JP2023030369A - Authentication device, wireless communication device, wireless communication system, method, and program - Google Patents

Abstract

An object of the present invention is to provide an authentication device, a wireless communication device, a wireless communication system, a method, and a program capable of appropriately operating network slices. According to one embodiment, an authentication device includes holding means and communication means. The holding means holds a private key used for wireless communication performed using each of the plurality of network slices established with the wireless communication device. The communication means transmits a first random number for updating the first secret key used in wireless communication performed using the first network slice and use start timing information regarding the use start timing of the updated first secret key. , to the wireless communication device using the second network slice. The first secret key updated based on the first random number is held in the holding means, and wireless communication between the base station and the wireless communication device is executed using the first network slice based on the use start timing. used for [Selection drawing] Fig. 6

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD Embodiments of the present invention relate to authentication devices, wireless communication devices, wireless communication systems, methods, and programs.

In recent years, 3GPP (Third Generation Partnership Project) has been studying 5G (fifth generation) mobile communication systems.

The 5G mobile communication system is based on the premise that various things are connected via the network, and in the 5G mobile communication system, wireless communication that realizes high speed, multiple connections, low delay, etc. can be performed. It is expected that a wide range of services will be provided by using such a 5G mobile communication system.

By the way, in a 5G mobile communication system, wireless communication can be performed by dividing into units called network slices, and it is necessary to appropriately operate the network slices.

WO2018/169071

Therefore, the problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide an authentication device, a wireless communication device, a wireless communication system, a method, and a program capable of appropriately operating network slices.

An authentication device according to an embodiment comprises holding means and communication means. The holding unit holds, for each network slice, a private key used for wireless communication executed using each of a plurality of network slices established with the wireless communication device. The communication means provides a first random number and the updated first secret key for updating a first secret key used in wireless communication performed using a first network slice included in the plurality of network slices. to the wireless communication device using a second network slice different from the first network slice. The first secret key updated based on the first random number is held in the holding means, and the base station and the wireless communication device are executed using the first network slice based on the usage start timing. used for wireless communication between

1 is a diagram showing an example of the configuration of a radio communication system according to the first embodiment; FIG. FIG. 4 is a diagram for explaining authentication processing; FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing an example of the configuration of an authentication device; 1 is a block diagram showing an example of the configuration of a wireless terminal; FIG. The figure which shows an example of the data structure of an information holding part. 4 is a flowchart showing an example of a processing procedure of an authentication device when updating a private key; FIG. 5 is a diagram for explaining a specific example of private key update processing; FIG. 11 is a flowchart showing an example of a processing procedure of an authentication device when updating a secret key in the second embodiment; FIG. 13 is a flow chart showing an example of a processing procedure of an authentication device when updating a secret key in the third embodiment;

Hereinafter, each embodiment will be described with reference to the drawings.
(First embodiment)
First, the first embodiment will be described. FIG. 1 shows an example of the configuration of a radio communication system according to this embodiment. The radio communication system is, for example, a 5G mobile communication system, and includes an authentication device 10, a base station 20 and a radio terminal 30.

The authentication device 10 executes processing (hereinafter referred to as authentication processing) for authenticating the wireless terminal 30 provided in the wireless communication system.

The base station 20 is placed between the authentication device 10 and the wireless terminal 30 and performs wireless communication with the wireless terminal 30 within the range covered by the base station 20 . Note that the authentication device 10 and the base station 20 are connected by wire, for example.

The wireless terminal 30 is, for example, a terminal device (wireless communication device) that performs wireless communication with the base station 20 via a network when using a service provided in a wireless communication system (5G mobile communication system).

Here, with reference to FIG. 2, the authentication processing executed by the authentication device 10 described above will be briefly described. In the present embodiment, it is assumed that authentication processing is performed using, for example, EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol)-AKA (Authentication and Key Agreement). Here, it is assumed that the authentication device 10 and the wireless terminal 30 execute communication processing. run through. The same applies to the following description.

First, the authentication device 10 transmits an EAP-Request/Identity to the wireless terminal 30 (step S1).

When the process of step S1 is executed, the wireless terminal 30 transmits an EAP response (EAP-Response/Identity) to the authentication device 10 as a response to the EAP request transmitted in step S1 (step S2).

Next, the authentication device 10 transmits an EAP request (EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge) to which a random number (128-bit RAND) generated in the authentication device 10 and an authentication code (AUTN) for tampering prevention are added to the wireless terminal. 30 (step S3).

Here, a SIM card is inserted in the wireless terminal 30, and a shared secret key is written in the SIM card. The wireless terminal 30 obtains a CK (Cipher Key) and an IK (Integrity Key) from the shared secret key written in the SIM card and the random number added to the EAP request transmitted from the authentication device 10 in step S3. By calculating, a secret key (a secret key based on CK and IK) used for wireless communication with the base station 20 is generated.

When the secret key is generated as described above, the wireless terminal 30 calculates the response value XRES from the shared secret key and the random number, and an EAP response (EAP-Response/AKA- Challenge), the calculated response value XRES is transmitted to the authentication device 10 (step S4).

The authentication device 10 receives the response value XRES transmitted in step S4, the shared secret key held by the communication carrier (the same shared secret key as the shared secret key written in the SIM card described above), and the above step In S3, the random number transmitted to the wireless terminal 30 is compared with the pre-calculated XRES, and if the XRES matches, a response (EAP-Success) indicating the success of the authentication process is transmitted to the wireless terminal 30. (Step S5).

When the authentication process as described above is performed, the wireless terminal 30 performs wireless communication with the base station 20 using the secret key described above. Specifically, when data is transmitted from the base station 20 to the wireless terminal 30 after the authentication process is executed, the data is encrypted using the public key paired with the private key described above in the public key cryptosystem. It is encrypted on the base station 20 side and decrypted on the wireless terminal 30 side using the private key.

Although not explained here, the above secret key is also generated on the authentication device 10 side from the shared secret key held by the communication carrier and the random number transmitted to the wireless terminal 30 . According to this, when data is transmitted from the wireless terminal 30 to the base station 20, the data is encrypted on the wireless terminal 30 side using the public key, and the private key generated by the authentication device 10 is used. Then, it is decoded on the base station 20 side.

By executing the above-described wireless communication between the base station 20 and the wireless terminal 30, the safety of wireless communication in the wireless communication system can be improved.

By the way, in a wireless communication system such as a 5G mobile communication system, it is necessary to support a wide range of requirements such as high speed, multiple connections, and low delay. Therefore, there is a technology (hereinafter referred to as network slicing technology) that manages or operates resources by logically dividing them into units called network slices.

According to this network slicing technology, multiple network slices (logical divisions) are built on common hardware resources (servers, routers, etc.) placed in the network, and each network slice is operated independently. be able to. By individually allocating such a network slice to each service provided in a wireless communication system (5G mobile communication system), network complication can be avoided and an efficient network can be constructed. Moreover, in the network slicing technology, since a common hardware resource is virtually divided and assigned to each of a plurality of network slices, it is possible to improve the utilization efficiency of the entire resource.

When a plurality of network slices as described above are established between the authentication device 10 (base station 20) and the wireless terminal 30, the authentication process described above is executed for each network slice, and the secret for each network slice is A key is generated at the authentication device 10 and the wireless terminal 30 .

The configurations of the authentication device 10 and the wireless terminal 30 provided in the wireless communication system according to this embodiment will be described below.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing an example of the configuration of the authentication device 10. As shown in FIG. As shown in FIG. 3, the authentication device 10 includes an authentication processing unit 11, an update processing unit 12, a communication unit 13, and an information holding unit .

The authentication processing unit 11 executes the authentication processing described above. The authentication processing unit 11 is used by a random number generation unit (not shown) that generates random numbers when the authentication processing described above is executed, and by the base station 20 when performing wireless communication with the wireless terminal 30. It includes a key generator (not shown) for generating a private key, and the like.

Here, the security of wireless communication performed between the base station 20 and the wireless terminal 30 can be improved by using the above secret key. should be updated regularly.

The update processing unit 12 updates the secret key generated in the authentication device 10 (authentication processing unit 11) and the wireless terminal 30 by executing the authentication processing by the authentication processing unit 11 (hereinafter referred to as update processing). to run. In the update process, a new secret key is generated in the authentication device 10 and the wireless terminal 30 by executing the same process as the authentication process described above. That is, the update processing unit 12 includes a random number generation unit (not shown) that generates random numbers for updating the secret key, a key generation unit (not shown) that generates a new secret key after updating, and the like.

In the present embodiment, part or all of the authentication processing unit 11 and the update processing unit 12 are implemented by at least one or more processors provided in the authentication device 10 (that is, the computer of the authentication device 10) executing a predetermined program. shall be realized by software. Part or all of the authentication processing unit 11 and the update processing unit 12 may be realized by hardware such as a predetermined processing circuit, or may be realized by a combination of software and hardware.

The communication unit 13 transmits a random number to the wireless terminal 30 when the authentication process and update process described above are executed. In addition, in the present embodiment, the communication unit 13 is realized by an antenna, a communication device, and the like provided in the authentication device 10 .

As described above, when a plurality of network slices are constructed between the authentication device 10 and the wireless terminal 30, a secret key is generated for each network slice. The generated private key is stored in association with an identifier for identifying the network slice (hereinafter referred to as network slice identifier).

In this embodiment, the information holding unit 14 is assumed to be implemented by a memory, a storage device, or the like provided in the authentication device 10 .

FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing an example of the configuration of the wireless terminal 30. As shown in FIG. As shown in FIG. 4, the wireless terminal 30 includes a communication section 31, a key generation section 32 and an information holding section 33. FIG.

The communication unit 31 receives the random number transmitted from the authentication device 10 when the authentication processing is executed by the authentication device 10 . Similarly, the communication unit 31 receives a random number transmitted from the authentication device 10 when the authentication device 10 executes update processing. Also, the communication unit 31 transmits the EAP response described with reference to FIG.

In this embodiment, the communication unit 31 is assumed to be implemented by an antenna, a communication device, etc. provided in the wireless terminal 30 .

The key generation unit 32 generates a secret key used for wireless communication with the base station 20 based on the shared secret key pre-written in the SIM card inserted in the wireless terminal 30 and the random number received by the communication unit 31. to generate

In this embodiment, part or all of the key generation unit 32 is implemented by at least one or more processors provided in the wireless terminal 30 (that is, the computer of the wireless terminal 30) executing a predetermined program, that is, It shall be implemented by software. Part or all of the key generation unit 32 may be realized by hardware such as a predetermined processing circuit, or may be realized by a combination of software and hardware.

As described above, a secret key is generated for each network slice, and the information holding unit 33 uses the secret key generated for each network slice by the key generation unit 32 as a network slice identifier for identifying the network slice. Store in association.

In this embodiment, the information holding unit 33 is assumed to be realized by a memory, a storage device, or the like provided in the wireless terminal 30 .

FIG. 5 shows an example of the data structure of the information holding unit 14 included in the authentication device 10. As shown in FIG. As shown in FIG. 5, the information holding unit 14 holds information such as a secret key, expiration date, allowable delay time, maximum traffic volume, etc. in association with the network slice identifier.

A network slice identifier is an identifier for identifying a network slice established between authentication device 10 and wireless terminal 30 .

The private key is a private key (private key used in the network slice) used for wireless communication performed using the network slice identified by the associated network slice identifier.

The term of validity is the term of validity set for the associated private key. The expiration date includes, for example, year, month, day and time, but may be expressed in other formats.

The permissible delay time is the permissible delay time in wireless communication performed using the network slice identified by the associated network slice identifier.

The maximum amount of communication is the maximum amount of communication (maximum amount of data that can be communicated) in wireless communication performed using the network slice identified by the associated network slice identifier.

The example shown in FIG. 5 shows an example of the data structure of the information holding unit 14 when a plurality of network slices including first and second network slices are constructed between the authentication device 10 and the wireless terminal 30. ing.

Specifically, the information holding unit 14 associates the network slice identifier “0001” with the secret key “secret key 1”, the expiration date “xxxx/xx/xx xx:xx”, the allowable delay time “50 ms” and The maximum communication volume "maximum communication volume 1" is held. According to this, the secret key used in wireless communication using the network slice (first network slice) identified by the network slice identifier “001” is “secret key 1”, and the “secret key 1” is It is shown that the expiration date is “xx, xx, xx, xx, xx, year xx”. It also shows that the allowable delay time in wireless communication using the first network slice is "50 ms" and the maximum communication traffic in the wireless communication is "maximum communication traffic 1".

In addition, the information holding unit 14 associates the network slice identifier "0002" with the secret key "secret key 2", the expiration date "yyyy/yy/yy yy:yy", the allowable delay time "1 s", and the maximum traffic volume. "Maximum traffic volume 2" is held. According to this, the secret key used in wireless communication using the network slice (second network slice) identified by the network slice identifier “002” is “secret key 2”, and the “secret key 2” is It indicates that the expiration date is “year yyyy yy month yy day yy hour yy minute”. It also shows that the allowable delay time in wireless communication using the second network slice is "1 s" and the maximum communication traffic in the wireless communication is "maximum communication traffic 2".

It is assumed that the expiration date described above is set in advance for the private key when the private key is generated by executing the authentication process and the update process, for example.

In addition, since each of the plurality of network slices is operated independently as described above, it is assumed that the above-described permissible delay time, maximum traffic volume, etc. are different for each network slice. Note that the above-described first network slice is a network slice that is used (assigned to video distribution) for purposes such as video distribution, for example, because the allowable delay time is short. On the other hand, the second network slice has a long permissible delay time, so it is a network slice that is used for purposes such as file transfer (assigned to file transfer).

Here, only information held in the information holding unit 14 in association with network slice identifiers for identifying the first and second network slices (that is, information on the first and second network slices) has been explained. When network slices other than the first and second network slices are constructed, information on the network slices is also held in the information holding unit 14 .

Also, here, the information holding unit 14 is described as holding (information on) the network slice identifier, secret key, expiration date, allowable delay time, and maximum communication volume for each network slice, but the information holding unit 14 Information other than these pieces of information may be held, or part of these pieces of information may not be held.

Although the data structure of the information holding unit 14 included in the authentication device 10 has been described here, it is assumed that the information holding unit 33 included in the wireless terminal 30 also holds similar information. The information held in the information holding unit 14 included in the authentication device 10 and the information held in the information holding unit 33 included in the wireless terminal 30 may be the same or different. .

Next, an example of the processing procedure of the authentication device 10 when updating the private key will be described with reference to the flowchart of FIG. Here, the secret key is already held in the authentication device 10 (information holding unit 14) and the wireless terminal 30 (information holding unit 33) by executing the authentication process described above, and the base station 20 and the wireless terminal 30 It is assumed that wireless communication using the private key is being performed in

First, the update processing unit 12 included in the authentication device 10 refers to the information holding unit 14 to specify a private key to be updated (hereinafter referred to as an update target key) (step S11).

Note that the update target secret key is executed using each of a plurality of secret keys held in the information holding unit 14 (that is, each of a plurality of network slices constructed between the authentication device 10 and the wireless terminal 30). (a plurality of private keys used for wireless communication), the expiration date held in the information holding unit 14 in association with the private key (that is, the expiration date set for the private key) identified based on

Specifically, for example, if the applicable expiration date exists within a predetermined period from the current date and time, the update processing unit 12 updates the private key held in the information holding unit 14 in association with the expiration date. is identified as the private key to be updated.

Here, for example, when updating the update target key specified in step S11, it is necessary to transmit a random number for updating the update target key from the authentication device 10 to the wireless terminal 30. For this, it is conceivable to use a network slice that uses the update target key.

However, for example, a first network slice with an allowable delay time of 50 ms and a second network slice with an allowable delay time of 1 s are constructed, and the secret key used in the first network slice (hereinafter referred to as the first secret key ) is specified as the key to be updated, and the first network slice is used to update the first secret key (i.e., random number transmission, etc.), the first network slice is There is a possibility that a delay time that exceeds the allowable delay time may occur, affecting the wireless communication performed using it. In this case, it is considered preferable to update the first secret key using a second network slice different from the first network slice (that is, a second network slice with a longer allowable delay time than the first network slice). be done.

Therefore, in the present embodiment, the update processing unit 12 refers to the information holding unit 14 and selects a network slice to be used when updating the update target key (that is, used to transmit the random number) (step S12 ).

In this case, the update processing unit 12 can select a network slice based on the allowable delay time held in the information holding unit 14, for example. Specifically, when a first network slice with a permissible delay time of 50 ms and a second network slice with a permissible delay time of 1 s are constructed, the update processing unit 12 updates the second network slice with a longer permissible delay time. (that is, the network slice identified by the network slice identifier held in the information holding unit 14 in association with the longest allowable delay time) is selected.

In step S12, one network slice may be selected from a plurality of network slices established between the authentication device 10 and the wireless terminal 30, and the selected network slice is the key to be updated. may be a network slice in which wireless communication using is performed (a network slice in which the update target key is used), or a network slice other than the network slice in which the update target is used.

Also, here, it has been described that a network slice is selected based on the allowable delay time held in the information holding unit 14, but the network slice is executed using each of a plurality of network slices, for example. It may be selected based on the current amount of communication in wireless communication (current amount of data in which wireless communication is being performed). In this case, the update processing unit 12, for example, measures the current amount of communication (data amount) in the wireless communication being executed using each network slice, and selects the network slice with the smallest measured current amount of communication. can do.

Further, the update processing unit 12 may select network slices based on the maximum traffic volume held in the information holding unit 14 . In this case, the update processing unit 12 selects, for example, the network slice with the largest maximum traffic (that is, the network slice identified by the network slice identifier held in the information holding unit 14 in association with the largest maximum traffic). can be selected.

Further, the update processing unit 12 may be configured to select a network slice based on the current communication traffic and the maximum communication traffic held in the information holding unit 14 . In this case, the update processing unit 12 can select the network slice with the largest difference between the current traffic and the maximum traffic or the network slice with the minimum ratio of the current traffic to the maximum traffic. In other words, the update processing unit 12 may select a network slice that has a margin in the current communication traffic (that is, communication status) for the set communication band.

Note that the network slice selection processing described here is just an example, and the update processing unit 12 selects a network slice that is less likely to affect wireless communication between the base station 20 and the wireless terminal 30 by updating the update target key. For example, a network slice may be selected by comprehensively considering the above-described allowable delay time, current traffic, maximum traffic, and the like.

Next, the update processing unit 12 determines whether or not the network slice selected in step S12 (hereinafter referred to as the selected network slice) matches the network slice using the update target key identified in step S11. (Step S13). Note that the network slice corresponding to the update target key identified in step S11 is a network slice identified by the network slice identifier held in the information holding unit 14 in association with the update target key.

If it is determined that the selected network slice does not match the network slice that uses the update target key (NO in step S13), the update processing unit 12 executes first update processing (step S14).

The first update process will be described below. In the first update process, the update processing unit 12 (communication unit 13) transmits a random number for updating the update target key to the wireless terminal 30 using the selected network slice.

The random number thus transmitted from the update processing unit 12 (communication unit 13) to the wireless terminal 30 is received by the communication unit 31 included in the wireless terminal 30, and the key generation unit 32 included in the wireless terminal 30 wirelessly A new secret key (that is, an updated secret key) is generated based on the shared secret key written in the SIM card inserted in the terminal 30 and the random number received by the communication unit 31 . The secret key generated by the key generation unit 32 in this way is stored in the information storage unit 33 in association with the network slice identifier for identifying the network slice that uses the update target key, and the execution is performed using the network slice. used for wireless communication between the base station 20 and the wireless terminal 30.

Further, the update processing unit 12 included in the authentication device 10 generates a new secret key (that is, the updated secret key based on the shared secret key held by the communication carrier and the random number transmitted to the wireless terminal 30). ). The private key generated by the update processing unit 12 in this way is stored in the information storage unit 14 in association with the network slice identifier for identifying the network slice that uses the update target key, and the execution is performed using the network slice. used for wireless communication between the base station 20 and the wireless terminal 30.

In the first update process described above, for example, the update target key identified in step S11 is the first secret key used in the first network slice, and the network slice selected in step S12 (selected network slice) is the first secret key. It is assumed that it is a second network slice that is different from the network slice. In this case, the update processing of the first secret key is executed using the second network slice at the update timing of the first secret key based on the validity period set for the first secret key.

Here, it is assumed that the random number for updating the update target key is transmitted from the authentication device 10 to the wireless terminal 30. Information (hereinafter referred to as use start timing information) may be further transmitted to the wireless terminal 30 . According to this, the base station 20 and the wireless terminal 30 can start using the updated secret key based on this use start timing (information).

The usage start timing information includes, for example, the date and time (time information) when the use of the updated private key is to start, and the date and time is, for example, the expiration date set for the update target key (information associated with the update target key). expiration date held in the holding unit 14). Note that the date and time included in the usage start timing information may be any date and time before the expiration date set for the key to be updated.

Further, for example, when each data transmitted from the base station 20 to the wireless terminal 30 is assigned a serial number (serial number) of the data, the usage start timing information is not the date and time but the updated secret key. It may contain the serial number of the data to start using.

Here, the usage start timing information includes the date and time or the serial number of the data, but if the base station 20 and the wireless terminal 30 can determine the usage start timing of the updated private key, the date and time and the data serial number can be determined. Usage start timing information including information other than the data serial number may be used.

However, if it is set in advance to start using the updated private key at a predetermined timing, for example, the use start timing information is not transmitted to the wireless terminal 30. good too.

Furthermore, in the case of setting the expiration date of the private key after updating in the authentication device 10, the expiration date is transmitted from the authentication device 10 to the wireless terminal 30 in addition to the above-described random number and usage timing information. may be

Here, it is assumed that the above-described first update process uses the second network slice to update the first secret key. The key (hereinafter referred to as the second secret key) may be further updated. Such updating of the second secret key is performed by transmitting a random number for updating the second secret key to the wireless terminal 30 using the second network slice. Timing information and the like may be transmitted to the wireless terminal 30 as in the case of updating the first secret key described above.

On the other hand, if it is determined that the selected network slice matches the network slice that uses the update target key (YES in step S13), the update processing unit 12 executes second update processing (step S15).

Here, in the second update process, for example, the update target key specified in step S11 is the second secret key used in the second network slice, and the network slice selected in step S12 is the second network slice. (that is, updating the second secret key using the second network slice), in the second update process, in addition to the second secret key, can update a different secret key (eg, the first secret key). In this case, the update process of the first secret key is executed using the second network slice at the update timing of the second secret key based on the validity period set for the second secret key.

Note that the first update process updates the first secret key (and the second secret key) at the update timing of the first secret key, and the second update process updates the first secret key (and the second secret key) at the update timing of the second secret key. and the second secret key), but the other points are the same, so detailed description of the second update process is omitted here.

Now, with reference to FIG. 7, a specific example of the private key update process executed in this embodiment will be described.

Here, first and second network slices are established between the authentication device 10 (base station 20) and the wireless terminal 30, and the wireless terminal 30 uses each of the first and second network slices to communicate with the base station. 20 is executing wireless communication. In the example shown in FIG. 7, a plurality of pieces of data are transmitted from the base station 20 to the wireless terminal 30, and a serial number (sequence number) SN is assigned to each piece of data.

Data transmitted from the base station 20 to the wireless terminal 30 using the first network slice is encrypted using, for example, a public key corresponding to the first secret key (hereinafter referred to as a first public key). The wireless terminal 30 decrypts the data using the first secret key K(A, 1) held in the information holding unit 33 included in the wireless terminal 30 .

Similarly, data transmitted from the base station 20 to the wireless terminal 30 using the second network slice uses, for example, a public key corresponding to the above-described second secret key (hereinafter referred to as a second public key). It is assumed that the data is encrypted, and the wireless terminal 30 uses the second secret key K(B, 1) held in the information holding unit 33 included in the wireless terminal 30 to decrypt the data.

Here, for example, after the data with "109" as the serial number SN is transmitted from the base station 20 to the wireless terminal 30 using the second network slice, the data with "110" as the serial number SN is transmitted. At the timing before transmission from the base station 20 to the wireless terminal 30 using the second network slice, for example, the first secret key K(A, 1) is identified as the key to be updated (that is, the first secret Assume that the update timing of the key K (A, 1) has been determined).

For example, assuming that the allowable delay time of the first network slice is 50 ms and the allowable delay time of the second network slice is 1 s, the network slice used to update the first secret key K(A, 1) is A second network slice is selected.

In this case, the second network slice is used to update the first secret key K (A, 1) and the second secret key (B, 1). In this update process, a random number for updating the first secret key K (A, 1) (hereinafter referred to as a first random number) and a random number for updating the second secret key K (B, 1) (hereinafter referred to as , a second random number) is transmitted from the authentication device 10 to the wireless terminal 30, and the first secret key K(A, 1) is converted to the first secret key K(A, 2) based on the first random number. The second secret key K(B, 1) is updated to the second secret key K(B, 2) based on the second random number.

Note that when the first secret key K(A, 1) is updated to the first secret key (A, 2), the first public key is similarly updated. Also, when the second secret key K(B, 1) is updated to the second secret key (B, 2), the first public key is similarly updated.

Here, the usage start timing information regarding the usage start timing of the first secret key K(A, 2) (that is, the updated first secret key) is transmitted to the wireless terminal 30 using the second network slice, Assume that the usage start timing information includes the serial number SN. Assuming that the serial number SN included in this usage start timing information is "150", the use of the first secret key K(A, 2) is as shown in FIG. It starts at the timing when the attached data is transmitted from the base station 20 to the wireless terminal 30 . In this case, data encrypted using the updated first public key is transmitted from the base station 20, and the wireless terminal 30 uses the updated first secret key K(A, 2) to encrypt the data. to decrypt.

On the other hand, the use of the second secret key K(B, 2) is started immediately after the updating process of the second secret key K(B, 1) is finished, but the first secret key K(A, 2 ), the use of the second secret key (B, 2) may be started based on the serial number SN or the like (use start timing information).

Note that the process described here corresponds to the first update process (the process of step S14 shown in FIG. 6) executed when the first secret key K(A, 1) is specified as the key to be updated. For example, when the second secret key K(B, 1) is identified as the key to be updated, the above-described second update process (the process of step S15 shown in FIG. 6) is executed, whereby the first secret key K(A,1) and the second secret key K(B,1) can be updated respectively.

As described above, in the present embodiment, the authentication device 10 obtains a secret key used for wireless communication performed using each of a plurality of network slices established between the wireless terminal (wireless communication device) 30 and , a first random number for updating a first secret key held for each network slice and used for wireless communication performed using the first network slice included in the plurality of network slices, and the updated Use start timing information regarding the use start timing of the first secret key is transmitted to the wireless terminal 30 using a second network slice different from the first network slice. In this case, the first secret key updated based on the above-described first random number is held in the information holding unit 14 of the authentication device 10, and based on the use start timing transmitted to the wireless terminal 30, the first It is used for wireless communication between the base station 20 and the wireless terminal 30 which is performed using network slices.

In addition, in the present embodiment, the wireless terminal 30 holds, for each network slice, a secret key used for wireless communication performed using each of a plurality of network slices established between the wireless terminal 30 and the authentication device 10. and a first random number for updating the first secret key used in wireless communication performed using the first network slice included in the plurality of network slices and the start of use of the updated first secret key Use start timing information about timing is received from the authentication device 10 using a second network slice different from the first network. In this case, the first secret key updated based on the first random number is held in the information holding unit 33 of the wireless terminal 30, and based on the use start timing received from the authentication device 10, the first network slice is used for wireless communication with the base station 20 performed using .

In the present embodiment, due to the configuration described above, the state in which the wireless communication is continued without affecting the wireless communication performed using the first network slice (that is, without imposing a communication load on the first network slice). , the first secret key used in the first network slice can be updated. In other words, for example, there are various technologies related to a method for connecting a plurality of network slices and a method for generating a secret key. Appropriate private key operation can be realized by cooperating with slices.

In the present embodiment, for example, the second network slice used when updating the first secret key based on the delay time allowed in wireless communication performed using each of the first and second network slices shall be selected. According to this, for example, the first secret key can be updated using the second network slice with a long allowable delay time without degrading the communication quality of the first network slice with a short allowable delay time. becomes possible.

Further, in the present embodiment, the second network slice to be used when updating the first secret key is selected based on the amount of communication in wireless communication performed using each of the first and second network slices. may be According to this, for example, it is possible to update the first secret key using the second network, which has a margin in the communication situation, without degrading the communication quality of the first network slice, which has a margin in the communication situation. Become.

Furthermore, in the present embodiment, when transmitting the first random number and use start timing information to the wireless terminal 30, the second secret key used for wireless communication performed using the second network slice is updated. may be sent to wireless terminal 30 using the second network slice. In this case, the second secret key updated based on the second random number is held in the information holding unit 14 of the authentication device 10, and the wireless communication between the base station 20 and the wireless terminal 30 is performed using the second network slice. Used for communication. Also, the second random number transmitted from the authentication device 10 is received by the wireless terminal 30, and the second secret key updated based on the second random number is held in the information holding unit 33 of the wireless terminal 30, It is used for wireless communication with the base station 20 which is performed using network slices.

In this embodiment, with such a configuration, it is possible to update the second secret key at the time of updating the first secret key, so that efficient updating of the secret key can be realized.

Here, for the sake of convenience, it is explained that the first and second secret keys are updated, but when three or more network slices including the first and second network slices are constructed, one network slice is A process of updating three or more secret keys, including the first and second secret keys, may be performed using the

Note that the update processing of the first secret key in this embodiment is executed based on the update timing of the first secret key determined based on the expiration date set for the first secret key, for example. Alternatively, it may be executed based on the update timing of the second secret key determined based on the expiration date set for the second secret key.

Furthermore, in the present embodiment, the usage start timing information may include a date and time calculated based on the validity period set for the first secret key, or the first network slice may be used. A data serial number attached to data transmitted in wireless communication executed using the first secret key (that is, a data serial number for starting use of the updated first secret key) may be included. By transmitting such use start timing information from the authentication device 10 to the wireless terminal 30, use of the updated first secret key can be started at a desired timing.

(Second embodiment)
Next, a second embodiment will be described. Note that the configurations of the wireless communication system, the authentication device, and the wireless terminal according to this embodiment are the same as those of the first embodiment described above, so they will be described with reference to FIGS.

Here, in the first embodiment described above, it is assumed that a plurality of network slices including the first and second network slices are preconfigured between the authentication device 10 (base station 20) and the wireless terminal 30. However, in a wireless communication system (5G mobile communication system), it is possible to construct a new network slice (hereinafter referred to as a third network slice) by newly allocating resources.

In the above-described first embodiment, the update target key (eg, first secret key) is updated using one of a plurality of network slices (eg, second network slice) that have already been constructed. However, this embodiment differs from the above-described first embodiment in that the update target key is updated using the third network slice at the timing when the third network slice is constructed.

An example of the processing procedure of the authentication device 10 when updating the private key will be described below with reference to the flowchart of FIG. Here, the secret key is already held in the authentication device 10 (information holding unit 14) and the wireless terminal 30 (information holding unit 33) by executing the authentication processing described in the first embodiment, and the base It is assumed that wireless communication using the secret key is being performed between the station 20 and the wireless terminal 30 .

Here, the third network slice is a new network slice different from the plurality of network slices including the first and second network slices already constructed between the authentication device 10 (base station 20) and the wireless terminal 30. Assume a newly built case. In this case, information indicating the construction of the third network slice is notified to the authentication device 10, and the authentication device 10 constructs the third network slice (that is, at the timing when the third network slice is newly constructed). existence) is confirmed (step S21).

When the process of step S21 is executed, the update processing unit 12 included in the authentication device 10 refers to the information holding unit 14 to identify the key to be updated (step S22). In step S22, the update target is the secret key used in the network slice that may affect wireless communication by executing the update process (that is, transmitting the random number for updating the secret key). shall be identified as a key.

Specifically, in step S22, based on the allowable delay time held in the information holding unit 14, for example, a secret key used in a network slice with a short allowable delay time can be specified as an update target key. can. Also, in step S22, for example, the current communication traffic in wireless communication being executed using each network slice is measured, and the secret key used in the network slice with the measured current communication traffic is updated. It may be specified as a target key. Furthermore, in step S22, based on the maximum traffic volume held in the information holding unit 14, for example, a secret key used in a network slice with a small maximum traffic volume may be specified as an update target key. In step S22, the private key used in the network slice with a small difference between the current traffic and the maximum traffic or the network slice with a large ratio of the current traffic to the maximum traffic is specified as the key to be updated. You may

When the processing of step S22 is executed, the authentication processing unit 11 and the update processing unit 12 execute authentication processing and update processing using the third network slice (step S23).

A detailed description of the authentication process is omitted, but a secret key (hereinafter referred to as a third secret key) is generated in the authentication device 10 and the wireless terminal 30 by executing the process described with reference to FIG. . Hereinafter, the third secret key generated in this way is used in wireless communication between the base station 20 and the wireless terminal 30 using the third network slice.

On the other hand, in the update process, a random number for updating the update target key (for example, the first secret key) specified in step S22 is transmitted from the authentication device 10 to the wireless terminal 30, and based on the random number to generate the updated private key. Note that the update processing executed in step S23 is as described in the above-described first embodiment except that the third network slice (new network slice) is used for updating the update target key. A detailed description thereof will be omitted.

As described above, in the present embodiment, a third network different from the plurality of network slices (first and second network slices) already established between the authentication device 10 (base station 20) and the wireless terminal 30 When the slice is newly constructed, the first secret key is updated by transmitting the first random number and usage start timing information to the wireless terminal 30 using the third network slice.

In the present embodiment, with the configuration described above, at the timing when the third network slice is newly constructed, without affecting the wireless communication performed using the first network slice (that is, without imposing a communication load). It becomes possible to update the first secret key.

In the above-described first embodiment, for example, since the second network slice is used to update the first secret key, the communication load is not applied to the first network slice, but the second network slice gives the communication load. On the other hand, in the present embodiment, the secret key is updated using the newly constructed third network slice (that is, the network slice in which wireless communication between the base station 20 and the wireless terminal 30 has not started). Therefore, there is an advantage in that a communication load is not applied to network slices that have already started wireless communication.

In this embodiment, the first secret key is updated at the timing when the third network slice is newly constructed, but when the new network slice is not constructed, the above-described processing shown in FIG. 6 is executed. may be configured to update the first secret key (and the second secret key) by

Note that in the present embodiment, the number of private keys (that is, update target keys) that are updated using the third network slice may be one, or may be plural. Specifically, as described above, in this embodiment, the secret key is updated using a network slice in which wireless communication (data communication) between the base station 20 and the wireless terminal 30 has not started (that is, the base station wireless communication between the station 20 and the wireless terminal 30). It may also be the private keys of all network slices in the

(Third embodiment)
Next, a third embodiment will be described. Note that the configurations of the wireless communication system, the authentication device, and the wireless terminal according to this embodiment are the same as those of the first embodiment described above, so they will be described with reference to FIGS.

Here, in the above-described first embodiment, the second network slice is used to update the first secret key. The update processing of the first secret key using the second network slice may not succeed (fail). In the present embodiment, for example, when the update of the first secret key is not successful, another network slice different from the second network slice is selected again and the process of updating the first secret key is executed. Differs from one embodiment.

An example of the processing procedure of the authentication device 10 when updating the private key will be described below with reference to the flowchart of FIG. 9 . Here, the secret key is already held in the authentication device 10 (information holding unit 14) and the wireless terminal 30 (information holding unit 33) by executing the authentication processing described in the first embodiment, and the base It is assumed that wireless communication using the secret key is being performed between the station 20 and the wireless terminal 30 .

First, the processes of steps S31 to S35 corresponding to steps S11 to S15 shown in FIG. 6 are executed.

Next, the update processing unit 12 included in the authentication device 10 determines whether or not the private key (first and second private keys) has been successfully updated as a result of the processing of step S34 or S35 ( step S36). In the private key update process, the same process as the authentication process shown in FIG. 2 is executed. However, in step S36, if the sequence of processes shown in FIG. Assume that it is determined that the update of the private key has not succeeded (that is, the update of the private key has failed). Specifically, in the update process, if, for example, an EAP response cannot be normally received from the wireless terminal 30, it is determined that the update target key has not been successfully updated.

If it is determined in step S36 that the private key has not been successfully updated (NO in step S36), the update processing unit 12 reselects a network slice other than the network slice selected in step S32 (step S37). .

For example, assuming that the second network slice is selected in step S32, in step S37, for example, one of the network slices other than the second network slice (that is, the network slice whose update target key has failed to be updated) is selected. A network slice is selected.

When the process of step S37 is executed, the update processing unit 12 executes the secret key update process using the network slice reselected in step S37 (step S38). Since the private key update process is as described in the first embodiment, detailed description thereof will be omitted here.

Note that when the first and second secret key update processes are executed in the first or second update process executed in step S34 or S35, the network slice reselected in step S37 is used to It is only necessary to update the first and second secret keys, but in step S38, the secret key used in the reselected network slice may be further updated.

Also, although not shown in FIG. 9, if the update of the private key is not successful even if the process of step S38 is executed, the process may be repeated by returning to step S37.

On the other hand, if it is determined in step S36 that the private key has been successfully updated, the process shown in FIG. 9 ends.

As described above, in this embodiment, for example, if the update of the first secret key (and the second secret key) is not successful, a network slice (second network slice) different from the network slice (second network slice) used for the update is used. 3 network slice) is used to transmit the first random number and use start timing information to the wireless terminal 30 .

In the present embodiment, due to the above configuration, even if the update of the first secret key using the second network slice fails, wireless communication performed using the first network slice is affected ( That is, it becomes possible to update the first secret key using the third network slice without imposing a communication load.

According to at least one embodiment described above, it is possible to provide an authentication device, a wireless communication device, a wireless communication system, a method, and a program capable of appropriately operating network slices.

While several embodiments of the invention have been described, these embodiments have been presented by way of example and are not intended to limit the scope of the invention. These embodiments can be implemented in various other forms, and various omissions, replacements, and modifications can be made without departing from the scope of the invention. These embodiments and their modifications are included in the scope and spirit of the invention, as well as the scope of the invention described in the claims and equivalents thereof.

DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 10... Authentication apparatus 11... Authentication process part 12... Update process part 13... Communication part 14... Information holding part 20... Base station 30... Wireless terminal (wireless communication apparatus) 31... Communication part 32... Key generation unit, 33... information holding unit.

Claims (17)

holding means for holding, for each network slice, a secret key used for wireless communication executed using each of a plurality of network slices constructed between a wireless communication device;
related to a first random number for updating a first secret key used in wireless communication performed using a first network slice included in the plurality of network slices and timing to start using the updated first secret key communication means for transmitting usage start timing information to the wireless communication device using a second network slice different from the first network slice;
The first secret key updated based on the first random number is held in the holding means, and the base station and the wireless communication device are executed using the first network slice based on the usage start timing. authentication device used for wireless communication between The communication means updates a second secret key used for wireless communication performed using the second network slice when transmitting the first random number and the use start timing information to the wireless communication device. further transmitting a second random number for to the wireless communication device using the second network slice;
The second secret key updated based on the second random number is held in the holding means and used for wireless communication between the base station and the wireless communication device using the second network slice. The authentication device according to claim 1. 2. The communication means transmits the first random number and the start-of-use timing information based on update timing of the first secret key based on an expiration date set for the first secret key, or 3. The authentication device according to 2. The communication means, based on update timing of the second secret key based on an expiration date set for the second secret key used for wireless communication performed using the second network slice, 3. The authentication device according to claim 1, which transmits the first random number and the usage start timing information. The second network slice used for transmitting the first random number and the use start timing information is based on a delay time allowed in wireless communication performed using each of the first and second network slices An authentication device according to any one of claims 1 to 4 selected. The second network slice used for transmitting the first random number and the use start timing information is based on the amount of communication or the maximum amount of communication in wireless communication performed using each of the first and second network slices 5. The authentication device according to any one of claims 1 to 4, wherein the authentication device is selected by The authentication device according to any one of claims 1 to 6, wherein said usage start timing information includes a date and time calculated based on an expiration date set for said first secret key. Each piece of data transmitted in wireless communication performed using the first network slice is assigned a serial number of the data,
The authentication device according to any one of claims 1 to 6, wherein the use start timing information includes a serial number of data for starting use of the updated first secret key. When a third network slice different from the plurality of network slices is newly constructed, the communication means replaces the first random number and the start-of-use timing information with the second network slice with the third network slice. 2. The authentication device according to claim 1, wherein slices are used to transmit to the wireless communication device. The communication means transmits the first random number and the start-of-use timing information to the wireless communication device using a third network slice different from the second network slice when the update of the first secret key is unsuccessful. The authentication device according to any one of claims 1 to 8. holding means for holding, for each network slice, a private key used for wireless communication executed using each of a plurality of network slices established between the authentication device;
related to a first random number for updating a first secret key used in wireless communication performed using a first network slice included in the plurality of network slices and timing to start using the updated first secret key communication means for receiving usage start timing information from the authentication device using a second network slice different from the first network slice,
The first secret key updated based on the first random number is held in the holding means and used for wireless communication with a base station using the first network slice based on the usage start timing. wireless communication device. The communication means updates a second secret key used for wireless communication performed using the second network slice when receiving the first random number and the use start timing information from the authentication device. a second random number from the authenticator using the second network slice;
12. The second secret key according to claim 11, which is updated based on the second random number, is held in the holding means, and is used for wireless communication with the base station using the second network slice. wireless communication device. In a wireless communication system in which multiple network slices are constructed between an authentication device and a wireless communication device,
The authentication device
a first holding means for holding, for each network slice, a private key used for wireless communication performed using each of the plurality of network slices;
related to a first random number for updating a first secret key used in wireless communication performed using a first network slice included in the plurality of network slices and timing to start using the updated first secret key a first communication means for transmitting use start timing information to the wireless communication device using a second network slice different from the first network slice;
The wireless communication device
a second holding means for holding, for each network slice, a private key used for wireless communication performed using each of the plurality of network slices;
a second communication means for receiving the first random number and the usage start timing information;
The first secret key updated based on the first random number is held in the first and second holding means, and based on the use start timing, the base station and the base station are executed using the first network slice. A wireless communication system used for wireless communication with the wireless communication device. A method performed by an authentication device, comprising:
a step of holding, in a holding means for each network slice, a private key used for wireless communication performed using each of a plurality of network slices constructed between a wireless communication device;
related to a first random number for updating a first secret key used in wireless communication performed using a first network slice included in the plurality of network slices and timing to start using the updated first secret key transmitting usage start timing information to the wireless communication device using a second network slice different from the first network slice;
The first secret key updated based on the first random number is held in the holding means, and the base station and the wireless communication device are executed using the first network slice based on the usage start timing. A method used for wireless communication between A method performed by a wireless communication device, comprising:
a step of holding, in a holding means for each network slice, a secret key used for wireless communication performed using each of a plurality of network slices constructed between the authentication device;
related to a first random number for updating a first secret key used in wireless communication performed using a first network slice included in the plurality of network slices and timing to start using the updated first secret key receiving usage start timing information from the authentication device using a second network slice different from the first network slice;
The first secret key updated based on the first random number is held in the holding means and used for wireless communication with a base station using the first network slice based on the usage start timing. How to be. A program executed by a computer of an authentication device,
to said computer;
a step of holding, in a holding means for each network slice, a private key used for wireless communication performed using each of a plurality of network slices constructed between a wireless communication device;
related to a first random number for updating a first secret key used in wireless communication performed using a first network slice included in the plurality of network slices and timing to start using the updated first secret key transmitting usage start timing information to the wireless communication device using a second network slice different from the first network slice;
The first secret key updated based on the first random number is held in the holding means, and the base station and the wireless communication device are executed using the first network slice based on the usage start timing. A program used for wireless communication between A program executed by a computer of a wireless communication device, comprising:
to said computer;
a step of holding, in a holding means for each network slice, a secret key used for wireless communication performed using each of a plurality of network slices constructed between the authentication device;
related to a first random number for updating a first secret key used in wireless communication performed using a first network slice included in the plurality of network slices and timing to start using the updated first secret key receiving usage start timing information from the authentication device using a second network slice different from the first network slice;
The first secret key updated based on the first random number is held in the holding means and used for wireless communication with a base station using the first network slice based on the usage start timing. program.

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