RU2602395C1 - Method and information processing device used for selection of rational strategies in combat operations of various groups - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: computer engineering.

SUBSTANCE: invention relates to digital computer engineering. Method comprises switching initial data on values of parameters of own combat equipment and equipment of each enemy group, recording thereof in memory units, characterised by that, it is supplemented with information on selection of a version of incomplete survey on coordinates of own weapons and enemy, initial data from outputs of memory units are transmitted t first inputs of three arithmetic units, in each of which in accordance with selected strategy, calculation of remaining own combat equipment and enemy equipment is carried out taking into account information on selection, coming from a panel for selection of version of incomplete survey via a decoder to second inputs of arithmetic units, from outputs of which in response to instruction from control unit information on remaining own combat equipment and enemy equipment to a display unit, which also displays information on selection of a version of incomplete survey, transmitted from corresponding panel for selection of version of incomplete survey.

EFFECT: high accuracy of processing information for determination of rational strategies in combat operations of different groups.

2 cl, 1 dwg, 2 tbl

Description

The invention relates to digital computing, in particular to digital computing systems for processing input information about the characteristics of military equipment, its transformation, choosing rational strategies, evaluating the results of combat confrontation (victory, defeat, parity), with the determination of its losses and damage to the enemy incomplete reconnaissance on the coordinates of the military assets of the opposing twice heterogeneous groups can be used by the command staff of the Armed Forces in the process of training it and retraining, conducting command and staff exercises and directly for planning group combat operations (GDB).

The technical result is to increase the accuracy of information processing to determine rational strategies in the fighting of diverse groups.

The known method [1-4], which reveals the dynamics of the battle and allows you to name the future winner. However, the method of warfare (DB) against heterogeneous groups with an assessment of its effectiveness is not known. In the sources cited, firstly, the DB is not considered against the party consisting of groups including heterogeneous military assets (BSR) with unequal characteristics, therefore, the choice of the correct strategy of group DBs cannot be made. Secondly, the price of the victory achieved is not estimated; there is no quantitative assessment of one's own losses in the victory. The third drawback in the conduct of the battle is the existing shift of emphasis towards the ratio of the number of BFR parties, and not the ratio of the intensities of firing by the parties, which leads to a decrease in combat effectiveness and even to the defeat of side A with group DBs (GDB) without taking it into account.

A known method [5] that eliminates these disadvantages, but it does not fully take into account the specifics of maintaining the GDB. Firstly, taking into account the heterogeneity of not only the BSS of the parties, but also the professional level of the personnel when managing this technique, for example, the use of terrain for stealth, the presence of combat experience, coherence, and other factors, leads to different probabilities of p _{1A 1} p _2A damage BSR and different rates of fire ƒ _1A ≠ ƒ _{2A of} the same BSR side A. Hence, there is an inequality in the intensities µ ₁ ведения µ _{2 of} firing fire by military means in groups B ₁ and B ₂ . Thus, taking into account not only the varieties of types of BSS: airplanes, helicopters, guns, tanks, missiles, etc., but also the different preparedness, coordination, experience and professionalism of personnel of all parties, leads to a more adequate model of conducting military operations.

The second disadvantage is the fact that the method [5] does not indicate situations in which the use of any of the considered

strategies leads to increased efficiency (effectiveness) of military operations.

The third disadvantage of the method [5] is the fact of non-accounting, in which the type and composition of the enemy’s base group are known, but the coordinates of their location are not known. In this situation, there is a need to choose a different strategy for maintaining GDB.

The closest is the method [6], which examines the influence of the presence (absence) of intelligence on the BSS coordinates of parties A and B in the fighting of homogeneous groups. The presence of another factor of heterogeneity associated with the incompleteness of providing intelligence information on the coordinates of the enemy’s BSR is easily traceable and can be taken into account when maintaining the database.

The situation is much more complicated when two factors of heterogeneity overlap each other, firstly, the factor of the heterogeneity of the products of the striking intensities of the attack groupings and the protection of opposing groupings of the parties, and secondly, the factor of the incompleteness of providing intelligence about the coordinates of the sides of the sides.

There are patents [7-10] for solving other problems in the database of heterogeneous groups and [11-14] aimed at creating equipment for receiving and implementing target designation that do not eliminate the identified shortcomings and do not solve the problem formulated by the authors.

Therefore, there is a need to develop such a method that would eliminate the noted drawbacks.

In contrast to the known methods, increasing the combat effectiveness (effectiveness) of maintaining the GDB in the present invention is due to:

- taking into account the heterogeneity of the BSR both due to the qualifications of the personnel of both sides, the rate of fire of the opposing BSR, and the incompleteness of providing intelligence on the coordinates of the BSR of the groupings of the parties;

- the choice of a rational strategy for maintaining GDB not only in the presence and absence of information about the coordinates of the enemy base units, but also if it is not fully provided;

- assessing the outcome of the upcoming hostilities before they take place, predicting the price of victory over the enemy (assessing their losses), in case of defeat - causing maximum damage to the enemy with determining the number of remaining unaffected BSR;

- identifying situations in which the wrong choice of strategies by party A leads to its defeat.

According to the invention, the technical result is achieved by switching the initial data on the values of the indicators of their military assets and means of each enemy grouping, writing it to memory blocks, characterized in that they supplement it with information about choosing the option of incomplete intelligence on the coordinates of their military means and the enemy (briefly : information about the choice), the initial data from the outputs of the memory blocks are transferred to the first inputs of the three arithmetic blocks, in each of which, in accordance with the chosen strategy, you the calculation of the remnants of their military assets and enemy means, taking into account the incompleteness of reconnaissance received from the selection panel through the decoder to the input of the display unit and to the second inputs of the arithmetic units, from the outputs of which, upon command from the control unit, information about the remnants of their military assets and enemy means a display unit, which also displays information about the choice of the option of incomplete intelligence.

The essence of the method is as follows.

A mathematical description of two-way combat is known using differential equations of battle dynamics [1-4]. Moreover, each of the two sides A and B contains a grouping of homogeneous BSR.

It is of interest to consider bilateral databases with heterogeneous groups. Opposing side B includes two heterogeneous groups B ₁ and B ₂ . Indicators of the BSR side A before the start of group databases will be:

M - the initial amount of military equipment;

- интенсивности поражающего огня БСр, пропорциональные вероятностям поражения целей одним выстрелом p_1A, р_2А и скорострельностям БСр

осуществляемые стороной А по БСр группировок B₁ и В₂.

- the intensity of the BSR fire, proportional to the probabilities of hitting targets with one shot p _1A , p _2A and the rate of fire of the BSR

carried out by party A on BSR groupings B ₁ and B ₂ .

In the GDB process (t> 0), the decreasing value of M at time t is denoted by m (t).

n₁(t) и N₂,

n₂{t) ведения БД по БСр стороны А.Groupings B ₁ and B ₂ have similar indicators: N ₁ ,

n ₁ (t) and N ₂ ,

n ₂ {t) maintaining the database on the BSS side A.

At the same time the start of the battle with side A with groupings B ₁ and B ₂ , depending on the initial data, the following problematic questions arise:

1) Which side will win?

2) at what price did the victory go, i.e. how much BSR is left on the winning side?

3) what is the target allocation strategy to adhere to side A in the presence (absence) and incomplete provision of information about the coordinates of the sides of the BSR and how does all this affect the effectiveness of the GDB?

4) in case of defeat of party A, identify: what is its strategy leading to maximum damage to the enemy, what is it and what to do?

5) in what situations does the choice of strategy not only have no effect, but also lead to defeat of side A?

In the existing literature [1-4], when maintaining a database between two parties with homogeneous BSR, there are answers to the first two questions. The presence of two types of heterogeneity: due to the heterogeneity of the products of the striking intensities of the BSR attack and defense groups, and also due to the incompleteness of providing information on the coordinates of the BSR of the parties, it makes it difficult to get an answer to all the questions posed.

Group Combat Planning Strategies (GDBs) and their classification. Consider the following strategies for maintaining GDB:

a) the strategy S _{0 of} one-stage group actions (OGD), when party A chooses an optimal relative number r ₁ such that, according to the grouping B _{1, the} databases are carried out with the part r ₁ m (t) of their BSr, and according to the grouping B _{2, the} other part is carried out with the other part r ₂ m (t), where r ₁ + r ₂ = 1. GDBs are carried out until the complete simultaneous destruction of both groups (victory) or before their defeat.

b) a two-stage GDB strategy, in which side A at the first stage, choosing strategy S ₁₂ , begins to destroy by all means the BSR of group B ₁ (r ₁ = 1) or another strategy S ₂₁ , when the destruction begins with group B ₂ (r ₂ = 1), and by all means leads the database to its complete destruction, at the second stage with the remaining military means, it destroys another grouping of B ₂ (r ₂ = 1) or B ₁ .

The rational maintenance of GDB, firstly, leads to maximizing the damage to the enemy, and secondly, to minimizing one’s losses.

Differential equations of GDB with incomplete information from the parties about the coordinates of the enemy’s BSR. Incompleteness of information from the parties is displayed by 8 variants of the table. 1. With the strategy S _0, databases are maintained simultaneously with the groups B ₁ , B ₂ . Then the differential equations reflecting the DB in time t in the presence (absence) of information on the coordinates of the BSR on both sides are written as follows:

The value 0 <r ₁ <1 is selected from the condition for the simultaneous destruction of the groups B ₁ , B ₂ .

The lack of information from side A about the coordinates of the Bp of grouping B ₁ or B ₂ is manifested in the addition of a factor in the form of a fraction n ₁ (t) / N ₁ or n ₂ (t) / N ₂ on the right side of equations (1a) or (1b).

The lack of information at side B about the coordinates of the BSR of side A is manifested in the addition of the factor in the form of a fraction m (t) / M to the entire right-hand side of equations (1a).

With strategy S _12, instead of equations (1a-d), the databases at the 1st stage t _{1 are} displayed by the following equations

The values of R _B and R _A1 , R _A2 are selected according to the same principle as for the strategy S ₀ .

After the destruction of group B ₁ (N _1∞ = 0), party A at the 2nd stage proceeds to the destruction of group B ₂ . The second stage t ₂ correspond to differential equations

The lack of information among the parties about the coordinates of BSR is expressed in the addition of factors to the right-hand sides of equations (3a, b), similar to adding them to equations (1a-c) and (2a, b).

With strategy S _21, instead of equations (2a-d), the databases at the 1st stage t _{1 are} displayed by the following equations

The values of R _B and R _A1 , R _A2 are selected according to the same principle as for strategies S ₀ , S ₁₂ .

After the destruction of group B ₂ (N _2∞ =), side A at the 2nd stage proceeds to the destruction of group B ₁ . The second stage t ₂ correspond to differential equations

The lack of information among the parties about the coordinates of BSR is expressed in the addition of factors to the right-hand sides of equations (4a, b), (5a, b), similar to adding them to equations (2a, b) and (3a, b).

The solution of differential equations (1) - (5) taking into account the initial conditions (Table 1) for the three strategies S ₀ , S ₁₂ and S ₂₁ leads to the results listed in table. 2. Incomplete provision of intelligence by the parties is characterized by 8 options (tab. 1, 2).

A device that implements the method and shown in the drawing (Fig. 1) contains the following blocks: switch 1, three memory blocks 2, 3, 4, a control unit 5 for synchronizing the operation of the device, three arithmetic blocks 6, 7, 8, each of which calculates the remnants of the BSR as a result of the database, respectively, with strategies S ₀ , S ₁₂ , S ₂₁ , the remote control 9 for choosing the incompleteness of reconnaissance option, (briefly: the remote control), which is part of the control unit, which allows you to select any of 8 options (see table. 1), the decoder 10, which decrypts the selected operator (researcher) in Rianta (e.g., 3) and a display unit 11, which displays (top - bottom):

- situation R (A ^{-, +} ) corresponding to option 3 ^; incompleteness of reconnaissance at side A (about B ₁ - no; about B ₂ - there); side B (about A - both groups have);

- DB results from exit AB ₁ (S ₀ ) “BSR residues: st. AM _∞ (S ₀ ) = 0; side In N _∞ (S ₀ ) = 4 ";

- DB results from exit AB ₂ (S ₁₂ ) “BSR residues: of the parties. AM _∞ (S ₁₂ ) = 0; side In N _∞ ( _S2 ) = 18 ";

- DB results from exit AB ₃ (S ₂₁ ) “BSR residues: st. AM _∞ (S ₂₁ ) = 26; side In N _∞ (S ₀ ) = 0 ";

The outputs of the switch 1 are connected to the corresponding informative inputs of the memory blocks 2, 3, 4, connected with all their outputs to the first inputs of all arithmetic blocks 6, 7, 8, the outputs of which are connected to the inputs of the display unit 10, the control panel 9, which is structurally included in block 5 controlling its output is connected to the informative inputs of the decoder 10 and the display unit 11, the decoder output is connected to the second inputs of the arithmetic units 6, 7, 8, the control outputs of the control unit 5 are connected to the control inputs of all blocks 1-11.

The operation of the device is as follows.

According to the drawing (Fig. 1), the initial data of the side A M, μ ₁ , μ ₂ and groups B ₁ N ₁ , λ ₁ and B ₂ , λ ₂ are fed to the inputs of the switch 1, the outputs of which are connected to the corresponding inputs of blocks 2, 3, 4 memories, where they are stored. The operator (researcher) on the remote control input options incomplete intelligence sets one of 8 options (table. 1), let it be option 3 (see table. 1, 2). This option corresponds to the binary code "0011", which prepares information on the incompleteness of reconnaissance of the parties on the coordinates of the BCP R (A ^{-, +} ) on the display unit; R (B ⁺ ). According to the same code “0011”, the decoder in each of the arithmetic units 6, 7, 8 according to equations (1b) - (5b) with the sign “-” substitutes an additional factor n ₁ (t) / N ₁ instead of R _A1 . In other cases, the additional factor will be “1”.

According to the control signal from the control unit 5, the initial data of the parties are supplied to the inputs of all arithmetic units 6, 7, 8, in each of which the residuals of the BSR of the side A (M _∝ ) and the groups B ₁ (N _1∝ ), B ₂ (N _2∝ ) of side B, the calculation of N _∝ = N _1∝ + N _2∝ . According to the control signal from the control unit 5 from the outputs of the arithmetic unit 6, 7, 8, the values of the corresponding residuals of the Bsr: M _∝ (S ₀ ), N _∝ (S ₀ ); M _∝ (S ₁₂ ), N _∝ (S ₁₂ ); M _∝ (S ₂₁ ), N _∝ (S ₂₁ ) are supplied to the corresponding inputs of the display unit 10, from which they are read by the operator (researcher). The synchronization of the blocks is carried out using the control unit 5.

Table 2 Analysis

Option 1: sides A, B are provided with intelligence R (A ^{+, +} ), R (B ⁺ ) about the enemy’s BSR coordinates. Taking into account the criterion of the 1st type of heterogeneity (the maximum product of the intensities of fire destruction of the defense and attack sides), the strategy S ₂₁ is rational, since

M _∞ (S _2l ) = 30> M _∞ (S ₀ ) = 25> M _∞ (S ₁₂ ) = 20.

Option 5: side A is provided with intelligence R (A ^{+, +} ) about the coordinates of the enemy’s BSR; side B - no R (B "). Rational, as before, is the strategy S ₂₁ , because

M _∞ (S ₂₁ ,) = 31> M _∞ (S ₀ ) = 28> M _∞ (S ₁₂ ) = 24.

Option 2: side A is not provided with intelligence R (A ^{-, -} ) about the coordinates of the enemy’s BSR; side B - provided by R (B ⁺ ). Side A is defeated in all strategies. The strategy S ₀ is pseudo rational, in which side A loses, but the maximum N _∞ (S ₀ ) = 5 causes damage to side B, because the remainder of the BSR is minimal. The remnants of the BSR of side B (depending on the choice of any of the strategies by side A) are characterized by inequalities

N _∞ (S ₀ ) = 5 <N _∞ (S ₂₁ ) = 11 <N _∞ (S ₁₂ ) = 18.

Option 6: parties A, B are not provided with reconnaissance R (A ^{-, -} ), R (B ^- ) about the enemy’s BSR coordinates. Rational is the strategy S ₀ . The preference of strategies is in the form

With strategy S _12, side A is defeated.

Option 3: side A is provided only with reconnaissance R (A ^{-, +} ) about the coordinates of the BSr of group B ₂ with a higher intensity of the damaging fire (λ ₂ > λ ₁ ); B side information is not provided R (B ^- ). Rational is the strategy of S ₂₁ , because Side A took advantage of the double superiority in heterogeneity (in terms of the intensity of the blasting fire, λ ₂ μ ₂ > λ ₁ μ ₁ and in the presence of intelligence A ^{-, +} ) with respect to group B ₂ .

The preference of strategies is in the form

With strategies S ₀ and S _12, side A is defeated.

Option 7: side A is provided with reconnaissance R (A ^{-, +} ) about the coordinates of the BFR group with a higher intensity of the firing fire (λ ₂ > λ ₁ ) of group B ₂ ; B side information is not provided R (B ^- ). Rational is still the strategy of S ₂₁ . The preference of strategies is in the form

With strategy S _12, side A is defeated.

Option 4: side A is provided with reconnaissance R (A ^{+, -} ) about the coordinates of the BSr of group B ₁ with a lower intensity λ _{1 of the} detonating fire (λ ₁ <λ ₂ ); B side information is provided by R (B ⁺ ). Rational is the strategy of S ₂₁ . The preference of strategies is in the form

With strategy S _21, side A is defeated.

Option 8: side A is provided with reconnaissance R (A ^{+, -} ) about the coordinates of the BSr of group B ₁ with a lower intensity λ _{1 of the} detonating fire (λ ₁ <λ ₂ ); B side information is not provided R (B ^- ). Rational is the strategy S ₀ . The preference of strategies is in the form

So, the presence of the 2nd type of heterogeneity - the incompleteness of providing the parties with intelligence about the enemy’s BSR groups leads to:

1) the need for priority provision with information R (A ^{-, +} ) of side A about the completeness of reconnaissance of the enemy’s BSr of group B _{2 of the} enemy with a higher intensity of the firing fire (λ ₂ > λ ₁ ), see strategy S ₂₁ ;

2) to an increase in the sensitivity of deviations from the rational strategy S ₂₁ , which not only reduces the remainder of the BSR of side A (var. 1, 5), but also leads to its defeat (var. 3, 7);

3) in the absence of intelligence R (A ^{-, -} ) from side A:

3.1) to reduce combat effectiveness (version 6:

3.2) to defeat side A (var. 2 - with any strategy, var. 6 - with S ₁₂ ),

3.3) to replace the rational strategy S ₂₁ with S ₀ (see var. 2, 6);

4) when providing reconnaissance information to party A about the coordinates of the BSR of the grouping not B ₂ , but B ₁ R (A ^{+, -} ):

4.1) to different rational strategies: S ₁₂ - for R (B ⁺ ) (version 4) and S ₀ - for R (B ^- ) (version 8),

4.2) to an increase in the sensitivity of deviation of the database results from rational strategies, which not only reduces the balance of the side-sided syndrome of side A (version 8), but also leads to its defeat (version 4).

The implementation of the proposed device at the first stage is possible in the form of a hardware-software complex on a personal computer or in military control systems, and at the second - in the form of an autonomous device.

Used sources

1. Zhirov A.Yu. Military applied mathematics. The probabilistic basis for evaluating the effectiveness of combat and support actions of aviation. - Monino: VVA them. Yu.A. Gagarina, 2004.S. 80-118.

2. Ivanov P.I. et al. Fundamentals and application of applied mathematics methods in military affairs. - Monino: VVA them. Yu.A. Gagarina, 1991.S. 186-224.

3. Ventzel E.S. Introduction to operations research. - M .: Owls. Radio, 1964, 391 p.

4. Abchuk V.A., Matveychuk F.A., Tomashevsky L.P. Equations of battle dynamics / Handbook of Operations Research. - M .: Military publishing house of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1979, p. 322-325.

5. Chernoscutov A.I. et al. Method and device of target distribution for group objects. Patent No. 2419140, G06F 17/00, G01S 5/04, F41G 7/00, F41G 7/34.

6. Chernoscutov A.I. et al. Method and device for choosing a target distribution strategy for group objects. Patent No. 2469386, G06F 17/00.

7. Chernoscutov A.I. and others. A method and device for choosing a strategy in the fighting of diverse groups. Patent No. 2467382.

8. Chernoscutov A.I. and others. A method and apparatus for assessing the impact of the delay in entering the reserve in the fighting of heterogeneous groups. Patent No. 2496084, G06F 17/00.

9. Chernoscutov A.I. et al. Method and device for evaluating the effect of false military assets in the fighting of heterogeneous groups. Patent No. 2,547,637.

10. Parkhomenko O.L. (RU) and others. Patent No. 2236666, F41G 7/00.

11. Danilenko A.I. (RU) and others. Patent No. 2073380, G01S 5/00.

12. Space automated system for monitoring moving objects. (RU), patent No. 2284550, G01S 13/06.

13. Belyaev B.G. (RU) and others. Patent No. 2157550, G01S 5/00.

Claims (2)

1. The method of processing information used to select rational strategies in the fighting of diverse groups, which consists in the fact that they commute the source data on the values of the indicators of their military assets and means of each enemy grouping, write it into memory blocks, characterized in that they supplement it with information about the choice of the incompleteness of intelligence about the coordinates of their military assets and the enemy, the initial data from the outputs of the memory blocks are transmitted to the first inputs of three arithmetic blocks, in each of which with In accordance with the chosen strategy, the remnants of their military assets and enemy assets are calculated taking into account the information about the choice received from the remote control panel for choosing the incomplete reconnaissance option through the decoder to the second inputs of arithmetic units, from the outputs of which information on the remnants of their military assets and means the enemy enters the display unit, which also displays information about the choice of the option of incompleteness of reconnaissance transmitted from the corresponding remote control of the choice of option is incomplete you are intelligence. 2. A device for implementing the method according to claim 1, comprising a switch and three memory units, characterized in that it includes a reconnaissance incompleteness selection panel, a decoder, three arithmetic units and a display unit, while the outputs of the switch are connected to the inputs of three units memory, connected with all its outputs to the first inputs of three arithmetic units, to the second inputs of which, through the decoder, a remote control for selecting the incomplete intelligence option is connected, the control outputs of the control unit are connected to the control inputs all x blocks, at the command of the control unit from the outputs of the arithmetic units, information is received on the display unit about the selected option of intelligence incompleteness, about the remnants of its military assets and the enemy.

Images