JP2007274380A - Authentication system, authentication server and program - Google Patents

Abstract

An authentication system that is center-type and that can determine whether or not trust is possible based on an authentication relationship between devices to be authenticated.
An authentication server performs mutual authentication with a device A20 and a device B30 in response to an authentication request with the device B30 received from the device A20. The reliability information table 17 of the authentication server 10 stores the reliability of each device from each device. The reliability confirmation processing unit 15 of the authentication server 10 acquires the reliability of the device A20 from the device B30 and the reliability of the device B30 to the device A20 with reference to the reliability information table 17, and the acquired result is two. If both are reliable, the device A20 and the device B30 are mutually trustworthy.
[Selection] Figure 1

Description

  The present invention relates to an authentication system, an authentication server, and a program, and more particularly to a center-type authentication system, an authentication server, and a program that perform mutual authentication among a large number of devices via an authentication server.

A conventional mutual authentication process using a public key certificate is a one-to-one mutual authentication. If the result of the authentication process becomes reliable, the device is fully trusted (for example, patents). Reference 1).
For example, when information is exchanged between a large number of devices, there are two types of methods for establishing mutual authentication between devices that exchange information: P2P type and center type. In the P2P type, as shown in FIG. 6A, for example, a device that exchanges information, for example, a device A100 and a device B101 directly verify each other's public key certificate and perform mutual authentication. To do. In the center type, as shown in an example in FIG. 6B, if mutual authentication is established between the device A 200 and the device B 202, first, the device A 200 and the device C 201 first communicate with each other's public key certificate. Next, the device C201 and the device B202 verify each other's public key certificate and perform mutual authentication. As a result, the device A200 that trusts the device C201 also trusts the device B202 that the device C201 trusts.
JP 2005-26842 A

  However, in the conventional center type and P2P type authentication systems, there is a problem that mutual authentication may be established in the center type while mutual authentication in which the mutual trust is not established in the P2P type. is there.

  For example, as illustrated in FIG. 7, the certificate authority CA includes CA-1A301, which is the root CA of Domain A, CA-2A302, which is a sub CA of CA-1A301, and CA-3A303, which is a sub CA of CA-2A302, CA-1B311 which is a root CA of Domain B and CA-2B312 which is a sub CA of CA-1B311. CA-1A301 and CA-1B311 which are root CAs of each domain have a range of up to two hops ( Consider a case where the mutual authentication certificates are mutually authenticated in inhibitPolicyMapping: 2). At this time, it is assumed that CA-3A303 issues a public key certificate for device A200, CA-2B312 issues a public key certificate for device B202, and CA-1A301 issues a public key certificate for device C201.

  In this case, the authentication between the device A200 and the device C201 is that the authentication path from the device A200 to the device C201 is device A200 => CA-2B312 => CA-1B311 => CA-1A301 => device C201, so the number of hops is CA-1A301 => The device C201 is “1” and reliable, and the authentication path from the device C201 to the device A200 is device C201 => CA-1A301 => CA-1B311 => CA-2B312 => device A200, so the number of hops is CA-1B311 => CA−. 2B312⇒ “2” of device A200, which is reliable and mutual authentication is established. Further, since the device B202 and the device C201 are the same Domain A, mutual authentication is established. Thus, since mutual authentication between the device A200 and the device C201 and mutual authentication between the device B202 and the device C201 are established, the device A200 and the device B202 are reliable in the center type.

  However, in the direct authentication between the device A200 corresponding to the P2P type and the device B202, the authentication path from the device A200 to the device B202 is as follows: device A200 => CA-2B312 => CA-1B311 => CA-1A301 => CA-2A302 => CA- Since 3A303 => device B202, the number of hops is “3” of CA-1A301 => CA-2A302 => CA-3A303 => device B202, so mutual authentication is not established.

  In other words, in the conventional center type authentication system, since the reliability is determined based on the authentication relationship between the device to be authenticated and the device that mediates the authentication, the authentication relationship between the devices to be authenticated is not reliable, There is a problem that it may be trusted.

  The present invention has been made in view of such circumstances, and an object of the present invention is to provide an authentication system that can determine whether or not trust is possible based on an authentication relationship between devices to be authenticated in the same manner as the P2P type while being a center type. Is to provide.

  The present invention has been made to solve the above-described problem, and the invention according to claim 1 is directed to an authentication request between a plurality of devices and another device received from one device among the plurality of devices. In the authentication system consisting of an authentication server that performs mutual authentication with the one device and the other device according to the authentication server, the authentication server includes a reliability information storage unit that stores the reliability of the plurality of devices; The reliability information from the one device to the other device and the reliability from the other device to the one device are acquired with reference to the reliability information storage means, and both of the acquired results are reliable. When it is possible, the authentication system includes a reliability confirmation unit that makes the one device and the other device trust each other.

  The invention according to claim 2 is the authentication system according to claim 1, wherein the reliability information storage unit stores the validity period of the reliability as well as the reliability of the plurality of devices. The reliability confirmation unit includes the reliability information storage unit that stores the reliability and validity period from the one device to the other device and the reliability and validity period from the other device to the one device. When both of the acquired results are reliable and within the expiration date, the one device and the other device are mutually reliable.

  The invention according to claim 3 is the authentication system according to claim 2, wherein the device includes each public key certificate, and the authentication server includes the reliability check unit in the reliability check unit. When referring to the information storage means, if the reliability between the required devices is not stored in the reliability information storage means, the public key certificate of each of the required devices is indicated as the reliability between the required devices. And a reliability information generating means for determining the authentication path between the reliability information storage means and storing the reliability information in the reliability information storage means.

  The invention according to claim 4 is the authentication system according to claim 3, wherein the device includes each attribute certificate, and the reliability information storage unit of the authentication server includes the plurality of devices. And whether or not trust from the public key certificate to the attribute certificate is stored, and the reliability confirmation unit of the authentication server stores the trust propriety from the one device to the attribute certificate of the other device and the other device. And whether the attribute certificate of the one device is trustworthy from the reliability information storage means, and when both of the acquired results are trustworthy, the attribute certificate of the one device and the The attribute certificate of the other device is trusted, and the reliability information generating unit of the authentication server refers to the required attribute illumination between the devices when the reliability confirmation unit refers to the reliability information storage unit. Is stored in the reliability information storage means. If not, whether to trust the attribute lighting between the required devices is determined by verifying an authentication path to the attribute certificate between the required devices, and stored in the reliability information storage unit It is characterized by.

  Further, the invention according to claim 5 is connected to a plurality of devices, and the one device and the other device in response to an authentication request with another device received from one device among the plurality of devices. In the authentication server that performs mutual authentication with each other, the reliability information storage unit that stores the reliability of the plurality of devices, the reliability of the one device to the other device, and the other device to the one device The reliability information storage means is obtained with reference to the reliability information storage means, and when both of the obtained results are reliable, the one device and the other device are mutually trusted. An authentication server comprising: a reliability confirmation unit.

  The invention according to claim 6 is a computer that performs mutual authentication with the one device and the other device in response to an authentication request with another device received from one device among the plurality of devices. A reliability information storage means for storing the reliability between the plurality of devices, the reliability from the one device to the other device, and the reliability from the other device to the one device. A program for making reference to the sex information storage means and, when both of the obtained results are reliable, causing the one device and the other device to function as a reliability confirmation means for mutual trust It is.

  According to this invention, the reliability confirmation unit acquires the reliability from one device to another device and the reliability from another device to the one device from the reliability information storage unit. If both are reliable, they are mutually trustworthy. Therefore, it is possible to determine whether or not trust is possible based on the authentication relationship between the center type devices to be authenticated.

  Embodiments of the present invention will be described below with reference to the drawings. FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram showing a configuration of an authentication system according to an embodiment of the present invention. Reference numeral 10 denotes an authentication server that authenticates the devices 20 and 30, and includes a request source authentication processing unit 11, a request destination authentication processing unit 12, a public key certificate storage unit 13, a service relay processing unit 14, a reliability confirmation processing unit 15, A reliability information generation processing unit 16 and a reliability information table 17 are provided. The request source authentication processing unit 11 verifies that the authentication path reaches from the request source public key certificate PKC received together with the authentication request to the public key certificate PKC of the own device acquired from the public key certificate storage unit 13. If the verification is successful, the device public key certificate PKC is transmitted to the requesting device. The request destination authentication processing unit 12 transmits the public key certificate PKC of its own device acquired from the public key certificate storage unit 13 to the request destination device received together with the authentication request, and the request destination device received as a reply to the transmission It is verified that the certification path reaches from the public key certificate PKC to the public key certificate PKC of the own apparatus acquired from the public key certificate storage unit 13, and the verification result is notified to the request destination device.

  The public key certificate storage unit 13 stores the public key certificate PKC of its own device. The service relay processing unit 14 has successfully verified the session start request received from the request source device in the request destination authentication processing unit 12 and the reliability is confirmed in the reliability confirmation processing unit 15 or the reliability information generation processing unit 16. When the request is made, the request is transmitted to the request destination device, and the service execution result received from the request destination device is transmitted to the request source device.

The reliability confirmation processing unit 15 refers to the reliability information table 17 so that the public key certificate PKC of the request source device can trust the public key certificate PKC and the attribute certificate AC of the request destination device; Confirm that the public key certificate PKC of the requesting device can trust the public key certificate PKC and the attribute certificate AC of the requesting device, and the validity period of each. And At this time, if the necessary information is not stored in the reliability information table 17, the reliability information generation processing unit 16 is requested to generate the corresponding information.
The reliability information generation processing unit 16 determines whether or not trust is possible by verifying that the certification path from the confirmation destination certificate requested to be generated by the reliability confirmation processing unit 15 to the confirmation source certificate arrives. , Select the closest expiry date among all the expiry dates of all the certificates required for verification of this certification path or the current time plus a predetermined time, and select this verification result and the selected time Is stored in the reliability information table 17.

  The reliability information table 17 stores the reliability information of the public key certificate PKC and the reliability information of the attribute certificate AC. The reliability information of the public key certificate PKC includes the CA name and serial number of the confirmation source PKC as shown in FIG. The public key certificate PKC of a certain device identified with the CA name of the confirmation destination PKC and the serial number. The reliability information as to whether or not the public key certificate PKC of the other device identified by (2) can be trusted and the reliability expiration date as the expiration date of the information are stored. The reliability information of the attribute certificate AC includes the CA name of the confirmation source PKC and the serial number as shown in FIG. The public key certificate PKC of a certain device identified by the AA name of the confirmation destination AC and the serial number. The reliability information indicating whether or not the attribute certificate AC of the other device identified in (2) is reliable and the reliability expiration date as the expiration date of the information are stored.

  Reference numeral 20 denotes a device A that is an authentication request source, and includes a mutual authentication processing unit 21, a service request processing unit 22, a service result processing unit 23, a public key certificate storage unit 24, and an attribute certificate storage unit 25. The mutual authentication processing unit 21 includes the public key certificate PKC of the own device acquired from the public key certificate storage unit 24, the attribute certificate AC of the own device acquired from the attribute certificate storage unit 25, and the service request destination device. Are transmitted to the authentication server 10 together with the authentication request. Further, the mutual authentication processing unit 21 verifies the authentication path from the public key certificate PKC of the authentication server 10 received from the authentication server 10 as a reply to the authentication request to the public key certificate PKC of the own device. The service request processing unit 22 transmits a session start request to the authentication server 10. The service result processing unit 23 receives the service execution result received from the authentication server 10 as a reply to the session start request, and displays this on the screen of the device A20.

The device B30 is a device that is a service request destination, and includes a mutual authentication processing unit 31, a service execution processing unit 32, a public key certificate storage unit 33, and an attribute certificate storage unit 34. The mutual authentication processing unit 31 verifies the authentication path from the public key certificate PKC of the authentication server 10 received from the authentication server 10 to the public key certificate PKC of the own device acquired from the public key certificate storage unit 33, When the authentication is successful, the public key certificate PKC of the own device acquired from the public key certificate storage unit 33 and the attribute certificate AC of the own device acquired from the public key certificate storage unit 33 are transmitted to the authentication server 10. . When the service execution processing unit 32 receives a session start request from the authentication server 10, the service execution processing unit 32 executes the service and transmits the execution result to the authentication server 10 as the service execution result.
Although not shown in FIG. 1, the authentication server 10, the device A20, and the device B30 are connected by a network such as a LAN (Local Area Network) and can communicate with each other.

  Next, with reference to FIG. 3, the relationship between each certificate and the issuing certificate authority CA of each certificate in this embodiment will be described. In this embodiment, CA-1A41, which is a root CA of Domain A40, CA-2A42, which is a sub CA of CA-1A41, CA-3A43, which is a sub CA of CA-2A42, and a root CA of Domain B50, as certificate authorities CA. CA-1B51 and CA-2B52, which are sub-CAs of CA-1B51, and CA-1A41 and CA-1B51, which are the root CAs of each domain, have a range of up to two hops (inhibitPolicyMapping: 2). Mutual authentication certificates authenticate each other. The public key certificate PKC of the authentication server 20 is issued by CA-1A41, the public key certificate PKC and attribute certificate AC of the device A20 are issued by CA-2B52, and the public key certificate PKC and attribute certificate of the device B30 are issued. The certificate AC is issued by CA-3A43.

  Next, the operation of this authentication system will be described with reference to FIG. First, the mutual authentication processing unit 21 of the device A20 has its own public key certificate PKC acquired from the public key certificate storage unit 24, its own attribute certificate AC acquired from the attribute certificate storage unit 25, and The URL of the requesting device B30 is transmitted to the authentication server 10 together with the authentication request (Sa1). Upon receiving the authentication request from the device A20, the requester authentication processing unit 11 receives the public key of its own device obtained from the public key certificate storage unit 13 of the authentication server 10 from the public key certificate PKC of the device A20 received together with the authentication request. It is verified that the certification path reaches the certificate PKC (Sa2).

  A specific verification procedure will be described. Here, the issuer of the public key certificate PKC of the device A20 is the certificate authority CA-2B52, and the issuer of the public key certificate PKC of the certificate authority CA-2B52 is the certificate authority CA-1B51 that is the parent certificate authority. Yes, the certificate authority CA-1B51 mutually authenticates with the certificate authority CA-1A41 within the range of up to two hops by the mutual authentication certificate. Since the certificate authority CA-1A41 is the issuer of the public key certificate PKC of the authentication server 10, this is the authentication path from the public key certificate PKC of the device A20 to the public key certificate PKC of the authentication server 10. The requester authentication processing unit 11 verifies the signature of each certificate with the public key included in the public key certificate PKC of the certificate issuer along the authentication path, and the expiration date of each certificate. Verify that is not expired.

  If there is no problem as a result of these verifications, the request source authentication processing unit 11 acquires the public key certificate PKC of the authentication server 10 from the public key certificate storage unit 13, and the device A20 that is the transmission source of the authentication request (Sa3). When the device A20 receives the public key certificate PKC of the authentication server 10, the mutual authentication processing unit 21 receives it and from the received public key certificate PKC of the authentication server 10 to the public key certificate PKC of the device A20. It is verified by the same procedure as in step Sa2 that the authentication path has reached (Sa4).

  If there is no problem as a result of the verification, the mutual authentication between the device A20 and the authentication server 10 is completed, and the service request processing unit 22 transmits a session start request for the device B30 to the authentication server 10 (Sa5). Upon receiving the session start request, the authentication server 10 obtains the public key certificate PKC of its own device from the public key certificate storage unit 13 and receives the public key certificate PKC. The service request is sent to the device B30 (Sa6). When the device B30 receives the public key certificate PKC of the authentication server 10, the mutual authentication processing unit 31 receives this and the public key certificate PKC of the device B30 from the received public key certificate PKC of the authentication server 10. It is verified by the same procedure as in step Sa2 that the authentication path has reached (Sa7).

If there is no problem as a result of the verification, the mutual authentication processing unit 31 acquires the public key certificate PKC of its own device from the public key certificate storage unit 33 and transmits the acquired public key certificate PKC to the authentication server 10. (Sa8). The request destination authentication processing unit 12 of the authentication server 10 receives the public key certificate PKC of the device B30 transmitted by the mutual authentication processing unit 31, and receives the public key certificate of the authentication server 10 from the received public key certificate PKC of the device B30. It is verified by the same procedure as in step Sa2 that the certification path reaches the certificate PKC (Sa9).
If there is no problem as a result of the verification, the mutual authentication between the device B30 and the authentication server 10 has been completed, and the request destination authentication processing unit 12 transmits a notification of the completion of the mutual authentication to the device B30 (Sa10). Upon receiving notification of completion of mutual authentication, the device B30 receives this and recognizes that mutual authentication has been performed.

On the other hand, after the request destination authentication processing unit 12 transmits the mutual authentication completion notification, in the authentication server 10, the process proceeds to step Sa11 and the reliability confirmation processing unit 15 operates in the flowchart shown in FIG. The reliability of the public key certificate PKC and the public key certificate PKC of the device B30 is confirmed, and the reliability of the attribute certificate AC of the device A20 and the attribute certificate AC of the device B30 is confirmed. The reliability check process in step Sa11 is not a conventional center type but a characteristic process in the present invention.
First, the reliability confirmation processing unit 15 refers to the reliability confirmation table 17 and refers to the CA name of the confirmation source PKC, the serial number. Is the CA name and serial number of the public key certificate PKC of the device A20 that is the service request source. The CA name and serial number of the confirmation destination PKC. Is the CA name and serial number of the public key certificate PKC of the device B30 that is the service request destination. Is searched to check whether or not the corresponding record exists (Sb1). If it exists, the reliability confirmation processing unit 15 confirms whether the expiration date registered in the corresponding record has expired (Sb2) and whether the reliability information is “OK” (Sb3). .

  If there is no problem in these confirmations, the reliability confirmation processing unit 15 refers to the reliability confirmation table 17 and, in the opposite direction to step Sb1, the CA name and serial number of the confirmation source PKC. Is the CA name and serial number of the public key certificate PKC of the device B30 that is the service request destination. The CA name and serial number of the confirmation destination PKC. Is the CA name and serial number of the public key certificate PKC of the device A20 that is the service request source. Is searched to check whether or not the corresponding record exists (Sb4). If it exists, the reliability confirmation processing unit 15 confirms whether the expiration date registered in the record has expired (Sb5) and whether the reliability information is “OK” (Sb6). . If there is no problem in these confirmations, the reliability confirmation results of the devices A20 and B30 are set to “OK” (Sb7).

  However, if the reliability information of one of the records is not “OK” but “NG” (Sb3, Sb6), the reliability confirmation processing unit 15 sets the reliability confirmation result to “NG” ( Sb11) If one of the records does not exist (Sb1, Sb4), or if the expiration date has expired (Sb2, Sb5), the reliability information generation processing unit 16 checks the confirmation source. It is verified that the certification path reaches from the public key certificate PKC to the public key certificate PKC as the confirmation destination (Sb8, Sb12) As a result of the verification, the reliability information generation processing unit 16 Then, a table corresponding to the reliability information table 17 is created, “OK” is added to the reliability information, a value obtained by adding a predetermined time to the current time, or a value closest to the validity period of the certificate used for verification. Out of Registers have values (Sb9, Sb13), in the case of step Sb9 transitions to step Sb4, the case of step Sb13 process proceeds to a step Sb7.

  On the other hand, as a result of the verification in step Sb8 or Sb12, if the authentication path cannot be reached, the reliability information generation processing unit 16 creates a table corresponding to the reliability information table 17 and adds “OK” to the reliability information. A value obtained by adding a predetermined time to the current time to the expiration date is registered (Sb10, Sb14). Receiving this, the reliability confirmation processing unit 15 sets the reliability confirmation result to “NG” (Sb11).

  Accordingly, the reliability confirmation processing unit 15 verifies that the public key certificate PKC of the request source device and the public key certificate PKC of the request destination device are mutually trustworthy. Further, the reliability confirmation processing unit 15 confirms that the public key certificate PKC of the request source device can trust the attribute certificate AC of the request destination device, and that the public key certificate PKC of the request destination device is the request source device. Confirmation that the attribute certificate AC is reliable is performed in a flow in which the confirmation destination in the flowchart of FIG. 5 is changed from the public key certificate PKC to the attribute certificate AC.

  An example of the operation of the flowchart according to FIG. 5 will be specifically described. Here, assuming that there is no corresponding record in step Sb1, the process proceeds to step Sb8, and the reliability confirmation processing unit 15 changes the service request source public key certificate PKC to the service request source public key certificate PKC. Check whether the certification path can reach the issuing certificate authority. At this time, the public key certificate PKC of the service request source is the public key certificate PKC of the device A20, and the issuing certificate authority of the public key certificate PKC of the service request source issues the public key certificate PKC of the device B30. This is the former certificate authority CA-2B52.

  When the authentication path is confirmed with reference to FIG. 3, first, the issuing certificate authority of the public key certificate PKC of the device B30 is the certificate authority CA-3A43, and the issuing certificate authority of the certificate authority CA-3A43 is The certificate authority CA-2A42 and the issuing certificate authority of the certificate authority CA-2A42 are the certificate authorities CA-1A41. The certificate authority CA-1A41 is mutually authenticated with the certificate authority CA-1B51 by the mutual authentication certificate 60, and the certificate authority CA-2B52 is a sub CA of the certificate authority CA-1B51. This certificate authority CA-2B52 is the certificate authority that issued the public key certificate PKC of the device A20 that is the service requester as described above. This is an authentication path. When the number of hops restricted by the mutual authentication certificate 60 is confirmed, the number of hops from the public key certificate PKC of the device B30 to the certification authority CA-1A41 is the public key certificate of the device B30. There are a total of three from PKC to certification authority CA-3A43, certification authority CA-3A43 to certification authority CA-2A42, and certification authority CA-2A42 to certification authority CA-1A41. For this reason, the certification path cannot reach the issuing certificate authority of the public key certificate PKC of the device B30 that is the service request source from the public key certificate PKC of the device A20 that is the service request destination.

For this reason, the process proceeds to step Sb10, and a record in which the confirmation source PKC is the public key certificate PKC of the device A20 and the confirmation destination PKC is the public key certificate PKC of the device B30 is generated in the reliability information table 17. Is set to “NG”, a value obtained by adding a predetermined time to the current time to the reliability deadline, and the reliability confirmation result is set to “NG” (Sb11).
When the reliability confirmation result in the reliability confirmation processing unit 15 is “NG”, the session start request from the device A20 is discarded, and the sequence ends.

  If the reliability confirmation result is “OK”, the service relay processing unit 14 transmits the session start request received in step Sa5 to the device B30 (Sa12). When the device B30 receives the session start request, the service execution processing unit 32 executes the service (Sa13), and transmits the result to the authentication server 10 as the service execution result (Sa14). When the authentication server 10 receives the service execution result, the service relay processing unit 14 transmits the received service execution result to the device A20 (Sa15). When the device A20 receives the service execution result, the service result processing unit 23 displays the service execution result on the screen.

In the present embodiment, the mutual authentication processing unit 21 of the device A20, the request source authentication processing unit 11 of the authentication server 10, the request destination authentication processing unit 12 and the mutual authentication processing unit 31 of the device B30 use public key certificates. However, the authentication performed between these processing units may be authentication using a common key, or may be authentication using an ID and a password or biometrics. . At this time, the mutual authentication processing unit 21 of the device A20 and the authentication method of the request source authentication processing unit 11 of the authentication server 10 and the authentication method of the request destination authentication processing unit 12 and the mutual authentication processing unit 31 of the device B30 are different. The authentication method may be used.
Thereby, it is possible to determine whether or not trust is possible between devices having different authentication methods based on the authentication relationship between the devices.

  In addition, the certificate used when performing each authentication in the present embodiment may be included in each device, or a repository is installed in a network in which the authentication server 10, the device A20, and the device B30 are connected, The repository may be stored. Further, when storing in the repository, the repository may be set for each domain of the certificate authority CA.

  In addition, the service implemented by the device B30 in the present embodiment and provided to the device A20 may be a service that discloses information only to the authenticated partner. The ASP (providing business service only to the authenticated partner) Application Service Provider).

  Further, the request source authentication processing unit 11, the request destination authentication processing unit 12, the service relay processing unit 14, the reliability confirmation processing unit 15, the reliability information generation processing unit 16, the mutual authentication processing unit 21, and the service request processing unit in FIG. 22. A program for realizing the functions of the service result processing unit 23, the mutual authentication processing unit 31, and the service execution processing unit 32 is recorded on a computer-readable recording medium, and the program recorded on the recording medium is stored in a computer system. The processing of these processing units may be performed by reading and executing. The “computer system” here includes an OS and hardware such as peripheral devices.

Further, the “computer system” includes a homepage providing environment (or display environment) if a WWW system is used.
The “computer-readable recording medium” refers to a storage device such as a flexible medium, a magneto-optical disk, a portable medium such as a ROM and a CD-ROM, and a hard disk incorporated in a computer system. Furthermore, the “computer-readable recording medium” dynamically holds a program for a short time like a communication line when transmitting a program via a network such as the Internet or a communication line such as a telephone line. In this case, a volatile memory in a computer system serving as a server or a client in that case is also used to hold a program for a certain period of time. The program may be a program for realizing a part of the functions described above, and may be a program capable of realizing the functions described above in combination with a program already recorded in a computer system.

  The embodiment of the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the drawings. However, the specific configuration is not limited to this embodiment, and includes design and the like within a scope not departing from the gist of the present invention.

It is a block diagram which shows schematic structure of the authentication system by one Embodiment of this invention. It is a figure which shows the example of the content of the reliability information table 17 in the embodiment. It is a figure explaining the relationship of the issuing certificate authority of each certificate in the same embodiment. It is a sequence diagram for demonstrating operation | movement of the authentication system in the embodiment. 4 is a flowchart for explaining operations of a reliability confirmation processing unit 15 and a reliability information generation processing unit 16 in the same embodiment. It is a block diagram which shows schematic structure of the conventional authentication system. It is a figure explaining the example of a relationship of the issuing certificate authority of each certificate in the conventional authentication system.

Explanation of symbols

DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 10 ... Authentication server 11 ... Request origin authentication process part 12 ... Request destination authentication process part 13 ... Public key certificate memory | storage part 14 ... Service relay process part 15 ... Reliability confirmation process part 16 ... Reliability information generation process part 17 ... Trust Sex information table 20 ... Device A
21 ... Mutual authentication processing unit 22 ... Service request processing unit 23 ... Service result processing unit 24 ... Public key certificate storage unit 25 ... Attribute certificate storage unit 30 ... Device B
31 ... Mutual authentication processing unit 32 ... Service execution processing unit 33 ... Public key certificate storage unit 34 ... Attribute certificate storage unit 40 ... Domain A
41 ... Certificate Authority CA-1A
42 ... Certificate Authority CA-2A
43 ... Certificate Authority CA-3A
50 ... DomainB
51 ... Certificate Authority CA-1B
52 ... CA CA-2B
60 ... Mutual authentication certificate 100 ... Device A
101 ... Device B
102 ... Device X
200: Device A
201 ... Device C
202 ... Device B
203 ... Device X
300 ... DomainA
301 ... Certificate Authority CA-1A
302 ... Certificate Authority CA-2A
303 ... Certificate Authority CA-3A
310 ... DomainB
311 ... Certificate Authority CA-1B
312 ... Certificate Authority CA-2B

Claims (6)

An authentication system comprising a plurality of devices and an authentication server that performs mutual authentication with the one device and the other device in response to an authentication request with another device received from one device of the plurality of devices In
The authentication server is
Reliability information storage means for storing reliability between the plurality of devices;
The reliability information from the one device to the other device and the reliability from the other device to the one device are acquired with reference to the reliability information storage means, and both of the acquired results are reliable. An authentication system comprising: a reliability confirmation unit configured to make the one device and the other device trust each other when it is acceptable. The reliability information storage means stores the validity period of the reliability along with the reliability between the plurality of devices,
The reliability confirmation means refers to the reliability information storage means for the reliability and validity period from the one apparatus to the other apparatus and the reliability validity and validity period from the other apparatus to the one apparatus. The one device and the other device are mutually trustworthy when both of the obtained results are reliable and within the expiration date. Authentication system. The device includes each public key certificate,
The authentication server is
When referring to the reliability information storage means in the reliability confirmation means, if the reliability between necessary devices is not stored in the reliability information storage means, the reliability between the required devices is The authentication system according to claim 2, further comprising: a reliability information generation unit that is determined by verifying a certification path between public key certificates of each required device and that is stored in the reliability information storage unit. . The device includes each attribute certificate,
The reliability information storage means of the authentication server stores the reliability of the attribute certificate from the public key certificate between the plurality of devices,
The reliability confirmation unit of the authentication server determines whether or not the one device can trust the attribute certificate of the other device and whether or not the other device can trust the attribute certificate of the one device. Obtained from the information storage means, and when both of the obtained results are reliable, the attribute certificate of the one device and the attribute certificate of the other device are trusted,
When the reliability information generating means of the authentication server refers to the reliability information storage means in the reliability confirmation means, the reliability information storage means stores the reliability of the attribute lighting between necessary devices. If not, whether to trust the attribute lighting between the necessary devices is determined by verifying an authentication path to the attribute certificate between the necessary devices, and stored in the reliability information storage unit The authentication system according to claim 3, wherein: In an authentication server connected to a plurality of devices and performing mutual authentication with the one device and the other device in response to an authentication request with another device received from one device among the plurality of devices,
Reliability information storage means for storing reliability between the plurality of devices; reliability information from the one device to the other device; and reliability information from the other device to the one device. When the two results obtained by referring to the storage means are reliable, the one device and the other device are provided with a reliability confirmation means for making each other reliable. An authentication server. A computer connected to a plurality of devices and performing mutual authentication with the one device and the other device in response to an authentication request with another device received from one device of the plurality of devices;
Reliability information storage means for storing reliability between the plurality of devices;
The reliability information from the one device to the other device and the reliability from the other device to the one device are acquired with reference to the reliability information storage means, and both of the acquired results are reliable. When it is possible, a program that causes the one device and the other device to function as a reliability confirmation unit that makes each other reliable.

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