JP2002544690A - Systems, devices and methods for secure communication and access control - Google Patents

Abstract

  (57) [Summary] A method for generating an identical electronic one-time pad at a first location and a second location, comprising: (a) providing a first electronic device at the first location and a second electronic device at the second location. Providing two electronic devices, the first and second electronic devices comprising: (i) a non-volatile memory; (ii) a processor; and (iii) at least one stored on the non-volatile memory. A true random number table, wherein the table is the same for the first and second electronic devices, and (iv) at least one software program for obtaining a true random number from the table; The software program is stored on the non-volatile memory, and the at least one software program is operated by the processor; Software program; (b) providing a communication channel for communication between the first electronic device and the second electronic device; and (c) following a selection procedure. Selecting a selected true random number from the table in the first and second electronic devices, wherein the selecting procedure is the same for the first and second electronic devices; The procedure includes exchanging at least a portion of a key between the first and second electronic devices over the communication channel, wherein the selected authentic random number is transmitted to the first and second electronic devices. (D) using the selected true random number to form at least one of the same electronic one-time pads at the first and second locations. The method comprising the door. The same electronic one-time pad has any desired length. A method for generating a practically unlimited amount of true random numbers is also provided, wherein the true random numbers are identical at a plurality of locations, the method is operated by a data processor, the method comprising: (a) an identical table of true random numbers; Providing the same pointer, the same seed, and the same pseudo-random number generator at the plurality of positions; and (b) obtaining the obtained true random number from the same table of the true random numbers according to the pointer, And (c) generating a pseudorandom number generated by the pseudorandom number generator, wherein the pseudorandom number is the same at the plurality of positions. And (d) combining the obtained true random number and the generated pseudo-random number to at least one of the quantity of true randomness And forming a said at least no genuine random number one said amount is identical at the location of the plurality of, and a step. In addition, the present invention includes a "star" network system. Here, the central electronic device has a master table, and the plurality of customer electronic devices each have at least one table stored in two forms, one of both forms being one of the two forms. Encrypted according to the master table, the other is in unencrypted form. Next, the customer electronic device sends the encrypted table to the central electronic device, which decrypts the table to initiate communication.

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates to a system, a device, and a method for providing secure communication between two parties. More particularly, the present invention relates to systems, devices and methods for providing such secure communications over a communications network.

[0002] Two-way secure communication has always been an important but difficult task. If the current information is shared between the two parties, a third unauthenticated person may access this information as well.
This problem is exacerbated when the authenticated parties are far apart and the information must be transferred in the form of a message rather than a direct communication.
Historically, the contents of messages were sometimes protected by encryption techniques.
In encryption technology, the content is converted into another form that is understandable only to the intended message recipient.

[0003] As information transfer techniques have become more complex and sophisticated, so have encryption techniques. Currently, encryption techniques can be performed by encoding the original message into an incomprehensible protected message according to a mathematical algorithm that uses a particular key. Only legitimate recipients should have both the same algorithm and the specific key needed to decrypt the protected message into the original message.
Thus, unintelligible encoded messages can be freely transmitted over relatively insecure communication channels, such as telephone networks, while maintaining security for non-authorized recipients.

[0004] Of course, the security of the encoded message depends on the possession of the key and how hard the algorithm can be broken by an unauthorized third party. The third party identifies the key, actually copies the key, and then uses the actual key to decrypt the message. Also, just as doors can be broken without a key to the lock, the encryption algorithm can also be broken without a legitimate mathematical key. In both cases, the longer the key, the more difficult the guesswork or brute force attack.

[0005] However, as computer technology has become increasingly faster, many previous "
The impregnable algorithm has succumbed to brute force attacks. For example, the DES (Data Encryption Standard) algorithm using a 56-bit key was considered invulnerable when it began in 1976. By 1993, DES with 56-bit key
Could, in theory, be broken in seven hours with a very sophisticated computer. To solve this problem, the key was extended to 128 bits. Other algorithms have also proven to be vulnerable to brute force attacks and are currently used with longer keys to reduce their vulnerability to attacks.

[0006] As computer technology is becoming ever more powerful and fast, there is no reason to expect today's "impregnable" algorithms to not succumb to future brute force attacks. In addition, some algorithms have become more vulnerable (although not easily predictable) to the discovery of new mathematical functions, such as new factorization algorithms. Such a function may make "secure" cryptographic algorithms vulnerable to attack. Thus, it is clearly not enough to expect that mathematical algorithms alone will provide all of the security for information.

[0007] Further security may be provided by using a public key-private key pair. In this system, for example, used in PGP (very good privacy) encryption software, the sender encrypts the message using a public key and the recipient decrypts it using a private key.

[0008] As noted above, such security measures with encryption techniques are important for transmitting secure messages over insecure communication channels. For example, voice and facsimile transmissions are typically sent over telephone networks, but they can be eavesdropped. This problem is exacerbated for very insecure communication channels such as mobile phones. Such insecure communication channels are easily accessed using hardware such as scanners, which can be purchased as "off the shelf" at electronics stores. Therefore, devices and methods for securing communications over insecure channels are important.

[0009] One example of such a method is described in US Pat.
473,689. In this way, two electronic devices generate and exchange two random numbers, and each device knows both numbers. Then, by exchanging a portion of each encrypted number, both numbers are encrypted and compared. Communication occurs only if both encrypted numbers match. One problem with this method is that both sides must have the same key for that random number of encryptions and decryptions. Thus, this key is susceptible to being stolen by unauthorized parties, especially when exchanged.

US Pat. No. 5,564,106 to Puhl et al. Describes a method for providing blind access to encryption keys. Here, the key of the member of the first group is
The first group is provided to the second group without identifying the members of the first group. Such a method would be useful for a government agency investigating a company's employees to allow the company to access the employee's keys without allowing the company to identify the employee. is there. However, this method does not lend itself to secure communication over an insecure channel because it assumes the security of the original encryption method.

A disadvantage of some currently available encryption methods for communication over an insecure channel is that the user must perform many steps before the communication can take place. If such encryption is performed automatically, for example by a semiconductor chip embedded in the communication device, there is no need for the user to actually perform the encryption before the communication takes place. One example of such a device is disclosed in US Pat. No. 5,539,828 to Davis. The device has a digital certificate that includes both a public and private pair of keys and a public key that is encrypted with the private key. In essence, since this device has automated public key encryption, again communication through this device is only as secure as the encryption method.

[0012] Other commercially available hardware devices, or hardware / software systems, have the same potential drawback: devices and systems are only as secure as the encryption methods used. Examples of such devices and systems include Litronic (Costa Mesa, California, USA)
) Information security products (smart card reader and encryption device driver,
And software for encrypting text and database information); Cylink Corp. (San Francisco, Califo
rnia, USA), which uses the DES encryption algorithm to help ensure security on LANs (Local Area Networks) and WANs (Wide Area Networks); and Cylink (S
There is a product of the United States of America (Unnyvale, California, USA), which provides high-speed encryption for digital networks, also using DES or patented encryption algorithms. These are examples of many such products available on the market today, where products for secure communications and encryption have become widely available,
And show that there is commercial demand.

Unfortunately, as noted above, all of these products are only as secure as the encryption methods used. Furthermore, all of the encryption methods used are based on mathematical algorithms and keys. This means that the encryption method can be broken by a brute force attack. As computer technology becomes more sophisticated and new mathematical algorithms for these algorithms become available, such brute force attacks become more manageable, and thus, the encrypted data is more susceptible to unauthorized interception.

However, there is one type of encryption that cannot be broken theoretically by a brute force attack on the encrypted message itself. This type of encryption involves a random number of the same length as the message itself. No algorithm can be broken. Rather, the message is encoded according to a random number having the same length as the message. Each such random number is used only once to encode the message. Since random numbers are used for encoding, the random numbers used for encoding cannot be guessed and cannot be derived according to mathematical algorithms or statistical analysis. In order to obtain a random number by guesswork, one has to guess all the random numbers used to encode a particular message, which is equivalent to actually guessing the message itself. Furthermore, obtaining one such random number by inverse problem engineering does not mean that other messages can be decrypted.
This is because later messages can be encoded with different random numbers.

At present, this encryption method usually uses a one-time pad.
) Requires that both have the same random number. This pad can be a literally paper physical pad with a series of random numbers written on it. The pad may also be in the form of an electronic storage hardware device, such as a diskette. When a message is sent or received, each uses one number on the pad and then discards the random number. Since they both use the same pad and use the same random numbers, the message is reliably encoded and decoded and there is no risk of a brute force attack. Of course, the paper pad or diskette itself is physically stolen or copied, but preventing and detecting such events is relatively simpler than electronic theft of messages.

One significant drawback of the “one-time pad” in currently available implementations is that both must have the same physical paper pad or diskette before communication takes place, thereby pre-requiring Communication is limited to those who have made arrangements. Also, message protection is only as good as the physical protection of the one-time pads themselves on both sides. In addition, both must perform certain steps in order for the encoding and decoding steps to occur. In addition, since physical paper pads or computer diskettes cannot hold an infinite number of these random numbers,
Physical paper pads or computer diskettes must be replaced on a regular basis. Thus, currently available methods are cumbersome and impractical for a wide range of communications between many different parties.

Thus, for example, for secure communication or secure identification over an insecure channel, which is automated and practical for a wide range of communications and other applications, A method and system for creating and using a "one-time pad" that is less susceptible to brute force against itself is needed and it may be useful to have one.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION In accordance with the present invention, there is provided a method for generating an identical electronic one-time pad at a first location and a second location, the method comprising: (a) Providing a first electronic device at a location and a second electronic device at the second location, the first and second electronic devices comprising: (i) a non-volatile memory; and (ii) A processor and (iii) at least one true random number table stored on the non-volatile memory, the table being the same for the first and second electronic devices; and (iv) the table. At least one software program for obtaining a true random number from a table, wherein the software program is stored on the non-volatile memory; A software program having a software program operated by the processor; and (b) providing a communication channel for communication between the first electronic device and the second electronic device. (C) selecting a selected true random number from the tables in the first and second electronic devices according to a selection procedure, wherein the selection procedure includes the first and second electronic devices. Identical to the device, the selecting procedure includes exchanging at least a portion of a key between the first and second electronic devices over the communication channel, wherein the selected authentic random number is the Steps that are the same for one and the second electronic device; and (d) using the selected true random number in the first and the second locations. Forming at least a portion of the electronic one-time pad.

Preferably, the same electronic one-time pad is of any desired length.

According to a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the step of selecting the selected true random number from the table includes: (i) generating a first true random number in the first electronic device; Generating a second genuine random number in the second electronic device; and (ii) transmitting the first genuine random number to the second electronic device via the channel, and transmitting the second genuine random number to the second electronic device. Transmitting to the first electronic device, wherein the first and second authentic random numbers form the at least a portion of the key. Preferably, the method is: (iii) using a pointer to obtain the obtained true random number from the table, wherein the pointer is substantially the same as the key and the selected The method further comprises the step of selecting a random number according to the obtained true random number. More preferably, the selected true random number is the obtained true random number.

Alternatively and preferably, said method further comprises (ii-a) merging said first and second true random numbers to form said at least a portion of said key.

According to another preferred embodiment of the present invention, at least one of said first and second electronic devices comprises a source of physical random phenomena, said first and said second electronic devices.
Is generated from a source of the physical random phenomenon. Preferably, the source of the physical random phenomenon is selected from the group consisting of a source of acoustic noise and a source of thermal noise.

According to another preferred embodiment of the invention, at least one of said first and second electronic devices is characterized by a pseudo-random number generator, said pseudo-random number generator being stored in said non-volatile memory Operating by the processor according to the at least one software program performed, wherein the pseudo-random number generator is operated substantially continuously for an undefined period to generate at least one of the first and second true random numbers. Outputting the output number from the pseudo-random number generator.

Preferably, the method comprises: (iv) providing at least one identical pseudo-random number generator in the first and second electronic devices, wherein the at least one pseudo-random number generator comprises: Operated by the processor according to at least one software program stored in the non-volatile memory; and (v) obtaining the obtained true random number from the table using a first pointer. Wherein said first pointer is substantially identical to said key; and (vi) seeding said at least one pseudorandom number generator as a seed to said at least one pseudorandom number generator; and (vii) Obtaining a generated pseudo-random number from the at least one pseudo-random number generator, wherein the generated pseudo-random number is Steps that are the same for the first and second electronic devices;
iii) selecting the selected true random number from the table using the generated pseudo random number as a second pointer. More preferably, the step of selecting the selected true random number comprises: (1) generating a second generated pseudo-random number from the at least one pseudo-random number generator; (2) merging the second generated pseudo-random number with the selected true random number, wherein the generated pseudo-random number is the same for the first and second electronic devices; Forming the generated true random number, wherein the merged true random number is the selected true random number. Most preferably, the method further comprises the step of repeating steps (vi)-(viii) and (1) and (2) at least once, wherein for said step (vi) said selected true random number is obtained. And the second pointer is the selected true random number from step (2) to repeat these steps. Preferably, a plurality of selected true random numbers are obtained by repeating this process at least once.

According to yet another preferred embodiment of the present invention, the method comprises: (d) by the first electronic device according to the one-time pad, a message and the selected true random number from the one-time pad. Encrypting the message to form an encrypted message by merging the encrypted message into the second electronic device via the communication channel. And transmitting.

Preferably, the method comprises: (f) receiving the encrypted message by the second electronic device; and (g) performing an inverse function on the encrypted message. Decrypting said encrypted message to obtain said at least a portion of said message.

Preferably, the message is divisible into a plurality of parts. More preferably, the message is divisible into a plurality of bytes, and the at least part of the message is one of the plurality of bytes.

Preferably, the plurality of true random numbers are generated by changing a seed of a pseudo random number generator at a random time. The seed can be changed by replacing or changing it with a selected random number. The random point in time itself can also be selected according to a random number.

According to yet another preferred embodiment of the present invention, the method comprises: (d) by the first electronic device according to the one-time pad, an identifier and the selected true random number from the one-time pad. Encrypting the identifier to form an encrypted message by merging the encrypted identifier according to a merge function; and (e) transmitting the encrypted identifier to the second electronic device; (F) receiving the encrypted identifier by the second electronic device; and (g) decrypting the encrypted identifier by performing an inverse function on the encrypted identifier. (H) obtaining access to an access control module by said second electronic device by said identifier; Deciding.

Preferably, the merge function includes a step of performing an XOR operation using the selected true random number and the identifier. More preferably, said access control module is selected from the group consisting of physical space, electronic device, and data. Also most preferably, the physical space is selected from the group consisting of rooms, safes, cars, buildings and safety equipment. Also most preferably, the electronic device is selected from the group consisting of a computer, a cash machine, a television, a mobile phone and a regular phone. Even more preferably, the data is stored in a bank account, e-mail (e-ma
il) and voicemail.

According to another embodiment of the present invention, there is provided a method for determining access by a user to an access control module, the method comprising: (a) a first electronic device for the user; Providing a second electronic device for the access control module, wherein each of the first and second electronic devices comprises (
i) a non-volatile memory, (ii) a processor, and (iii) at least one true random number table stored on the non-volatile memory, the table being the same for the first and second electronic devices. And (iv) at least one software program for obtaining a true random number from the table, the software program being stored on the non-volatile memory, and
One software program having a software program operated by the processor; and (b) providing a communication channel for communication between the first electronic device and the second electronic device. And (c) selecting a selected true random number from the tables in the first and second electronic devices according to a selection procedure, wherein the selection procedure includes the first and the second The same for the electronic device, the selected true random number is the same for the first and the second electronic device; and (d) by the first electronic device, the identifier and the Encrypting the identifier to form an encrypted message by merging the selected authentic random number with a merge function; e) sending the encrypted identifier to the second electronic device; (f) receiving the encrypted identifier by the second electronic device; and (g) receiving the encrypted identifier. (D) decrypting the encrypted identifier by performing an inverse function on the generated identifier to obtain the identifier, wherein the inverse function is the inverse of the merge function; Determining an access to an access control module by the second electronic device accordingly.

According to yet another embodiment of the present invention, there is provided a method for secure transmission of a message, the method comprising: (a) providing a first electronic device at a first location and a second electronic device; Providing a second electronic device in a location, wherein the first electronic device comprises:
And each of the second electronic devices is: (i) a non-volatile memory, (ii) a processor, and (iii) at least one true random number table stored on the non-volatile memory, wherein the tables are the first and the second random number tables. A table, and (iv) at least one software program for obtaining a true random number from the table, wherein the at least one software program is located on the non-volatile memory, the table being identical to the second electronic device; Storing the at least one software program and the software program operated by the processor, comprising: (b) for communication between the first electronic device and the second electronic device. Providing the first and the second communication channels according to a selection procedure. Selecting a selected genuine random number from the table in a second electronic device, wherein the selecting procedure is the same for the first and second electronic devices and the selected genuine random number is selected. Is the same for the first and second electronic devices; and (d) the first electronic device converts at least a portion of the message and the selected true random number into a merge function. Thus, encrypting the message to form an encrypted message by merging; and (e) transmitting the encrypted message over the communication channel to the second electronic device. Including.

According to yet another embodiment of the present invention, there is provided a device for generating an electronic one-time pad, the device comprising: (a) a non-volatile memory; (b) a processor; A read-only true random number table stored on a non-volatile memory; and (d) a first software program for obtaining the obtained true random number from the table, wherein the first software program is the first software program. A first software program stored on a volatile memory, and wherein the first software program is operated by the processor; (e) an input port for receiving at least a portion of a key; A second software program for selecting the selected true random number according to the obtained true random number and the selection procedure, Authenticated random numbers form at least a part of the electronic one-time pad,
A second software program; and (g) a read / write memory for storing the electronic one-time pad, wherein the non-volatile memory, the processor and the input port are located on a single chip; Access to the chip is enabled only through the input port.

Preferably, said read / write memory is located on said single chip. Alternatively and preferably, the read / write memory is at a physically separate location.

Preferably, when the second software program receives a command via the input port, the second software program selects the selected true random number. Also preferably,
Further including an additional input port on the chip for receiving a reset signal, wherein the second electronic device selects the selected true random number until the chip receives the reset signal. Also preferably, the device is (h) a generator for generating a generated true random number, wherein the generated true random number forms a second part of the key, wherein the generator A generator located on a single chip, and (i
) An output port, wherein said output port is located on said single chip and said second one of said keys;
And an output port that can be transmitted via the output port.

More preferably, the generator includes a source of a physical random phenomenon, and the generated true random number is generated from the source of the physical random phenomenon. Most preferably, the source of the physical random phenomenon is selected from the group consisting of a source of acoustic noise and a source of thermal noise.

[0037] Alternatively and preferably, said generator is a pseudo-random number generator operated by said processor according to at least one software program stored in said non-volatile memory, said pseudo-random number generator being undefined. Operating substantially continuously for a period of time, the generated true random number is obtained from the pseudo-random number generator.

According to a preferred embodiment of the present invention, said input port is capable of receiving a message and at least one software program for encrypting said message according to an electronic one-time pad to form an encrypted message Is stored on the non-volatile memory, the at least one software program is operated by the processor, and the encrypted message is transmittable via the output port. Preferably, the input port is capable of receiving a message, and at least one software program for encrypting the message according to an electronic one-time pad to form an encrypted message is physically separate from the chip. Stored on a second non-volatile memory located at a location where the at least one software program is run by the processor and the encrypted message is transmittable via the output port.

According to another preferred embodiment of the present invention, the non-volatile memory encrypts the identifier according to an electronic one-time pad and at least one software program for forming an encrypted identifier Wherein the at least one software program is run by the processor and the encrypted message is transmittable via the output port.

According to yet another embodiment of the present invention, a plurality of read-only random number tables are stored on the non-volatile memory, and at least one software program for selecting at least one of the tables Is stored on the non-volatile memory and operated by the processor, the electronic one-time pad is generated according to the at least one of the tables. More preferably,
A system for secure communication is provided, the system comprising: (a) a first device according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention; and (b) a second device according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention; At least one of the plurality of read-only random number tables is the same on the first device and the second device, and the software program can select the at least one same table.

Hereinafter, the term “message” refers to a collection of data in the form of bytes.
The message includes, but is not limited to, textual information and image information.

Hereinafter, the term “communication channel” means any communication between two electronic devices capable of effecting communication. Examples of communication channels include, but are not limited to, a regular telephone network, any computer network, both wireless and wired, transmitted by cable, and cellular telephone networks. In some circumstances, these communication channels are also considered "insecure channels." An "insecure channel" means that these types of communications tend to be intercepted by unauthenticated third parties (but not necessarily,
(Possibly). Hereinafter, the term "open channel" means a channel for which no security measures have been taken. Similarly, the term "open text" means unencrypted text transmitted over any communication channel.

Examples of electronic devices include facsimile machines, telephones, cell phones, televisions, and any other device intended for communication by voice, satellite dish, television transmitter, cable repeater, computer, and the like. Hereinafter, the term "computer network" means a connection between any two computers that allows the transmission of data. Hereinafter, the term “computer” is used for DOS, Windows ^™ , OS
/ 2 ^TM or personal computer having an operating system such as Linux (PC), Macintosh ^TM computers, computers having JAVA ^TM -OS as the operating system, Sun Microsy
Graphical workstations such as the Stems ^™ and Silicon Graphics ^™ computers, and AIX or Sun Micros
It refers to other computers having ystems UNIX (registered trademark) operating system with a version such as SOLARIS ^TM of ^TM or any other available operating systems. Hereinafter, the term “Windows ^™ ” refers to Microsoft Inc. Windows 95 ^™ , Windows 3. This includes, but is not limited to, x ^™ (“x” is an integer such as “1”), WindowsNT ^™ , Windows98 ^™ , WindowsCE ^™, and any upgraded version of these operating systems.

Hereinafter, the term “non-secure communication device” refers to any device that cannot perform the secure communication method of the present invention. Similarly, the term "non-secure communication protocol" means any protocol other than the secure communication protocol of the present invention. Thus, the term "non-secure" is not intended to indicate the actual security or characteristics of a non-secure device or non-secure protocol, but to indicate that the device or protocol is not of the present invention. Only intended.

Hereinafter, the term “true random number” means a number that is stochastically random in the sense that it cannot be regenerated repeatedly at will. The term “pseudorandom number” means a number that is generated according to a mathematical algorithm and that can be theoretically regenerated repeatedly. The term "random number generator" refers to a mathematical algorithm that allows a computer to generate pseudorandom numbers. One feature of such a pseudo-random number generator is that the seed is automatically changed each time a random number is generated. Hereinafter, the term "selection procedure"
Means, for example, both the step of selecting an existing random number from a true random number table, and the procedure by which such an existing random number is further changed, changed or manipulated.

Hereinafter, the term “cash machine” refers to inserting a card with a magnetic strip and
(Individual identification number) This means a machine where cash can be obtained by inputting an identification number.

For the present invention, a software application can be written in substantially any suitable programming language that can be readily selected by one of ordinary skill in the art.
The programming language chosen should be adapted to the computer hardware and operating system on which the software program runs.
Examples of suitable programming languages include C, C ^++, and Java,
It is not limited to these. Further, when the functions of the present invention are described as a sequence of steps for a method, they may be implemented as a sequence of software instructions operated by a data processor, and the present invention may be implemented as software, firmware or hardware. Can be implemented.

The above and other objects, aspects and advantages can be better understood from the following detailed description of preferred embodiments of the invention with reference to the drawings, in which:

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION The present invention creates and uses a practically unlimited number of electronic "one-time pads", for example, for secure communication or secure identification over an insecure channel. And a system for the same. The system includes an electronic device (eg, a semiconductor chip) that includes at least one random number table and can generate an electronic “one-time pad”. For secure communication, each person must have this chip or another form of the electronic device of the present invention.

Then, any two persons with the electronic device of the present invention can perform secure communication or secure identification procedures. In either case, preferably, the two transmit at least one random number as part of the key. The key is then used as part of the method of the invention for generating an electronic "one-time pad" by selecting at least one true random number from a random number table according to a selection procedure. The "one-time pad" can then be used, for example, to encrypt the message. However, the "one-time pad" is used only once and cannot be detected and cannot be obtained by analysis. Further, if one bit of the key changes, a completely different "one-time pad" is obtained. Each "one-time pad" is generated by each of their electronic devices at the beginning of a two-party communication and can be of any desired length. Thus, a "one-time pad" is created as needed for a two-way communication and then preferably discarded.

Preferably, the process starts by encrypting the target recipient identifier according to at least one table mutually known to both the sender and the recipient. This identifier is public. Next, the encrypted identifier is transmitted to the receiving electronic device of the present invention. The receiving electronic device then decrypts the encrypted identifier according to a mutually known table and compares the received and decrypted identifier with the identifier stored at the receiving electronic device. Preferably, the receiving electronic device is configured to stop the decoding procedure if the stored identifier is different from the received and decoded identifier. This preferred embodiment prevents unauthenticated recipients from impersonating the authenticated user and participating in secure communications or identification procedures for that authenticated user.

According to a preferred embodiment of the present invention, each person may have more than one electronic device of the present invention. For example, a bank may have an electronic device of the present invention having one table or set of tables of true random numbers for internal communication and another electronic device having a different set of tables for communicating with a customer or the same invention. Devices. Thus, while secure communication can take place between any two parties having the electronic device of the present invention, each party communicates with others at multiple locations in a hierarchy of communications between members of different groups. To do so, one may have more than one such device, or such a device with more than one set of true random number tables.

As described above, generation of the “one-time pad” depends on true random numbers. However, a chip or other electronic device of the present invention can generate a practically infinite number of random numbers, so that a device with this chip could theoretically not use substantially the same number more than once. Can communicate for many years. Accordingly, the methods, devices and systems of the present invention relate to the generation and disposable of two substantially simultaneous electronic "one-time pads" at two locations.

The present invention is directed to methods and systems for creating and using a practically unlimited number of electronic “one-time pads” for secure communication or secure identification, for example, over an insecure channel. The system includes an electronic device, eg, a semiconductor chip, that can generate a “one-time pad” of random numbers. To communicate, each person must have this chip. However, since the chip can generate an almost infinite number of random numbers, devices with this chip can theoretically communicate for many years without using substantially the same number more than once.

In another preferred embodiment of the present invention, a device incorporating the system of the present invention is described. Still other preferred embodiments include, for example, a physical space such as a safe or car, an electronic device such as a computer or cash machine, or a subject's access to data such as information associated with a bank account. A method and system for anti-counterfeit identification and related electronic devices are described.

A method for simultaneously generating a practically unlimited amount of the same true random number at a plurality of positions is within the scope of the present invention. Preferably, the following method is embodied as a software module operated by a data processor. In a first step, a true random number is selected from at least one table containing the true random number according to the pointer. Since the pointer is known for a plurality of positions, the selected true random number is the same at all positions. Next, the selected true random number is 1
Combined with at least one pseudo-random number generated by one pseudo-random number generator to form a final true random number. Since the pseudo-random number generator is the same at all positions and has the same seed at all positions, the same pseudo-random number is generated at all positions. Therefore, the same final true random number is formed at all positions.

According to a preferred feature of the method of the present invention, a further independent pseudo-random number generator determines a random point in time for replacing the seed of the above-mentioned random number generator. New seeds are generated according to the method of the invention and are therefore identical at all positions. Furthermore, the further independent pseudo-random number generator is also the same in all positions, and the same when the seed is replaced. More preferably, these times are determined by the sequence of numbers output. This preferred feature increases the difficulty of "gutting" the pseudorandom number generated by the pseudorandom number generator.

Alternatively and more preferably, a new seed is generated according to a pointer obtained from a completely random physical source, such as thermal noise. The pointer is obtained at one position and transmitted to all other positions, or the first part of the pointer is obtained at one position and the second part of the pointer is obtained at a different position; Either that part of the pointer is exchanged. Optionally and preferably, at each location the pointer follows a one-time pad of random numbers.
Sent in an encrypted state. The seed is then replaced, if necessary, at a predetermined time, rather than at a time determined by a further pseudo-random number generator. More preferably, the predetermined point in time is determined according to the size of the random number table, and the replacement of the seed is performed more frequently for smaller tables.

The principles and operation of a method, device and system for producing an electronic “one-time pad” of the present invention may be better understood with reference to the drawings and accompanying descriptions. And is not meant to be limiting.

Reference is now made to the drawings. FIG. 1 is an exemplary method for producing a practically unlimited number of identical copies of an electronic "one-time pad" having substantially any desired length at two different locations, according to the present invention. In this method, a true or probabilistic random number is selected according to a protocol that allows the same true random number to be selected at both locations. The method may be implemented, for example, as a software program running on a computer. In this implementation, since the two different locations may be two different computers connected by a network, communication may be provided via the computer and network communication hardware as is well known in the art.

At a minimum, both locations may have electronic devices capable of performing the method of the present invention. The electronic device should include a non-volatile memory and a processor. The term "electronic device" is not intended to mean that both the non-volatile memory and the processor are located only in a single device, such as a semiconductor chip. Alternatively, for example, the non-volatile memory and the processor may be located in a single computer or in two different computers.

[0062] Preferably, the electronic devices in both the first and second locations are connected via a communication channel substantially as described above.

In step 1 of the method, at least one true random number table is provided that is identical at both positions (referred to as “position 1” and “position 2”). True random numbers can be obtained, for example, from such a number of books. In this specification, each true random number is specified by a continuous number that functions as a pointer. For example, the first random number in the table is specified by the number “1”, the second random number is specified by the number “2”, and so on. The true random number table is stored on the nonvolatile memory of the electronic device.

In addition, a software program is provided that can access the true random number table to obtain a true random number from the table. The software program is operated by the processor and stored on the non-volatile memory. Hereinafter, the phrase "obtain true random numbers" means the act of directly reading or accessing such numbers from a true random number table.

In step 2 of the method, a number generator is provided which may be the same or different at position 1 and position 2. The number generator is, for example, a PC that generates a pseudorandom number from a seed (
(Personal Computer) Either a mathematical algorithm executed by a computing device such as a computer, or a source of physical random phenomena such as a device that generates thermal or acoustic noise.

In both cases, preferably, a true random number is generated using a number generator. For sources of physical random phenomena, this effect is inherent in the nature of the source. For mathematical algorithms, the effect is to start the seed, preferably continuously modified by the output of the number generator, run the number generator for an undefined period, and then use the generated number as needed It is obtained by doing. In this situation, the number generator can effectively act as a roulette wheel, since the numbers generated can be chosen essentially randomly and are therefore unpredictable. One example of such a number generator is a pseudo-number generator operated with seeds from random events.

In step 3 of the method, the position 1 and position 2 number generators generate at least one number designated as a first generated number and a second generated number. For clarity, only two generated numbers (one at each position) are used herein, but it will be understood that each position may generate more than one such number. . In addition, the number of numbers generated by each side need not be the same. In step 4, the first generated number is transmitted from position 1 to position 2,
On the other hand, a second generated number is transmitted from position 2 to position 1. Thus, each location has all of the generated numbers, which collectively form at least a portion of the "one-time key" for the one-time pad.

Preferably, the “one-time key” is formed by manipulating these generated numbers, for example by merging these generated numbers to form at least one merged number. Is done. Then, the merged number may be a “one-time key”.

In step 5, at least one true random number is obtained from the table according to the pointer using the “one-time key”. The pointer is a continuous number or the like, which specifies a true random number. For example, both the first and second generated numbers probably use the first generated number to specify a portion of the table, while the second generated number is a specific true random number. To obtain one true random number by using it as a pointer to. Alternatively and preferably, two true random numbers are obtained by using each generated number to obtain a true random number.

At this point, the method may end and at least one and preferably a plurality of true random numbers are generated, and the resulting true random numbers are selected true random numbers that form at least a part of a one-time pad. . However, in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the method continues, providing at least one pseudo-random number generator at each location in step 6, wherein the at least one pseudo-random number generator includes a non-volatile memory of each electronic device. It is operated by the processor of each electronic device according to at least one software program stored therein. The pseudorandom number generator is a mathematical algorithm executed by a computing device such as a PC (personal computer) computer, and generates a pseudorandom number from a seed. This pseudo-random number generator is preferably different from the number generator in step 1. However, the pseudo-random number generator must be the same at both locations, and if the same seed is provided to the pseudo-random number generators on both sides, the same pseudo-random number can be generated as output.

In step 7, the true random number (s) obtained are used as seed (s) for the pseudo-random number generator at each location, and the generated pseudo-random number (s) is identical at both locations. Generate random numbers. If there are two true random numbers, they are merged to form a seed. Preferably, the pseudorandom number generator, once given a particular seed, changes the seed so that it can be executed substantially without further intervention.

In step 8, this pseudo-random number is used as a second pointer to a true random number table to obtain a new true random number. The true random number table for this step can be the same table as the previous step. Alternatively and preferably, the tables may be different. However, this true random number table must be the same at both position 1 and position 2, so the selected true random number is the same at both position 1 and position 2. The selected authentic random numbers optionally and preferably form a selected authentic random number.

Alternatively and preferably, in step 9, a second generated pseudo-random number that is also identical at position 1 and position 2 is generated. This random number is calculated in step 7
Or a different pseudo-random number generator. But,
Both the pseudo-random number generator and the seed for that generator are position 1 and position 2
, The same pseudo-random number is obtained at position 1 and position 2. At step 10, the selected true random number selected at step 8 is merged with the pseudo-random number generated at step 9 to form a merged true random number. Since the merge step needs to be performed by a function that maintains the probability distribution, the merged number is also a true random number. For example,
The function may add them together or perform an XOR logical bit operation. Preferably, steps 8 to 10 are repeated at least once, and the selected or merged true random numbers form a second pointer to the true random number table. More preferably, those steps are repeated more than once.

In step 11, the merged random number is output to be at least part of the “one-time pad”. The method may then repeat steps 8-11 as many times as necessary to generate a "one-time pad" of the desired size.

If necessary, a plurality of true random numbers are generated by changing the seed of the pseudo-random number generator at random times. The seed can be changed by replacing or using the selected random number. The random point in time itself can also be chosen according to a random number. Alternatively, at least one or more of the above steps of merging a true random number with a pseudo-random number may be used to generate a true random number. If more than one step is used, the steps can be in virtually any order.

According to a preferred feature of this method of the present invention, a further independent pseudo-random number generator determines a random point in time when the seed of said pseudo-random number generator (s) is replaced. New seeds are generated according to this method of the invention and are therefore identical at all positions. Preferably, the new seed is a random number generated from the random number table described in the above step. Furthermore, the time at which the seed is replaced is also the same, since the further independent pseudo-random number generator is also the same at all positions. More preferably, these times are determined according to the output number sequence. This preferred feature makes it more difficult to "guess" the pseudo-random numbers generated by the pseudo-random number generator, and thus more difficult to determine the generated random numbers.

According to a more preferred feature of the invention, the process for generating random numbers generates a new random number table each time a plurality of random numbers are required, and as described above, from these new tables. It involves the further step of generating a plurality of random numbers. Most preferably, the new random number table is a temporary table, and is destroyed after the random numbers have been generated. This preferred feature distinguishes between stored tables and generated random numbers, thereby increasing the difficulty of "gutting" a plurality of generated random numbers.

One particular advantage of this method is that it allows a selectable number from a table containing a finite number of random numbers so that the position of each true random number is not exposed by observing the output of the method. Also, although the true random number table is finite, the probability of using any particular column of true random numbers more than once, such as when the number of true random numbers used is only about hundreds to thousands, is Small, almost never. For example, 4
Assuming that 100 million electronic devices of the present invention have the same table containing the same 8000 random numbers and use a 12-byte key to generate a "one-time pad", all devices will have After generating a “one-time pad” once per minute during that time, only one such generated pad is expected to be identical to the previously generated pad. . If the seed of the pseudo-random number generator is changed according to the above preferred method, the generated number will be "
It is even more difficult to "guess" or determine by an external source. Thus, the method of the present invention allows a practically unlimited number of such "one-time pads" to be generated without repetition.

FIG. 2A is a block diagram illustrating an example of an electronic device of the present invention for generating an electronic “one-time pad” that is identical at two different locations. Although the example device is shown as an integrated single chip embodiment, not all components need be located on a single chip. It is noted that components described herein are intended as logical or virtual entities, are identified by function, and are not necessarily physical components. The operation of the electronic "one-time pad" is substantially as described in FIG.

The one-time pad device 10 has an internal non-volatile memory 12 which can be, for example, a ROM (Read Only Memory). The non-volatile memory 12 has at least one
Includes two software programs. The software program includes instructions for the pseudo-random number generator and any operating instructions for operating the one-time pad device 10 (particularly enabling communication between different one-time pad devices 10). Non-volatile memory 12 also includes at least one read-only true random number table and a first software program for obtaining true random numbers from the table. A pseudo-random number generator is a mathematical algorithm that can generate pseudo-random numbers and is operated as software by the processor 14. The first software program is also operated by the processor 14.

In addition, preferably, the one-time pad device 10 is an electronic one-time pad or the like, and features additional read / write memory for both reading and writing information, and is referred to herein as a RAM ( Random access memory)
Shown as 16. The RAM 16 is particularly necessary if, for example, the volatile memory 12 is a ROM. If the non-volatile memory 12 is, for example, a flash array and is writable, the non-volatile memory 12 and the RAM 16 can be combined in one memory as needed. Alternatively and preferably, RA
The M16 is located at a physically separated location different from other components of the one-time pad device 10.

Preferably, the one-time pad device 10 also has a separable number generator for generating true random numbers without interruption and independent of communication from any other one-time pad device 10. If another pseudo-random number generator is used as the number generator, preferably the pseudo-random number generator generates a number starting from the seed substantially as soon as the one-time pad device 10 first receives electrical power. Start generating.
Since the selection time itself is random, these numbers are selected as true random numbers, so the selected number cannot be predetermined. More preferably, substantially any one-time pad device 10 has a different seed for this pseudo-random number generator. Most preferably, the number generator generates a true random number using a random event, such as a source of random phenomena such as thermal noise, acoustic noise, or radioactive decay.

Also, preferably, the nonvolatile memory 12, the RAM 16 (if any), and the processor 14 are not accessible from outside the one-time pad device 10. Thus, a software program for enabling communication between the true random number table and the different one-time pad devices 10 and performing the method of FIG. 1 is not accessible from outside the one-time pad device 10. Instead, the one-time pad device 10 has an input port 18 for receiving information and an output port 20 for transmitting information. Preferably, communication is only possible through input port 18 and output port 20, so that one-time pad device 10 is electrically sealed to the other after programming. This is accomplished, for example, by passing current through one or more legs of the one-time pad device 10 to break certain interconnects. Thus, since a secure connection is provided between the one-time pad device 10 and other external entities, the internal operation of the one-time pad device 10 can proceed substantially without interruption. One example of a chip that incorporates these desired features is a chip that can write data and overwrite multiple times, but cannot retrieve information by reading data from the chip.

Preferably, the software program selects the selected true random number when receiving a command via the input port 18.

[0085] Both the input port 18 and the output port 20 are connected to the processor 14, for example any standard microprocessor. Processor 14 can operate any software program stored on non-volatile memory 12, receive data from input port 18, and transmit a limited set of data via output port 20 It is. The data set is limited according to, for example, a software program stored in the nonvolatile memory 12. Preferably, the set of data includes a portion of a "one-time key" transmitted from the one-time pad device 10, as shown in FIG. Similarly, while substantially any data may be received via input port 18, processor 14 may include a portion of the “one-time key” received from one-time pad device 10, for example, as shown in FIG. It can only operate on a relatively limited set of data that can include. Processor 14 may also preferably write data to or read data from RAM 16 as needed to perform any necessary operations.

The operation of the one-time pad device 10 is as follows. When one-time pad device 10 receives a signal from another such device (not shown), one-time pad device 10 generates a portion of the one-time key, as described above,
Then, this part is transmitted to the other device via the output port 20. The signal may be through the input port 18, through another leg of the chip, or according to any other identification protocol. In any case, then the other device:
The other portion of the one-time key may be sent to the one-time pad device 10, which may receive this portion via the input port 18. The remaining operation of the one-time pad device 10 is substantially as described in FIG. 1 until a desired length of the one-time pad is generated.

Optionally and preferably, the one-time pad device 10 is such that the procedure for selecting the selected authentic random number is performed substantially until the one-time pad device 10 receives a reset signal. , A further input port 19 for receiving a reset signal.

The one-time pad device 1 whose operation is shown in the flowchart in FIG. 2B
According to a preferred embodiment of 0, the non-volatile memory 12 may also include a unique identification number to identify a particular one-time pad device 10 (step 1). The identification number is determined according to a reversible mathematical function.
By 0, at least a portion of the generated one-time pad may be used and encrypted by merging the identification number with at least one number from the generated one-time pad (step 2). For example, the XOR operator is performed using each digit of the identification number and the generated true random number from the one-time pad to form an encrypted identification number. The true random number used can be the same for both devices, for example by using the first random number generated from the one-time pad.

Next, the encrypted identification number can be transmitted from the one-time pad device 10 and received by another device (not shown) (step 3). The other device then decrypts the encrypted identification number using the same copy of the one-time pad generated above according to the inverse of the function of step 2 (
Step 4). For example, if the function of step 2 is addition, its inverse function is
Subtraction. The inverse function of the XOR operation is the XOR operation itself. The identification number may serve as proof of the legitimate identity of the one-time pad device 10 (step 5).
. An example of this embodiment of the one-time pad device 10 allows an organization such as a bank to identify a legitimate customer using a legitimate identification number before initiating communication (eg, performing a transaction). obtain.

FIG. 2C shows a flowchart of the operation of another preferred embodiment of the one-time pad device 10. Here, the one-time pad device 10 is used for message encryption. In step 1, a further software program, or a further portion of the same software program, is provided on non-volatile memory 12 for execution by processor 14. After the one-time pad has been generated as described above for step 2, a message (either ciphertext or plaintext) is received by the one-time pad device 10 via the input port 18 (step 3). If the message is encrypted, the one-time pad device 10 decrypts the message by using the one-time pad (step 4). Alternatively, if the message is in the clear, the one-time pad device 10 encrypts the message by using a one-time pad. The process of encryption and decryption is similar to that described for the identification numbers in FIG. 2B.

To encrypt a message, preferably the message is divided into multiple parts (
(For example, a plurality of bytes). Each part is encrypted by merging with one true random number from the one-time pad according to the inverse function. For example, an XOR operation may be performed using one true random number and each byte of the message. The same operation on the XOR, the inverse of that operation, is then performed again, using the same one-time number from the one-time pad, for message decoding.

The length of the one-time pad is predetermined by transmitting the number of message parts from the first one-time pad device 10 to another such device, if necessary. Alternatively and preferably, the first one-time pad device 10 has encrypted the message, and thus calculated the number of parts of the message, so that the process of generating the one-time pad will continue until the appropriate length is obtained. Simply continue and the first one-time pad device 10 simply stops the process when the appropriate length is obtained. Also, and preferably, both one-time pad devices 10 generate and use the one-time pad "on the fly" substantially simultaneously to decrypt or encrypt the message, and more preferably the length of the message. Information is not exchanged first.

In a preferred embodiment of the one-time pad device 10 described in FIG. 2A, 2B or 2C and shown in FIG. 2D, at least two sets of true random numbers, shown as table set 11 and table set 13 Is provided on the non-volatile memory 12. the term"
A “table set” is used herein to include at least one such table. In this embodiment, at least one table set, such as set 13, is for “public” communication with any other one-time pad device 10. At least one other table set, such as set 11, is designated for users in a private group, for example, users in a bank. This set is unique to this private group, and no other one-time pad device 10 has this same set outside of the set operated by members of that private group. Of course, many such table sets of true random numbers can be provided. The selection of a particular set of tables may be made during communication by a software program that operates the one-time pad device 10. Thus, more security is provided for internal communications within the group, since only members of the group may have this special set of tables.

Further, preferably, the number of one-time pad devices 10 having a particular table set 11 may be recorded, for example, by one member of the group. If one such one-time pad device 10 using table set 11 is stolen, lost, or otherwise removed from one member of the group, the remaining one-time pad with table set 11 The device 10 is removed from operation and replaced by a different group of one-time pad devices 10 with a different table set of true random numbers. Thus, access to any particular one-time pad device 10 that has a special set of tables unique to one group could be more closely adjusted.

In still another preferred embodiment of the one-time pad device 10 shown in any of FIGS. According to at least one known table, the target receiving one-time pad device 10
Start by encrypting the identifier of This identifier may be public.
Next, the encrypted identifier is sent to the receiving one-time pad device 10 at the start of a message or other communication procedure. Next, the receiving one-time pad device 10 decrypts the encrypted identifier according to a mutually known table, and receives the decrypted identifier and the received one-time pad device 10.
Is compared with the identifier stored in. The receiving one-time pad device 10 is preferably configured such that if the stored identifier is different from the received and decoded identifier, the decoding procedure is stopped. This preferred embodiment prevents an unauthorized recipient from impersonating the authenticated user and participating in the secure communication or identification procedure of the authenticated user.

FIG. 3 is a schematic block diagram of an embodiment of a system for forgery prevention identification of a subject. This system preferably has the preferred embodiment of the electronic one-time pad device of FIGS. 2A and 2B. The identification system 22 includes a target device 24
And an access device 26. Preferably, both target device 24 and access device 26 each feature one-time pad device 10. Alternatively, any electronic device that can perform the operations described in FIGS. 1 and 2A-2D can replace one-time pad device 10. In any event, both target device 24 and access device 26 require the necessary ones, such as one-time key components, to enable respective one-time pad device 10 to operate substantially as described above. Information may be sent and received.

The target device 24 and the access device 26 communicate via a communication channel 28. Communication channel 28 may be any of a number of different types of channels. Such channels include optical signals of any wavelength, such as infrared, other electromagnetic signals, audio signals, visual images, wired and wireless cables, or artificial sanitary transmissions,
As well as, but not limited to, a channel using a cellular telephone network, a regular telephone network or any type of computer network.

The target device 24 is operated by a user (not shown) that needs to be identified in order to gain access to the access control module 30. For convenience, the target device 24 may be a small portable device, similar in size to an electronic lock for a car, or as small as a smart card. Examples of access control module 30 include physical spaces such as rooms, safes, cars, buildings or safety equipment, electronic devices such as computers, televisions, cash machines, mobile phones and regular telephones, and bank accounts, emails ( e-mail) and data such as information related to voice mail, etc., but are not limited thereto. As can be seen from these examples, both certain access control modules 30 require the user to be identified prior to action and may encrypt any resulting information resulting from the user's actions. Examples of an access control module 30 that preferably has both features include, but are not limited to, regular phones and mobile phones.

The target device 24 communicates with the access device 26 substantially as described for FIGS. 2A, 2B and 2D. Briefly, the non-volatile memory 12 of the one-time pad device 10 in the target device 24 also
Includes a unique identifier for identifying Examples of such identifiers include, but are not limited to, an identification number, a character string, a sequence of electronically generated acoustic tones, or virtually any other type of information that may be quantized. The identifier is
The one-time pad device 10 uses at least a portion of the generated one-time pad and merges its identifier with at least one number from the generated one-time pad according to a mathematical function that must be reversible. Can be encrypted.

Next, the encrypted identifier may be transmitted from target device 24 and received by access device 26. Next, access device 26 may decrypt the encrypted identifier, as described above. Next, access device 2
6 checks the identifier against a list of identifiers for the target device 24. The access device 26 may, for example, allow a user (not shown) to be given access to the access control module 30 or determine whether the user should be granted access using other functions. Can decide. The identifier may serve as proof of the legitimate identity of the target device 24 (and, thus, perhaps the user).

Alternatively, the identifier may be stored and encrypted by the access device 26. Next, the access device 26 transmits the encrypted identifier to the target device 24.
Can be sent to The target device 24 may then need to decrypt the encrypted identifier and send some type of acknowledgment to the access device 26 according to the identifier. If desired, target device 24 may send a response to another access-allowed device 32 that is separate from access device 26.
According to this configuration, the access permission device 32 is a one-time pad device 1
It is not necessary to include 0, but may be a normal access granting device 32 operable according to signals received from the target device 24.

According to another preferred embodiment of the identification system 22, in addition to, or as an alternative to, the static identifier, the authentic random number is the target device 24 according to a process for generating a one-time pad authentic random number. And access device 26 may be generated "on the fly" by the respective one-time device 10. Next, the target device 24 may transmit the true random number to the access device 26. The access device 26 may compare the received true random number with the true random number generated by the one-time pad device 10 of the access device 26. If the two numbers are the same, access can be given to the user. Otherwise, access is denied. This is because the inability to select the same true random number may indicate that the target device 24 is not legitimate. Identification, as described above,
It can be more specific by using a table of true random numbers restricted to private groups.

In addition or as an alternative to these other identification mechanisms, the password
It may be stored on the access device 26 and / or the target device 24. The user may be required to enter a password before access is granted.

All of these different embodiments of the identification system 22 can preferably be combined in parallel or series with other existing modes of identification. Other existing modes of identification include, but are not limited to, smart cards and readers, magnetic strip cards and readers, devices for enrolling voice prints or fingerprints, and mechanical locks and keys that only operate manually.

FIG. 4A shows an embodiment of a system for secure communication of the present invention using the devices of FIGS. 2A, 2C and 2D. The secure communication system 34 includes a plurality of secure communication devices 36. Only two of them are shown for illustrative clarity, but are not intended to be limiting. The plurality of secure communication devices 36 are, for example, a facsimile machine or are connected to the facsimile machine. Preferably, each secure communication device 36 features a one-time pad device 10. Alternatively, any electronic device that can perform the operations described in FIG. 1 and FIGS. 2A and 2C can replace one-time pad device 10. In any event, both secure communication devices 36 provide the necessary information, such as one-time key components, to enable each one-time pad device 10 to operate substantially as described above. Can send and receive.

The first secure communication device 38 is connected to the second secure communication device 40 via a communication channel 42. The communication channel 42 is not always secure from access or “sniffing” by unauthorized parties. Examples of communication channels 42 are described above and include, but are not limited to, existing telephone and cellular networks, and computer networks.

The communication is performed on the first secure communication device 3 as essentially described with reference to FIG. 2C.
8 and the second communication device 40. Briefly, the first secure communication device 38 sends a request for communication via the communication channel 42, for example, by sending at least one true random number as one component of a one-time key. Next, the second secure communication device 40 receives the request and responds accordingly by transmitting it as one component of at least one other authentic random one-time key. Next, the first secure communication device 38 and the second communication device 40 create a one-time pad as described for FIGS. 1, 2A, 2C and 2D. Next, the message is encrypted by the first secure communication device 38 and then transmitted to the second secure communication device 40, in a manner substantially similar to that described in FIG. 2C. . next,
The second secure communication device 40 decrypts the encrypted message substantially as described in FIG. 2C.

As also shown in FIG. 4A, the secure communication system 34 includes one or more non-secure communication devices 44. Only one of the secure communication devices 44 is shown for clarity of illustration, but is not intended to be limiting in any way. First secure communication device 3
If 8, for example, sends a message to non-secure communication device 44, first secure communication device 38 may determine that non-secure communication device 44 cannot execute a secure communication protocol. Such a determination is made because the non-secure communication device 44 is unable to respond to the request for secure communication made by the first secure communication device 38, and the first secure communication device 38 Switch to a non-secure communication protocol. Alternatively, if non-secure communication device 44 attempts to send a message to first secure communication device 38, non-secure communication device 44 may initiate communication using a non-secure communication protocol. In such a situation, the first secure communication device 38 may also respond by switching to a non-secure communication protocol. Preferably, first secure communication device 38 may maintain a record or log of such events. The record or log is
For example, describe the identity of the non-secure communication device and the content of the message.

[0109] Optionally, in the above example, if any type of non-secure communication device initiates communication, the first secure communication device 38 may instead change the user (not shown). . Preferably, the user may determine whether the user should be changed when unsecured communication is required to determine whether unsecured communication using the non-secure communication device is allowed. As another option, preferably, the user may choose to be changed only if, for example, the first secure communication device 38 is attempting to initiate communication with the non-secure communication device 44. Thus, insecure communication may be performed either automatically or according to a user's choice.

Examples of the secure communication device 36 include, but are not limited to, a facsimile machine, a voice scrambler, a modem, an Ethernet card, a regular telephone or a mobile phone. In addition, the secure communication device 36 may also provide access to signals from television broadcast facilities, for example, to provide "personal" service to each television subscriber. Also, because the secure communication device 36 may allow for accurate identification of information from remote meters for utility equipment, such as gas or electricity, the utility equipment provider may, for example, determine the source and accuracy of such information. Degrees can be identified positively.

[0111] For these embodiments, the secure communication device 36 may be transparent to the user and may automatically execute the secure communication protocol without reference to the user. A possible exception is when communication is performed with a non-secure communication device 44, in which case the user may be changed as needed as described above.

Alternatively and preferably, the secure communication device 36 may be used as a “black box” to which another electronic device is connected, as shown in FIG. 4B. As shown, the non-secure communication device 46 is connected to the secure communication device 36. If the secure communication device 36 is not present, the non-secure communication device 46 may typically be connected directly to the non-secure communication channel 42. Instead, in FIG. 4B, the non-secure communication device 46 is connected to the secure communication device 36. next,
Secure communication device 36 is connected to non-secure communication channel 42. Therefore,
All messages or communications to or from the non-secure communication device 46 will be made according to the secure communication protocol without modification to the non-secure communication device 46.
Be executed.

By way of example only, and not by way of limitation, non-secure communication device 46 may be a facsimile machine, telephone or voice scrambler, and non-secure communication channel 42 may be a regular telephone line. The telephone plug from the non-secure communication device 46 can then be inserted into the secure communication device 36 via an appropriately adapted input port 48.
Next, output port 50 is connected to a telephone jack, which is a connection point to non-secure communication channel 42. Once these connections are made, the combination of the non-secure communication device 46 and the secure communication device 36 operates in substantially the same manner as the secure communication device 36 is actually built into the non-secure communication device 46. But,
The main advantage is that existing non-secure communication devices can be adapted for the secure communication of the present invention. In addition, non-secure communication devices can be purchased "off-the-shelf" without requiring special manufacturing or factories for each type of non-secure communication device. Instead, all such devices can be adapted as desired using the secure communication device 36 without inconvenience to the user.

Additional functions or data operations required during operation, whether the secure communication device is embedded in a non-secure communication device or whether the safety communication device is added after manufacture May be recorded in the RAM 16 of the one-time pad 10 in the secure communication device 36. Naturally, RAM16
Are not suitable for storing information needed after the secure communication device 36 loses electrical power. If such information needs to be retained regardless of the status of the secure communication device 36, for example, a flash array can replace the RAM 16.

According to yet another embodiment of the present invention, which may be implemented using any of the electronic devices of the present invention of FIGS. 2A-2D, a “star” network configuration 52 may be used, as shown in FIG. Created using a device. At the center of the star network 52 is the central electronic device 54 of the present invention. Central electronic device 54 communicates with a plurality of customer electronic devices 56 of the present invention. At least one random number master table is maintained at the central electronic device. Each customer electronic device 56
Has its own unique table. Each random number table at the customer electronic device 56 is maintained in two forms: one encrypted according to the master table at the central electronic device 54 and one unencrypted. When customer electronic device 56 initiates communication with central electronic device 54, customer electronic device 56 first transmits its unique table to central electronic device 54 in an encrypted state. Next, the central electronic device 54 decrypts the encrypted unique table according to the at least one master table,
A unique table for the customer electronic device 56 is obtained. Communication then takes place between the central electronic device 54 and the customer electronic device 56, for example by using the unique table as a random number table for performing the method of the invention as described above. If necessary, these unique tables can be used to create new tables according to methods common to both central electronic device 54 and customer electronic device 56. Also, if desired, any of the above methods for communication can be used with this method after the encrypted table has been decrypted by central electronic device 54. In addition, a password may be recorded within the customer electronic device 56 if desired. The user is required to enter this password to access customer electronic device 56.

This embodiment of the invention can be used for many different implementations. For example, central electronic device 54 may be located at a credit card clearing center to process transaction requests for credit card billing. Central electronic device 54 may also be located at a credit card provider. The customer may make a request to charge a credit card via the customer electronic device 56. This embodiment of the invention can also be used for mobile phones and "paid TV". In “pay TV”, a user must pay a fee to watch a particular television program. Thus, this embodiment of the present invention can be used for many different types of commercial activities.

[0117] Any of the above "one-time pad" devices may also be implemented using a conventional computer, for example, a table of random number members is sent to an individual on a diskette.

It can be understood that the above description is intended only by way of example, and that many other embodiments are possible within the spirit and scope of the invention.

[Brief description of the drawings]

FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a method for generating an electronic “one-time pad” of the present invention.

FIG. 2A illustrates an embodiment of an electronic device for generating an electronic “one-time pad” of the present invention.

FIG. 2B illustrates an example of an electronic device for generating an electronic “one-time pad” of the present invention.

FIG. 2C illustrates an embodiment of an electronic device for generating an electronic “one-time pad” of the present invention.

FIG. 2D illustrates an embodiment of an electronic device for generating an electronic “one-time pad” of the present invention.

FIG. 3 illustrates an embodiment of a system using the devices of FIGS. 2A and 2D of the present invention.

FIG. 4A is a diagram illustrating an embodiment of a system for secure communication.

FIG. 4B is a diagram illustrating an example of a communication device in the system of FIG. 4A.

FIG. 5 illustrates an embodiment of a “star” system for secure communication between a central electronic device and a client device of the present invention.

──────────────────────────────────────────────────続 き Continuation of front page (81) Designated country EP (AT, BE, CH, CY, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, IE, IT, LU, MC, NL, PT, SE ), OA (BF, BJ, CF, CG, CI, CM, GA, GN, GW, ML, MR, NE, SN, TD, TG), AP (GH, GM, KE, LS, MW, SD, SL, SZ, UG, ZW), EA (AM, AZ, BY, KG, KZ, MD, RU, TJ, TM), AE, AL, AM, AT, AU, AZ, BA, BB, BG, BR , BY, CA, CH, CN, CU, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, GB, GD, GE, GH, GM, HR, HU, ID, IL, IN, IS , JP, KE, KG, KP, KR, KZ, LC, LK, LR, LS, LT, LU, LV, MD, MG, MK, MN, MW, MX, NO, NZ, PL, PT, RO, RU, SD, SE, SG, SI, SK, SL, TJ, TM, TR, TT, UA, UG, US, UZ, VN, YU, ZA, ZW (D) combining the obtained true random number and the generated pseudo-random number to form at least one true random number of the quantity, wherein the at least one true random number of the quantity is the plurality of true random numbers. The same at the position of In addition, the present invention includes a "star" network system. Here, the central electronic device has a master table, and the plurality of customer electronic devices each have at least one table stored in two forms, one of both forms being one of the two forms. , According to the master table, and the other is in unencrypted form. Next, the customer electronic device sends the encrypted table to the central electronic device, which decrypts the table to initiate communication.

Claims (94)

[Claims] 1. A method for generating an identical electronic one-time pad at a first location and a second location, comprising: (a) providing a first electronic device at the first location; Providing a second electronic device at two locations, wherein the first and second electronic devices comprise: (i) a non-volatile memory; (ii) a processor; and (iii) on the non-volatile memory. At least one true random number table stored in the table, wherein the table is the same for the first and second electronic devices; and (iv) at least one for obtaining a true random number from the table. A software program, wherein the software program is stored on the non-volatile memory, and the at least one software program is (B) providing a communication channel for communication between the first electronic device and the second electronic device; and (c) selecting Selecting a selected true random number from the tables in the first and second electronic devices according to a procedure, wherein the selection procedure is the same for the first and second electronic devices. Wherein the selecting procedure includes exchanging at least a portion of a key between the first and second electronic devices over the communication channel, wherein the selected authentic random number is associated with the first and second electronic devices. (D) using the selected true random number at the first and second locations;
Forming at least one of the same electronic one-time pad. 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the same electronic one-time pad is of any desired length. 3. The step of selecting the selected true random number from the table includes: (i) generating a first true random number in the first electronic device and a second true random number in the second electronic device. Generating a true random number; and (ii) transmitting the first true random number to the second electronic device via the channel and transmitting the second true random number to the first electronic device. 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the first and second authentic random numbers form the at least a portion of the key. And (iii) obtaining a true random number from said table using a pointer, said pointer being substantially the same as said key, and said selected random number being equal to said key. 4. The method of claim 3, further comprising the step of selecting according to the obtained true random number. 5. The method of claim 4, wherein the selected true random number is the obtained true random number. 6. The method of claim 3, further comprising (ii-a) merging the first and second true random numbers to form the at least a portion of the key. 7. At least one of said first and second electronic devices includes a source of physical random phenomena, and at least one of said first and second true random numbers.
4. The method of claim 3, wherein one is generated from a source of the physical random phenomenon. 8. The method of claim 7, wherein the source of the physical random phenomenon is selected from the group consisting of a source of acoustic noise and a source of thermal noise. 9. The processor according to claim 1, wherein at least one of said first and second electronic devices is characterized by a pseudo-random number generator, said pseudo-random number generator according to at least one software program stored in said non-volatile memory. And wherein the step of generating at least one of the first and second true random numbers comprises outputting an output number from the pseudo random number generator, wherein the pseudo random number generator is operated substantially continuously for an undefined period of time. 4. The method of claim 3, comprising the step of: 10. (iv) providing at least one identical pseudo-random number generator in the first and second electronic devices, wherein the at least one pseudo-random number generator is in the non-volatile memory Being operated by said processor according to at least one software program stored in: v) obtaining the obtained true random number from said table using a first pointer, (Vi) providing the obtained true random number as a seed to the at least one pseudorandom number generator; and (vii) providing the at least one pseudorandom number to the at least one pseudorandom number generator. Obtaining a generated pseudo-random number from a random number generator, wherein the generated pseudo-random number is stored in the first and second electronic data units; 4. The method of claim 3, further comprising: (viii) using the generated pseudorandom number as a second pointer to select the selected true random number from the table. The method described in. 11. The step of selecting the selected true random number includes: (1) generating a second generated pseudo-random number from the at least one pseudo-random number generator; The generated pseudo-random numbers correspond to the first and second
(2) merging the second generated pseudo-random number with the selected true random number;
11. The method of claim 10, further comprising the step of forming a merged true random number, wherein the merged true random number is the selected true random number. 12. The step of providing the at least one true random number table comprises: (1) providing an initial true random number table; and (2) obtaining from the table using a first pointer. Obtaining a true random number, wherein the first pointer is substantially the same as the key; and (3) providing the obtained true random number as a seed to the at least one pseudo-random number generator. And (4) obtaining a generated pseudo-random number from the at least one pseudo-random number generator, wherein the generated pseudo-random number is the same for the first and second electronic devices. (5) selecting the selected true random number from the initial table using the generated pseudo-random number as a second pointer; (6) step Repeating steps 2-5 to create the at least one true random number table. 13. The step of selecting the selected true random number comprises: (A) generating a second generated pseudo-random number from the at least one pseudo-random number generator; The generated pseudo-random numbers correspond to the first and second
(B) merging the second generated pseudo-random number with the selected true random number;
13. The method of claim 12, further comprising forming a merged true random number, wherein the merged true random number is the selected true random number. 14. The steps (vi) to (viii) of claim 10 wherein the obtained true random number is the selected true random number, and the second pointer repeats the steps of claims 10 and 11. 12. The method of claim 11, further comprising repeating the step of claim 11 at least once, wherein said selected true random number from step 11 (2) of step (a). 15. The method of claim 14, wherein a plurality of selected true random numbers are obtained by repeating the steps of claim 14 at least once. 16. The step (vi) comprising: (1) providing a further identical pseudo-random number generator in said first and second electronic devices, said further pseudo-random number generator comprising: Being operated by the processor according to at least one software program stored in a memory; (2) generating further pseudo-random numbers by the further pseudo-random number generator using the seed; (3) 11. The method of claim 10, further comprising :) forming a second seed using the further pseudo-random number; and (4) replacing the seed with the second seed. 17. The method of claim 16, wherein said second seed is said further pseudorandom number. 18. The method according to claim 17, wherein step (4) is performed at random intervals determined by the further pseudo-random number generator. 19. A step (3) of: (A) obtaining a generated pseudo-random number from the at least one pseudo-random number generator, wherein the generated pseudo-random number is the first and second pseudo random numbers. (B) selecting the further authentic random number from the table using the generated pseudo-random number as an additional pointer; and (C) selecting the second authentic random number from the additional true random number. Forming the two seeds. 20. The step of forming the second seed from the further true random number comprises: (I) generating a second generated pseudo-random number from the at least one pseudo-random number generator; The second generated pseudo-random number is the first and second pseudo-random numbers.
(II) merging the second generated pseudo-random number with the further true random number;
20. The method of claim 19, further comprising forming a merged true random number, wherein the merged true random number is the second seed. 21. Step (vi) comprising: (1) providing a completely random physical source; and (2) generating a new random number with the completely random physical source. The method of claim 10, further comprising: (3) forming a second seed using the new random number; and (4) replacing the seed with the second seed. 22. Step (2) includes: (A) generating at least one pointer and selecting a random number; (B) exchanging the at least one pointer; and (C) selecting the random number. 22. The method of claim 21, further comprising: forming a selected random number; and (D) selecting the new random number according to the selected random number. 23. The method according to claim 22, wherein step (2) is performed at predetermined intervals. 24. The method according to claim 23, wherein the predetermined interval is determined according to a size of the random number table. 25. The step of selecting the selected random number comprises: (i) providing at least one identical pseudo-random number generator at the first and second electronic devices, wherein the at least one A pseudorandom number generator operated by the processor according to at least one software program stored in the non-volatile memory; and (ii) using the key as a seed at a substantially random time; Generating the generated pseudo-random numbers by the pseudo-random number generator. 26. The method according to claim 25, wherein the seed is modified by the obtained true random number obtained from the true random number table. 27. The method of claim 26, wherein the random time point is selected according to the obtained true random number. 28. (d) merging at least a portion of a message with the selected true random number from the one-time pad by the first electronic device according to the one-time pad according to a merge function; The method further comprising: encrypting the message to form an encrypted message; and (e) transmitting the encrypted message to the second electronic device over the communication channel. 2. The method according to 1. 29. (f) receiving the encrypted message by the second electronic device; and (g) performing the inverse function on the encrypted message by performing an inverse function on the encrypted message. Decoding the received message to obtain the at least a portion of the message. 30. The method of claim 28, wherein the message is divisible into a plurality of bytes, and wherein the at least a portion of the message is one of the plurality of bytes. 31. The merging function includes performing an XOR operation using the selected true random number and the bytes of the message.
The method according to 0. 32. (d) merging the identifier with the selected true random number from the one-time pad by the first electronic device according to the one-time pad according to a merge function, Encrypting to form an encrypted message; (e) transmitting the encrypted identifier to the second electronic device; and (f) encrypting the encrypted identifier by the second electronic device. (G) decrypting the encrypted identifier to obtain the identifier by performing an inverse function on the encrypted identifier, the inverse function comprising: (H) accessing the access control module by the second electronic device according to the identifier; The method of claim 1, further comprising the step of determining. 33. The method of claim 32, wherein the merge function includes performing an XOR operation using the selected true random number and the identifier. 34. The method of claim 32, wherein said access control module is selected from the group consisting of physical space, electronic device, and data. 35. The method of claim 34, wherein the physical space is selected from the group consisting of a room, a safe, a car, a building, and security equipment. 36. The method of claim 34, wherein the electronic device is selected from the group consisting of a computer, a cash machine, a television, a mobile phone, and a regular phone. 37. The method of claim 34, wherein the data is selected from the group consisting of a bank account, an e-mail, and a voice mail. 38. A method for determining access by a user to an access control module, the method comprising: (a) providing a first electronic device for the user and a second electronic device for the access control module. Providing, wherein the first and the second
(Ii) a non-volatile memory; (ii) a processor; and (iii) at least one true random number table stored on the non-volatile memory, wherein the table is the first and the second random number tables. (Iv) at least one software program for obtaining a true random number from the table, wherein the at least one software program is stored on the non-volatile memory; And the at least one software program comprises a software program operated by the processor; and (b) a communication channel for communication between the first electronic device and the second electronic device. (C) the first and second electronic data according to a selection procedure. Selecting a selected authentic random number from the table in the chair, wherein the selecting procedure is the same for the first and second electronic devices, wherein the selected authentic random number is the first authentic random number. And d. Being the same for the second electronic device; and (d) merging the identifier with the selected true random number according to the first electronic device according to a merge function. Encrypting to form an encrypted message; (e) transmitting the encrypted identifier to the second electronic device; and (f) encrypting the encrypted identifier by the second electronic device. (G) decrypting the encrypted identifier by performing an inverse function on the encrypted identifier to obtain the identifier. A flop, inverse function is the inverse of the merge function, the steps, in accordance (h) said identifier, by the second electronic device, the method comprising the steps of: determining access to the access control module. 39. The method of claim 38, wherein the merge function includes performing an XOR operation using the selected true random number and the bytes of the message. 40. The method of claim 38, wherein said access control module is selected from the group consisting of a physical space, an electronic device, and data. 41. The method of claim 40, wherein the physical space is selected from the group consisting of a room, a safe, a car, a building, and safety equipment. 42. The method of claim 40, wherein the electronic device is selected from the group consisting of a computer, a cash machine, a television, a mobile phone, and a regular phone. 43. The method of claim 40, wherein the data is selected from the group consisting of a bank account, an e-mail, and a voice mail. 44. The method according to claim 44, wherein the step of selecting the selected true random number from the table comprises: (i) generating a first true random number in the first electronic device; and selecting a second true random number in the second electronic device. Generating a genuine random number; and (ii) transmitting the first genuine random number to the second electronic device via the channel and transmitting the second genuine random number to the first electronic device. 39. The method of claim 38, wherein the first and second authentic random numbers form the at least a portion of the key. 45. (iii) obtaining an obtained true random number from the table using a pointer, wherein the pointer is substantially the same as the key, and the selected random number is The method of claim 44, further comprising the step of being selected according to the obtained true random number. 46. The selected true random number is the obtained true random number.
46. The method of claim 45. 47. The method of claim 44, further comprising (ii-a) merging the first and second true random numbers to form the at least a portion of the key. 48. At least one of said first and second electronic devices includes a source of physical random phenomena, and at least one of said first and second true random numbers provides a source of said physical random phenomena. 46. The method of claim 44, wherein the method is generated from a source. 49. The method of claim 48, wherein the source of the physical random phenomenon is selected from the group consisting of a source of acoustic noise and a source of thermal noise. 50. At least one of said first and second electronic devices is characterized by a pseudo-random number generator, said pseudo-random number generator according to at least one software program stored in said non-volatile memory. The pseudo-random number generator is operated substantially continuously for an undefined period,
45. The method of claim 44, wherein generating at least one of a second and a true random number comprises outputting an output number from the pseudo-random number generator. 51. (iv) providing at least one identical pseudo-random number generator in the first and second electronic devices, wherein the at least one pseudo-random number generator is in the non-volatile memory; Being operated by said processor according to at least one software program stored in: v) obtaining the obtained true random number from said table using a first pointer, (Vi) providing the obtained true random number as a seed to the at least one pseudorandom number generator; and (vii) providing the at least one pseudorandom number to the at least one pseudorandom number generator. Obtaining a generated pseudo-random number from a random number generator, wherein the generated pseudo-random number is stored in the first and second electronic data units; 45. The method of claim 44, further comprising: (viii) selecting the selected true random number from the table using the generated pseudorandom number as a second pointer. The described method. 52. The step of selecting the selected true random number includes: (1) generating a second generated pseudo-random number from the at least one pseudo-random number generator; The generated pseudo-random numbers correspond to the first and second
(2) merging the second generated pseudo-random number with the selected true random number;
52. The method of claim 51, further comprising forming a merged true random number, wherein the merged true random number is the selected true random number. 53. The steps (vi) to (viii) of claim 51, wherein the obtained true random number is the selected true random number, and the second pointer repeats the steps of claims 51 and 52. 53. The method of claim 52, further comprising repeating the step of claim 52 at least once, said selected true random number from step (2) of claim 49. 54. The method of claim 53, wherein the plurality of selected true random numbers are obtained by repeating the steps of claim 53 at least once. 55. A method for secure transmission of a message, comprising: (a) providing a first electronic device at a first location and a second electronic device at a second location. Wherein the first and second electronic devices are: (i) a non-volatile memory; (ii) a processor; and (iii) at least one true random number table stored on the non-volatile memory. A table, wherein the table is the same for the first and second electronic devices; and (iv) at least one software program for obtaining a true random number from the table, wherein the at least one software A program is stored on the non-volatile memory, and the at least one software program is a software program operated by the processor. (B) providing a communication channel for communication between the first electronic device and the second electronic device; and (c) following the selection procedure. Selecting a selected true random number from the table in the first and second electronic devices, wherein the selecting procedure is the same for the first and second electronic devices, The authenticity random number is the same for the first and second electronic devices; and (d) by the first electronic device, at least a portion of the message and the selected authenticity random number. Encrypting the message to form an encrypted message by merging according to a merge function; and (e) transmitting the encrypted message to the communication channel. Method comprising the steps of: transmitting to said second electronic device on Le. 56. The method of claim 55, wherein the message is divisible into a plurality of bytes, and wherein the at least a portion of the message is one of the plurality of bytes. 57. The merging function includes performing an XOR operation using the selected true random number and the bytes of the message.
7. The method according to 6. 58. The step of selecting the selected true random number from the table comprises: (i) generating a first true random number at the first electronic device and a second true random number at the second electronic device. Generating a genuine random number; and (ii) transmitting the first genuine random number to the second electronic device via the channel and transmitting the second genuine random number to the first electronic device. 56. The method of claim 55, wherein the first and second authentic random numbers form the at least a portion of the key. 59. (iii) obtaining an obtained true random number from the table using a pointer, wherein the pointer is substantially the same as the key, and the selected random number is 59. The method of claim 58, further comprising the step of selecting according to the obtained true random number. 60. The selected true random number is the obtained true random number,
60. The method according to claim 59. 61. The method of claim 58, further comprising: (ii-a) merging the first and second true random numbers to form the at least a portion of the key. 62. At least one of said first and second electronic devices includes a source of physical random phenomena, and at least one of said first and second true random numbers provides a source of said physical random phenomena. 59. The method of claim 58, wherein the method is generated from a source. 63. The method of claim 62, wherein the source of the physical random phenomenon is selected from the group consisting of a source of acoustic noise and a source of thermal noise. 64. At least one of said first and second electronic devices features a pseudo-random number generator, said pseudo-random number generator according to at least one software program stored in said non-volatile memory. The pseudo-random number generator is operated substantially continuously for an undefined period,
59. The method of claim 58, wherein generating at least one of a second and a true random number comprises outputting an output number from the pseudo-random number generator. 65. (iv) providing at least one identical pseudo-random number generator in the first and second electronic devices, wherein the at least one pseudo-random number generator is in the non-volatile memory Being operated by said processor according to at least one software program stored in: v) obtaining the obtained true random number from said table using a first pointer, (Vi) providing the obtained true random number as a seed to the at least one pseudorandom number generator; and (vii) providing the at least one pseudorandom number to the at least one pseudorandom number generator. Obtaining a generated pseudo-random number from a random number generator, wherein the generated pseudo-random number is stored in the first and second electronic devices; 59. The method of claim 58, further comprising the steps of: being the same for the device; and (viii) selecting the selected true random number from the table using the generated pseudorandom number as a second pointer. The described method. 66. The step of selecting the selected true random number comprises: (1) generating a second generated pseudo-random number from the at least one pseudo-random number generator; The generated pseudo-random numbers correspond to the first and second
(2) merging the second generated pseudo-random number with the selected true random number;
66. The method of claim 65, further comprising forming a merged true random number, wherein the merged true random number is the selected true random number. 67. The steps (vi) to (viii) of claim 65, wherein the obtained true random number is the selected true random number, and the second pointer repeats the steps of claims 65 and 66. 70. The method of claim 66, further comprising repeating the step of claim 66 at least once, said selected true random number from step (2) of claim 66. 68. The method of claim 67, wherein a plurality of selected true random numbers are obtained by repeating the steps of claim 67 at least once. 69. (f) receiving the encrypted message by the second electronic device; and (g) performing the inverse function on the encrypted message by performing an inverse function on the encrypted message. 70. The method of claim 68, further comprising: decoding the received message to obtain the at least a portion of the message, wherein the inverse function is the inverse of the merge function. 70. The second electronic device has an identifier, and the step (
d): (i) assigning the identifier of the second electronic device to a message; (ii) combining the identifier and the message to form a combined message; (iii) the first Encrypting the combination message by the electronic device by merging at least a portion of the combination message and the selected true random number according to a merge function to form the encrypted message. 56. The method according to claim 55. 71. (f) receiving the encrypted identifier by the second electronic device; and (g) decrypting at least the identifier of the message encrypted by the second electronic device. Forming a received identifier; and (h) comparing the received identifier with an identifier stored by the second electronic device, wherein the received identifier is the second identifier. Decrypting the remainder of the encrypted message only if it is the same as the identifier stored on the electronic device. 72. The method of claim 71, wherein step (g) is performed according to a random number table that is the same on the first electronic device and the second electronic device. 73. A device for generating an electronic one-time pad, comprising: (a) a non-volatile memory; (b) a processor; and (c) a read-only true random number stored on the non-volatile memory. (D) a first software program for obtaining an obtained true random number from the table, wherein the first software program is stored on the non-volatile memory, and the first software program A first software program, wherein the program is operated by the processor; (e) an input port for receiving at least a portion of a key; and (f) selected according to the obtained true random number and a selection procedure. A second software program for selecting true random numbers, wherein the selected true random numbers are stored in at least an electronic one-time pad. And (g) a read / write memory for storing the electronic one-time pad, wherein the non-volatile memory, the processor and the input port are a single chip. A device located on top and where access to the chip is enabled only through the input port. 74. The device of claim 73, wherein said read / write memory is located on said single chip. 75. The device of claim 73, wherein said read / write memory is in a physically separate location. 76. The second software program, when receiving a command via the input port, selects the selected true random number.
A device as described in. 77. A further input port for receiving a reset signal on the chip, wherein the second electronic device selects the selected true random number until the chip receives the reset signal. 74. The device of claim 73. 78. A generator for generating a generated true random number, wherein the generated true random number forms a second part of the key, the generator comprising the single chip A generator located above, (i) an output port, wherein the output port is located on the single chip, and wherein the second portion of the key is transmittable via the output port. 74. The device of claim 73, further comprising: an output port. 79. The generator of claim 78, wherein the generator comprises a source of physical random phenomena, and the generated true random number is generated from the source of physical random phenomena.
A device as described in. 80. The device of claim 79, wherein the source of the physical random phenomenon is selected from the group consisting of a source of acoustic noise and a source of thermal noise. 81. The generator, wherein the generator is a pseudorandom number generator operated by the processor according to at least one software program stored in the non-volatile memory, wherein the pseudorandom number generator is substantially for an undefined period. 79. The device of claim 78, operated continuously, wherein the generated true random number is obtained from the pseudo-random number generator. 82. The non-volatile memory, wherein the input port is capable of receiving a message and at least one software program for encrypting the message according to the electronic one-time pad to form an encrypted message. 79. The device of claim 78, wherein the at least one software program is operated by the processor, and wherein the encrypted message is transmittable via the output port. 83. The input port is capable of receiving a message, and at least one software program for encrypting the message according to the electronic one-time pad to form an encrypted message comprises a physical program from the chip. Stored on a second non-volatile memory located at a location that is substantially separated, wherein the at least one software program is operated by the processor, and the encrypted message is transmittable through the output port. 79. The device of claim 78. 84. The non-volatile memory includes an identifier and at least one software program for encrypting the identifier according to the electronic one-time pad to form an encrypted identifier. 79. The device of claim 78, wherein a program is run by said processor, and said encrypted message is transmittable via said output port. 85. A plurality of read-only random number tables stored on the non-volatile memory, and at least one software program for selecting at least one of the tables is stored on the non-volatile memory. 79. The device of claim 78, operated by said processor, wherein said electronic one-time pad is generated according to said at least one of said tables. 86. (a) The first device according to claim 85, and (b) the second device according to claim 85, wherein at least one of the plurality of read-only random number tables is included. A system for secure communication, wherein one is identical on the first device and the second device, and wherein the software program is capable of selecting the at least one identical table. 87. A central electronic device characterized by (a) at least one master random number table; and (b) at least one customer electronic device, wherein said at least one customer electronic device is at least one customer random number table. , And a corresponding encrypted customer random number table encrypted according to the at least one master random number table to form an encrypted table, and the at least one customer electronic device A system for secure communication, including at least one customer electronic device, transmitting an encrypted table to the central electronic device and initiating communication with the central electronic device. 88. The method according to claim 87, wherein the corresponding encrypted table is encrypted outside of the at least one customer electronic device and is then stored by the at least one customer electronic device. system. 89. The at least one customer electronic device is a customer device and the central device is a credit card handling company device.
90. The system of claim 88. 90. The system of claim 88, wherein said at least one customer electronic device is a mobile phone and said central device is a mobile carrier device. 91. The at least one customer electronic device is a television,
89. The system of claim 88, wherein the central device is a television company transmitting device. 92. A method for generating a practically unlimited amount of true random numbers, wherein the true random numbers are the same at a plurality of locations, the method is operated by a data processor, and the method comprises the steps of: Providing the same table, the same pointer, the same seed, and the same pseudo-random number generator at the plurality of positions; and (b) obtaining the obtained true random number from the same table of the true random numbers according to the pointer. And (c) generating the pseudorandom number generated by the pseudorandom number generator, wherein the pseudorandom number is the same at the plurality of positions. (D) combining the obtained true random number and the generated pseudo-random number with at least one of Of a step of forming a true random number, wherein the at least true random number of one said amount is identical at the location of the plurality of, and the step method. 93. The method of claim 92, wherein step (a) further comprises providing a further pseudo-random number generator for generating the seed. 94. A method for generating an identical electronic one-time pad at a first location and a second location, comprising: (a) providing a first electronic device at the first location; and Providing a second electronic device at two locations, wherein the first and second electronic devices comprise: (i) a non-volatile memory; (ii) a processor; and (iii) on the non-volatile memory. At least one true random number table stored in the table, wherein the table is the same for the first and second electronic devices; and (iv) obtaining a true random number from the table; At least one software program for operating a pseudo-random number generator, wherein the software program is stored on the non-volatile memory; (B) providing a communication channel for communication between the first electronic device and the second electronic device. (C) selecting a selected true random number from the tables in the first and second electronic devices according to a selection procedure, wherein the selection procedure includes the first and the second Being the same for an electronic device, the selecting procedure includes exchanging at least a portion of a key between the first and second electronic devices over the communication channel, and the selecting procedure comprises: (i) From the table, obtain the obtained true random number, and use the obtained true random number as a seed for the pseudorandom number generator to obtain the selected true random number. (Ii) generating a pseudo-random number from the pseudo-random number generator, and selecting the selected true random number from the table according to the pseudo-random number; (iii) the pseudo-random number generator Generating a pseudorandom number from the table, obtaining the obtained true random number from the table, and selecting the selected true random number by merging the obtained true random number and the pseudorandom number; iv) changing the seed of the pseudo-random number generator at a substantially random point in time and selecting the selected true random number according to the output of the pseudo-random number generator. (D) using the selected true random number, wherein the selected true random number is the same for the first and second electronic devices. Te, in the first position and the second,
Forming at least a portion of the same electronic one-time pad.