KR20160065716A - Method of data transfer in electronic device - Google Patents

Abstract

In a data transmission method of an electronic device including a secure module, an application processor, and a sensor including a processor and a secure element, the processor switches the operation mode to the bypass mode, and the application processor and the secure element perform mutual authentication And when the mutual authentication is successful, the application processor and the secure element generate the session key, the processor switches the operation mode to the normal mode, the secure module encrypts the sensing data provided from the sensor using the session key, The processor transmits the encrypted sensing data to the application processor, and the application processor decrypts the sensing data encrypted using the session key to obtain the sensing data.

Description

[0001] METHOD OF DATA TRANSFER IN ELECTRONIC DEVICE [0002]

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to an electronic apparatus, and more particularly, to a data transmission method of an electronic apparatus.

2. Description of the Related Art [0002] With the recent introduction of various functions in an electronic system such as a mobile device, the frequency of processing security data such as personal information, cryptographic key, etc. in an electronic system is increasing.

However, there is a problem that the security data is leaked when an attack is received from the outside in transmission and reception of security data between the components of the electronic system.

Therefore, there is a need for a method for securely transmitting and receiving secure data between components of an electronic system.

An object of the present invention is to provide a data transmission method of an electronic device capable of securely transmitting and receiving secure data.

Another object of the present invention is to provide an electronic device implementing the data transmission method.

According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a data transmission method of an electronic device including a secure module including a processor and a secure element, an application processor and a sensor according to an embodiment of the present invention, The processor switches the operation mode to the bypass mode, the application processor and the secure element perform mutual authentication, and when the mutual authentication is successful, the application processor and the secure element generate a session key, The secure module uses the session key to encrypt the sensing data provided by the sensor and the processor sends the encrypted sensing data to the application processor, email And decrypting the encrypted sensing data with the session key to obtain the sensing data.

In one embodiment, the processor and the secure element included in the secure module may be formed as one package.

The processor is connected to the application processor through an external terminal of the package, and the secure element can be connected to the processor through an internal bus formed inside the package.

Wherein the processor communicates with the application processor in the normal mode, bypasses a signal received from the application processor in the bypass mode and provides the signal to the secure element, and bypasses the signal received from the secure element To the application processor.

In one embodiment, the step of the processor switching the operation mode to the bypass mode comprises the steps of: the application processor sending a bypass request signal to the processor, and in response to the bypass request signal And switching the operation mode from the normal mode to the bypass mode to form a bypass channel connecting the application processor and the secure element.

In one embodiment, the step of the processor switching the operation mode to the bypass mode comprises the steps of: the application processor transmitting a bypass request signal and a unique number of the application processor to the processor; Determining whether a unique number of the application processor exists in the unique number table in response to the bypass request signal, and if the unique number of the application processor exists in the unique number table, And switching from the normal mode to the bypass mode to form a bypass channel connecting the application processor and the secure element.

In one embodiment, the secure element stores a first private key, a public key of a certificate authority (CA), and a first certificate issued by the certification authority, and the application processor includes a second private key, The public key of the certification authority and the second certificate issued by the certification authority.

Wherein the step of performing mutual authentication between the application processor and the secure element comprises the steps of: the application processor transmitting a certificate request signal to the secure element, the secure element sending the first certificate to the application The method comprising: transmitting to the processor, the application processor verifying the first certificate using the public key of the certification authority; if the application processor succeeds in verifying the first certificate, The method comprising: obtaining a first public key of the secure element; transmitting, by the application processor, a verification request signal and the second certificate to the secure element; Authenticating the second certificate using the authentication key and obtaining a second public key of the application processor included in the second certificate if the secure element succeeds in verifying the second certificate can do.

Wherein the step of the application processor and the secure element generating the session key comprises the steps of: the secure element generating a random value and transmitting the random value to the application processor, the application processor including a one- Encrypting the random value and the one-time public key using the second private key, transmitting the encrypted random value and the encrypted one-time public key to the secure element, Decrypts the encrypted random value using the second public key, decrypts the encrypted one-time public key using the second public key if the decrypted random value and the random value match, Acquiring a one-time public key, Calculating a secret value based on the private key and the one-time public key, generating the session key and the first authentication value based on the secret value, and transmitting the first authentication value to the application processor, The application processor calculates the secret value based on the first public key and the one-time private key, generates a second authentication value based on the secret value, and if the second authentication value matches the first authentication value , Generating the session key based on the secret value.

In one embodiment, the step of the secure module encrypting the sensing data provided from the sensor using the session key comprises receiving the sensing data from the sensor, Sending the session key request signal to the secure element, the secure element sending the session key to the processor in response to the session key request signal, and the processor encrypting the sensing data using the session key . ≪ / RTI >

In one embodiment, the step of the secure module encrypting the sensing data provided from the sensor using the session key comprises receiving the sensing data from the sensor, Transmitting the encryption request signal and the sensing data to the secure element, the secure element encrypting the sensing data using the session key in response to the encryption request signal, and transmitting the encrypted sensing data to the secure element To the processor.

In one embodiment, the sensor may be included inside the secure module.

In one embodiment, the application processor includes a trusted execution environment (TEE) and a rich operating system execution environment (REE), and the application processor is capable of executing the trusted execution environment And can perform communication with the secure module.

According to an aspect of the present invention, there is provided a data transmission method for an electronic device including a secure module including a processor and a secure element according to an embodiment of the present invention and an application processor, Wherein the application processor and the secure element generate a session key when the mutual authentication is successful and the application processor and the secure element generate a session key when the mutual authentication is successful, Mode to a normal mode, the secure module encrypts secure data stored in the secure element using the session key, and the processor transmits the encrypted secure data to the application processor, And decrypts the encrypted security data using the session key to obtain the security data.

In one embodiment, the step of the secure module encrypting the secure data stored in the secure element using the session key comprises the steps of: the processor transmitting a data request signal to the secure element; Sending the session key and the secure data to the processor in response to a data request signal, and encrypting the secure data using the session key.

In one embodiment, the step of the secure module encrypting the secure data stored in the secure element using the session key comprises the steps of: the processor transmitting a data request signal to the secure element; Encrypting the secure data using the session key in response to a data request signal, and transmitting the encrypted secure data to the processor.

According to an aspect of the present invention, there is provided an electronic device including a secure module and an application processor. The secure module includes a secure element for storing a first private key, a public key of a certificate authority (CA), and a first certificate issued by the certification authority, and a processor. The application processor stores a second private key, a public key of the certification authority, and a second certificate issued by the certification authority. Wherein the application processor and the secure element perform mutual authentication using the first certificate, the second certificate and the public key of the certification authority while the processor is operating in the bypass mode, , The application processor and the secure element generate the session key using the first private key and the second private key. Wherein the secure module encrypts secure data using the session key after the processor transitions to a normal mode and the processor transmits the encrypted secure data to the application processor, And decrypts the encrypted security data to obtain the secure data.

In one embodiment, the processor and the secure element included in the secure module are formed as one package, the processor is connected to the application processor through an external terminal of the package, And may be coupled to the processor via an internal bus.

Wherein the processor communicates with the application processor in the normal mode, bypasses a signal received from the application processor in the bypass mode and provides the signal to the secure element, and bypasses the signal received from the secure element To the application processor.

In one embodiment, the electronic device may further comprise a sensor for generating and providing the security data to the processor.

The data transmission method of an electronic device according to embodiments of the present invention can securely transmit and receive important data between a secure module including a secure element (SE) and an application processor while reducing communication overhead have.

1 is a block diagram illustrating an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention.
2 is a flowchart showing a data transmission method of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 3 is a flowchart showing an example of a step of switching the operation mode to the bypass mode by the processor of FIG. 2. FIG.
4 is a flowchart showing another example of the step of switching the operation mode to the bypass mode by the processor of Fig.
5A and 5B are flowcharts showing an example of a step of performing mutual authentication between the application processor and the secure element of FIG.
6A and 6B are flowcharts showing an example of a step in which the application processor and the secure element of FIG. 2 generate a session key.
FIG. 7 is a flowchart showing an example of a step of encrypting sensing data provided from a sensor using the session key by the secure module of FIG. 2;
8 is a flowchart showing another example of the step of encrypting the sensing data provided from the sensor using the session key by the secure module of Fig.
9 is a block diagram showing an example of the electronic device shown in Fig.
10 is a block diagram illustrating an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention.
11 is a flowchart showing a data transmission method of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention.
12 is a flowchart illustrating an example of a step of encrypting security data stored in a secure element using the session key by the secure module of FIG.
13 is a flowchart showing another example of a step in which the secure module of FIG. 11 encrypts security data stored in a secure element using a session key.
14 is a block diagram illustrating an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention.
15 is a block diagram illustrating an electronic system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
16 is a diagram showing an example in which the electronic system of Fig. 15 is implemented as a smartphone.

For the embodiments of the invention disclosed herein, specific structural and functional descriptions are set forth for the purpose of describing an embodiment of the invention only, and it is to be understood that the embodiments of the invention may be practiced in various forms, The present invention should not be construed as limited to the embodiments described in Figs.

The present invention is capable of various modifications and various forms, and specific embodiments are illustrated in the drawings and described in detail in the text. It is to be understood, however, that the invention is not intended to be limited to the particular forms disclosed, but on the contrary, is intended to cover all modifications, equivalents, and alternatives falling within the spirit and scope of the invention.

The terms first, second, etc. may be used to describe various components, but the components should not be limited by the terms. The terms may be used for the purpose of distinguishing one component from another. For example, without departing from the scope of the present invention, the first component may be referred to as a second component, and similarly, the second component may also be referred to as a first component.

It is to be understood that when an element is referred to as being "connected" or "connected" to another element, it may be directly connected or connected to the other element, . On the other hand, when an element is referred to as being "directly connected" or "directly connected" to another element, it should be understood that there are no other elements in between. Other expressions that describe the relationship between components, such as "between" and "between" or "neighboring to" and "directly adjacent to" should be interpreted as well.

The terminology used in this application is used only to describe a specific embodiment and is not intended to limit the invention. The singular expressions include plural expressions unless the context clearly dictates otherwise. In the present application, the terms "comprise", "having", and the like are intended to specify the presence of stated features, integers, steps, operations, elements, components, or combinations thereof, , Steps, operations, components, parts, or combinations thereof, as a matter of principle.

Unless otherwise defined, all terms used herein, including technical or scientific terms, have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this invention belongs. Terms such as those defined in commonly used dictionaries should be construed as meaning consistent with meaning in the context of the relevant art and are not to be construed as ideal or overly formal in meaning unless expressly defined in the present application .

Hereinafter, preferred embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. The same reference numerals are used for the same constituent elements in the drawings and redundant explanations for the same constituent elements are omitted.

1 is a block diagram illustrating an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 1, an electronic device 10 includes a secure module 100, an application processor 200, and a sensor 300.

The secure module 100 includes a processor 110 and a secure element (SE)

The secure element 120 includes a first certificate CT1 corresponding to the secure element 120 issued by a certificate authority CA, a public key CA_PB of the certification authority 120, And stores the private key PR1. The first public key PB1 corresponding to the first private key PR1 is included in the first certificate CT1.

In one embodiment, the secure element 120 may include the ability to defend against attacks from the outside, for example, a lab attack. The function of defending an attack from outside included in the secure element 120 can be implemented in various forms. Accordingly, the first certificate CT1, the public key CA_PB of the certification authority, and the first private key PR1 may be securely stored in the secure element 120. [

The processor 110 is connected to the secure element 120 via an internal bus INT_BUS.

The secure module 100 including the processor 110 and the secure element 120 is formed in one package. For example, the processor 110 and the secure element 120 may be implemented as a system in package (SiP), a through silicon via (TSV), a multi chip package (MCP) And may be formed as a single package through a package on package (PoP) or the like.

The processor 110 is directly connected to the application processor 200 via an external bus EXT_BUS connected to an external terminal of the package corresponding to the secure module 100. [

The application processor 200 receives the public key CA_PB of the certification authority, the second certificate CT2 corresponding to the application processor 200 issued by the certification authority, and the second private key PR2 of the application processor 200, / RTI > The second public key PB2 corresponding to the second private key PR2 is included in the second certificate CT2.

As described above, the secure module 100 including the processor 110 and the secure element 120 is formed in one package, and the internal bus INT_BUS connecting the processor 110 and the secure element 120 is The internal bus INT_BUS is not exposed to the outside of the package. Therefore, when data communication is performed between the processor 110 and the secure element 120, it is not necessary to form a secure channel between the processor 110 and the secure element 120, The overhead of communication can be effectively reduced.

In one embodiment, the processor 110 may operate in either a normal mode or a bypass mode.

In the bypass mode, the processor 110 may form a bypass channel (BP_CH) that connects the application processor 200 and the secure element 120. Therefore, in the bypass mode, the processor 110 bypasses the signal received from the application processor 200 through the bypass channel BP_CH and provides the signal to the secure element 120, and the signal received from the secure element 120 To the application processor 200 through the bypass channel BP_CH.

In the normal mode, the processor 110 may deactivate the bypass channel BP_CH and communicate directly with the application processor 200. [

The sensor 300 generates sensing data (SSD) and provides it to the processor 110.

In one embodiment, the sensor 300 may be a biosensor that senses biometric information. For example, the sensor 300 senses a fingerprint, an iris pattern, a vein pattern, a heart rate, blood sugar, and the like, generates sensing data (SSD) corresponding to the sensed information, However, the sensor 300 is not limited to a biosensor, and the sensor 300 may be any sensor such as an illuminance sensor, an acoustic sensor, an acceleration sensor, or the like.

1, the sensor 300 exists outside the secure module 100, but the sensor 300 may be included in the secure module 100 according to an embodiment of the present invention. In this case, the processor 110, the secure element 120, and the sensor 300 may be formed in one package.

The secure module 100 encrypts the sensing data SSD provided from the sensor 300 and transmits the sensing data SSD to the application processor 200. The application processor 200 encrypts the encryption data SSD provided from the secure module 100, The security level of the data transmission in the electronic device 10 can be improved by decoding the sensed data to acquire the sensing data SSD.

2 is a flowchart showing a data transmission method of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention.

The data transfer method shown in FIG. 2 may be performed through the electronic device 10 of FIG.

2 shows a method for securely transmitting sensing data (SSD) generated by the secure module 200 from the sensor 300 to the application processor 200. As shown in FIG.

Hereinafter, a data transmission method of the electronic device 10 will be described with reference to Figs. 1 and 2. Fig.

Referring to FIG. 2, in the data transfer method of the electronic device 10 according to the present invention, the processor 110 switches the operation mode from the normal mode to the bypass mode (step S100). In one embodiment, the processor 110 may transition the operating mode from the normal mode to the bypass mode in response to a request from the application processor 200.

3 is a flowchart showing an example of a step S100 of switching the operation mode of the processor of FIG. 2 to the bypass mode.

Referring to FIG. 3, the application processor 200 may transmit a bypass request signal to the processor 110 (step S110).

The processor 110 switches the operation mode from the normal mode to the bypass mode in response to the bypass request signal received from the application processor 200 and connects the application processor 200 and the secure element 120 A bypass channel BP_CH can be formed (step S120). Therefore, the processor 110 bypasses the signal received from the application processor 200 via the bypass channel BP_CH to provide the signal to the secure element 120, and transmits the signal received from the secure element 120 to the bypass channel BP_CH) and provide it to the application processor 200.

4 is a flowchart showing another example of step S100 in which the processor of FIG. 2 switches the operation mode to the bypass mode.

Referring to FIG. 4, the application processor 200 may transmit the bypass request signal and the unique number of the application processor to the processor 110 (step S130).

The processor 110 may previously store a unique number table for storing a unique number of a device that is allowed to communicate. The processor 110 may determine whether the unique number of the application processor 200 exists in the unique number table in response to the bypass request signal received from the application processor 200 (step S140).

If there is a unique number of the application processor 200 in the unique number table (step S140; YES), the processor 110 switches the operation mode from the normal mode to the bypass mode, A bypass channel BP_CH connecting the secure element 120 can be formed (step S150). Therefore, the processor 110 bypasses the signal received from the application processor 200 via the bypass channel BP_CH to provide the signal to the secure element 120, and transmits the signal received from the secure element 120 to the bypass channel BP_CH) and provide it to the application processor 200.

On the other hand, if there is no unique number of the application processor 200 in the unique number table (step S140; NO), the processor 110 keeps the operation mode in the normal mode and communicates with the application processor 200 Can be terminated.

Referring again to FIG. 2, the application processor 200 and the secure element 120 perform mutual authentication (step S200). In one embodiment, the application processor 200 and the secure element 120 can perform mutual authentication using a first certificate CT1, a second certificate CT2, and a public key CA_PB of the certificate authority have.

5A and 5B are flowcharts showing an example of a step S200 of performing mutual authentication between the application processor and the secure element of FIG.

Referring to FIGS. 5A and 5B, the application processor 200 may transmit a certificate request signal to the secure element 120 (step S210).

The secure element 120 may transmit the first certificate CT1 stored in the secure element 120 to the application processor 200 in response to the certificate request signal received from the application processor 200 (step S220) .

The application processor 200 verifies the first certificate CT1 received from the secure element 120 using the public key CA_PB of the certificate authority stored in the application processor 200 It can be determined whether the verification is successful (step S240).

If the first certificate CT1 stored in the secure element 120 and the second certificate CT2 stored in the application processor 200 are issued from different certification authorities, the verification may fail. If the verification fails (step S240: NO), the application processor 200 determines that the mutual authentication is unsuccessful and terminates the communication with the secure element 120. [

On the other hand, if the first certificate CT1 stored in the secure element 120 and the second certificate CT2 stored in the application processor 200 are issued from the same certification authority, the verification may succeed. If the verification is successful (step S240; YES), the application processor 200 can acquire the first public key PB1 of the secure element 120 included in the first certificate CT1 (step S250).

Thereafter, the application processor 200 may transmit a verification request signal to the secure element 120 and a second certificate CT2 stored in the application processor 200 (step S260).

The secure element 120 is received from the application processor 200 using the public key CA_PB of the certification authority stored in the secure element 120 in response to the verification request signal received from the application processor 200 The second certificate CT2 may be verified (step S270), and it may be determined whether the verification is successful (step S280).

If the first certificate CT1 stored in the secure element 120 and the second certificate CT2 stored in the application processor 200 are issued from different certification authorities, the verification may fail. If the verification fails (step S280: NO), the secure element 120 determines that the mutual authentication has failed and can terminate the communication with the application processor 200. [

On the other hand, if the first certificate CT1 stored in the secure element 120 and the second certificate CT2 stored in the application processor 200 are issued from the same certification authority, the verification may succeed. If the verification is successful (step S280; YES), the secure element 120 can acquire the second public key PB2 of the application processor 200 included in the second certificate CT2 (step S290). In this case, it can be determined that the mutual authentication is successful.

5A and 5B, if the mutual authentication is successful, the secure element 120 and the application processor 200 can acquire the public key of the counterpart, respectively.

Referring again to FIG. 2, when the mutual authentication fails (step S300; NO), the communication between the application processor 200 and the secure element 120 is terminated.

On the other hand, if the mutual authentication is successful (step S300; YES), the application processor 200 and the secure element 120 generate a session key (step S400). As will be described later, the session key can be used to encrypt and decrypt the sensing data SSD generated from the sensor 300. In one embodiment, the application processor 200 and the secure element 120 may generate the session key using a first private key PR1 and a second private key PR2.

6A and 6B are flowcharts illustrating an example of a step S400 of the application processor and the secure element of FIG. 2 generating a session key.

6A and 6B, the secure element 120 may generate a random value and transmit the random value to the application processor 200 (step S410).

When receiving the random value from the secure element 120, the application processor 200 generates a one-time private key and a one-time public key pair, and transmits a second private key (" PR2) to encrypt the random value and the one-time public key, and to transmit the encrypted random value and the encrypted one-time public key to the secure element 120 (step S420).

The secure element 120 may decrypt the encrypted random value using the second public key PB2 of the application processor 200 obtained in the mutual authentication (step S200) (step S430) .

Thereafter, the secure element 120 may determine whether the decrypted random value matches the random value initially generated by the secure element 120 (step S440).

If the decrypted random value does not match the random value initially generated by the secure element 120 (step S440: NO), the secure element 120 can terminate the communication with the application processor 200 (Step S495).

On the other hand, if the decrypted random value and the random value initially generated by the secure element 120 coincide with each other (Step S440; Yes), the secure element 120 performs the mutual authentication (Step S200 The one-time public key may be decrypted using the second public key PB2 of the application processor 200 acquired in step S450.

The secure element 120 then computes a secret value based on the one-time public key and the first private key PR1 stored in the secure element 120, and based on the secret value, Key and a first authentication value, and transmits the first authentication value to the application processor 200 (step S460).

In one embodiment, a first algorithm for calculating the secret value based on the one-time public key and a first private key (PR1), and a second algorithm for generating the session key and the first authentication value based on the secret value 2 algorithm can be defined in advance between the secure element 120 and the application processor 200. [

When receiving the first authentication value from the secure element 120, the application processor 200 transmits the one-time private key and the first public key of the secure element 120 acquired in the step of performing the mutual authentication (step S200) The secret value may be calculated based on the key PB1, and the second authentication value may be generated based on the secret value (step S470).

In one embodiment, the application processor 200 uses the first algorithm and the second algorithm, which are predefined between the secure element 120 and the application processor 200, to generate the secret value and the second authentication value Respectively.

 Thereafter, the application processor 200 may determine whether the second authentication value matches the first authentication value received from the secure element 120 (step S480).

If the second authentication value does not match the first authentication value received from the secure element 120 (step S480: No), the application processor 200 can terminate the communication with the secure element 120 Step S495).

On the other hand, if the second authentication value matches the first authentication value received from the secure element 120 (step S480; YES), the application processor 200 generates the session key based on the secret value (Step S490).

In one embodiment, the application processor 200 may generate the session key using the second algorithm predefined between the secure element 120 and the application processor 200.

Therefore, the session key generated by the secure element 120 may be the same as the session key generated by the application processor 200.

The secure element 120 and the application processor 200 may internally store the session key, respectively.

Referring again to FIG. 2, after the application processor 200 and the secure element 120 generate the session key, the processor 110 switches the operation mode from the bypass mode to the normal mode (step S500 ). In one embodiment, the processor 110 may transition the operating mode from the bypass mode to the normal mode in response to a request from the application processor 200.

Thereafter, the secure module 100 receives the sensing data SSD from the sensor 300 and encrypts the sensing data SSD using the session key stored in the secure element 120 (step S600).

In one embodiment, the processor 110 may include a hardware encryption engine. In this case, the processor 110 may encrypt the sensing data (SSD) using the hardware encryption engine.

In another embodiment, the processor 110 may not include a hardware encryption engine. In this case, the secure element 120 can encrypt the sensing data SSD.

7 is a flowchart showing an example of a step (S600) in which the secure module of FIG. 2 encrypts sensing data provided from a sensor using a session key.

7 shows the operation of the electronic device 10 when the processor 110 includes the hardware encryption engine.

Referring to FIG. 7, the processor 110 may receive sensing data (SSD) from the sensor 300 (step S610). When the sensor 300 is a biosensor for sensing body information, the sensing data SSD may include biometric information such as a fingerprint, an iris pattern, a blood line pattern, a heart rate, blood glucose, and the like.

The processor 110 may send a session key request signal to the secure element 120 (step S620).

The secure element 120 may transmit the session key stored in the secure element 120 to the processor 110 in response to the session key request signal received from the processor 110 (step S630).

1, the secure module 100 including the processor 110 and the secure element 120 is formed as a single package, and the internal structure of the secure element 120, which connects the processor 110 and the secure element 120, Since the bus INT_BUS is formed inside the package, the internal bus INT_BUS is not exposed to the outside of the package. Accordingly, the secure element 120 can securely transmit the session key to the processor 110 without forming a secure channel between the processor 110 and the secure element 120. [ Therefore, the communication overhead of the electronic device 10 can be effectively reduced.

The processor 110 may encrypt the sensing data SSD using the session key received from the secure element 120 (step S640).

8 is a flowchart showing another example of the step of encrypting the sensing data provided from the sensor using the session key by the secure module of Fig.

8 shows the operation of the electronic device 10 when the processor 110 does not include the hardware encryption engine.

Referring to FIG. 8, the processor 110 may receive sensing data (SSD) from the sensor 300 (step S650). When the sensor 300 is a biosensor for sensing body information, the sensing data SSD may include biometric information such as a fingerprint, an iris pattern, a blood line pattern, a heart rate, blood glucose, and the like.

The processor 110 may transmit the encryption request signal and the sensing data SSD to the secure element 120 (step S660).

The secure element 120 may encrypt the sensing data SSD using the session key stored in the secure element 120 in response to the encryption request signal received from the processor 110 in operation S670.

Then, the secure element 120 may transmit the encrypted sensing data to the processor 110 (step S680).

Referring again to FIG. 2, the processor 110 transmits the encrypted sensing data to the application processor 200 (step S700).

The processor 110 is connected to the application processor 200 through an external bus EXT_BUS connected to the external terminal of the package corresponding to the secure module 100. As a result, May transmit the encrypted sensing data to the application processor 200 via the external bus EXT_BUS. Since the sensing data SSD is transmitted from the processor 110 to the application processor 200 while being encrypted with the session key, even if the external bus EXT_BUS is probed through the scope, the leakage of the sensing data SSD Can be effectively prevented.

The application processor 200 decrypts the encrypted sensing data received from the processor 110 using the session key stored in the application processor 200 to acquire the sensing data SSD (step S800).

1 to 8, in the electronic device 10 according to the embodiments of the present invention, the secure module 100 including the processor 110 and the secure element 120 is a single package . Also, while the processor 110 is operating in the bypass mode, the application processor 200 and the secure element 120 may receive the first certificate CT1 stored in the secure element 120, Mutual authentication is performed by using the second certificate CT2 stored in the application processor 200 and the public key CA_PB of the certification authority stored in common with the application processor 200 and the secure element 120, The application processor 200 and the secure element 120 use the first private key PR1 stored in the secure element 120 and the second private key PR2 stored in the application processor 200, Creates a session key. The secure module 100 encrypts the sensing data SSD using the session key and transmits the sensing data SSD to the application processor 200. The application processor 200 decrypts the encrypted sensing data using the session key, To obtain sensing data (SSD). Therefore, the security level of data transmission in the electronic device 10 can be improved.

In one embodiment, the application processor 200 may be implemented with another secure module having the same configuration as the secure module 100. [ In this case, through the operations as described above with reference to Figs. 1 to 8, the secure modules included in the electronic device 10 can securely perform data communication with each other.

1 to 8, data communication in the case where the application processor 200 and the secure module 100 are included in the same electronic device 10 has been described. However, the present invention is not limited to this, The transmission method may be applied even when the application processor 200 and the secure module 100 are included in different electronic devices, respectively.

9 is a block diagram showing an example of the electronic device shown in Fig.

9, the electronic device 10a may include a secure module 100, an application processor 200a, and a sensor 300. [

The secure module 100 and the sensor 300 included in the electronic device 10a of FIG. 9 may be the same as the secure module 100 and the sensor 300 included in the electronic device 10 of FIG. The configuration and operation of the secure module 100 and the sensor 300 included in the electronic device 10 of FIG. 1 have been described above with reference to FIGS. 1 to 8, and a duplicate description will be omitted.

The application processor 200a may be implemented as an application processor having a trusted execution environment (TEE) and a rich operating system execution environment (REE). For example, a trusted execution environment (TEE) can be implemented using ARM TrustZone.

In the rich OS execution environment (REE), a normal application (NORMAL APP) 211 is run on a general operating system (RICH OS) 212 such as Android and the like. In a trusted execution environment (TEE) A predetermined security application (TRUSTED APP) 221 that performs communication with the secure module 100 on the SECURE OS 222 may be driven.

In addition, the application processor 200a may include a secure storage device 223 included in a trusted execution environment (TEE). For example, the secure storage device 223 may be an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), a flash memory, a phase change random access memory (PRAM), a resistance random access memory (RRAM) Gate Memory, PoRAM, Magnetic Random Access Memory (MRAM), Ferroelectric Random Access Memory (FRAM), or the like.

The second certificate CT2 corresponding to the application processor 200a issued by the certification authority and the second private key PR2 of the application processor 200a are stored in the secure storage device 223 ). ≪ / RTI >

Since the secure storage device 223 operates in a trusted execution environment (TEE), the secure storage device 223 may be accessible only through the secure application 221 operating in a trusted execution environment (TEE). That is, the general application 211 operating in the rich OS execution environment (REE) may be blocked from accessing the secure storage device 223.

The security application 221 uses the public key CA_PB of the certificate authority stored in the secure storage device 223, the second certificate CT2 and the second private key PR2, It is possible to securely obtain the sensing data (SSD) from the secure module 100 by performing the operation as described above.

As described above with reference to FIG. 9, the application processor 200a communicates with the secure module 100 through the trusted execution environment (TEE) to acquire the sensing data (SSD), so that the electronic device 10a The security level of the data transmission can be further improved.

10 is a block diagram illustrating an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 10, the electronic device 20 includes a secure module 100 and an application processor 200.

The secure module 100 and the application processor 200 included in the electronic device 20 of Figure 10 are identical to the electronic device 10 of Figure 1 except that the secure element 120 further stores the security data SED. The secure module 100 and the application processor 200 may be the same. The configuration and operation of the secure module 100 and the application processor 200 included in the electronic device 10 of FIG. 1 have been described above with reference to FIGS. 1 to 9, and a duplicate description will be omitted.

11 is a flowchart showing a data transmission method of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention.

The data transfer method shown in Fig. 11 can be performed through the electronic device 20 of Fig.

11 shows a method for securely transmitting secure data SED stored in the secure element 120 to the application processor 200 by the secure module 200. [

Hereinafter, a data transfer method of the electronic device 20 will be described with reference to FIGS. 10 and 11. FIG.

Referring to FIG. 11, in the data transfer method of the electronic device 20 according to the present invention, the processor 110 switches the operation mode from the normal mode to the bypass mode (step S100).

The application processor 200 and the secure element 120 perform mutual authentication (step S200).

If the mutual authentication fails (Step S300: No), the communication between the application processor 200 and the secure element 120 is terminated.

On the other hand, if the mutual authentication is successful (step S300; YES), the application processor 200 and the secure element 120 generate a session key (step S400).

After the application processor 200 and the secure element 120 generate the session key, the processor 110 switches the operation mode from the bypass mode to the normal mode (step S500).

The first through fifth steps S100, S200, S300, S400, and S500 shown in FIG. 11 are the same as the first through fifth steps S100, S200, S300, S400, and S500 shown in FIG. . ≪ / RTI > Detailed operations of the first through fifth steps S100, S200, S300, S400, and S500 shown in FIG. 2 have been described in detail with reference to FIGS. 1 through 8, and a duplicate description will be omitted here.

The secure module 100 encrypts the secure data SED stored in the secure element 120 using the session key stored in the secure element 120 (step S601).

In one embodiment, the processor 110 may include a hardware encryption engine. In this case, the processor 110 may encrypt the security data SED stored in the secure element 120 using the hardware encryption engine.

In another embodiment, the processor 110 may not include a hardware encryption engine. In this case, the secure element 120 can encrypt the security data SED.

12 is a flowchart showing an example of a step (S601) in which the secure module of FIG. 11 encrypts security data stored in a secure element using a session key.

12 shows the operation of the electronic device 20 when the processor 110 includes the hardware encryption engine.

Referring to FIG. 12, the processor 110 may transmit a data request signal to the secure element 120 (step S611).

The secure element 120 may transmit the session key and the secure data SED stored in the secure element 120 to the processor 110 in response to the data request signal received from the processor 110 ).

1, the secure module 100 including the processor 110 and the secure element 120 is formed as a single package, and the internal structure of the secure element 120, which connects the processor 110 and the secure element 120, Since the bus INT_BUS is formed inside the package, the internal bus INT_BUS is not exposed to the outside of the package. The secure element 120 can securely transmit the session key and the secure data SED to the processor 110 without forming a secure channel between the processor 110 and the secure element 120. [ Thus, the communication overhead of the electronic device 20 can be effectively reduced.

The processor 110 may encrypt the secure data SED using the session key received from the secure element 120 (step S631).

13 is a flowchart showing another example of a step in which the secure module of FIG. 11 encrypts security data stored in a secure element using a session key.

13 shows the operation of the electronic device 20 when the processor 110 does not include the hardware encryption engine.

Referring to FIG. 13, the processor 110 may transmit a data request signal to the secure element 120 (step S641).

The secure element 120 may encrypt the secure data SED using the session key stored in the secure element 120 in response to the data request signal received from the processor 110 (step S651).

Then, the secure element 120 can transmit the encrypted secure data to the processor 110 (step S661).

Referring again to FIG. 11, the processor 110 transmits the encrypted security data to the application processor 200 (step S701).

The processor 110 is connected to the application processor 200 through an external bus EXT_BUS connected to the external terminal of the package corresponding to the secure module 100. As a result, May transmit the encrypted security data to the application processor 200 via the external bus EXT_BUS. Since the security data SED is transmitted from the processor 110 to the application processor 200 while being encrypted with the session key, even if the external bus EXT_BUS is probed through the scope, the leakage of the security data SED Can be effectively prevented.

The application processor 200 decrypts the encrypted security data received from the processor 110 using the session key stored in the application processor 200 to obtain security data SED (step S801).

The electronic device 20 according to the embodiments of the present invention can securely transmit the security data SED stored in the secure element 120 to the application processor 200 as described above with reference to FIGS. Therefore, the security level of data transmission in the electronic device 20 can be improved.

14 is a block diagram illustrating an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention.

14, the electronic device 30 includes a secure module 100, an application processor 200, and a sensor 300. [

The electronic device 30 of FIG. 14 may be the same as the electronic device 10 of FIG. 1, except that the secure element 120 further stores the security data SED. That is, the electronic device 30 of FIG. 14 may correspond to the combination of the electronic device 10 of FIG. 1 and the electronic device 20 of FIG.

The electronic device 30 therefore includes a method for securely transmitting the sensing data SSD generated from the sensor 300 to the application processor 200 by the secure module 200 described above with reference to Figs. The secure module 200 can securely transfer the secure data SED stored in the secure element 120 to the application processor 200 in a secure manner.

The configuration and operation of the electronic device 10 of Fig. 1 and the electronic device 20 of Fig. 10 have been described in detail with reference to Figs. 1 to 13. Therefore, detailed description of the electronic device 30 of Fig. 14 is omitted.

15 is a block diagram illustrating an electronic system according to an embodiment of the present invention.

15, an electronic system 900 includes a secure module 910, an application processor 920, a storage device 930, a memory device 940, an input / output device 950, A power supply 960 and a sensor 970. 15, the electronic system 900 may further include ports capable of communicating with, or communicating with, video cards, sound cards, memory cards, USB devices, and the like .

The application processor 920 controls the overall operation of the electronic system 900. The application processor 920 may execute applications that provide Internet browsers, games, animations, and the like. According to an embodiment, the application processor 920 may include a single processor core or a plurality of processor cores (Multi-Core). For example, the application processor 920 may include a multi-core such as a dual-core, a quad-core, and a hexa-core. Also, according to an embodiment, the application processor 920 may further include a cache memory located internally or externally.

The secure module 910 includes a processor 911 and a secure element 912. The secure module 910 including the processor 911 and the secure element 912 is formed in one package and the internal bus INT_BUS connecting the processor 911 and the secure element 912 is formed inside the package . The secure elite 912 may include a capability to defend against external attacks, for example, a lab attack. Thus, the secure erim 912 can securely store the secure data. The processor 911 may be coupled to the application processor 920.

The sensor 970 may be a biosensor for sensing biometric information. For example, the sensor 970 senses a fingerprint, an iris pattern, a vein pattern, a heart rate, a blood sugar, etc., generates sensing data corresponding to the sensed information, and provides the sensed data to the processor 911 included in the secure module 910 can do. However, the sensor 970 is not limited to a biosensor, and the sensor 970 may be any sensor such as an illuminance sensor, an acoustic sensor, an acceleration sensor, and the like.

The secure module 910, the application processor 920 and the sensor 970 included in the electronic system 900 of FIG. 15 are respectively connected to the secure module 100 included in the electronic device 30 of FIG. 14, the application processor 200 And a sensor 300 as shown in FIG. The configuration and operation of the secure module 100, the application processor 200 and the sensor 300 included in the electronic device 30 of FIG. 14 have been described in detail with reference to FIGS. 1 to 14. Therefore, the secure module 910, A detailed description of the application processor 920 and the sensor 970 will be omitted.

The storage device 930 may store a boot image for booting the electronic system 900. For example, the storage device 930 may comprise a non-volatile memory device such as a flash memory device, a solid state drive (SSD), or the like.

The memory device 940 may store data necessary for operation of the electronic system 900. For example, the memory device 940 may include volatile memory devices such as Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM), Static Random Access Memory (SRAM), and the like.

The input / output device 950 may include input means such as a touch pad, a keypad, an input button and the like, and output means such as a display, a speaker, and the like. The power supply 960 can supply the operating voltage required for operation of the electronic system 900.

According to an embodiment, the electronic system 900 may be a mobile phone, a smart phone, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a portable multimedia player (PMP), a digital camera Camera, a music player, a portable game console, a navigation system, a laptop computer, and the like.

16 is a diagram showing an example in which the electronic system of Fig. 15 is implemented as a smartphone.

15 and 16, the secure element 912 included in the smartphone 900a may previously store security data corresponding to the user's biometric information.

For example, when the sensor (SR) 970 included in the smartphone 900a is a fingerprint sensor that detects a user's fingerprint, the secure data stored in the secure element 912 corresponds to the fingerprint information of the user .

The secure module 910, the application processor 920, and the sensor 970 may perform the operations as described above with reference to FIGS. 1-8, if the current user is to determine whether the current user is an authorized user, And securely transmit the sensing data corresponding to the fingerprint information of the current user generated from the sensor 970 to the application processor 920 through the secure module 910. [ The secure module 910 and the application processor 920 may also perform operations as described above with reference to Figures 10 to 13 to securely transmit the secure data stored in the secure element 912 to the application processor 920 . The application processor 920 can effectively determine whether the current user is an authorized user based on whether the sensing data transmitted from the secure module 910 and the security data match with each other.

The user authentication operation using the fingerprint information described with reference to FIG. 15 is only one application example of the data transmission method of the electronic device according to the present invention, and the data transmission method of the electronic device according to the present invention can be applied in various ways .

Although the preferred embodiments of the present invention have been disclosed for illustrative purposes, those skilled in the art will appreciate that various modifications, additions and substitutions are possible, without departing from the scope and spirit of the invention as disclosed in the accompanying claims. It will be understood that the invention may be modified and varied without departing from the scope of the invention.

10, 20, 30: Electronic device 100: Secure module
110: processor 120: secure element
200: Application processor 300: Sensor
900: Electronic system

Claims (10)

In a data transmission method of an electronic device including a secure module including a processor and a secure element, an application processor and a sensor,
Switching the operating mode of the processor to bypass mode;
Performing mutual authentication between the application processor and the secure element;
Generating a session key by the application processor and the secure element when the mutual authentication is successful;
The processor switching the operation mode to a normal mode;
Encrypting the sensing data provided by the sensor using the session key;
The processor transmitting the encrypted sensing data to the application processor; And
And the application processor decrypting the encrypted sensing data using the session key to obtain the sensing data. The method of claim 1, wherein the processor and the secure element included in the secure module are formed as one package, the processor is connected to the application processor through an external terminal of the package, Wherein the processor is coupled to the processor via an internal bus formed in the processor. 3. The method of claim 2, wherein the processor communicates with the application processor in the normal mode, bypasses a signal received from the application processor in the bypass mode and provides the signal to the secure element, And supplies the bypassed signal to the application processor. 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the secure element stores a first private key, a public key of a certificate authority (CA), and a first certificate issued by the certification authority, A public key of a certification authority and a second certificate issued by the certification authority are stored. 5. The method of claim 4, wherein the mutual authentication of the application processor and the secure element comprises:
The application processor sending a certificate request signal to the secure element;
The secure element sending the first certificate to the application processor in response to the certificate request signal;
The application processor verifying the first certificate using the public key of the certification authority;
Acquiring a first public key of the secure element included in the first certificate when the application processor succeeds in verifying the first certificate;
The application processor sending a verification request signal and the second certificate to the secure element;
Verifying the second certificate using the public key of the certification authority in response to the verification request signal; And
And acquiring a second public key of the application processor included in the second certificate when the secure element succeeds in verifying the second certificate. 6. The method of claim 5, wherein the application processor and the secure element generate the session key,
The secure element generating a random value and transmitting the random value to the application processor;
The application processor generates a one-time private key and a one-time public key pair, encrypts the random value and the one-time public key using the second private key, respectively, and encrypts the encrypted random value and the encrypted one- Transmitting to the secure element;
The secure element decrypts the encrypted random value using the second public key, and if the decrypted random value and the random value match, encrypting the encrypted one-time public key using the second public key Decrypting the public key to obtain the one-time public key;
Wherein the secure element computes a secret value based on the first private key and the one-time public key, generates the session key and the first authentication value based on the secret value, ; And
The application processor calculates the secret value based on the first public key and the one-time private key, and generates a second authentication value based on the secret value, and the second authentication value and the first authentication value And generating the session key on the basis of the secret value, if it is matched. 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the step of the secure module encrypting the sensing data provided from the sensor using the session key comprises:
The processor receiving the sensing data from the sensor;
The processor transmitting a session key request signal to the secure element;
The secure element sending the session key to the processor in response to the session key request signal; And
And the processor encrypts the sensing data using the session key. 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the step of the secure module encrypting the sensing data provided from the sensor using the session key comprises:
The processor receiving the sensing data from the sensor;
The processor transmitting an encryption request signal and the sensing data to the secure element;
Encrypting the sensing data using the session key in response to the encryption request signal; And
And the secure element transmits the encrypted sensing data to the processor. 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the application processor comprises a trusted execution environment (TEE) and a rich operating system execution environment (REE) And a data transmission method of an electronic device that performs communication with the secure module. In a data transmission method of an electronic device including a secure module including a processor and a secure element and an application processor,
Switching the operating mode of the processor to bypass mode;
Performing mutual authentication between the application processor and the secure element;
Generating a session key by the application processor and the secure element when the mutual authentication is successful;
The processor switching the operation mode to a normal mode;
Encrypting the secure data stored in the secure element using the session key;
The processor transmitting the encrypted security data to the application processor; And
And the application processor decrypting the encrypted secure data using the session key to obtain the secure data.

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