JP2014052847A - Fiscal printer and method for controlling fiscal printer - Google Patents

Abstract

The present invention provides a fiscal printer capable of preventing a falsification confirmation control program for confirming that a fiscal control program has not been falsified from being read illegally.
A fiscal printer 1 includes a fiscal control unit 21 that performs fiscal control, a first storage unit 22 that stores a fiscal control program that performs fiscal control, and falsification that confirms that the fiscal control program has not been tampered with. A falsification confirmation control unit 23 that performs confirmation control, a second storage unit 24 that stores a falsification confirmation control program that performs falsification confirmation control, a rewrite control unit 26 that performs rewrite control of the falsification confirmation control program, and a rewrite control unit 26 And a power source 27 for supplying power to the power source. When it is detected that a falsification action is performed on the fiscal memory, power is supplied to the rewrite control unit 26 and the rewrite control unit 26 rewrites the falsification confirmation control program.
[Selection] Figure 3

Description

  The present invention relates to a fiscal printer and a control method of a fiscal printer.

2. Description of the Related Art Conventionally, a fiscal printer having a function of storing fiscal information related to sales transactions is known (for example, see Patent Document 1). The fiscal printer described in Patent Document 1 includes a fiscal control circuit board on which a fiscal memory that stores fiscal information is mounted. A main CPU that reads and writes data from and to the fiscal memory is mounted on the fiscal control circuit board. The main CPU reads / writes data from / to the fiscal memory according to a predetermined control program stored in the ROM or the like.

JP 2010-134580 A

In recent years, every time a fiscal printer is started up, the main CPU of the fiscal control circuit board is prevented from operating according to a tampered control program.
Some countries are starting to require confirmation of the contents of their control programs. In order to prevent the main CPU from operating in accordance with the altered control program, a function for confirming that the control program has not been altered is required. Further, in order to realize this function, a tampering confirmation control program for confirming that the control program has not been tampered with is necessary.

It is also necessary to prevent the main CPU control program from being falsified in accordance with the falsification confirmation control program that has been falsified. In order to prevent the falsification confirmation of the control program of the main CPU according to the falsification confirmation control program that has been falsified, the falsification confirmation control program stored in the ROM or the like is illegally read out. It is preferable to prevent the falsification confirmation control program from being obtained.

Accordingly, an object of the present invention is to provide a fiscal printer and a fiscal printer capable of preventing an unauthorized reading of a falsification confirmation control program for confirming that a fiscal control program for writing fiscal information has not been falsified. It is to propose a control method.

In order to solve the above-described problem, a fiscal printer according to the present invention includes a fiscal memory in which fiscal information is stored, a fiscal control unit that performs at least fiscal control to write the fiscal information to the fiscal memory, and the fiscal control. A first storage unit storing a fiscal control program for performing falsification, a falsification confirmation control unit for performing falsification confirmation control for confirming that the fiscal control program stored in the first storage unit has not been falsified, and A second storage unit that stores a falsification confirmation control program for performing falsification confirmation control, a falsification detection mechanism that detects that a falsification act on the fiscal memory is performed, and the falsification confirmation stored in the second storage unit A rewrite control unit for performing a rewrite control for rewriting a control program; A power supply for supplying power to the replacement control unit and the second storage unit, and when the tampering detection mechanism detects that the tampering action is performed on the fiscal memory, the rewrite control unit and the second storage unit The power is supplied from the power source, and the rewrite control unit rewrites the falsification confirmation control program stored in the second storage unit.

In order to solve the above-described problem, a fiscal printer control method according to the present invention includes a fiscal memory in which fiscal information is stored, and a fiscal control unit that performs fiscal control for writing the fiscal information to at least the fiscal memory. A first storage unit storing a fiscal control program for performing the fiscal control, and a tampering confirmation control for performing tampering confirmation control for confirming that the fiscal control program stored in the first storage unit has not been tampered with A control unit, a second storage unit that stores a falsification confirmation control program for performing the falsification confirmation control, a falsification detection mechanism that detects that a falsification act on the fiscal memory is performed, and the second storage unit. Rewriting to rewrite the falsification confirmation control program A fiscal printer control method comprising: a control unit; and a power source that supplies power to the rewrite control unit and the second storage unit, wherein the tampering detection mechanism is configured to perform the tampering action on the fiscal memory. When detected, power is supplied from the power source to the rewrite control unit and the second storage unit, and the rewrite control unit rewrites the falsification confirmation control program stored in the second storage unit. To do.

In the fiscal printer and the fiscal printer control method of the present invention, when the falsification detection mechanism detects that the falsification of the fiscal memory is performed, the rewrite control unit rewrites the falsification confirmation control program stored in the second storage unit. Yes. In other words, in the present invention, when there is a possibility that the falsification confirmation control program may be read illegally in accordance with the falsification action on the fiscal memory, the rewrite control unit prevents the falsification confirmation control program from being read out. Has been rewritten. Therefore, in the present invention, it is possible to prevent the falsification confirmation control program from being read illegally.

In the present invention, it is preferable that the rewrite control unit writes certain data for erasing the falsification confirmation control program in the second storage unit. If comprised in this way, since the rewriting control part should just write fixed data in a 2nd memory | storage part, control of a rewriting control part becomes easy.

In the present invention, the fiscal printer includes a real-time clock capable of storing the date and time of occurrence of the tampering action, and the level of the output signal of the real-time clock is after the fiscal printer has completed its manufacturing process and completed. And, when the tampering detection mechanism detects that the tampering action is performed after the use of the fiscal printer is started, the rewrite control unit changes that the tampering action is performed on the fiscal memory. When the tampering detection mechanism detects and the level of the output signal of the real time clock changes, it is preferable to rewrite the tampering confirmation control program stored in the second storage unit. With this configuration, even if the tampering detection mechanism detects that the tampering action is performed, if the level of the output signal of the real-time clock does not change, the rewrite control unit stores the tampering confirmation stored in the second storage unit Do not rewrite the control program. Therefore, for example, in the manufacturing process of the fiscal printer, it is possible to prevent the falsification confirmation control program from being rewritten accidentally.

In the present invention, it is preferable that the rewrite control unit rewrites the falsification confirmation control program from the top address of the second storage unit. In general, in a control program stored in a storage unit such as a flash memory, important data such as a vector table unit is written on the head address side of the storage unit. Therefore, with this configuration, even if the remaining capacity of the power source when the falsification confirmation control program is rewritten is small and the power supply from the power source to the rewrite control unit and the second storage unit is interrupted in a short time, the second memory It becomes possible to rewrite important data on the head address side of the section. Therefore, even if the remaining capacity of the power supply when rewriting the falsification confirmation control program is small and the power supply from the power supply to the rewrite control unit and the second storage unit is interrupted in a short time, a significant falsification confirmation control program is illegally It becomes possible to prevent reading. Further, with this configuration, even if the power supply capacity is small and power supply from the power supply to the rewrite control unit and the second storage unit is interrupted in a short time, important data on the head address side of the second storage unit Can be rewritten. Therefore, even if the capacity of the power source is reduced, it is possible to prevent a significant tampering confirmation control program from being read illegally.

In the present invention, the fiscal printer includes a switch to which the rewrite control unit and the second storage unit are connected, the power source is a primary battery for backup, and the rewrite control unit and the second storage unit are: It is preferable that the power source is directly connected to the power source via the switch. In other words, in the present invention, it is preferable that the rewrite control unit and the second storage unit are connected to a power source without using electronic components that cause a voltage drop such as resistance.
If comprised in this way, when applying the voltage from a power supply to the rewriting control part and the 2nd memory | storage part, a useless voltage drop by resistance etc. will not arise. Therefore, even if the remaining capacity of the power supply when rewriting the tampering confirmation control program is small, it becomes possible to rewrite the tampering confirmation control program by operating the rewrite control unit and the second storage unit. In addition, since a useless voltage drop does not occur, it is possible to rewrite the falsification confirmation control program by operating the rewrite control unit and the second storage unit even when the capacity of the power supply is small. That is, even if the capacity of the power supply is reduced, it is possible to rewrite the falsification confirmation control program and prevent the falsification confirmation control program from being read illegally.

1 is an external perspective view of a fiscal printer according to an embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 2 is an external perspective view showing the fiscal printer of FIG. 1 from different angles. The block diagram of the fiscal printer of FIG. The circuit diagram of a primary battery and its peripheral part. The flowchart of an example of the rewriting control by MCU.

Hereinafter, a fiscal printer to which the present invention is applied and a control method of the fiscal printer will be described with reference to the drawings.

(Fiscal printer configuration)
FIG. 1 is an external perspective view of a fiscal printer 1 according to an embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 2 is an external perspective view showing the fiscal printer 1 of FIG. 1 from different angles. FIG.
It is a block diagram of the fiscal printer 1 of FIG. FIG. 4 is a circuit diagram of the primary battery 27 and its peripheral part.

A fiscal printer 1 (hereinafter referred to as “printer 1”) of this embodiment is a printer for accounting connected to a POS terminal or the like. The printer 1 has a function of printing print information related to sales transactions on a receipt and issuing a printed receipt, and a function of storing and holding fiscal information related to sales transactions. The printer 1 includes a printer main body 2 and a fiscal module 3 fixed to the bottom of the printer main body 2.

Inside the printer main body 2, a recording paper storage unit, a recording paper transport mechanism, a print head, and the like (not shown) are mounted. The printer body 2 includes an opening / closing lid 4 disposed on the front side of the upper surface of the printer body 2 and an opening / closing lid 5 disposed on the rear side of the upper surface of the printer body 2. A receipt discharge port 6 extending in the width direction of the recording paper is provided between the opening / closing lid 4 and the opening / closing lid 5.
Is formed. A slide button 7 is disposed on the side of the receipt outlet 6.
When the slide button 7 is operated, the opening / closing lid 5 is unlocked and the opening / closing lid 5 can be opened. Further, when the opening / closing lid 5 is opened, the recording paper storage unit is exposed and the recording paper can be exchanged. When the opening / closing lid 4 is opened, the ink ribbon can be exchanged.

The fiscal module 3 includes a fiscal memory board 10, an EJ memory board 11, a printer control board 12, and a fiscal control board 13. The fiscal memory board 10, the EJ memory board 11, the printer control board 12, and the fiscal control board 13 are arranged inside a metal housing 14. The housing 14 includes a case body 15 and a cover member 16 that covers the opening of the case body 15. The fiscal module 3 is provided with various connectors 17 for electrically connecting the fiscal module 3 to a host computer (not shown).

A fiscal memory in which fiscal information is stored is mounted on the fiscal memory substrate 10. The fiscal memory is a flash memory or an OTP-ROM. The EJ memory board 11 is mounted with an EJ (electronic journal) memory in which printing information for receipts is stored. The fiscal memory substrate 10 and the EJ memory substrate 11 are covered with a black epoxy resin. A printer control CPU 18 for controlling each mechanism of the printer main body 2 is mounted on the printer control board 12.

The fiscal control board 13 has a fiscal control CPU 21 as a fiscal control unit.
A flash memory 22 as a first storage unit, a program falsification confirmation CPU 23 as a falsification confirmation control unit, a flash memory 24 as a second storage unit, an RTC (real time clock) 25, and a rewrite control unit An MCU (memory control unit) 26, a backup primary battery 27 as a power source, and a reset IC 28 are mounted.

The fiscal control CPU 21 performs fiscal control for writing fiscal information into the fiscal memory and printing information into the EJ memory. The flash memory 22 stores a fiscal control program for the fiscal control CPU 21 to perform the fiscal control. The fiscal control CPU 21 writes fiscal information into the fiscal memory, print information into the EJ memory, and the like based on the fiscal control program stored in the flash memory 22. Note that the flash memory 22 of this embodiment is a serial flash memory.

The program falsification confirmation CPU 23 performs falsification confirmation control for confirming that the fiscal control program stored in the flash memory 22 has not been falsified. The flash memory 24 stores a falsification confirmation control program for the program falsification confirmation CPU 23 to perform falsification confirmation control. Based on the falsification confirmation control program stored in the flash memory 24, the program falsification confirmation CPU 23 executes the fiscal control program stored in the flash memory 22 and the basic fiscal control program each time the printer 1 is activated. Compare. In addition, the program falsification confirmation CPU 23
If the contents of the two control programs do not match, the printer 1 is stopped. If the contents of the two control programs match, the printer 1 is made operable. Note that the flash memory 24 of the present embodiment is a parallel flash memory. In this embodiment,
The vector table portion is composed of several bytes of data starting from the data stored at the head address of the flash memory 24.

The RTC 25 has a function of storing the date and time of occurrence of falsification to the fiscal memory detected by a falsification detection mechanism (not shown) described later. The RTC 25 outputs, for example, a rectangular wave digital signal. The level of the output signal of the RTC 25 is after the printer 1 has completed its manufacturing process and completed, and after the use of the printer 1 is started,
It changes when the tampering detection mechanism detects tampering with fiscal memory. For example, RT
The level of the output signal of C25 is switched from the low level to the high level or from the high level to the low level when the tampering detection mechanism detects the falsification action to the fiscal memory.

The MCU 26 performs rewrite control for rewriting the falsification confirmation control program stored in the flash memory 24. The MCU 26 includes a flash memory in which a rewrite control program for performing rewrite control is stored. Details of the rewrite control by the MCU 26 will be described later.

The primary battery 27 is connected to various electronic components such as SRAM (Static Random Access Memory) that need to be supplied with backup power. These electronic components have resistance 2
9 (see FIG. 4) is connected to the primary battery 27. The resistor 29 functions to prevent these electronic components from being damaged by the inrush current from the primary battery 27.

Further, the primary battery 27 is connected to the flash memory 24, the MCU 2 via the switch 30.
6 and a reset IC 28 are connected. The flash memory 24, the MCU 26, and the reset IC 28 are directly connected to the primary battery 27 via the switch 30. That is, the flash memory 24, the MCU 26, and the reset IC 28 are directly connected to the primary battery 27 without passing through electronic components such as resistors that cause a voltage drop (
(See FIG. 4). The switch 30 is normally in an open state in which the connection between the flash memory 24, the MCU 26 and the reset IC 28 and the primary battery 27 is cut off. When it is detected by the tampering detection mechanism described below that tampering with the fiscal memory is performed, the switch 30 is closed, and the flash memory 24, the MCU 26, the reset IC 28, and the primary battery 27 are connected. Power is supplied from the primary battery 27 to the flash memory 24, MCU 26 and reset IC 28.

In addition to the above-described configuration, the fiscal module 3 includes a tampering detection mechanism (not shown) for detecting that tampering with the fiscal memory is performed. This tampering detection mechanism detects, for example, that the fiscal module 3 has been removed from the printer body 2 and that the cover member 16 has been removed from the case body 15. The tampering detection mechanism detects, for example, that the fiscal module 3 has been removed from the printer body 2 and that a hole has been opened in the housing 14 with a drill or the like. That is, the tampering detection mechanism detects that the fiscal module 3 has been removed from the printer body 2 and that the cover member 16 has been removed from the case body 15, or that the fiscal module 3 has been removed from the printer body 2. By detecting that a hole has been drilled in the housing 14 with a drill or the like, it is detected that the falsification of the fiscal memory is performed.

(Rewrite control by MCU)
FIG. 5 is a flowchart of an example of rewrite control by the MCU 26. In the fiscal module 3, when the falsification detection mechanism detects that the falsification of the fiscal memory is performed (step S1), the switch 30 is closed, and the flash memory 24, MCU2
6 and the reset IC 28 are supplied with power from the primary battery 27 (step S2). Then, the reset signal output from the reset IC 28 is input to the MCU 26 (step S3).

Thereafter, the MCU 26 reads the interrupt output status of the RTC 25. That is, the MCU 26 checks whether or not the level of the output signal of the RTC 25 has changed (step S4). R
If the level of the output signal of the TC 25 has changed (“Yes” in step S4), the MCU 26 rewrites the falsification confirmation control program stored in the flash memory 24 according to the rewrite control program (step S4). S5). In this embodiment, the MCU 26 writes certain data for erasing the falsification confirmation control program in the flash memory 24 in step S5. In step S <b> 5, the MCU 26 rewrites the falsification confirmation control program from the top address of the flash memory 24.

In step S5, the MCU 26 transmits 4-byte data to the flash memory 24 by byte access, and the falsification confirmation control program stored in the flash memory 24 in a predetermined procedure according to the specifications of the flash memory 24. Rewrite. For example, in step S5, the MCU 26 first sets “AAAh” to the address bus and sets “AAh” to the data bus. Thereafter, the MCU 26 sets “555h” to the address bus and sets “55h” to the data bus. Thereafter, the MCU 26 sets “AAAh” to the address bus and sets “A0h” to the data bus. Thereafter, the MCU 26 sets “000h” to the address bus and sets “00h” to the data bus. Thereafter, the MCU 26 toggles the WE (write enable) terminal.
Each time the WE terminal is toggled, data “00h” is written to the flash memory 24. That is, every time the WE terminal is toggled, 0 data is written in the flash memory 24.

When the tampering confirmation control program stored in the flash memory 24 is rewritten in step S5, the rewrite control by the MCU 26 ends. If the level of the output signal of the RTC 25 has not changed (“No” in step S4), the falsification confirmation control program stored in the flash memory 24 is not rewritten and the MCU
The rewrite control by 26 is finished.

(Main effects of this embodiment)
As described above, in the present embodiment, when the tampering detection mechanism detects that a tampering action is performed on the fiscal memory and the level of the output signal of the RTC 25 changes, M
The CU 26 rewrites the falsification confirmation control program stored in the flash memory 24. In other words, in this embodiment, the MCU 26 rewrites the falsification confirmation control program so that the falsification confirmation control program is not read when there is a possibility that the falsification confirmation control program may be read illegally in association with the falsification of the fiscal memory. ing. Therefore, in this embodiment, it becomes possible to prevent the falsification confirmation control program from being read illegally.

Note that the time required for rewriting all data in the falsification confirmation control program of this embodiment is about 12 seconds. On the other hand, while removing the fiscal module 3 from the printer body 2,
It takes one minute or more to remove the cover member 16 from the case body 15 or to make a hole in the housing 14 with a drill or the like to expose the flash memory 24. Therefore, in this embodiment, when the falsification confirmation control program is rewritten, all data in the falsification confirmation control program is normally rewritten (that is, all data in the falsification confirmation control program is erased).

In this embodiment, the MCU 26 writes certain data for erasing the falsification confirmation control program in the flash memory 24. That is, in this embodiment, the MCU 26 may write certain data into the flash memory 24 in order to rewrite the falsification confirmation control program. Therefore, in this embodiment, the MCU 26 can be easily controlled.

In this embodiment, the MCU 26 rewrites the falsification confirmation control program stored in the flash memory 24 when the level of the output signal of the RTC 25 is changing. That is, in this embodiment, even if the tampering detection mechanism detects that the tampering action is performed, the RTC
If the level of the output signal 25 does not change, the MCU 26 does not rewrite the tampering confirmation control program stored in the flash memory 24. Therefore, in this embodiment, for example, in the manufacturing process of the printer 1, it is possible to prevent the falsification confirmation control program from being rewritten accidentally.

In this embodiment, the MCU 26 rewrites the falsification confirmation control program from the head address of the flash memory 24. Therefore, for example, even if the remaining capacity of the primary battery 27 when performing rewrite control by the MCU 26 is small and the power supply from the primary battery 27 to the MCU 26 and the flash memory 24 is interrupted in a short time, the vector table of the flash memory 24 The part can be rewritten. Therefore, in this embodiment, even if the remaining capacity of the primary battery 27 when performing rewrite control by the MCU 26 is small, it is possible to prevent a significant tampering confirmation control program from being read illegally. Further, for example, when the capacity of the primary battery 27 is small and rewriting control by the MCU 26 is performed, even if the power supply from the primary battery 27 to the MCU 26 and the flash memory 24 is interrupted in a short time, the vector table of the flash memory 24 The part can be rewritten. Therefore, in this embodiment, even when the capacity of the primary battery 27 is reduced, it is possible to prevent a significant tampering confirmation control program from being read illegally.

In this embodiment, the flash memory 24, the MCU 26, and the reset IC 28 are directly connected to the primary battery 27 without using electronic components such as resistors that cause a voltage drop.
Therefore, in this embodiment, the flash memory 24, the MCU 26, and the reset IC 28
In addition, when the voltage from the primary battery 27 is applied, a wasteful voltage drop due to resistance or the like does not occur. Therefore, in this embodiment, for example, the primary battery 27 when performing rewrite control by the MCU 26.
Even if the remaining capacity of the flash memory 24 is small, the flash memory 24, the MCU 26, and the reset IC 28
The rewriting control by the MCU 26 can be performed by operating the. Further, in this embodiment, since a useless voltage drop due to resistance or the like does not occur, for example, even if the capacity of the primary battery 27 is small, the rewrite control by the MCU 26 can be performed. That is, in this embodiment, even if the capacity of the primary battery 27 is reduced, the flash memory 24, the MCU 26, and the reset IC 28 can be operated to perform rewrite control by the MCU 26.

(Other embodiments)
In the above-described form, the MCU 26 writes certain data for erasing the falsification confirmation control program in the flash memory 24 when rewriting the falsification confirmation control program, but if the falsification confirmation control program can be rewritten, The MCU 26 may write any data into the flash memory 24. In the above-described form, MC
Although the U 26 rewrites the falsification confirmation control program from the head address of the flash memory 24, the MCU 26 may rewrite the falsification confirmation control program from an arbitrary address of the flash memory 24.

In the above-described form, the MCU 26 detects the tampering action on the fiscal memory by the tampering detection mechanism, and the tampering stored in the flash memory 24 when the level of the output signal of the RTC 25 changes. The confirmation control program is being rewritten.
However, the MCU 26 may rewrite the tampering confirmation control program stored in the flash memory 24 when the tampering detection mechanism detects that tampering with the fiscal memory is performed.

In the above-described form, the tampering detection mechanism indicates that the fiscal module 3 has been removed from the printer body 2 and the cover member 16 has been removed from the case body 15 or that a hole has been drilled in the housing 14 with a drill or the like. By detecting this, it is detected that falsification of the fiscal memory is performed. However, the falsification detection mechanism may detect that the falsification of the fiscal memory is performed by detecting that the fiscal module 3 has been removed from the printer main body 2.

In the above-described embodiment, the fiscal control stored in the flash memory 22 is detected when the tampering detection mechanism detects that the manipulation of the fiscal memory is performed and the level of the output signal of the RTC 25 is changed. The MCU 26 may rewrite the program.

DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 1 ... Fiscal printer, 21 ... Fiscal control CPU (Fiscal control part), 22 ... Flash memory (1st memory | storage part), 23 ... Program falsification confirmation CPU (falsification confirmation control part), 24... Flash memory (second storage unit), 25.
RTC (real time clock), 26 ... MCU (rewrite control unit), 27 ... primary battery (power supply), 30 ... switch

Claims (6)

Fiscal memory that stores fiscal information,
A fiscal control unit that performs fiscal control to write the fiscal information to at least the fiscal memory; and
A first storage unit storing a fiscal control program for performing the fiscal control;
A tampering confirmation control unit for performing tampering confirmation control for confirming that the fiscal control program stored in the first storage unit is not tampered;
A second storage unit for storing a falsification confirmation control program for performing the falsification confirmation control;
A tampering detection mechanism for detecting that tampering with the fiscal memory is performed;
A rewrite control unit for performing rewrite control for rewriting the falsification confirmation control program stored in the second storage unit;
A power source for supplying power to the rewrite control unit and the second storage unit,
When the tampering detection mechanism detects that the tampering action is performed on the fiscal memory, power is supplied from the power source to the rewrite control unit and the second storage unit, and the rewrite control unit stores the second memory. A fiscal printer, wherein the falsification confirmation control program stored in the unit is rewritten. The rewrite control unit receives certain data for erasing the falsification confirmation control program as the second data.
The fiscal printer according to claim 1, wherein the fiscal printer is written in a storage unit. A real-time clock capable of storing the date and time of occurrence of the tampering action;
The level of the output signal of the real-time clock is that the falsification is performed after the fiscal printer is completed after completing its manufacturing process and after the use of the fiscal printer is started. Changes when the falsification detection mechanism detects,
The rewriting control unit is stored in the second storage unit when the tampering detection mechanism detects that the tampering action is performed on the fiscal memory and the level of the output signal of the real-time clock changes. The fiscal printer according to claim 1, wherein the falsification confirmation control program is rewritten. 4. The fiscal printer according to claim 1, wherein the rewrite control unit rewrites the falsification confirmation control program from a head address of the second storage unit. 5. A switch to which the rewrite control unit and the second storage unit are connected;
The power source is a primary battery for backup,
The rewrite control unit and the second storage unit are directly connected to the power source via the switch.
The fiscal printer according to claim 1, wherein the fiscal printer is connected. Fiscal memory that stores fiscal information,
A fiscal control unit that performs fiscal control to write the fiscal information to at least the fiscal memory; and
A first storage unit storing a fiscal control program for performing the fiscal control;
A tampering confirmation control unit for performing tampering confirmation control for confirming that the fiscal control program stored in the first storage unit is not tampered;
A second storage unit for storing a falsification confirmation control program for performing the falsification confirmation control;
A tampering detection mechanism for detecting that tampering with the fiscal memory is performed;
A rewrite control unit for performing rewrite control for rewriting the falsification confirmation control program stored in the second storage unit;
A control method of a fiscal printer comprising: a power source that supplies power to the rewrite control unit and the second storage unit,
When the tampering detection mechanism detects that the tampering action is performed on the fiscal memory, power is supplied from the power source to the rewrite control unit and the second storage unit, and the rewrite control unit stores the second memory. A control method for a fiscal printer, wherein the falsification confirmation control program stored in the unit is rewritten.

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