HK40089665A - Multi-purpose smart card with user trusted bond - Google Patents

Description

Multi-purpose smart cards with user trust links

Technical Field

This disclosure relates to a new generation of "smart cards" designed to create a separable, invisible "trusted link" between the cardholder and the physical embodiment of the smart card, wherein this trusted link relationship is based on biometric verification to enhance and simplify the authentication process of multi-purpose smart cards and for general financial or commercial purposes.

Background Technology

Before chips can be legally implanted in a person's body or before a Big Brother society can identify anyone, anywhere, there will be a need for an interface between humans and the digital world. One primary method is the use of small, portable cards or other small devices, such as digital watches or digital phones, capable of some form of interaction—either through visual identification by an agent or automatically via network functionality. Beyond simple identification, "cards" can do much more, such as serving as a link for banking transactions or storing funds or credit for goods or services. Current inventions are advancing the field of portable card identification and use.

As part of this disclosure, the term "card" or "smart card" is generally used to refer to any tangible object, usually but not necessarily in the shape of a credit card, that has the capabilities and functions described below. Historically, wallets have ranged from banknotes/coins to standard-sized credit cards. Such cards and their shapes have been known throughout history and have been easily inserted into most readers and most wallets. Therefore, while these "cards" or "smart cards" can take any shape or form, such as wearable jewelry, the most common form is a flat, palm-sized piece of plastic.

As background, in the late 1960s, Helmut Grottrup and Jurgen Dethloff secured German Patent No. DE 1574074, which used a semiconductor device to place a tamper-proof identification switch on a card. These first cards were designed to provide an individually copy-protected key for the refueling process at unattended gas stations. By 1974, US Patent No. 4,105,156, which described the first officially named "smart card," was published. The invention was titled "Identification System Safeguarded Against Misuse." This first device was designed with a secret digital code that, when entered, would break the input gate and prevent a portion of the memory stored in the device from accessing it, thus achieving a security purpose. At this time, people used national identity cards (IDs) and checks for bank payments. Gradually, the complexity of these cards increased, and by 1977, they had two chips (a microprocessor and a memory), which allowed the use of a self-programmable single-chip microcomputer (SPOM).

Soon, the smart card market exploded worldwide. By 1992, the Carte Bleue debit card began to be widely used in France. These new Carte Bleue cards improved upon regular bank or credit cards, being programmed at issuance and accompanied by an activation code called a Personal Identification Number (PIN), which had to be entered at ATMs or portable stations in restaurants for card insertion and reading. However, while these PINs offered improved security, they could still be copied, stolen, or known simply by looking over the user's shoulder. One way to circumvent the PIN system was to use the cardholder's data, such as a postal code, which was frequently used at gas stations. Typically, a PIN is four digits, while a postal code is five digits.

These new cards also incorporate the electronic contact pad structure now common in most credit cards and mobile phone SIM cards in the United States. The seven-contact structure, resembling the fingers of a clenched fist, powers a flat, miniaturized processor/memory array to respond to electronic input via the contacts. Another later improvement relates to the ability to store “credit” of another type of recognized currency in the memory of these new cards, rather than simple authentication information. For example, a restaurant chain might have a ledger listing outstanding “gift cards” with credit that require login, verification, and updates via a network. The new invention allows these cards to be easily programmed with a currency/credit and security system for use and local updates at any reader in the chain's locations. Thus, some card-based systems function as “wallets” and will contain funds redeemable only at certain readers. This allows the reader/card to be decoupled from any network or remote computer/bank where the transaction will be approved. As described above, the nature of the use and functionality between these two types is fundamental and leads to entirely different ways of using them.

Around the same time as the Blue Card, a smart card began to be used in GSM mobile phones operating with a Small Subscriber Identity Module (SIM). The phone number was linked to the SIM card, which could be slid into any phone to access the telephone service network. Around the world, many types of credit and debit cards began to be issued using more than just simple magnetic stripes. The United States has been reluctant to make any changes to how commercial transactions are processed, either by not increasing currency denominations like other countries, not implementing plastic money, adding coins for lower denominations, or replacing credit or debit cards with smart cards. Undeniably, the world is transitioning from ordinary paper money to digital currency.

In 2005, Mr. Finis Conner invented a new type of smart card. It is described in U.S. Patent No. 7,350,717, entitled "High Speed Smart Card with Memory." A figure from this patent is reproduced as Figure 1. This new smart card incorporates several new features, such as a switch for toggling between two controllers that access the memory at different speeds, and additional onboard controllers for sending and receiving commands. The disclosure of this patent is hereby incorporated by reference as it provides interesting background and key terminology for this technology. Ownership of this technology currently remains with the inventor of the new smart card described below. The invention is primarily intended for applications requiring a higher level of security and safety, such as access to military installations, enhanced card usage in high-value transactions, or even building security.

A key issue with smart cards remains their portability, flexibility, and, more importantly, their power management so that they become unusable when the power supply is depleted and the card's internal processing requires local power (rather than drawing power from a connector). If they are not properly charged, these cards may become unusable. For example, in the RFID field, there are two competing technologies: one is low-power, inductor-based power supply for internal messages (e.g., microchips in a marathon), and the other requires some type of local power supply and transmission using an antenna (e.g., a garage door opener). Similarly, smart cards can operate with or without an onboard power supply.

In late 2013, retail companies suffered massive thefts of traditional credit card information (names, card numbers, PINs on the back of the card, and Social Security details). This sent a chilling reminder to credit card users across the United States: while the system is convenient, they are now vulnerable to hacking and corporate manipulation. Even more alarming is the potential for stores with easily stolen personal information to face serious liability. For example, stores with one-click purchase features need to store customers' residential and financial billing information. In 2014, [Company Name] was one of the first U.S. companies to decide to finally implement smart chip technology to protect itself from future credit card identity theft. It also decided to stop storing personal information. Around the same time, several countries began imposing obligations and restrictions on the collection, storage, and management of customer information.

Since then, the use of Europay MasterCard Visa (EMV) cards in the United States has grown almost exponentially. This system is known as the "chip and PIN" model. Today in the U.S., most taxis and retail stores are equipped to read smart card chips, and their use is guaranteed when the chip is present on the card. The U.S. system remains in the "chip and signature" format, rather than using a PIN. The system is designed only to prevent online number theft but does not require a valid code from the user.

Alongside smart cards built with chips, memory, and contacts, a new technology associated with contactless cards was invented around 2004. These systems became increasingly popular for payments and ticketing. Typical uses include public transportation and highway toll collection. While most systems are incompatible, the MIFARE ^™ standard from semiconductors is the market leader. These “contactless” cards have evolved to use NXP MIFARE Ultralight and paper/card/PET instead of PVC. These low-cost cards are distributed by vending machines. To name a few, these cards now include citizen cards, driver's licenses, and patient cards. There are standards for both contactless smart cards (ISO/IEC 7816) and contactless cards (ISO/IEC 14443). A well-known contactless system is American ExpressPay ^™ .

For example, a new type of passport called an electronic passport, or digital passport, is a traditional paper passport with an embedded electronic microprocessor chip containing biometric information that can be used to authenticate the passport holder's identity. Current standards use (a) facial recognition, (b) fingerprint recognition, or (c) iris recognition. These biometric file formats are stored according to ICAO document 9303 from the International Civil Aviation Organization. By 2017, approximately 120 countries had begun using biometric passports, which rely on machine-readable lines stored and accessed using well-known Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) systems to authenticate data. Currently, U.S. passport cards do not conform to the ICAO 9303 standard. According to the ICAO 9303 standard, which conforms to ISO/IEC 14443, a minimum of 32 kilobytes of EEPROM storage is required.

In 2011, the current owner of this technology also secured U.S. Patent No. 8,811,959, entitled "Bluetooth Enabled Credit Card with a Large Data Storage Volume." This invention is groundbreaking in many respects. It incorporates a Bluetooth stack, utilizes photovoltaic power, and also uses piezoelectric power for recharging/expanding the technology. The technology includes two batteries stacked on a flexible substrate and multiple electronic microcomponents, such as an oscillator and a finger reader area. The card includes multiple logic elements to help manage the oscillator, flash NOR and NAND memory, batteries, and battery recharging. The system also includes an encryption engine and the use of biometric information. This patent is also incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

Some cards, such as those described in U.S. Patent No. 8,811,959, are approximately 85.6 mm long, 53.98 mm wide, and 0.76 mm thick. Card 1 has a base layer and a top layer. The description from this patent is shown in Figure 2. These layers are preferably polycarbonate, polystyrene, or equivalent sheet materials. Artwork may be printed on the top and bottom layers as desired. This card includes a battery compartment in which two batteries are installed, one mounted on top of the other. The batteries are preferably commercial products from Infinite ^{PowerSolutions ™} , Littleton ^™ , ^{Colo ™ ,} or equivalents (e.g., part number MEC102). The batteries are mounted on a flexible substrate with electrical interconnects. Plastic is filled in the space to provide a smooth surface for attaching the top and bottom layers to the card.

These cards also offer a large surface area to prevent delamination during use. Each battery (as of 2011) is rated at 2.5 mAh and can supply 100 mA of current. Each battery measures approximately 25.4 mm × 50.8 mm × 0.17 mm and, when stacked, occupies about 0.4 mm of the card's thickness. Two batteries connected in parallel provide 5 mAh. If the electronics on the card consume, for example, 45 mA, a transaction using the card could last approximately 400 seconds. Assuming they are charged to 75% capacity, the maximum duration for a typical transaction is 300 seconds, or 5 minutes. At a Bluetooth data transfer rate of 1.5 MB/s, 5 minutes allows for processing approximately 56 MB of data.

A spare battery pack with manufacturer part number PGEB0053559 is available in The Oren, Utah. This battery measures 0.5mm × 35mm × 59mm and is rated at 65mAh. Using this battery requires only a single cell and may result in longer data processing cycles. Both batteries described above are rechargeable, thereby increasing the amount of data exchanged per transaction and extending the card's lifespan. The battery can be automatically recharged using technologies such as piezoelectric films, RF antennas, or flexible photovoltaic films via integrated energy harvesting. A region provided in the card contains the recharging mechanism. In a preferred embodiment, a piezoelectric bending element polarized in a cantilever mode is utilized. When the card is placed in a wallet or in the user's clothing, the bending of the card deflects the voltage-generating piezoelectric element. This voltage can drip charge the battery. Alternatively, charge can be generated by fanning the card, and the battery charges similarly to an automatic winding mechanical watch. Therefore, if the battery is low, a fan-shaped operation can be used to complete a transaction.

In another preferred embodiment, a coil can be embedded to act as an inductor to pick up electromagnetic radiation. Electronics on the card use these signals to trickle charge the battery. Other embodiments include both piezoelectric elements and coils embedded in the smart card. Alternatively, a solar cell array can be built into the card. Electronic components can be mounted to a flexible substrate using electrical connections between these components and the recharging mechanism. The memory module is a semiconductor flash integrated circuit. In 2011, manufacturing technology provided 8GB of storage capacity with a NAND flash die size of 135mm². Circuits manufactured from 300mm or 200mm wafers would have a thickness of approximately 750 micrometers. This technology has improved over time.

The communication interface, transaction security, general-purpose microprocessor functions, "wake-up" logic, power management, and radio modulation are preferably provided as a single integrated circuit. Of course, other embodiments may use multiple circuits to provide this functionality. Appropriate discrete devices and oscillators are also mounted to the flexible substrate. The volume can be filled with plastic, or it can consist of a thermally laminated structure made of several plastic sheets of suitable thickness to fill the space and create a flat surface for the top layer. This allows the top layer to be laminated, thereby maximizing the contact area to prevent these films from delaminating during use.

If placed in a wallet or clothing, or if the battery is recharged using a fan-out operation, the card may deform. ISO 7816 specifies the deflection limits for the card. A block diagram of the electronics residing on these cards is shown, incorporating a microcontroller from as early as 2011, preferably an 8051 or ARM processor—8-bit or 32-bit—depending on desired features, performance, and cost. Control firmware resides in read-only memory. Dynamic random access memory stores variables and provides temporary memory space. In this embodiment, RAM is a non-volatile read/write memory that is primarily in a "off" state. Oscillator and wake-up and sleep timer logic then control the power supply to the electronics.

Primarily residing in the "off" state, the card is only powered when information is requested. Service handshake activities are used to establish a personal area network. Data storage is in a NAND or NOR flash circuit with a serial or parallel interface to the flash controller. Serial interfaces are preferred because they improve reliability by reducing the likelihood of trace interruptions, thus minimizing the number of interconnects. In implementations requiring more data processing, parallel interfaces provide faster data throughput.

Furthermore, the encryption engine is used to encrypt data transmitted from the card to an external host. Authentication logic allows the card to establish a secure association with the external host and satisfy the security conditions of the transaction. Physical security can be provided via a hardened epoxy coating applied to the entire package or relevant components or data paths within the card. This helps protect sensitive information such as encryption keys and biometric templates. This tamper-proof protection can be implemented such that if an adversary attempts to peel off this coating for probing, the package will be compromised, rendering it unusable. In other embodiments where cost is a significant consideration, tamper-proof physical security applies only to the encryption engine, which contains a small amount of non-volatile storage for storing an encryption key called the master storage key. Sensitive data is encrypted using the master storage key and stored in an unprotected memory module.

The power management circuitry includes logic for powering specific logic blocks within the sample card. A switch can be incorporated into the card to control the power supplied by the battery. This switch uses mechanical contacts attached to both the top and bottom layers. The switch is activated when a user presses an area. In other embodiments, the switch may be implemented as a capacitor or a thermal sensing unit, where heat near a user's finger or body activates the switch. The advantage of using a switch is that battery power is only used during transactions, and the card is in an "off" state at all other times. Furthermore, because the electronics remain inactive in this "off" state, enhanced security is achieved. This makes the card less vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks, where an adversary attempts to connect a Bluetooth-enabled host device to the card to prevent or delay connection between the card and a target device.

The display can be manufactured within the card as an electronic ink unit or a dot matrix device. This display allows the PIN code and password to be displayed during transactions. A cheaper arrangement uses thin LEDs or LEDs/displays positioned within the host unit. The switch can incorporate a thin fingerprint sensor, such as those manufactured by e-Smart ^™ Technologies Ltd. This sensor has a thickness of approximately 0.2 mm. The sensor sheet can be manufactured within the top cover so that when the user presses the switch, the fingerprint pattern can be detected when the card is powered on. This type is compared with a stored template created during card issuance. If a valid match is obtained, the transaction is allowed to proceed. If the match is invalid, power is never supplied to the circuitry, and the card remains inactive. To overcome the possibility of erroneous rejection, the user can clean the card to remove fragments and try again or use another registered finger.

All control logic can be implemented as a single mixed-signal ASIC to achieve the lowest material cost and minimize the number of interconnects on the flexible substrate. In other embodiments, the analog portion is on a separate chip from the digital logic. The digital logic includes a microcontroller, RAM, and ROM, which can be integrated on a single chip. Other embodiments include memory within the same digital logic chip for the highest level of integration. This implementation reduces cost and minimizes interconnects between electronic blocks. In addition to executing onboard firmware stored in ROM, the microcontroller also retrieves firmware stored in memory, loads it into RAM, and executes it. The firmware stored in memory consists of software code for multiple applications authorized by the card issuer to run on the card. These applications may be developed and tested after card manufacturing.

As shown in Figure 3, one of the most common methods for user authentication is a two-step process. The user has a predefined password (e.g., samplepassword123), which is pre-selected by the user, usually known only to them, and stored on the system (backend server). Access to this password must be granted for transactions. This password approach has problems: if the password is too simple, it's easy to guess; if it's too complex, it's difficult to remember and requires the user to memorize it. Furthermore, users granted access to the backend server storing the password can often access a large number of passwords.

Typically, when someone enters someone's workplace and looks around at the notes on the wall, they will find a complex password. As shown in Figure 3, to strengthen this protection, when access is accessed using a regular password, the queried server will create a second-step authentication. It will generate a "One-Time Password" (OTP) and send it to the user using one of several methods (e.g., 823124). Recently, this OTP has begun to be included in a submenu of applications paired with the server's OTP generator. In most cases, as shown, the user will receive a personalized key with a number generator associated with the server (the user types the token in Figure 3), or if the server obtains the user's mobile phone number, it will send a request with a code number for entry. To grant access, the server will require this multi-factor authentication (e.g., in two steps at different software levels, samplepassword123+823124 or samplepassword123 and 823124). The problem with this system is that it does not eliminate the inherent vulnerabilities associated with passwords regarding their storage, the difficulty of remembering them, and their ability to be discovered. While such a two-step process is more secure, managing both ends of these secured transactions is costly and time-consuming. These impose an additional burden on users who must be able to receive additional codes. Establishing this process is also difficult unless all systems are functioning correctly, powered on, and network-connected to the backend server. For example, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has moved to a two-step system instead of a PKI system. The user enters a first password and requests a second code to be entered later. If the system is slow to respond, the user may wait or issue several sequential requests, resulting in codes that overwrite each other.

As a rule, true security and assurance should be impossible to bypass or even notice. A security system should be designed so that it doesn't function at all when security is threatened. But as often depicted in science fiction, for every security system, fraudsters and experts with the sole purpose of infiltrating the system can always bypass the password by circumventing the second layer of protection. If every factor in a multi-factor authentication system suffers from the same problem, then it, "as a whole," does not provide a higher level of security against those determined to penetrate. For example, as shown in Figure 3, if a person has a note with the primary password in their wallet and a personalized device for token generation in their bag, then a stolen bag would result in the theft of both the password and the token.

A new level of security is needed—a higher level of security that relies on smart cards but creates new processes, methods, and devices to improve every existing system.

Summary of the Invention

This disclosure relates to a new generation of "smart cards" designed to create a separable, invisible "bond" between the cardholder and the smart card itself, wherein this trusted bond enhances and simplifies the authentication process and during use of the multi-purpose smart card. This new smart card initiates and connects to a specific user using biometric information added to the card, and the user using the biometric information connects to the card via the trusted bond by pairing the biometric information. The trusted bond with the smart card can be broken in one of several ways, including disconnecting from the network, moving away from the user, impacting an accelerometer, external parameters, etc. The multi-purpose smart card also uses this established trusted bond with the user to simplify the user's authentication for use in encrypted computer networks, ground security, or other retail and payment functions.

Attached Figure Description

The figures described herein are for illustrative purposes only, and not for all possible implementations, and are not intended to limit the scope of this disclosure.

Figure 1 is an image taken from U.S. Patent No. 7,350,717 entitled "High Speed Smart Card with Memory".

Figure 2 is an image taken from U.S. Patent No. 8,811,959, entitled "Bluetooth Enabled Credit Card with a Large Data Storage Volume".

Figure 3 is an image from the prior art illustrating a generally known and common multi-factor security process that uses both cryptography and token generators.

Figure 4 is an image of a system for securely accessing software networks and platforms using multi-purpose smart cards with user-trusted connections.

Figure 5 illustrates a top view of a potentially multi-purpose smart card with a user trusted link according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

Figure 6 generally illustrates the internal elements found in the multi-purpose smart card with a user trusted link shown in Figure 5, according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

Figure 7 illustrates the process and steps for creating a trusted link between a multi-purpose smart card and a user's trusted link.

Figure 8 illustrates the use of trust verification parameters, as shown in part of the process in Figure 7.

The corresponding reference element symbol indicates the corresponding part that runs through several views in the drawings.

Detailed Implementation

Example embodiments will now be described more fully with reference to the accompanying drawings.

Physical identity verification typically requires the presence of an individual (as shown as 1 in Figure 4) and is combined with an identifier presented in an approved/trusted form (e.g., a picture ID). This form of physical identity verification has evolved over the years and generally provides a sufficient level of proof for most types of transactions that require identity verification (e.g., financial transactions, transit, etc.). But as teenagers looking for alcohol demonstrate, nothing is easier than creating a fake ID.

The improved principles shown in Figures 1 to 33 and described in the background section, as shown in Figures 4 to 8, can create a new technology for the smart card 2 shown, as indicated by arrow 6. This technology directly sends all necessary identifiers to the computer system/host 3, which then passes them to the server 4 and/or, for example, the host of a card reader. The information transmitted by arrow 6 can be a multi-factor message (e.g., biometrics + password, biometrics + OTP code, password + OTP code, etc.).

As shown in Figure 4, User 1 pairs with Multi-Use Smart Card 2 using Trusted Link 11. Once paired and Link 11 established, Card 2 immediately sends Information 6 to Computer System 3 or sends Information associated with Link 12 to Computer System 3, Server 4, or any other location. The general principle is that the new Card 2 has a capacity not only to interact with User 1 in the normal data-transferable manner 5, but also, once paired with User 1 5, to create and establish a temporary and severable Link 11, which can be used alone or in conjunction with the pairing 5. Similarly, data associated with this established Link 12 can be transmitted alone or in conjunction with normal authentication. More details are described below once the hardware has been explained.

hardware

Generally, the system using the 100+ card 2 is shown in Figure 4. This card is also shown in a close-up in Figure 5. As generally shown, the card comprises a top layer 31 and a bottom layer 32. Part of system 100 includes environmental conditions, such as local wireless networks 9 typically found at any deployment location or location of interest (e.g., employee free networks). Nowadays, GPS or normal 5G telecommunications networks 8 also reach the environment in which system 100 operates. Furthermore, the inventors note how RFID or Bluetooth short-range data transmission or data connection systems 10 are also found in this environment of use for system 100. Any type of environmental wave or energy (e.g., radio waves, solar waves, heat waves, etc.) that could ultimately be captured and interact with any receiver or transceiver located on card 2 in the environment is also considered, but not shown. To generally understand how system 100 works, a trusted link 11 is created between user 1 and his/her card 2, such as through contact, scanning, etc., in addition to any ordinary means of communication and pairing 5. Trust can be built in various ways, partially dependent on many factors including environmental factors 8, 9, and 10, as described below.

In other words, system 100 is a dynamic environment in which external sources or transmission paths have a direct or semi-direct relationship with card 2 and its associated computer system. For example, and to name just a few, card 2 could be used to allow an elevator to access a secure floor within a building. As part of this example, the elevator console is element 3 remotely connected to a backend server 4. As the elevator moves, if card 2 contains an accelerometer, this causes changes in the environmental factors (i.e., gravity) sensed by card 2. Additionally, because the elevator's metal casing is large, the value of the Faraday drag coefficient associated with the electromagnetic insulation when the elevator is closed can be calculated. Similarly, portable exercise equipment now has sensors designed to measure external stimuli to the user (e.g., running, heart rate, acceleration, speed, etc.), and the new card 2 relies on these core principles as part of the pairing process 11.

The smart card 2 shown in Figures 5 and 6 generally includes a battery or other onboard power supply 23. In one embodiment, for simplicity, it is shown as a single block, but as generally described in the art incorporated herein by reference, the components including a microprocessor, memory, and battery 23 are a non-BLE (Bluetooth Low) battery with an extended lifespan (3 to 5 years). In other embodiments, other power sources may be used alternatively. Any type of locally enabled portable power source is considered.

Card 2 may also include one-time password generators (OTP) 15, 25, a UHR RFID tag 22 for remote in-range detection (up to 30 feet) of the connection to the data connection system 10 shown in Figure 5, a multi-protocol contactless access control interface 21, and a low-power Bluetooth connector.

As shown in Figure 5, the cover of Card 2 can be printed using any normal thermal color printer (typically available technology associated with security card production) and adhered to the internal (shown in Figure 6) electronics, or the image can be incorporated into such electronics using any new technology. Those skilled in the art will recognize that while the current design is intended for a printed cover with identity elements such as a facial image 33, name and title 13, and employee code 14, the use of surface identification information enhances the system because it creates visual third-party legal protection and allows smart cards to be used as visual entry point identifiers as is commonly understood. All visual identification technologies, such as those used for currency (e.g., US dollar bills) or shipping container identification (e.g., barcodes or other codes (not shown)), are anticipated and required for all protective systems.

Figure 5 also shows a thumb power symbol 11, which in one embodiment is designed to help the user power the smart card. In another embodiment, the card remains permanently or partially powered, as used in e-reader book technology. This element 11, shown as 24 below, may also include fingerprint readers of the models and types used in other known devices (e.g., iPhone 7-9). These readers may, for example, simply read some fingerprint location data, may be paired with inductive or resistive sensors, or may include thermal sensors to avoid erroneous readings. As part of iPhone 10+ technology, such finger readers can be conveniently replaced by cameras capable of mapping and reading 3D facial features according to other known technologies. The card 2 shown above and here includes a reader 24 associated with biometric information. Those skilled in the art will understand that as new biometric readers become more complex, they can be added to reader 24. Although the illustration focuses on the biometric reader 24 on card 2, it is possible to consider any type of connection or removal between the microprocessor on the card and a reader mounted locally (as shown) (e.g., on an external pad/reader at a terminal or door).

To name just a few of the most commonly used sensors that can be added, these include: (a) temperature sensors, including infrared sensors, IC sensors, thermistors, resistor temperature detectors, and thermocouples; (b) proximity sensors, such as inductive sensors, capacitive sensors, photoelectric sensors, and ultrasonic sensors; (c) pressure sensors; (d) infrared sensors; (e) image sensors, such as charge-coupled devices or complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor imagers; (f) motion detection sensors; (g) accelerometer sensors; (h) gyroscope sensors, such as rotation, vibration, or optical/MEMS sensors; and (i) optical sensors, such as photodetectors, fiber optic detectors, pyrometers, or proximity detectors.

As shown, Card 2 includes an Ultra High Frequency (UHR) Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) as shown in Figure 6. The UHF-band RFID uses an 860 to 960 MHz band and allows it to read multiple tags in bulk over a longer range, according to the ISO 18000-63/ECP global standard (e.g., LXMS21NCH from Tag 22 for remote in-range detection (up to 30 feet)). This technology, for example, allows for management in smart factories for PCBs. This technology can also work with pocket readers, such as the Blueberry UHF MS4 from Tetrium Technology ^™ . As explained, the presence of this UHF-band RFID in the appropriate location will create an environment where the location of the cardholder of smart card 2 with tags identified by the system will be automatically tracked. As explained below, range loss can lead to card distrust when using this technology. In one embodiment of this disclosure, Card 2 supports both UCODE-7 and UCODE-8—technologies from semiconductors. This is designed to support MIFARE Classic EV1, Advanced EV1, DesFire EV1, and HID ICLASS interfaces.

The OTP system described above operates in time synchronization between the authentication server and the embedded local device. These are known to be unstable over long periods. The embedded local device can be based on a mathematical algorithm used to generate new passwords from previous passwords. Others include challenges. The onboard technology described above is very similar to the RSA-secure SecurID™ token. This system is also programmable to support both HTOP and TOTP systems.

As explained below, the key concept is that Card 2, which contains this type of biometric information, can establish trust with User 1 using one of the various methods defined below. Also explained below, this established trust can be broken in one of several ways, typically associated with the nature, quantity, and type of sensors found in Card 2. Each set of uses can be related to different factors associated with trust, as detailed in a set of examples below.

Methods of establishing and dividing trust

A famous unsigned quote states, "Building trust takes years, breaking trust takes seconds, and repairing trust takes forever." The core concept of this invention is that card 2 can be personalized and attached to user 1 via an additional trust-based association. To establish trust, several steps are required, most commonly associated with sensor input and biometric verification. To break established trust, one of a few conditions must be met. The inventors now describe, in greater detail and in more detail, the different steps, processes, and systems for establishing and breaking the trust association between user 1 and card 2, as described above in Figures 4 through 6.

Returning to Figure 4, instead of using multiple fields or actions when card 2 is placed near a reader (e.g., 3 in Figure 4), in one embodiment, an automatically generated token 6 is transmitted wirelessly or via physical contact when a person approaches computer 3, without any interaction from the user. If trust 11 is established, a trust-based token 12 can be sent instead of or as a supplement to the normal string or the automatically generated token 6. For example, in addition to swiping the card and entering a PIN, the card typically requires a person to enter a retinal scan at the reader. By placing the retinal information inside the memory of card 2, the user can pick up card 2 and manually enter a PIN and enter the retinal information into the sensor on the card. Card 2 will link the PIN with the biometric information in the card, confirm trust, and establish a bond. When the card is placed near the detector, if trust is established, data 12 will be sent directly and most likely wirelessly to open the door without a PIN or retinal scan. In other cases, the card can be inserted and those data 6, which contain both the PIN and retinal information, can be sent directly.

In the system described herein, there is no need to store the password in reader station 3 or backend server 4, nor is there a need for the server to issue/manage OTP token 7. The server can then operate completely disconnected from the user. While backend server 4 is not required to operate during connection, those skilled in the art will understand that additional security levels can be implemented to further enhance security. For example, in the above example, if card 2 is used, and the user does not need to enter a PIN and eye sensor mapping at the eye reader, then backend server 4 can add a third, higher level of security that is unique to the individual, such as requiring the additional input of a request code (e.g., please provide your date of birth).

Next, for example, the commonly used simple type of password is replaced by a biometric authentication and acceptance code 6. This new process and system includes storing biometric authentication or other highly associated types of information in the card and having it authenticated (i.e., connected) by the card user. In one embodiment, the same card holding the biometric information is also split to create an OTP token and directly transmitted to replace functionality with other lower-generation cards.

Initial pairing with new users

The above describes the new smart card 2 and shows it in one embodiment having a thumbprint power-on system 11, a digital code generator 15, and a visible identifier 22 and associated electronics, as shown in Figure 6, whose use is better illustrated in Figure 7. As shown, firstly, the smart card 2 is typically powered 201 in the first step simply by pressing the thumbprint and holding this position down for a longer period than usual (e.g., three seconds), such as the touch element 24 in Figure 6 or any other equivalent element, as a simple switch with a timer wake-up mode. This switches the card from a “blank” mode to a “wake-up” mode. In this wake-up mode, at this stage, the card is not assigned a user and does not store, for example, biometric information such as (a) a picture, (b) personally identifiable information such as a date of birth, or (c) thumbprint information or other types of information (e.g., facial mapping), which can be locally verified using the correct type of sensor.

While one type of sensor is described or shown, other types are also considered, such as biometric data associated with LEDs or with cardiac measurements of an object in the context of a user's skin. In other cards, the device may remain in sleep mode until it approaches the reader and can be wirelessly activated via an antenna system to enter live mode. Other common and known methods are also considered for opening the card or activating any electronic component (including switches, tabs) or energizing or even dynamically moving the card or any electronic component (including switches, tabs) (by creating a piezoelectric current by moving the body of card 2).

Next, if card 2 is woken up in one embodiment, it will run internal diagnostics and use the calculated OPT generator 15 to send messages as the system is powered on.

Once powered on, the system checks and searches for empty storage spaces where biometric data is typically found in the memory. The goal of pairing is to fill this memory according to its internal programming and the type of the current card 2. The user can be provided with guidance on the “New ID” as part of an 8-DEL display or any other equivalent programming tool. A simple system can be used to scroll through text on an 8-DEL display. For example, if a thumbprint is required, the display will alternate between “New ID” and “Touch PW” as the sensor measures the fingerprint. In other embodiments, an external portable device is used to protect a set of readily visible biometric information, which is uploaded directly via a USB port connector to the memory. In cases where the card has a camera and a 3D facial imprint is required, the display will read the “New ID” and “Find”, and will provide additional information about the initial pairing phase of the card in a guide or on-screen instructions. Again, this system can be performed using known pairing techniques associated with other types of telephones.

Although only a small digital display was shown, those skilled in the art will understand that the resolution and capacity of such displays, utilizing flexible screens, can be increased over time. As demonstrated, facial images can be uploaded to the card as additional biometric commands.

Next, the unpaired card 201 is provided to the person or new user to whom the card was assigned and will be associated with card 202. In the step of pairing card 203 with the user, as shown in Figure 7, one of several pairing methods may be performed depending on the type of card 2 and the technology associated with the selected card 2. For example, if reader 24 is an indexed fingerprint reader, then the card can read: the “finger R” used to read the finger. Other types of identification 203 may be implemented; for example, a camera may capture a 3D image of a face. Technologies used to read biometric information are now popular in the mobile phone industry (i.e., the iPhone 7 using fingerprints and the iPhone 10 using 3D facial mapping). In the sports world, rings or watches are now designed with integrated sensors that monitor and measure various vital signs. For example, such external devices may use Bluetooth technology to pair with the card. All these pairing modes are associated with the request and input of biometric data 204 local to card 2.

Figure 7 also shows different pairing modes 205 and 206, where simple codes (such as passwords) can be entered and used, which lowers the security level but maintains a connection to the system. For example, this lower level of security can be used during sporting events with normal volunteers who have access to limited areas of the stadium, while higher biometric data entries 203 can be reserved for a few people who have access to sensitive areas such as athletes' locker rooms or ticket centers.

Terminal identification data 206 can be retained for faster batch processing of biometric entries 204, 205 or for data entries such as iris reading, where this reading technology is not advanced enough for initial measurement and mapping by portable micro-devices, but where a simpler technology can be used to verify that the reader is available on a smart card. Additional identification systems can be planned in the event that card 2 is connected to the identification data terminal.

Creating Trust

At step 207, shown in Figure 7, trust is established once card 2 has been paired with user 1, as shown in Figure 4. The key novel concept of this device is "trust" or "active pairing," once information has been entered and card 2 is now paired with the user. As defined in this invention, a person/user holding the card pairs or matches with device 207 by verifying the required information entered as part of pairing process 202.

For example, in the morning, once User 1 picks up a wallet with a previously paired card 203, User 1 checks Card 2, and once it is powered on, trust may be compromised. For example, the numerical window 15 could simply read "TRUSTREQ," or the image 22 could be replaced with a different image or notification. Trust 208 can be established with Card 2 once it has been verified before it can be used.

Before any use of card 2, computer system 200 verifies trust 207 to see if it has been established 208 for use in a transaction 210. This simple system, as described at 211, allows certain "trust verification parameters" TVP 225 to be established, lost 209, or confirmed as lost trust 209. Several concepts can help improve security through the loss of trust.

Trust verification parameters

In most cases, users using Card 2 for any purpose have a predetermined goal in mind regarding its use. Consider many different uses, each associated with a possible instance. As shown in Figure 7, trust must be established (208) for a significant portion of the usage cycle (typically before Card 210 is used and data is sent out). In the event of a loss of trust (209), trust can be rebuilt (212) (in some embodiments). In the case of rebuilding, the user may be required to return to the authentication phase (207).

Figure 8 illustrates the sequential logic of a set of parameters 301, 302, 303, and 304. Those skilled in the art will understand that although four parameters are shown, considering the function of one or more of these parameters sequentially, collaboratively, or in any set arrangement leads to, for example, random testing of external conditions.

Accelerometer 301 can be easily used on card 2 and programmed to immediately break trust under certain conditions. For example, trust may be broken if the value exceeds a certain threshold set by the sensor. In one instance, this could be used to prevent misuse of corporate cards. Trust could be broken if a third party steals or robs the card from another party. The accelerometer or sensor 26 shown in Figure 4 can be embedded in smart card 2, and trust can be broken 301 if the value exceeds a set threshold (e.g., the card is lost, stolen, or even moved suspiciously). Again, once trust is broken, card 2 will send the correct information to any external device.

A capacitance sensor 27, as shown in Figure 6, can be added and operates within the card along with other components for detecting values typically associated with a person's body energy levels. If a person loses the card or the capacitance value drops too much, the card will be considered to have moved a fixed distance 302 from the person's body. This is similar to the process when an iWatch is removed from a user's wrist, and subsequently, some sensors are considered to have lost physical connection with the user. In this embodiment, a low capacitance value can be set as the trigger point, and a higher capacitance value as well. For example, a pool locker can be paired with card 2 to store personal items. The card can be provided to the person in the form of a wristband. If card 2 is disconnected from user 1 and then used by a second person, a simple loss of trust 209 may occur when the trust is tested, if the value is outside a range or if the value has moved outside the range in the past (i.e., the last hour).

In another example, an external sensor (watch, phone, or other device) can be used as a proximity detector, as illustrated by 8, 9, and 10 in Figure 4. Trust is broken 303 upon loss of Bluetooth or other short-range connectivity. For example, a paired card 2 can be given to an employee in a networked workplace. Once the employee leaves the workplace, the signal is lost and trust can be broken immediately or, if already lost, during testing by searching for data. As another example, a coffee chain could have some type of signal value at all its locations for its employees to use. Again, signal loss is described as a condition, and those skilled in the art will understand that signal retrieval can also be a condition for loss of trust.

In yet another possible variation, smart cards monitor workplace wireless signals, and trust is broken if a signal is lost (304). Network 9 is shown as illustrated in Figure 4. Similarly, it could be other types of networks 8, 10.

Example 1: Monthly Ski Pass

Most ski resorts sell ski passes for riders to wear. These passes are expensive, and managing them can be a nightmare for resort owners due to bulky ski equipment and harsh environmental conditions. Passes can easily be exchanged and handed over to others who are often too difficult to verify. Using the technology described above, a seasonal pass can be personalized to the user in one of several ways at the time of issuance by entering biometric information. This card can be custom-designed using TVP 225, which is best suited to creating a trust-based system most suited to the sport of skiing. For example, because the sport involves significant acceleration changes, an accelerometer threshold 301 may not be well-suited. Pairing the card with the user's own personal mobile phone may also not be optimal, as people may want to ski without their phones. However, since most users have a pair of boots, a simple RFID tag can be attached to the person's ski boot. When trust is verified 207, as long as the ski pass card 2 is within short range of the RFID tag on the boot, trust is established 208 and the use of the card is enabled 210.

Example 2: Employee Value

Many online systems today require two levels of security and a card at point 210 to automatically send information without prompting the user, as shown in Figure 4. When an employee attempts to access the computer system while at work, if the card is paired, trust is automatically verified at 207. Once established at 208, data is automatically sent to the computer at 210 to gain access without any further confirmation. As described, trust conditions can include the local network as a signal environment, the presence of a user's own dedicated mobile phone with Bluetooth nearby, or the capacitance calibration value of a user sitting in a chair. Signal loss can also be added as an alarm condition. For example, in a workplace, all employee cards can be deactivated simply by sending a specific fixed signal wirelessly or by turning off wireless. Furthermore, to establish trust, a person may need to pass through a access control or badge within a specific time period (e.g., 30 minutes).

As part of this card 2, it is equally important that while the conditions for establishing trust 217 are visible, known, and fixed for any type of use, TVP 225 may be unknown or can be changed or modified to further enhance the level of security.

The current version incorporates advanced, ultra-thin, flexible circuitry with technology similar to that of a 32-bit ARM microprocessor in a mobile phone. These advanced RISK machines (ARMs) exist in both 32-bit and 64-bit versions. It also includes 256-bit AES hardware encryption, the most common federal government standard. This standard is included in the ISO/IEC 18033-3 standard. Additionally, the current model uses Bluetooth, Bluetooth Low Energy, Near Field Communication (10 cm or less), and a USB interface. Flash memory is approximately 8GB, and the battery is rechargeable.

Furthermore, the use of the publicly described "fuzz extractor" algorithm is also being considered. As part of the SentryID platform, it is possible to generate a set of deterministic keys directly from the user's biometric template. This eliminates the vulnerabilities associated with the need to store encryption keys, as the keys are generated only at the point of authentication and are temporary, not persistent. The SentryID platform can apply this approach to provide a trusted platform that significantly surpasses existing authentication mechanisms.

This document describes the general concept of creating a trust bond between Card 2 and User 1. Establishing this connection as early as possible, before information is actually entered, saves time and effort. Card 2 also appears to work automatically, without disturbing the user when needed. A person holding a paired and trusted Card 2 can enter the wireless server network range and automatically access the network via the concept of the card never being “untrusted”, as shown in Figure 7. Furthermore, while Figure 7 illustrates multiple ways a trust bond can be lost, for each situation, it is possible to program different types of bond loss for each environment. For example, in cases requiring higher security, only one of trust loss behaviors 301, 302, 303, and 304 will result in loss, as shown in Figure 8. However, in other configurations, two parameters need to be lost. For example, as long as the card remains in capacitive contact 302, trust will not be lost even if network 304 is lost. Such configurations are endless. As illustrated in Figure 6, for simplicity, line 310 and the logic require that four parameters 301, 302, 303, and 304 not be lost.

Another very interesting question is how to remotely activate or deactivate this card using external signals from wireless radios such as Bluetooth, UHF RFID, or WiFi. For example, for added security, all cards could be made "untrusted" via an external command. In the event of a security breach, all cards could be deactivated. In more serious breaches, deactivation could prevent any rebuilding of trust.

In another embodiment, image 22 shown in Figure 5 is an e-ink or active display capable of displaying QR codes or other types of information. This allows for more possibilities. For example, a QR scanner could be placed next to a door. The ability to visually indicate when a cardholder has entered an unauthorized area by flashing a warning indicator on a portion of the integrated card display or code is also considered. Furthermore, the inventors have taught that the card uses optical fibers and similar materials placed on the card to visually indicate when a cardholder has entered an unauthorized area by brightly illuminating the edges or surface of the card. Additionally, card 2 can only be activated after the user authenticates himself via a second device (e.g., a smartphone, biometric capture device, or embedded input device). For example, the technology could be paired with and require an iWatch to function.

The foregoing and Figures 4 to 8 illustrate and describe a multi-purpose smart card in a dynamic environment, the dynamic environment including: an operating field originating from a data connection system, GPS or a normal telecommunications network, and a local wireless network, and the smart card including: a top layer having a cover printed and affixed to a bottom layer, the cover containing identity elements, an activation symbol, and a code display window for allowing the use of a One-Time Password Generator (OTP); a bottom base having a microprocessor connected to a power source for running software for the operation of the smart card in the dynamic environment, and a mass storage device for storing the user's biometric information and private data; the microprocessor being connected to the One-Time Password Generator (OTP), a biometric reader, a UHR RFID tag for remote in-range detection, a multi-protocol contactless access control interface with a low-power Bluetooth connector, and at least one sensor; and wherein the smart card is configured to upload user biometric data to the storage and is enabled to allow the user to store the user's biometric data in the storage to perform a pairing operation, wherein the user authenticates himself to the smart card by providing biometric information to the smart card at the biometric reader.

The smart card is further configured to enable at least a portion of the dynamic environment from (a) the data connection system, (b) the GPS or normal telecommunications network, or (c) the local wireless network to interact with one of (i) the UHR RFID tag for remote capability detection, (ii) the multiprotocol contactless access control interface with a low-power Bluetooth connector, or (iii) at least one sensor for managing (establishing or losing) trust between the smart card and the user, wherein the smart card is further configured as part of the management of trust between the smart card and the user to allow testing and verification of the programming of at least one Trust Validation Parameter (TVP) before the card issues data to aid as part of securing digital transactions, and wherein the smart card is further configured as part of the management of trust between the smart card and the user to allow, respectively, continuous, random, or sequential testing of the programming of more than one Trust Validation Parameter (TVP) before the card issues data to aid as part of securing digital transactions.

Furthermore, the data released to facilitate the secure digital transactions includes a security token (HOTP or TOTP system), and at least one sensor is selected from the group consisting of: (a) temperature sensors, including infrared sensors, IC sensors, thermistors, resistor temperature detectors, and thermocouples; (b) proximity sensors, such as inductive sensors, capacitive sensors, photoelectric sensors, and ultrasonic sensors; (c) pressure sensors; (d) infrared sensors; (e) image sensors, such as charge-coupled devices or complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor imagers; (f) motion detection sensors; (g) accelerometer sensors; (h) gyroscope sensors, such as rotation, vibration, or optical/MEMS sensors; and (i) optical sensors, such as photodetectors, fiber optic detectors, pyrometers, or proximity detectors.

Similarly, a process for using a multi-purpose smart card in a dynamic environment, said dynamic environment including at least one of: an operating field originating from a data connection system, GPS or a normal telecommunications network, and a local wireless network, wherein said smart card includes: a top layer having a cover printed and adhered to a bottom layer, said cover containing identity elements, an activation symbol, and a code display window for allowing the use of a One-Time Password Generator (OTP); a bottom base having thereon a microprocessor for running software for the operation of said smart card in said dynamic environment and connected to a power source, and a mass storage device for storing user biometric information and private data; said microprocessor being connected to the One-Time Password Generator (OTP), a biometric reader, and a UHR for remote in-range detection. The method comprises: an RFID tag, a multi-protocol contactless access control interface with a low-power Bluetooth connector, and at least one sensor; wherein the smart card is configured to upload user biometric data to the memory and is enabled to allow the user to store the user biometric data in the memory to perform a pairing operation, wherein the user authenticates himself to the smart card by providing biometric information to the smart card at the biometric reader, the method comprising the steps of: powering an unpaired card; providing the unpaired card to a new user; pairing the card with the user by (a) typing in the user's biometric data, (b) requesting a code, or (c) typing in the identification data from a terminal; and establishing trust by allowing the card, which is further configured to enable at least a portion of the dynamic environment from (a) the data connection system, (b) the GPS or normal telecommunications network, or (c) the local wireless network, to interact with (i) the UHRRFID tag for remote capability detection, (ii) the multi-protocol contactless access control interface with a low-power Bluetooth connector, or (iii) at least one sensor.

Furthermore, it is also considered to allow steps to manage (establish or lose) trust between the smart card and the user, steps to allow the testing and verification of programming of at least one Trust Verification Parameter (TVP) before the card issues data to help secure digital transactions, and steps to allow the continuous, random or sequential testing of programming of more than one Trust Verification Parameter (TVP) before the card issues data to help secure digital transactions.

Finally, the above also describes a method for using a smart card in a dynamic environment, the dynamic environment including one of the following: an operating field from a data connection system, GPS or a normal telecommunications network, or a local wireless network, and the smart card including: a top layer having a cover printed and adhered to a bottom layer, the cover containing identity elements, an activation symbol, and a code display window for allowing the use of a One-Time Password Generator (OTP); a bottom base having a microprocessor connected to a power source for running software for the operation of the smart card in the dynamic environment, and a mass storage device for storing the user's biometric information and private data; the microprocessor being connected to the One-Time Password Generator (OTP), a biometric reader, and a UHR for remote in-range detection. The method comprises: an RFID tag, a multi-protocol contactless access control interface with a low-power Bluetooth connector, and at least one sensor; wherein the smart card is configured to upload user biometric data to the memory and is enabled to allow the user to store the user biometric data in the memory to perform a pairing operation, wherein the user authenticates himself to the smart card by providing biometric information to the smart card at the biometric reader; the method includes the following steps: pairing an unpaired card with a user by inserting biometric data into the memory of the card; creating trust by allowing the user to confirm the paired biometric data in the memory of the card at the biometric reader; and establishing a set of trust verification parameters to test trust (established or lost) before the card is used in any digital transactions.

The foregoing description of embodiments has been provided for purposes of illustration and description. It is not intended to be exhaustive or limiting of this disclosure. Individual elements or features of a particular embodiment are generally not limited to that particular embodiment, but are interchangeable and can be used in the chosen embodiment where applicable, even if not explicitly shown or described. This can also be varied in many ways. Such changes are not considered to depart from this disclosure, and all such modifications are intended to be included within the scope of this disclosure.

Claims (17)

1. A multi-purpose smart card in a dynamic environment, the dynamic environment comprising: The operating field originates from one of a data connection system, GPS or a normal telecommunications network, or a local wireless network, and the smart card includes: The top layer has a cover printed on and glued to the bottom layer, which contains identity elements, activation symbols, and a code display window for allowing the explanation of the One-Time Password Generator (OTP); The bottom base layer has a microprocessor for running software for the operation of the smart card in the dynamic environment and connected to a power source, and a large-capacity storage memory for storing the user's biometric information and private data. The microprocessor is connected to a one-time password generator (OTP), a biometric reader, a UHR RFID tag for remote in-range detection, a multi-protocol contactless access control interface with a low-power Bluetooth connector, and at least one sensor; and The smart card is configured to upload user biometric data to the memory and is enabled to allow the user to store the user biometric data in the memory to perform a pairing operation, wherein the user authenticates himself to the smart card by providing biometric information to the smart card at the biometric reader. 2. The multi-purpose smart card in a dynamic environment according to claim 1, wherein the smart card is further configured to enable at least a portion of the dynamic environment from (a) the data connection system, (b) the GPS or normal telecommunications network, or (c) the local wireless network to interact with one of (i) the UHR RFID tag for remote facility-based detection, (ii) the multi-protocol contactless access control interface having a low-power Bluetooth connector, or (iii) the at least one sensor for managing (establishing or losing) trust between the smart card and the user. 3. The multi-purpose smart card in a dynamic environment according to claim 2, wherein the smart card is further configured as part of the management of trust between the smart card and the user to allow testing and verification of the programming of at least one Trust Verification Parameter (TVP) before the card issues data to help secure digital transactions. 4. The multi-purpose smart card in a dynamic environment according to claim 3, wherein the smart card is further configured as part of the management of trust between the smart card and the user to allow for continuous, random, or sequential testing of the programming of more than one Trust Verification Parameter (TVP) before the card issues data to aid in securing digital transactions. 5. The multi-purpose smart card in a dynamic environment according to claim 3, wherein the data issued to facilitate the secure digital transaction includes a security token (HOTP or TOTP system). 6. The multi-purpose smart card in a dynamic environment according to claim 1, wherein the at least one sensor is selected from the group consisting of: (a) temperature sensors, including infrared sensors, IC sensors, thermistors, resistor temperature detectors, and thermocouples; (b) proximity sensors, such as inductive sensors, capacitive sensors, photoelectric sensors, and ultrasonic sensors; (c) pressure sensors; (d) infrared sensors; (e) image sensors, such as charge-coupled devices or complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor imagers; (f) motion detection sensors; (g) accelerometer sensors; (h) gyroscope sensors, such as rotation, vibration, or optical/MEMS sensors; and (i) optical sensors, such as photodetectors, fiber optic detectors, pyrometers, or proximity detectors. 7. A method for using a multi-purpose smart card in a dynamic environment, the dynamic environment comprising one of: an operating field originating from a data connection system, GPS or a normal telecommunications network, and a local wireless network, wherein the smart card comprises: a top layer having a cover printed and affixed to a bottom layer, the cover containing identity elements and an activation symbol; a bottom base having thereon a microprocessor for running software for operation of the smart card in the dynamic environment and connected to a power source, and a mass storage memory for storing a user's biometric information and private data; the microprocessor being connected to a biometric reader, a UHR RFID tag for remote in-range detection, a multi-protocol contactless access control interface with a low-power Bluetooth connector, and at least one sensor; wherein the smart card is configured to upload user biometric data to the memory and is enabled to allow the user to store the user biometric data in the memory to perform a pairing operation, wherein the user authenticates himself to the smart card by providing biometric information to the smart card at the biometric reader. The method includes the following steps: Power supply to unpaired cards; Provide the unpaired card to new users; The card is paired with the user by one of (a) inputting the user's biometric data, (b) requesting a code, or (c) inputting identification data from a terminal; and trust is established by allowing the card, which is further configured to enable at least a portion of the dynamic environment from (a) the data connection system, (b) the GPS or normal telecommunications network, or (c) the local wireless network, to interact with one of (i) the UHR RFID tag for remote capability detection, (ii) the multiprotocol contactless access control interface with a low-power Bluetooth connector, or (iii) the at least one sensor. 8. The method of using the multi-purpose smart card in a dynamic environment according to claim 7, further comprising the step of allowing management (establishment or loss) of trust between the smart card and the user. 9. The method of using the multipurpose smart card in a dynamic environment according to claim 8, further comprising the step of allowing the programming of at least one Trust Verification Parameter (TVP) to be tested and verified before the card issues data to aid as part of secured digital transactions. 10. The method of using the multipurpose smart card in a dynamic environment according to claim 9, further comprising the step of allowing the programming of more than one Trust Authentication Parameter (TVP) to be tested sequentially, randomly, or sequentially, respectively, before the card issues data to help secure digital transactions. 11. The method of using the multi-purpose smart card in a dynamic environment according to claim 7, wherein the at least one sensor is selected from the group consisting of: (a) temperature sensors, including infrared sensors, IC sensors, thermistors, resistor temperature detectors, and thermocouples; (b) proximity sensors, such as inductive sensors, capacitive sensors, photoelectric sensors, and ultrasonic sensors; (c) pressure sensors; (d) infrared sensors; (e) image sensors, such as charge-coupled devices or complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor imagers; (f) motion detection sensors; (g) accelerometer sensors; (h) gyroscope sensors, such as rotation, vibration, or optical/MEMS sensors; and (i) optical sensors, such as photodetectors, fiber optic detectors, pyrometers, or proximity detectors. 12. A method for using a smart card in a dynamic environment, the dynamic environment comprising one of: an operating field originating from a data connection system, GPS or a normal telecommunications network, and a local wireless network, wherein the smart card comprises: a top layer having a cover printed and affixed to a bottom layer, the cover containing identity elements and an activation symbol; a bottom base having thereon a microprocessor for running software for operation of the smart card in the dynamic environment and connected to a power source, and a mass storage memory for storing a user's biometric information and private data; the microprocessor being connected to a biometric reader, a UHR RFID tag for remote within-capacity detection, and at least one sensor; wherein the smart card is configured to upload user biometric data to the memory and is enabled to allow the user to store the user biometric data in the memory to perform a pairing operation, wherein the user authenticates himself to the smart card by providing biometric information to the smart card at the biometric reader, the method comprising the following steps: An unpaired card is paired with a user by inserting biometric data into the card's memory; Trust is established by allowing the user to verify the paired biometric data in the card's memory at the biometric reader; and Establish a set of trust verification parameters to test trust (established or lost) before the card is used in any digital transactions. 13. The method of claim 12, wherein the smart card is further configured to enable at least a portion of the dynamic environment from (a) the data connection system, (b) the GPS or normal telecommunications network, or (c) the local wireless network to interact with one of (i) the UHR RFID tag for remote capability detection, (ii) the multiprotocol contactless access control interface having a low-power Bluetooth connector, or (iii) at least one sensor for managing (establishing or losing) trust between the smart card and the user. 14. The method of claim 13, wherein the smart card is further configured as part of the management of trust between the smart card and the user to allow for the programming of at least one Trust Verification Parameter (TVP) to be tested and verified before the card issues data to help secure digital transactions. 15. The method of claim 14, wherein the smart card is further configured as part of the management of trust between the smart card and the user to allow for the continuous, random, or sequential testing of more than one Trust Verification Parameter (TVP) before the card issues data to aid in securing digital transactions. 16. The method of claim 15, wherein the method includes the additional step of publishing data to facilitate the use of the secured digital transaction, the data comprising a security token (HOTP or TOTP system). 17. The method of claim 12, wherein at least one sensor of the card is selected from the group consisting of: (a) temperature sensors, including infrared sensors, IC sensors, thermistors, resistor temperature detectors, and thermocouples; (b) proximity sensors, such as inductive sensors, capacitive sensors, photoelectric sensors, and ultrasonic sensors; (c) pressure sensors; (d) infrared sensors; (e) image sensors, such as charge-coupled devices or complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor imagers; (f) motion detection sensors; (g) accelerometer sensors; (h) gyroscope sensors, such as rotation, vibration, or optical/MEMS sensors; and (i) optical sensors, such as photodetectors, fiber optic detectors, pyrometers, or proximity detectors.