Value。
因此，不再強制在密鑰之真形式下操控或儲存密鑰，而可採用其已遮罩形式。此外，該硬體可能包括一用於執行完整性檢查之硬體循環冗餘檢查(CRC)模組。16位元模組就足夠了，不過其他CRC大小也適合。
不過，無共處理器且無硬體CRC模組，本發明之密鑰保護方法也會相當好地工作。
參考圖1，一種依據本發明之密鑰保護方法可方便地藉由用種子值植入一亂數產生器(RNG)之開始而開始(如步驟11所示)。不同種子值自亂數產生器產生不同隨機序列。已植入種子值之亂數產生器將在隨後步驟中用於密鑰遮罩。因此，亂數產生器之種子值植入(步驟11)可發生在密鑰遮罩所需要之隨機位元組之產生(步驟16)之前的任何時間。
程序之第一主要部分(步驟12至15)獲得一加密結果及對應加總檢查碼，以便在隨後秘密密鑰之完整性檢查中使用。
將一欲受保護秘密密鑰以純文字載入至(步驟12)一密鑰暫存器中。該密鑰可視密碼編譯演算法而具有任何合適長度。再者，可存在多個密鑰，例如在三元DES中，其在用於加密與解密之連續輪回集中使用兩個或三個獨立密鑰。密碼編譯演算法可包括一密鑰產生常式，在該密鑰產生常式中使用剛剛載入至密鑰暫存器中之秘密密鑰(或多個祕密密鑰)產生一用於演算法之不同輪回的輪回子密鑰序列。所有此等變化為本發明之密鑰保護所涵蓋。
接下來使用密碼編譯演算法及該欲受保護密鑰來加密用於在密鑰驗證中使用之已知資料(VERIF_DATA)(步驟13)。例如，藉由使用一循環冗餘檢查(CRC)常式來計算加密結果之加總檢查碼(步驟14)。例如，藉由儲存於一安全記憶體中將該加密結果及其對應加總檢查碼保存為一用於該加密結果之驗證簽章。然後完全消除密鑰暫存器(步驟15)。
接下來使用先前已植入種子值之亂數產生器產生(步驟16)用於一密鑰遮罩操作之隨機位元組。使用(例如)密鑰位元與隨機位元組之一或多者的一逐位元XOR，採用隨機位元組來遮罩原始秘密密鑰(或多個原始秘密密鑰)(步驟17)：Masked_Key：＝Real_Key XOR Masking_Value。
遮罩所需要的隨機位元組之數目將取決於密鑰大小及欲遮罩密鑰數。使用多個密鑰時，可使用相同或不同隨機位元組來遮罩不同密鑰。一旦遮罩，便將已遮罩密鑰(或多個已遮罩密鑰)儲存於一安全非揮發性記憶體(例如EEPROM)之一規定位置處。
將已遮罩密鑰(或多個已遮罩密鑰)從該規定記憶體位置載入至(步驟18)一密鑰暫存器(或多個暫存器)中。接著使用已遮罩密鑰(或多個已遮罩密鑰)來解密先前加密結果(步驟19)，該解密自原始加密以一相反方向使用相同密碼編譯演算法。(應注意，在加密期間使用多個密鑰之情況下，例如在三元DES中，通常必須以相反順序使用該等密鑰以便正確解密)。若考量一加密函式Encrypt(Data,Key,Mask)及一對應解密函式Decrypt(Data,Key,Mask)，且若採用Encrypt(VALID...DATA,Real_Key,0)作為先前加密結果(步驟19)，則步驟20中之解密應為Decrypt(Encrypt(VALID_DATA,Real_Key,0)),Masked_Key,Masking_Value)＝VALID_DATA(若Real_Key＝Masked_Key XOR Masking_Value)。
將使用已遮罩密鑰之解密結果與有效資料(VALID_DATA)作比較(步驟20)。已遮罩密鑰應對應於加密VALID_DATA時所產生之驗證簽章(加總檢查碼)。若解密結果不等於VALID_DATA，則已遮罩密鑰未通過完整性檢查，並用旗標標記一過失插入(步驟21)。不過，若解密結果等於VALID_DATA，則已遮罩密鑰通過完整性檢查，且可加以使用。一旦完成完整性檢查，便將用於解密及完整性檢查之所有硬體暫存器消除(步驟22)。
圖1係依據本發明之一密鑰保護方法之一範例性具體實施例的流程圖。
(無元件符號說明)

Claims (10)

  1. 一種在硬體密碼編譯系統中保護秘密密鑰完整性以防遭受過失攻擊之方法，該方法包含：自已知資料及一欲受保護秘密密鑰獲得一加密結果及對應加總檢查碼；遮罩該秘密密鑰以獲得一已遮罩密鑰；將該已遮罩密鑰載入至一密鑰暫存器中；在於該硬體密碼編譯系統中使用一已遮罩密鑰之前的任何時間，首先藉由採用該已遮罩密鑰解密該加密結果以獲得一解密結果並將該解密結果與有效資料作比較來檢查該已遮罩密鑰之完整性；及若該解密結果不等於有效資料，則將與該已遮罩密鑰有關之所有資料消除並用旗標標記一過失插入。
  2. 如請求項1之方法，其中獲得一加密結果及對應加總檢查碼包含：將該欲受保護秘密密鑰以純文字載入至一密鑰暫存器中；將已知資料呈現給一加密演算法並使用該秘密密鑰加密該已知資料以獲得該加密結果；在該加密結果上執行一加總檢查碼計算以獲得該對應加總檢查碼；及將該加密結果及加總檢查碼保存於一安全記憶體中。
  3. 如請求項2之方法，其中該加總檢查碼計算係一循環冗餘檢查(CRC)常式。
  4. 如請求項1之方法，其中遮罩該秘密密鑰包含使用亂數產生器硬體產生隨機位元組並使用一遮罩常式將該等隨機位元組應用於該秘密密鑰。
  5. 如請求項4之方法，其中該遮罩常式係該等隨機位元組與該秘密密鑰的一逐位元XOR運算。
  6. 如請求項4之方法，其中採用一已知種子值植入該亂數產生器硬體之後產生該等隨機位元組，不同種子值產生不同隨機位元組序列。
  7. 一種在硬體密碼編譯系統中保護秘密密鑰完整性以防遭受過失攻擊之方法，該方法包含：將一欲受保護秘密密鑰以純文字載入至一密鑰暫存器中；將已知資料呈現給一加密演算法並使用該秘密密鑰加密該已知資料以獲得一加密結果；在該加密結果上執行一加總檢查碼計算以獲得一對應加總檢查碼；及保存該加密結果及加總檢查碼，並將該秘密密鑰從該密鑰暫存器清除；使用亂數產生器硬體產生隨機位元組並使用一遮罩常式將該等隨機位元組應用於該秘密密鑰以獲得一已遮罩密鑰；將該已遮罩密鑰載入至一密鑰暫存器中；採用該已遮罩密鑰解密該已保存加密結果以獲得一解密結果；將該解密結果與有效資料作比較；及若該解密結果不等於有效資料，則將與該已遮罩密鑰有關之所有資料消除並用旗標標記一過失插入，不過若該解密結果等於有效資料，則認證該已遮罩密鑰之完整性以便在該密碼編譯系統中使用。
  8. 如請求項7之方法，其中該加總檢查碼計算係一循環冗餘檢查(CRC)常式。
  9. 如請求項7之方法，其中該遮罩常式係該等隨機位元組與該秘密密鑰的一逐位元XOR運算。
  10. 如請求項7之方法，其中採用一已知種子值植入該亂數產生器硬體之後產生該等隨機位元組，不同種子值產生不同隨機位元組序列。
TW096143280A 2006-12-22 2007-11-15 密鑰保護機制 TWI434565B (zh)

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US11/615,225 US7822207B2 (en) 2006-12-22 2006-12-22 Key protection mechanism

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
TW200830832A TW200830832A (en) 2008-07-16
TWI434565B true TWI434565B (zh) 2014-04-11

Family

ID=39542851

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
TW096143280A TWI434565B (zh) 2006-12-22 2007-11-15 密鑰保護機制

Country Status (5)

Country Link
US (1) US7822207B2 (zh)
CN (1) CN101569131B (zh)
DE (1) DE112007003061T5 (zh)
TW (1) TWI434565B (zh)
WO (1) WO2008079524A2 (zh)

Families Citing this family (27)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
FR2904901B1 (fr) * 2006-08-09 2008-10-03 Sagem Defense Securite Procede de verification de l'integrite d'une clef de chiffrement obtenue par combinaison de parties de clef
US7822207B2 (en) 2006-12-22 2010-10-26 Atmel Rousset S.A.S. Key protection mechanism
FR2931326A1 (fr) * 2008-05-16 2009-11-20 St Microelectronics Rousset Verification d'integrite d'une cle de chiffrement
FR2952256B1 (fr) * 2009-11-04 2011-12-16 St Microelectronics Rousset Protection d'une cle de chiffrement contre des attaques unidirectionnelles
CN101977180B (zh) * 2010-06-08 2013-06-19 南京大学 一种基于漏洞攻击的安全协议验证方法
US8644500B2 (en) * 2010-08-20 2014-02-04 Apple Inc. Apparatus and method for block cipher process for insecure environments
CN102542319B (zh) * 2010-12-10 2016-06-29 上海华虹集成电路有限责任公司 Psam卡中密钥保护方法
DE102010055237A1 (de) 2010-12-20 2012-06-21 Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh Verfahren zum geschützten Ausführen einer kryptographischen Berechnung
US11228566B1 (en) 2011-03-08 2022-01-18 Ciphercloud, Inc. System and method to anonymize data transmitted to a destination computing device
US9432342B1 (en) * 2011-03-08 2016-08-30 Ciphercloud, Inc. System and method to anonymize data transmitted to a destination computing device
US8699703B2 (en) * 2011-10-19 2014-04-15 Apple Inc. System and method for pseudo-random polymorphic tree construction
CN102404108B (zh) * 2011-10-25 2014-07-09 宁波大学 一种针对aes-128算法的新型故障攻击方法
EP2602952A1 (en) * 2011-12-07 2013-06-12 Gemalto SA Cryptographic method for protecting a key hardware register against fault attacks
EP2629447A1 (en) * 2012-02-17 2013-08-21 Gemalto SA Method and device for protecting an electronic device against fault attack(s)
DE102012011730A1 (de) * 2012-06-13 2013-12-19 Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh Gegen Safe Error Angriffe geschützte kryptographische Berechnung
WO2014112182A1 (ja) * 2013-01-18 2014-07-24 三菱電機株式会社 データ復号装置、属性ベース暗号システム、乱数要素除去装置、ランダム化秘密鍵生成装置、データ復号方法およびデータ復号プログラム
US9703937B2 (en) * 2013-04-10 2017-07-11 Dell Products, L.P. Method to prevent operating system digital product key activation failures
EP2858005A1 (en) * 2013-10-03 2015-04-08 Gemalto SA Integrity check of a non-readable instruction register
WO2016112338A1 (en) * 2015-01-08 2016-07-14 Intertrust Technologies Corporation Cryptographic systems and methods
US9929858B2 (en) * 2015-09-21 2018-03-27 Nxp B.V. Method and system for detecting fault attacks
US11362824B2 (en) * 2018-05-25 2022-06-14 Intertrust Technologies Corporation Content management systems and methods using proxy reencryption
TWI722496B (zh) * 2019-06-20 2021-03-21 慧榮科技股份有限公司 使用者資料的加解密方法及裝置
US11507699B2 (en) * 2019-09-27 2022-11-22 Intel Corporation Processor with private pipeline
US11379580B1 (en) * 2020-03-16 2022-07-05 Xilinx, Inc. Mixed storage of data fields
TWI781544B (zh) * 2020-03-31 2022-10-21 台灣積體電路製造股份有限公司 積體電路裝置以及產生用於積體電路裝置的安全密鑰的方法及系統
US11528135B2 (en) 2020-03-31 2022-12-13 Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, Ltd. Integrated circuit (IC) signatures with random number generator and one-time programmable device
US11962693B2 (en) 2020-03-31 2024-04-16 Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, Ltd. Integrated circuit (IC) signatures with random number generator and one-time programmable device

Family Cites Families (31)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4965825A (en) * 1981-11-03 1990-10-23 The Personalized Mass Media Corporation Signal processing apparatus and methods
US5631960A (en) * 1995-08-31 1997-05-20 National Semiconductor Corporation Autotest of encryption algorithms in embedded secure encryption devices
US5761306A (en) * 1996-02-22 1998-06-02 Visa International Service Association Key replacement in a public key cryptosystem
US5937066A (en) * 1996-10-02 1999-08-10 International Business Machines Corporation Two-phase cryptographic key recovery system
US6092229A (en) * 1996-10-09 2000-07-18 Lsi Logic Corporation Single chip systems using general purpose processors
US6282290B1 (en) * 1997-03-28 2001-08-28 Mykotronx, Inc. High speed modular exponentiator
WO1998052316A1 (en) * 1997-05-09 1998-11-19 Connotech Experts-Conseils Inc. Initial secret key establishment including facilities for verification of identity
US5991415A (en) * 1997-05-12 1999-11-23 Yeda Research And Development Co. Ltd. At The Weizmann Institute Of Science Method and apparatus for protecting public key schemes from timing and fault attacks
US6965673B1 (en) * 1997-09-19 2005-11-15 Telcordia Technologies, Inc. Method of using transient faults to verify the security of a cryptosystem
US6055316A (en) * 1997-12-26 2000-04-25 Sun Microsystems, Inc. System and method for deriving an appropriate initialization vector for secure communications
AU2557399A (en) * 1998-01-02 1999-07-26 Cryptography Research, Inc. Leak-resistant cryptographic method and apparatus
US6510518B1 (en) * 1998-06-03 2003-01-21 Cryptography Research, Inc. Balanced cryptographic computational method and apparatus for leak minimizational in smartcards and other cryptosystems
US6289455B1 (en) * 1999-09-02 2001-09-11 Crypotography Research, Inc. Method and apparatus for preventing piracy of digital content
US6973187B2 (en) * 2000-01-31 2005-12-06 Vdg, Inc. Block encryption method and schemes for data confidentiality and integrity protection
US7051199B1 (en) * 2000-06-19 2006-05-23 Xerox Corporation System, method and article of manufacture for providing cryptographic services utilizing a network
US6990468B1 (en) * 2000-06-19 2006-01-24 Xerox Corporation System, method and article of manufacture for cryptoserver-based auction
US20030223579A1 (en) * 2000-07-13 2003-12-04 Eran Kanter Secure and linear public-key cryptosystem based on parity-check error-correcting
US6941284B2 (en) * 2000-11-30 2005-09-06 Pitney Bowes Inc. Method for dynamically using cryptographic keys in a postage meter
FR2820577B1 (fr) * 2001-02-08 2003-06-13 St Microelectronics Sa Procede securise de calcul cryptographique a cle secrete et composant mettant en oeuvre un tel procede
JP4188571B2 (ja) * 2001-03-30 2008-11-26 株式会社日立製作所 情報処理装置の演算方法および耐タンパ演算攪乱実装方式
US7000115B2 (en) * 2001-06-19 2006-02-14 International Business Machines Corporation Method and apparatus for uniquely and authoritatively identifying tangible objects
US20030023850A1 (en) * 2001-07-26 2003-01-30 International Business Machines Corporation Verifying messaging sessions by digital signatures of participants
EP1430641A2 (en) * 2001-09-27 2004-06-23 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. An encryption device, a decrypting device, a secret key generation device,a copyright protection system and a cipher communication device
EP1442391B1 (de) * 2001-10-17 2005-08-31 Infineon Technologies AG Verfahren und vorrichtung zum absichern einer berechnung in einem kryptographischen algorithmus
US7596531B2 (en) * 2002-06-05 2009-09-29 Sun Microsystems, Inc. Method and apparatus for protecting against side channel attacks against personal identification numbers
AU2003271594A1 (en) * 2002-09-11 2004-04-23 Giesecke And Devrient Gmbh Protected cryptographic calculation
US7715551B2 (en) * 2004-04-29 2010-05-11 Stmicroelectronics Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd. Apparatus and method for consistency checking public key cryptography computations
US7949883B2 (en) * 2004-06-08 2011-05-24 Hrl Laboratories, Llc Cryptographic CPU architecture with random instruction masking to thwart differential power analysis
US20050289311A1 (en) * 2004-06-29 2005-12-29 David Durham System and method for secure inter-platform and intra-platform communications
US7680273B2 (en) * 2004-12-08 2010-03-16 Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. System and method for optimizing error detection to detect unauthorized modification of transmitted data
US7822207B2 (en) 2006-12-22 2010-10-26 Atmel Rousset S.A.S. Key protection mechanism

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
TW200830832A (en) 2008-07-16
US7822207B2 (en) 2010-10-26
CN101569131A (zh) 2009-10-28
US20080152144A1 (en) 2008-06-26
WO2008079524A3 (en) 2008-08-14
CN101569131B (zh) 2012-12-12
DE112007003061T5 (de) 2009-10-29
WO2008079524A2 (en) 2008-07-03

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
TWI434565B (zh) 密鑰保護機制
JP6366595B2 (ja) 耐グリッチ性暗号離散対数ベースの署名のための方法及びシステム
Schmidt et al. Optical fault attacks on AES: A threat in violet
JP5805249B2 (ja) 検証可能な耐漏洩性暗号化および復号化
US11418321B2 (en) Block cryptographic method for encrypting/decrypting messages and cryptographic devices for implementing this method
US8850221B2 (en) Protection against side channel attacks with an integrity check
CN112394877A (zh) 用于安全存储器的方法及其系统
EP3596876B1 (en) Elliptic curve point multiplication device and method for signing a message in a white-box context
Dobraunig et al. Fault attacks on nonce-based authenticated encryption: Application to keyak and ketje
Dassance et al. Combined fault and side-channel attacks on the AES key schedule
Amiel et al. Fault analysis of DPA-resistant algorithms
CN101925875A (zh) 用于非对称加密的对策方法和设备
US9544132B2 (en) Cryptographic method for protecting a key hardware register against fault attacks
JP2011072040A (ja) 誤りに基づく攻撃から電子回路を保護する方法
BR112013012216B1 (pt) proteção contra as escutas passivas
US20210367766A1 (en) A computation device using shared shares
Seuschek et al. A cautionary note: Side-channel leakage implications of deterministic signature schemes
Young et al. Bandwidth-optimal kleptographic attacks
US20110126085A1 (en) Method of signature verification
US20200067693A1 (en) Systems and methods for masking ecc operations
Karri et al. Parity-based concurrent error detection in symmetric block ciphers
WO2023212838A1 (en) Fast signature generation and verification
Liu et al. Improving tag generation for memory data authentication in embedded processor systems
CA2327037A1 (en) Method to detect fault attacks against cryptographic algorithms
Tunstall Smart card security

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
MM4A Annulment or lapse of patent due to non-payment of fees