TWI313995B - Content protection method - Google Patents
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- TWI313995B TWI313995B TW95129510A TW95129510A TWI313995B TW I313995 B TWI313995 B TW I313995B TW 95129510 A TW95129510 A TW 95129510A TW 95129510 A TW95129510 A TW 95129510A TW I313995 B TWI313995 B TW I313995B
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims description 75
- PCHJSUWPFVWCPO-UHFFFAOYSA-N gold Chemical compound [Au] PCHJSUWPFVWCPO-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 claims description 15
- 229910052737 gold Inorganic materials 0.000 claims description 15
- 239000010931 gold Substances 0.000 claims description 15
- 230000006378 damage Effects 0.000 claims description 11
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 claims description 2
- 238000012937 correction Methods 0.000 claims description 2
- 239000000126 substance Substances 0.000 claims 2
- RYGMFSIKBFXOCR-UHFFFAOYSA-N Copper Chemical compound [Cu] RYGMFSIKBFXOCR-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 claims 1
- 230000000739 chaotic effect Effects 0.000 claims 1
- 229910052802 copper Inorganic materials 0.000 claims 1
- 239000010949 copper Substances 0.000 claims 1
- 239000000835 fiber Substances 0.000 claims 1
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 5
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 description 4
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 description 4
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 description 2
- 101100457838 Caenorhabditis elegans mod-1 gene Proteins 0.000 description 1
- 101150110972 ME1 gene Proteins 0.000 description 1
- 241001441724 Tetraodontidae Species 0.000 description 1
- 239000008186 active pharmaceutical agent Substances 0.000 description 1
- 230000001934 delay Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 1
- 239000000463 material Substances 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
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- 230000008439 repair process Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000004044 response Effects 0.000 description 1
- XLYOFNOQVPJJNP-UHFFFAOYSA-N water Substances O XLYOFNOQVPJJNP-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 1
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- Two-Way Televisions, Distribution Of Moving Picture Or The Like (AREA)
Description
修正本 1313995 九、發明說明: 【發明所屬之技術領域】 本發明係有關-種數位内容保護方法,_是指—種可讓聲 影像資料湖容瓶妓全料_容用戶端之數仙護方二。 【先前技術】 當網際網路持續增_舰,提供乡舰給制者的内容提供 者數量正在增加,使用者麟以技格式來戦這些多舰,而非MODIFICATION 1313995 IX. DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION: TECHNICAL FIELD OF THE INVENTION The present invention relates to a digital content protection method, and _ refers to a kind of sound image data that can be used to make a bottle of water. Fang II. [Prior Art] As the Internet continues to increase, the number of content providers providing ship-to-shippers is increasing, and users are using the technical format to smash these multiple ships instead of
載-整個難’然而這__送的方鎮有許錄減且面 拙.蓟。 舉例而言’網_路連線賴具有足_雜來提㈣料傳輸, 不足的頻寬通常會讓視訊撥放出現延遲現象。 此外,如果個-個非安全的通賴道,轉者可以纖所 於内容槪n和内容用戶端的通訊。重播攻擊為—種攻擊者側錄下在 -段連線階段_有的通訊資料,之後攻擊者假触容舰器並且將 之前侧錄的資料傳送給另-個連線階段内的内容用戶端。 若攻擊者成功侧錄媒體内容且能狗偽裝成内容祠服器,内容提供 者將會損失-般將媒_容傳遞給用戶端所應得的可能娜卜 /、 此外’這些舰内容中可能存在敏感、機密資訊、私人 業機密,或是麵給特定用戶端__容,缺乏實作適# 序可能會讓媒體内容落入不適當的他人手中。 隻程 這些媒體能 甚者,一旦14些媒體内容不受到内容提供者的控制 夠輕易的被重新散播。 因此’當多媒體資料透過—個非安全的通道傳送時,有一 來保護多媒體内容是有其必要性的。 ^ 【發明内容】 為達本發明之目的與其他有利之處,錢服傳統方法的缺點本 發明之目的將於此具體且廣泛地贿,本㈣提供了—套内容保護系 1313995 修正本 統得以從内容伺服器透過非安全的通道來安全地遞交聲音/影像資料 給内容用戶端。 ’ 内容舰器和内容用戶端可以是硬體或是軟體模組。若通道並非 -個安全的通道’攻擊者可以織介於内容舰器與内容用戶端之間 所有的通訊,本發明的系統不僅可阻止攻擊者取得明文資料,也可 止重播攻擊。 對於每個連線階段來說’本發明_容保護系統由兩個步驟組合 而成,第一階段是用戶端-伺服器端相互認證並建立連線階段金鑰= 在此步驟’内容伺服器與内容用戶端驗證彼此的合法性,並且同時門 交換資訊’藉此伺服器和用戶端都能計算/取得同樣的連線階段^ 瑜。第二個步驟中,聲音/影像資料在於内容飼服器端使用此一連線 階段金鍮進行純,並細額戶端使賴魏錄進行解密。 本發明採用了對稱式加解密演算法作為其元件,這套内容保護系 統的優點是採計分著名的加解密演算法而非設計_個新的演算法'。、 舉例而言,可使用-套128位元之AES加解密演算法,由於其安全 性已經被廣為信任,而且它能夠以軟體實作並能進行高速運算,也 以低邏輯陳量的硬體實作。此外,這項加解密演算法也能夠以其: 區塊加解密演异法取代’如DES、Blowfish或RC4等等。 此外’如果某個版本的伺服器或是用戶端被發現能被成功攻擊, 它的辨識號碼將會被放到黑名單中,每侧服器和用戶端均擁有 黑名單,這個名單將會定期進行更新,若—台舰器發現—台用 的辨識號碼在這個黑名單中,它將會終結這個連線階段;若一台用戶 端發現概H的辨賊碼在聰黑料巾,它會終結連線二段。 底下藉由具體實施例配合所附的圖式詳加說明,當 = 發明之目的、技_容、特點及其所達成之功效。 易瞭解本 【實施方式】 底下將配合所附關式詳述本發gj之具體實施例,並盡可能在圖 1313995 修正本 式和敘述中使用相同的參考符號以代表同樣或是相似的部分。 請參考第1A圖,此為本發明中用戶端和飼服器端之通訊流之實施 例示意圖’並且參考第1B圖,其為本發明中證認程序之—實: 程圖。 抓 本發明之内容保護系麟第-步驟係“戶端·飼 證產生和連線階段金雜合而成,挑戰/回應程序如描述= 服器50和用戶端6〇進行彼此之間的互相驗證,並且也建立一個 P0b段金输。用在這個程序之巾的舰根據以下敘絲定義: —Load - the whole is difficult. However, this __ sent to the town has a record of reduction and face 拙.蓟. For example, the 'network_road connection' has a sufficient amount of material to transmit, and the insufficient bandwidth usually causes delays in video playback. In addition, if there is a non-secure channel, the transferer can communicate with the content user and the content client. The replay attack is an attacker who records the communication data in the - segment connection phase, and then the attacker falsely touches the ship and transmits the previously recorded data to the content client in the other connection phase. . If the attacker successfully records the media content and can disguise the dog as a content server, the content provider will lose the possibility of passing the media content to the user's possible Nabu/, and in addition, the contents of these ships may be The existence of sensitive, confidential information, private business secrets, or face to a specific user __ capacity, lack of practical implementation may cause media content to fall into the hands of inappropriate others. Only those media can do it, once 14 media content is not easily controlled by the content provider, it can be easily re-distributed. Therefore, when multimedia data is transmitted through an unsecured channel, it is necessary to protect multimedia content. ^ [Summary of the Invention] In order to achieve the object and other advantages of the present invention, the disadvantages of the traditional method of the present invention are the specific and extensive bribery of this invention. (4) provides a set of content protection system 1313995 Securely deliver voice/video data to content clients from content servers via non-secure channels. The content ship and content client can be hardware or software modules. If the channel is not a secure channel, the attacker can weave all the communication between the content ship and the content client. The system of the present invention not only prevents the attacker from obtaining the plaintext data, but also the replay attack. For each connection phase, the present invention is composed of two steps. The first phase is the client-server end mutual authentication and establishing the connection phase key = in this step 'content server Verify the legitimacy of each other with the content client, and at the same time, the door exchanges information 'by both the server and the client can calculate/obtain the same connection phase ^ Yu. In the second step, the sound/image data is used by the content feeder to use the connection stage to perform the pure, and the fine account to decrypt the Lai Weilu. The present invention employs a symmetric encryption and decryption algorithm as its component. The advantage of this content protection system is that it is a well-known encryption and decryption algorithm rather than a design_a new algorithm'. For example, the 128-bit AES encryption and decryption algorithm can be used, because its security has been widely trusted, and it can be implemented in software and can perform high-speed operations, as well as low-status hardware. Implementation. In addition, this encryption and decryption algorithm can also be replaced by its: block encryption and decryption algorithm [such as DES, Blowfish or RC4 and so on. In addition, if a version of the server or client is found to be successfully attacked, its identification number will be placed in the blacklist. Each server and client have a blacklist. This list will be periodically. To update, if the ship is found - the identification number for the station is in this blacklist, it will end the connection phase; if a user finds that the identification code of the H is in the black towel, it will End the second paragraph of the connection. The following is a detailed description of the specific embodiments with the accompanying drawings, when the purpose of the invention, the technical capabilities, characteristics and the effects achieved. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS [Embodiment] The specific embodiment of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings, and the same reference numerals will be used in the drawings and the description of FIG. 1313995 to represent the same or similar parts. Please refer to FIG. 1A, which is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of a communication flow between a user end and a feeder end in the present invention, and refers to FIG. 1B, which is a true diagram of the verification procedure in the present invention. Grasping the content of the invention, the protection system is based on the "end of the household, the birth certificate and the connection stage, and the challenge/response procedure is as follows = the server 50 and the user terminal 6 are mutually interacting with each other. Verification, and also establish a P0b segment of gold. The ship used in this program of towels is defined according to the following: -
11 連接11 connection
φ XORφ XOR
Rl 一串由伺服器產生的128位元之亂數。Rl A string of 128-bit random numbers generated by the server.
Rz 一串由用户端產生的128位元之亂數。 X1 Κχ2 一組128位元的秘密金鑰,飼服器與用戶端將使用 其來在相互認證與連線階段金鑰產生期間保護之間 的資料交換。伺服器和用戶端都會將這組金鑰内建 於其中。 IDsRz A string of 128-bit random numbers generated by the client. X1 Κχ2 A set of 128-bit secret keys that the feeder and client will use to exchange data between mutual authentication and protection during the connection phase key generation. Both the server and the client will have this set of keys built into it. IDs
IDcIDc
Εκχΐ() Εκχ2() EcO 一串128位元的伺服器辨識號碼,伺服器提供這個 號碼給用戶端,讓用戶端知道在與那台伺服器進行 通訊。伺服器的每個版本皆有一獨特的辨識號碼, 所有同版本的伺服器都共享同一組辨識號碼。 一串128位元的用戶端辨識號碼,用戶端提供這個 號碼給伺服器’讓伺服器知道該使用哪一組秘密金 鑰。用戶端的每個版本皆有一獨特的辨識號碼,所 有同版本的用戶端都共享同一組辨識號碼。 使用Κχ·ι的AES加密程序。 使用Κχ2的AES加密程序。 使用共通金鍮的AES加密程序,共通金錄為一串所 1313995 修正本 有版本的伺服器與用戶端都知道的固定128位元長 度的金输。 Ksi 一串由伺服器產生的128位元亂數,用以作為一部 分的連線階段金錄。 KS2 一串由用戶端產生的128位元亂數,用以作為一部 分的連線階段金鑰。 Ks 連線階段金鑰 如第1A圖及第1B圖所示,認證程序1〇〇的步驟包含: 步驟105 飼服器50通知用戶端60開始認證程序; 步驟110 伺服器50傳送亂數①與Ec(丨Ds㊉Ri)至用戶端6〇; 步驟112 用戶端60使用共通金鑰來解密Ec(丨為 (IDs®Ri),然後取出 IDs ; 步驟113 用戶端60使用|DS來查詢秘密金錄組心1與心2 ; 步驟115 用戶端60產生亂數R2與Ks2。用戶端6〇使用AES 加密來產生序列叫丨EC(IDC㊉R2) |丨Εκχ2(ΡΗ|Κ32), 並將其傳送至伺服器5〇 ; 步驟120 伺服器50使用共通金输來將Ec(丨Dc0R2)解密成 (IDC㊉R2),接著取出丨Dc ; 步驟125 饲服器50使用|DC來查詢秘密金输組Κχι與& ; 步驟130 伺服器50使用Κχ2來將Ekx^D解密成⑻,丨丨 KS2,); 步驟135 右Rl不等於Rl,則認證失敗’且伺服器50會終結 此連線階段; 步驟140 伺服器50產生一組亂數Ksi ; 步驟145 伺服器50制AES加贿縣加密(R2丨丨Ksi)為 II KS1) ’並將其送給用戶端6〇 ; 步驟150 用戶端60使用秘密金輪Κχι來將Ekxi(R2丨丨Ks撕 修正本 1313995 密為(R2’ 丨| Ksi,); 步驟160若R2’不相等於R2,則認證失敗且用戶端6〇會終 結此連線階段。 、 請參考第1C圖,其為一本發明中連線階段金鑰建立程序16〇之 -實施例雜,在帛1B騎叙程雜权後,鱗軸段並未被 伺服器或是用戶端終結’相互認證已經成功,為了要建立連線階段金 . 鑰’伺服器和用戶端會執行下列步驟: 步驟165伺服器計算連線階段金鑰為Ks=Ksi㊉Ks2,; 步驟170用戶端計算連線階段金鑰為Ks,=Ks1,㊉KS2,KS,應 要與Ks相等。 ~ 或者,伺服器可以KS = EKs1( KS2,)計算連線階段金鑰,並且用 戶知可以KS = EKs1’( KS2)計算連線階段金錄為,KS,應該要與KS 相等。 、 第2A圖為本發明中數位内容之加密/解密流程2〇〇之一實施例流 程圖。 在第1B圖和第1C圖所述之認證程序1〇〇以及連線階段金鑰建立 机程160成功完成之後’將可開始進行聲音/影像的傳輪,力〇密/解密的 φ 程序200係根據下列步驟共同組合而成: 步驟205 伺服器使用連線階段金錄Ks與128位元AES加解 密演算法加密聲音/影像資料; 步驟210 用戶端使用連線階段金鑰Ks,將聲音/影像資料解密。 為了提供尚品質的影像,例如HDTV,必須可以提供如1920x1080 x30fps之相當高解析度影像,在此狀況下,未壓縮的影像串流的使用 頻寬(bitrate)將會很高,大約120 MByte/sec。因此,在第2A圖中所 描述的封包内容加密方法將會要求伺服器端與用戶端具有強大的運算 能力’只有快速的CPU可能是不夠的’顯示卡上的GPUs可能也不 夠快使用AES解密法來解密每秒i20Mbytes的資料。 1313995 修正本 因此在本發明之實施例中,使用另一種方式來加密影像封包内 容’對每個影像訊框而言’根據以下方法來產生一個128位元的數字 KFi,而Kr將會作為用來加密第j個影像訊框的訊框金鑰。 A =^(1), for i -1 KFi 二KFi—' ® EKs、KFi for i > 1 於第2B圖中描述的加密/解密方法22〇係由下列步驟組合而成: 步驟225 決定i ; 步驟230對每個i值,若i =1,伺服器使用Κπ加密整個影像 訊框; 步驟235 若丨> 1,伺服器使用Kr加密整個影像訊框。 在實施例中,使用KR加密影像訊框之方法為RC4串流加解密演 算法,用以加密整個影像訊框,RC4較AES有數倍快,本方法的優 點在於RC4是個人們信任並且相當完善的加解密演算法。 此外,為了避免使用RC4之方法還不夠快,本發明採用了另一種 方法來加密一個影像訊框。 如第2C圖所示’此為本發明中數位内容之加密/解密流程24〇之 一實施例流程圖,在此方法中,影像訊框被切割為複數巨集區塊 (macro-blocks),每個巨集區塊擁有16χ16像素。在實施例中,下列 符號被定義如下:Εκχΐ() Εκχ2() EcO A string of 128-bit server identification numbers. The server provides this number to the client to let the client know that it is communicating with that server. Each version of the server has a unique identification number, and all servers of the same version share the same set of identification numbers. A string of 128-bit client identification numbers, the client provides this number to the server 'to let the server know which set of secret keys to use. Each version of the client has a unique identification number, and all users of the same version share the same identification number. Use A·ι's AES encryption program. Use the AES encryption program of Κχ2. Using the common AES encryption program, the common record is a string of 1313995. The fixed version of the server and the client know the fixed 128-bit length of gold. Ksi A string of 128-bit random numbers generated by the server, used as part of the connection stage record. KS2 A string of 128-bit random numbers generated by the client to serve as part of the connection phase key. The Ks connection stage key is as shown in FIG. 1A and FIG. 1B. The steps of the authentication procedure 1包含 include: Step 105: The feeder 50 notifies the client 60 to start the authentication procedure; Step 110 The server 50 transmits the random number 1 and Ec (丨Ds 十 Ri) to the client 6〇; Step 112 The client 60 decrypts Ec using the common key (丨s(IDs®Ri), and then takes out the IDs; Step 113 The client 60 uses the |DS to query the secret record group Heart 1 and heart 2; Step 115 Client 60 generates random numbers R2 and Ks2. The client 6 uses AES encryption to generate a sequence called EC (IDC X R2) | 丨Ε κ χ 2 (ΡΗ | Κ 32), and transmits it to the server. Step 120: The server 50 uses the common gold input to decrypt Ec (丨Dc0R2) into (IDC ten R2), and then takes out 丨Dc; Step 125 The feeder 50 uses |DC to query the secret gold input group Κχι and & Step 130 The server 50 uses Κχ2 to decrypt Ekx^D into (8), 丨丨KS2,); Step 135 Right Rl is not equal to R1, then the authentication fails 'and the server 50 terminates the connection phase; Step 140 Server 50 Generate a set of random numbers Ksi; Step 145 Server 50 AES Plus Bribe County Encryption (R2丨丨Ksi) II KS1) 'and send it to the client 6〇; Step 150 The client 60 uses the secret gold wheel Κχι to Ekxi (R2丨丨Ks tear correction 1313995 is (R2' 丨| Ksi,); Step 160 if R2 'Not equal to R2, the authentication fails and the client 6〇 will terminate this connection phase. Please refer to Figure 1C, which is a connection stage key establishment procedure in the invention. After the B1B rides the miscellaneous power, the scaled axis segment is not terminated by the server or the client. ' Mutual authentication has been successful. In order to establish the connection phase, the key 'server' and the client will perform the following steps: Step 165 The server calculates the connection phase key as Ks=Ksi ten Ks2; Step 170 The user calculates the connection phase key as Ks, =Ks1, ten KS2, KS, which should be equal to Ks. ~ Alternatively, the server can be KS = EKs1 ( KS2,) Calculate the connection phase key, and the user knows that KS = EKs1' (KS2) can be used to calculate the connection stage, and KS should be equal to KS. Figure 2A shows the encryption of digital content in the present invention. Flowchart of one embodiment of the decryption process 2. In Figure 1B and Figure 1C After the authentication procedure 1 and the connection stage key establishment process 160 are successfully completed, 'the sound/image transmission can be started, and the φ program 200 of the compact/decryption is combined according to the following steps: Step 205: The server encrypts the sound/image data by using the connection stage Jins Ks and the 128-bit AES encryption and decryption algorithm; Step 210 The user uses the connection stage key Ks to decrypt the sound/image data. In order to provide a quality image, such as an HDTV, it is necessary to provide a relatively high resolution image such as 1920x1080 x 30fps. In this case, the bitrate of the uncompressed video stream will be very high, about 120 MByte/ Sec. Therefore, the packet content encryption method described in Figure 2A will require strong computing power on the server side and the client side. 'Only a fast CPU may not be enough'. The GPUs on the display card may not be fast enough to use AES decryption. To decrypt the data of i20Mbytes per second. 1313995 Amendment Thus, in an embodiment of the present invention, another method is used to encrypt the image packet content 'for each image frame' to generate a 128-bit digital KFi according to the following method, and Kr will be used as To encrypt the frame key of the jth video frame. A =^(1), for i -1 KFi Two KFi-' ® EKs, KFi for i > 1 The encryption/decryption method 22 described in Figure 2B is a combination of the following steps: Step 225 Decide i Step 230 For each i value, if i =1, the server encrypts the entire video frame using Κπ; Step 235 If 丨> 1, the server uses Kr to encrypt the entire video frame. In the embodiment, the method of using the KR encrypted video frame is the RC4 stream encryption and decryption algorithm for encrypting the entire image frame, and the RC4 is several times faster than the AES. The advantage of the method is that the RC4 is trusted and quite perfect. The encryption and decryption algorithm. Furthermore, in order to avoid the RC4 method being fast enough, the present invention employs another method of encrypting an image frame. As shown in FIG. 2C, 'this is a flowchart of an embodiment of the encryption/decryption process 24 of digital content in the present invention. In this method, the image frame is cut into complex macro-blocks. Each macro block has 16χ16 pixels. In the embodiment, the following symbols are defined as follows:
Mi 在此影像訊框中第i個巨集區塊。 W 该影像訊框的寬度,以像素為單位。 5亥影像訊框的高度,以像素為單位。 P 一個質數,其也與(W/16)互質。 S(Mi) 使用一個輕量級的演算法打亂Mi,例如3 CPUcycle/byte 〇 加密的方法240係由下列步驟組合而成: 步驟245 決定i ; 1313995 修正本 步驟250對每個丨值,若I (mod PH,使用RC4加密从; 步驟255 若i (mod 1,則將Mi加密為: 夕(於LG-1)/#尸+1)㊉从i 這個方法將比全部使用RC4來加密影像的方法快上約p倍。 請參考第3圖,此為本發明中數位内容之銷毀流程3〇〇之^施例 流程圖。 若飼服器或用戶端的版本被認定為會產生危害,其辨識號碼將會 被放入一黑名單之中,每個伺服器和用戶端都擁有這張黑名單,這份 •名單將會被定時更新’第3圖所述之銷毀程序300由下列步驟組合: 成: 〇 步驟305 步驟310 步驟315 步驟320 用戶端自伺服器端收到IDS ; 用戶端判定該IDs是否在黑名單中; 若4丨Ds在黑名單中,用戶端結束此連線階段; 飼服器自用戶端接收到丨Dc; 步驟325恤器端判定該丨Dg是否在黑名單中; 步驟330若該丨Dc在黑名單中,舰器結束此連線階段。Mi is the i-th macro block in this video frame. W The width of the image frame, in pixels. The height of the 5th image frame, in pixels. P is a prime number, which is also compatible with (W/16). S(Mi) uses a lightweight algorithm to scramble Mi, for example, 3 CPUcycle/byte 〇 Encryption method 240 is composed of the following steps: Step 245 decides i; 1313995 Correct this step 250 for each threshold, If I (mod PH, use RC4 encryption from; step 255 if i (mod 1, then encrypt Mi to: eve (in LG-1) / #尸+1) ten from i this method will use RC4 to encrypt than all The method of image is about p times faster. Please refer to Figure 3, which is a flow chart of the process of destroying the digital content in the present invention. If the version of the feeder or the client is deemed to be harmful, The identification number will be placed in a blacklist. Each server and client has this blacklist. This list will be updated regularly. The destruction procedure 300 described in Figure 3 consists of the following steps. Combination: into: 〇 Step 305 Step 310 Step 315 Step 320 The client receives the IDS from the server; the client determines whether the IDs are in the blacklist; if 4丨Ds is in the blacklist, the client ends the connection phase The feeding device receives the 丨Dc from the user end; the step 325 determines the 丨Dg Whether it is in the blacklist; Step 330 If the 丨Dc is in the blacklist, the player ends the connection phase.
用戶端在傳送資料給伺服器前將查驗黑名單,如第1B圖中之步』 115所述,*舰器在傳送資·帛戶端祕查驗黑,如 中之步驟140所述。 1 太恭”Γ稱式加解密演算法做為其組成元件,但須註明的是 寅算法,舉例而言,使請位元AES= 古ill疋目广任其安全性’而且它能夠以軟體實作並能進行 ί=^=梅代俯S、8丨_料^等等 發明實施之範圍。故即;實施例而已’並非用來限定本 及精·•或修 11 1313995 修正本 【圖式簡單說明】 第1A圖為本發明中用戶端和伺服器端之通訊流之實施例示意圖。 第1B圖為本發明中一認證程序之流程圖。 第1C圖為本發明中一連線階段金瑜建立程 第2A圖至第2C圖為本發明中數位内容加=圖。 第3圖為本發明中—銷毀程序之流程圖。雜序之流輕圖。 【主要元件符號說明】 。 5〇伺服器 60用戶端The client will check the blacklist before transmitting the data to the server, as described in step 1B of Figure 1B, and the ship is inspected by the client, as described in step 140. 1 Tai Gong's nickname encryption and decryption algorithm is used as its component, but it must be noted that the algorithm is used, for example, to make the bit AES = Gu 疋 广 广 广 广 安全 安全 security and 'software The implementation can be carried out ί=^=Meidei S, 8丨_material^, etc. The scope of the invention is implemented. Therefore, the embodiment is not used to limit the essence and/or repair 11 1313995 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS FIG. 1A is a schematic diagram of an embodiment of a communication flow between a client and a server in the present invention. FIG. 1B is a flow chart of an authentication procedure in the present invention. FIG. 1C is a connection stage gold in the present invention. Fig. 2A to Fig. 2C are diagrams showing the digital content plus = map in the present invention. Fig. 3 is a flow chart of the destruction procedure in the present invention. The flow diagram of the miscellaneous sequence. [Description of main component symbols]. Server 60 client
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| TWI513290B (en) * | 2010-07-23 | 2015-12-11 | Silicon Image Inc | Mechanism for partial encryption of data streams |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TWI513290B (en) * | 2010-07-23 | 2015-12-11 | Silicon Image Inc | Mechanism for partial encryption of data streams |
| US9654810B2 (en) | 2010-07-23 | 2017-05-16 | Lattice Semiconductor Corporation | Mechanism for partial encryption of data streams |
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