TW201828660A - Method, apparatus and system for quantifying defense result indicating that the defense result is more accurate since an evaluation and an evaluation index for calculating the defense result of this invention are relatively comprehensive - Google Patents
Method, apparatus and system for quantifying defense result indicating that the defense result is more accurate since an evaluation and an evaluation index for calculating the defense result of this invention are relatively comprehensive Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
Description
本發明涉及網路技術領域,尤其涉及量化防禦結果的方法、裝置及系統。 The present invention relates to the field of network technologies, and in particular, to a method, apparatus, and system for quantifying a defense result.
隨著網路技術的不斷進步,網路領域中的網路攻擊也越來越多。目前,在眾多網路攻擊中分散式拒絕服務攻擊(Distributed Denial of Service,DDoS)已經成為較為嚴重的攻擊手段。為此,在原有系統架構中加入防禦端來阻擋DDoS攻擊。 With the continuous advancement of network technology, there are more and more cyber attacks in the network field. At present, distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) has become a serious attack in many network attacks. To this end, the defensive end is added to the original system architecture to block DDoS attacks.
如圖1所示,為現有網路系統架構的一種示意圖。由圖示可知,系統架構包含業務端、路由設備、防禦端和目標端。其中,業務端包含正常業務端和攻擊端。攻擊端發送多種形式的攻擊資料流程量,防禦端依據自身內部的防禦策略阻擋攻擊資料流程量。 As shown in Figure 1, it is a schematic diagram of an existing network system architecture. As shown in the figure, the system architecture includes a service end, a routing device, a defensive end, and a target end. The service end includes a normal service end and an attack end. The attacker sends various forms of attack data flow, and the defensive end blocks the attack data flow according to its internal defense strategy.
防禦端中的防禦策略過鬆,則會導致大量的攻擊流量攻擊目標端;但是防禦策略過緊,則會影響正常業務端向目標端發送正常的資料流程量。因此,需要評估防禦端防禦策略的防禦結果,並根據防禦結果來確定適當的防禦策 略。 If the defense policy in the defensive end is too loose, a large amount of attack traffic will be attacked on the target end. However, if the defense policy is too tight, the normal service will send normal data flows to the target. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the defense outcome of the defensive end defense strategy and determine the appropriate defense strategy based on the defense outcome.
目前,由於評估防禦結果過程中使用方法不完善、參數指標不全面以及資料流程量不完整,所以導致評估防禦結果的結果不準確。 At present, the results of evaluating the defense results are inaccurate due to imperfect use methods, incomplete parameter parameters, and incomplete data flow.
本發明提供了量化防禦結果的方法、裝置及系統,藉由改進評估方法,提高評估防禦結果的準確性。另外,結合雲平台更進一步提高資料流程量的完整性。 The present invention provides a method, apparatus and system for quantifying a defense result, and by improving an evaluation method, improves the accuracy of evaluating a defense result. In addition, combined with the cloud platform to further improve the integrity of the data flow.
為了實現上述目的,本發明採用以下技術手段:一種量化防禦結果的方法,包括:獲取可疑資料流程量集合,所述可疑資料流程量集合為位於雲平台的防禦端經核心路由牽引業務端接取目標端的原始資料流程量後,由所述原始資料流程量所包含的可疑IP位址集合中每個可疑IP位址對應的資料流程量所組成的,所述可疑IP位址集合為依據預設檢測規則在所述原始資料流程量中確定的;獲取正常資料流程量,所述正常資料流程量為所述防禦端對所述可疑資料流程量集合按預設防禦策略清洗後剩餘的資料流程量;授權主機性能參數,所述主機性能參數為所述防禦端在將所述正常資料流程量發送至目標端後,在所述目標端上提取得到的參數的集合;基於目標參數集合來量化防禦結果;其中,所述目標 參數集合至少包括:所述可疑資料流程量集合、正常資料流程量和主機性能參數。 In order to achieve the above object, the present invention adopts the following technical means: a method for quantifying a defense result, comprising: acquiring a suspicious data flow quantity set, where the suspicious data flow quantity set is located at a defensive end of the cloud platform and is accessed by a core route traction service end After the original data flow of the target end, the data flow corresponding to each suspicious IP address in the suspicious IP address set included in the original data flow quantity is composed, and the suspicious IP address set is preset according to The detection rule is determined in the original data flow quantity; the normal data flow quantity is obtained, and the normal data flow quantity is the data flow quantity remaining after the defensive end cleans the suspicious data flow quantity set according to the preset defense strategy Authorizing the host performance parameter, the host performance parameter is a set of parameters extracted by the defense terminal on the target end after sending the normal data flow amount to the target end; and quantifying the defense based on the target parameter set a result; wherein the target parameter set includes at least: the suspicious data flow quantity set, a normal data flow The throughput and host performance parameters.
優選的,所述目標參數集合還包括:與所述防禦端相連的業務監控裝置發送的接取成功率;其中,所述接取成功率為所述業務監控裝置在控制多個位於不同地理位置的業務端接取所述目標端後,依據所述目標端回饋的請求成功率和請求時間延遲計算得到的。 Preferably, the target parameter set further includes: a success rate of the transmission sent by the service monitoring device connected to the defensive end; wherein the success rate of the receiving is controlled by the service monitoring device in multiple geographical locations After the service end picks up the target end, it is calculated according to the request success rate and the request time delay of the target end feedback.
優選的,所述目標參數集合還包括網路服務品質;其中,所述網路服務品質為所述防禦端依據可疑資料流程量集合和所述正常資料流量計算得到的。 Preferably, the target parameter set further includes network service quality, wherein the network service quality is calculated by the defense terminal according to the suspicious data flow quantity set and the normal data flow.
優選的,所述可疑流量清洗裝置中的所述預設防禦策略對應期望SLA等級;則所述基於目標參數集合來量化防禦結果包括:利用所述目標參數集合以及預設參數集合確定所述各個參數的變化值集合;其中,所述預設參數集合為預先存儲的、無攻擊資料流程量的情況下各個參數的集合;將所述各個參數的變化值集合與所述期望SLA等級中的各個參數範圍進行匹配;若匹配成功,則確定所述防禦端的防禦效果達到所述期望SLA等級;若匹配不成功,則確定所述防禦端的防禦效果未達到所述期望SLA等級。 Preferably, the preset defense policy in the suspicious traffic cleaning device corresponds to a desired SLA level; and the quantifying the defense result based on the target parameter set includes: determining, by using the target parameter set and the preset parameter set, the each a set of change values of the parameter; wherein the preset parameter set is a set of each parameter in a case of a pre-stored, non-attack data flow amount; each of the change value sets of the respective parameters and the desired SLA level The parameter range is matched; if the matching is successful, it is determined that the defense effect of the defensive end reaches the expected SLA level; if the matching is unsuccessful, it is determined that the defense effect of the defensive end does not reach the expected SLA level.
優選的,還包括:若匹配不成功,則將當前的防禦策略的前一防禦策 略,確定為所述預設防禦策略;其中,所述防禦端中存儲有按順序排列的多個SLA等級,以及,與每個SLA等級對應的一個防禦策略,SLA等級越小表示目標端所享受的服務等級越高,並且,前一SLA等級的對應的防禦策略優於後一SLA等級對應的防禦策略。 Preferably, the method further includes: if the matching is unsuccessful, determining a previous defense policy of the current defense policy as the preset defense policy; wherein the defense terminal stores multiple SLA levels arranged in sequence, And a defense strategy corresponding to each SLA level, the smaller the SLA level, the higher the service level enjoyed by the target end, and the corresponding defense strategy of the previous SLA level is better than the defense strategy corresponding to the latter SLA level.
優選的,所述利用所述目標參數集合以及預設參數集合確定所述各個參數的變化值集合,包括:依據所述可疑資料流程量集合和所述正常資料流程量,計算輸入協定信息和輸出協定信息變化率的變化量集合;其中,所述輸入協議信息從所述可疑資料流程量集合中提取得到的,所述輸出協議信息從所述正常資料流程量中提取得到;和,計算所述正常資料流程量的核心資料集與所述預設參數集合中的預設核心資料集之間的標準差集合;其中,所述核心資料集包括請求應答率、業務成功率、30x狀態碼的所佔比例、40x狀態碼的所佔比例、50x狀態碼的所佔比例和正常用戶請求的時間延遲;和,計算所述主機性能參數和所述預設參數集合中的預設主機性能參數之間的第二變化值集合;和/或,計算所述接取成功率與所述預設參數集合中預設接取成功率的第三變化值集合;和/或,計算所述網路服務品質與所述預設參數集合中預設網路服務品質的第四變化值集合。 Preferably, the determining, by using the target parameter set and the preset parameter set, the change value set of the each parameter comprises: calculating input protocol information and output according to the suspicious data flow quantity set and the normal data flow quantity a set of changes in the rate of change of the agreement information; wherein the input protocol information is extracted from the set of suspect data flows, the output protocol information is extracted from the normal data flow; and, a standard deviation set between a core data set of a normal data flow quantity and a preset core data set in the preset parameter set; wherein the core data set includes a request response rate, a service success rate, and a 30x status code The proportion, the proportion of the 40x status code, the proportion of the 50x status code, and the time delay of the normal user request; and, between calculating the host performance parameter and the preset host performance parameter in the preset parameter set a second set of change values; and/or, calculating a third change in the success rate of the pick-up and the preset success rate in the preset parameter set And a set of values of the fourth change value of the network service quality and the preset network service quality in the preset parameter set.
優選的,依據所述可疑資料流程量集合和所述正常資料流程量,計算輸入協定信息和輸出協定信息變化率的變化量集合,包括:計算輸入方向的syn信息與輸出方向的syn信息的差值,將該差值與所述輸入方向的syn信息的比值作為syn信息的增加率;計算輸入方向的syn-ack信息與輸出方向的syn-ack信息的差值,將該差值與所述輸入方向的syn-ack信息比值作為的syn-ack信息的增加率;將所述syn信息的增加率與所述syn-ack信息的增加率的差值,確定為所述變化量集合。 Preferably, the change set of the change rate of the input agreement information and the output agreement information is calculated according to the suspicious data flow quantity set and the normal data flow quantity, including: calculating a difference between the syn information in the input direction and the syn information in the output direction. a value, the ratio of the difference to the syn information of the input direction is used as an increase rate of the syn information; calculating a difference between the syn-ack information in the input direction and the syn-ack information in the output direction, the difference being The syn-ack information ratio of the input direction is used as the increase rate of the syn-ack information; and the difference between the increase rate of the syn information and the increase rate of the syn-ack information is determined as the change amount set.
優選的,所述計算所述正常資料流程量的核心資料集與所述預設參數集合中的預設核心資料集之間的標準差集合,包括:計算所述核心資料集與預設核心資料集中,針對請求應答率的第一標準差、針對業務成功率的第二標準差、針對30x狀態碼的所佔比例的第三標準差、針對40x狀態碼的所佔比例的第四標準差、針對50x狀態碼的所佔比例的第五標準差和針對正常用戶請求的時間延遲的第六標準差;將所述第一標準差、所述第二標準差、所述第三標準差、所述第四標準差、所述第五標準差和所述第六標準差的集合,確定為所述標準差集合。 Preferably, the calculating a standard deviation set between the core data set of the normal data flow quantity and the preset core data set in the preset parameter set comprises: calculating the core data set and preset core data Concentration, the first standard deviation for the request response rate, the second standard deviation for the service success rate, the third standard deviation for the proportion of the 30x status code, the fourth standard deviation for the 40x status code, a fifth standard deviation for the proportion of the 50x status code and a sixth standard deviation for the time delay of the normal user request; the first standard deviation, the second standard deviation, the third standard deviation, the The set of the fourth standard deviation, the fifth standard deviation, and the sixth standard deviation is determined as the standard deviation set.
優選的,所述接取成功率包括請求成功率和請求時間 延遲;則所述計算所述接取成功率與所述預設參數集合中預設接取成功率的第三變化值集合,包括:計算所述接取成功率中請求成功率與預設接取成功率中請求成功率的變化率;計算所述接取成功率中請求時間延遲與預設接取成功率中請求時間延遲的變化量;將所述變化率和所述變化量,確定為所述第三變化值集合。 Preferably, the success rate of the connection includes a request success rate and a request time delay; the calculating a third change value set of the success rate of the connection and the preset success rate in the preset parameter set, including Calculating a rate of change of the request success rate in the success rate of the connection and the success rate of the request in the preset success rate; calculating a request time delay in the success rate of the connection and a request time delay in the success rate of the preset connection The amount of change; determining the rate of change and the amount of change as the third set of change values.
優選的,所述主機性能參數包括:所述目標端的主機在接收到第一個syn封包之後半開連結的數量;所述目標端的主機CPU;所述目標端的主機記憶體;所述目標端的連接表;所述目標端的主機輸入輸出次數;以及,所述目標端的主機的進出流量所佔比例。 Preferably, the host performance parameter includes: a number of half-open links after the host of the target end receives the first syn packet; a host CPU of the target end; a host memory of the target end; and a connection of the target end a table; a number of host input and output times of the target end; and a proportion of the inbound and outbound traffic of the host at the target end.
優選的,所述網路服務品質包括:在清洗所述原始資料流程量過程中帶來的網路延時;在清洗所述原始資料流程量過程中帶來的網路丟包率;在清洗所述原始資料流程量過程中帶來的TCP可用性;在清洗所述原始資料流程量過程中帶來的UDP可用性;以及, 在清洗所述原始資料流程量過程中帶來的抖動。 Preferably, the network service quality includes: a network delay caused by cleaning the original data flow amount; a network packet loss rate brought by cleaning the original data flow amount; The TCP availability brought about by the raw data flow process; the UDP availability brought about by cleaning the raw data flow; and the jitter caused by cleaning the raw data flow.
一種量化防禦結果的系統,包括:業務端、位於雲平台的防禦端、目標端以及與所述業務端、所述防禦端和所述目標端相連的核心路由;所述核心路由,用於複製業務端接取目標端的原始資料流程量,獲得副本資料流程量;所述防禦端,用於獲取可疑資料流程量集合,所述可疑資料流程量集合為位於雲平台的防禦端經核心路由牽引業務端接取目標端的原始資料流程量後,由所述原始資料流程量所包含的可疑IP位址集合中每個可疑IP位址對應的資料流程量所組成的,所述可疑IP位址集合為依據預設檢測規則在所述原始資料流程量中確定的;獲取正常資料流程量,所述正常資料流程量為所述防禦端對所述可疑資料流程量集合按預設防禦策略清洗後剩餘的資料流程量;授權主機性能參數,所述主機性能參數為所述防禦端在將所述正常資料流程量發送至目標端後,在所述目標端上提取得到的參數的集合;基於目標參數集合來量化防禦結果;其中,所述目標參數集合至少包括:所述可疑資料流程量集合、正常資料流程量和主機性能參數。 A system for quantifying a defense result, comprising: a service end, a defensive end located at a cloud platform, a target end, and a core route connected to the service end, the defensive end, and the target end; the core route is used for copying The business end accesses the original data flow of the target end, and obtains the copy data flow quantity; the defensive end is used to obtain the suspicious data flow quantity set, and the suspicious data flow quantity set is the core route traction service located at the defensive end of the cloud platform After the source data volume of the target end is taken, the data flow corresponding to each suspicious IP address in the suspicious IP address set included in the original data flow quantity is formed, and the suspicious IP address set is And determining, according to the preset detection rule, the amount of the normal data flow, where the normal data flow quantity is the remaining after the defensive end cleans the suspicious data flow quantity set according to the preset defense strategy Data flow quantity; authorized host performance parameter, the host performance parameter is that the defensive end sends the normal data flow amount to the target And extracting the obtained set of parameters on the target end; and quantifying the defense result based on the target parameter set; wherein the target parameter set includes at least: the suspicious data flow quantity set, the normal data flow quantity, and the host performance parameter .
優選的,所述防禦端包括:與所述核心路由相連的可疑流量檢測裝置,用於依據預設檢測規則分析所述副本資料流程量,獲得所述副本資料流程量中包含的可疑IP位址集合,並發送所述可疑IP位址集合; 與所述核心路由和所述可疑流量檢測裝置相連的可疑流量清洗裝置,用於獲取所述可疑IP位址集合,在所述核心路由的原始資料流程量中牽引可疑資料流程量集合,其中,按預設防禦策略清洗所述可疑資料流程量集合,並將所述可疑資料流程量集合在清洗後剩餘的正常資料流程量,轉發至所述目標端;與所述可疑流量檢測裝置、所述可疑流量清洗裝置和所述目標端相連的雲主機,用於在所述可疑流量檢測裝置上獲取所述可疑資料流程量集合,所述可疑資料流程量集合中包含與每個可疑IP位址對應的可疑資料流程量;在所述可疑流量清洗裝置上獲取正常資料流程量,在將所述正常資料流程量發送至目標端後,在所述目標端上獲取表示目標端性能的主機性能參數。 Preferably, the defensive end includes: a suspicious traffic detecting device connected to the core route, configured to analyze the copy data flow according to a preset detection rule, and obtain a suspicious IP address included in the copy data flow. And collecting the suspect IP address set; the suspicious traffic cleaning device connected to the core route and the suspicious traffic detecting device, configured to acquire the suspect IP address set, and the original data in the core route Tracing a collection of suspicious data flows in a process quantity, wherein the suspicious data flow quantity set is cleaned according to a preset defense policy, and the suspicious data flow quantity is collected in a normal data flow quantity after cleaning, and forwarded to the target a cloud host connected to the suspicious traffic detecting device, the suspicious traffic cleaning device, and the target end, configured to acquire the suspicious data flow quantity set on the suspicious traffic detecting device, where the suspicious data flow The quantity set includes a suspicious data flow amount corresponding to each suspicious IP address; obtaining normal on the suspicious traffic cleaning device The amount of material flow, after the normal data flow sent to the target amount of the end, on the end of the target performance parameter acquisition target that the host-side performance.
優選的,所述系統還包括:與所述雲主機相連的業務監控裝置,用於控制多個位於不同地理位置的業務主機接取所述目標端,依據所述目標端回饋的接取成功率和請求時間延遲,計算接取成功率;將所述接取成功率發送至所述雲主機;相應的,所述目標參數集合還包括所述接取成功率。 Preferably, the system further includes: a service monitoring device connected to the cloud host, configured to control a plurality of service hosts located in different geographical locations to access the target end, and according to the success rate of the target end feedback And the request time delay is calculated, and the success rate of the connection is calculated; the success rate of the connection is sent to the cloud host; correspondingly, the target parameter set further includes the success rate of the connection.
優選的,所述雲主機還用於,依據所述可疑資料流程量集合和所述正常資料流程量,計算網路服務品質;相應的,所述目標參數集合還包括所述網路服務品質。 Preferably, the cloud host is further configured to calculate a network service quality according to the suspicious data flow quantity set and the normal data flow quantity; correspondingly, the target parameter set further includes the network service quality.
優選的,所述核心路由還用於,將可疑流量清洗裝置 在原始資料流程量中牽引可疑資料流程量集合之後剩餘的資料流程量,轉發至所述目標端。 Preferably, the core route is further configured to forward the data flow amount remaining after the suspicious traffic cleaning device pulls the suspicious data flow quantity set in the original data flow quantity to the target end.
優選的,所述雲主機具體用於,利用所述目標參數集合以及預設參數集合確定所述各個參數的變化值集合;將所述各個參數的變化值集合與所述期望SLA等級中的各個參數範圍進行匹配;若匹配成功,則確定防禦端的防禦效果達到所述期望SLA等級;若匹配不成功,確定所述防禦端的防禦效果未達到所述期望SLA等級。 Preferably, the cloud host is specifically configured to determine, by using the target parameter set and the preset parameter set, a change value set of the each parameter; and set a change value set of the each parameter to each of the expected SLA levels. The parameter range is matched; if the matching is successful, it is determined that the defense effect of the defensive end reaches the expected SLA level; if the matching is unsuccessful, it is determined that the defense effect of the defensive end does not reach the expected SLA level.
優選的,所述雲主機還用於,在匹配不成功的情況下,將當前的防禦策略的前一防禦策略,確定為所述預設防禦策略;其中,所述預設參數集合為預先存儲的、無攻擊資料流程量的情況下各個參數的集合;所述防禦端中存儲有按順序排列的多個SLA等級,以及,與每個SLA等級對應的一個防禦策略,SLA等級越小表示目標端所享受的服務等級越高,並且,前一SLA等級的對應的防禦策略優於後一SLA等級對應的防禦策略。 Preferably, the cloud host is further configured to: determine, in the case that the matching is unsuccessful, the previous defense policy of the current defense policy as the preset defense policy; wherein the preset parameter set is pre-stored a set of various parameters in the case of no attack data flow; the defensive end stores a plurality of SLA levels arranged in order, and a defense strategy corresponding to each SLA level, the smaller the SLA level indicates the target The higher the service level enjoyed by the terminal, and the corresponding defense strategy of the previous SLA level is better than the defense strategy corresponding to the latter SLA level.
優選的,所述主機性能參數,包括:所述目標端的主機在接收到第一個syn封包之後半開連結的數量;所述目標端的主機CPU;所述目標端的主機記憶體;所述目標端的連接表;所述目標端的主機輸入輸出次數;以及, 所述目標端的主機的進出流量所佔比例。 Preferably, the host performance parameter includes: a quantity of a half-open link after the host of the target end receives the first syn packet; a host CPU of the target end; a host memory of the target end; and a target end of the target end a connection table; a number of times of input and output of the host at the target end; and a proportion of the inbound and outbound traffic of the host at the target end.
優選的,所述網路服務品質包括:在清洗所述原始資料流程量過程中帶來的網路延時;在清洗所述原始資料流程量過程中帶來的網路丟包率;在清洗所述原始資料流程量過程中帶來的TCP可用性;在清洗所述原始資料流程量過程中帶來的UDP可用性;以及,在清洗所述原始資料流程量過程中帶來的抖動。 Preferably, the network service quality includes: a network delay caused by cleaning the original data flow amount; a network packet loss rate brought by cleaning the original data flow amount; The TCP availability brought about by the raw data flow process; the UDP availability brought about by cleaning the raw data flow; and the jitter caused by cleaning the raw data flow.
由以上技術內容可以看出本發明具有以下有益效果:本發明實施例將防禦端設置於雲平台,在雲平台防禦端可以將業務端的原始資料流程量牽引到自身,目標端的業務一般都是在雲平台上運行,所以防禦端可以在雲平台上獲得目標端的資料流程量,同時,防禦端還可以獲得自身的資料流程量。所以,在雲平台下可以將業務端、目標端和防禦端三者的資料流程量統一集中,從而可以獲得三端的資料流程量。由於,本發明中可以將業務端、防禦端和目標端三部分的資料流程量進行統一分析,從而使得評估防禦結果的評價角度和指標較為全面,進而使得防禦結果較為準確。 It can be seen from the above technical content that the present invention has the following beneficial effects: the defensive end is set on the cloud platform in the embodiment of the present invention, and the original data flow of the service end can be pulled to itself on the defensive end of the cloud platform, and the services at the target end are generally in the The cloud platform runs, so the defensive end can obtain the data flow of the target end on the cloud platform, and the defensive end can also obtain its own data flow amount. Therefore, under the cloud platform, the data flow of the business end, the target end, and the defensive end can be unified and centralized, so that the data flow of the three end can be obtained. Because the data flow of the business part, the defensive end and the target end can be uniformly analyzed in the invention, the evaluation angle and the index of the evaluation of the defense result are comprehensive, and the defense result is more accurate.
100‧‧‧業務端 100‧‧‧Business side
200‧‧‧防禦端 200‧‧‧defensive end
300‧‧‧目標端 300‧‧‧ Target
400‧‧‧核心路由 400‧‧‧ Core Routing
201‧‧‧可疑流量檢測裝置 201‧‧‧Suspicious flow detection device
202‧‧‧可疑流量清洗裝置 202‧‧‧Suspicious flow cleaning device
203‧‧‧雲主機 203‧‧‧Cloud Host
500‧‧‧業務監控裝置 500‧‧‧Business monitoring device
600‧‧‧分光器 600‧‧‧distributor
為了更清楚地說明本發明實施例或現有技術中的技術 方案,下面將對實施例或現有技術描述中所需要使用的附圖作簡單地介紹,顯而易見地,下面描述中的附圖僅僅是本發明的一些實施例,對於本領域普通技術人員來講,在不付出創造性勞動的前提下,還可以根據這些附圖獲得其他的附圖。 In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings used in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly described below. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are only Some embodiments of the invention may also be used to obtain other figures from these figures without departing from the art.
圖1為現有網路系統架構的一種示意圖;圖2為本發明實施例公開的量化防禦結果的系統的結構示意圖;圖3為本發明實施例公開的又一量化防禦結果的系統的結構示意圖;圖4為本發明實施例公開的又一量化防禦結果的系統的結構示意圖;圖5為本發明實施例公開的又一量化防禦結果的系統的結構示意圖;圖6為本發明實施例公開的量化防禦結果的方法的流程圖;圖7為本發明實施例公開的量化防禦結果的方法中計算防禦結果的流程圖。 1 is a schematic diagram of an existing network system architecture; FIG. 2 is a schematic structural diagram of a system for quantifying a defense result according to an embodiment of the present invention; FIG. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of another system for quantifying a defense result according to an embodiment of the present invention; FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of another system for quantifying a defense result according to an embodiment of the present invention; FIG. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of another system for quantifying a defense result according to an embodiment of the present invention; FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of a method disclosed in an embodiment of the present invention; A flowchart of a method for defending a result; FIG. 7 is a flowchart of calculating a defense result in a method for quantifying a defense result disclosed in an embodiment of the present invention.
下面將結合本發明實施例中的附圖,對本發明實施例中的技術方案進行清楚、完整地描述,顯然,所描述的實施例僅僅是本發明一部分實施例,而不是全部的實施例。基於本發明中的實施例,本領域普通技術人員在沒有做出 創造性勞動前提下所獲得的所有其他實施例,都屬於本發明保護的範圍。 The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention are clearly and completely described in the following with reference to the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. It is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, but not all embodiments. All other embodiments obtained by a person of ordinary skill in the art based on the embodiments of the present invention without creative efforts are within the scope of the present invention.
現有技術中在量化防禦結果過程中的評價角度和評價指標不全面的根本原因在於:無法將業務端、防禦端和目標端三者的資料流程量進行統一集中。三者的資料流程量無法統一集中的原因為:攻擊端的資料流程量來自網路的外部,防禦端的資料流程量一般是在網路的邊界或者出口,目標端的資料流程量一般是歸屬用戶自己管理,即三者的資料流程量不在同一系統中;並且,業務端、目標端和防禦端三者之間無介面,即三者之間資料流程量無法經由介面進行資料共用;所以三者資料流程量難以統一集中。 In the prior art, the fundamental reason for the incomplete evaluation angle and evaluation index in the process of quantifying the defense result is that the data flow of the business end, the defensive end and the target end cannot be uniformly centralized. The reason why the data flow of the three cannot be unified is that the data flow of the attack side comes from the outside of the network, and the data flow of the defensive end is generally at the boundary or the exit of the network. The data flow of the target end is generally managed by the user. , that is, the data flow of the three is not in the same system; and there is no interface between the business side, the target end and the defensive end, that is, the data flow between the three cannot be shared by the interface; therefore, the data flow of the three It is difficult to concentrate and concentrate.
為此,本發明提供的一種量化防禦結果的系統。如圖2所示,量化防禦結果的系統包括:業務端100,位於雲平台的防禦端200,目標端300,以及,與所述業務端100、防禦端200和目標端300相連的核心路由400。本實施例中防禦端200旁路設置在核心路由400的一側。 To this end, the present invention provides a system for quantifying defense outcomes. As shown in FIG. 2, the system for quantifying the defense result includes: a service end 100, a defensive end 200 of the cloud platform, a target end 300, and a core route 400 connected to the service end 100, the defensive end 200, and the target end 300. . In this embodiment, the defensive end 200 is bypassed on one side of the core route 400.
下面詳細介紹量化防禦結果的系統中各部分的作用: The role of each part of the system that quantifies the defense results is detailed below:
本發明中業務端100可以包含有多個業務主機,每個業務主機均有唯一的源位址(IP位址),每個業務主機均可以向目標端300發送資料流程量。因此,業務端100向目標端300發送的原始資料流程量中包含有多個業務主機 發送的資料流程量,每個資料流程量中均包含業務主機的源位址,即原始資料流程量中包含有多個業務主機的源位址(IP位址)。 In the present invention, the service end 100 may include multiple service hosts, each of which has a unique source address (IP address), and each service host may send a data flow to the target end 300. Therefore, the original data flow sent by the service end 100 to the target end 300 includes the data flow volume sent by the multiple service hosts, and each data flow quantity includes the source address of the service host, that is, the original data flow quantity is included. The source address (IP address) of multiple service hosts.
由於一部分業務主機是正常業務主機,一部分業務主機是攻擊業務主機,所以原始資料流程量中一部分是由正常業務主機發送的正常資料流程量,一部分是由攻擊業務主機發送的攻擊資料流程量。 Because some service hosts are normal service hosts and some service hosts are attack service hosts, part of the original data flow is the normal data flow sent by the normal service host, and part of the attack data flow sent by the attack service host.
業務端100可以將旨在發送至目標端300的原始資料流程量發送至核心路由400。 The business end 100 can send the raw material flow amount intended to be sent to the target end 300 to the core route 400.
核心路由400,用於複製業務端接取目標端的原始資料流程量,獲得副本資料流程量。 The core route 400 is used for copying the raw data flow of the target end to obtain the copy data flow.
核心路由400可以採用分光器分光方式或者軟體程式複製的方式,將業務端100接取目標端300的原始資料流程量進行複製,從而得到與原始資料流程量一致的副本資料流程量。這可以方便後續防禦端200可以對副本資料流程量進行檢測,以查看副本資料流程量中是否有具有攻擊資料流程量。 The core route 400 can use the splitter splitting mode or the software program copying method to copy the original data flow amount of the target end 300 to the target end 300, thereby obtaining the copy data flow amount consistent with the original data flow amount. This can facilitate the subsequent defensive end 200 to detect the amount of the copy data flow to check whether there is an attack data flow amount in the copy data flow.
如圖3所示,所述防禦端200具體包括: As shown in FIG. 3, the defensive end 200 specifically includes:
(a)可疑流量檢測裝置201。 (a) Suspicious flow rate detecting means 201.
可疑流量檢測裝置201與所述核心路由400相連,用 於依據預設檢測規則分析所述副本資料流程量,獲得所述副本資料流程量中包含的可疑IP位址集合,並發送所述可疑IP位址集合。 The suspicious traffic detection device 201 is connected to the core route 400, and configured to analyze the copy data flow amount according to a preset detection rule, obtain a suspicious IP address set included in the copy data flow, and send the suspicious IP address. A collection of addresses.
可疑流量檢測裝置201中的預設檢測規則可以為具有攻擊性的多個異常IP位址。由可疑IP位址發送而來的資料流程量為可能具有攻擊性的可疑資料流程量。 The preset detection rule in the suspicious traffic detecting device 201 may be a plurality of abnormal IP addresses that are aggressive. The amount of data flow sent from a suspect IP address is a potentially suspicious amount of suspicious data.
可疑流量檢測裝置201在獲得副本資料流程量後,可以提取其中所有IP位址,然後可以將所有IP位址與預設檢測規則中的異常IP位址進行對比。當副本資料流程量中所有IP位址包含有異常IP位址時,則說明副本資料流程量中包含有可疑資料流程量。 After obtaining the copy data flow amount, the suspicious traffic detecting device 201 can extract all the IP addresses therein, and then compare all the IP addresses with the abnormal IP addresses in the preset detection rules. When all the IP addresses in the copy data flow contain abnormal IP addresses, it indicates that the copy data flow contains the suspicious data flow.
將副本資料流程量中所包含的所有異常IP位址作為可疑IP位址,將所有可疑IP位址的集合稱為可疑IP位址集合,將可疑IP位址集合發送至可疑流量清洗裝置202。 All abnormal IP addresses included in the copy data flow are regarded as suspicious IP addresses, and a collection of all suspect IP addresses is referred to as a suspicious IP address set, and the suspect IP address set is sent to the suspicious traffic cleaning device 202.
在確定可疑IP位址集合後,在副本資料流程量中提取與每個可疑IP位址對應的可疑資料流程量,將所有可疑資料流程量的集合稱為可疑資料流程量集合;並將可疑資料流程量集合發送至雲主機203,供雲主機203計算防禦結果使用。 After determining the set of suspicious IP addresses, the suspicious data flow corresponding to each suspicious IP address is extracted in the copy data flow, and the collection of all suspicious data flows is called a suspicious data flow set; and the suspicious data is The set of process quantities is sent to the cloud host 203 for the cloud host 203 to calculate the defense result for use.
(b)可疑流量清洗裝置202。 (b) Suspicious flow cleaning device 202.
與所述核心路由400和所述可疑流量檢測裝置201相連的可疑流量清洗裝置202,用於獲取所述可疑IP位址集合,在所述核心路由400的原始資料流程量中牽引可疑資 料流程量集合,其中,按預設防禦策略清洗所述可疑資料流程量集合,並將所述可疑資料流程量集合在清洗後剩餘的正常資料流程量,轉發至所述目標端300。 The suspicious traffic cleaning device 202 connected to the core route 400 and the suspicious traffic detecting device 201 is configured to acquire the suspect IP address set, and to pull the suspicious data flow amount in the original data flow of the core route 400. The collection, wherein the suspicious data flow quantity set is cleaned according to a preset defense policy, and the suspicious data flow quantity is collected in the normal data flow quantity remaining after the cleaning, and is forwarded to the target end 300.
可疑流量清洗裝置202在獲得可疑IP位址集合之後,便在核心路由400的原始資料流程量中牽引與每個可疑IP位址對應的可疑資料流程量,並將所有可疑資料流程量的集合組成可疑資料流程量集合。 After obtaining the suspicious IP address set, the suspicious traffic cleaning device 202 pulls the suspicious data flow corresponding to each suspicious IP address in the original data flow of the core route 400, and composes a set of all suspicious data flows. A collection of suspicious data flows.
在原始資料流程量中去除可疑資料流程量集合後剩餘數量,為不具有攻擊性IP位址對應的資料流程量,所以這部分資料流程量可以不用牽引至可疑流量清洗裝置202中進行清洗,直接由核心路由400轉發至目標端300即可。 After the removal of the suspicious data flow quantity set in the original data flow quantity, the remaining quantity is the data flow quantity corresponding to the non-aggressive IP address, so the part of the data flow quantity can be directly washed by the suspicious flow cleaning device 202, directly It can be forwarded by the core route 400 to the target terminal 300.
可疑資料流程量集合為從可疑IP位址傳輸而來的資料流程量,所以可疑資料流程量集合中可疑資料流程量可能是正常資料流程量,可能是攻擊資料流程量。因此,可疑流量清洗裝置202在獲得可疑資料流程量集合後,需要依據預設防禦策略清洗可疑資料流程量集合中的攻擊資料流程量。 The suspicious data flow collection is the amount of data flow transmitted from the suspect IP address, so the suspicious data flow in the suspicious data flow set may be the normal data flow, which may be the attack data flow. Therefore, after obtaining the suspicious data flow quantity set, the suspicious traffic cleaning device 202 needs to clean the attack data flow amount in the suspicious data flow quantity set according to the preset defense policy.
可見,本發明中可疑流量清洗裝置203僅需對原始資料流程量中可疑資料流程量集合進行清洗即可,而無需全部的原始資料流程量進行清洗。由於減少了可疑流量清洗裝置203的資料流程量,所以,可以提高可疑流量清洗裝置203的清洗效率。 It can be seen that, in the present invention, the suspicious flow cleaning device 203 only needs to clean the set of suspicious data flows in the original data flow, and does not need to clean all the original data flows. Since the amount of data flow of the suspicious flow cleaning device 203 is reduced, the cleaning efficiency of the suspicious flow cleaning device 203 can be improved.
理論上,經過可疑流量清洗裝置202清洗之後輸出的 資料流程量為不具有攻擊性的正常資料流程量。所以,可以將正常資料流程量轉發至目標端300,以便業務端100接取目標端300的正常資料流程量可以轉發至目標端300。 Theoretically, the amount of data flow output after being cleaned by the suspicious flow cleaning device 202 is a non-aggressive normal data flow. Therefore, the normal data flow can be forwarded to the target end 300, so that the normal data flow of the target end 300 of the service end 100 can be forwarded to the target end 300.
現實情況下,可疑流量清洗裝置202中的預設防禦策略並一定是最適用於目標端的防禦策略。即按預設防禦策略清洗可疑資料流程量集合後得到的資料流程量中仍然有攻擊資料流程量(此時說明防禦策略過鬆);或者,清洗後得到的資料流程量中原本正常的資料流程量被清洗掉(此時說明防禦策略過緊)。 In reality, the preset defense policy in the suspicious traffic cleaning device 202 must be the defense strategy most suitable for the target end. That is, there is still an attack data flow in the data flow obtained after cleaning the suspicious data flow collection according to the preset defense strategy (in this case, the defense strategy is too loose); or, the data flow obtained after cleaning is the normal data flow. The amount is washed away (this indicates that the defense strategy is too tight).
因此,可疑流量清洗裝置202可以將可疑資料流程量集合在清洗後剩餘的正常資料流程量,發送至雲主機203,以便供雲主機203計算防禦結果,從而根據防禦結果來改善預設防禦策略。 Therefore, the suspicious traffic cleaning device 202 can collect the normal data flow amount remaining after the cleaning of the suspicious data flow amount to the cloud host 203, so that the cloud host 203 calculates the defense result, thereby improving the preset defense policy according to the defense result.
(c)雲主機203。 (c) Cloud host 203.
與所述可疑流量檢測裝置201、所述可疑流量清洗裝置202和所述目標端300相連的雲主機203,用於在所述可疑流量檢測裝置201上獲取所述可疑資料流程量集合,所述可疑資料流程量集合中包含與每個可疑IP位址對應的可疑資料流程量;在所述可疑流量清洗裝置202上獲取正常資料流程量,在將所述正常資料流程量發送至目標端300後,在所述目標端300上獲取表示目標端300性能的主機性能參數;將目標參數集合確定為量化防禦結果的基礎;其中,所述目標參數集合至少包括:所述可疑資料流 程量集合、所述正常資料流程量和所述主機性能參數。 a cloud host 203 connected to the suspicious traffic detecting device 201, the suspicious traffic cleaning device 202, and the target terminal 300, configured to acquire the suspicious data flow quantity set on the suspicious traffic detecting device 201, The suspicious data flow quantity set includes a suspicious data flow quantity corresponding to each suspicious IP address; the normal data flow quantity is obtained on the suspicious traffic cleaning apparatus 202, and after the normal data flow quantity is sent to the target end 300, Obtaining a host performance parameter indicating the performance of the target end 300 on the target end 300; determining the target parameter set as a basis for quantifying the defense result; wherein the target parameter set at least includes: the suspicious data flow quantity set, the The normal data flow amount and the host performance parameter are described.
雲主機203在可疑流量檢測裝置201上獲取可疑資料流程量集合,在可疑流量清洗裝置202上獲取按預設防禦策略清洗後的正常資料流程量,利用這兩部分資料計算清洗前和清洗後的資料流程量的變化率;並將變化率作為量化防禦結果的一個依據。 The cloud host 203 obtains the set of suspicious data flows on the suspicious traffic detecting device 201, and obtains the normal data flow after cleaning according to the preset defense policy on the suspicious traffic cleaning device 202, and uses the two pieces of data to calculate the pre-cleaning and post-cleaning processes. The rate of change in the amount of data flow; and the rate of change as a basis for quantifying the defense outcome.
由於清洗後的正常資料流程量發送至目標端300,所以,正常資料流程量會對目標端產生直接的影響,即目標端300的性能狀態最先產生變化,例如,CPU佔用過多、無法響應等等。因此,在將清洗後得到的正常資料流程量發送至目標端300後,可以提取目標端的主機性能參數,將主機性能參數作為量化防禦結果的一個依據。 Since the normal data flow after cleaning is sent to the target terminal 300, the normal data flow has a direct impact on the target end, that is, the performance state of the target end 300 is changed first, for example, the CPU is too large, unable to respond, etc. Wait. Therefore, after the normal data flow obtained after the cleaning is sent to the target end 300, the host performance parameter of the target end can be extracted, and the host performance parameter is used as a basis for quantifying the defense result.
其中,所述主機性能參數,包括:所述目標端的主機在接收到第一個syn封包之後半開連結的數量;所述目標端的主機CPU;所述目標端的主機記憶體;所述目標端的連接表;所述目標端的主機輸入輸出次數;以及,所述目標端的主機的進出流量所佔比例。 The host performance parameter includes: a number of half-open connections after the host of the target end receives the first syn packet; a host CPU of the target end; a host memory of the target end; and a connection of the target end a table; a number of host input and output times of the target end; and a proportion of the inbound and outbound traffic of the host at the target end.
在本發明提供的量化防禦結果的系統下,位於雲平台的防禦端200可以在核心路由上藉由路由調度策略將業務端100的原始資料流程量牽引至自身;目標端300的業務一般都是在雲平台上運行,所以,防禦端200可以在雲平台上獲得目標端300的資料流程量;同時,位於雲平台的防禦端200還可以在雲平台獲得自身的資料流程量。所以,在雲平台上可以將業務端100、目標端300和防禦端 200三者的資料流程量進行統一集中。 In the system for quantifying the defense result provided by the present invention, the defensive end 200 of the cloud platform can pull the original data flow of the service end 100 to itself through the routing scheduling policy on the core route; the services of the target end 300 are generally The defensive end 200 can obtain the data flow of the target end 300 on the cloud platform. Meanwhile, the defensive end 200 of the cloud platform can also obtain its own data flow quantity on the cloud platform. Therefore, the data flow of the service end 100, the target end 300, and the defensive end 200 can be uniformly centralized on the cloud platform.
此外,由於業務端100、目標端300和防禦端200三者的資料流程量均經過雲平台下,雲平台具有統一資料格式的作用。因此,雲平台上可以將三者的資料格式統一,從而可以方便對三者的資料流程量進行統一分析。因此,在雲平台上防禦端200可以藉由大數據分析的能力,同時對業務端100、目標端300和防禦端200三者資料流程量進行統一分析,由於量化防禦結果的評估角度和指標較為全面,所以可以得到準確的防禦效果。 In addition, since the data flow of the service end 100, the target end 300, and the defensive end 200 are all under the cloud platform, the cloud platform has the function of a unified data format. Therefore, the data format of the three can be unified on the cloud platform, so that the data flow of the three can be conveniently analyzed. Therefore, on the cloud platform, the defensive end 200 can analyze the data flow of the service end 100, the target end 300, and the defensive end 200 by using the capability of big data analysis, because the evaluation angles and indicators of the quantitative defense results are relatively Comprehensive, so you can get accurate defense effects.
為了使雲主機203計算得到的防禦結果更加準確,如圖4所示,本發明提供的量化防禦結果的系統還包括:與所述雲主機相連的業務監控裝置500。 In order to make the defense result calculated by the cloud host 203 more accurate, as shown in FIG. 4, the system for quantifying the defense result provided by the present invention further includes: a service monitoring apparatus 500 connected to the cloud host.
業務監控裝置500用於控制多個位於不同地理位置的業務主機接取所述目標端300,依據所述目標端300回饋的請求成功率和請求時間延遲,計算接取成功率;將所述接取成功率發送至所述雲主機203。將接取成功率作為目標參數集合的一員,以便供雲主機203計算防禦結果。 The service monitoring device 500 is configured to control a plurality of service hosts located in different geographical locations to access the target terminal 300, and calculate a success rate of the request according to the request success rate and the request time delay fed back by the target terminal 300; The success rate is sent to the cloud host 203. The success rate is taken as a member of the target parameter set for the cloud host 203 to calculate the defense result.
在可疑流量清洗裝置202將清洗後的正常資料流程量發送至目標端300之後,正常資料流程量(若清洗效果不好則可能攜帶有攻擊資料流程量)可能會目標端造成正常運行造成影響。例如,假設目標端為“淘寶網”,在正常資料流程量發送至目標端之後,可能造成用戶無法正常打開“淘寶網”頁面的情況。 After the suspicious traffic cleaning device 202 sends the cleaned normal data flow to the target terminal 300, the normal data flow amount (if the cleaning effect is not good, the attack data flow may be carried) may affect the normal operation of the target end. For example, if the target end is “Taobao”, after the normal data flow is sent to the target end, the user may not be able to open the “Taobao” page normally.
所以,業務監控裝置500可以控制位於不同位址位置 的多個業務主機接取目標端300,來計算目標端300的接取成功率,從接取成功率上查看清洗後的正常資料流程量是否對目標端的正常業務造成影響。 Therefore, the service monitoring device 500 can control the plurality of service hosts located at different address locations to access the target terminal 300 to calculate the success rate of the target terminal 300, and check whether the normal data flow after cleaning is obtained from the success rate of the connection. It affects the normal business of the target.
例如,控制地理位置為深圳、北京、上海和廣州等多個業務主機接取“淘寶網”,根據“淘寶網”是否能夠打開頁面以及打開頁面的速度,來計算多個業務主機的接取成功率。然後,將多個業務主機的平均接取成功率作為“淘寶網”的接取成功率。 For example, control the geographical location for multiple business hosts in Shenzhen, Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou to access “Taobao.” According to whether Taobao can open the page and open the page, calculate the connection of multiple service hosts. Take the success rate. Then, the average success rate of multiple service hosts is taken as the success rate of the "Taobao" connection.
在得到目標端300的接取成功率之後,將接取成功率作為目標參數集合的一員,以便供雲主機203計算防禦結果。 After the success rate of the target end 300 is obtained, the success rate is taken as a member of the target parameter set for the cloud host 203 to calculate the defense result.
此外,量化防禦結果的目標參數集合中還可以包括:網路服務品質。 In addition, the target parameter set for quantifying the defense result may also include: network service quality.
防禦端200對可疑資料流程量集合進行清洗的過程中,可能會引起整體網路的抖動,造成網路服務品質下降、目標端300的接取成功率下降和主機性能參數下降,進而影響防禦結果的計算。所以,所述雲主機203還用於,依據所述可疑資料流程量集合和所述正常資料流程量,計算網路服務品質;並將所述網路服務品質作為目標參數集合的一員。這使得雲主機203在計算防禦結果時可以考慮網路服務品質,從而得出合理的防禦效果。 During the process of cleaning the suspicious data flow collection by the defensive end 200, the overall network may be jittered, the quality of the network service is degraded, the success rate of the target end 300 is decreased, and the performance parameters of the host are decreased, thereby affecting the defense result. Calculation. Therefore, the cloud host 203 is further configured to: calculate a network service quality according to the suspicious data flow quantity set and the normal data flow quantity; and use the network service quality as a member of the target parameter set. This allows the cloud host 203 to consider the quality of the network service when calculating the defense result, thereby obtaining a reasonable defense effect.
其中,網路服務品質包括:所述網路服務品質包括:在清洗所述原始資料流程量過程中帶來的網路延時;在清洗所述原始資料流程量過程中帶來的網路丟包 率;在清洗所述原始資料流程量過程中帶來的TCP可用性;在清洗所述原始資料流程量過程中帶來的UDP可用性;以及,在清洗所述原始資料流程量過程中帶來的抖動。 The network service quality includes: the network service quality includes: a network delay caused by cleaning the original data flow process; and a network packet loss caused by cleaning the original data flow process Rate; the TCP availability brought by the process of cleaning the raw data flow; the UDP availability brought by the process of cleaning the raw data flow; and the jitter caused by cleaning the raw data flow .
上述圖2-圖4所示的量化防禦結果的系統即適用於光纖網路又適用於非光纖網路。在光纖網路中資料流程量較大,所以利用核心路由對原始流量進行複製的速率較慢。 為了加快對原始資料流程量的複製過程,本發明提供了一種適用於光線網路的量化防禦結果的系統。 The system for quantifying the defense results shown in Figures 2 to 4 above is applicable to both the fiber network and the non-fiber network. In the optical network, the amount of data flow is large, so the rate of copying the original traffic using the core route is slow. In order to speed up the process of copying the raw data flow, the present invention provides a system suitable for quantitative defense results of a light network.
如圖5所示,本發明的量化防禦結果的系統,包括:業務端100,與所述業務端100相連的分光器600,位於雲平台的防禦端200,目標端300,以及,與所述分光器600、防禦端200和目標端300相連的核心路由400。本實施例中防禦端200旁路設置在核心路由400的一側。 As shown in FIG. 5, the system for quantifying the defense result of the present invention includes: a service end 100, a splitter 600 connected to the service end 100, a defensive end 200 of the cloud platform, a target end 300, and The splitter 600, the defensive end 200, and the core router 400 connected to the target end 300. In this embodiment, the defensive end 200 is bypassed on one side of the core route 400.
本實施例中由分光器600來實現對業務端100發送至目標端300的原始流量進行複製得到副本資料流程量的過程,並將副本資料流程量和原始資料流程量發送至核心路由400。本實施例中其它內容與圖2-圖4所示的內容一致,在此不再贅述。 In this embodiment, the process of copying the original traffic sent by the service terminal 100 to the target terminal 300 to obtain the copy data flow amount is implemented by the optical splitter 600, and the copy data flow amount and the original data flow amount are sent to the core route 400. Other contents in this embodiment are the same as those shown in FIG. 2 to FIG. 4, and details are not described herein again.
在上述圖2-圖5所示的量化防禦結果的系統的基礎上,下面介紹本發明的量化防禦結果的方法的實施例,本 實施例應用於量化防禦結果的系統的防禦端的雲主機。如圖6所示,所述方法具體包括以下步驟S601~S602: Based on the above-described system for quantizing the defense result shown in Figs. 2 to 5, an embodiment of the method for quantizing the defense result of the present invention is described below, and the present embodiment is applied to the cloud host at the defensive end of the system for quantifying the defense result. As shown in FIG. 6, the method specifically includes the following steps S601 to S602:
步驟S601:獲取可疑資料流程量集合;其中,所述可疑資料流程量集合為位於雲平台的防禦端經核心路由牽引業務端接取目標端的原始資料流程量後,由所述原始資料流程量所包含的可疑IP位址集合中每個可疑IP位址對應的資料流程量所組成的,所述可疑IP位址集合為依據預設檢測規則在所述原始資料流程量中確定的。 Step S601: Acquiring a set of suspicious data flows; wherein the set of suspicious data flows is obtained by the source data flow quantity after the defensive end of the cloud platform receives the original data flow amount of the target end by the core route traction service end The data flow corresponding to each suspicious IP address in the set of suspicious IP addresses is included, and the set of suspicious IP addresses is determined in the original data flow according to a preset detection rule.
步驟S602:獲取正常資料流程量;其中,所述正常資料流程量為所述防禦端對所述可疑資料流程量集合按預設防禦策略清洗後剩餘的資料流程量。 Step S602: Acquire a normal data flow quantity, where the normal data flow quantity is a data flow quantity remaining after the defensive end cleans the suspicious data flow quantity set according to a preset defense policy.
步驟S603:授權主機性能參數;其中,所述主機性能參數為所述防禦端在將所述正常資料流程量發送至目標端後,在所述目標端上提取得到的參數的集合。 Step S603: Authorize the host performance parameter, where the host performance parameter is a set of parameters extracted by the defense terminal on the target end after the normal data flow quantity is sent to the target end.
步驟S604:基於目標參數集合來量化防禦結果;其中,所述目標參數集合至少包括:所述可疑資料流程量集合、正常資料流程量和主機性能參數。 Step S604: Quantify the defense result based on the target parameter set; wherein the target parameter set includes at least: the suspicious data flow quantity set, the normal data flow quantity, and the host performance parameter.
此外,所述目標參數集合還包括:與所述防禦端相連的業務監控裝置發送的接取成功率;其中,所述接取成功率為所述業務監控裝置在控制多個位於不同地理位置的業務端接取所述目標端後,依據所述目標端回饋的請求成功率和請求時間延遲計算得到的。 In addition, the target parameter set further includes: a success rate of the transmission sent by the service monitoring device connected to the defensive end; wherein the success rate of the receiving is controlled by the service monitoring device in multiple geographical locations After the service end picks up the target end, it is calculated according to the request success rate and the request time delay of the target end feedback.
網路服務品質;其中,所述網路服務品質為所述防禦端依據可疑資料流程量集合和所述正常資料流量計算得到 的。 The quality of the network service; wherein the quality of the network service is calculated by the defensive end according to the set of suspicious data flows and the normal data traffic.
防禦端的雲主機獲取目標參數集合的過程,已在圖2-圖5所示的量化防禦結果的系統實施例中進行清楚說明,此處不再贅述。 The process of obtaining the target parameter set by the cloud host on the defensive end is clearly illustrated in the system embodiment of the quantitative defense result shown in FIG. 2 to FIG. 5, and details are not described herein again.
由此可以看出,本發明具有以下有益效果:本發明實施例將防禦端設置於雲平台,在雲平台防禦端可以將業務端的原始資料流程量牽引到自身,目標端的業務一般都是在雲平台上運行,所以防禦端可以在雲平台上獲得目標端的資料流程量,同時,防禦端還可以獲得自身的資料流程量。所以,在雲平台下可以將業務端、目標端和防禦端三者的資料流程量統一集中,從而可以獲得三端的資料流程量。由於,本發明中可以將業務端、防禦端和目標端三部分的資料流程量進行統一分析,從而使得評估防禦結果的評價角度和指標較為全面,進而使得防禦結果較為準確。 It can be seen that the present invention has the following beneficial effects: the defensive end is set on the cloud platform in the embodiment of the present invention, and the original data flow of the service end can be pulled to itself on the defensive end of the cloud platform, and the services of the target end are generally in the cloud. The platform runs, so the defensive end can obtain the data flow of the target end on the cloud platform, and the defensive end can also obtain its own data flow. Therefore, under the cloud platform, the data flow of the business end, the target end, and the defensive end can be unified and centralized, so that the data flow of the three end can be obtained. Because the data flow of the business part, the defensive end and the target end can be uniformly analyzed in the invention, the evaluation angle and the index of the evaluation of the defense result are comprehensive, and the defense result is more accurate.
在得到目標參數集合後可以計算防禦結果。在介紹計算防禦結果的內容之前,首先說明防禦端中可疑流量清洗裝置所使用的防禦策略和SLA等級。其中,SLA為Service-Level Agreement的縮寫,意思是服務等級協定。SLA為關於網路服務供應商和客戶間的一份合同,其中定義了服務類型、服務品質和客戶付款等術語。 The defense result can be calculated after the target parameter set is obtained. Before introducing the content of the calculation of the defense result, first explain the defense strategy and SLA level used by the suspicious traffic cleaning device in the defensive end. Among them, SLA is the abbreviation of Service-Level Agreement, which means service level agreement. The SLA is a contract between an Internet Service Provider and a customer that defines terms such as service type, quality of service, and customer payment.
在防禦端中預先存儲有多個防禦策略,一個防禦策略對應一個理論上應達到的SLA等級。比如,第一SLA等級對應第一防禦策略,第二SLA等級對應第二防禦策 略,第三SLA等級對應第三防禦策略,依次類推。並且,第一SLA等級、第二SLA等級和第三SLA等級的對使用者而言,服務品質逐漸降低,同理,第一防禦策略、第二防禦策略和第三防禦策略對於攻擊流量而言逐漸變鬆。即,防禦策略越緊對應的防禦結果越好,使得目標端的SLA等級越高。 A plurality of defense strategies are pre-stored in the defensive end, and one defense strategy corresponds to a theoretically reached SLA level. For example, the first SLA level corresponds to the first defense policy, the second SLA level corresponds to the second defense policy, the third SLA level corresponds to the third defense policy, and so on. Moreover, for the user of the first SLA level, the second SLA level, and the third SLA level, the service quality is gradually reduced. Similarly, the first defense strategy, the second defense strategy, and the third defense strategy are for attack traffic. Gradually become loose. That is, the tighter the defense strategy, the better the defense result, so that the SLA level of the target end is higher.
在使用防禦端清洗原始流量之前,目標端300的使用者與網路服務提供商之間協商,並設定目標端300所希望達到的期望SLA等級。網路服務提供商會依據與期望SLA等級對應的防禦策略作為預設防禦策略,採用預設防禦策略阻擋攻擊目標端的攻擊資料流程量,並使得最終的防禦結果達到用戶所希望的期望SLA等級。 Before using the defensive end to clean the original traffic, the user of the target end 300 negotiates with the network service provider and sets the desired SLA level that the target end 300 desires to achieve. The network service provider uses the defense policy corresponding to the desired SLA level as the preset defense policy, and uses the preset defense policy to block the attack data flow of the attack target end, and the final defense result reaches the desired SLA level desired by the user.
為了使得目標端達到的期望SLA等級,在圖2所示的可疑流量清洗裝置中預先設定有與期望SLA等級對應的預設防禦策略。理論上,該防禦策略能夠使得防禦結果達到對應的期望SLA等級。但是,隨著攻擊資料流程量的不斷變化,攻擊資料流程量可能會突破防禦策略而攻擊目標端,進而使得目標端上的SLA等級低於期望SLA等級。 In order to achieve the desired SLA level reached by the target end, a preset defense policy corresponding to the desired SLA level is preset in the suspicious traffic cleaning device shown in FIG. 2. In theory, the defensive strategy can bring the defensive outcome to the corresponding desired SLA level. However, as the amount of attack data continues to change, the attack data flow may break through the defense strategy and attack the target end, thereby making the SLA level on the target side lower than the expected SLA level.
所以,可以計算目標端所得到防禦效果是否達到期望SLA等級。如圖7所示,包括以下步驟: Therefore, it can be calculated whether the defense effect obtained by the target end reaches the desired SLA level. As shown in Figure 7, the following steps are included:
步驟S701:利用所述目標參數集合以及預設參數集合確定所述各個參數的變化值集合;其中,所述預設參數集合為預先存儲的、無攻擊資料流程量的情況下各個參數 的集合。 Step S701: Determine, by using the target parameter set and the preset parameter set, a change value set of each parameter, where the preset parameter set is a set of each parameter in a case of a pre-stored, non-attack data flow quantity.
詳細的計算過程,將在本實施例之後進行詳細說明。 The detailed calculation process will be described in detail after this embodiment.
步驟S702:判斷是否匹配成功,即將所述各個參數的變化值集合與所述期望SLA等級中的各個參數範圍進行匹配,並判斷是否匹配成功。 Step S702: Determine whether the matching is successful, that is, match the change value set of each parameter with each parameter range in the expected SLA level, and determine whether the matching is successful.
在雲主機中存儲有每個SLA等級的各個參數的範圍。將按目標參數集合計算得到的各個參數變化值與期望SLA等級的參數範圍進行對比。 The range of individual parameters for each SLA level is stored in the cloud host. Each parameter change value calculated according to the target parameter set is compared with the parameter range of the desired SLA level.
步驟S703:若匹配成功,則確定防禦端的防禦效果達到所述期望SLA等級。 Step S703: If the matching is successful, it is determined that the defense effect of the defensive end reaches the desired SLA level.
若各個參數的變化值集合在期望SLA等級規定的範圍內,則表示目前的防禦效果達到期望的防禦效果;可以按照繼續按照可疑流量清洗裝置中預設防禦策略繼續對接取目標端的資料流程量進行清洗。 If the change value of each parameter is within the range specified by the desired SLA level, it indicates that the current defense effect achieves the desired defense effect; the data flow rate of the target data can be continuously continued according to the preset defense strategy in the suspicious traffic cleaning device. Cleaning.
步驟S704:若匹配不成功,則將當前的防禦策略的前一防禦策略,確定為所述預設防禦策略;重新進入步驟S701。其中,所述防禦端中存儲有按順序排列的多個SLA等級,以及,與每個SLA等級對應的一個防禦策略,SLA等級越小表示目標端所享受的服務等級越高,並且,前一SLA等級的對應的防禦策略優於後一SLA等級對應的防禦策略。 In step S704, if the matching is unsuccessful, the previous defense policy of the current defense policy is determined as the preset defense policy; and the process proceeds to step S701. The defensive end stores a plurality of SLA levels arranged in order, and a defense strategy corresponding to each SLA level. The smaller the SLA level, the higher the service level enjoyed by the target end, and the previous one The corresponding defense strategy of the SLA level is better than the defense strategy corresponding to the latter SLA level.
若匹配不成功,則確定防禦端的防禦效果未達到所述期望SLA等級。即:若各個參數的變化值集合未在期望SLA等級規定的範圍內,則表示目前的防禦效果未達到期 望的防禦效果,即表示可疑流量清洗裝置中預設防禦策略過鬆,不能達到期望SLA等級。所以,需要收緊防禦策略,以便經過防禦策略清洗後的防禦效果達到期望SLA等級。 If the match is unsuccessful, it is determined that the defense effect of the defensive end does not reach the desired SLA level. That is, if the set of change values of each parameter is not within the range specified by the desired SLA level, it indicates that the current defense effect does not reach the desired defense effect, that is, the preset defense strategy in the suspicious traffic cleaning device is too loose to achieve the desired SLA. grade. Therefore, it is necessary to tighten the defense strategy so that the defense effect after the defense strategy is cleaned up to the desired SLA level.
因此,選擇當前防禦策略的前一防禦策略,確定為預設防禦策略。然後,按最新的預設防禦策略繼續對接取目標端的資料流程量進行清洗,並按本發明的方法計算防禦結果(各個參數的變化值集合),並判斷防禦結果(各個參數的變化值集合)是否達到期望SLA等級(期望SLA等級各個參數範圍)。若仍防禦結果未達到期望SLA等級,在繼續收緊防禦策略,重複執行計算防禦結果的過程,直接判定防禦結果達到期望SLA等級。 Therefore, the previous defense strategy of the current defense strategy is selected and determined as the preset defense strategy. Then, according to the latest preset defense policy, the data flow of the target data is continuously cleaned, and the defense result (the set of change values of each parameter) is calculated according to the method of the present invention, and the defense result (the set of change values of each parameter) is determined. Whether the desired SLA level is reached (expected SLA level various parameter ranges). If the defense result does not reach the expected SLA level, continue to tighten the defense strategy, repeat the process of calculating the defense result, and directly determine that the defense result reaches the desired SLA level.
下面結合具體的應用場景,來對步驟S701:利用所述目標參數集合以及預設參數集合確定所述各個參數的變化值集合的步驟,進行詳細說明。 The steps of determining the set of change values of the respective parameters by using the target parameter set and the preset parameter set are described in detail in conjunction with a specific application scenario.
即依據所述可疑資料流程量集合和所述正常資料流程量,計算輸入協定信息和輸出協定信息變化率的變化量集合。其中,所述輸入協議信息從所述可疑資料流程量集合中提取得到的,所述輸出協議信息從所述正常資料流程量中提取得到。 That is, according to the suspicious data flow quantity set and the normal data flow quantity, the change set of the input agreement information and the output agreement information change rate is calculated. The input protocol information is extracted from the suspicious data flow quantity set, and the output protocol information is extracted from the normal data flow quantity.
業務端和目標端的傳輸方式為一對一的,例如:業務端向目標端發送建立連接請求,則目標端向業務端與建立 連接確認指令。所以,業務端向目標端發送的信息,與目標端向業務端發送的信息數量理應為一致的。當輸出的信息數量或輸入的信息數量突然增大時,則說明防禦端的清洗效果不好。 The transmission mode of the service end and the target end is one-to-one. For example, the service end sends a connection establishment request to the target end, and the target end establishes a connection confirmation instruction to the service end. Therefore, the information sent by the service end to the target end should be consistent with the amount of information sent by the target end to the service end. When the amount of information output or the amount of information input suddenly increases, the cleaning effect of the defensive end is not good.
下面以具體三種流量型攻擊為例,對本步驟進行詳細說明: The following three specific traffic attacks are taken as an example to describe this step in detail:
在正常情況下,業務端向目標端發送syn(可以建立連接?)請求信息,目標端會回饋syn-ack(可以+請確認)信息,業務端再次向目標端發送ack(確認)信息,從而建立兩者連接。 Under normal circumstances, the service end sends a syn (can establish a connection?) request message to the target end, the target end will feed back the syn-ack (can + confirm) information, and the service end sends ack (acknowledgement) information to the target end again, thereby Establish a connection between the two.
在目標端受到syn flood攻擊(即攻擊端向目標端發送大量syn請求信息)的情況下,如果防禦策略的清洗效果不好,輸出方向的syn-ack信息將會增多;但是,業務端發出的第三個ack信息會減少。 When the target end is attacked by a syn flood (that is, the attacker sends a large amount of syn request information to the target end), if the cleaning effect of the defense policy is not good, the syn-ack information in the output direction will increase; however, the service side sends out The third ack message will be reduced.
因此,計算syn信息清洗前和清洗後的增加比率Psyn,以及,syn-ack信息清洗前和清洗後的增加比率Psyn-ack。 Thus, increasing the ratio information before calculating syn cleaning and after cleaning syn P, and increase the ratio of syn-ack message before washing and after washing P syn-ack.
Psyn=(ppssyn-pps` syn)/ppssyn P syn =(pps syn -pps ` syn )/pps syn
Psyn-ack=(ppssyn-ack-pps` syn-ack)/ppssyn-ack P syn-ack =(pps syn-ack -pps ` syn-ack )/pps syn-ack
P1=Psyn-Psyn-ack P 1 =P syn -P syn-ack
其中,ppssyn為按預設防禦策略清洗前的syn信息數量,pps` syn為按預設防禦策略清洗後的syn信息數量; ppssyn-ack為按預設防禦策略清洗前的syn-ack信息數量,pps` syn為按預設防禦策略清洗後的syn-ack信息數量,P1代表防禦端的防禦結果。 Where pps syn is the number of syn messages before cleaning according to the preset defense policy, pps ` syn is the number of syn messages after cleaning according to the preset defense policy; pps syn-ack is the syn-ack information before cleaning according to the preset defense policy The number, pps ` syn is the number of syn-ack messages after cleaning according to the preset defense policy, and P1 represents the defense result of the defensive end.
理想情況下,輸入方向的syn封包和輸出方向的syn-ack信息是1:1,即P1=0。所以P1的值越大的時候,代表了輸入方向的syn信息大部分沒有得到回應,此時,表示防禦結果越差。 Ideally, the syn-ack information for the syn packet in the input direction and the output direction is 1:1, that is, P1=0. Therefore, when the value of P1 is larger, most of the syn information representing the input direction is not responded, and at this time, the worse the defense result is.
在正常情況下,業務端向目標端發送ack(確認)請求信息,目標端在確認未與業務端建立連接時,業務端向目標端發送rst(重定)信息。即,如果目標端收到的一個明顯不屬於自己的一個連接,則向業務端發送一個復位包。 Under normal circumstances, the service end sends ack (acknowledgement) request information to the target end. When the target end confirms that no connection is established with the service end, the service end sends rst (re-determination) information to the target end. That is, if the target receives a connection that is obviously not its own, it sends a reset packet to the service.
在目標端受到ack flood攻擊的情況下,如果防禦端的清洗效果不好,則rst信息將會增多。因此,計算ack信息清洗前和清洗後的增加比率Pack,計算rst信息清洗前和清洗後的增加比率Prst。 In the case of an ack flood attack on the target side, if the cleaning effect on the defensive end is not good, the rst information will increase. Therefore, the increase ratio P ack of the ack information before and after the cleaning is calculated, and the increase ratio P rst before and after the cleaning of the rst information is calculated.
Pack=(ppsack-pps` ack)/ppsack P ack =(pps ack -pps ` ack )/pps ack
Prst=(ppsrst-pps` rst)/ppsrst P rst =(pps rst -pps ` rst )/pps rst
P2=Pack-Prst P2=P ack -P rst
其中,ppsack為按預設防禦策略清洗前的rst信息數量,pps` ack為按預設防禦策略清洗後的rst信息數量,ppsrst為按預設防禦策略清洗前的rst信息數量,pps` rst為 按預設防禦策略清洗後的rst信息數量,P2代表防禦端的防禦結果。 Where pps ack is the number of rst information before cleaning according to the preset defense policy, pps ` ack is the number of rst information after cleaning according to the preset defense policy, and pps rst is the number of rst information before cleaning according to the preset defense policy, pps ` Rst is the number of rst information after cleaning according to the preset defense policy, and P2 is the defense result of the defensive end.
理想情況下,輸入方向的ack信息和輸出方向的rst信息是1:1,即P2=0。所以P2的值越大的時候,代表了輸入方向的ack信息大部分沒有得到回應,此時,表示防禦結果越差。 Ideally, the ack information in the input direction and the rst information in the output direction are 1:1, that is, P2=0. Therefore, when the value of P2 is larger, most of the ack information representing the input direction is not responded, and at this time, the worse the defense result is.
在目標端受到icmp flood攻擊的情況下,如果防禦端的清洗效果不好,icmp response信息將會增多。因此,計算icmp信息清洗前和清洗後的增加比率Picmp,計算icmp response信息清洗前和清洗後的增加比率Picmp response。 In the case where the target end is attacked by the icmp flood, if the cleaning effect of the defensive end is not good, the icmp response information will increase. Thus, increasing the ratio information before calculating icmp cleaning and after cleaning icmp P, before calculating the increase ratio icmp Response information cleaning and after cleaning P icmp response.
Picmp=(ppsicmp-pps` icmp)/ppsicmp P icmp =(pps icmp -pps ` icmp )/pps icmp
Picmp-reponse=(ppsicmp-reponse-pps` icmp-reponse)/ppsicmp-reponse P icmp-reponse =(pps icmp-reponse -pps ` icmp-reponse )/pps icmp-reponse
P3=Picmp-Picmp-reponse P3=P icmp -P icmp-reponse
其中,ppsicmp為清洗前的icmp信息數量,pps` icmp為清洗後icmp信息數量,ppsicmp-reponse為清洗前的icmp response信息數量,pps` icmp-reponse為清洗後icmp response信息數量,P3代表防禦端的防禦結果。 Wherein, pps icmp is the number icmp information before cleaning, pps `icmp after washing quantity icmp message, pps icmp-reponse is the number icmp Response information before cleaning, pps` icmp-reponse is the number icmp Response information cleaning, P3 representatives Defensive end defense results.
理想情況下,輸入方向的icmp信息和輸出方向的icmp response信息是1:1,即P3=0。所以P3的值越大的時候,代表輸入方向的icmp信息大部分沒有得到回應,此時,表示防禦結果較差。 Ideally, the icmp information in the input direction and the icmp response information in the output direction are 1:1, that is, P3=0. Therefore, when the value of P3 is larger, most of the icmp information representing the input direction is not responded, and at this time, the defense result is poor.
以上列舉了計算輸入協定信息和輸出協定信息的所佔 比例的三個實例。可以理解的是,還可以計算其它表徵防禦結果的流量類型的所佔比例,來評估防禦結果。在此不再一一列舉。 The above lists three examples of calculating the proportion of input agreement information and output protocol information. It can be understood that the proportion of other types of traffic characterizing the defense result can also be calculated to evaluate the defense result. I will not list them one by one here.
本步驟主要用於評估流量型攻擊的防禦結果。其中,syn flood攻擊、ack flood攻擊和icmp flood攻擊均為流量型攻擊。因此,在獲得所有用於評估防禦結果的比率後(P1、P2和P3),計算多個防禦結果比率的平均值,作為針對評估流量型攻擊的防禦結果。 This step is mainly used to evaluate the defense result of traffic-type attacks. Among them, the sn flood attack, the ack flood attack, and the icmp flood attack are all traffic attacks. Therefore, after obtaining all the ratios for evaluating the defense results (P1, P2, and P3), the average of the multiple defense result ratios is calculated as a defense result for evaluating the traffic type attack.
由於,本步驟主要用於評估流量型攻擊的防禦結果,syn flood攻擊是流量型攻擊中的典型代表,所以,也可以直接採用P1作為對流量型攻擊的防禦結果。 Because this step is mainly used to evaluate the defense result of the traffic attack, the syn flood attack is a typical representative of the traffic attack. Therefore, P1 can also be directly used as the defense result of the traffic attack.
流量性能參數的另一表現形式為:計算所述正常資料流程量的核心資料集與所述預設參數集合中的預設核心資料集之間的標準差集合。 Another manifestation of the traffic performance parameter is: calculating a standard deviation set between the core data set of the normal data flow quantity and the preset core data set in the preset parameter set.
本步驟的主要目的在於,藉由即時獲取請求信息和相應的回應信息的所佔比例以及分析http的狀態碼的變化,來評估正常請求信息和異常請求信息的所佔比例是否符合預期。 The main purpose of this step is to evaluate whether the proportion of the normal request information and the abnormal request information is in conformity with the expected ratio of the request information and the corresponding response information and the change of the status code of the http.
在具體使用過程中,可以計算表徵正常資料流程量的核心資料集;其中,核心資料集包括請求應答率、業務成功率、30x狀態碼的所佔比例、40x狀態碼的所佔比例、50x狀態碼的所佔比例和正常用戶請求的時間延遲。 In the specific use process, the core data set representing the normal data flow amount can be calculated; wherein the core data set includes the request response rate, the service success rate, the proportion of the 30x status code, the proportion of the 40x status code, and the 50x status. The proportion of the code and the time delay of the normal user request.
下面對核心資料集中各個參數進行詳細說明: The following is a detailed description of each parameter in the core data set:
目標端的請求信息和回應信息比值是在不斷變化的。以統計週期t為例,比如t1到t2時間段內突然開始有攻擊,則http的請求信息和回應信息都會增多。當防禦端的防禦結果不好時,正常的請求信息得到回應信息則會特別少。所以,統計請求信息和回應信息的所佔比例,如果防禦端的清洗效果不好,那麼請求信息和回應信息的比值將會低於某一個極限值。 The ratio of request information to response information on the target side is constantly changing. Taking the statistical period t as an example, for example, if an attack suddenly starts within the time period from t1 to t2, the request information and the response information of http will increase. When the defensive end's defense result is not good, the normal request information will receive a small amount of response information. Therefore, if the proportion of the request information and the response information is statistically small, if the cleaning effect of the defensive end is not good, the ratio of the request information to the response information will be lower than a certain limit value.
Prequest=Chave_response/Crequest_total* 100% P request =C have_response /C request_total * 100%
其中,Prequest為網站的請求應答率,Chave_response為回應信息的數量,Crequest_total為總的請求信息的數量。 Among them, P request is the request response rate of the website, C have_response is the number of response information, and C request_total is the total number of request information.
200 ok信息是表示業務請求成功的信息,則P200 ok表示業務成功率。請求回應的比例Prequest僅可以衡量當前網路http流量情況。而P200 ok能反映業務端得到的回應的概率。 The 200 ok information is information indicating that the service request is successful, and P 200 ok indicates the service success rate. The proportion of request responses P request can only measure the current network http traffic. The P 200 ok can reflect the probability of the response received by the business.
P200ok=Chave_200ok/Chave_response* 100% P 200ok = C have_200ok / C have_response * 100%
其中,Chave_200ok表示業務請求成功的信息,Chave_response為回應信息的數量。 Among them, C have_200ok indicates the success of the service request, and C have_response is the number of response messages.
在正常資料流程量中出現誤丟包的時候會出現30x、40x和50x等狀態碼。大量的GET包得不到回應,一般會 返回40x和50x錯誤的狀態碼。因此,狀態碼的所佔比例可以衡量防禦出現誤殺正常資料流程量的情況。 Status codes such as 30x, 40x, and 50x appear when a packet is lost in the normal data flow. A large number of GET packets are not responding, and generally return 40x and 50x error status codes. Therefore, the proportion of the status code can be measured against the amount of normal data flow.
值得注意的是,某些防護系統會使用人機識別機制來判斷接取者是否是真實的流覽器。如業界常用的url redirect演算法,即是藉由返回一個302(30x)狀態碼來判斷接取者是程式還是真實的流覽器,所以網路中302(30x)狀態碼的劇增,也可以作為評估防禦結果的指標。 It is worth noting that some protection systems use a human-machine recognition mechanism to determine if the accessor is a real browser. For example, the url redirect algorithm commonly used in the industry, by returning a 302 (30x) status code to determine whether the accessor is a program or a real browser, so the 302 (30x) status code in the network has increased dramatically. Can be used as an indicator to evaluate the defense outcome.
以上三種指標可以綜合衡量CC攻擊的清洗率 The above three indicators can comprehensively measure the cleaning rate of CC attacks.
P30x=Chave_30x/Chave_response* 100% P 30x =C have_30x /C have_response * 100%
P40x=Chave_40x/Chave_response * 100% P 40x =C have_40x /C have_response * 100%
P50x=Chave_500/Chave_response* 100% P 50x =C have_500 /C have_response * 100%
其中,P30x表示30x的狀態碼在回應信息中的所佔比例,Chave_30x表示30x的信息數量;P40x表示40x的狀態碼在回應信息中的所佔比例,Chave_40x表示40x的信息數量;P50x表示50x的狀態碼在回應信息中的所佔比例,Chave_50x x表示50x的信息數量。 Where P 30x represents the proportion of the status code of 30x in the response information, C have_30x represents the amount of information of 30x; P 40x represents the proportion of the status code of 40x in the response information, and C have_40x represents the amount of information of 40x; P 50x represents the proportion of the 50x status code in the response message, and C have_50x x represents the amount of information of 50x.
(d)正常用戶的請求的RTT(請求時間延遲),假設用戶在攻擊時間內共發起了n次請求,則評估本次攻擊事件的時候,以用戶的平均時間延遲作為參考。 (d) The RTT of the normal user's request (request time delay). If the user has initiated a total of n requests during the attack time, the average time delay of the user is used as a reference when evaluating the attack event.
將經過(a)、(b)、(c)和(d)得到的Prequest,P200ok,P30x,P40x,P50x,T0構建核心資料集M,M定義了攻擊時刻核心流量指標的資料。 P request , P 200ok , P 30x , P 40x , P 50x , T 0 obtained by (a), (b), (c) and (d) are used to construct the core data set M, M to define the core traffic index at the attack time. data of.
為了更加準確的確定防禦結果,因此可以計算多個核心資料集的陣列M。例如,統計n個核心資料集形成陣列M,則M={M1,M2,...Mi...Mn};其中,Mi={Prequest,P200ok,P30x,P40x,P50x,T0},i=1、2......n。 In order to more accurately determine the defense result, it is possible to calculate an array M of multiple core data sets. For example, counting n core data sets to form array M, then M={M 1 , M 2 , . . . M i . . . M n }; wherein, M i ={P request , P 200ok , P 30x , P 40x , P 50x , T 0 }, i=1, 2...n.
針對雲環境下的服務基於歷史的大數據分析,得出另外一組核心資料集N。即N={P`request,P`200ok,P`30x,P`40x,P`50x,T`0}。N表示在沒有攻擊時的各個指標的所佔比例,即標準的核心資料集。 For the history-based big data analysis of services in the cloud environment, another set of core data sets N is obtained. I.e., N = {P` request, P` 200ok , P` 30x, P` 40x, P` 50x, T` 0}. N represents the proportion of each indicator in the absence of an attack, that is, the standard core data set.
理想情況下,這些指標的變化不會出現明顯的波動。但是,當防禦策略不夠理想時,可能會導致個別指標出現急劇變化。如,在某一次的攻擊事件中出現了200ok狀態碼和歷史同期相比巨大的變化曲線時,則表示防禦結果較差從而導致正常請求信息的回應減少。 Ideally, there will be no significant fluctuations in the changes in these indicators. However, when the defensive strategy is not ideal, it may lead to a sharp change in individual indicators. For example, when a 200ok status code has a large change curve compared with the historical period in a certain attack event, it indicates that the defense result is poor, resulting in a decrease in the response of the normal request information.
因此,本發明用標準差來評估攻擊時防禦策略對業務指標造成的影響,將核心資料集N作為平均值,然後針對每個參數計算標準差。以指標Prequest為例,對計算標準差的公式進行詳細說明:
其中,σ requst 為表示Prequest的標準差,為第i個Prequest的值,n為陣列M中核心資料集的個數。P`request在此 處代表平均值,核心資料集N中的P`request。 Where σ requst is the standard deviation indicating the P request , For the value of the i-th P request , n is the number of core data sets in the array M. P` request here represent the mean, P` request the core data set N.
按上述方式計算陣列M={M1,M2,...Mi...Mn}與N中每個參數的標準差,從而得到多個標準差σ={σ requst ,σ200ok,σ30x ,σ40x ,σ50x ,σ0}。當標準差越小時,則表示防禦結果越好,當標準差越大時,則表示防禦結果越差。 Calculated in the above manner array M = {M 1, M 2 , ... M i ... M n} with standard N for each parameter difference to obtain a plurality of standard deviation σ = {σ requst, σ 200ok , σ 30 x , σ 40 x , σ 50 x , σ 0 }. When the standard deviation is smaller, it means that the defense result is better, and when the standard deviation is larger, it means that the defense result is worse.
即計算所述主機性能參數和所述預設參數集合中的預設主機性能參數之間的第二變化值集合。 That is, a second set of change values between the host performance parameter and the preset host performance parameter in the preset parameter set is calculated.
在可疑流量清洗裝置按預設防禦策略清洗後的正常資料流程量傳輸至所述目標端後,獲取目標端的主機性能參數。因為,DDos攻擊時受害主機最先產生狀態的變化,獲取受害主機的性能參數,可以直接量化出攻擊流量對主機產生的影響。主機性能參數在某些情況下,比監測網路流量變化更為方便。 After the suspicious traffic cleaning device transmits the normal data flow after cleaning according to the preset defense policy to the target end, the host performance parameter of the target end is obtained. Because the victim host first generates state changes during the DDos attack, and obtains the performance parameters of the victim host, it can directly quantify the impact of the attack traffic on the host. Host performance parameters are more convenient than monitoring network traffic changes in some cases.
例如,一個典型的例子就是tcp慢連接發生時,可能網路流量並無異常。但是,觀察目標端主機的連接表可以發現有大量殘餘的連接。因此,藉由評估主機性能參數,作為衡量防禦端的一個重要因素。 For example, a typical example is when the tcp slow connection occurs, there may be no abnormal network traffic. However, observing the connection table of the target host can find a large number of residual connections. Therefore, by evaluating host performance parameters, it is an important factor in measuring the defensive end.
參見表1,所述主機性能參數包括:所述目標端的主機在接收到第一個syn封包之後半開連結的數量,所述目標端的主機CPU,所述目標端的主機記憶體,所述目標端的連接表,所述目標端的主機輸入輸出次數,以及,所述目標端的主機的進出流量所佔比例。 Referring to Table 1, the host performance parameter includes: the number of half-open links after the host of the target end receives the first syn packet, the host CPU of the target end, the host memory of the target end, and the target end The connection table, the number of input and output of the host at the target end, and the proportion of the inbound and outbound traffic of the host at the target end.
即計算所述接取成功率與所述預設參數集合中預設接取成功率的第三變化值集合。 That is, a third set of change values of the success rate of the connection and the preset success rate of the preset parameter set is calculated.
接取成功率可以包含請求成功率和請求時間延遲,然後計算請求成功率與預設接取成功率之間的變化率,以及,計算請求時間延遲與預設請求時間延遲之間的變化量,並將該變化率和變化量作為第三變化值集合。 The success rate of the connection may include a request success rate and a request time delay, and then calculate a rate of change between the request success rate and the preset access success rate, and calculate a change amount between the request time delay and the preset request time delay. The rate of change and the amount of change are used as a third set of change values.
由於攻擊流量會對目標端造成影響,進而影響目標端的業務性能。為了確定目標端目前的業務性能(能夠正常響應正常業務請求),本發明實施例控制正常業務端接取目標端。然後藉由計算請求成功率的變化率和請求時間延遲的變化量,來確定攻擊資料流程量對目標端的影響,這可以從側面反映防禦結果的好壞。 As the attack traffic affects the target end, it affects the service performance of the target. In order to determine the current service performance of the target end (which can normally respond to the normal service request), the embodiment of the present invention controls the normal service end to access the target end. Then, by calculating the rate of change of the request success rate and the amount of change of the request time delay, the impact of the attack data flow on the target end is determined, which can reflect the quality of the defense result from the side.
即計算所述網路服務品質與所述預設參數集合中預設網路服務品質的第四變化值集合。 That is, a fourth set of change values of the network service quality and the preset network service quality in the preset parameter set is calculated.
基於分散式環境下,針對被攻擊主機的防禦策略可能影響整體的網路狀態。因此,帶來的後果是其它未被攻擊的主機也會受到影響。所以,在評估防禦成功率的時候還需要整體的網路性能參數作為評估標準。 Based on a decentralized environment, the defense policy against the attacked host may affect the overall network state. Therefore, the consequences are that other hosts that are not attacked will also be affected. Therefore, the overall network performance parameters are also required as an evaluation criterion when evaluating the defense success rate.
參見表2,所述網路環境參數包括:在清洗原始資料流程量過程中帶來的網路延時,在清洗原始資料流程量過程中帶來的網路丟包率,在清洗原始資料流程量過程中帶來的TCP可用性,在清洗原始資料流程量過程中帶來的UDP可用性,以及,在清洗原始資料流程量過程中帶來的抖動。 Referring to Table 2, the network environment parameters include: network delay caused by cleaning the original data flow, network packet loss rate during cleaning of the original data flow, and cleaning of the original data flow The TCP availability brought about by the process, the UDP availability brought about by cleaning the raw data flow, and the jitter caused by cleaning the raw data flow.
下面介紹依據目標參數集合計算得到各個參數的變化值集合與期望SLA等級有的各個參數範圍進行匹配的具體過程。以此來評估防禦結果是否滿足使用者的最終期望SLA等級。 The following describes the specific process of matching the set of change values of each parameter with each parameter range of the desired SLA level according to the target parameter set. This is used to assess whether the defense outcome meets the user's final desired SLA rating.
DDoS在遭受不同的攻擊時,網路流量的變化也不同。為了從流量層面上量化DDoS防禦端的影響。參見表3本發明定義出網路中關鍵協定信息的SLA指標。如,TCP重傳率的上限,當高於某一上限時,則表示防禦結果未達到期望SLA等級。 When DDoS is attacked differently, the network traffic changes differently. In order to quantify the impact of the DDoS defensive end from the traffic level. Referring to Table 3, the present invention defines SLA indicators for key agreement information in the network. For example, the upper limit of the TCP retransmission rate, when it is above a certain upper limit, indicates that the defense result does not reach the desired SLA level.
一套應用伺服器需要滿足的業務性能指標。因此,在評估ddos防禦結果是否達到使用者的SLA目標時,參見表4,可以藉由是否符合下表中的業務性能指標來考核。 A set of application performance indicators that the application server needs to meet. Therefore, when assessing whether the ddos defense result meets the user's SLA goal, see Table 4, which can be assessed by compliance with the business performance indicators in the table below.
藉由對主機狀態的回饋,根據不同的攻擊類型,判斷是否符合當前主機SLA的指標。參見表5為表徵主機狀態的參數。 By responding to the status of the host, it is determined whether the indicator of the current host SLA is met according to different attack types. See Table 5 for the parameters that characterize the state of the host.
基於分散式環境下針對被攻擊主機的防禦策略可能影響整體的網路狀態,因此帶來的後果是其他未被攻擊的主機也會受到影響。所以在評估防禦成功率的時候還需要整體的網路服務品質作為評估依據,參見表6,定義如下關鍵核心指標來表徵這一維度的SLA參數。 A defense policy for an attacked host based on a distributed environment may affect the overall network state. As a result, other unattacked hosts are also affected. Therefore, when assessing the success rate of defense, the overall network service quality is also required as the evaluation basis. See Table 6 to define the following key core indicators to characterize the SLA parameters of this dimension.
藉由以上期望SLA等級的各個參數指標設定的範圍,來確定各個參數的變化值集合是否在期望SLA等級的各個參數範圍內。若各個參數的變化值集合是否在期望SLA等級的各個參數範圍內,則判定防禦策略的防禦效果 達到期望SLA等級,否則表示防禦策略的防禦效果未達到期望SLA等級。 Whether the set of change values of the respective parameters is within each parameter range of the desired SLA level is determined by the range set by each parameter index of the above-mentioned desired SLA level. If the change value set of each parameter is within the range of each parameter of the desired SLA level, it is determined that the defense effect of the defense strategy reaches the desired SLA level, otherwise the defense effect of the defense strategy does not reach the desired SLA level.
以上為本發明所提供的全部內容,從以上技術內容可以得出:本發明實施例將防禦端設置於雲平台,在雲平台防禦端可以將業務端的原始資料流程量牽引到自身,目標端的業務一般都是在雲平台上運行,所以防禦端可以在雲平台上獲得目標端的資料流程量,同時,防禦端還可以獲得自身的資料流程量。所以,在雲平台下可以將業務端、目標端和防禦端三者的資料流程量統一集中,從而可以獲得三端的資料流程量。由於,本發明中可以將業務端、防禦端和目標端三部分的資料流程量進行統一分析,從而使得評估防禦結果的評價角度和指標較為全面,進而使得防禦結果較為準確。 The above is the entire content provided by the present invention. It can be concluded from the above technical content that the defensive end is set on the cloud platform, and the defensive end of the cloud platform can pull the original data flow of the service end to itself, and the target end service Generally, it runs on the cloud platform, so the defensive end can obtain the data flow of the target end on the cloud platform, and the defensive end can also obtain its own data flow. Therefore, under the cloud platform, the data flow of the business end, the target end, and the defensive end can be unified and centralized, so that the data flow of the three end can be obtained. Because the data flow of the business part, the defensive end and the target end can be uniformly analyzed in the invention, the evaluation angle and the index of the evaluation of the defense result are comprehensive, and the defense result is more accurate.
本實施例方法所述的功能如果以軟體功能單元的形式實現並作為獨立的產品銷售或使用時,可以存儲在一個計算設備可讀取存儲介質中。基於這樣的理解,本發明實施例對現有技術做出貢獻的部分或者該技術方案的部分可以以軟體產品的形式體現出來,該軟體產品存儲在一個存儲介質中,包括若干指令用以使得一台計算設備(可以是個人電腦,伺服器,行動計算裝置或者網路設備等)執行本發明各個實施例所述方法的全部或部分步驟。而前述的存儲介質包括:USB隨身碟、行動硬碟、唯讀記憶體(ROM,Read-Only Memory)、隨機存取記憶體(RAM, Random Access Memory)、磁碟或者光碟等各種可以存儲程式碼的介質。 The functions described in the method of the present embodiment can be stored in a computing device readable storage medium if implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as a standalone product. Based on such understanding, portions of the embodiments of the present invention that contribute to the prior art or portions of the technical solutions may be embodied in the form of a software product stored in a storage medium, including a number of instructions for causing one The computing device (which may be a personal computer, a server, a mobile computing device, or a network device, etc.) performs all or part of the steps of the methods described in various embodiments of the present invention. The foregoing storage medium includes: USB flash drive, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM, random access memory), disk or optical disk, and the like. The medium of the code.
本說明書中各個實施例採用遞進的方式描述,每個實施例重點說明的都是與其它實施例的不同之處,各個實施例之間相同或相似部分互相參見即可。 The various embodiments in the specification are described in a progressive manner, and each embodiment focuses on differences from other embodiments, and the same or similar parts of the respective embodiments may be referred to each other.
對所公開的實施例的上述說明,使本領域專業技術人員能夠實現或使用本發明。對這些實施例的多種修改對本領域的專業技術人員來說將是顯而易見的,本文中所定義的一般原理可以在不脫離本發明的精神或範圍的情況下,在其它實施例中實現。因此,本發明將不會被限制於本文所示的這些實施例,而是要符合與本文所公開的原理和新穎特點相一致的最寬的範圍。 The above description of the disclosed embodiments enables those skilled in the art to make or use the invention. Various modifications to these embodiments are obvious to those skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein may be implemented in other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the invention. Therefore, the present invention is not to be limited to the embodiments shown herein, but the scope of the invention is to be accorded
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| TWI742808B (en) * | 2020-08-20 | 2021-10-11 | 中華電信股份有限公司 | Method and device for detecting a hidden channel |
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| TWI700330B (en) * | 2018-11-09 | 2020-08-01 | 台光電子材料股份有限公司 | Resin composition and articles made from it |
| TWI742808B (en) * | 2020-08-20 | 2021-10-11 | 中華電信股份有限公司 | Method and device for detecting a hidden channel |
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