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GB2449675A - colour-coded identification signalling system - Google Patents

colour-coded identification signalling system Download PDF

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Publication number
GB2449675A
GB2449675A GB0710345A GB0710345A GB2449675A GB 2449675 A GB2449675 A GB 2449675A GB 0710345 A GB0710345 A GB 0710345A GB 0710345 A GB0710345 A GB 0710345A GB 2449675 A GB2449675 A GB 2449675A
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Prior art keywords
personnel
commanders
colour
units
base
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Granted
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GB0710345A
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GB2449675B8 (en
GB2449675B (en
GB0710345D0 (en
Inventor
Maurice Bligh
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Individual
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Individual
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    • GPHYSICS
    • G01MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01SRADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S13/00Systems using the reflection or reradiation of radio waves, e.g. radar systems; Analogous systems using reflection or reradiation of waves whose nature or wavelength is irrelevant or unspecified
    • G01S13/74Systems using reradiation of radio waves, e.g. secondary radar systems; Analogous systems
    • G01S13/76Systems using reradiation of radio waves, e.g. secondary radar systems; Analogous systems wherein pulse-type signals are transmitted
    • G01S13/78Systems using reradiation of radio waves, e.g. secondary radar systems; Analogous systems wherein pulse-type signals are transmitted discriminating between different kinds of targets, e.g. IFF-radar, i.e. identification of friend or foe
    • GPHYSICS
    • G01MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01VGEOPHYSICS; GRAVITATIONAL MEASUREMENTS; DETECTING MASSES OR OBJECTS; TAGS
    • G01V15/00Tags attached to, or associated with, an object, in order to enable detection of the object
    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07CTIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00111
    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07CTIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/20Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/28Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass the pass enabling tracking or indicating presence
    • GPHYSICS
    • G08SIGNALLING
    • G08BSIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
    • G08B1/00Systems for signalling characterised solely by the form of transmission of the signal
    • G08B1/08Systems for signalling characterised solely by the form of transmission of the signal using electric transmission ; transformation of alarm signals to electrical signals from a different medium, e.g. transmission of an electric alarm signal upon detection of an audible alarm signal
    • GPHYSICS
    • G08SIGNALLING
    • G08BSIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
    • G08B5/00Visible signalling systems, e.g. personal calling systems, remote indication of seats occupied
    • G08B5/22Visible signalling systems, e.g. personal calling systems, remote indication of seats occupied using electric transmission; using electromagnetic transmission
    • H04Q7/38
    • H04Q7/3855
    • H04Q7/3874
    • H04Q7/3876
    • H04Q7/3883

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
  • Remote Sensing (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Electromagnetism (AREA)
  • Life Sciences & Earth Sciences (AREA)
  • General Life Sciences & Earth Sciences (AREA)
  • Geophysics (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

The system relates to a radio frequency network of transmitters/receivers or transponders to link commanders of coalition armed forces engaged in combat against a common enemy. This enables commanders to identify and locate all coalition personnel/equipment from those of an enemy. Easily-understood symbols and text messages are displayed on VDUs to represent coalition forces in a given area. The visual information is automatically processed from encrypted digital data disseminated via terrestrial or satellite network links. Commanders can push-button veto any planned attacks against enemy positions to prevent potential 'friendly fire' incidents, or sanction attacks if deemed safe to proceed. The system is adaptable for civilian applications (with or without encryption) to identify personnel and their whereabouts during potentially hazardous operations or emergencies.

Description

COLOUR-CODED IDENTIFICATION SIGNALLING SYSTEM
Field of the invention:
The invention relates to a network of radio frequency communication devices primarily intended for deployment among the personnel of armed forces but also for civilian use. The devices are predominantly autonomous and capable of transmitting, receiving and processing digitally encoded data for transposition into visual information, which identifies a sender and their geographical location from the point of transmission to the point of reception.
Background to the invention:
One of the most dangerous aspects facing combatants engaged in modern theatres of war is that of being mistaken for the enemy by their own forces or coalition forces.
Horrendous incidents of so-called friendly fire' have illustrated the need for a communication system that provides unequivocal identification of all coalition personnel, vehicles, ordinance, and accommodation etc., within a given combat zone or simulated combat zone, and for civilian personnel associated with the military and likewise subject to friendly fire' incidents.
The human error factor in many cases of mistaken identity has often been attributed to the failure of communications between commanders of ground, sea and air forces and the proverbial misunderstood, misinterpreted message or signal sent and received by voice radio communication between speakers of different languages and/or speakers of different accents within a common language. Therefore one solution to this long-standing problem, in my view, is to provide all friendly forces' commanders with a standardized, easily understood visual signalling system that transcends an over-reliance currently placed on voice communications and/or improvised visual markers to indicate the identity and whereabouts of coalition forces.
Summary of the invention:
Accordingly, the invention employs radio frequency equipment to facilitate the identification and location of participating personnel, together with their support equipment such as transport vehicles, ordinance, accommodations, etc., wherever and whenever the danger exists of being mistaken for an enemy and particularly during the rapidly
changing circumstances of a battlefield.
The system requires little human intervention to enable its full range of functions to be implemented; independent of voice communications. Its primary purpose is to automatically disseminate update security-protected visual information to all coalition armed force(s) commanders responsible for operational strategies or logistics deployed during actual combat and/or simulated combat scenarios.
The system is designed to automatically:- (a) transmit digitally encoded radio signals to all personnel/equipment deployed in a given combat zone.
(b) receive and process digitally encoded radio signals to provide strategic data in real time.
(C) display colour-coded symbols representing all personnel and support equipment within in a close or middling distance combat zone, and/or simulated combat zone.
(d) display the geographical location of all coalition forces' personnel/equipment so that commanders can assess -prior to any planned attacks against enemy positions -whether or not any coalition forces' personnel/equipment could be in danger from friendly fire' while in close proximity to an enemy.
(e) display text messages in languages appropriate to the end-users.
(f) provide base or battlefield commanders with a push-button means to advise all friendly forces to abort any planned attacks against an enemy if coalition forces personnel or equipment is assessed to be in danger from friendly fire' (g) alternatively, provide base or battlefield commanders with a push-button means to confirm that identified coalition forces have been assessed clear of any friendly fire' danger so that planned attacks against an enemy may commence by general consensus of all coalition forces' commanders.
For these purposes, the system fundamentally requires:- (h) a language-independent programme of visual indicators and a language dependent programme of text messages to link the tactical decision-makers of all participating coalition forces, at all times.
(I) an alphanumeric cross-referenced security encryption process to deny an enemy from gleaning military intelligence by hacking' into the communications system.
To facilitate these requirements, all base commanders, field commanders, combatants and their support equipment will require customized communication devices electronically programmed with encrypted data and unique identification codes.
The preferred embodiment of the invention will therefore consist of the following elements of existing technology:- (1) Radio Frequency Identification units (RFID).
(2) Transmitter/receiver/micro processing video display units (VDU's) (3) Digital radio transmission and reception (4) Global Satellite Positioning (GPS) [optional].
These elements are functionally combined with - (5) A micro processor software programme of system protocols, visual facilities and templates for end-user encryptions.
Brief description of the drawings:
FIGURE 1 shows a terrestnal communications network linking coalition ground and air forces. In the simulated battle-field scenario their identities and respective locations are safely confirmed while coalition support aircraft are attacking an enemy position.
FIGURE 2 shows a satellite radio communications network linking coalition ground and air forces for the same purposes as in Fig 1.
FIGURE 3 shows a representation of what might appear on coalition
base and field commanders VDUs.
FIGURE 4 shows designated symbols to identify coalition forces' personnel and equipment.
FIGURE 5 shows a split screen display representing combat zones.
FIGURE 6 shows a functional description of the system and what text messages might be displayed on commander's base or field VDUs.
Detailed description of the invention
(1) Radio frequency identification (RFID) units RFID technology is a means by which to tag' personnel for the purpose of determining their location, often within buildings. For the military and/or civilian applications envisaged here, similar RFID lapel or badge-type miniaturized radio transmitter/ receivers or transponders will be employed for convenient use indoors and outdoors. Other similar units will be customised for attachment to support equipment, barracks, etc. The purpose of the military personnel/equipment RFID units is to receive digitally encoded signals from base or field commanders' master units, and then transmit respond' encoded signals back to the base or field commanders' master units. These signals, when processed, will result in a series of schematic diagrams within an overall picture' pertaining to the geographical location of all identified coalition forces' personnel and support equipment in the closer or middling distance combat zone. This visual information is then simultaneously despatched throughout a network of functionally identical communicators held by the base or field commanders of all participating coalition forces To determine distances between field commanders' master units and the personnel/equipment RFID units, another necessary element is involved in the process of displaying the locations of all coalition forces within a given area. This element relates to a useful application of science established and proven effective in earlier inventions such as radar.
Principally, the time a radio wave takes to travel from the point of transmission to the point of rebound from a target is calculable in terms of distance from the known speed of radio waves, However, in this invention the said principle does not specifically relate to the rebounding or reflection of radio waves. Here the purpose of transmitting radio waves is to trigger' or activate the said RFID receiver/transmitters to instantaneously transmit a radio signal that contains exclusive data relative to the sender. Therein the time radio waves take to reach their target receivers in order to activate a transmitter to despatch a respond signal, plus the time taken for the purpose of electronic processing, will be calculable and related to the distance(s) between transmitters and receivers.
()\ T r rri#4 rI * * .,r-i....
JIUL.bIIIq VJUU UIJId UIIIt VL)LIb Various practical forms of these master' units will be necessary for the purposes described Battle-field commanders will normally require battery operated hand-held or lap-top portable units during close combat scenarios. Base commanders' will normally require master desk-top or console units operating on generator mains-power in tand based or maritime headquarters, including aircraft, tanks etc. All master' units will contain the necessary micro processing technology to transmit and receive digital data. They will be able to decode and process incoming data for subsequent display as symbols, graphics, and text (static or moving) in monochrome and/or a plurality of colours In the colour-coded identification signalling system, the colour blue will be predominant as having been designated to visually represent only coalition forces' personnel and their support equipment. Blue has been chosen because it has been customary for some years for armed forces personnel to refer to friendly fire' incidents as blue-on-blue' incidents.
Also the colour blue (light blue) is the adopted uniform colour of armed forces deployed under the auspices of the United Nations Organisation The colour red is designated generally to indicate a state of danger or warning in an emergency situation where, for example, an urgent communication is necessary to abort and prevent a planned attack by coalition forces against enemy positions because coalition forces' personnel may be too close to the action and therefore in jeopardy from the dreaded friendly fire' scenario.
The colour green is designated to indicate go' commands, typically, where an airborne attack on known or suspected enemy positions has been proposed and the commanders of participating coalition forces are happy to sanction the proposed attack from their respective locations having assessed that there is no foreseeable danger to their own forces.
Remaining suitable colours will be reserved to display optional text and alphanumeric data, or otherwise, to enhance the visual effects and capabilities of the VDU's.
For the purpose of providing an indication of distance(s) relative to the geographical location of identified personnel and support equipment, an electronically overlaid gnd-map reference will be displayed on base or field commanders' VDUs. It is likely to be a matter of preference for the end-user as to whether the scale is calibrated in metric or imperial measurements, and/or whether the overlay was provided by Global Positioning Satellite (GPS).
(3) Digital radio transmission and reception of signals The purpose(s) of digital radio transmission/reception is to facilitate the processes necessary for encrypted signals to be sent and received safely throughout the communications network.
Digital encryption will shield the communications network beneath an umbrella of security measures designed to protect the integrity of the system against penetration by an enemy, or otherwise. For this reason, it is deemed necessary and prudent that a plurality of radio frequencies be employed at any given time.
It is envisaged that radio frequencies will need to be carefully chosen by military communications experts prior to deployment of the system at the intended geographical location of deployment.
Some radio frequencies could be predetermine as generally suitable and preset into the RFID units at manufacturing stage, while other radio frequencies might need to be pre-selected by the end-user prior to inauguration or application of the system.
The choice of frequencies will broadly depend on:- (I) the output power of transmitters and the corresponding effectiveness of their emitting radio waves to travel distances.
(k) natural or atmospheric conditions and intensity of radio traffic (I) the nature of terrain in which transmitter and receiving units are required to operate.
In regards to (I), it may be necessary in mountainous regions to deploy radio frequencies within a particular section of the radio frequency spectrum, wherein such frequencies or wave-lengths are known to be more suitable for this application and rather than those commonly used for line-of-sight locations such as at sea, flat landscapes, deserts.
Notwithstanding, the system's security protocols and uniform software encryption programme will always require these radio transmit/receive frequencies to be variable. They made be deployed within a cluster of suitable frequencies, or otherwise, at any given time.
For system security relevant to base and field commanders' master units and their send/receive signals to personnel and equipment RFID units, it will be necessary to systematically alternate the radio wave frequencies deployed for transmitting and receiving signals. This is because the system's protocols demand that a transmission trigger' frequency should never be the same frequency used for a subsequent transmission or transmissions and in order to trigger' an automatic respond' signal from an RFID unit. And by the same token, it wli be necessary for the RFID units to systematically alternate their transmission frequencies and coincide with the listening or receiver frequencies of base or field commanders' units.
Indeed, coordinated frequency alternation will provide an additional element of security to thwart an enemy from electronically penetrating the system, and will be part of the overall encryption process. [A further method of strengthening this process will be revealed at a more
appropriate section in this description]
Therein, the combination of alternating radio frequencies and digital encryption should ensure that only genuine base or field commands' master units will have the capabilities to determine:- (m) what transmitter/receiving frequencies are being used (or will be used) to despatch/receive signals at any given moment in time.
(n) what unique PIN (Personal Identification Number) and unique ID type codes ascribed to the RFID units will induce the REID units to transmit individually encoded respond' signals back to the commander's base or
field master units
Notwithstanding, consideration must be given to provide failsafe or backup modes to cope with a possible scenario where a combatant's personal RDIF unit, or any other system unit, was captured or otherwise obtained by an enemy.
Initially, any captured or otherwise obtained RFID equipment would prove useless without knowledge of the correct log-in encoded data in order to active the system. Otherwise, concerted attempts to access information via random or computerized sequential mathematical input or guesswork would activate an automatic self-destruct wipe memory' mode in the genuine system unit(s) microprocessors as a result of receiving too many wrong answers' or failures to insert the correct PIN entry codes or ID codes.
In other circumstances, the same self-destruct mode could be manually activated at the press of a button by a base commander, a field commander or combatant.
In situations where base or field commanders and their personnel have no access to voice communications equipment (or when not wishing to use voice radio communications for whatever reason) an optional feature may be utilized as an urgent or emergency means to communicate with military or civilian personnel.
In military ternis this feature could be described as a Your commander demands a manual response to determine whether you are dead or alive' mode. [This relates to a much-voiced problem raised by battle- field commanders wherein injured or dead soldiers cannot easily be distinguished, often at distance, from others who may be static for a period of time as part of a covert surveillance or actual combat operation.] The said mode will enable military commanders to push-button transmit an encoded signal designed to activate a vibrating device (similar to those used in some mobile or cellular telephones) to be incorporated in a recipient's personnel REID unit. This discreet physical indication will alert recipients to respond manually if they are capable of doing so They will only need to apply a finger touch to a respective button on the RFID unit, effectively to null the vibrating device, (or in respect of a RFID unit fitted to a vehicle, etc, to null a suitable flashing light or possibly an audible signal) and simultaneously transmit a respond' signal to indicate on the commander's base unit that he/she was cognizant and aware of their commander's concerns relating to their welfare.
In other circumstances combative personnel or civilians may wish to seek urgent assistance by manually triggering an emergency transmission mode signal from their personnel/support equipment REID units. This action will result in a distinctive flashing colour-coded symbol (see Fig. 4) being displayed on their base or field commander's master unit, with an optional accompanying audible signal synchronised with the flashing identification symbol to specifically attract a commander's attention.
(4) Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) [optionati.
It is essential that the communications link between base commanders of different national armed forces, or different commanders within the same national armed forces deployed in a coalition force, is secure from electronic penetration at all times.
One factor to be considered relates to the distances between the respective commanders. These distances may be greater than the closer or middling distance range that in-field commanders' portable units may be required to operate when transmitting and receiving signals from personnel/equipment RFID units, and when linking up with their immediate base commanders.
As previously mentioned, the operational location and nature of terrain will most likely determine whether or not a terrestrial radio communications link was feasible and trustworthy for the purpose of securely linking all base commanders' units, given sufficient transmitting power. Alternatively, it may be adjudged that a satellite communication link, or a military Internet link, is more trustworthy and capable of providing the necessary security. Moreover, all terrestrial radio signals between personnel or equipment RFID units and their field or base commanders could be transferred to a satellite communication system should the necessary technology be embodied in the RFID and base commanders' units In this event, some of the following encryption protocols regarding terrestrial communications may be overwritten by alternative encryption protocols embodied in a satellite communication system.
(5) System protocols and encryptions.
The security protocols and alphanumeric encryptions embodied in this section of the invention could be likened to a cargo' of digitalised data that the system's transmitter units will be required to carry and deliver to their respective radio receivers or intended recipients' destinations.
Obviously the deliverer must foremost know the correct names and addresses' of intended recipients. For security reasons, this information will always be privy to the end-users of the colour-coded identification signalling system, and it will always be their responsibility to input the required information prior to system inauguration and to keep the system's micro processors updated with any changes.
The specific subject of mind-boggling combinations and choices of alphanumeric codes that could be applied by the end-user will be addressed later. Meanwhile, one way to make life difficult for any would-be interceptor of military encoded radio messages is to stagger and/or alternate the radio frequencies used This means that the slave' REID units will be required to tune into specific listening frequencies at different times to receive instructions or updates to continue to perform their duties and according to their masters' orders.
It should be said that when the system's receiver units are required to standby in the listening frequency mode, they will not respond operationally to any spurious radio signals, digital or otherwise. Only correctly encoded digital signals from a commander's master base or
field units will be recognised.
If however a particular listening frequency became the victim of a serious amount of disruptive radio traffic or deliberate jamming', the receiver would abandon this frequency and switch to an alternative predetermined frequency to continue monitoring for radio signals from the system's master units.
With sufficient encryption a lucky strike' signal containing digital data that coincidentally matched an REID unit's correct PIN entry code would be astronomical high in odds against that happening. However, if it did happen the incoming lucky strike signal would only trigger the receiver to transmit a respond' signal once. For embodied in the encrypted signal and data would be an instruction to dictate what frequency the REID unit must deploy to transmit a respond' signal on the next single occasion, and what specific frequency should be used to listen-in for subsequent radio signals transmitted by commanders' base or field units deploying alternative frequencies.
In all operations regarding the transmitting and receiving of encoded signals, it will be necessary for all master base or field units to be syrichronised to GMT (Greenwich Mean Time) sometimes referred to as UTC (Universal Coordinated Time) as this element of time-synchronisation will be essential in the process of when radio frequencies are to be rotated automatically throughout the network of communicators.
Alphanumeric codes: A simple fact of mathematics provides the answer to thwart and frustrate a concerted attempt to electronically penetrate the security protocols of the encryption system envisaged in this invention; namely that millions of combinations result from employing alphanumeric sequence of letters from A-Z and digits from 0 to 9, inclusive.
Additionally, the process of alternating radio frequencies and by which codes are transmitted increases the overall security element to a high degree against any attempts to glean intelligence by penetrating the digital-data-based system. Consequently, the task(s) involved, plus the relative time it takes to crack' any given alphanumeric combinations, will be formidable and likely beyond practicality.
Notwithstanding, it must be assumed that an enemy would attempt to hack into the system by intercepting signals from or to base commanders' units and/or signals from or to personnel/support equipment units. If so, this would result in obtaining a rapid burst of digital data in a meaningless jumble of alphanumeric digits transmitted.- (o) only once on that radio frequency, on that occasion Even if the captured digital data was recorded and immediately re-transmitted by an enemy in the hope of penetrating the system, it would not succeed because:- (p) the foremost entry PIN code of a personnel/equipment RFID unit-the one originally transmitted by a genuine base of field commander's master unit-would have already been changed by automatic rotation of the PIN entry code protocols for the log-in procedure required on the next or subsequent transmission from a commander's master unit.
(q) The frequency used to transmit the original authentic signal would have already been changed by the automatic rotation of the frequency protocols for the log-in procedure required on the next or subsequent transmission.
The following tables example how alphanumeric sequences and rotating PIN entry codes and fixed ID codes could be applied to an encryption system, and how the codes are then transmitted on different radio frequencies (F 1-8) on each occasion.
The first table relates to a transmission of data on a first occasion, and the second table to a transmission of the same data on a second (or a subsequent) occasion. [Noticeably, the codes are deliberately staggered' or interspersed by using different frequencies as part of the encryption process and also to avoid electronic misreading of closely similar aiphanumerical sequences such as codes A0123456789*2 transmitted on frequency Fl, and code A0123456798*3 transmitted on frequency F2 in the first table, and frequency F3 and F4, in the second
table, respectively.
F-I A01234567892 80132456789*2 C01345678922 D01354678922 F-2 AOl 23456798*3 BO 132456798*3 CO 134567829*3 DOl 35647892*3 F-3 A0123456879*4 B0132456879*4 C0134567298*4 00135647298*4 F-4 A0123465789*5 B0132457896*5 C0134576892*5 D0135647289*5 F-5 A0123465879*6 B0132457689*6 C0134572689*6 D0135642789*6 F-6 AOl 23465978*7 BOl 32457986*7 COl 34572869*7 DOl 35642879*7 F-7 A0123465897*8 B0132468975*8 C0134572896*8 D0135642897*8 F8 A0123465987*1 60132468795*1 C0134572698*1 D0135647289*1 F-2 A0123456789*3 80132456789*3 C0134567892*3 00135467892*3 F-3 A0 123456798*4 80132456798*4 CO 134567829*4 00135647892*4 F-4 AOl 23456879*5 BOl 32456879*5 COl 345672985 00135647298*5 F-5 AOl 23465789*6 BO 132457896*6 COl 34576892*6 DOl 35647289*6 F-S AOl 23465879*7 BOl 32457689*7 CO1 34572689*7 DO 135642789*7 F-7 A0123465978*8 80132457986*8 C0134572869'8 D0135642879*8 F-8 A0123465897*1 80132468975*2 C0134572896*3 D0135642897*4 F-I A0123465987*2 B0132468795*2 C01345726982 D0135647289*2 Explanation of the examples: The alphabet letters A, B, C & D preceding the numerals 0-9 represent any alphanumeric sequence that may be employed to define a plurality of entry' or PIN codes that can be automatically rotated by master base units when transmitting a signal to induce the RFID units to respond'.
The 0-9 numerals represent the unique, permanent ID alphanumeric code ascribed to RFID units.
The star symbol (.) followed by a numeral represents an alphanumeric sequence that may be configured to define what frequency (Fl-B) the RFID units' transmitters will be required to deploy and in order to send a respond' signal on the next occasion when triggered to do so.
Concludin! notes: While the end-users of the system may find that the encryption protocols embodied in this invention will prove sufficient to fulfil the intended functions and comply with their minimal security requirements, the system's master micro processing units, however, should be manufactured to allow for any reasonable degree of enhanced or sophisticated encryption programmes that the end-users may deem necessary.
Alternatively, the system may require no such enhanced encryption processes when applied to civilian life for use by police, fire and rescue services, security services, etc. In this respect, the unencrypted or basic deployment of digital data and RFID technology embodied in this invention will be sufficient to transmit and receive ID codes for processing and displaying symbolically to indicate the identity and whereabouts of personnel for determining the status of their wellbeing.
Detailed description of the drawings
As shown in FIGURE 1, coalition forces' aircraft (1) are attacking an identified enemy position (2). The aircraft (1) are aware of the locations of coalition personnel (6) and command bases (4) (5) & (7) and are linked via a terrestrial radio communications network (3).
As shown in FIGURE 2, coalition aircraft are attacking an identified enemy position (as shown in Fig. 1) while linked to personnel (6) and their command bases via a satellite radio communications network (8).
As shown in FIGURE 3, a representation of what might appear on the VDU's (12) of coalition base and field commanders. An overlay (10) affixes map coordinates, As shown in FIGURE 4, the intended blue coloured encircled X symbol (9) is designated to identify coalition aircraft, ground base headquarters, armoured transport vehicles, missile sites, ships etc. The intended red coloured eight-pointed star symbol (11) isintended to flash when surrounding an identified coalition forces' personnel blue symbol (6) or support equipment blue symbol (9) to indicate an emergency signal from the said personnel and/or from their support equipment.
As shown in FIGURE 5, a split screen mode on commanders' VDUs (12). Coalition forces combat zones are represented by the letters A, B,C,D,E,F,G, & H. The intended red coloured eight-pointed star symbol (11) displayed in zone C and zone H indicates that two base commanders have vetoed a planned attack against enemy positions.
The commanders of zones A,B,D,E,F,& G respectively have indicated no such objections.
As shown in FIGURE 6, the system functional diagram explains how coalition commanders can cooperatively prevent friendly fire' attacks against blue' or coalition forces The text message (14) represents an intended red coloured flashing signal to abort an attack against an identified enemy. The text message (13) represents an intended green coloured static signal to proceed with an attack against an identified enemy.

Claims (1)

  1. Claims: CLAIM # 1: A colour-coded identification signalling system
    wherein a network of radio frequency transmitters and receivers link the commanders of all land-based, airborne and maritime coalition or friendly armed forces engaged in simulated or actual combat scenarios in a theatre of war, for the purpose of communicating visual information relating to the identification and geographical location of all friendly armed forces' personnel, or civilian associates, operating within buildings such as barracks, occupied premises, transport vehicles, tanks, aircraft, ships and other confining environments, or outdoors in the vicinity of said confining environments and/or ordinance such as missile launch sites and various support equipment that may be subject to misidentification as that of belonging to an enemy and therefore subject to so-called friendly-fire attack; wherein by the means of simultaneously displaying colour-coded symbols and text messages on portable, desk-top or console video display units (VDUs) for the said commanders of coalition forces to observe, in real time, for the purpose of assessing as to whether the said friendly forces' personnel and their support equipment might be in danger of misidentification, and if so, that any such planned attacks may aborted, postponed or amended by visually notifying all commanders via the said network link to revise or cancel the orders relating to any such planned attacks that might otherwise result in disastrous consequences for the said personnel of coalition armed forces, or civilians, if they were otherwise to be mistaken for an enemy by personnel among coalition rmd fnms * CLAIM # 2: A colour-coded identification signalling system, as claimed in Claim 1, wherein the said communications network link can also be deployed to visually notify all base and field commanders of land, air and sea coalition forces, by means of symbols and alphanumeric text data that any planned attacks against an enemy may proceed without foreseeable danger to any friendly armed forces personnel, or civilians, that may be deployed within or near to the enemy or designated target areas.
    CLAIM # 3: A colour-coded identification signalling system, as claimed in Claims 1 & 2, wherein radio frequency identification (REID) units are custoniised for use, and are provided to all coalition personnel, or civilians, for the purpose of automatically processing and verifying digitally encoded data as having originated from their base commanders' units, then responding by automatically transmitting predetermined and unique identification codes back to their commanders' base units for subsequent electronic processing, and then to appear visually as symbols and text information identifying all personnel, their support equipment and geographical location(s) as
    displayed on base or field commanders' VDUs.
    CLAIM # 4: A colour-coded identification signalling system, as claimed in Claims I to 3, wherein another purpose of the said radio frequency transmissions containing alphanumeric encrypted information emanating from RFID units and intended for processing by base or field commanders' master units, is also a means by which base commanders' units are able to calculate distances from the known speed of radio wave emissions relative to the time taken between transmissions from the location of said personnel and support equipment units, plus the time taken to process incoming data, to the reception and processing of the incoming data at the location of their base commanders units; and wherein satellite global positioning may also be deployed to determine said distances and location of personnel and support equipment.
    CLAIM # 5. A colour-coded identification signalling system, as claimed in Claims 1 to 4, wherein digitally encrypted data received from said personnel and support equipment RFID units, when processed to appear as colour-coded symbols representing personnel and support equipment, and when displayed on the VDU's of base or field commanders units, will predominantly be the colour blue as the designated colour to represent all coalition forces in any real or simulated combat zones and other operational arenas, for the purpose of visually alerting all coalition forces' commanders of their presence and location within the said combat and possible danger zones.
    CLAIM # 6: A colour-coded identification signalling system, as claimed in Claims 1 to 5, wherein base or field commanders VDU units display text messages in the predetermined languages of participating coalition forces' commanders, and wherein the colour red is designated as the colour to represent a flashing warning of danger and/or a consensus order to abort any planned attack against any designated enemy positions, for the purpose of preventing a mistaken identity attack against coalition forces personnel and support equipment.
    CLAIM # 7: A colour-coded identification signalling system, as claimed in Claimsi to 6, wherein base or field commanders VDU units display text messages in the colour green to represent a static confirmation that coalition forces' personnel or support equipment appears to be in no danger from mistaken identity or friendly-fire attack within a given area, and that consequently any planned attack(s) against enemy positions may proceed without foreseeable danger to coalition forces' personnel.
    CLAIM # 8. A colour-coded identification signalling system, as claimed in Claims 1 to 7, wherein base or field commanders' VDU units display text messages or alphanumeric data in colours other than the pre-designated colours blue, red and green, for the purpose of enhancing the visual effects and intended functions of the VDU display(s) for the said communication of visual signals throughout the communications network.
    CLAIM # 9: A colour-coded identification signalling system wherein customised digitally encrypted data is transmitted by base or field commanders' master units, and personnel/support equipment RFID units, using a plurality of radio frequencies within the radio frequency spectrum, in a specific sequence and at variable times for the purpose of enhancing encryption and system security protocols to prevent an enemy, or otherwise, electronically penetrating the network communications system with view to gleaning military intelligence as to the location and identification of coalition personnel and their support equipment.
    CLAIM # 10 A colour-coded identification signalling system, as claimed in Claims I to 9, wherein digitally encrypted data is received by base or field commanders' master units, and personnel/support equipment REID units, using a plurality of radio frequencies within the radio frequency spectrum, in a specific sequence and at variable times for the purpose of enhancing encryption and security protocols, and to prevent an enemy, or otherwise, electronically penetrating the network communications system with view to gleaning military intelligence as to the location and identification of coalition personnel and support equipment.
    CLAIM # 11: A colour-coded identification signalling system, as claimed in Claims 1 to 10, wherein a plurality of radio frequencies is employed for transmitting and receiving encrypted data on specific occasions, and wherein radio frequency alternation is employed as an integral element in the process of encryption; the said method(s) being also employed as a means to avoid electronic misreading of said data, and to strengthen the security and safety protocols associated with the overall process of encryption relative to the purposes of the system.
    CLAIM # 12: A colour-coded identification signalling system wherein if any RFID personnel or support equipment unit(s) should fall into the hands of an enemy, or otherwise, any unauthorised or malicious attempts to penetrate the security protocols of the system by means of random, sequential or other forms of electronic input by guesswork or otherwise, would result in the automatic activation of an incorporated delete-memory or self-destruct mode in the said RFID units of personnel and support equipment, for the purpose of rendering the captured equipment useless to any would-be abuser.
    CLAIM # 13: A colour-coded identification signalling system, as claimed in Claims 1 to 12, wherein a said self-destruct mode incorporated in personnel and support equipment RFID units can be remotely activated by base or field commanders' master units, or manually activated by personnel in a deemed emergency situation, for the purpose of rendering the equipment useless.
    CLAIM # 14: A colour-coded identification signalling system wherein if base or field commanders are unsure of the wellbeing or cognisance of any personnel deployed in any simulated or real combat zone, or otherwise, encoded signals may be transmitted to automatically activate a vibrating device incorporated into the personnel RFID units, for the purpose of physically indicating to the said personnel that their commanders demanded a manually operated or push-button response to trigger an automatic transmission and radio signal for the purpose of visually indicating on a base or field commanders' master VDU units that the intended recipient(s) are indeed cognisant of their commanders' concerns.
    CLAIM # 15: A colour-coded identification signalling system wherein if base or field commanders are unsure as to the status of any personnel engaged in duties within the confines of, or in the vicinity of support equipment deployed in any simulated or real combat zone, the base or field commanders can transmit encoded signals to remotely active an audible signal or a flashing light signal incorporated into support equipment REID units, for the purpose of indicating to personnel that their commander(s) demanded a manually operated or push-button response to trigger an automatic transmission and radio signal, for the purpose of visually indicating on base or field commanders' master VDU units that the recipient(s) are indeed cognisant of their commander(s) concerns.
    CLAIM # 16: A colour-coded identification signalling system wherein a manual or push-button means is incorporated into a personnel or combatant's RFID unit to trigger an automatic radio signal for the purpose of advising commanders that urgent or emergency assistance was required at the location of the personnel, and by means of displaying a distinctive flashing blue and red colour-coded symbol on the base and field commanders' master VDUs, and/or in conjunction with an optional audible signal on their base or field commander(s) master VDU units, to identify the sender and the geographical location of the received signal indicating a state of emergency.
    CLAIM # 17: A colour-coded identification signalling system, as claimed in Claims 1 to 16, wherein the identification and location of personnel may also be relevant to the commanders of civilian forces such as police, fire and rescue services, security services, etc., for the purpose of identifying and locating their personnel who may be within or without confining environments during routine duties or general emergencies.
    CLAIM # 18 A colour-coded identification signalling system, as claimed in Claims 1 to 17, wherein commanders of civilian forces or organisations wishing to utilize the system, may not deem it necessary to deploy the encryption processes primarily embodied in the system for the purpose of thwarting the acquisition of military intelligence by system penetration; and wherein the primary concern of civilian application is simply to identify and locate personnel in any given area and on occasions where the automatic and manually assisted functions of the system are otherwise identical to those relevant to the safety of military personnel, for the purpose of assessing the movements of civilian personnel during routine duties or those related to potentially hazardous incidents such as civilian riots and other urgencies or emergencies.
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