JP2002522840A - Electronic money generation transfer and redemption apparatus and method - Google Patents

Abstract

(57) Summary New electronic currency forms (3 and 4), new electronic counterfeit defense schemes, and new storage devices (20) used without necessity with the new electronic currency forms (3 and 4). An electronic commerce system comprising an electronic money generator (17 and 18) and a deposit provision tracking device (21), which realizes an allowable security level and enables anonymous electronic exchange of substitute money.

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to an apparatus and a method for transferring electronic money in digital form. The substitute money itself is not new. Current cash substitutes include credit cards, debit cards, checks, and travel checks. Each of these substitutes requires providing a user identifier and other forms of accounting information in the case of the transaction. The transfer of the user accounting information increases the possibility of theft and increases the number of theft prevention and fraud detecting means required for the reliable substitute currency.

[0002] Internet commerce and personal e-commerce are hindered by the people's resistance to sending accounting and identification information on a transaction-by-transaction basis. For example, with cash, a person can go directly to a store and purchase goods without the store or anyone knowing the person's name, address, bank name, or bank account number. An obstacle to digital commerce is the inability to receive a guarantee that the substitute money is legitimate and redeemable while maintaining such an anonymous money transfer system.

A conventional system, such as that disclosed in US Pat. No. 5,757,917, for example,
It uses a complex system consisting of a communication network, a verification code and an authentication code. This system requires the user to obtain a cardholder account at the issuing institution. As a result, the user loses the anonymity of the transaction when the system verifies each transaction against the user's accounting information. Thus, the system knows that user 1 has purchased a loaf of bread at a bakery also registered via this system. This system prevents commercial transactions between individuals connected to the system and unconnected individuals. That is, electronic commerce is not allowed to flow to users who have not been registered in advance in this system.

[0004] An article in the New York Times, "Cybercash's Lesson in Web Survival," published August 10, 1998, describes another form of electronic money. This article discloses a secure socket layer system and an electronic wallet system. In both systems, the user's credit card information is exchanged. In a secure socket layer system, a user provides an encrypted credit card number, which is sent to a business partner. The customer receives and decrypts the information. Then, the business partner encrypts the data and sends it to the credit card company. The credit card company opens the data and charges the user's account. In the electronic wallet system, the electronic wallet keeps a record of all credit card numbers of the user and encrypts one of them. The encrypted credit card is sent to the business partner. The merchant cannot read the credit card number, but can read the relevant transaction information. The information is transmitted to a credit card company, which decrypts the credit card information and charges the user's account. In both systems, a user's credit card information is exchanged. The present invention is configured to be used without transmitting and receiving this information.

[0005] Also, all electronic commerce schemes proposed so far are based on a network authentication scheme in which all such transactions occur on the network, most notably the Internet. Perhaps well aimed, these systems form two societies, one connected by credit card accounting and one that can engage in e-commerce. Any e-commerce must be available and accessible by all members of society. And it must be accessible to urban youth who sell newspapers, just as it must be to the vice president of a fully networked company.

[0006] The present invention solves these and other problems. The present invention allows an anonymous user to receive a substitute electronic currency without first having to be registered or authenticated, and to exchange electronic currency without exchanging accounting information in another manner. Also, without being connected to a computer network,
For example, a simple storage device that the newspaper seller we mentioned can use to engage in e-commerce is also disclosed.

As part of the problem to be overcome, there are numerous ways of generating money, the generation of freely exchangeable electronic money that does not require user identification, counterfeiting of users and non-users To prevent counterfeiting, and to provide a standardized electronic money format that can be exchanged.

The present invention is configured to overcome the above-mentioned problems and to provide an electronic commerce system that realizes an allowable security level and enables anonymous electronic exchange of substitute money. In particular, the present invention provides a new form of electronic money, a new electronic counterfeit defense scheme,
A new storage device used without necessity with this new electronic currency form;
An electronic money generator and a deposit reserve tracking device are provided.

While the above and other objects, advantages and features of the invention will become apparent hereinafter, the nature of the invention will become more apparent by reference to the following detailed description, the appended claims and the accompanying drawings. You will understand.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS The detailed description of the invention, including the preferred embodiments, is set forth below.

The present invention has several different products and methods configured for use in conjunction with the systems described herein or alone. Those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that these products can be classified in a number of different ways. For the purposes of this application, the following classifications are used: That is, the electronic money, the storage device, the transaction program, the issuing module, the redemption module, and the network maintenance module.

A. Electronic Money Electronic money units (ECUs) are the basic components on which other features of the present invention are based. Current forms of electronic money are disadvantaged because they cannot be used for transactions without identifying the parties to the transaction. The present invention solves this problem by using multiple identifiers and encryption techniques.

The ECU 1 at the most basic stage is composed of a unique algorithm recorded on a substantial electronic storage medium 2, and most fundamentally, a floppy (registered trademark) disk. The unique algorithm serves as a serial number and a predetermined par value. When the generated algorithm is published, its value is announced for redemption. See FIG. ECUs can be issued in place of any value, including but not limited to US currency, stocks, securities, tangible or tangible assets. The ECU, which is a single algorithm, can cause memory problems. As more and more ECUs are used, the required algorithm length and complexity will continue to increase. Although the algorithm serves as a serial number to identify each ECU, its use as a face value identifier may make the transaction more difficult. The parties have no way to check that the ECU is at par value as requested without redemption or verification by the issuing agency.

In order to solve this problem, a system composed of a plurality of identifiers, for example, a plurality of algorithms is used. The denomination identifier 3 is combined with the serial number identifier 4.
See FIG. Denominations vary by institution and time. For example, 2
Unlike supplying money with a fixed numerical display, such as $ 0, the face value identifier comprises a variable length algorithm recorded as representing $ 20. Making the par value identifiers variable with the work of serial numbers and / or time increases security. A denomination correction table indicating the denomination corresponding to the denomination identifier may be made publicly available. See FIG.

If two different identifiers are used, the encryption algorithm may be applied to one or both. The use of the term encryption refers to standard encryption as well as to the formatting of data to which only the intended user has access. This makes it possible to exchange electronic money while suppressing falsification or change of the electronic money. See FIG. Dual identifiers can be used for denominations, serial numbers, or both.

A double key type system consisting of encryption and decryption is used, for example, together with the PGP encryption method. Thereby, the security of the electronic money is further enhanced. In a double key encryption system, one key is used for encryption and the other key is used for decryption. The user can only decrypt items encrypted with the corresponding encryption key. Even if only the encryption key is accessed, the user cannot decrypt it. Recipients who wish to verify some small identifying information on the electronic currency can access the portion of the encrypted currency that represents the denomination information using a publicly available decryption key. FIG. 12 shows a public verification method. The public verification key can be obtained by the user through a telephone line or the Internet. The user receives the key and determines the authenticity of the money. Further, a re-encryption key may be provided. If no re-encryption key is provided, only a copy of the ECU is decrypted at the time of the transaction. See FIG.

Double key encryption also helps prevent tampering by requiring re-encryption after decryption. Re-encryption keys are also publicly available and may change over time. In other words, many public decryption keys are available to decrypt the ECU, but only the latest re-encryption key is available. This ensures that all re-encrypted ECUs are updated at the predetermined time. The old key is erased in stages over time, keeping the user from having to keep the ECU for a long time without keeping it in a licensed authority. There is a risk that a forger will decrypt the ECU or alter its denomination, but it is unlikely that the forger will be able to re-encrypt the currency. The ever-changing re-encryption and decryption keys can further limit the amount of time that a forger can covertly damage a surrogate currency system or cause damage if successful.

It is also possible to use a plurality of double key encryptions so that the first level of denomination information can be accessed but not the entire denomination identifier. Two levels of double key encryption make the lowest level of security publicly accessible. The user has access to the public decryption key and public re-encryption key. The second level is a secure hierarchy that can only be accessed by issuing and redemption agencies. Third
Levels can also be provided. The Issuing Authority may provide designated merchants access to the decryption and re-encryption keys to provide last-minute access to the ECU while providing a purchase verification point higher than the publicly available . This supplier level multiple double key encryption scheme may be provided to suppliers daily, weekly or on a purchase basis depending on how often encryption is changed for new ECUs issued by the issuing agency.

1. The requirement for uniformity is an obstacle to the widespread use of electronic currency header ECUs.
Multiple issuing agencies can issue ECUs, and users can use various types of ECUs.
Can be freely exchanged, the ECU system needs to have provisions for uniform or non-uniform structures.

A preferred selection function of the ECU is that different engines can have different ECU structures. To enable this selection function, the ECU is provided with a header 5 and a list of ECUs. The standardized header identifies the issuing institution name, the location of the information and / or the number or web address for contacts to various levels of verification information. Information may be further provided.

The ECU may be different for each issuing organization as long as a certain standard is maintained.
All ECUs must have a value identifier and a denomination identifier in combination or separately. A plurality of face value identifiers may be used, but there must be at least one face value identifier. In addition, the ECU must include or operate at least with a basic transfer program that duplicates the ECU and erases the original.

The various ECU types and types are made compatible by using headers that are preferably attached to the ECU at each encryption level. The identification header identifies the transfer program containing the money information. For example, the first five bits of the currency header are used to identify where the base denomination information is included,
The header identifies whether any program information such as time dependency, currency devaluation, and multiple encryption information is included, and the location of the data. The second header 6 encrypted in the second layer 7 consisting of a serial number identifier or a denomination identifier may include information on the data level and the previous level. This second level header contains the position and value of the character string of the first data level data.
A verification method may be optionally included. If the data in the second header does not match the data in the first data level, tampering may be present.

The reconfigured ECU structure can be used as yet another basic verification tool or identifier for the business partners or institutions involved in the transaction. One specific ECU
May be configured to include information on the authenticity of money. For example,
Known suppliers can use a predetermined pattern to alternate between denomination identifiers and serial number identifiers. Such a pattern may be changed over time.

[0024] 2. When the electronic money conversion ratio ECU is stored in a storage medium, its size becomes a problem. Although the security level is different for different denominations, and thus the relative size for different denominations, the size of the ECU may be a factor preventing its daily use. For example, security protection for a par value of 25 cents may be relatively low. The ECU size may also prohibit the portable holding device from having a $ 100 face value of 25 cents. This is pleasing to most, if not all, users.

The ECU size becomes a bigger issue when it needs to be changed and must be transmitted. One solution to this problem is to incorporate a conversion factor module into the trading program, as described in more detail below. The transaction module will actually reduce the monetary value of the highest value ECU by creating multiple ECUs in the ECU that match the encrypted conversion rate information or the currency reduction rate information. For example, a denomination of $ 100 is devalued by creating a plurality of denominations equivalent to $ 100 each including an encryption conversion factor of 1/100. It is not necessary that all the ECUs to be devalued be uniformly devalued, and non-uniform devaluation may be considered. For many transactions, this method can be used for low par value, which should not have been encrypted as strongly.
This may not be desirable because the dollar denomination would increase encryption. Further, by enlarging the size of the devalued ECU, it is possible to intentionally prevent all of the degraded ECUs from being redeemed or replaced in a timely manner.

However, the par value display algorithm may also include a portion of the conversion rate for inter-ECU transactions based on various currencies. This facilitates international exchange of currencies.

[0027] 3. Security Selection Function Although some security selection functions have already been described, additional security selection functions for the ECU are available.

The anti-counterfeiting used in traditional currency forms is a time hindrance. That is, once a currency is issued, the old currency is not invalidated unless a new currency is issued and switched. Even then, there will be a period of overlap unless all currencies in the old form are revoked. Old currencies can always appear. The ECU solves this problem by providing a time-dependent function.

The ECU may be time dependent so as to have a lifetime. In its immature form, the encryption key is phased out and the ECU becomes invalid. For example, assume that each public key has a one-month lifetime. If the ECU is not decrypted or re-encrypted every month, it becomes outdated and invalid.

The life of the time-dependent ECU may be short or long. The ECU may be generated by a time-dependent program so that the amount of the denomination changes with the time. This feature allows interest and other increases in asset valuations to change automatically over time. Alternatively, based on the latest information provided to the ECU, a long-lived ECU corresponding to stocks or assets of which value rises or falls is determined by the ECU.
May be constantly updated. In this case, the change in value may include an increase in the face value.

Further, the ECU may be embedded in a self-executable program such as a time-dependent computer virus, or may be embedded with the program. Time-dependent programs can be attached to or embedded in ECUs that have a limited lifespan of money, which requires users to periodically store ECUs in an authorized depository that can regenerate and reissue ECUs become. Numerous time-dependent schemes are available. The embedded self-executable program may be activated after one month has elapsed in combination with the time dependence of the public key.

The time-dependent currency is used to force the ECU back through the network of issuing agencies, to circulate the ECU with its authenticity and counterfeiting levels, and the work of the assets available for redemption. It may be measured.

To protect against counterfeiters, the issuing authority may use self-destroying programs or virus encryption.

An institution independent of the issuing institution periodically changes the basic structure of the ECU to create a degree of suspicion that the issuing institution uses to prevent forgery.

In a preferred embodiment, the ECU includes three denomination identifiers and three serial number identifiers. The first layer of double key encryption is applied to a first denomination identifier and a first serial number identifier. Further protection can be obtained by interleaving the two identifiers before encryption, based on yet another algorithm or pattern. The packet of the second denomination and the serial number is created together with a header identifying the position of the second packet information, and is attached to the first encrypted packet. The header contains a small data string and a position in the first encrypted part for tampering identification. Double key encryption is applied to this packet. A third denomination and serial number packet is created along with a header that identifies the location of the second packet information and is attached to the second encrypted packet. This third packet is
It is then encrypted using a single key encryption. The header identifies the issuing institution and par value information. In the case of basic security, the recipient decrypts the ECU using a known institutional encryption key and verifies its denomination and serial number. For transactions with pre-registered sellers, a second encrypted packet may be accessed. Double key encryption ensures that only authorized vendors who have access to both the encryption and decryption information will access this second packet. Finally, the third packet is dedicated to the institution. The encryption level may be changed according to memory constraints.

B. The storage device ECU includes, but is not limited to, ROM, RAM, DRAM, and SR.
It is stored in any generally available storage medium such as an AM, a floppy disk, and a hard disk drive. An optical storage device may be used to reduce inadvertent destruction of the ECU due to magnetic fluctuations. Essentially, any electronic or optical storage medium can be used. If the ECU is not on the storage medium, it is in the transfer phase between the two storage media.

The storage medium can take various forms from the ECU on the floppy disk,
That is, the data may be physically transferred to a portable ECU storage device or an automatic teller machine provided to receive and pay the ECU in the hard disk drive by the operation of the issuing organization.

ECU that is probably the safest to save via a network to a deposit account or trustee
It is a storage method. Network storage, in its most basic form, consists of an electronic safe that is backed up and properly protected against inadvertent destruction. Storage by the network can be performed based on the anonymity of the user. Users are allocated disk space for storing the ECU. The type and balance of the ECU may not be determined by the storage device unless some form of disaster insurance is required or the ECU balance does not need to be known for a transaction. Re-encryption for time-dependent ECUs can also be incorporated. The storage network may be configured to operate automatically and deduct storage costs directly from the stored ECU. ECU monitoring is based on total, type,
It can be linked to network storage so that information such as the issuing agency is released periodically.

FIG. 9 shows a typical storage device. This device 8 has an input port 9 consisting of a bus or an infrared electronic transfer signal receiving device. Preferably, a standardized bus having a male bus 10 and a female bus 11 is provided. This allows the two devices to be easily connected by flipping one over. The digital signal processor 12 is connected to the BUS 9, and the BUS 9 is connected to the memory device 13 and the power supply 14. A plurality of memory devices 13a and 13b may be provided, and all or some of them may be removable. Also, the memory 13
An authentication code memory or a public key memory 15 connected to an input device such as a modem or a network is provided in the memory or as an independent memory. Further, a transaction log memory is provided. Furthermore, a processor 16 is provided and connected to the digital signal processor, memory and network equipment. The storage device may be configured to be gripped by hand or may be incorporated into an automatic teller machine. If the device is located at a fixed position, it is convenient because it is dedicated to connection to the authentication server used to distribute the ECU information.

The ECU cash register and the electronic money automatic teller machine also have a built-in storage device. In such cases, the transaction is also tied to the traditional currency form. Thus, the storage medium is coupled to a processor that is also connected to the network via a modem or the like. Connection to the network may be regular or permanent depending on the anticipated transaction and the required security level.

C. Transactions Transactions are executed in a number of different ways. The security level required by the user will determine, at least to some extent, the measures to be taken. In a basic transaction, the ECU is transferred from one storage device, a handheld device, to another storage device. In this case, the two devices are connected. Ideally, all storage devices are provided with reversible connectors having male and female connectors so that one device is connected upside down.

The device on the transfer side instructs the ECU to perform the transfer via the input device. FIG.
reference. A touchpad or similar input device may be used. Then, press the execution key. The receiving device may be set to the receiving mode, or the exact amount of the ECU to be transferred may be entered to further protect confidentiality. The transferring device first sets up the interconnection with the receiving device. If the route between them is interrupted or tampered with during the transfer, the transfer is canceled. A standard communication path is established. The transfer side device searches the memory to find an ECU to be transferred. This information is transmitted to the receiving device. The receiving device duplicates the ECU in its memory and erases the original ECU. The transaction ends. Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the transfer and erase functions can be performed on either device or a combination of both devices.

Ideally, the receiving device transfers the ECU to the authentication memory. The receiving device performs an initial analysis of the money header to determine the type of ECU. Thereafter, the search of the authentication memory of the receiving side device is started, and it is determined whether the public decryption key and the re-encryption key exist. If they are present, the authenticity of the ECU can be determined. If the authenticity does not match a user-defined or predetermined threshold, the ECU is rejected. The ECU in the authentication memory is deleted, and the rejection code is transferred to the transmitting device. The rejection code is also stored in the receiving device. The rejection code is stored in a transaction log that stores information about the identifier, time, currency type, etc., and may be uploaded to an authentication server for processing.

When the ECU is received, the receiving device sends an erasing command to the transmitting device to erase the ECU from the memory. A log of the transaction is generated indicating that a monetary unit has been sent and received. Both devices may store this log information.

If the transferring device cannot recognize the exact denomination in the memory, it notifies the receiving device that a change or devaluation is required. The receiving device searches the memory to determine whether the change can be given. If trading is possible,
Both devices proceed normally. The receiving device sends the change after the receiving device's ECU is received and received and before clearing the transferring device's memory. Similarly, a verification process is performed. If both devices accept the transaction, the original EC
U is deleted from both devices and the transaction ends.

The same processing may be followed when the ECU is rounded down or the conversion factor is used. However, it is not allowed to increase the value of the ECU unless the device is the issuing organization. The conversion rate transaction is executed in the same manner. Before re-encryption by the receiving device,
The conversion rate is inserted into the face value field and the header is changed accordingly. Upon receiving the ECU, the transmitting device erases the original money immediately. Then, the receiving device transmits a re-encrypted copy of the money to the transmitting device according to the conversion rate and the transaction amount. Both devices record changes in value in their logs. A copy of the ECU may be stored or transmitted to the user network for purposes other than transactions. The user network will be described later in detail.

A storage device identifier may be provided in the ECU storage device. The storage device identifier may be fixed or may be changed each time authentication information is obtained. This identifier may be stored in the transaction log. The authentication key network may download the transaction log information and process it for fraud detection purposes. When it is determined that the ECU storage device has been tampered with or malfunctions, the information of the ECU storage device is transmitted to all the ECU storage devices. When the two ECU storage devices contact for the first time, the malfunctioning device is identified and the transaction is aborted. Thus, fraud can be prevented by further adding a security level.

[0048] The trading program may also be incorporated into an interactive TV. Alternatively, an interactive TV or home shopping TV program may be used with an Internet connection or conventional telephone device in preparation for an ECU transaction.

D. Issuer The issuer in its most basic form comprises a computer 17 and a storage device 18. As one of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate, the computational power required to generate more complex ciphers may exceed the computational power available to the majority of home users.

Ideally, the issuing institution has the following modules: a serial number generation module, a denomination display generation module, a money generation module, and a money information storage module. Additional modules include a multiple currency generation module, an encryption module, a program selection module, a currency regeneration module, a tracking module, a multi-level authentication module, an asset allocation module, and the like.

System security and asset allocation are two important modules for a successful ECU system. Also, the issuing agency must be able to redeem the ECU, and in that regard must protect the recovered assets. The assets may be invested in a variety of commercially available means so that the issuing agency can generate supplementary assets. The supplemental asset management module may be operably connected to the redemption module and the verification module. This allows the auxiliary asset management module to periodically predict the amount of funds that will not be redeemed or will be redeemed fraudulently. Asset allocation makes auxiliary assets investable to keep the ECU system viable.

The issuing agency may use various money generation programs as long as the ECU is generated according to a predetermined standard. Basic face value identifiers and transaction routines must be standardized. The level of encryption may vary from issuer to issuer.
In that regard, one issuer may choose to use one or more algorithms for par value verification. The issuing agency may choose to connect time-dependent software to each ECU.

E. Network The network 19 is used to allow the public to access 23 monetary information and encryption or decryption keys. Further, log information may be collected using a network. Whenever the storage device 20 contacts the network for update information, the network may request a copy of the storage device log.

A network monitoring module 12 may be provided to track currency usage, such as currency devaluation and rejected transactions. Rejected transactions may also be tracked based on the reason for rejection. For example, if there is not enough change in the ECU pool, the issuing organization 22 may issue a plurality of banknotes with a lower face value to a new user.

Since a general public encryption key is used, the user does not need to be identified when connecting the storage device to the network. Once updated general authentication information is available, the user can participate in the transaction anonymously without sending the user's accounting information.

The regular connection of all storage devices with the time-dependent ECU is guaranteed. The use of a new re-encryption key with the phase-out of the old decryption key ensures that devices that have not contacted the network in a reasonable amount of time are forcibly returned. This regular connection gives access to various information that can be used to monitor and control ECU transactions. Devices that indicate that rejection or other irregular trading practices are prevalent may be investigated.

F. Reimbursement There are various levels and types of reimbursement. The above transactions are EC
Redemption is considered if paid in place of U. Reimbursement in the context disclosed herein is the repayment of the ECU to the Issuing Authority or its affiliates and the EC
The source exchanged for U indicates that a non-ECU is transferred to the provider. ECU
Redemption involves providing an ECU to the receiving device that has access to all the decryption keys and the asset return to be redeemed to the provider.

When redeeming the ECU, a transaction similar to the above-described transaction may be used. The level of authentication may be different for full authentication and partial authentication. The redemption device is connected directly to the asset allocation module, or via a network or through periodic updates, and registers the redemption of the ECU.

The redeemed ECU may be reused, such as partially or completely re-encrypted.

Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the invention described above has a wide range of commercial applicability. Also, those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the electronic currency devices and methods described herein have great commercial utility in the banking, electronics and Internet commerce. .
Further, those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the invention described and claimed herein can be modified and not limited to the specific embodiments described above.

[Brief description of the drawings]

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an electronic money unit (ECU).

FIG. 2 is a flowchart for issuing an ECU.

FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of an ECU structure.

FIG. 4 is a flowchart of ECU generation.

FIG. 5 is a flowchart of ECU generation.

FIG. 6 is a flowchart of ECU generation.

FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of an ECU structure.

FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of an ECU structure.

FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram of an ECU storage device.

FIG. 10 is a logic diagram of an ECU transaction.

FIG. 11 is a schematic diagram of an ECU issuing device.

FIG. 12 is a schematic diagram of an ECU network.

[Procedure for Amendment] Submission of translation of Article 19 Amendment of the Patent Cooperation Treaty

[Submission date] March 9, 2000 (200.3.9)

[Procedure amendment 1]

[Document name to be amended] Statement

[Correction target item name] Claims

[Correction method] Change

[Correction contents]

[Claims]

──────────────────────────────────────────────────続 き Continued on the front page (51) Int.Cl. ⁷ Identification symbol FI Theme coat ゛ (Reference) G09C 1/00 660 H04L 9/00 641 H04L 9/14 G07D 9/00 476 (81) Designated country EP (AT , BE, CH, CY, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, IE, IT, LU, MC, NL, PT, SE), OA (BF, BJ, CF, CG, CI, CM) , GA, GN, GW, ML, MR, NE, SN, TD, TG), AP (GH, GM, KE, LS, MW, SD, SL, SZ, UG, ZW), EA (AM, AZ) , BY, KG, KZ, MD, RU, TJ, TM), AE, AL, AM, AT, AU, AZ, BA, BB, BG, BR, BY, CA, CH, C N, CR, CU, CZ, DE, DK, DM, EE, ES, FI, GB, GD, GE, GH, GM, HR, HU, ID, IL, IN, IS, JP, KE, KG, KP , KR, KZ, LC, LK, LR, LS, LT, LU, LV, MD, MG, MK, MN, MW, MX, NO, NZ, PL, PT, RO, RU, SD, SE, SG, SI, SK, SL, TJ, TM, TR, TT, UA, UG, US, UZ, VN, YU, ZA, ZWF terms (reference) 3E040 AA03 BA07 CB04 DA03 3E042 AA01 CC02 EA01 3E044 AA20 BA05 BA10 DD01 DE01 5B017 AA07 BA07 5J104 AA08 AA16 AA44 EA06 JA21 NA02 NA42 PA12

Claims (9)

[Claims] An electronic money unit comprising a header including information relating to the position of a denomination identifier and a serial number identifier in a digital array, and a storage device including a denomination identifier and a serial number identifier corresponding to the information of the header. . 2. The system according to claim 1, further comprising a second denomination identifier and a second serial number identifier, wherein the second denomination identifier and the second serial number identifier are encrypted by a first encryption technique. Electronic monetary unit. 3. The electronic money unit according to claim 2, wherein the first denomination identifier and the first serial number identifier are encrypted by a second encryption technique. 4. The electronic money unit according to claim 2, wherein the first encryption technique is a double key encryption method. 5. An electronic apparatus comprising: a step of generating an electronic money unit; a step of assigning a value to the electronic money unit; a step of recording the assigned value; and a step of issuing the electronic money unit. How to issue money. 6. The electronic money issuing method according to claim 6, further comprising a step of encrypting at least a part of the electronic money unit. 7. The electronic money issuing method according to claim 6, further comprising a step of transmitting the encrypted data to the electronic money unit storage device. 8. An electronic money management system comprising an issuing module, a network module, and a redemption module. 9. An electronic money storage device comprising an input port, money, and a processor.