JP2003249944A - Wireless access network, wireless multi-hop network, authentication server, base station and wireless terminal - Google Patents

Abstract

(57) [Problem] To provide a technology excellent in resistance to DoS attack in a wireless access network and a wireless multi-hop network. An authentication server (AS) and a new base station (A) are provided.
By performing the mutual authentication by P), the operator guarantees the security of the AP installed by the general user. A new wireless terminal (M
When T) accesses, first, it is confirmed whether or not each other is a legitimate device by performing mutual authentication between the MT and the AP,
The AP prevents a DoS attack that pretends to be authentication by preventing the packet transmitted by the new MT from being transferred to the operator's network until this mutual authentication succeeds.
Further, after the mutual authentication between the MT and the AP succeeds, the mutual authentication between the MT and the AS and the packet inspection (transmission source confirmation) of the authentication packet are performed, so that the AS accurately grasps which AP has accessed which AP. I do.

Description

Detailed Description of the Invention

[0001]

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to an authentication method for authenticating a wireless terminal and a base station in a wireless access network or a wireless multi-hop network connected to a wired network via a base station.

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art FIG. 50 shows an authentication server (AS: Authe).
2 shows a general functional configuration of a wireless access network using the Niccation Server). This wireless access network is a wireless terminal MT (Mob
terminal terminal), a base station AP (Access Point) that wirelessly communicates with the wireless terminal MT, and an authentication server AS connected to the base station AP via the operator side wired network NW.

The authentication server AS, as software, is an authentication function 101 with a wireless terminal that performs mutual authentication with the wireless terminal MT, a wireless terminal management function 102 that registers and manages the authenticated wireless terminal MT in a database, and a network N.
Wired section packet inspection function 10 for inspecting W packets
3. A packet discrimination function 104 for discriminating packets is provided.

The base station AP is, as software, an authentication packet transfer function 201 for transferring an authentication packet between the authentication server AS and the wireless terminal MT, a wireless section packet inspection function 202 for inspecting a packet of a wireless network,
A wired section packet inspection function 203 for inspecting packets of the wired network NW and a packet discrimination function 204 for discriminating packets are provided.

The wireless terminal MT, as software, is a mutual authentication function 301 with an authentication server for executing mutual authentication with the authentication server AS, a wireless section packet inspection function 302 for inspecting a packet of a wireless network, and a packet discrimination function for discriminating a packet. It is equipped with 303.

[0006] In the proposed radio access network, when a radio terminal MT accesses the network, the MT performs mutual authentication with the AS via the base station AP. The base station AP terminates the authentication packet received from the wireless terminal MT and transfers it to the authentication server AS, and transfers the authentication packet received from the authentication server AS to the wireless terminal MT. When the authentication of the wireless terminal MT by the authentication server AS is successful, the base station AP is allowed to transfer the data packet wirelessly transmitted from the MT to the operator side network NW, and the wireless terminal MT allows the operator's network. Allows access to other connected terminals on the NW.

[0007]

In such a radio access network, the base station AP is installed not in a limited access environment such as in a company but in an environment where anyone can easily access such as outdoors. However, in such a case, as shown in FIG. 51, a malicious user can deactivate the authentication server AS by pretending to authenticate the wireless terminal MT and transmitting a large number of packets. Such a Denial of Service
In the case of (DoS) attack, it becomes impossible for a new user to access the wireless access network by the wireless terminal MT.

On the other hand, when the general user installs the base station AP, not the business operator, the authentication server AS does not authenticate the new base station AP, so the business operator can guarantee the security function of such AP. It will be impossible. Therefore, other users cannot access the AP installed by the general user at ease. Besides, the base station AP
If the authentication is not performed, the legitimacy of the traffic information, billing information, etc. transmitted from the base station AP cannot be confirmed, which is a problem.

Further, when a general user installs a base station AP, as shown in FIG. 52, the installation density of APs becomes high, and one wireless terminal MT has a plurality of base stations AP # i and AP.
It is possible that #j and #j can be accessed at the same time.
In such an environment, the wireless terminal MT simultaneously authenticates with the authentication server via a plurality of APs, and there is a problem that the same authentication process occurs at the same time.

The problem that the simultaneous authentication process occurs becomes remarkable in a wireless multi-hop network in which each wireless terminal MT has a relay function. FIG. 53 shows a functional configuration example of a wireless multi-hop network. In this wireless multi-hop network, the base station AP additionally has a packet relay function 205, and the wireless terminal MT additionally has a packet relay function 304. Then, in the wireless multi-hop network shown in FIG. 53, for example, the wireless terminal MT7 is relayed to the other wireless terminals MT6 and MT4 to access the base station AP1, and the base station AP1 is accessed.
1 to the authentication server AS through the network NW, and communicates with the wireless terminal MT7 from the AS on the reverse path.

In such a wireless multi-hop network, since the new wireless terminal MT does not have the route information to the base station AP before the authentication, it sends the authentication request by broadcast. In this case, multiple MTs in the vicinity of the new MT receive the authentication request, and each relays the authentication request to the next MT that communicates with the base station. As a result, the same authentication process occurs at the same time.

FIG. 54 shows a problem at the time of authentication in the wireless multi-hop network. The wireless terminal MT9 is a new MT
When a DoS attack is made by pretending to be the authentication of the above, a plurality of wireless terminals MT5, MT6, MT7 simultaneously receive a signal sent out by broadcast from this wireless terminal MT9, and these wireless terminals pass through other wireless terminals. Accessing a plurality of base stations AP # i, AP # j, and from now on, an authentication request will be sent to the authentication server AS at the same time, and an illegal packet will flow into the wireless multi-hop network and the transfer of other packets will be disturbed. It will be done.

It is an object of the present invention to provide a technique having excellent resistance to a DoS attack in such a proposed radio access network and radio multi-hop network.

[0014]

According to a first aspect of the present invention, there is provided a wireless terminal, a base station wirelessly communicating with the wireless terminal,
In a wireless access network composed of this base station and an authentication server connected by a carrier side network, A. The base station transmits a base station-authentication server authentication packet when newly connecting to the business operator side network, and performs mutual authentication with the authentication server. B. The wireless terminal performs mutual authentication with a neighboring base station when newly accessing the wireless access network, and transmits a wireless terminal-authentication server authentication packet after successful authentication, and the base station uses the wireless When the mutual authentication with the terminal is successful, the transfer of the wireless terminal-authentication server authentication packet transmitted from the wireless terminal is permitted, and the authentication server uses the wireless terminal-authentication server authentication packet. A processing function of performing mutual authentication with the wireless terminal via the base station; The wireless terminal, the base station, and the authentication server each attach a packet inspection data indicating a transmission source to the authentication packet when transmitting or transferring the authentication packet, D. Each of the wireless terminal, the base station, and the authentication server, when receiving the authentication packet between the wireless terminal and the authentication server, inspects the packet inspection data attached to it, and if the inspection fails, attaches it. A processing function for discarding the authentication packet that has been set, E. The authentication server has a processing function of registering the information of each of the authenticated new base station and new wireless terminal in its own device.

In the wireless access network according to the first aspect of the present invention, the authentication server (AS) and the base station (AP) perform mutual authentication so that the business operator can guarantee the security of the AP installed by the general user. It will be possible. New wireless terminal (M
When T) makes an access, it is possible to confirm whether each other is a legitimate device by first performing mutual authentication between MT-APs, and the AP sends a new MT until the mutual authentication succeeds. Since the generated packet is not transferred to the business operator side network, it is possible to prevent a DoS attack disguised as authentication.

After successful mutual authentication between MT-AP, MT-A
By performing mutual authentication between S and packet inspection (source confirmation) of this authentication packet, the AS can identify which MT and which MT
It is possible to accurately grasp and manage whether the user has accessed.

According to a second aspect of the present invention, there is provided a wireless multi terminal comprising a wireless terminal having a relay capability, a base station which wirelessly communicates with the wireless terminal, and an authentication server which is connected to the base station through a carrier side network. In a hop network, A. The base station performs a processing function of performing mutual authentication using the authentication server and a base station-authentication server authentication packet when newly connecting to the business operator side network, B. The wireless terminal, when newly accessing the wireless multi-hop network, performs a mutual authentication with a nearby authenticated wireless terminal or a base station and a packet for authentication between wireless terminals, C. If there are a plurality of wireless terminals or base stations for which mutual authentication between the wireless terminals has succeeded, one wireless terminal or base station is selected from among them, and the selected wireless terminal or base station is
A processing function for permitting the transfer of the authentication packet between the wireless terminal and the authentication server transmitted from the new wireless terminal, D. After the successful mutual authentication between the wireless terminals, the new wireless terminal uses a wireless terminal-authentication server authentication packet to perform mutual authentication with the authentication server via the selected wireless terminal or base station. , E. The new wireless terminal, the selected wireless terminal, the base station,
Each of the authentication servers attaches packet inspection data indicating a transmission source to the authentication packet when transmitting or transferring the wireless terminal-authentication server authentication packet, F. The new wireless terminal, the selected wireless terminal, the base station,
Each authentication server, when receiving each of the authentication packets, inspects the packet inspection data attached to it, and if the inspection fails, a processing function of discarding the attached authentication packet, G. The authentication server has a processing function of registering information of a new base station and a new wireless terminal, which have succeeded in mutual authentication, in their own devices.

In the wireless multi-hop network according to the invention of claim 2, when a new wireless terminal (MT) accesses the wireless multi-hop network, first, mutual authentication is performed between the new MT and the neighboring MT, so that the mutually valid devices. And the neighboring MTs will not forward the packet sent by the new MT to the wireless multi-hop network until this mutual authentication succeeds, thus preventing a DoS attack pretending to be authentication. You can

Further, at the time of mutual authentication, MT or AP for relaying a mutual authentication packet between MT-AS (authentication server)
By selecting one (base station), it is possible to prevent a plurality of same authentication processes from occurring at the same time.

Furthermore, by performing mutual authentication between MT-AS and packet inspection (source confirmation) of this authentication packet after mutual authentication between MT-AP succeeds, AS can determine which MT has accessed which AP. It is possible to accurately grasp and manage.

A third aspect of the present invention is a wireless access network including a wireless terminal, a base station that wirelessly communicates with the wireless terminal, and an authentication server connected to the base station via a carrier side network. When a new access to the wireless access network, a wireless terminal-a base station authentication packet is transmitted to perform mutual authentication with a neighboring base station, and the wireless terminal is used after successful authentication. It has a function of transmitting an authentication packet between authentication servers and performing mutual authentication with the authentication server.

In the wireless terminal (MT) according to the invention of claim 3,
The AP has a function of performing mutual authentication with the base station (AP) when newly entering the wireless access network, and after performing the mutual authentication with the authentication server (AS).
If the MT is not used, the AP has a function of not forwarding the packet transmitted by the new MT to the network on the carrier side until mutual authentication with the new MT is successful.
It is possible to build a wireless access network that cannot communicate with the authentication server (AS),
It can contribute to the construction of a wireless access network that is highly resistant to DoS attacks that pose as authentication.

The invention according to claim 4 is the wireless terminal according to claim 3, which is provided with a function of calculating and attaching packet inspection data indicating a transmission source to a packet for authentication between a wireless terminal and an authentication server to be transmitted. By attaching the packet inspection data to the authentication packet between the wireless terminal and the authentication server, the transmission source can be revealed to the receiving base station and it can be prevented from being used for an unauthorized attack.

According to the invention of claim 5, in the wireless terminal of claim 3 or 4, when the wireless terminal-base station authentication packet is transmitted and a response is received from a plurality of base stations, the wireless terminal-base station It is provided with a function of selecting one legitimate base station in the inter-authentication and transmitting the wireless terminal-authentication server authentication packet to the authentication server through the base station.

According to a sixth aspect of the invention, in the wireless terminal of the fifth aspect, when the wireless terminal-base station authentication packet is transmitted and a response is received from a plurality of base stations, the base station with the quickest response gives priority. The wireless terminal-base station authentication is performed by selectively selecting it.

According to a seventh aspect of the invention, in the wireless terminal of the fifth aspect, when the wireless terminal-base station authentication packet is transmitted and a response is received from a plurality of base stations, the reception level of the response signal is strong. Select the wireless terminal from the base station preferentially-
It has a function of executing authentication between base stations.

According to an eighth aspect of the present invention, in the wireless terminal of the fifth aspect, when the wireless terminal-base station authentication packet is transmitted and a response is received from a plurality of base stations, the wireless communication between the base stations is performed. It has a function of selecting a legitimate base station based on the information acquired in the authentication procedure between the terminal and the base station.

In the wireless terminal (MT) according to the invention of claims 5 to 8, the new MT is an AP which relays a MT-AS (authentication server) mutual authentication packet at the time of MT-AP (base station) mutual authentication. Alternatively, by selecting MT according to a predetermined logic, it is possible to prevent a plurality of the same authentication processes from occurring at the same time.

A ninth aspect of the present invention is a wireless access network including a wireless terminal, a base station that wirelessly communicates with the wireless terminal, and an authentication server that is connected to the base station via a carrier side network. Alternatively, an authentication server used in a wireless multi-access network, a function of executing mutual authentication with a newly accessed base station, and registering information of the successfully authenticated base station in its own device, and a wireless terminal-authentication server The packet inspection data is attached to the inter-authentication packet and transmitted to the base station, and the packet inspection data attached to the authentication packet between the wireless terminal and the authentication server sent from the base station is inspected, and the inspection has failed. In that case, the packet is discarded, and if this inspection is successful, mutual authentication with the wireless terminal is performed, and the information of the wireless terminal that has succeeded in mutual authentication is registered in the device itself. It is those with that function.

In the authentication server (AS) of the ninth aspect of the invention, mutual authentication is performed with the base station (AP), with the new wireless terminal (MT), and when mutual authentication with the new wireless terminal is performed. The packet inspection data indicating the source attached to the authentication packet is inspected, and if this inspection is successful, mutual authentication will be performed.
Therefore, it is possible to manage only a legitimate AP, and it is possible to accurately grasp which AP has accessed which MT.

According to the invention of claim 10, in the authentication server of claim 9, when a wireless terminal that has succeeded in mutual authentication moves to a communication area of another base station, new mutual authentication with the wireless terminal is performed. After the successful authentication, the wireless terminal has a function of notifying the old base station to which the wireless terminal belongs that the wireless terminal has moved.

In the authentication server (AS) of the invention of claim 10, the movement of the wireless terminal (MT) authenticated by itself is managed,
When MT moves from one base station (AP) to another AP,
After the mutual authentication between MT and AS is successful, the old AP to which the MT belongs is notified that the MT has moved, so that the MT which has once been mutually authenticated to the AP but now moves and cannot communicate. Does not have to be kept indefinitely, the MT management data in the AP can be reduced, and the processing speed can be increased accordingly.

The invention of claim 11 is a wireless access network comprising a wireless terminal, a base station wirelessly communicating with the wireless terminal, and an authentication server connected to the base station via a carrier side network. Or a base station used in a wireless multi-hop network, and when newly connecting to the wireless access network or the wireless multi-hop network, a base station-authentication server authentication packet is transmitted to the authentication server to perform mutual authentication. It has a function to execute.

In the base station (AP) of the invention of claim 11,
Mutual authentication is always performed with the authentication server when connecting to a new wireless access network or wireless multi-hop network, making it difficult to install an AP illegally and ensuring the security of the AP installed by a general user. It becomes possible to do.

According to the twelfth aspect of the invention, in the base station of the eleventh aspect, mutual authentication is performed in response to a wireless terminal-base station authentication request from a new wireless terminal, and when the mutual authentication is successful, the wireless communication is completed. For the wireless terminal-authentication server authentication packet transmitted from the terminal, the packet inspection data attached to it is inspected, and if the inspection fails, the packet is discarded, and if the inspection is successful, The packet inspection data calculated by the device itself is attached to the wireless terminal-authentication server authentication packet, transferred to the authentication server, and the authentication result shown in the authentication packet sent from the authentication server is referred to. It is characterized by having a function of determining whether or not to permit transfer of all packets transmitted by the new wireless terminal to the carrier side network.

In the base station (AP) of the invention of claim 12,
When a new wireless terminal (MT) makes an access, first, mutual authentication is performed between MT-AP to check whether MT is a valid device, and the new MT is transmitted until the mutual authentication succeeds. Since the generated packet is not transferred to the business operator side network, it is possible to prevent a DoS attack disguised as authentication.

The invention of claim 13 is the invention of claim 11 or 12.
In the base station, the function of registering the information of each wireless terminal that has succeeded in mutual authentication in its own device and the function of deleting the registration information of the corresponding wireless terminal upon receiving a movement notification from the authentication server. Therefore, when the wireless terminal moves to the communication area of another base station, the resource for managing the wireless terminal can be saved by deleting the information of the wireless terminal that cannot communicate.

[0038] A fourteenth aspect of the present invention is a wireless multi-system comprising a wireless terminal having a relay capability, a base station which wirelessly communicates with this wireless terminal, and an authentication server which is connected to this base station through a carrier side network. A wireless terminal used in a hop network, when its own device newly accesses the wireless multi-hop network, mutual authentication is performed with other authenticated wireless terminals or base stations in the vicinity, and with a plurality of wireless terminals or base stations. If the mutual authentication is successful, the function of selecting one legitimate wireless terminal or base station as the proxy terminal and executing the mutual authentication with the authentication server via the proxy terminal, and the own device by another new wireless terminal In the case of the selected proxy terminal, the packet for authentication between the new wireless terminal and the authentication server transmitted from another new wireless terminal Those having a function of transferring to the other wireless terminal or a base station on the route.

In the wireless terminal (MT) according to the invention of claim 14, when the wireless multi-hop network is newly accessed, the MT is provided with the function of first performing mutual authentication with the neighboring MT or AP. When newly entering the wireless multi-hop network, the neighboring MT or AP is asked to confirm whether it is a legitimate device, and the neighboring MT or A
Since P does not transfer the packet transmitted by the MT to the wireless multi-hop network until the mutual authentication succeeds, P can contribute to the construction of a wireless multi-hop network having a high resistance to a DoS attack disguised as authentication.

The wireless terminal (MT) of the invention of claim 14 also has a function of selecting one MT or AP (base station) for relaying an MT-AS (authentication server) mutual authentication packet at the time of mutual authentication. By providing the above, it is possible to prevent the same authentication processing from occurring more than once at the same time.

According to a fifteenth aspect of the present invention, in the wireless terminal of the fourteenth aspect, when the device itself newly accesses the wireless multi-hop network, the packet for authentication between wireless terminals is transmitted to other wireless terminals or base stations in the vicinity. A function of transmitting, a function of attaching packet inspection data indicating a transmission source to a packet for authentication between a wireless terminal and an authentication server when the device itself is a new wireless terminal, and a function of the device itself being another new wireless terminal. If the proxy terminal is selected by, the packet inspection data is inspected for the wireless terminal-authentication server authentication packet sent from another new wireless terminal, and if the inspection fails, the authentication packet is sent. If the inspection is successful, the packet is discarded and the packet inspection data indicating the transmission source calculated by the own device is attached to the authentication packet, and the other wireless terminal or base on the route is attached. Are those having a function of transferring relative station, which radio terminal to which the base station (AP) (M
It is possible to make the authentication server accurately grasp whether T) has accessed.

The invention of claim 16 is the invention of claim 14 or 15.
When receiving a response from a plurality of other wireless terminals or base stations in response to a mutual authentication request to the base station or other wireless terminals, the wireless terminal of the above preferentially proxies from the base station or the other wireless terminals. It has a function of selecting as a terminal.

The invention of claim 17 is that of claim 14 or 15.
When receiving a response from a plurality of other wireless terminals or base stations in response to a mutual authentication request to the base station or other wireless terminals, the wireless terminal of It has a function of selecting as a proxy terminal.

The invention of claim 18 relates to claim 14 or 15.
In the wireless terminal of, when receiving a response from a plurality of other wireless terminals or base stations in response to a mutual authentication request to the base station or other wireless terminals, the information of the other wireless terminals or base stations acquired by the mutual authentication is added. It has a function of selecting a proxy terminal based on the above.

The wireless terminal (M according to the invention of claims 16 to 18)
In T), when MT-AP (base station) mutual authentication is performed, MT
By providing the function of selecting the optimum AP or MT for relaying the packet for mutual authentication between AS (authentication server), it is possible to prevent the same authentication processing from occurring at the same time.

[0046]

BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION Embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the drawings.

[First Embodiment] FIG. 1 shows a first embodiment of the present invention.
2 shows the functional configuration of the wireless access network of the embodiment, FIG. 2 shows the functional configuration of the authentication server AS, FIG. 3 shows the functional configuration of the base station AP, and FIG. 4 shows the functional configuration of the wireless terminal MT. The wireless access network of this embodiment includes a wireless terminal MT, a base station AP that wirelessly communicates with the wireless terminal MT, and an authentication server AS that is connected to the base station AP via the operator side wired network NW.

The authentication server AS, as software, is an authentication function 101 with a wireless terminal that performs mutual authentication with the wireless terminal MT, a wireless terminal management function 102 that manages the authenticated wireless terminal MT using a database, and a network NW. Wired section packet inspection function 1 to inspect all packets
03, a packet discrimination function 104, and in addition, a mutual authentication function with a base station for executing mutual authentication with the base station 10
5. It has a base station management function 106 for managing the authenticated base station AP using a database.

The base station AP is, as software, an authentication packet transfer function 201 for transferring an authentication packet between the authentication server AS and the wireless terminal MT, a wireless section packet inspection function 202 for inspecting a packet of the wireless network,
The wired section packet inspection function 203 for inspecting the packet of the wired network NW and the packet discrimination function 204 are provided. In addition, the mutual authentication function 206 with the authentication server for executing the mutual authentication with the authentication server AS, and the mutual communication with the wireless terminal MT. A mutual authentication function 207 with a wireless terminal that performs authentication, a packet transfer determination function 208 that determines whether or not a received packet can be transferred, and a wireless terminal management function 209 that manages the wireless terminal MT using a database are provided.

The wireless terminal MT has, as software, a mutual authentication function 301 with an authentication server for executing mutual authentication with the authentication server AS, a wireless section packet inspection function 302 for inspecting a packet of a wireless network, and a packet discrimination function 303. In addition, it has a mutual authentication function 305 with the base station that executes mutual authentication with the base station AP.

Next, the operation of the radio access network of the first embodiment having the above configuration will be described.

<Mutual Authentication Between Base Station AP and Authentication Server AS> A general user installs the base station AP, and the base station AP
It is assumed that the user has contracted for the access line to the authentication server AS of the business operator. The base station AP can be used not only by the installed user but also by other users.
When another user uses the base station AP, the base station AP
The payback is provided by the business operator to the user who installed the.

When a general user newly installs a base station (AP # k) on the network NW, this base station AP
#K authenticates with the authentication server AS managed by the business operator.
The authentication sequence is shown in FIG. 5, and the authentication packet payload data is shown in FIG. 4 shows the authentication flow seen from the AP side, and FIG. 8 shows the authentication flow seen from the AS side.

First, step S101 in the flow of FIG.
Then, the base station AP # k calculates the key generation information KEap # k and transmits the authentication request to which the key generation information is attached.

In step S111 of the flow in FIG. 8, the authentication server AS that has received the authentication request receives the key generation information KEa.
s is calculated, and the shared key Kap # k-as between AP # k and AS is calculated from the key generation information KEap # k of the base station and the key generation information KEas of the authentication server (step S11).
2). The authentication server AS further calculates a random number R1 and sends an authentication request response with the key generation information KEas and the random number R1 attached.
It transmits to P # k (step S113).

In step S102 of the flow of FIG. 4, the base station AP # k that has received the authentication request response receives the shared key Kap # k-a from KEap # k and KEas to AP # k-AS.
s is calculated (step S103), and the signature data Sigap # k is calculated using R1 and the private key SKap # k of the own device (step S104). The base station AP # k further calculates a random number R2, R2, and the certificate Certap of its own device.
#K and Sigap # k are attached to the authentication information and the packet is transmitted to the authentication server AS (step S10).
5).

The authentication server AS which has received the authentication information from the base station AP # k in step S114 of the flow of FIG.
The ertap # k is inspected (step S115). If the inspection fails, the authentication result showing the authentication failure
It is transmitted to #k (steps S117 and S118). Ce
If rtap # k is successfully tested, this Ce
The public key PKap # k of AP # k is extracted from rtap # k, and Sigap # k is inspected using this PKap # k (step S115). If the inspection fails, the authentication result indicating the authentication failure is transmitted to AP # k (steps S117 and S118).

If the check in step S115 is successful, the authentication server AS determines that the base station AP # k is legitimate, and calculates the signature data Sigas using R2 and the private key SKas of its own device ( Step S116).
Then, the authentication server AS uses the certificate Certas of its own device.
And the signature data Sigas are attached to the authentication result, and the packet is transmitted to AP # k (step S118).

The base station AP # k which has received the authentication result from the authentication server AS in step S106 of the flow of FIG.
Inspect the received Certas. If the inspection fails, the authentication process is started from the beginning (step S10).
Branch to NO at 7.) If the test is successful, then C
The public key PKas of the AS is retrieved from the ertas, and the Sigmas is also inspected using this PKas. If the AP also succeeds in this inspection, the AP determines that the AS is a legitimate AS installed by the business operator, and the mutual authentication between AP # k-AS is completed. Even when the Sigas inspection fails in step S107, the received authentication result is discarded and the authentication process is started from the beginning.

In this way, if the authentication server AS authenticates the new base station AP, it is registered in the database,
The business operator can recognize the AP installed by the user, and other users can use such AP by assuming that the AP has the same security as that installed by the business operator.

<Mutual Authentication Between Wireless Terminal MT and Base Station AP> When a new wireless terminal MT # i tries to access the network NW via AP # k, MT # i first communicates with AP # k. Authenticate. AP # k does not transfer the packet transmitted from MT # i to the carrier network NW until this authentication is successful. FIG. 9 shows the MT authentication sequence, and FIG. 10 shows the payload data of the authentication packet. Further, FIG. 11 shows the authentication flow seen from the MT side, and FIG. 12 shows the authentication flow seen from the AP side.

First, step S20 in the flow of FIG.
In step 1, the wireless terminal MT # i calculates the key generation information KEmt # i and sends the authentication request 1 with the key generation information attached to the base station A.
Send to P # k.

The base station AP which has received the authentication request 1 from the wireless terminal MT # i in step S211 of the flow of FIG.
#K calculates the key generation information KEap # k, and the key generation information KEmt # i on the wireless terminal side and the shared key Kmt between the key generation information KEap # k on the base station side and the MT # i-AP # k.
# I-ap # k is calculated (step S212). The base station AP # k further calculates the random number R1 and calculates the key generation information KE.
The authentication request response 1 to which ap # k and the random number R1 are attached is transmitted to the wireless terminal MT # i (step S213).

The wireless terminal MT # i, which has received the authentication request response 1 from the base station AP # k in step S202 of the flow of FIG. 11, receives the key generation information KEmt # i of its own apparatus and the key generation information KEap of the base station. The shared key Kmt # i-ap # k between #k and MT # i-AP # k is calculated (step S20).
3) Further, the signature data Sigmat # i is calculated using the random number R1 and the private key SKmt # i of the own device (step S204). The wireless terminal MT # i further uses the random number R2.
And R2, the certificate Certmt # i of the own device, and the signature data Sigmat # i are attached to the authentication information 1 and the packet is transmitted to the base station AP # k (step S20).
5).

AP # k which has received the authentication information 1 from the wireless terminal MT # i in step S214 of the flow of FIG.
Inspects Certmt # i (step S21
5). If the inspection fails, the authentication result 1 indicating the authentication failure is transmitted to MT # i (steps S219 to S2).
21). If the inspection is successful, Certmt # i through M
The public key PKmt # i of T # i is taken out. Base station AP #
k is Sigmat using the public key PKmt # i of MT # i
#I is also inspected (step S215).

If the inspection is successful, the base station AP # k determines that the wireless terminal MT # i is a regular MT, and the random number R
2. Using the private key SKap # k of the device itself, the signature data S
igap # k is calculated (step S216). Then, the base station AP # k attaches its own certificate Certap # k and signature data Sigap # k to the authentication result 1 and transmits the packet to the wireless terminal MT # i (step S2).
17). The base station AP # k permits the transfer of the authentication 2 packet transmitted from the MT # i to the authentication server AS when the authentication of the wireless terminal MT # i is successful (step S218). Even when the inspection of the signature data Sigmat # i of the wireless terminal MT # i fails in step S215,
The authentication result 1 indicating the authentication failure is transmitted to MT # i (steps S219 and S220), and the transfer of the authentication 2 packet transmitted from the wireless terminal MT # i to the authentication server AS is prohibited (step S221). .

In step S206 of the flow of FIG. 11, MT # i, which has received the authentication result 1 from the base station AP #, inspects the certificate Certap # k of the base station (step S).
207). If the inspection fails, authentication 1 is started from the beginning (NO in step S207). If the inspection is correct, the base station AP # k starts from this Certap # k
Public key PKap # k of Furthermore, the wireless terminal MT
#I inspects the signature data Sigap # k of the base station AP # k using the retrieved public key PKap # k. If this check is also correct, it is determined that this base station AP # k is a legitimate AP recognized by the operator, and mutual authentication between MT # i and AP # k is completed (branch to YES in step S207). . Even if the inspection fails, the authentication 1 is started from the beginning (NO in step S207).

In this way, since the base station AP # k does not transmit the packet by the wireless terminal MT # i to the carrier side network until the authentication of the wireless terminal MT # i is successful, the authentication by the unauthorized wireless terminal is performed. Authentication server A used
It is possible to prevent attacks on S. At the same time, base station A
It is possible to prevent the access line of the user who owns P from being illegally used.

<Mutual Authentication Between Wireless Terminal MT # i-Authentication Server AS> When the mutual authentication between the wireless terminal MT # i and base station AP # k is successful, the wireless terminal MT # i determines that base station AP #. Authentication with the authentication server AS is performed via k. FIG. 13 shows an authentication flow seen from the wireless terminal MT # i side,
FIG. 14 shows the authentication flow viewed from the authentication server AS side.
Furthermore, FIG. 1 shows the authentication flow seen from the base station AP # K side.
5, shown in FIG. The packet payload data is shown in FIG.

In step S231 of the flow of FIG. 13, first, the wireless terminal MT # i generates a sequence number SQN and uses the SQN and the shared key Kmt # i-ap # k to indicate the packet inspection data indicating the transmission source. Calculate PCV. The wireless terminal MT # i transmits the authentication request 2 added with these SQN and PCV to the base station AP # k (step S2).
32).

The base station AP which has received the authentication request 2 from the wireless terminal MT # i in step S241 of the flow of FIG.
#K inspects the PCV using SQN and Kmt # i-ap # k. If the inspection fails, the received authentication request 2 is discarded. If the inspection is successful, the PCV is calculated using the SQN in the received packet and the shared key Kap # k-as (step S242). When the base station AP # k creates this new PCV, it discards the original PCV and creates a new PV.
The authentication request 2 with the CV added is transmitted to the authentication server AS (step S243).

The authentication server AS that has received the authentication request 2 from the base station AP # k in step S251 of the flow of FIG.
Uses the received PCV as sequence number SQN and shared key K
Inspect using ap # k-as (step S25)
2). If the inspection fails, the received authentication request 2 is discarded. If the inspection is successful, the random number R3 is calculated.
The authentication server AS further generates a sequence number SQN and uses the SQN and the shared key Kap # k-as to execute the PC.
V is calculated (step S253), and the authentication request response 2 to which the random number R3 and these SQN and PCV are added is sent to the base station AP.
It is transmitted to #k (step S254).

The base station AP which has received the authentication request response 2 from the authentication server AS in step S241 of the flow of FIG.
#K is the sequence number SQN and shared key Kap # k-a
Check PCV with s. If the result of this check is correct, the base station AP # k has the SQN and the shared key Kmt # i-a.
A new PCV is calculated using p # k (step S2
42). Upon generating the new PCV, the base station AP # k discards the old PCV and transmits the authentication request response 2 with the new PCV added to the wireless terminal MT # i (step S24).
3).

The wireless terminal MT # i, which has received the authentication request response 2 in step S233 of the flow of FIG. 13, inspects the PCV using SQN and Kmt # i-ap # k (step S234). If the inspection fails, the received authentication request response 2 is discarded. The wireless terminal MT # i is a PC
If the inspection of V is successful, the random number R3, the secret key SKmt
The signature data Sigmat # i is calculated using #i (step S235). Furthermore, the wireless terminal MT # i uses the random number R
4 is calculated, and this random number R4, the certificate Certm of the own device
t # i, signature data Sigmat # i and PCV calculated by the same procedure as above are added to the authentication information 2 and the packet is transmitted to the base station AP # k (steps S236, S).
237).

The base station AP that has received the authentication information 2 from the wireless terminal MT # i in step S241 of the flow of FIG.
#K inspects the PCV, and if correct, adds the PCV calculated by the same procedure as above and adds the authentication information 2 to the authentication server AS.
(Steps S242 and S243).

In step S255 of the flow of FIG. 14, the AS that has received the authentication information 2 from the base station AP # k is the PC.
V is inspected (step S256). If the inspection fails, the received authentication information 2 is discarded. When the inspection is successful, the signature data Certmt # i is inspected. If the inspection is unsuccessful, a new SQN and PCV calculated by the same procedure as above are added to the authentication result 2 indicating the authentication failure and transmitted to the base station AP # k (steps S261 to S261).
263). In step S257, the signature data Certmt
If the inspection of #i is successful, this signature data Cert
The public key PKmt # i of the wireless terminal MT # i is extracted from mt # i. The authentication server AS further uses this public key PKm.
The signature data Sigmat # i is inspected using t # i (step S257).

The authentication server AS executes MT in step S257.
If the inspection of #i is also successful, the wireless terminal MT # i is authorized M
It is determined that T is the random number R4, the private key SKas of the own device
To calculate signature data Sigas (step S
258). The authentication server AS further has the certificate C of its own device.
ertas and Sigas, PCV calculated by the same procedure as above is added to the authentication result 2, and the packet is added to the base station A.
It transmits to P # k (step S259, S260). Authentication result 2 indicating authentication failure even if this check fails
To the base station AP # k with new SQN and PCV added (steps S261 to S263).

In step S271 of the flow of FIG. 16, the base station AP # k which has received the authentication result 2 from the authentication server AS.
Examines the PCV, adds a new PCV if the result is correct, and transmits the authentication result 2 to MT # i (step S
272-S274). If the authentication result 2 indicates that the authentication is successful, the base station AP # k permits the transfer of the data packet transmitted from the MT # i to the operator side network at this point (step S275).

When the authentication result 2 received in step S271 indicates the authentication failure, the base station AP # k does not permit the transfer of the data packet transmitted from the wireless terminal MT # i to the operator side network (step S272, S
276-S278).

The wireless terminal MT # i which has received the authentication result 2 in step S238 of the flow of FIG. 13 inspects the PCV (step S239). If the test fails,
The wireless terminal MT # i retransmits the authentication information 2 (step S
236, S237). If the inspection is successful, the wireless terminal M
T # i inspects Certas (step S24)
0). If this check fails, the wireless terminal MT # i
Starts authentication 2 from the beginning. When the inspection of Certas is successful, the wireless terminal MT # i extracts the public key PKas of the authentication server AS from Certas, and the public key PKas
The signature data Sigas is inspected using Kas. Even if this inspection fails, authentication 2 is started from the beginning (NO in step S240). If the inspection of the signature data Sigas is also successful, the wireless terminal MT # i determines that the authentication server AS is a legitimate AS recognized by the operator, and the mutual authentication between MT # i and AS is completed (step S240). ).

As described above, in the wireless access network of the first embodiment, the packet check data (PCV) is added to the authentication 2 packet, so that the authentication server AP is a packet transmitted from the authorized wireless terminal MT. It is possible to confirm that there is and prevent an attack using the authentication 2. Further, the authentication server AS can confirm that the authentication 2 packet transmitted from the wireless terminal MT has been transmitted via the legitimate base station AP. Furthermore, after the base station AP authenticates the wireless terminal MT, the authentication server AS changes the wireless terminal MT.
By authenticating, the business operator can know which wireless terminal MT is accessing which base station AP, and the base station AP illegally declares access to the wireless terminal MT and receives a payback from the business operator. It is possible to prevent unauthorized use of unauthorized services and reporting of unauthorized billing information.

[Second Embodiment] Next, a second embodiment of the radio access network of the present invention will be described. A characteristic of the network of the second embodiment is that the base stations AP # 1 and AP # k exist in a situation as shown in FIG. 17, that is, in an area where communication with the new wireless terminal MT is possible, and authentication is performed for both of them. In the situation where communication is possible for the procedure, the new wireless terminal MT selects the appropriate one (here, AP # k) as the base station for relaying the MT-AS mutual authentication packet, so that the same authentication process is performed simultaneously. The point is that it has a function to prevent it from occurring.

In order to realize this, the wireless terminal MT has the functional configuration shown in FIGS. 18 and 19. That is,
In addition to the functional configuration of the first embodiment shown in FIG. 1, a base station selection function 306 is provided, and this base station selection function 306 turns the first received base station into a base station for relay. The selection prevents the same authentication process from occurring more than once at the same time.

Next, the operation of the wireless access network according to the second embodiment will be described in A including the wireless terminal authentication sequence of FIG. 20 and the wireless terminal base station AP selection processing of FIG.
This will be described using the P authentication flow.

When a general user newly installs the base station AP # k on the network NW, the AP # k authenticates with the authentication server AS managed by the operator. This procedure is common to the first embodiment. 5 and the authentication sequence of FIG.
Authentication packet payload data, A of FIGS. 7 and 8
This is as in the P-AS authentication flow.

When a radio terminal MT # i tries to access the network via the base station AP, MT # 1
First authenticates with the AP. The base station AP does not transfer the packet transmitted from the wireless terminal MT # 1 to the operator side network NW until this authentication is successful. The MT authentication sequence is shown in FIG. The payload data of the MT authentication packet used in the second embodiment is shown in FIG. 10 as in the first embodiment. Also, AP
The MT-AP authentication flow seen from the side is shown in FIG.
The AS-to-AS authentication flow is the same as that of the first embodiment shown in FIGS. 13 and 14, and the MT-AS-authentication flow on the side of the base station AP # k which is a relay is the same as that of the first embodiment shown in FIGS. 15 and 16, respectively. . However, in the case of the second embodiment, M on the MT side
The difference is that the T-AP authentication flow is changed to that shown in FIG.

MT-AP as seen from the MT side shown in FIG.
In step S301 of the inter-authentication flow, a certain wireless terminal MT
When #i tries to access the network, the key generation information KEmt # i is calculated, and the authentication request 1 with the key generation information attached is transmitted by broadcast to the base station AP.

Similar to the first embodiment, the AP # k which has received the authentication request 1 from the wireless terminal MT # 1 in step S211 of the flow of FIG. 12 calculates the key generation information KEap # k, and further Shared key Kmt # between MT # i and AP # k
i-ap # k is calculated (step S212). Further, the base station AP # k calculates a random number R1 and calculates KEap # k,
Authentication request response 1 with R1 attached is transmitted to MT # i (step S213).

In the situation shown in FIG. 17, since the base station AP # 1 also receives the authentication request 1 from the same wireless terminal MT # i, the key generation information KEap # 1 is calculated similarly and MT
The shared key Kmt # i-ap # 1 between # i-AP # 1 is calculated (step S212). Base station AP # 1 is
The random number R1 ′ is calculated, and the authentication request response 1 with KEap # 1 and R1 ′ attached is transmitted to MT # i in the same manner as the base station AP # k (step S213).

Steps S302 to S3 of the flow shown in FIG.
In 04, the wireless terminal MT # i has previously selected the base station selection function 306.
The authentication processing response 1 received after the second one is based on the logic incorporated in the above, that is, the processing of processing the authentication request response 1 received first, and the authentication processing response 1 received after the second authentication of the base station. When the processing response 1 is selected, it is discarded. Here, it is assumed that the authentication processing response 1 from the base station AP # k is first received, and the authentication processing response 1 from the base station AP # 1 is received after that.

MT # i, which first receives the authentication request response 1 from the base station AP # k, receives the key generation information KEmt # i of its own device and the base station AP in step S305 as in the first embodiment. Key generation information KEap # k of #k to MT # i
-Calculate the shared key Kmt # i-ap # k between AP # k. Then, the signature data Sigmat # i is calculated using the random number R1 and the private key SKmt # i of the own device (step S306). Then, the wireless terminal MT # i calculates a random number R2, and R2, the certificate Certmt # i of its own device, and Sig.
mt # i is attached to the authentication information 1 and the packet is transmitted to the selected base station AP # k (step S307).

The base station AP which has received the authentication information 1 from the wireless terminal MT # i in step S214 of the flow of FIG.
After that, #k performs the same processing as in the first embodiment, and if it is determined that the base station MT # i is a regular MT,
Authentication result 1 is transmitted to MT # i (steps S215 to S
217), and when MT # i is successfully authenticated, MT #
The transfer of the authentication 2 packet transmitted from i to the AS is permitted (step S218). On the other hand, if the MT inspection fails, the authentication result 1 indicating the authentication failure is set to MT # i.
To the AS and prohibits the transfer of the authentication 2 packet transmitted from MT # i to the AS (steps S219 to S2).
21).

The wireless terminal MT # i which has received the authentication result 1 from the base station AP # k in step S308 of the flow shown in FIG.
Checks the certificate Certap # k of the base station AP # k (step S309). If this check fails, authentication 1 is started from the beginning. Then, in this case, the packet of the authentication request response 1 from the base station AP # k received first is discarded, and the authentication processing is performed on the authentication request response 1 received from the base station AP # 1 received second. Become. That is,
If a response is first received from AP # k and second AP # 1 even in the second authentication, steps S303 and S3.
At 11, the first AP # k packet is discarded. Then, the authentication process is performed for the authentication request response 1 of AP # 1 received second in step S304.

In step S309, the base station AP #
If the certificate Certap # k of k is successfully verified,
The wireless terminal MT # i transmits the base station AP # from the Certap # k.
The public key PKap # k of k is extracted, and this PKap # k
Sigap # k is inspected by using, and if this inspection is also successful, it is determined that the base station AP # k is a legitimate AP installed by the operator, and mutual authentication between MT # i and AP # k is completed. . Even if this check fails, authentication 1 is started from the beginning. Also in this case, the authentication process is similarly performed on the authentication request response 1 from the base station AP # 1 received second.

If the above authentication 1 is successful, the wireless terminal MT
#I is the authentication server AS via the selected base station AP # k
And authenticate. This MT-AS authentication procedure is the first
13. The MT-AS authentication flow on the MT side is shown in FIG. 13, the MT-AS authentication flow on the AP side is shown in FIG. 14, and the MT-AS on the base station AP # k side that serves as a relay is similar to the embodiment of FIG. The inter-authentication flow is shown in FIGS. 15 and 16, respectively.

According to the radio access network of the second embodiment, as in the first embodiment, the base station A
Since P # k does not transmit the packet by MT # i to the carrier side network until the authentication of the wireless terminal MT # i is successful, it is possible to prevent the attack on the authentication server AS using the authentication by the unauthorized wireless terminal. Yes, the base station AP
It is also possible to prevent unauthorized use of the access line of the user who owns the. Further, in the case of the second embodiment, by selecting one legitimate base station AP, it is possible to prevent the same packet for authentication 2 from being simultaneously transmitted to the authentication server AS.

[Third Embodiment] Next, the third embodiment of the present invention will be described.
The wireless access network according to the embodiment will be described. The radio access network of the third embodiment has the same functional configuration as that of the second embodiment, but FIG.
In the situation shown in FIG. 7, that is, when the new wireless terminal MT # i receives the authentication request response 1 from the plurality of base stations AP # 1 and AP # k at the same time or in succession, the received signal level is the highest. It is characterized in that a base station (here, AP # k) is selected and the subsequent authentication procedure is executed. FIG. 22 shows an AP authentication flow including a base station selection process of the wireless terminal MT in the third embodiment. All other processing is common to the second embodiment.

The functional configuration of the radio terminal MT is shown in FIG.
It is similar to the second embodiment shown in FIG. However, the base station selection function 306 differs from the second embodiment in that the same authentication process is prevented from occurring at the same time by selecting the base station having the highest reception level.

Next, the operation of the wireless access network according to the third embodiment will be described in A including the wireless terminal authentication sequence of FIG. 20 and the base station AP selection processing of the wireless terminal of FIG.
This will be described using the P authentication flow.

When a general user newly installs a base station AP # k on the network, AP # k authenticates with the authentication server AS managed by the business operator.
5 is common to the embodiment, and is the same as the authentication sequence in FIG. 5, the packet payload data for authentication in FIG. 6, and the AP-AS authentication flow in FIGS. 7 and 8.

When a radio terminal MT # i tries to access the network via the base station AP, MT # 1
First authenticates with the AP. The base station AP does not transfer the packet transmitted from the wireless terminal MT # 1 to the operator side network NW until this authentication is successful. The payload data of the MT authentication packet used in the third embodiment is shown in FIG. 10 as in the first embodiment. Further, the MT-AP authentication flow seen from the AP side is shown in FIG. 12, and the MT-AS authentication flow is shown in FIGS. 13 and 14.
In addition, the MT-AS authentication flow on the side of the base station AP # k which is a relay is the same as that of the first and second embodiments shown in FIGS. 15 and 16, respectively.

MT-AP seen from MT side shown in FIG.
In step S301 of the inter-authentication flow, a certain wireless terminal MT
When #i tries to access the network, the key generation information KEmt # i is calculated, and the authentication request 1 with the key generation information attached is transmitted by broadcast to the base station AP.

Similar to the first embodiment, the AP # k that has received the authentication request 1 from the wireless terminal MT # 1 in step S211 of the flow of FIG. 12 calculates the key generation information KEap # k, and further Shared key Kmt # between MT # i and AP # k
i-ap # k is calculated (step S212). Further, the base station AP # k calculates a random number R1 and calculates KEap # k,
Authentication request response 1 with R3 attached is transmitted to MT # i (step S213).

In the situation shown in FIG. 17, since the base station AP # 1 also receives the authentication request 1 from the same wireless terminal MT # i, the key generation information KEap # 1 is calculated in the same manner, and MT
The shared key Kmt # i-ap # 1 between # i-AP # 1 is calculated (step S212). Base station AP # 1 is
The random number R1 ′ is calculated, and the authentication request response 1 with KEap # 1 and R1 ′ attached is transmitted to MT # i in the same manner as the base station AP # k (step S213).

Steps S302 to S30 of the flow shown in FIG.
At 4 ', the wireless terminal MT # i has previously selected the base station selection function 306.
The base station is selected based on the logic incorporated in, that is, the logic that the base station with the highest signal level of the authentication request response 1 received within a predetermined time after transmission is selected,
The other authentication processing response 1 is discarded (step S30).
4 ', S312). Therefore, the wireless terminal MT # i, which has received the authentication request response 1 within the predetermined time from the base stations AP # 1 and AP # k in the first authentication processing response, measures the reception level of the authentication request response 1. , The authentication request response 1 from the base station AP # k having a high measurement level is processed, and the packet of the authentication request response 1 of the AP # 1 is discarded.

MT # i which selects the authentication request response 1 from the base station AP # k in step S304 'of the flow of FIG.
In step S305, as in the first and second embodiments, the key generation information KEmt # i of the own device and the base station AP # are transmitted.
The shared key Kmt # i-ap # k between MT # i-AP # k is calculated from the key generation information KEap # k of k. Then, the signature data Sigmat # i is calculated using the random number R1 and the private key SKmt # i of the own device (step S306). Then, the wireless terminal MT # i calculates a random number R2, attaches R2, the certificate Certmt # i, and Sigmat # i of its own device to the authentication information 1 and selects the packet from the base station AP #.
It is transmitted to k (step S307).

The base station AP which has received the authentication information 1 from the wireless terminal MT # i in step S214 of the flow of FIG.
After that, #k performs the same processing as in the first and second embodiments, and if it determines that the base station MT # i is a regular MT, it transmits the authentication result 1 to MT # i ( Step S215
~ S217), and M is authenticated when MT # i is successfully authenticated.
The transfer of the authentication 2 packet transmitted from T # i to the AS is permitted (step S218). On the other hand, if the MT inspection fails, the authentication result 1 indicating the authentication failure is MT.
#I, and the transfer of the authentication 2 packet transmitted from MT # i to AS is prohibited (steps S219-).
S221).

The wireless terminal MT # i which has received the authentication result 1 from the base station AP # k in step S308 of the flow shown in FIG.
Checks the certificate Certap # k of the base station AP # k (step S309). If this check fails,
Returning to step S301, authentication 1 is started from the beginning.

In step S309, the base station AP #
If the certificate Certap # k of k is successfully verified,
The wireless terminal MT # i transmits the base station AP # from the Certap # k.
The public key PKap # k of k is extracted, and this PKap # k
Is used to inspect the Sigap # k, and if this inspection is also successful, it is determined that the base station AP # k is a legitimate AP recognized by the operator, and the mutual authentication between the MT # i and the AP # k is completed. .
Even if this check fails, authentication 1 is started from the beginning.

When it is determined in step S309 that the authentication 1 is repeated from the beginning, the wireless terminal MT # i retransmits the authentication request 1 by broadcast (step S30).
1). On the other hand, the base station AP #
k, AP # 1 returns the authentication request response 1, and the reception level of the base station AP # k is the base station AP # 1.
It was assumed that it was higher than the reception level of.

In this case, MT # i first selects the base station AP # k in step S302, but in step S303 it is determined that the base station AP # k is the base station determined to be NG in the first determination. Then, the packet is discarded (steps S303 and S311). Then, the authentication request response 1 of the next base station AP # 1 is adopted, and if it is determined in step S304 'that the reception level is not higher than that of AP # 1, then the authentication request response of this base station AP # 1 is sent. The processing from step S305 onward is performed for 1. Note that step S
The processing after 305 is the same as that of the second embodiment shown in the flow of FIG.

According to the radio access network of the third embodiment, as in the second embodiment, the base station A
Since P # k does not transmit the packet by MT # i to the carrier side network until the authentication of the wireless terminal MT # i is successful, it is possible to prevent the attack on the authentication server AS using the authentication by the unauthorized wireless terminal. Yes, the base station AP
It is also possible to prevent unauthorized use of the access line of the user who owns the. Furthermore, in the case of the third embodiment, by selecting one legitimate base station AP, it is possible to prevent the same authentication 2 packet from being transmitted to the authentication server AS. In addition, the reliability of wireless communication can be improved by selecting a base station with a high signal reception level.

[Fourth Embodiment] The radio access network of the fourth embodiment has the same functional configuration as that of the second embodiment, but the situation shown in FIG. 17, that is, a new radio terminal. MT # i has a plurality of base stations AP # 1 and AP # k
When the authentication request response 1 is received at the same time, or before or after, the base station having the highest received signal level (here, AP # k) is selected and the subsequent authentication procedure is executed. Have. FIG. 23 shows an AP authentication flow including a base station selection process of the wireless terminal MT in the fourth embodiment. All other processing is common to the second and third embodiments.

The functional configuration of the radio terminal MT is shown in FIG.
It is similar to the second and third embodiments shown in FIG. However,
The base station selection function 306 confirms each of the plurality of base stations that have received the band use status, preferentially selects the base station having the most available band, and processes the authentication request response 1, This is different from the second and third embodiments in that a plurality of the same authentication processes are prevented from occurring at the same time.

Next, the operation of the wireless access network according to the fourth embodiment will be described in A including the wireless terminal authentication sequence of FIG. 20 and the wireless terminal base station AP selection processing of FIG.
This will be described using the P authentication flow.

When a general user newly installs the base station AP # k on the network, the AP # k authenticates with the authentication server AS managed by the operator. This procedure is the first and second steps.
5 is common to the embodiment, and is the same as the authentication sequence in FIG. 5, the packet payload data for authentication in FIG. 6, and the AP-AS authentication flow in FIGS. 7 and 8.

When a wireless terminal MT # i attempts to access the network via the base station AP, MT # 1
First authenticates with the AP. The base station AP does not transfer the packet transmitted from the wireless terminal MT # 1 to the operator side network NW until this authentication is successful. The payload data of the MT authentication packet used in the fourth embodiment is also shown in FIG. 10 as in the first embodiment. Further, the MT-AP authentication flow seen from the AP side is shown in FIG. 12, and the MT-AS authentication flow is shown in FIGS. 13 and 14.
In addition, the MT-AS authentication flow on the side of the base station AP # k which is a relay is the same as that of the first and second embodiments shown in FIGS. 15 and 16, respectively.

MT-AP as seen from the MT side shown in FIG.
In step S301 of the inter-authentication flow, a certain wireless terminal MT
When #i tries to access the network, the key generation information KEmt # i is calculated, and the authentication request 1 with the key generation information attached is broadcast to the base station AP.

Similar to the first embodiment, the AP # k that has received the authentication request 1 from the wireless terminal MT # 1 in step S211 of the flow of FIG. 12 calculates the key generation information KEap # k, and further Shared key Kmt # between MT # i and AP # k
i-ap # k is calculated (step S212). Further, the base station AP # k calculates a random number R1 and calculates KEap # k,
Authentication request response 1 with R3 attached is transmitted to MT # i (step S213).

In the situation shown in FIG. 17, since the base station AP # 1 also receives the authentication request 1 from the same wireless terminal MT # i, the key generation information KEap # 1 is calculated similarly and MT
The shared key Kmt # i-ap # 1 between # i-AP # 1 is calculated (step S212). Base station AP # 1 is
The random number R1 ′ is calculated, and the authentication request response 1 with KEap # 1 and R1 ′ attached is transmitted to MT # i in the same manner as the base station AP # k (step S213).

Steps S302 to S30 of the flow shown in FIG.
4 ″, the wireless terminal MT # i has previously selected the base station selection function 306.
Select the base station based on the logic built in, that is, the logic to select the base station with the most free band among the base stations that have transmitted within a predetermined time after transmission,
The other authentication processing response 1 is discarded (step S30).
4 ″, S312). Therefore, the wireless terminal MT # i, which has received the authentication request response 1 within the predetermined time from the base stations AP # 1 and AP # k in the first authentication processing response, determines the bandwidth of those base stations. Of the authentication request response 1 from the base station AP # k having a large bandwidth, the packet of the authentication request response 1 of AP # 1 is discarded.

MT # i for which the authentication request response 1 from the base station AP # k is selected in step S304 ″ of the flow of FIG.
In step S305, as in the first and second embodiments, the key generation information KEmt # i of the own device and the base station AP # are transmitted.
The shared key Kmt # i-ap # k between MT # i-AP # k is calculated from the key generation information KEap # k of k. Then, the signature data Sigmat # i is calculated using the random number R1 and the private key SKmt # i of the own device (step S306). Then, the wireless terminal MT # i calculates a random number R2, attaches R2, the certificate Certmt # i, and Sigmat # i of its own device to the authentication information 1 and selects the packet from the base station AP #.
It is transmitted to k (step S307).

The base station AP which has received the authentication information 1 from the wireless terminal MT # i in step S214 of the flow of FIG.
After that, #k performs the same processing as in the first and second embodiments, and if it determines that the base station MT # i is a regular MT, it transmits the authentication result 1 to MT # i ( Step S215
~ S217), and M is authenticated when MT # i is successfully authenticated.
The transfer of the authentication 2 packet transmitted from T # i to the AS is permitted (step S218). On the other hand, if the MT inspection fails, the authentication result 1 indicating the authentication failure is MT.
#I, and the transfer of the authentication 2 packet transmitted from MT # i to AS is prohibited (steps S219-).
S221).

The wireless terminal MT # i that has received the authentication result 1 from the base station AP # k in step S308 of the flow of FIG.
Checks the certificate Certap # k of the base station AP # k (step S309). If this check fails,
Returning to step S301, authentication 1 is started from the beginning.

In step S309, the base station AP #
If the certificate Certap # k of k is successfully verified,
The wireless terminal MT # i transmits the base station AP # from the Certap # k.
The public key PKap # k of k is extracted, and this PKap # k
Sigap # k is inspected by using, and if this inspection is also successful, it is determined that the base station AP # k is a legitimate AP recognized by the operator, and mutual authentication between MT # i and AP # k is completed. .
Even if this check fails, authentication 1 is started from the beginning.

When it is determined in step S309 that the authentication 1 is repeated from the beginning, the wireless terminal MT # i retransmits the authentication request 1 by broadcast (step S30).
1). On the other hand, the base station AP #
It is assumed that k and AP # 1 have returned the authentication request response 1, and that the base station AP # k has a larger available band than ap # 1 in the second time.

In this case, MT # i first selects the base station AP # k in step S302, but in step S303, it is determined that the base station AP # k is the base station determined to be NG in the first determination. Then, the packet is discarded (steps S303 and S311). Then, if the authentication request response 1 of the next base station AP # 1 is adopted and it is determined in step S304 ″ that there is no other candidate base station, this base station AP # 1
The processing from step S305 is performed on the authentication request response 1 of 1. The processing from step S305 is
This is the same as the processing of the second embodiment shown in the flow of FIG.

According to the radio access network of the fourth embodiment, like the second embodiment, the base station A
Since P # k does not transmit the packet by MT # i to the carrier side network until the authentication of the wireless terminal MT # i is successful, it is possible to prevent the attack on the authentication server AS using the authentication by the unauthorized wireless terminal. Yes, the base station AP
It is also possible to prevent unauthorized use of the access line of the user who owns the. Furthermore, in the case of the fourth embodiment, by selecting one legitimate base station AP, it is possible to prevent the same authentication 2 packet from being transmitted to the authentication server AS. In addition, the response speed of wireless communication can be increased by selecting a base station with a large available band.

[Fifth Embodiment] Next, the fifth embodiment of the present invention will be described.
The wireless access network according to the embodiment will be described. The wireless access network according to the fifth embodiment has the same functional configuration as that of the second embodiment, but FIG.
When the new wireless terminal MT # i receives the authentication request response 1 from the plurality of base stations AP # 1 and AP # k at the same time or in succession, all of them are temporarily held. It is characterized in that the authentication 1 process is performed in order from the base station having the earliest response, the base station for which the authentication 1 is successful is selected, and the subsequent authentication procedure is executed. Figure 24 shows
In the fifth embodiment, an AP authentication flow including a base station selection process of the wireless terminal MT is shown. All other processing is common to the second embodiment.

The functional configuration of the radio terminal MT is shown in FIG.
It is similar to the second embodiment shown in FIG. However, when the base station selection function 306 receives the authentication request responses 1 from a plurality of base stations, all of them are temporarily held and the processing of the authentication 1 is performed in order from the base station with the earliest response to perform the authentication 1 Is different from the second embodiment in that the same authentication process is prevented from occurring at the same time by selecting a successful base station.

Next, the operation of the wireless access network according to the fifth embodiment will be described with reference to the wireless terminal authentication sequence of FIG. 20 and the wireless terminal base station AP selection processing of FIG.
This will be described using the P authentication flow.

When a general user newly installs the base station AP # k on the network, the AP # k authenticates with the authentication server AS managed by the operator. This procedure is the first and second steps.
5 is common to the embodiment, and is the same as the authentication sequence in FIG. 5, the packet payload data for authentication in FIG. 6, and the AP-AS authentication flow in FIGS. 7 and 8.

When a radio terminal MT # i tries to access the network via the base station AP, MT # 1
First authenticates with the AP. The base station AP does not transfer the packet transmitted from the wireless terminal MT # 1 to the operator side network NW until this authentication is successful. The payload data of the MT authentication packet used in the fifth embodiment is shown in FIG. 10 as in the first embodiment. Further, the MT-AP authentication flow seen from the AP side is shown in FIG. 12, and the MT-AS authentication flow is shown in FIGS. 13 and 14.
In addition, the MT-AS authentication flow on the side of the base station AP # k which is a relay is the same as that of the first and second embodiments shown in FIGS. 15 and 16, respectively.

MT-AP as seen from the MT side shown in FIG.
In step S401 of the inter-authentication flow, a certain wireless terminal MT
When #i tries to access the network, the key generation information KEmt # i is calculated, and the authentication request 1 with the key generation information attached is transmitted by broadcast to the base station AP.

Similar to the first embodiment, the AP # k that has received the authentication request 1 from the wireless terminal MT # 1 in step S211 of the flow of FIG. 12 calculates the key generation information KEap # k, and further Shared key Kmt # between MT # i and AP # k
i-ap # k is calculated (step S212). Further, the base station AP # k calculates a random number R1 and calculates KEap # k,
Authentication request response 1 with R1 attached is transmitted to MT # i (step S213).

In the situation shown in FIG. 17, since the base station AP # 1 also receives the authentication request 1 from the same wireless terminal MT # i, the key generation information KEap # 1 is calculated in the same manner, and MT
The shared key Kmt # i-ap # 1 between # i-AP # 1 is calculated (step S212). Base station AP # 1 is
The random number R1 ′ is calculated, and the authentication request response 1 with KEap # 1 and R1 ′ attached is transmitted to MT # i in the same manner as the base station AP # k (step S213).

Steps S402 and S4 of the flow shown in FIG.
In 03, the wireless terminal MT # i has previously selected the base station selection function 306.
The base station is selected based on the logic incorporated in the above, that is, the logic which selects the earliest received base station among the authentication request responses 1 received within a predetermined time after transmission, and the other authentication processing responses 1 The authentication process for is suspended. Here, it is assumed that the authentication processing response 1 from the base station AP # k is the earliest.

The wireless terminal MT # i, which has received the authentication request response 1 from the base stations AP # 1 and AP # k within a predetermined time, receives the authentication request response 1 from the base station AP # k which has responded first.
Is processed (steps S402 to S404).
The other authentication processing response 1 received from the base station AP # 1 is
It is held until the authentication 1 succeeds for the base station that responded earlier than that, but is discarded when the base station that responded earlier is selected.

MT # i which selects the authentication request response 1 from the base station AP # k in step S404 of the flow of FIG.
In step S405, as in the first and second embodiments, the key generation information KEmt # i of the own device and the base station AP # are transmitted.
The shared key Kmt # i-ap # k between MT # i-AP # k is calculated from the key generation information KEap # k of k. Then, the signature data Sigmat # i is calculated using the random number R1 and the private key SKmt # i of the own device (step S406). Then, the wireless terminal MT # i calculates a random number R2, attaches R2, the certificate Certmt # i, and Sigmat # i of its own device to the authentication information 1 and selects the packet from the base station AP #.
It is transmitted to k (step S407).

The base station AP which has received the authentication information 1 from the wireless terminal MT # i in step S214 of the flow of FIG.
After that, #k performs the same processing as in the first and second embodiments, and if it determines that the base station MT # i is a regular MT, it transmits the authentication result 1 to MT # i ( Step S215
~ S217), and M is authenticated when MT # i is successfully authenticated.
The transfer of the authentication 2 packet transmitted from T # i to the AS is permitted (step S218). On the other hand, if the MT inspection fails, the authentication result 1 indicating the authentication failure is MT.
#I, and the transfer of the authentication 2 packet transmitted from MT # i to AS is prohibited (steps S219-).
S221).

The wireless terminal MT # i which has received the authentication result 1 from the base station AP # k in step S408 of the flow of FIG.
Examines the certificate Certap # k of the base station AP # k (step S409). If this check fails, the packet is discarded (step S411) and it is determined whether the authentication request response 1 from another base station is received (step S412).

In step S412, if the authentication request response 1 from the other base station remains, the process returns to step S404, and the base station that has the earliest response among the remaining authentication request responses 1 is selected, The processing from S405 is repeated. In the situation of FIG. 17, the base station AP # 1 is selected first, but if the authentication of the base station AP # k is unsuccessful, the base station AP # 1 that responds subsequently is subjected to step S405. Subsequent processing will be performed. In step S412, if there is no authentication request response 1 from another base station, step S412 is performed.
Returning to 401, the authentication 1 is started from the beginning.

In step S409, the base station AP #
If the certificate Certap # k of k is successfully verified,
The wireless terminal MT # i transmits the base station AP # from the Certap # k.
The public key PKap # k of k is extracted, and this PKap # k
Is used to inspect the Sigap # k, and if this inspection is also successful, it is determined that the base station AP # k is a legitimate AP recognized by the operator, and the mutual authentication between the MT # i and the AP # k is completed. .
Even if this inspection fails, steps S411 and S4
12 is performed, and the authentication process is similarly performed on the authentication request response 1 from the base station AP # 1 which has returned the second response.

If the above authentication 1 is successful, the wireless terminal MT
#I is the authentication server AS via the selected base station AP # k
And authenticate. This MT-AS authentication procedure is the same as in the first and second embodiments, and MT-A on the MT side is the same.
The S-to-S authentication flow is shown in FIG. 13, the AP-side MT-AS authentication flow is shown in FIG. 14, and the relay base station AP # k-side MT is shown.
The inter-AS authentication flow is shown in FIGS. 15 and 16, respectively.

According to the radio access network of the fifth embodiment, like the first embodiment, the base station A
Since P # k does not transmit the packet by MT # i to the carrier side network until the authentication of the wireless terminal MT # i is successful, it is possible to prevent the attack on the authentication server AS using the authentication by the unauthorized wireless terminal. Yes, the base station AP
It is also possible to prevent unauthorized use of the access line of the user who owns the. Furthermore, in the case of the fifth embodiment, by selecting one legitimate base station AP, it is possible to prevent the same authentication 2 packet from being transmitted to the authentication server AS. In addition, the response speed of wireless communication can be increased by preferentially selecting from the base station that responded first, and the response time from the response from multiple base stations can be held once on the wireless terminal side. Since the authentication process is preferentially performed from the one that is earlier, the communication process can be performed faster than in the case of the third embodiment.

[Sixth Embodiment] Next, the sixth embodiment of the present invention will be described.
The wireless access network according to the embodiment will be described. The functional configuration of the radio access network of the sixth embodiment is the same as that of the second embodiment, but FIG.
When the new wireless terminal MT # i receives the authentication request response 1 from the plurality of base stations AP # 1 and AP # k at the same time or in succession, all of them are temporarily held. It is characterized in that the authentication 1 process is performed in order from the base station having the highest reception level of the response signal, the base station with the successful authentication 1 is selected, and the subsequent authentication procedure is executed. FIG. 25 shows an AP authentication flow including a base station selection process of the wireless terminal MT in the sixth embodiment. All other processing is common to the second embodiment.

The functional configuration of the radio terminal MT is shown in FIG.
It is similar to the second embodiment shown in FIG. However, when the base station selection function 306 receives the authentication request responses 1 from a plurality of base stations, all of them are temporarily held and the processing of the authentication 1 is performed in order from the base station having a higher response signal reception level. However, it is different from the second embodiment in that the same authentication process is prevented from occurring at the same time by selecting the base station for which the authentication 1 has been successful.

Next, the operation of the wireless access network according to the sixth embodiment will be described in A including the wireless terminal authentication sequence of FIG. 20 and the wireless terminal base station AP selection processing of FIG.
This will be described using the P authentication flow.

When a general user newly installs the base station AP # k on the network, the AP # k authenticates with the authentication server AS managed by the operator. This procedure is the first and second steps.
5 is common to the embodiment, and is the same as the authentication sequence in FIG. 5, the packet payload data for authentication in FIG. 6, and the AP-AS authentication flow in FIGS. 7 and 8.

When a wireless terminal MT # i tries to access the network via the base station AP, MT # 1
First authenticates with the AP. The base station AP does not transfer the packet transmitted from the wireless terminal MT # 1 to the operator side network NW until this authentication is successful. The payload data of the MT authentication packet used in the sixth embodiment is shown in FIG. 10 as in the first embodiment. Further, the MT-AP authentication flow seen from the AP side is shown in FIG. 12, and the MT-AS authentication flow is shown in FIGS. 13 and 14.
In addition, the MT-AS authentication flow on the side of the base station AP # k which is a relay is the same as that of the first and second embodiments shown in FIGS. 15 and 16, respectively.

MT-AP as seen from the MT side shown in FIG.
In step S401 of the inter-authentication flow, a certain wireless terminal MT
When #i tries to access the network, the key generation information KEmt # i is calculated, and the authentication request 1 with the key generation information attached is transmitted by broadcast to the base station AP.

Similar to the first embodiment, the AP # k that has received the authentication request 1 from the wireless terminal MT # 1 in step S211 of the flow of FIG. 12 calculates the key generation information KEap # k, and further Shared key Kmt # between MT # i and AP # k
i-ap # k is calculated (step S212). Further, the base station AP # k calculates a random number R1 and calculates KEap # k,
Authentication request response 1 with R1 attached is transmitted to MT # i (step S213).

In the situation shown in FIG. 17, since the base station AP # 1 also receives the authentication request 1 from the same wireless terminal MT # i, the key generation information KEap # 1 is calculated in the same manner and MT
The shared key Kmt # i-ap # 1 between # i-AP # 1 is calculated (step S212). Base station AP # 1 is
The random number R1 ′ is calculated, and the authentication request response 1 with KEap # 1 and R1 ′ attached is transmitted to MT # i in the same manner as the base station AP # k (step S213).

Steps S402 and S4 in the flow of FIG.
In 03, the wireless terminal MT # i has previously selected the base station selection function 306.
A base station is selected based on the logic incorporated in the above, that is, the base station is selected based on the logic that the base station with the highest reception level is selected from the authentication request responses 1 received within a predetermined time after transmission, and the other authentication processing responses 1 The authentication process for is suspended. Here, it is assumed that the reception level of the authentication processing response 1 from the base station AP # k is the highest.

The wireless terminal MT # i, which has received the authentication request response 1 from the base stations AP # 1 and AP # k within a predetermined time, receives the authentication request response 1 from the base station AP # k having the higher reception level. Then, the processing is performed (steps S402 to S40).
4 '). The authentication processing response 1 from the other received base station AP # 1 is held until the authentication 1 succeeds with respect to the other base station having a higher reception level, but the other base station having a higher reception level It will be discarded when selected.

MT # i which selects the authentication request response 1 from the base station AP # k in step S404 'of the flow of FIG.
In step S405, as in the first and second embodiments, the key generation information KEmt # i of the own device and the base station AP # are transmitted.
The shared key Kmt # i-ap # k between MT # i-AP # k is calculated from the key generation information KEap # k of k. Then, the signature data Sigmat # i is calculated using the random number R1 and the private key SKmt # i of the own device (step S406). Then, the wireless terminal MT # i calculates a random number R2, attaches R2, the certificate Certmt # i, and Sigmat # i of its own device to the authentication information 1 and selects the packet from the base station AP #.
It is transmitted to k (step S407).

The base station AP which has received the authentication information 1 from the wireless terminal MT # i in step S214 of the flow of FIG.
After that, #k performs the same processing as in the first and second embodiments, and if it determines that the base station MT # i is a regular MT, it transmits the authentication result 1 to MT # i ( Step S215
~ S217), and M is authenticated when MT # i is successfully authenticated.
The transfer of the authentication 2 packet transmitted from T # i to the AS is permitted (step S218). On the other hand, if the MT inspection fails, the authentication result 1 indicating the authentication failure is MT.
#I, and the transfer of the authentication 2 packet transmitted from MT # i to AS is prohibited (steps S219-).
S221).

The wireless terminal MT # i which has received the authentication result 1 from the base station AP # k in step S408 of the flow shown in FIG.
Examines the certificate Certap # k of the base station AP # k (step S409). If this check fails, the packet is discarded (step S411) and it is determined whether the authentication request response 1 from another base station is received (step S412).

If the authentication request response 1 from the other base station remains in step S412, step S404 '.
Returning to step S405, the base station having the highest reception level of the response signal is selected from the remaining authentication request responses 1 and step S405.
The subsequent processing is repeated. In the situation of FIG. 17, the base station AP # 1 is selected first, but the base station AP # k is selected.
If the authentication of 1 is unsuccessful, the processing of step S405 and subsequent steps will be performed for the next base station AP # 1 having a high reception level. In step S412,
When the authentication request response 1 from another base station does not remain, all packets are discarded, the process returns to step S401, and authentication 1 is started from the beginning.

At step S409, the base station AP #
If the certificate Certap # k of k is successfully verified,
The wireless terminal MT # i transmits the base station AP # from the Certap # k.
The public key PKap # k of k is extracted, and this PKap # k
Is used to inspect the Sigap # k, and if this inspection is also successful, it is determined that the base station AP # k is a legitimate AP recognized by the operator, and the mutual authentication between the MT # i and the AP # k is completed. .
Even if this inspection fails, steps S411 and S4
12 is performed, and the authentication process is similarly performed on the authentication request response 1 from the base station AP # 1 having the second highest reception level of the response signal.

If the above authentication 1 is successful, the wireless terminal MT
#I is the authentication server AS via the selected base station AP # k
And authenticate. This MT-AS authentication procedure is the same as in the first and second embodiments, and MT-A on the MT side is the same.
The S-to-S authentication flow is shown in FIG. 13, the AP-side MT-AS authentication flow is shown in FIG. 14, and the relay base station AP # k-side MT is shown.
The inter-AS authentication flow is shown in FIGS. 15 and 16, respectively.

According to the radio access network of the sixth embodiment, like the first embodiment, the base station A
Since P # k does not transmit the packet by MT # i to the carrier side network until the authentication of the wireless terminal MT # i is successful, it is possible to prevent the attack on the authentication server AS using the authentication by the unauthorized wireless terminal. Yes, the base station AP
It is also possible to prevent unauthorized use of the access line of the user who owns the. Furthermore, in the case of the sixth embodiment, it is possible to prevent the same authentication 2 packet from being transmitted to the authentication server AS by selecting one regular base station AP. In addition, the reliability of wireless communication can be improved by preferentially selecting a base station with a high reception level of a response signal, and the responses from a plurality of base stations can be temporarily stored on the wireless terminal side. Since the authentication process is performed with priority given to the response signal having the highest reception level, the communication process can be speeded up as compared with the case of the second embodiment.

[Seventh Embodiment] Next, the seventh embodiment of the present invention will be described.
The wireless access network according to the embodiment will be described. The wireless access network according to the seventh embodiment has the same functional configuration as that of the second embodiment, but FIG.
When the new wireless terminal MT # i receives the authentication request response 1 from the plurality of base stations AP # 1 and AP # k at the same time or in succession, all of them are temporarily held. Check the bandwidth usage status of each base station,
It is characterized in that the processing of authentication 1 is performed in order from the base station with the largest free band, the base station for which authentication 1 is successful is selected, and the subsequent authentication procedure is executed. FIG. 26 shows an AP authentication flow including a base station selection process of the wireless terminal MT in the seventh embodiment. All other processing is second
This embodiment is common to the embodiment.

The functional configuration of the radio terminal MT is shown in FIG.
It is similar to the second embodiment shown in FIG. However, when the base station selection function 306 receives the authentication request response 1 from a plurality of base stations, all of them are temporarily held, and the processing of the authentication 1 is performed in order from the base station with the largest free band,
This is different from the second embodiment in that the same authentication process is prevented from occurring at the same time by selecting a base station for which authentication 1 has succeeded.

Next, the operation of the wireless access network according to the seventh embodiment will be described in A including the wireless terminal authentication sequence of FIG. 20 and the base station AP selection processing of the wireless terminal of FIG.
This will be described using the P authentication flow.

When a general user newly installs the base station AP # k on the network, the AP # k authenticates with the authentication server AS managed by the operator. This procedure is the first and second steps.
5 is common to the embodiment, and is the same as the authentication sequence in FIG. 5, the packet payload data for authentication in FIG. 6, and the AP-AS authentication flow in FIGS. 7 and 8.

When a wireless terminal MT # i attempts to access the network via the base station AP, MT # 1
First authenticates with the AP. The base station AP does not transfer the packet transmitted from the wireless terminal MT # 1 to the operator side network NW until this authentication is successful. The payload data of the MT authentication packet used in the seventh embodiment is as shown in FIG. 10 as in the first embodiment. Further, the MT-AP authentication flow seen from the AP side is shown in FIG. 12, and the MT-AS authentication flow is shown in FIGS. 13 and 14.
In addition, the MT-AS authentication flow on the side of the base station AP # k which is a relay is the same as that of the first and second embodiments shown in FIGS. 15 and 16, respectively.

MT-AP as seen from the MT side shown in FIG.
In step S401 of the inter-authentication flow, a certain wireless terminal MT
When #i tries to access the network, the key generation information KEmt # i is calculated, and the authentication request 1 with the key generation information attached is transmitted by broadcast to the base station AP.

Similarly to the first embodiment, the AP # k which has received the authentication request 1 from the wireless terminal MT # 1 in step S211 of the flow of FIG. 12 calculates the key generation information KEap # k, and further Shared key Kmt # between MT # i and AP # k
i-ap # k is calculated (step S212). Further, the base station AP # k calculates a random number R1 and calculates KEap # k,
Authentication request response 1 with R1 attached is transmitted to MT # i (step S213).

In the situation shown in FIG. 17, since the base station AP # 1 also receives the authentication request 1 from the same wireless terminal MT # i, the key generation information KEap # 1 is calculated similarly and MT
The shared key Kmt # i-ap # 1 between # i-AP # 1 is calculated (step S212). Base station AP # 1 is
The random number R1 ′ is calculated, and the authentication request response 1 with KEap # 1 and R1 ′ attached is transmitted to MT # i in the same manner as the base station AP # k (step S213).

Steps S402 and S4 of the flow shown in FIG.
In 03, the wireless terminal MT # i has previously selected the base station selection function 306.
The base station is selected based on the logic incorporated in the above, that is, the base station having the largest free band in the authentication request response 1 received within a predetermined time after transmission is selected, and the other authentication processing responses are selected. The authentication process for 1 is put on hold. Here, it is assumed that the base station AP # k has the largest free band.

The wireless terminal MT # i, which has received the authentication request response 1 from the base stations AP # 1 and AP # k within a predetermined time, transmits the authentication request response 1 from the base station AP # k having the larger free band. Is processed (steps S402 to S40)
4 ″). The authentication processing response 1 from the other received base station AP # 1 is held until the authentication 1 succeeds with respect to the other base station having a larger bandwidth, but the other base station Will be discarded when is selected.

MT # i which selects the authentication request response 1 from the base station AP # k in step S404 ″ of the flow of FIG.
In step S405, as in the first and second embodiments, the key generation information KEmt # i of the own device and the base station AP # are transmitted.
The shared key Kmt # i-ap # k between MT # i-AP # k is calculated from the key generation information KEap # k of k. Then, the signature data Sigmat # i is calculated using the random number R1 and the private key SKmt # i of the own device (step S406). Then, the wireless terminal MT # i calculates a random number R2, attaches R2, the certificate Certmt # i, and Sigmat # i of its own device to the authentication information 1 and selects the packet from the base station AP #.
It is transmitted to k (step S407).

The base station AP which has received the authentication information 1 from the wireless terminal MT # i in step S214 of the flow of FIG.
After that, #k performs the same processing as in the first and second embodiments, and if it determines that the base station MT # i is a regular MT, it transmits the authentication result 1 to MT # i ( Step S215
~ S217), and M is authenticated when MT # i is successfully authenticated.
The transfer of the authentication 2 packet transmitted from T # i to the AS is permitted (step S218). On the other hand, if the MT inspection fails, the authentication result 1 indicating the authentication failure is MT.
#I, and the transfer of the authentication 2 packet transmitted from MT # i to AS is prohibited (steps S219-).
S221).

The wireless terminal MT # i which has received the authentication result 1 from the base station AP # k in step S408 of the flow of FIG.
Examines the certificate Certap # k of the base station AP # k (step S409). If this check fails, the packet is discarded (step S411) and it is determined whether the authentication request response 1 from another base station is received (step S412).

In step S412, if the authentication request response 1 from another base station remains, step S404 ″.
Returning to step 1, the base station having the largest free band is selected from the remaining authentication request responses 1, and the processing from step S405 is repeated. In the situation of FIG. 17, the base station AP # 1 is selected first, but if the authentication of the base station AP # k is unsuccessful, then the base station AP # 1 is processed in step S405 and subsequent steps. Processing will be carried out. In step S412, if the authentication request response 1 from another base station does not remain, all packets are discarded, the process returns to step S401, and authentication 1 is started from the beginning.

In step S409, the base station AP #
If the certificate Certap # k of k is successfully verified,
The wireless terminal MT # i transmits the base station AP # from the Certap # k.
The public key PKap # k of k is extracted, and this PKap # k
Is used to inspect the Sigap # k, and if this inspection is also successful, it is determined that the base station AP # k is a legitimate AP recognized by the operator, and the mutual authentication between the MT # i and the AP # k is completed. .
Even if this inspection fails, steps S411 and S4
12 and the base station AP with the second largest free band
Authentication processing is similarly performed on the authentication request response 1 from # 1.

When the above authentication 1 is successful, the wireless terminal MT
#I is the authentication server AS via the selected base station AP # k
And authenticate. This MT-AS authentication procedure is the same as in the first and second embodiments, and MT-A on the MT side is the same.
The S-to-S authentication flow is shown in FIG. 13, the AP-side MT-AS authentication flow is shown in FIG. 14, and the relay base station AP # k-side MT is shown.
The inter-AS authentication flow is shown in FIGS. 15 and 16, respectively.

According to the radio access network of the seventh embodiment, as in the first embodiment, the base station A
Since P # k does not transmit the packet by MT # i to the carrier side network until the authentication of the wireless terminal MT # i is successful, it is possible to prevent the attack on the authentication server AS using the authentication by the unauthorized wireless terminal. Yes, the base station AP
It is also possible to prevent unauthorized use of the access line of the user who owns the. Furthermore, in the case of the seventh embodiment, by selecting one legitimate base station AP, it is possible to prevent the same authentication 2 packet from being transmitted to the authentication server AS. In addition, the response processing speed of wireless communication can be increased by preferentially selecting a base station with a large available band, and the responses from a plurality of base stations can be temporarily stored on the wireless terminal side. Since the authentication process is performed with priority given to the one with the largest free band, the communication process can be speeded up as compared with the case of the fourth embodiment.

[Eighth Embodiment] Next, the eighth embodiment of the present invention will be described.
The wireless access network according to the embodiment will be described with reference to FIGS. 27 to 32. The system of the eighth embodiment is characterized in that the authentication server AS has a function of registering and managing the identifiers of the wireless terminal and the base station, which are paths, in the database of the own device. This authentication server AS
27 is a functional configuration shown in FIG. 27 and FIG. 29. In addition to the functional configuration of the first embodiment shown in FIG. 1, a wireless terminal movement management function 107 is provided. Corresponding base station M
T is the functional configuration shown in FIGS. 28 and 30, and is provided with a resource releasing function 210 in addition to the functional configuration of the first embodiment shown in FIG.

The management function of the wireless terminal and the base station by the authentication server AS is executed as follows. FIG. 31 shows a resource releasing sequence, and FIG. 32 shows a packet format used at this time. The MT registration confirmation flow is shown in FIG.

After mutual authentication between the new wireless terminal MT # i and the authentication server AS succeeds in the wireless access network according to any of the first to seventh embodiments, as shown in the flow of FIG. The authentication server AS uses the new wireless terminal M
Identifiers I of T # i and the base stations AP1 and AP2 that relayed the authentication packet between the wireless terminal and the authentication server
D (preferably using a MAC address, but may be an ID newly set in this system) is registered and managed as a pair in the database (step S501).

At the time of this registration, the authentication server AS confirms whether the identifier ID of the new wireless terminal MT # i is already registered in the database (step S50).
2). If already registered, the new wireless terminal MT # i is different from the base station AP1 which is a pair with another base station AP1.
A resource release notification indicating that it has moved to P2 is transmitted (step S503).

Base station AP1 which has received the resource release notice
Refers to the identifier of the wireless terminal MT in the resource release notification, releases the corresponding resource, and transmits the resource completion to the authentication server AS.

As a result, in the wireless access network of the eighth embodiment, the authentication server AS manages the movement of the wireless terminal MT # i authenticated by itself, and the wireless terminal from one base station AP1 to another base station. When moving to AP2, after successful mutual authentication between the wireless terminal and the authentication server, the wireless terminal MT is sent to the old base station AP1 to which the wireless terminal belongs.
By notifying that #i has moved, the base station does not have to keep a record of the wireless terminal MT # i which has once performed mutual authentication but has now moved and cannot communicate. The management data of the terminal can be reduced, and the processing speed can be increased accordingly.

[Ninth Embodiment] A wireless multi-hop network according to a ninth embodiment of the present invention will be described. 34 shows a functional configuration of the wireless multi-hop network according to the ninth embodiment of the present invention, FIG. 35 is a functional configuration of the authentication server AS, FIG. 36 is a functional configuration of the base station MT,
FIG. 37 shows a functional configuration of the wireless terminal MT. The wireless multi-hop network according to the ninth embodiment includes a wireless terminal MT additionally provided with a packet relay function, a base station A provided with a packet relay function and wirelessly communicating with the wireless terminal MT.
P, an authentication server AS connected to the base station AP via the operator side wired network NW.

In this wireless multi-hop network, as shown in FIG. 38, for example, the wireless terminal MT9 is relayed to the other wireless terminals MT3 and MT2 to access the base station AP1, and from this base station AP1 to the network NW. Through the authentication server AS, and vice versa.
The S communicates with the wireless terminal MT9.

Therefore, as shown in FIGS. 34 and 35,
The authentication server AS, as software, includes a wireless terminal authentication function 101 that performs mutual authentication with the wireless terminal MT, a wireless terminal management function 102 that manages the authenticated wireless terminal MT using a database, and a packet of the network NW. A wired section packet inspection function 103 for inspecting and a packet discrimination function 104 for discriminating packets are provided.
A base station mutual authentication function 105 for executing mutual authentication with the base station and a base station management function 106 for managing the authenticated base station AP using a database are provided.

As shown in FIGS. 34 and 36, the base station AP
Is as software, authentication server AS-wireless terminal MT
An authentication packet transfer function 201 for transferring an authentication packet between them, a wireless section packet inspection function 202 for inspecting a packet of a wireless network, a wired section packet inspection function 203 for inspecting a packet of a wired network NW,
A packet discrimination function 204 for discriminating packets and a packet relay function 205 for relaying packets are provided. In addition, a mutual authentication function 206 with an authentication server for executing mutual authentication with the authentication server AS and a mutual authentication with a wireless terminal MT are provided. A mutual authentication function 207 with a wireless terminal to be executed, a packet transfer judgment function 208 for judging whether or not a received packet can be transferred, a wireless terminal management function 209 for managing the authenticated wireless terminal by a database, and a wireless terminal selection function 211 are provided. There is.

As shown in FIGS. 34 and 37, the wireless terminal M
T is software as a mutual authentication function 301 with an authentication server that performs mutual authentication with the authentication server AS, a wireless section packet inspection function 302 that inspects a packet of a wireless network, and a packet determination function 30 that performs packet determination.
3, a packet relay function 304 that relays a packet from another wireless terminal, a mutual authentication function 307 with a wireless terminal that performs mutual authentication with another wireless terminal or a base station, and one of a plurality of wireless terminals or base stations The wireless terminal selection function 308 for selecting a proxy terminal and the authentication packet transfer function 309 for transferring an authentication packet when the proxy terminal is selected.

Next, the operation of the wireless multi-hop network of the ninth embodiment having the above configuration will be described.
Also in the wireless multi-hop networks shown in FIGS. 34 and 38, the base station AP is installed by a business operator or a general user. In the case of this network, the wireless terminal MT can be relayed not only to a nearby base station but also to a nearby wireless terminal and can transmit the relay to the carrier network NW. Further, in order to realize this network, each wireless terminal MT may transfer a packet received from another wireless terminal MT or a packet received from a base station AP to an adjacent MT or AP on the destination route. it can.

<Mutual Authentication Between Authentication Server AS and Base Station AP> When a general user newly installs the base station AP1 in the network, the base station AP1 authenticates with the authentication server AS managed by the business operator. This authentication sequence is shown in FIG. 5 as in the first embodiment, and the authentication packet payload data is shown in FIG. The authentication flow is also the same as in the first embodiment, and is shown in FIGS. 7 and 8. However, the identification number of the base station AP is # k = 1 here, and AP1 is used instead of AP # k.

First, step S101 of the flow shown in FIG.
Then, the base station AP1 calculates the key generation information KEap1 and transmits the authentication request to which the key generation information is attached.

At step S111 in the flow of FIG. 8, the authentication server AS that has received the authentication request from the base station AP1
The key generation information KEas is calculated, and the shared key Kap1-as between AP1-AS is calculated from KEap1 and KEas (step S112). The authentication server AS further calculates a random number R1 and transmits an authentication request response with KEas and R1 attached to the base station AP1 (step S113).

The base station AP1 which has received the authentication request response from the authentication server AS in step S102 of the flow of FIG.
Is the shared key Kap between the AP1-AS and the key generation information KEap1 of its own device and the key generation information KEas of the authentication server AS.
1-as is calculated, the random number Rl and the private key SKap of the own device
The signature data Sigap1 is calculated using 1 (step S104). The base station AP1 further calculates a random number R2, attaches this R2, the certificate Certap1 of its own device, and Sigap1 to the authentication information and transmits the packet to the authentication server AS (step S105).

The authentication server AS which has received the authentication information from the base station AP1 in step S114 of the flow of FIG.
Inspect the attached Certap1. If the inspection fails, the authentication result indicating the authentication failure is transmitted to AP1 (steps S115, S117, S118). If the inspection is successful, the public key PKap1 of AP1 is retrieved from Certap1, and the seed name data Sigap1 of the base station AP1 is further inspected using this PKap1. Even if this inspection fails, the authentication result indicating the authentication failure is transmitted to AP1 (steps S115, S).
117, S118).

If this inspection also succeeds, it is determined that the base station AP1 is an authorized base station, and step S11 is performed.
The process branches to YES in step 5, and the random number R2 and the private key SKa of the own device
The signature data Sigas is calculated using s (step S116). The authentication server AS further attaches its own certificate Certas and signature data Sigas to the authentication result, and transmits the packet to the base station AP1 (step S118).

The base station AP1 which has received the authentication result from the authentication server AS in step S106 of the flow of FIG.
Check the attached signature data Certas of the authentication server. If the inspection fails, the authentication process is started from the beginning (NO in step S107). If this check is successful, the authentication server's certificate Certa
The public key PKas of the authentication server AS is extracted from s. The base station AP1 further inspects the signature data Sigas of the authentication server using the retrieved public key PKas. If the inspection fails, discard the received authentication result,
The authentication process is started from the beginning (NO in step S107).
Branch to). If the inspection is successful, the authentication server AS determines that it is a legitimate authentication server installed by the business operator, and the AP
Mutual authentication between 1-AS is completed (YES in step S107).

By thus authenticating the new base station AP1 by the authentication server AS, the business operator grasps the AP installed by the user, and the user has the same level of security as that installed by the business operator. You will be able to use it as if you have it.

<Mutual Authentication Between Wireless Terminals MT-MT> FIG. 3
In the network shown in FIG. 8, when the wireless terminal MT9 accesses the network NW for the first time, the neighboring wireless terminals M
Authentication is received from T or the base station AP. The wireless terminal MT or the base station AP, which is a proxy terminal in the vicinity of the wireless terminal MT9, authenticates the packet transmitted from MT9 with the authentication 1
Will not be transferred before the local device until it succeeds. Wireless terminal M
FIG. 39 shows the authentication sequence of T9, and FIG. 40 shows the payload data of the authentication packet.

In the following, although the wireless terminals MT3, MT4, MT8 exist near the wireless terminal MT9, the wireless terminal MT9 selects MT3 by the wireless terminal selection function 308 and relays this MT3 first ( Proxy server), authentication server A with the route of MT3-MT2-AP1
It is assumed that the mutual authentication procedure is performed with S.

At the first step S601 in the authentication flow seen from the wireless terminal MT9 of FIG. 41, the wireless terminal MT9
Generates a random number R1 and broadcasts authentication request 1 with R1 added. In the situation of FIG. 38, this authentication request 1 is transmitted to the wireless terminals MT3, MT4 and MT8 as described above.
Received at the same time.

The wireless terminal MT which has received the authentication request 1 from the wireless terminal MT9 in step S611 of the flow of FIG.
3 generates the random number R2 and calculates the signature data Sigmat3 using the secret key SKmt3 of the own device and the random number R1 (step S612). The wireless terminal MT3 subsequently transmits the authentication request response 1 to which the random number R2, Sigmat3, and the certificate Certmt3 of its own device are added to the wireless terminal MT9 (step S613). Similarly, each of MT4 and MT8 that has received the authentication request 1 from the wireless terminal MT9 also transmits the authentication request response 1 to MT9.

The wireless terminal MT9, which has received the authentication request response 1 from the plurality of wireless terminals MT3, MT4, MT8 in step S602 of the flow in FIG. 41, has the certificates (Certmt3, Certmt4, Cert) attached thereto.
Check mt8). If the inspection fails, the received authentication request response is discarded. If the inspection is successful, the public key (PKmt3, PKmt4, PKmt
8) is taken out and each signature data (Sigmat3, Sigmat4, Sigmat8) is inspected using the public key (step S603).

If there is no relay MT that has been successfully inspected, the received authentication request response 1 is discarded, and the process returns to the beginning (NO in step S604).

If the relay MT that has been successfully tested is also 1, the flow branches to YES at step S604. When there are a plurality of relay MTs that have been successfully inspected, if the base station AP is included in the relay MTs, the base station is preferentially proxied (Pr.
If all the wireless terminals have been successfully selected and successfully tested, the new wireless terminal MT9 is the base station AP.
1, the route information RInfo up to AP2 is checked, and one MT having the smallest number of hops to AP is selected. Furthermore, if there are multiple candidates, 1 is randomly selected from the candidates.
One relay MT is selected (step S605). Here, it is assumed that the wireless terminal MT3 is selected. If there are multiple candidates, the wireless terminal with the highest received signal level,
Alternatively, the first received wireless terminal may be selected. The wireless terminal MT3 thus selected becomes the Proxy MT of the new wireless terminal MT9.

The wireless terminal MT9 subsequently uses the random number R2 and the secret key SKmt9 of its own device to generate the signature data Sigmat9.
And the authentication information 1 to which R2, Sigmat9, and the certificate Certmt9 of the own device are added
(Here, MT3) (steps S606, S)
607).

The radio terminal MT3 selected by the radio terminal MT9 is MT9 in step S614 of the flow in FIG.
Upon receiving the authentication information 1 from, the certificate Certmt9 of the new wireless terminal MT9 is checked. If the inspection fails, the authentication result 1 indicating the authentication failure is transmitted to the MT 9 (steps S615, S618 to S620).

If the check is successful, the public key PKmt9 is extracted from Certmt9, and this public key PKmt9 is extracted.
Is used to inspect the signature data Sigmat9 of the wireless terminal MT9. If this test fails, the wireless terminal M
T3 transmits the authentication result 1 indicating the authentication failure to the wireless terminal MT9, and MT3 prohibits the transfer of the authentication 2 packet transmitted from MT9 to the AP (steps S615, S).
618-S620). On the other hand, if this inspection is also successful, the new MT authentication is successful, and the authentication result 1 is transmitted to the MT 9 (steps S615 and S616). At this time, the wireless terminal MT3 permits transfer of the authentication 2 packet transmitted from the wireless terminal MT9 to the AP (step S617).

When the wireless terminal MT9 receives the authentication result 1 in step S608 of the flow in FIG. 41, the wireless terminal MT9
-Mutual authentication between MT3 is completed.

In this way, the authenticated legitimate wireless terminal MT3 in the wireless multi-hop network authenticates the new wireless terminal MT9, so that the packet transmitted by the unauthorized wireless terminal pretending to be authenticated flows into the network. Can be prevented. In addition, the new wireless terminal is an authorized ProxyMT
By selecting one, it is possible to prevent a plurality of the same authentication 2 packets from being generated and transferred to the network NW.

<Mutual Authentication Between Wireless Terminal MT and Authentication Server> If the above-described mutual authentication 1 between wireless terminals is successful,
The wireless terminal MT9 will perform mutual authentication with the authentication server AS via the wireless terminal MT3 and the base station AP1.

In the first step S621 of the authentication flow seen from the new wireless terminal MT side in FIG. 43, the wireless terminal MT9 generates the sequence number SQN, and this SQN and secret key S
Calculate the packet inspection data PCV using Kmt9,
The authentication request 2 added with these SQN and PCV is transmitted to the wireless terminal MT3 (step S622).

In step S661 of the authentication flow seen from the ProxyMT side of FIG. 45, the wireless terminal MT3 that has received the authentication request 2 from the wireless terminal MT9 uses the PCV attached to it as the sequence number SQN and public key PKmt9.
To inspect (step S651). If the inspection fails, the received authentication request 2 is discarded. If the inspection is successful, the wireless terminal MT3 calculates the packet inspection data PCV using the network key NK (shared key) common to the SQN and the wireless multi-hop network distributed to the authenticated device (step S652). Then, the wireless terminal MT3 discards the original PCV and transmits the authentication request 2 to which the newly calculated PCV is added to the next device on the route (here, the wireless terminal MT2) (step S6).
53).

In step S671 of the flow of FIG. 46, if the wireless terminal MT3 serving as a relay receives the authentication request 2 from the wireless terminal MT9, it checks the packet inspection data PCV using the sequence number SQN and the network key NK. If it fails, the received authentication request 2 is discarded, and if it succeeds, the packet is directly transmitted to the wireless terminal MT2 that is the next device on the route (step S672). Similarly, if the wireless terminal MT2, which is the next device, receives the authentication request 2 from the wireless terminal MT3 serving as a relay, the SQN and N
The PCV is inspected by using K. If it fails, the received authentication request 2 is discarded, and if it succeeds, the packet is directly transmitted to the base station AP1 which is the next device on the route (step S672). Step S651 of the flow
Then, the base station A that has received the authentication request 2 from the wireless terminal MT2
P1 uses the packet inspection data PCV as the sequence number S
Check using QN and network key NK. If the inspection fails, the received authentication request 2 is discarded. If the check is successful, the PCV is calculated using the SQN and the shared key Kap1-as (step S652), and the original PC
The authentication request 2 in which V is discarded and a new PCV is added is transmitted to the authentication server AS (step S653).

In step S631 of the authentication flow seen from the authentication server AS side shown in FIG. 44, the base station AP1
The authentication server AS that has received the authentication request 2 from the PCV checks the PCV using SQN and Kap1-as (step S
632). If the check fails, the authentication server AS discards the received authentication request 2. If the test is successful,
The authentication server AS subsequently calculates a random number R3, generates a sequence number SQN, and then the SQN and shared key Kap1-a.
The packet inspection data PCV is calculated using s, and the random number R
Authentication request response 2 with SQN and PCV added is transmitted to base station AP1 (steps S633 and S634).

The base station A which has received the authentication request response 2 from the authentication server AS in step S651 of the flow of FIG.
P1 is a sequence number SQN, shared key Kap1-as
To inspect the packet inspection data PCV. If the inspection fails, the received authentication request response 2 is discarded. If the inspection is successful, the base station AP1 newly calculates the packet inspection data PCV using the sequence number SQN and the network key NK, discards the original PCV,
The authentication request response 2 to which the newly calculated PCV is added is transmitted to the wireless terminal MT2 serving as a relay (step S652,
S653).

In step S671 of the flow of FIG. 46, the relay wireless terminal MT2 that has received the authentication request response 2 from the base station AP1 inspects the PCV using SQN and NK, and if the inspection fails, the received authentication. Discard request response 2,
If the inspection is successful, it is directly transmitted to the wireless terminal MT3 to be the next relay (step S672).

Wireless terminal MT that is Proxy MT
3 is the wireless terminal M in step S651 of the flow of FIG.
When the authentication request response 2 from T2 is received, the packet inspection data PCV is inspected using the sequence number SQN and the network key NK, and if this inspection is successful, S
The PCN is newly calculated using the QN and the secret key SKmt3, the original PCV is discarded, and the authentication request response 2 with the new PCV added is transmitted to the new wireless terminal MT9 (steps S652 and S653).

The new wireless terminal MT9, which has received the authentication request response 2 from the wireless terminal MT3 in step S623 of the flow in FIG. 43, inspects the packet inspection data PCV using the sequence number SQN and the public key PKmt3 (step S624). ). If the test fails, the wireless terminal M
At T9, the received authentication request response 2 is discarded and authentication 2 is started from the beginning. If the inspection is successful, the wireless terminal MT9 uses the random number R3 and the secret key SKmt9 to generate the signature data Sig.
mt9 is calculated (step S625). Wireless terminal MT
9 subsequently calculates a random number R4, adds the random number R4, the certificate Certmt9 of the device itself, the signature data Sigmat9, and the packet inspection data PCV calculated by the same procedure as above to the authentication information 2 and adds the packet to the wireless terminal. The data is transmitted to MT3 (steps S626 and S627).

The Proxy wireless terminal MT3 which has received the authentication information 2 in step S651 of the flow of FIG.
V is checked, and if the result is correct, a new PCV is added and the authentication information 2 is transmitted to the wireless terminal MT2 to be the next relay (steps S652 and S653).

The next relay wireless terminal MT2 is shown in FIG.
When the authentication information 2 from the wireless terminal MT3 is received in step S671 of the flow of FIG. 7, the PCV is inspected, and if the inspection result is correct, the authentication result 2 is transmitted to the base station AP1 as it is (step S672).

[0223] The base station AP1 which has received the authentication information 2 from the wireless terminal MT2 in step S651 of the flow in Fig. 45.
Checks the PCV, adds a new PCV if the result is correct, and sends a packet of authentication result 2 to the authentication server AS (steps S652, S653).

The authentication server AS that has received the authentication information 2 from the base station AP1 in step S635 of the flow shown in FIG.
Checks the PCV (step S636). If the check fails, the AS discards the received authentication information 2. If the check is successful, the AS checks the certificate Certmt9 of the wireless terminal MT9 (step S637). If the inspection fails, the AS adds the new PCV to the authentication result 2 indicating the authentication failure and transmits it to the base station AP1 (steps S637, S641 to S643).

If the inspection of the certificate Certmt9 of the wireless terminal MT9 is successful, the authentication server AS determines that the certificate Certmt9 is Certmt9.
The public key PKmt9 of the wireless terminal MT9 is taken out from the wireless terminal MT9, and Sigmat9 is further inspected using this PKmt9.
If the inspection fails, the authentication result 2 indicating the authentication failure
Is added to the new PCV and transmitted to the base station AP1 (steps S637, S641 to S643). If the inspection is successful, the wireless terminal MT9 determines that it is a legitimate MT, and the authentication server AS calculates the signature data Sigas using the random number R4 and the private key SKas of its own device (step S63).
7, S638).

Next, the authentication server AS uses the network key N
K is encrypted with the public key PKmt9 of the wireless terminal MT9, its own certificate Certas and signature data Sigas, new PCV, and encrypted network key NK are added to the authentication result 2 (step S639), and the packet is sent to the base station. It transmits to AP1 (step S640).

Upon receiving the authentication result 2 from the authentication server AS, the base station AP1 receives step S65 of the flow shown in FIG.
Check PCV at 1. If the inspection result is correct, a new PCV is added and authentication result 2 is transmitted to MT2 (steps S652 and S653).

In step S671 of the flow of FIG. 46, if the wireless terminal MT2 serving as a relay receives the authentication result 2 from the base station AP1, it inspects the PCV, and if the result is correct, the authentication result 2 is directly sent to the next wireless terminal MT3. (Step S672).

In step S651 of the flow in FIG. 45, if the wireless terminal MT3 receives the authentication result 2 from the wireless terminal MT2, it checks the PCV, and if the result is correct, a new PCV is displayed.
Is added to the authentication result 2 and the packet is transmitted to the new wireless terminal MT9 (steps S652 and S653).

In step S628 of the flow in FIG. 33, P
The wireless terminal MT9, which has received the authentication result 2 from the roxy wireless terminal MT3, inspects the PCV (step S62).
9). If the check fails, the wireless terminal MT9 retransmits the authentication information 2. If the inspection of the PCV is successful, the wireless terminal MT9 further determines the certificate Certa of the authentication server AS.
inspect s. If the test fails, the wireless terminal MT
9 starts authentication 2 from the beginning (N in step S630)
Branch to O). If the inspection is successful, the wireless terminal MT9 extracts the public key PKas of the authentication server AS from the certificate Certas of the authentication server, and inspects the signature data Sigas of the authentication server using this PKas. Even if this check fails, the wireless terminal MT9 starts authentication 2 from the beginning.
Is started (NO in step S630). If this check is successful, the wireless terminal MT9 finally determines that the authentication server AS is a legitimate AS installed by the operator, decrypts the network key NK using the private key SKmt9, and saves it. Mutual authentication between the MT9 and the authentication server AS is completed (YES in step S630).

In the wireless multi-hop network of the ninth embodiment of the present invention, by adding the packet check data (PCV) to the packet for authentication 2 as described above, the wireless terminal MT and the base station AP on the route can Since it is confirmed that the packet is transmitted from the authorized MT, it is possible to prevent an attack using the authentication 2. Further, the authentication server AS can confirm that the authentication 2 packet transmitted from the wireless terminal MT is transmitted via the legitimate base station AP. Furthermore, the authentication server AS authenticates MT after the base station AP authenticates the wireless terminal MT, so that the business operator can know which base station AP which wireless terminal MT is accessing.

[Tenth Embodiment] In the ninth embodiment, when the authentication request response 1 in step S602 is received in the new MT side process of the MT-to-MT authentication process shown in the flow chart of FIG. 41, When the responses from the plurality of wireless terminals and the base station are received, the authentication processing is executed for all of them in step S603, and when there are a plurality of wireless terminals that have been successfully authenticated, the base station is preferentially selected in step S605. If the base station is not included, the one having the smallest hop count to the base station is selected from the plurality of wireless terminals. However, the logic for selecting a Proxy terminal from a plurality of wireless terminals and base stations is not limited to this, and for example, authentication processing is performed in order from the base station or wireless terminal that received the response first without distinguishing between the base station and wireless terminals. The wireless terminal or base station that has been successfully authenticated.
A method of selecting as an xy terminal can also be adopted.

The wireless multi-hop network of the tenth embodiment is characterized by adopting this selection procedure. That is, as in the ninth embodiment, FIGS.
In the wireless multi-hop network having the functional configuration of FIG. 7, the wireless terminal selection function 308 of each wireless terminal MT carries out the MT-MT authentication processing of FIG.

In the situation shown in FIG. 38, it is assumed that the new wireless terminal MT9 broadcasts the authentication request 1 (step S601) and the authentication request response 1 is returned from a plurality of wireless terminals and base stations. Here, it is assumed that the authentication request response 1 is received from the plurality of wireless terminals MT3, MT4, MT8 (step S602).

At this time, the radio terminal MT9 first selects the radio terminal or the base station that received the response first (here, the radio terminal MT3 is selected. Step S604).
-1). Then, the certificate Certmt3 attached to the authentication request response 1 is inspected (step S604-).
2). If the inspection fails, the received authentication request response 1
Is discarded, and the procedure for selecting the wireless terminal or the base station that has received the response and performing the certificate check again is repeated (steps S604-1, S604-2, S604-3).

If the certificate is successfully checked in step S604-2, the public key PKmt3 is taken out from the certificate and the signature data Sigmat3 is checked using the public key (step S604-2). Even when this check fails, the procedure of discarding the received authentication request response 1, selecting the wireless terminal or the base station that has received the response next, and performing the certificate check again is repeated (step S604-).
1, S604-2, S604-3). Then, if there is no relay MT for which both inspections have succeeded, the process returns to the beginning and starts over from the broadcast of the authentication request 1 (branch to NO in step S604-3). If there is a relay MT that has passed both inspections, the process branches to YES in step S604-2. Here again, it is assumed that the wireless terminal MT3 has been selected (step S605).

The wireless terminal MT9 subsequently uses the random number R2 and the private key SKmt9 of its own device to generate the signature data Sigmat9.
And the authentication information 1 to which R2, Sigmat9, and the certificate Certmt9 of the own device are added
(Here, MT3) (steps S606, S)
607).

When the wireless terminal MT3 selected by the wireless terminal MT9 receives the authentication information 1 from MT9 in step S614 of the flow of FIG. 42 thereafter, as in the ninth embodiment, the new wireless terminal MT9 is certified. Book Certmt9
To inspect. If the inspection fails, the authentication result 1 indicating the authentication failure is transmitted to the MT 9 (step S615, step S615).
S618 to S620).

If the check is successful, the public key PKmt9 is extracted from Certmt9, and the public key PKmt9 is extracted.
Is used to inspect the signature data Sigmat9 of the wireless terminal MT9. If this test fails, the wireless terminal M
T3 transmits the authentication result 1 indicating the authentication failure to the wireless terminal MT9, and MT3 prohibits the transfer of the authentication 2 packet transmitted from MT9 to the AP (steps S615, S).
618-S620). On the other hand, if this inspection is also successful, the new MT authentication is successful, and the authentication result 1 is transmitted to the MT 9 (steps S615 and S616). At this time, the wireless terminal MT3 permits transfer of the authentication 2 packet transmitted from the wireless terminal MT9 to the AP (step S617).

When the wireless terminal MT9 receives the authentication result 1 in step S608 of the flow in FIG. 41, the wireless terminal MT9
-Mutual authentication between MT3 is completed.

In this way, the authenticated legitimate wireless terminal MT3 in the wireless multi-hop network authenticates the new wireless terminal MT9, so that the packet transmitted by the unauthorized wireless terminal under the guise of the authentication flows into the network. Can be prevented. In addition, the new wireless terminal is an authorized ProxyMT
Alternatively, it is possible to prevent a plurality of the same authentication 2 packets from being generated and transferred to the network NW by selecting one base station. In addition, in the case of the tenth embodiment,
By preferentially selecting the proxy terminal from the wireless terminal or the base station that responds first, the substantial communication processing speed can be increased.

[Eleventh Embodiment] A wireless multi-hop network according to an eleventh embodiment of the present invention will be described.
This will be described with reference to FIG. In the wireless multi-hop network of the eleventh embodiment, as in the ninth embodiment, in the wireless multi-hop network having the functional configurations of FIGS. 34 to 37, the wireless terminal selection function 308 of each wireless terminal MT is It is characterized by performing the MT-MT authentication process of FIG.

That is, when the new wireless terminal MT receives the authentication request response 1 from a plurality of wireless terminals and base stations in the authentication processing between MTs, the authentication processing is performed in order from the base station or the wireless terminal having the higher reception level. The wireless terminal or the base station that has been successfully authenticated is selected as the Proxy terminal.

In the situation shown in FIG. 38, it is assumed that the new wireless terminal MT9 broadcasts the authentication request 1 (step S601), and the authentication request response 1 is returned from a plurality of wireless terminals and base stations. Here, it is assumed that the authentication request response 1 is received from the plurality of wireless terminals MT3, MT4, MT8 (step S602).

At this time, the radio terminal MT9 first selects the radio terminal or base station having the highest reception level of the response signal (here, it is assumed that the radio terminal MT3 is also selected, step S604-11). Then, the certificate Certmt3 attached to the authentication request response 1 is inspected (step S
604-2). If the inspection fails, the procedure of discarding the received authentication request response 1, selecting the wireless terminal or the base station that has received the response next, and performing the certificate inspection again is repeated (steps S604-11 and S604). -2, S60
4-3).

If the certificate is successfully checked in step S604-2, the public key PKmt3 is extracted from the certificate and the signature data Sigma3 is checked using the public key. Even when this check fails, the procedure of discarding the received authentication request response 1, selecting the wireless terminal or the base station that has received the response next, and performing the certificate check again is repeated (step S604-11). , S604-2, S60
4-3). Then, the number of relay MTs that passed both inspections is 1
If it is not enough, the process returns to the beginning and starts over from the broadcast of the authentication request 1 (branch to NO in step S604-3).

If there is a relay MT that has passed both inspections,
The process branches to YES in step S604-2. even here,
It is assumed that the wireless terminal MT3 has been selected (step S6).
05). The subsequent processing is the same as that of the tenth embodiment.

In this way, the authenticated legitimate wireless terminal MT3 in the wireless multi-hop network authenticates the new wireless terminal MT9, so that the packet transmitted by the unauthorized wireless terminal pretending to be authenticated flows into the network. Can be prevented. In addition, the new wireless terminal is an authorized ProxyMT
Alternatively, it is possible to prevent a plurality of the same authentication 2 packets from being generated and transferred to the network NW by selecting one base station. In addition, in the case of the eleventh embodiment,
The reliability of communication can be improved by preferentially selecting a proxy terminal from a wireless terminal or a base station having a high reception level of a response signal.

[Twelfth Embodiment] A wireless multi-hop network according to a twelfth embodiment of the present invention will be described.
It demonstrates using FIG. In the wireless multi-hop network of the twelfth embodiment, the wireless terminal selection function 308 of each wireless terminal MT is the same in the wireless multi-hop network having the functional configurations of FIGS. 34 to 37 as in the ninth embodiment. It is characterized in that the MT-MT authentication process of FIG. 49 is performed.

That is, when the new wireless terminal MT receives the authentication request response 1 from a plurality of wireless terminals and base stations in the authentication processing between MTs, the wireless terminal having the smallest number of hops to the base station AP is in order. It is characterized in that the authentication process is performed and the wireless terminal or the base station that has been successfully authenticated is selected as the Proxy terminal.

In the situation shown in FIG. 38, it is assumed that the new wireless terminal MT9 broadcasts the authentication request 1 (step S601 in FIG. 49), and the authentication request response 1 is returned from a plurality of wireless terminals and base stations. . here,
It is assumed that the authentication request response 1 is received from the plurality of wireless terminals MT3, MT4, MT8 (step S602).

At this time, the radio terminal MT9 selects the radio terminal having the smallest number of hops to the base station, or if it directly receives the authentication request response 1 from the base station, the base station is selected as it is ( It is also assumed here that the wireless terminal MT3 is selected (step S604-21). Then, the certificate Certmt3 attached to the authentication request response 1 is inspected (step S604-2). If the inspection fails, the procedure of discarding the received authentication request response 1, selecting the wireless terminal having the next smallest number of hops to the base station, and performing the certificate inspection again is repeated (step S604).
-11, S604-2, S604-3).

If the certificate is successfully checked in step S604-2, the public key PKmt3 is extracted from the certificate and the signature data Sigma3 is checked using the public key. Even when this check fails, the procedure of discarding the received authentication request response 1, selecting the wireless terminal having the next smallest number of hops to the base station, and performing the certificate check again is repeated (step S604). -21, S604-
2, S604-3). Then, if there is no relay MT that has passed both inspections, the process returns to the beginning and the authentication request 1
From the broadcast (step S604-
Branch to NO at 3).

If there is a relay MT that has passed both inspections,
The process branches to YES in step S604-2. even here,
It is assumed that the wireless terminal MT3 has been selected (step S6).
05). The subsequent processing is the same as that of the tenth embodiment.

In this way, the authenticated legitimate wireless terminal MT3 in the wireless multi-hop network authenticates the new wireless terminal MT9, so that the packet transmitted by the unauthorized wireless terminal pretending to be authenticated flows into the network. Can be prevented. In addition, the new wireless terminal is an authorized ProxyMT
Alternatively, it is possible to prevent a plurality of the same authentication 2 packets from being generated and transferred to the network NW by selecting one base station. In addition, in the case of the twelfth embodiment,
By preferentially selecting a proxy terminal from a wireless terminal having a small number of hops to the base station, communication reliability and response speed can be improved.

Note that the present invention is also subject to the rights of the software programs incorporated into the respective devices and executed in order to realize the respective functions of the illustrated flowcharts performed by the wireless terminal, the base station, and the authentication server in all the above embodiments. It is what

[0257]

According to the wireless access network of the first aspect of the present invention, the authentication server (AS) and the base station (AP) perform mutual authentication, thereby ensuring the security of the AP installed by the general user by the business operator. Can be guaranteed. Further, when a new wireless terminal (MT) makes an access, it is possible to confirm whether or not the MT-APs are legal devices by first performing mutual authentication between the MTs and APs, and the APs succeed in this mutual authentication. Until then, the packet transmitted by the new MT is not transferred to the network on the carrier side, so that a DoS attack pretending to be authenticated can be prevented. Furthermore, by performing mutual authentication between MT-AS and packet inspection (source confirmation) of this authentication packet after successful mutual authentication between MT-AP, the AS can accurately determine which AP has accessed which MT. Can be grasped and managed.

According to the wireless multi-hop network of the invention of claim 2, when a new wireless terminal (MT) accesses the wireless multi-hop network, the new MT first appears.
Mutual authentication between neighboring MTs makes it possible to confirm whether or not they are legitimate devices, and neighboring MTs can transmit packets transmitted by the new MT to the wireless multi-hop network until this mutual authentication succeeds. Since it is not transferred to, it is possible to prevent a DoS attack pretending to be authentication. Also, by selecting one MT or AP (base station) that relays a packet for mutual authentication between MT-AS (authentication server) at the time of mutual authentication, it is possible to prevent the same authentication processing from occurring at the same time. To do. Furthermore, after the mutual authentication between the MT-AP succeeds, the mutual authentication between the MT-AS and the packet inspection (source confirmation) of this authentication packet are performed to determine which A
It is possible to accurately grasp and manage which MT has accessed P.

According to the wireless terminal (MT) of the third aspect of the invention, mutual authentication is performed with the base station (AP) when a new entry is made into the wireless access network, and after the success, mutual authentication with the authentication server (AS) is performed. With the function to perform authentication,
By providing the AP with the function of not forwarding the packet transmitted by the new MT to the operator's network until mutual authentication with the new MT is successful, communication with the AP without using the MT, and eventually the authentication server (AS). It is possible to build a wireless access network that cannot communicate with the wireless LAN and contribute to building a wireless access network that is resistant to a DoS attack disguised as authentication.

According to the wireless terminal of the fourth aspect of the present invention, the authentication packet to be transmitted has a function of calculating and attaching the packet inspection data indicating the transmission source, so that the packet inspection data is attached to the authentication packet. This makes it possible to reveal the transmission source to the reception-destination base station and prevent it from being used for an unauthorized attack.

According to the wireless terminal (MT) of the invention of claims 5 to 8, the new MT relays the MT-AS (authentication server) mutual authentication packet at the time of MT-AP (base station) mutual authentication. By selecting the AP or MT to be performed according to a predetermined logic, it is possible to prevent the same authentication process from occurring a plurality of times at the same time.

According to the authentication server (AS) of the invention of claim 9, mutual authentication is performed with the base station (AP), mutual authentication with the new wireless terminal (MT), and mutual authentication with the new wireless terminal. In this case, the packet inspection data indicating the transmission source attached to the authentication packet is inspected, and if this inspection is successful, mutual authentication will be carried out. Can manage
Further, it is possible to accurately grasp which AP has accessed which MT.

According to the authentication server (AS) of the tenth aspect of the invention, the movement of the wireless terminal (MT) authenticated by itself is managed, and when the MT moves from one base station (AP) to another AP, After the mutual authentication between MT-AS is successful, the MT
By notifying the old AP to which the MT belonged that the MT has moved, it is not necessary to keep a record of the MT that has once mutually authenticated with the AP but has now moved and cannot communicate. The management data of can be reduced and the processing speed can be increased accordingly.

According to the base station (AP) of the eleventh aspect of the present invention, when newly connecting to a wireless access network or a wireless multi-hop network, mutual authentication with an authentication server is always carried out. It is possible to ensure the security of the AP installed by the general user by the business operator.

According to the base station (AP) of the invention of claim 12, when the new wireless terminal (MT) accesses, whether MT is a legitimate device by first performing mutual authentication between MT and AP. Until the mutual authentication succeeds, the packet transmitted by the new MT is not transferred to the network on the carrier side, so that a DoS attack pretending to be authenticated can be prevented.

According to the base station of the thirteenth aspect of the present invention, the function of registering the information of each wireless terminal that has succeeded in mutual authentication in its own apparatus, and the registration information of the corresponding wireless terminal upon receiving the movement notification from the authentication server. With the function to delete
When the wireless terminal moves to the communication area of another base station,
Resources for managing the wireless terminal can be saved by deleting the information of the wireless terminal that cannot communicate.

According to the wireless terminal (MT) of the invention of claim 14, when the wireless multi-hop network is newly accessed, it is provided with the function of first performing mutual authentication with the neighboring MT or AP. When an MT newly joins the wireless multi-hop network, the MT or AP nearby
The MT or AP in the vicinity does not forward the packet sent by the MT to the wireless multi-hop network until the mutual authentication succeeds, so that the DoS attack pretending to be authenticated is prevented. It can contribute to the construction of a highly durable wireless multi-hop network. In addition, the MT or AP (base station) that relays the MT-AS (authentication server) mutual authentication packet at the time of mutual authentication is set to 1
By providing the function of selecting one, it is possible to prevent the same authentication process from occurring more than once at the same time.

According to the wireless terminal (MT) of the fifteenth aspect of the invention, when the device itself newly accesses the wireless multi-hop network, the wireless terminal authentication packet is transmitted to the nearby wireless terminals or base stations. Functions, when the device itself is a new wireless terminal, a function of attaching packet inspection data indicating the transmission source to the authentication packet between the wireless terminal and the authentication server, and the device itself selected by another new wireless terminal If the proxy terminal has been verified, the packet inspection data is inspected for the wireless terminal-authentication server authentication packet sent from another new wireless terminal, and if the inspection fails, the authentication packet is discarded. , If the inspection is successful, attach the packet inspection data indicating the transmission source calculated by the device itself to the authentication packet, and attach it to another wireless terminal or base station on the route. Since a function of transferring, it is possible to accurately grasp what wireless terminal (MT) accesses to which base station (AP) to the authentication server.

The wireless terminal (M according to the invention of claims 16-18
According to T), a function of selecting the optimum AP or MT for relaying the MT-AS (authentication server) mutual authentication packet at the time of MT-AP (base station) mutual authentication is provided. It is possible to prevent the same authentication process from occurring at the same time.

[Brief description of drawings]

FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a functional configuration of a radio access network according to a first embodiment of this invention.

FIG. 2 is a functional block diagram of an authentication server according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 3 is a functional block diagram of a base station according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 4 is a functional block diagram of a wireless terminal according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 5 is an authentication sequence diagram between the base station (AP) and the authentication server (AS) in the first embodiment.

FIG. 6 is an explanatory diagram of payload data of an AP-AS authentication packet according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 7 is an AP-AS implemented in the first embodiment.
The flowchart of the authentication process on the AP side in inter-site authentication.

FIG. 8 is an AP-AS implemented in the first embodiment.
The flowchart of the authentication process on the AS side in inter-authentication.

FIG. 9 is a wireless terminal (MT) according to the first embodiment-
The authentication sequence diagram between authentication servers (AS).

FIG. 10 is an explanatory diagram of payload data of an MT-AS authentication packet according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 11 is an MT-A implemented in the first embodiment.
The flowchart of the authentication process by MT side in P authentication.

FIG. 12 is an MT-A implemented in the first embodiment.
The flowchart of the authentication process on the AP side in P-to-P authentication.

FIG. 13 is an MT-A implemented in the first embodiment.
The flowchart of the authentication process on the MT side in the S-to-S authentication.

FIG. 14 is an MT-A implemented in the first embodiment.
The flowchart of the authentication process on the AS side in S authentication.

FIG. 15 is an MT-A implemented in the first embodiment.
9 is a flowchart of authentication processing when a packet other than the authentication result 2 on the AP side in the S-to-S authentication is received.

FIG. 16 is an MT-A implemented in the first embodiment.
9 is a flowchart of an authentication process at the time of receiving a packet of authentication result 2 on the AP side in S-S authentication.

FIG. 17 is an explanatory diagram showing a situation in which one radio terminal (MT) communicates with a plurality of base stations (AP) in an environment with a high base station density in the radio access network according to the second embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 18 is a block diagram of a functional configuration of a wireless terminal according to the second embodiment.

FIG. 19 is a functional block diagram of a wireless terminal according to the second embodiment.

FIG. 20 is an authentication sequence diagram between the MT and the authentication server (AS) implemented in the second embodiment.

FIG. 21 is a flowchart of an AP selection process of MT according to the second embodiment.

FIG. 22 is a flowchart of MT AP selection processing in the radio access network according to the third embodiment of this invention.

FIG. 23 is a flowchart of MT AP selection processing in the radio access network according to the fourth embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 24 is a flowchart of MT AP selection processing in the wireless access network according to the fifth embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 25 is a flowchart of MT AP selection processing in the radio access network according to the sixth embodiment of this invention.

FIG. 26 is a flowchart of MT AP selection processing in the wireless access network according to the seventh embodiment of this invention.

FIG. 27 is a block diagram of a functional configuration of an authentication server (AS) in the wireless access network according to the eighth embodiment of this invention.

FIG. 28 is a block diagram of a functional configuration of a base station (AP) according to an eighth embodiment.

FIG. 29 is a diagram showing an authentication server (A according to the eighth embodiment.
The functional block diagram of S).

FIG. 30 is a functional block diagram of a base station (AP) according to the eighth embodiment.

FIG. 31 is a sequence diagram of resource release processing for an AP of AS according to the eighth embodiment.

FIG. 32 is an explanatory diagram of a packet format used in the above resource release processing.

FIG. 33 is a flowchart of an AS MT movement management process according to the eighth embodiment.

FIG. 34 is a block diagram of a functional configuration of a wireless multi-hop network according to a ninth embodiment of this invention.

FIG. 35 is a functional block diagram of an authentication server according to the ninth embodiment.

FIG. 36 is a functional block diagram of a base station according to the ninth embodiment.

FIG. 37 is a functional block diagram of a wireless terminal according to the ninth embodiment.

FIG. 38 is an operation explanatory diagram of the wireless access network according to the ninth embodiment;

FIG. 39 is an authentication sequence diagram between the wireless terminal (MT) and the authentication server (AS) implemented in the ninth embodiment.

FIG. 40 is an MT-A used in the ninth embodiment.
Explanatory drawing of the payload data of the authentication packet between S.

FIG. 41 is an MT-M implemented in the ninth embodiment.
The flowchart of the authentication process of the new MT side in T authentication.

FIG. 42 is an MT-M implemented in the ninth embodiment.
The flowchart of the authentication process on the Proxy MT side in the T-to-T authentication.

FIG. 43 is an MT-A implemented in the ninth embodiment.
The flowchart of the authentication process of the new MT side in S authentication.

FIG. 44 is an MT-A implemented in the ninth embodiment.
The flowchart of the authentication process on the AS side in S authentication.

FIG. 45 is an MT-A implemented in the ninth embodiment.
ProxyMT side or base station (AP) in S-to-S authentication
The flowchart of the authentication process at the time of receiving the authentication 2 packet on the side.

FIG. 46 is an MT-A implemented in the ninth embodiment.
The flowchart of the packet relay process by the relay MT side in S authentication.

FIG. 47 is a flowchart of authentication processing on the new MT side in MT-MT authentication carried out in the wireless multi-hop network according to the tenth embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 48 is a flowchart of authentication processing on the new MT side in MT-MT authentication executed in the wireless multi-hop network according to the eleventh embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 49 is a flowchart of authentication processing on the new MT side in MT-MT authentication executed in the wireless multi-hop network according to the twelfth embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 50 is a block diagram of a functional configuration of a conventionally proposed radio access network.

FIG. 51 is an explanatory diagram of a DoS attack on a conventionally proposed wireless access network.

FIG. 52 is an explanatory diagram of a mechanism of multiple occurrence of authentication processing in a conventionally proposed wireless access network.

FIG. 53 is a block diagram of a functional configuration of a conventionally proposed wireless multi-hop network.

FIG. 54 is an explanatory diagram of a mechanism of multiple occurrence of authentication processing in a conventionally proposed wireless multi-hop network.

[Explanation of symbols]

101 Mutual Authentication Function with Wireless Terminal 102 Wireless Terminal Management Function 103 Wired Section Packet Inspection Function 104 Packet Discrimination Function 105 Mutual Authentication Function with Base Station 106 Base Station Management Function 107 Wireless Terminal Mobility Management Function 201 Authentication Packet Transfer Function 202 Wireless Section packet inspection function 203 Wired section packet inspection function 204 Packet discrimination function 205 Packet relay function 206 Mutual authentication function with authentication server 207 Mutual authentication function with wireless terminal 208 Packet transfer judgment function 209 Wireless terminal management function 210 Resource release function 301 Authentication Mutual authentication function with server 302 Wireless section packet inspection function 303 Packet discrimination function 304 Packet relay function 305 Mutual authentication function with base station 307 Mutual authentication function with wireless terminal 308 Wireless terminal selection function 309 Packet transfer function AS Authentication Server (Authentication S
AP AP base station (Access Point) MT wireless terminal (Mobile Terminal) NW (wired) carrier network

   ─────────────────────────────────────────────────── ─── Continued front page    (72) Inventor Masayoshi Nakayama             2-3-1, Otemachi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo             Inside Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (72) Inventor Hiroto Suda             2-3-1, Otemachi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo             Inside Telegraph and Telephone Corporation F-term (reference) 5J104 AA07 KA02 MA01 PA07                 5K030 GA15 HA08 JL01 JT09 LB05                 5K067 AA32 BB02 BB21 CC08 DD17                       EE02 EE10 HH22 HH24 HH36

Claims (18)

[Claims] 1. A wireless access network comprising a wireless terminal, a base station wirelessly communicating with the wireless terminal, and an authentication server connected to the base station via a carrier side network. The base station transmits a base station-authentication server authentication packet when newly connecting to the business operator side network, and performs mutual authentication with the authentication server. B. The wireless terminal performs mutual authentication with a neighboring base station when newly accessing the wireless access network, and transmits a wireless terminal-authentication server authentication packet after successful authentication, and the base station uses the wireless When the mutual authentication with the terminal is successful, the transfer of the wireless terminal-authentication server authentication packet transmitted from the wireless terminal is permitted, and the authentication server uses the wireless terminal-authentication server authentication packet. A processing function of performing mutual authentication with the wireless terminal via the base station; Each of the wireless terminal, the base station, and the authentication server attaches packet inspection data indicating a transmission source to the authentication packet when transmitting or transferring the wireless terminal-authentication server authentication packet, D. Each of the wireless terminal, the base station, and the authentication server, when receiving the authentication packet between the wireless terminal and the authentication server, inspects the packet inspection data attached to it, and if the inspection fails, attaches it. A processing function for discarding the authentication packet that has been set, E. A wireless access network, wherein the authentication server has a processing function of registering information of each of the authenticated new base station and new authenticated wireless terminal in its own device. 2. A wireless multi-hop network comprising a wireless terminal having a relay capability, a base station wirelessly communicating with the wireless terminal, and an authentication server connected to the base station via a carrier side network, ． The base station performs a processing function of performing mutual authentication using the authentication server and a base station-authentication server authentication packet when newly connecting to the business operator side network, B. The wireless terminal, when newly accessing the wireless multi-hop network, performs a mutual authentication with a nearby authenticated wireless terminal or a base station and a packet for authentication between wireless terminals, C. If there are a plurality of wireless terminals or base stations for which mutual authentication between the wireless terminals has succeeded, one wireless terminal or base station is selected from among them, and the selected wireless terminal or base station is
A processing function for permitting the transfer of the authentication packet between the wireless terminal and the authentication server transmitted from the new wireless terminal, D. After the successful mutual authentication between the wireless terminals, the new wireless terminal uses a wireless terminal-authentication server authentication packet to perform mutual authentication with the authentication server via the selected wireless terminal or base station. , E. The new wireless terminal, the selected wireless terminal, the base station,
Each of the authentication servers attaches packet inspection data indicating a transmission source to the authentication packet when transmitting or transferring the wireless terminal-authentication server authentication packet, F. The new wireless terminal, the selected wireless terminal, the base station,
Each of the authentication servers, when receiving the authentication packet between the wireless terminal and the authentication server, inspects the packet inspection data attached thereto, and if the inspection fails, the authentication packet attached with the inspection packet. Processing function of discarding, G. A wireless multi-hop network characterized in that the authentication server has a processing function of registering information of a new base station and a new wireless terminal, which have succeeded in mutual authentication, in their own devices. 3. A wireless terminal used in a wireless access network including a wireless terminal, a base station that wirelessly communicates with the wireless terminal, and an authentication server connected to the base station through a network on the business side. In the case of newly accessing the wireless access network, a wireless terminal-a base station authentication packet is transmitted to perform mutual authentication with a neighboring base station, and after successful authentication, the wireless terminal-
A wireless terminal having a function of transmitting an authentication packet between authentication servers and performing mutual authentication with the authentication server. 4. The wireless terminal according to claim 3, further comprising a function of calculating and attaching packet inspection data indicating a transmission source to a transmitting wireless terminal-authentication server authentication packet. 5. When the wireless terminal-base station authentication packet is transmitted and responses are received from a plurality of base stations, one legitimate base station is selected in the wireless terminal-base station authentication and the base The wireless terminal according to claim 3 or 4, further comprising a function of transmitting the authentication packet between the wireless terminal and the authentication server to the authentication server via a station. 6. The wireless terminal-base station authentication packet is transmitted, and when a response is received from a plurality of base stations, the wireless terminal-base station authentication is preferentially selected from the base stations having a quick response. The wireless terminal according to claim 5, wherein the wireless terminal has a function of executing. 7. When the wireless terminal-base station authentication packet is transmitted and a response is received from a plurality of base stations, the wireless terminal-base is preferentially selected from the base stations having strong reception levels of response signals. The wireless terminal according to claim 5, further comprising a function of performing inter-office authentication. 8. When the wireless terminal-base station authentication packet is transmitted and a response is received from a plurality of base stations, the information obtained in the wireless terminal-base station authentication procedure between each base station is added. The wireless terminal according to claim 5, further comprising a function of selecting an authorized base station based on the wireless terminal. 9. A wireless access network or a wireless multi-access network comprising a wireless terminal, a base station wirelessly communicating with the wireless terminal, and an authentication server connected to the base station via a carrier side network. The authentication server used to perform the mutual authentication with the newly accessed base station and register the information of the successfully authenticated base station in its own device, and the authentication packet between the wireless terminal and the authentication server. The packet inspection data is attached and transmitted to the base station. The packet inspection data attached to the wireless terminal-authentication server authentication packet sent from the base station is inspected. If the inspection fails, the packet is sent. It has a function of discarding it, performing mutual authentication with the wireless terminal if this inspection is successful, and registering the information of the wireless terminal that has succeeded in mutual authentication in its own device. Authentication server, wherein the door. 10. When a wireless terminal that has succeeded in mutual authentication moves to a communication area of another base station, new mutual authentication is performed with the wireless terminal, and after the successful authentication, the wireless terminal belongs to the wireless terminal. The authentication server according to claim 9, further comprising a function of notifying the old base station that the wireless terminal has moved. 11. A wireless access network or a wireless multi-hop network including a wireless terminal, a base station wirelessly communicating with the wireless terminal, and an authentication server connected to the base station via a carrier side network. A base station used in, and when newly connecting to the wireless access network or the wireless multi-hop network, a function of transmitting a base station-authentication server authentication packet to the authentication server to perform mutual authentication. A base station characterized by having. 12. The wireless terminal-authentication server authentication transmitted from the wireless terminal when mutual authentication is performed in response to a wireless terminal-base station authentication request from a new wireless terminal and the mutual authentication is successful. Packet, the packet inspection data attached to the packet is inspected, and if the inspection fails, the packet is discarded. If the inspection is successful, the wireless terminal-authentication server authentication packet is automatically The packet inspection data calculated by the device is attached and transferred to the authentication server, and the operator of all packets sent by the new wireless terminal by referring to the authentication result shown in the authentication packet sent from the authentication server The base station according to claim 11, further comprising a function of determining whether to permit transfer to the side network. 13. A device having a function of registering information of each wireless terminal that has succeeded in mutual authentication in its own device and a function of deleting registration information of a corresponding wireless terminal upon receiving a movement notification from the authentication server. The base station according to claim 11 or 12, which is characterized. 14. A wireless multi-hop network comprising a wireless terminal having a relay capability, a base station wirelessly communicating with the wireless terminal, and an authentication server connected to the base station via a carrier side network. When a device is a wireless terminal and newly accesses the wireless multi-hop network, mutual authentication is performed with other authenticated wireless terminals or base stations in the vicinity, and mutual authentication with multiple wireless terminals or base stations has succeeded. In this case, the function of selecting one legitimate wireless terminal or base station as the proxy terminal and executing mutual authentication with the authentication server via the proxy terminal, and the proxy terminal selected by the new wireless terminal If it is, the new wireless terminal-authentication server authentication packet transmitted from another new wireless terminal is transmitted to another Wireless terminal characterized by comprising a function of transferring to the line terminal or a base station. 15. A function of transmitting a packet for authentication between wireless terminals to another wireless terminal or a base station in the vicinity when the apparatus itself newly accesses the wireless multi-hop network, and the apparatus itself is a new wireless terminal. In this case, the function to attach the packet inspection data indicating the transmission source to the authentication packet between the wireless terminal and the authentication server and to send it, and if the own device is a proxy terminal selected by another new wireless terminal, Of the new wireless terminal or the wireless terminal-authentication server transmitted from the base station, the packet inspection data is inspected, and if the inspection fails, the authentication packet is discarded, and if the inspection is successful, It has a function to attach the packet inspection data indicating the transmission source calculated by the device itself to the authentication packet and transfer it to another wireless terminal or base station on the route. The wireless terminal of claim 14, wherein. 16. When receiving a response from a plurality of other wireless terminals or base stations in response to a mutual authentication request to the base station or other wireless terminals, the base station or the other wireless terminals that respond quickly give priority to the proxy. The wireless terminal according to claim 14 or 15, further comprising a function of selecting the terminal. 17. When receiving a response from a plurality of other wireless terminals or base stations to a mutual authentication request to the base station or other wireless terminals, the base station or other wireless terminals having a strong reception level preferentially The wireless terminal according to claim 14 or 15, further comprising a function of selecting as a proxy terminal. 18. When information is received from a plurality of other wireless terminals or base stations in response to a mutual authentication request to the base station or other wireless terminals, the information of the other wireless terminals or base stations acquired by the mutual authentication is added. The wireless terminal according to claim 14 or 15, further comprising a function of selecting a proxy terminal based on the proxy terminal.