TW201042487A - Remote identity authentication method for verification based on biometrics - Google Patents

Abstract

Provided is a remote identity authentication method for verification based on biometrics. The authentication process makes use of biometrics information, hash function operation and exclusive-OR operation to not only reduce the overall system computation and the condition requirement of computing capability, but also satisfy the living convenience for modern people. In addition, when the secret information in the device held by the user is leaked, a complete security can still be kept. Therefore, it is able to resist resending attack, insider attack and denial of service attack, or prevent the verification table from being stolen, and proceed information verification during login.

Description

201042487 VI. Description of the Invention: [Technical Field] The present invention relates to a remote identity authentication mechanism, and in particular to a remote identity authentication method based on biometrics. [Prior Art] According to the evolution of the identity § forbearance mechanism, Lamport first grew in 1981: a dynamic password information (Dynamic passw〇r (j) authentication mechanism is used to store a verification form on the server. (Veriflcati〇n tabie) to authenticate the user device is legal. Therefore, if the server is compromised, this verification form may be threatened by theft or modification. Modern because smart card has memory function, logic Features such as computing, data controllers, and portability are widely used by many scholars in the design of remote authentication mechanisms. However, if the smart card does not meet the Mutual authentication requirements, it may result in Server spooflng attack; Chien et al. proposed a mechanism for using the smart card system to assist storage authentication in 2002, using a hash function (NIST FIB PUB 180-2, 2002). The smart card method for remote authentication has the following advantages: (1) the user device can freely select the desired password information when the s main book is located; (2) The server does not need to use any authentication table to authenticate legitimate user devices; (3) mutual authentication is achieved, so that legitimate user devices and servers can authenticate each other, and (4) completely based on hash function operations, reducing overall operations Cost. However, the aforementioned mechanism will still cause the server to suffer from Parallel session attack, Reflection attack, Insider attack, and Password guessing attack. The problem of stealing important data is generated. Although many mechanisms for matching smart cards are subsequently proposed, it is assumed that the information in the smart card is safe and cannot be disclosed, but in fact, in Kocher et al., Messerges et al. And the research of Yen and j0ye et al. mentioned that the secret information in the smart card can be cracked and intercepted through interception and analysis, so the smart card has been questioned in terms of security. Liao et al first proposed ten Guidelines are used as criteria for evaluating remote authentication mechanisms, and they also demonstrate the proposed mechanism even In the case of a lost smart card, the ten criteria can be met, and various attacks can be resisted. However, Xiang et al. pointed out that Liao's mechanism has a password guessing attack and a fake attack (1〇11). 〇11 such as 11 attack) and the damage service (Denial of service attack) and other weaknesses. However, Wang et al. proposed a mechanism for the double-variant hash function (Tw〇_variant pool operation), which can resist password information guessing attacks even when the secret information in the smart card is leaked. However, recently γ〇〇η et al. said that Wang's _ still has security concerns, such as the lack of forward secrets (Forward Secrecy) and the fear of still being subjected to password guessing attack. Biometric (m〇metric) is the use of human body physiology (physi〇1〇gicai) body organ organization 'for example: fingerprint, face, sound, iris, etc., and behavioral patterns (Be-(10) sign, for example: typing button dynamics Identification, to identify someone's identity' Because the physiological Wei is determined by DNA, 201042487 In addition to being unique, it is extremely difficult to be copied or forged, the biggest difference from traditional identity authentication technology is that it It is not a recognition, such as a smart card, but a recognition, and according to the literature J〇yce and Gupta, Kim points out that combining the following three forms of methods helps to improve the safety of the overall system: (1) personal Know (s〇methingy〇ukn〇w), for example, cryptography §fl, (2) personally owned (s〇methingy〇uhave), for example: smart card '(3) possessed by the individual (s〇mething y 〇u 啦), for example: personal physiology; therefore, there are more and more people like this to design a remote authentication protocol.

Lee et al. proposed a remote authentication mechanism based on fingerprint identification and with a smart card. In this method, the perception H will process the fingerprint of the user device into a number of money images, and the software usually records the fingerprint. Several feature points 'then operate the distance and angle between the main feature points to define a "template"; then use the algorithm to convert the geometric relationship into a unique set of numbers, and the silk recognizes the fingerprint to identify the maker. Once the user template is registered in the smart card's note, in the future, when the luxury is used and the finger is placed on the biometric acquisition device, the system will only be shipped again, and his template 'and then the template stored previously. Alignment, judging whether the two luxurys are correct or not. The main purpose of the present invention is to provide a remote identity authentication method based on biometrics verification, which* However, it can be used to meet the information convenience and security of modern people's life. Even when the information in the system is exposed, it can resist the password information guessing attack. In order to achieve the foregoing objective, a remote identity authentication method based on biometrics provided by the present invention includes: registering a user via an i-home device [generated after registration of a ship-registering information; the user device includes a biometric acquisition device; the user providing the user device at least - green information, one (four) f message, and - biometric template 'the user device provides a - chaotic value, the server has a private record; the bioship template _ (4) reading by the biometric acquisition device to convert its own biometrics; the registration information includes a secret information and a comparison record, the secret information and the number of the key is recorded by the private record, the first-random value The bribe code #讯, money the identity information is generated by at least a one-way operation; the server transmits the registration information to the user device and is stored in the user device; the person and the verification: at the user via the user The user device requests to board the user, and the user inputs the user device to be confirmed - the identity information to be confirmed, the password information to be confirmed, and the biometric model to be confirmed a user equipment that applies the one-way operation to the secret information by using the identity information to be confirmed, the password information to be confirmed, the biometric template to be confirmed, and the first chaotic value as a known factor. The parameter to be transferred is compared with the parameter of the parameter to be tb; if the result of the comparison is incorrect, the login action of the user device is interrupted; if the comparison result is correct, the user device is about to obtain a second random value. Transmitting to the server, the server replaces the 201042487 Boer L value according to the second chaotic value, and generates a new secret information, and transmits the new secret information to the account device to replace the secret information; The new secret information is obtained by re-passing the one-way operation with the change of the first iL value of the haikou. [Embodiment] In order to explain the technology and features of the present invention in detail, the following preferred embodiments are combined with the drawings. The following is a description of the following: Ο 参阅 参阅 第 第 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 远端 远端 远端 远端 远端 远端 远端 远端 远端 远端 远端 远端 远端 远端 远端 远端 远端 远端 远端The user device V of the server P includes a biometric feature acquisition device for capturing the biometric feature of the user 2' and 1 to obtain a biometric template F; the server 5, the second receiving age After that, the H access and the operation processing information are input. The description of the biometrics as the remote (4) authentication method is as follows: the registration phase · as shown in the figure - 'when the user wants to obtain the service of the servo ^' He must first pass the manufacturer's device (4) to the other device, and then the book will be processed. Then the feeding service will calculate the information submitted by the user, and then transfer the calculated-registered tfUZ to the xiao through the safe passage. And stored in the user device ", the details are as follows: " Step-: User input - identity information is still with a exhausted information, and the user device ί / randomly generated - the first random value touch, and With the code information and the first chaotic value 丨 as a factor, first perform a hash-computation-first parameter. The calculation is as shown in the following formula i.) 7 201042487 In addition, the user places the finger on the biometric feature to obtain the fat fingerprint feature value and obtains the biological difficulty F. In this case, the fingerprint is taken as an example. The upper shot is a mixture of visual _, toe pattern or facial features - or a mixture of the above biological features; finally, the identity information is still transmitted, the ς-parameter β and the biometric template are transmitted to the ship for registration. :乂Step 2··When the servo^ receives the message from the user device in the step--the server generates the following operation--the password hash Vw. The first-password hash value _ is obtained by using the cipher information and the first, and the mutated or mutated operation, and then performing the _ operation with the ciphertext F, and then mutually exclusive or contiguous with the biometric template F. , column 2 shows: ,, bite (four) hpw^hiPW®!^)®!^ (Type 2) The registration information milk contains a secret information for a comparison parameter 2 of which the secret information is read by Identity information—the ship’s ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ -厶(still ten) tenΑ/λψ / on (3rd type) The ratio=parameter\ is the identity information, when the private key X is first repudiated, and then the same function is continued with the biological template. The calculated result is as shown in the following formula: (Form 4) = Step 3: When the feeding device continues to calculate and the registration information is generated, it is transmitted to the household and is stored in the application. Step 4: When the user device α receives the registration information, the milk system first stores it in 201042487 to the user device ί/, and then the user The first arbitrary value ΛΑ% within the user input means to solve the problems in the future need to remember. Second, the login phase In the second figure, the process of the entire login phase is shown. After the registration is completed, if the user wants to log in to the server S to obtain a service or access a resource, the user first enters a confirmation identity information/仏 and a pending password information to the user device, and then the user's finger. After the biometric feature acquisition device 55 scans Ο 取得 to obtain a biometric template to be confirmed, the user device performs the following step: message/D, step 1: the user device _ inputs the identity to be confirmed by the user. The tombstone information to be confirmed... and the to-be-confirmed 2" hash value is calculated by the "complex operation" and then reconciled with the biometric template f to be confirmed, and the sugar is as follows: 5 ^所;^翻数地进= A (尸I 十游G|) φ & and then use the secret information, and the to-be-confirmed (5th) line mutually exclusive or operate to obtain a two-parameter Ρ2, / face value (four), into P2 = R ® hPwid „, the following formula 6: Finally, the user is shocked " by the second parameter (type 6) levy template 匕 through the hash function operation 2 The biometric pair to be confirmed is aligned with the parameter L, and its operation and discriminant are as follows, ~ And the ratio of

Pid» = hPi(Fldn) and 8: pi^ = pc (7th) If the result of the comparison is the same, continue (8th) and read the next step; otherwise, immediately 9 201042487 Login request. Step 2: The user device " generates a second chaotic value with the first chaotic value / WG, does not repeat 'and generates the following random number confirmation information (: coffee and - time hash value Cr asks the server s Wherein, the random number confirmation is obtained by mutually exclusive or calculating the second random number/the second parameter A, and the agricultural operation is as shown in the following formula: 9, :WG20/>2 (9th Equation) The time hash value cr is obtained by performing the hash function operation on the second random number and then mutually exclusive or computing with the user device time stamp and then performing the hash function operation, and the operation is as follows: As shown in the formula: ', (第ίο式) CT = Ap2 (h(RNG2)@TU) > Step 3: The user shakes r to confirm the identity information to be broken, and the random number confirms the information 〇_, The time hash value and the user device timestamp [pass the server s. u, three, the verification phase in the third figure shows the flow of the entire verification phase. When the server $ receives the user device t / The sent identity information I to be sent, the random number confirmation information C·, the time hash value Cr, and the user device view the word service Do the following verification step '' and then decide whether to allow the user to log in to the servo H to access its # source. Correct, #的户装置" Verify that it is legal after the server s will respond to the user The device r can be similarly confirmed whether the server s is correct or not. Step-: The feeding service & first confirms that the format of the identity information to be confirmed is "" correct. If it is a mismatched login request Step 2: The server 5 generates a server time stamp 7; the server time stamp Γ 10 201042487 is obtained from the server 5 after receiving the third step of the previous stage. The server _ server time Poke the heart, the difference between the two, to determine whether it is a predetermined time difference (four), the S difference ΔΓ indicates a reasonable time interval of the transmission delay, wf曰1 △Τ' then rejects the request for the arrival, and the closing is greater than The difference key X between the scales is used to verify the received step 2: the server S uses the private gold message as follows: Ο Ο First, the server continues to use the identity information to be confirmed and the private key _ Count, the _ the chaos is mutually exclusive or transferred - The third sacred, its 11 formula: P3 = C secret ® h (lDidn ® X, ^ (11th)), the ship imx the third parameter "factor calculates its hash function value" Mutual exclusion or operation with the touch device, _ with the initial identity information I and the difficult gold I enter (four) (four) number operation, get a waiting time cumbersome value ', and then the __ hash value ^ Compared with the time hash value Q, its operation and discriminant are as shown in the following 12th and 13th formulas:

Cw = ’) (do (7)) 10 7;) (12th gas)

Ct Ct (13th) If the result of the comparison is not correct, the request for the arrival is terminated; no _ the server s believes that the user device ^; is a legitimate user device and allows it to log in ^ and proceed - Turn around, and temporarily record the scale identification information % until the end of the communication. Step 4: When the server s• verifies that the user device is a legitimate user device 201042487, the servo operation generates a response message to the user device. The user device " is mutually exclusive or operated by the identity information I to be confirmed, and the hash function operation is performed after the third privilege and the server.

=Incoming lamp series phase operation, the handle is Wei Wei message~, its operation is shown in the formula 14·· JQ = 顺/%" 十叫| />3 |丨[) (J4) > 5. When the user device arrives at the response "fU, c„p ' returned by the ship & and then performs the next _ operation to determine whether the 値 &; is correct: ~ step = five - - use - user When the time is lost and the shop is 戮 运 运 运 疋 right 疋 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Step 5 bis: using the first parameter A, the second chaotic value Teng 2, and the feeding device time stamp ^ to perform a tandem connection operation, and then performing a hash function operation with the value of the value, and comparing In response to the message Q, the formula is as shown in the following formula I5:

Kparng.wt^^c^ (15th formula), μ right 疋 is inconsistent, then the end of the connection is disconnected from the server $; otherwise, under the nose, 9 information, and the second chaotic value generated by the paste Replacing the secret information* and the first random number t in the original user device ν, the user device dynamically changes the secret 3 and the information π in the temporary setting after the user device is added. The user device u uses the to-be-confirmed password and the second chaotic value mine 2 to mutually exclusive or operate (4) with a hash function operation, and then with the to-be-confirmed biometric template 匕" mutually exclusive "calculated - new fee code The hash value; its operation is as shown in the following formula 16: 12 201042487 Na Wdn (16th) The new secret «Xun um by the secret capital ·, the first - password hash t and the new - password hash The value k is mutually exclusive or the operation is as shown in the following 17th: and new = and ten hpw ten hpw new (17th) 4. Transforming the password information stage Ο Ο The fourth figure shows the process of transforming the password information. After the completion of the green book, he can freely change the password information sand at any time, (and ^ does not need to pass the ship | ^ _ help, improve _ sharp wish detection effect and __ ζ first move the user device " 'and lose Person-passage identity information# pass (four) code poor news I and put the finger to the biometric acquisition device 2 intercept its characteristic value operation a pass biometric template ^, once the user sets, after the miscellaneous certificate 'can submit - new password Information ^ to do the update. Its thin Lang is as follows: The user device U uses the information input by the user to perform the following test. The traffic (4) information and the first-disorder value are first mutually exclusive 21 and then hashed, and then the common biometric template is The result of mutual exclusion or operation results in a pass-through first password hash value, and its operation is as shown in the following 18th formula: - Tao, PW, mG 'Qing Tao (18th) = use the secret information Performing the pass-through first cryptographic hash value ^ performing the ' operation 'final' of the user device to perform the hash function calculation by the aforementioned operation value and the pass-through 201042487 biometric template, and to compare with the comparison pair The result - to 'continue to continue the next step; stand = bundle this login request, the discriminant is shown in the following 19th formula. (19th formula) can submit the new secret arm message ^ If the user device c / Pass the verification, and proceed to the next step. Step 2: The user device " utilizes the operation of the new password information sand, and more details of the content to replace the password information. New password information U mouth the first mess Numerical value, first mutual exclusion or transport After the calculation = line hash operation 'and then the general biometric template core system is mutually exclusive or operated by the factor - the updated first - password hash value _ ^ the operation is as shown in the following 18: (Form 18) hP'pd = hdw ® RNG)® Fpass is mutually exclusive by the secret information λ, the first password, the updated secret information hash value, the money, the training, the __ The calculation is obtained, and its operation is as shown in the following 19th formula: (19th formula)

Rupd = R® hpw® hjmu/Ki It can be seen from the above that 'the invention solves the security problem of remote user device authentication'. This agreement combines the dense solution mechanism and the high security of biometric identification; X force effect lies in ·· (-μ user device every time the login message is dynamic, so it can resist the resend attack; (-) system f can not know or calculate the exhaustion of the user device u Information, preventing internal attacks; 201042487 (3) The user device t/ is free to select or change the password information /w, and the user device r provides an extremely efficient password information detection before logging in; The server does not need to store any verification table, and prevents attacks such as blocking service or verification table being stolen. [Simplified Schematic] 0 The first figure is a flowchart of the registration phase of a preferred embodiment of the present invention. 1 is a flow chart of a login phase of a preferred embodiment of the present invention. The second figure is a flow chart of a verification phase of a preferred embodiment of the present invention. The fourth figure is a process of transforming a password information phase according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention. Figure.

[Main component symbol description] User device f; Biometric acquisition device book registration information rib password information household account first parameter θ secret information λ private key; C pending password information / ^ to be confirmed - secret value (4) Comparison parameter Ρ idn server S biometric template F identity information / £) The first chaotic value of the first dynasty miscellaneous Qin value fipW comparison parameter p. The identity information to be confirmed JD dn The biometric template to be confirmed 4 The second parameter is the second chaotic value 15 201042487 The number of the chaos is ‧ The δ ΐ ΐ User device time stamp 7: Time difference ΔΓ To compare the time hash value <^_ User instant Timestamp U New first password hash value rush password password information new password information household update first password hash value rush time hash value Cr server time stamp 7; third parameter corpse 3 response message c„p new secret information and _ Pass-through identity information called the coffee pass biometric template ^ Pass the first password hash value update after the secret information heart, 16

Claims (1)

201042487 VII. Patent application scope: A remote identity authentication method based on biometrics verification, including the following steps: Continued ^ - User registered via the "user device pair" - ship after the production of the beta book #4 household device contains _ biometric acquisition device: the user provides at least one identity information, a password information and a biometric template of the user device, the user device provides a first chaotic value, and the feeding device has a "private gold H biometric feature" The template gamma user converts the biometric feature by the biometric feature acquisition device; the registration information 13 secret, Μ, and - comparison parameters, the secret information and the comparison parameter are from the private The first random number, the password information, and the identity information are generated by at least one-way operation; the server transmits the registered beta to the user device and is stored in the user device; login and verification: in the When the user requests to log in to the service device 11 via the user device, the user is input to the good device by the user - the body to be confirmed is {8° information, and the information to be confirmed is to be confirmed. And - to confirm the biological Wei template, ^ the household device is to apply the identity information, the to-be-confirmed password information, the to-be-confirmed biometric template, and the first random number as a known factor ^ the secret information The one-way operation is used to obtain a waiting parameter to compare the parameter to be compared with the comparison parameter; if the comparison result is incorrect, the login action of the user device is interrupted; if the comparison result is correct, Then, the user device transmits a second random value to the server, and the server replaces the first random number according to the second random value, and generates a new secret information, and then transmits the new secret information. 201042487 to the user device to replace the 四 (4) news; its towel shop secret message is matched with the change of the second random value and re-acquired through the one-way operation. </ RTI> </ RTI> </ RTI> <RTIgt; </ RTI> <RTIgt; </ RTI> <RTIgt; </ RTI> <RTIgt; </ RTI> <RTIgt; </ RTI> <RTIgt; Or after the ^ and then into the hash function to get the - the - parameter, and then transferred to the server side integrated in the registration information. 53 3. The remote identity authentication method based on biometrics (4) according to the second application of the full-time application, wherein: in the login and verification step, the user device is to confirm the password information to be confirmed with the first mess. After the values are mutually exclusive or operated, they are substituted into the hash function to obtain a first-password hash value to be confirmed, and then integrated into the to-be-aligned parameter. 4. The remote identity authentication method based on biometrics as described in the third paragraph of the patent scope, wherein: in the registration step, the one-way operation is a hash operation or a hash operation combined with mutual exclusion or calculation 1. According to the scope of the patent application, the remote identification method based on the biometrics verification is based on the fingerprint, the retina, the toe pattern, and the facial features. One of them or a mixture. 6. The remote identity authentication method based on the biometrics as the soft test base according to the scope of the patent application scope, wherein: in the login and verification step, the user device further has a user time stamp, the user device The time warfare is the time when the user logs in. The user device time stamp is mutually exclusive or computed with the second chaotic value, and then substituted into the hash function to obtain a one-time value. , Hash 18 201042487 7. The remote identity method based on the biometrics test described in item 6 of the patent application scope, wherein the user device is also in the boarding and verification (4) When the second random value is transmitted to the server, the user device time stamp is transmitted to the ship; the ship generates a server time stamp when receiving the request of the user device, and compares the X household The device time stamp and the shaft device time stamp can determine whether the time of the user device's boarding time is within a predetermined time difference, and if not, the login action is interrupted. 8. The remote identity authentication method based on biometrics according to claim 6 of the patent application scope, wherein: in the login and verification step, the user device also simultaneously generates the second random number The second random number and the to-be-identified identity information, the to-be-confirmed password information, and the private key perform the one-way operation to generate a random number confirmation information and a time hash value 'and transmit the random number confirmation information Go to the server; the server performs the one-way operation on the random number confirmation information through the identity information to be confirmed by the user, the password information to be confirmed, and the private key to obtain a third parameter; The user device time stamp is mutually exclusive or operated with the third parameter, and then the hash function is substituted into a time-matching time hash value, and the time-matched time hash value is compared with the time hash value; If not, the login action of the user device is interrupted. 19