RU2771865C1 - Method and device for multifactor protection of objects from miniature unmanned aerial vehicles - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: protection systems.

SUBSTANCE: invention relates to the field of countering unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and can be used in the development of complexes to combat them and prevent illegal penetration of miniature UAVs (mini-UAVs) into the territory of controlled objects. The expected result is achieved through the integrated use of a multi-position radar complex and an optoelectronic means of detecting and recognizing mini-UAVs and the simultaneous use of several damaging factors, including radio-electronic suppression of on-board receivers of control and navigation channels of mini-UAVs, as well as the creation of an extended cloud of damaging elements in the area where the mini-UAV is located and along its flight route, resulting in physical damage to the structural elements of a miniature unmanned aerial vehicle or disruption of their stable functioning.

EFFECT: increase in the reliability of the protection of objects from mini-UAVs.

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Description

The invention relates to the field of countering unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and can be used in the development of complexes to combat them and prevent illegal intrusions of miniature UAVs (mini-UAVs) into the territory of controlled objects. The technical result of the claimed invention is to increase the reliability of protecting objects from mini-UAVs, achieved through the integrated use of a multi-position radar complex and the simultaneous use of several damaging factors, including electronic jamming of mini-UAVs onboard receivers and the creation of a cloud of damaging elements, leading to physical damage to structural elements miniature unmanned aerial vehicle or hindering the performance of its tasks.

Most of the well-known proposals in the field of countering UAVs are limited to considering only methods and devices for their detection or functional defeat. However, for such purposes as mini-UAVs, which have extremely low radar, optical, thermal imaging and acoustic visibility, the ability to detect them in a timely and reliable manner is of decisive importance. As for the methods of functional impact on mini-UAVs, the known inventions do not fully take into account their characteristic performance and flight characteristics (performance characteristics and performance characteristics), the ability of mini-UAVs to almost instantly change the trajectory and flight speed, take off vertically and land. This makes most of the proposals that provide for combating them on the basis of traditional approaches typical of other aerodynamic air objects ineffective. In addition, almost all the proposed solutions lack the fundamental ability to counteract several mini-UAVs simultaneously. This makes such proposals of little demand if it is necessary to protect objects from threats from a group of mini-UAVs, especially those who raid the object simultaneously from different sides.

It is also important when evaluating the proposed solutions to combat UAVs that the majority of mini-UAVs that can pose a threat to protected objects have a much lower cost compared to traditional aircraft such as airplanes, cruise and other types of missiles. In view of this, when choosing ways to deal with them, one should proceed from the commensurability of the costs of creating and using such devices and the cost of the mini-UAVs themselves. Thus, a complex organizational and technical solution is needed, which should be based on methods for effectively detecting mini-UAVs and their reliable functional destruction.

There are various ways to defeat or suppress UAVs, differing in the principles of operation and conditions of use. For example: UAVs - UAV interceptors (patent No. 2490585 dated May 15, 2012); trap nets installed in the air using various means (patents No. 72753 dated April 27, 2008, No. 72754 dated April 27, 2008, No. 2679377 dated February 8, 2018); anti-air mines of various designs (patents No. 2237859 of 10/10/2004, No. 2734267 of 08/20/2019); barrage balloons designed to obstruct the flight of UAVs (patents No. 63785 dated 06/30/1944, No. 2273818 dated 04/10/2006).

The effective application of these technical solutions is limited by the imperfection of the design and methods of use, the small space protected by such means. In addition, due to safety or sanitary restrictions, most of them cannot be used in areas where people are located. For example, such conditions limit the use of powerful electromagnetic pulses that can disable not only the UAV control system, but also disrupt the operation of systems and means of wide communication and broadcasting (patent No. 2551821 dated May 27, 2015, No. ., No. 2700206 dated April 20, 2018). For the same reasons, it is not advisable to use standard combat means to combat mini-UAVs: such as aviation, anti-aircraft artillery and systems (patents No. 2321818 of 10.04.

Inventions are known (patents No. 2578524 dated February 25, 2014, No. 2700107 dated October 24, 2018), which propose to place means of destruction on spatially separated air platforms, for example, rocket packages, to combat UAVs.

The disadvantages of these proposals are the need for high-precision guidance of missiles, the limited area of destruction of UAVs with one shot, and the economic inexpediency in terms of destroying inexpensive UAVs.

There are ways to deal with low-altitude targets, which offer less expensive submunitions than missiles. For example, a metal mortar (patents No. 2189557 dated September 20, 2002, No. 2734267 dated August 20, 2019).

The disadvantages of such methods is that such mortars use crushed stone of a sufficiently large fraction as striking elements, the volume of which for one mortar reaches 1500 kg and a powder charge weighing 20 kg. The use of such a device poses a threat to people and infrastructure. In addition, such a mortar is not stable and dangerous to maintain for personnel.

Known methods of countering UAVs, providing after its detection, the simultaneous determination of the coordinates of the aircraft and weather data, the results of joint processing of which calculate the point of creation of a special cloud. The following are considered as elements of such a cloud, for example: cobwebs made of light durable strips (tapes) of synthetic fiber, (patents No. abrasive particles and means of their dispersion in the atmosphere (patent No. 2725662 dated August 24, 2018). The cloud is formed by firing a special projectile ahead of the UAV, taking into account the parameters of its movement and the time of formation of the cloud.

The disadvantages of these proposals is that UAVs, especially miniature classes, are capable of almost instantly changing the direction and value of the angular velocity of movement. Such maneuverability of the UAV makes it unlikely to correctly calculate the UAV velocity vector and effectively create a cloud of functionally striking elements at the lead point.

Patent No. 2721815 dated 04/08/2019 considers a system for countering UAVs, which provides for the formation of a curtain in the air space, consisting of balloons filled with a gas lighter than air.

The obvious disadvantage of this proposal is its dependence on weather conditions, and, above all, the strength and direction of the wind.

Known methods of combating UAVs in the form of targeted use of high-power jamming signals to navigation systems, control and information transmission channels [1].

The disadvantage of these methods of combating UAVs is the need to create directed powerful radiation, which is costly, especially in the context of the need for the massive use of electronic countermeasures. In addition, such devices disrupt the operation of all radio-electronic means operating in these operating frequency ranges, including Wi-Fi and global navigation network receivers.

An important disadvantage of all these technical solutions is the lack of the ability to counteract a group of mini-UAVs with different performance characteristics and performance characteristics and making a raid on a controlled object at the same time. This disadvantage is a consequence of the fact that the proposed solutions consider the use of only one means of functional destruction or suppression of mini-UAVs. This, for example, does not take into account the ability of most modern mini-UAVs to fly not only in the remote control mode, but also according to the flight program pre-set in the onboard control system. The latter circumstance makes ineffective the means of electronic suppression of only the remote control channels of the mini-UAV.

Known inventions that simultaneously offer several factors of functional impact on UAVs. Such proposals include, for example, a barrier device that contains a system of balloons, cables that hold balloons at a height of up to 150 m, a thin nylon network placed between balloons, and anti-personnel fragmentation mines fixed between grid nodes, as well as regular aerosol means, mounted on a nylon mesh, and an aerosol launch control system (patent No. 2197701 dated January 27, 2003).

The disadvantage of this technical solution is its complexity and low reliability of defeating mini-UAVs with mines, since due to the inertia of their operation, UAVs with a high probability can go beyond the impact zone with fragments. The use of trap networks is also ineffective, due to their relatively small geometric dimensions, and the deployment of large networks is a significant difficulty.

There is a known method of functional suppression of UAVs, which involves the sequential use of several damaging factors - this is electromagnetic radiation (EMR) of short duration (from fractions to tens of nanoseconds), dye spraying onto the surface of UAV optical devices and a cloud of damaging elements, leading to physical damage to the UAV structural elements (patent). No. 2700207 dated December 5, 2018).

The disadvantage of this method is the use of electromagnetic radiation as one of the damaging factors, which makes this method very costly and hardly applicable in populated areas. This is due to the need for the functional suppression of the UAV generation of ultra-high power radiation signals, as well as the calculation of the radiation power and the orientation of the emitting antenna towards the detected UAV. As for spraying the dye onto the surface of UAV optical devices, this method requires accurate determination of its coordinates and output to the point of application of the UAV - interceptor.

Thus, most of the existing methods of combating UAVs have a common drawback - the use of one damaging factor, which negatively affects the probability of hitting an unmanned aerial vehicle.

In the case of using several damaging factors, the proposed device designs are characterized by complexity, low accuracy and the probability of performing the task as intended.

The determining condition for an effective fight against mini-UAVs is the possibility of their timely and reliable detection.

There are various methods for detecting UAVs and devices that implement them.

The main methods for detecting UAVs include: radar, radio engineering, optical visible and infrared, laser, acoustic. A comparative analysis of detection devices that implement these methods allows us to draw the following conclusions about the possibility of their use in detecting mini-UAVs with an effective dispersion surface (EDS) of 0.01 square meters or less.

Acoustic detectors have a short detection range (patents No. 2589290 dated February 24, 2015, No. 2116632 dated July 27, 1998, No. 2532562 dated July 17, 2013). In an urban environment or in an industrial area, a high level of background noise is a significant difficulty for acoustic detectors due to the low reliability of the correct selection of acoustic signatures from the operation of UAV propellers against this background noise. The tendency to reduce the noise level of UAV propellers or the use of non-screw structures of such devices makes such acoustic detectors ineffective.

Optoelectronic means (OES) of detection using optical visible and infrared methods (patents No. 2120139, dated 04.29.1998, 2304792 dated 12.14.2005, No. 2701177 dated 02.26.2019, No. 2305303 dated 08.22.2005 d) also have insufficient detection range. At the same time, with optical magnification, the probability of detecting a UAV decreases due to the narrowing of the field of view space. Significantly reduce the potential of the UES smoke content of atmospheric air, the presence in it of hydro- and meteorological formations (snow, rain, hail, cloudiness, hoarfrost), dust particles, sand; low level of self-thermal radiation of the mini-UAV, as well as its low thermal contrast against the background of other objects. In addition, the identification of a detected object using the ECO as a UAV may be accompanied by errors due to the fact that the silhouettes of the UAV, collected, for example, in a handicraft way, may differ significantly from those contained in the system database.

Existing electronic intelligence means use their own radio emissions to detect targets and do not allow detecting targets flying in the “radio silence” mode (BY patents, No. 13748 of 10/30/2010, No. 2159447 of 12/28/1999, No. .2014, No. 2282864 dated March 22, 2005). Most of the inventions that offer various methods of combating UAVs offer detection devices based specifically on radio direction finding methods. The detection range and accuracy of mini-UAVs in such detectors significantly depends on the power of the emitted signals by on-board radio devices and the number of receiving devices.

The most effective for detecting mini-UAVs are active radar. The active mode of operation of such radar stations (RLS) provides for the emission of signals of a certain structure and wavelengths in the direction of the target, followed by the reception and processing of signals reflected from the target. Active radar techniques make it possible to detect objects that do not emit their own radio signals. However, most of these radars use signals of the meter and decimeter wavelength ranges, the parameters of which ensure the detection of targets with an EOPD of at least 0.1 square meters, which is not enough to detect a mini-UAV. The use of signals of shorter wavelengths (C and Ku - bands) in such radars is associated with a deterioration in the characteristics of their propagation in the atmosphere, especially in conditions of hydro and meteorological formations, and the high radiation powers of such transmitters do not allow the installation of radars in populated areas.

The disadvantages of most active radars is the combined principle of their design, which provides that the transmitter of probing signals and the receiver of signals reflected from the target are located in one place [2,3,4,5]. In view of this, such radars have low noise immunity at low altitudes, primarily in terms of interfering reflections from local objects. In addition, under conditions of deliberate jamming on the reception channels of such radars, their capabilities are significantly reduced. An additional disadvantage of active combined radars is their complexity and high cost.

In the invention No. 2744497 dated March 10, 2021 “Method of protecting objects from the penetration of remotely controlled small-sized low-altitude aircraft (UAV type)”, it is proposed to simultaneously use two detection channels to detect a mini-UAV: radar and radio frequency. As a radar channel, a radar motion sensor (RLDD) is proposed, based on the use of the effect of frequency change reflected from a moving signal object (Doppler effect) to detect UAVs. As a radio frequency detection channel, it is proposed to use a spectrum analyzer that allows analyzing the electromagnetic environment in the frequency range of the transmitters of the UAV control panels. An increase in the overall level of radiation in the specified range and exceeding its certain threshold level, preceding the appearance of a moving object over a protected area, should confirm the results of the detection of the RAE and allow identifying the detected moving air object as a UAV.

This method, which involves the use of a remote design of the radar, where the receiver and the group of transmitters are spaced apart on the ground, allows you to avoid the disadvantages inherent in the combined design of an active radar when protecting objects from mini-UAVs. In the considered RLDD, it is proposed to use continuous linear-frequency-modulated signals (chirp signals) with a fixed letter as probing signals for each of the transmitters included in the RLDD. With further coherent processing of the signals reflected from the target, they are compared with the reference signal, which makes it possible to make a decision about the presence of a target in a certain volume of space. However, the use of this method implies a fairly accurate frequency synchronization of the emitted and reflected signals and the need for complex tuning of the RLDD. In addition, the use of chirp signals does not allow accurate determination of target coordinates, which reduces the capabilities of the complex. Additional disadvantages of this method of protecting objects from unmanned aerial vehicles are the short detection range of signals used to control mini-UAVs by radio frequency detection methods and the lack of information in the proposed technical solution on methods or means of direct protection of an object or impact on a UAV.

Thus, the traditionally used detection methods and means have significant limitations in detecting mini-UAVs. The proposed methods for detecting mini-UAVs using multi-position radars have insufficient accuracy in determining their coordinates.

The closest analogue to the claimed invention is the Stopdron-Arsenal UAV combat complex, which implements several technical solutions for this simultaneously [6]. The complex is designed for radar active detection, optical recognition of UAVs and counteraction to them by directional interruption of UAV control signals. The placement of the elements of the complex ensures the formation of an area of protection against UAVs above the object. The main radar, which is part of the complex, is active and combined (the receiving and transmitting devices of the radar are combined in one unit). At the same time, this radar operates in the Ku frequency band, 16.97 GHz. The additional radar of the complex consists of several radio direction finders spaced apart in space. Upon receipt of a signal about the detected target from the main radar, confirmed by data from the additional radar, the device for optical recognition and directional jamming of the UAV control channels, which are combined in one product, is activated.

The complex use of several detection tools at the same time, based on different physical principles, provides an increase in the probability of correct detection of a mini-UAV. However, in general, the complex has the same disadvantages as each of the devices included in its composition separately (a combined design and an ultra-high frequency range of the main radar, which has restrictions on the propagation of signals; one striking factor is electronic jamming of the UAV control channel; a jamming transmitter, having a limited spatial orientation and not allowing to ensure the protection of the object during the massive use of UAVs).

Claimed as an invention, the system of multifactorial protection of objects from miniature unmanned aerial vehicles is implemented by means of a technical solution that involves the use of interacting devices combined by a single control loop and algorithm for the functioning of interacting devices: designed to detect and identify mini-UAVs, radio frequency suppression of radio receivers of control channels and navigation of unmanned aerial vehicles devices, creating a cloud of damaging elements in the area where the mini-UAV is located and in the direction of flight.

The invention is illustrated by drawings.

Fig. 1 - block diagram of a system for multifactorial protection of objects from miniature unmanned aerial vehicles;

Fig. 2 is a drawing explaining the application of a system of multifactorial protection of objects from miniature unmanned aerial vehicles;

Fig. 3 is a drawing of a multibarrel pyrotechnic launcher.

The system of multifactorial protection of objects from miniature unmanned aerial vehicles (Fig. 1) includes: a multi-position radar detector (MRLO) - the main detection channel, consisting of N signal transmitters (PS) designed to generate target illumination signals and interference with communication and navigation channels mini- UAV 1 and processor of signals and radar information (OS RLI) 2; an optical detection and recognition device (OOR) of targets 3, which is an additional detection channel for a mini-UAV and consists of an optoelectronic means (OES) with a turntable (PP) and a video data processor module (MVD); multi-barrel pyrotechnic launchers (MPPU) (mortar type) for salvo launch of fireworks rockets containing damaging elements of various designs 4. The number of MPPU (M) is selected based on the features and area of the controlled object, as well as safety requirements for people and surrounding objects.

The system of multifactor protection of objects from miniature unmanned aerial vehicles is arranged as follows. Each of N PS 1 consists of a control module (MU) 5, a frequency synthesizer (MF) 6, power amplifiers (PA) 7, an antenna system (AS) 8, a synchronization signal receiver (PRSS) with an antenna 9. PS are placed on supports of natural or artificial origin, occupying a dominant position in height within the protected object.

OS RLI 2 is designed to generate and transmit radio signals for synchronization and control of MRLO 10, transmit information 11 to local and remote display and control devices (DU) 12. OS RLI consists of a signal receiver module (MPS) 13, a digital signal processing module and RLI (MTSO) 14, multi-channel antenna system (MAC) 15, the transmitter of synchronization signals (PSS) 16 with an antenna. OS radar is located on a hill in the center of the protected object.

The system of multifactorial protection of objects from miniature unmanned aerial vehicles can operate in standby mode or in the mode of suppression/destruction of mini-UAV 17. In this case, the transition from standby mode to suppression/destruction mode can be carried out automatically or automated - at the command of the operator of the complex. This transition is provided by interrupting the frequency-phase synchronization channel of the operation of the MRLO 10, which in standby mode is continuously maintained between the RLI OS and the PS. Frequency-phase synchronization of the MRLO operation is necessary to ensure coherent processing in the radar imager OS of signals reflected from the target.

Depending on the operating mode of the system of multifactorial protection of objects from miniature unmanned aerial vehicles, various types of signals are generated and emitted in the PS. In standby mode, in the midrange of each PS, probing signals are generated, which are phase-code-dominated (PCM) sequences of pulses with a fixed phase shift of each of them relative to the signals of other PS 18. In the mini-UAV threat neutralization mode, interference signals are generated and emitted in the frequency ranges of control channels mini-UAV (2.4 GHz and 5.8 GHz) and mini-UAV navigation channels (1.2 and 1.6 GHz) 19. These signals are amplified in the PA and through the speaker, which has a directional radiation pattern (DNA) with a width of 60 hail, in the azimuth and elevation planes are emitted in a given direction, creating a zone of illumination and suppression (ZPP) of a mini-UAV. The number and location of the PS should ensure the creation of a continuous multi-frequency electromagnetic field of the required configuration, which allows, with a given probability of correct detection (Rpr.det.), to detect mini-UAVs and carry out reliable electronic jamming of their receiving devices via remote control and navigation channels on the approach and directly above the territory protected object.

The beams of all PSs located within the facility are oriented upwards at large angles, which makes it possible to reduce the required radiation power, the power consumption of the complex, and the level of radio interference for nearby third-party receivers.

The signal emitted by the PS and reflected from the target 20 is received by the MAC OS of the radar, which is a block consisting of six horizontally and one vertically oriented receiving antennas, with the help of which a sequential survey of the airspace is carried out according to the algorithm established in the OS of the radar.

After processing the received signals in the OS RLI, at the output of the MCO, radar information (RLI) is formed about the coordinates and parameters of the movement of the target, which arrives at the local or remote control unit 12. This information is displayed on the monitor screen in a form that allows you to determine the fact of violation of the boundaries of the protected area, time , speed, range to the mini-UAV and the trajectory of its flight. At the same time, in the OS and the radar, a control signal 21 UOR 3 is generated. On this signal, the PP UOR 22 deploys the OES 23 in the direction of the detected MRLO target and performs its automatic additional search 24 and capture for auto-tracking. Video data about the detected and tracked target from the OES are sent to ATS 25, where they are recognized using a model built on the basis of artificial neural networks and formed databases of air objects of various types and classes. This information, as well as the video image of the target 26 followed by the OES, are received by the UOU, where they are displayed on the monitor. In addition, when a detected target is identified as a mini-UAV, a confirmation signal 27 is generated in the ATS, which is sent to the MCO.

After receiving a confirmation signal from the ATS, the synchronization channels between the PS, in the RFP of which the target was detected, and the radar OS are switched off, after which the KZO switches to the suppression / defeat mode. The PS with which the synchronization channel is interrupted begin the directed emission of interference signals to the navigation and control channels of the mini-UAV.

At the same time, automatically from the RLI OS or automated at the command of the KZO operator on the MPPU 4, located between the RLI OS and the PS in the RFP of which a mini-UAV was detected, a command is given to launch 28 fireworks rockets 29.

The use of a system of multifactorial protection of objects from miniature unmanned aerial vehicles is illustrated by the figure (Fig. 2). The system itself is placed on the ground in such a way as to create within the boundaries of the object 30 and the immediate approaches to it a field of radar control and an electronic suppression zone 31, formed, respectively, by illumination signals 18 and interference signals 19, a zone of functional destruction 32 of a mini-UAV 17, created by a volley launch fireworks rockets 29 from each MPPU 4. To do this, in the system of multifactorial protection of objects from miniature unmanned aerial vehicles, the principle of multi-position detection and suppression (defeat) means is applied, which provides for the creation of a spatially separated network of PS MRLO and MPPU.

It is known [7,8] that when using spaced radar detection tools in the clearance zone of the location (between the transmitter and receiver), the target EOPD increases by an average of 20-25 dB relative to the backscatter EOPD for radars with combined designs. It is theoretically substantiated and practically confirmed that the airframe designs of most modern aircraft are designed in such a way that most of the energy of direct electromagnetic radiation signals is not re-reflected in the strictly opposite direction, but is scattered mainly into the lower hemisphere of the airframe (patent No. ). Thus, the EOPD of such targets for MRLO is additionally increased. Therefore, the spaced MRLO provides the detection of small-sized and hardly noticeable objects for other means of radar. In addition, due to the vertical orientation of the antenna patterns of the PS, in which the air object in horizontal flight is at a minimum distance, both from the transmitter and the receiver, the energy characteristics of the detection signals increase even more. Such a spatial-energy construction of the MRLS can significantly reduce its energy consumption, since it does not require a high radiation power of the PS and exclude the influence of the radio shadow area on the MRLS from high radio-reflecting objects, buildings and structures.

After the target is detected by the MRLO and its coordinates are determined, a signal 21 is sent to the OES, the turntable turns the OES in the direction of the target, and optical addition 24 of the target is carried out and it is taken for auto-tracking. Video data about the target is processed in the MOVD, where the target is classified, after which the information enters the terminal display and control devices, where it is grouped with radar information about the target.

The advantages of the multi-position system of multi-factorial protection of objects from miniature unmanned aerial vehicles are also manifested in relation to the conditions when the complex switches to the mode of emitting interference signals to the receiving devices of the control and navigation channels of the mini-UAV 19 and the use of MPPU. Directional emission of radio interference allows you to keep low, safe for people and not disturbing the operation of other radio equipment, the power values of the output signal of the PS. This ensures a sufficient level of interference power density at the input of mini-UAV receivers and reliable interruption of control and navigation channels.

Placing a sufficient number of MPPUs around and directly on the territory of a controlled object makes it possible to create in the area where the mini-UAV is located and along the route of its flight at the required time, provided for by the algorithm of the operation of the system of multifactorial protection of objects from miniature unmanned aerial vehicles, a spatially extended cloud functionally affecting the mini-UAV. UAVs of striking elements of the required density 32. The multi-position principle of placing MPPU provides a high probability of reliable destruction of UAVs at any point in the space controlled by the MRLS, and allows you to reduce the charge of the fireworks themselves and the charges of damaging elements to a level that is safe for people and objects on the ground.

Simultaneously with the start of jamming the control and navigation channels of the mini-UAV or with the time delay set in the operation algorithm of the complex, electric signals 28 are transmitted to multi-barreled mortars, leading to a series of shots equipped with pyrotechnic devices in them. As a result, in the area where the mini-UAV is located or along the course of its movement, a spatially extended cloud of elements functionally affecting the mini-UAV is created.

MPPU (Fig. 3) is a structure consisting of barrels (mortars) 33 multidirectional at different angles relative to the vertical axis, the number of which (S) is determined by the requirements for the geometric dimensions of the area of expansion of striking elements and its density.

Mortar diameter can be from 100 mm to 250 mm, height - from 400 to 1000 mm. Mortars are made in the form of a cylindrical body 34 with a muffled rear part, mounted on an H-shaped frame 35, the dimensions and weight of which provide maximum stability of the MPPU during volley shots. A starting device 36 is built into the body of each mortar, consisting of a disposable electric igniter and an electrical connector, to which a signal-starting wire 37 is connected from the outside, connected to a cable assembly 38 from all MPPU mortars, which in turn is connected to the UOU 12.

Fireworks rocket 29 contains fireworks charge 39, propelling charge 40 and igniter igniter cord 41. Fireworks charge, depending on the diameter of the rocket and the power of the propelling charge, may contain striking elements of various designs and physical principles of action. For example: shot of various diameters; capsules with a network; emulsions with properties adhering to the mini-UAV surface, leading to a decrease in the transparency of the mini-UAV video camera or increasing its EOPD; aerosols with good electrically conductive or abrasive characteristics on an adhesive basis, leading to the closure of all open electronic circuits, especially the collectors of electric motors, optics and devices for dropping striking elements by gluing them to the carrier or sticking the reset mechanism; graphite particles, when an electric charge is passed through it, a volumetric electric charge is formed, which disables the radio exchange system; adhesive lavsan ribbons, which, when they get on the UAV, are able to stick to all its surfaces and block the screws; tapes with weights (weighting) at the ends (such as lightweight extinguished).

Each MPPU shot creates a dense cloud of damaging (neutralizing) elements at a selected height. In this case, the maximum height of the destruction of the mini-UAV is the sum of the altitude of the missile, the height of the detonation of the charge of the damaging (neutralizing) elements and the maximum distance from the center of detonation of these elements of the mini-UAV. Thus, the maximum height of the "barrier" for UAVs can be 500-600 meters, which is quite enough to reliably cover objects.

The tactics of using charges can be different. First, undermining the charge and creating a cloud of damaging (neutralizing) elements directly in the area where the mini-UAV is located. Secondly, the creation of such a cloud of aerosol elements in the direction of the mini-UAV flight, and thus the creation of a protective barrier.

The use of a system of multifactorial protection of objects from miniature unmanned aerial vehicles allows us to solve the following problems.

Increasing the probability of correct detection of a mini-UAV due to the simultaneous use of two target detection channels: the main - radar and additional - optoelectronic with the function of automatic tracking and target class recognition.

Detection of small-sized and hardly noticeable in the radar range of aircraft and their groups due to the multi-position construction of a system of multi-factorial protection of objects from miniature unmanned aerial vehicles and the application of the principle of diversity radar, as well as the vertical orientation of the radiation patterns of signal transmitters, in which the air object is at a minimum distance, as from the transmitter as well as from the receiver. In addition, such a spatial-energy construction of a multifactorial protection system for objects from miniature unmanned aerial vehicles for protecting an object can significantly reduce its energy consumption and eliminate interfering effects on people and other radio equipment, since it does not require high radiation power from signal transmitters.

Determining the coordinates and parameters of the target's movement through the use of radar signals and methods for their processing.

Opto-electronic detection, automatic tracking, mini-UAV recognition and transmission of video data about it to a display and control device.

To prevent further flight of a mini-UAV, several interrelated factors affecting it by a common algorithm of operation: electronic jamming of control and navigation channels and functional damage or blocking of the UAV structural elements and its functions. This combination of mini-UAV damage and suppression factors makes it possible to increase the reliability of object protection in relation to single-factor protection methods and devices, especially when several mini-UAVs are used simultaneously.

Information sources

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3. Handbook of radar (ed. Skolnik M.I.) v. 1 - 1976 (Skolnik M.I. Handbook of radar in 4 books (1976-1978)). M., "Owls. Radio”, 1976, 456 p.

4. Moschensky Yu.V., Nechaev A.S. Theoretical foundations of radio engineering. Signals: Tutorial. - 2nd ed., revised. and additional - St. Petersburg: Publishing house "Lan", 2016. - 216 p.: ill. - (Textbooks for universities. Special literature).

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Claims (1)

System of multifactorial protection of objects from miniature unmanned aerial vehicles (mini-UAVs), which provides an increase in the reliability of such protection due to the complex complementary use of a multi-position radar detector (MRLO), consisting of a signal processor and radar information (OS RLI) and signal transmitters spaced around the object ( PS), creating a continuous field of radar control and an optical detection and recognition device (OOR) of targets, which is an additional detection channel for a mini-UAV and consists of an optoelectronic tool (OES) that, based on signals from the radar OS, detects and automatically tracks mini-UAVs. UAV, as well as a video data processor module (MVD), in which targets are identified as UAVs, and the simultaneous use of several factors to defeat them, including electronic jamming of on-board receivers of control and navigation channels of the mini-UAV PS, lane switching to the suppression mode based on the results of target detection and its identification as a mini-UAV, as well as the creation of an extended cloud of striking elements with the help of multi-barrel pyrotechnic launchers (MPPU) spaced around the object, leading to physical damage to the structural elements of a miniature unmanned aerial vehicle or disruption of its stable functioning .

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