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GB2204984A - Playback and recording of copyright material - Google Patents

Playback and recording of copyright material Download PDF

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Publication number
GB2204984A
GB2204984A GB08710212A GB8710212A GB2204984A GB 2204984 A GB2204984 A GB 2204984A GB 08710212 A GB08710212 A GB 08710212A GB 8710212 A GB8710212 A GB 8710212A GB 2204984 A GB2204984 A GB 2204984A
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Prior art keywords
type
data
production
production method
module
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Application number
GB08710212A
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GB2204984B (en
GB8710212D0 (en
Inventor
John Henry Jenkins
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Individual
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Individual
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Priority to GB8710212A priority Critical patent/GB2204984B/en
Publication of GB8710212D0 publication Critical patent/GB8710212D0/en
Publication of GB2204984A publication Critical patent/GB2204984A/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of GB2204984B publication Critical patent/GB2204984B/en
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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/00137—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving measures which result in a restriction to contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier to authorised users
    • G11B20/00152—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving measures which result in a restriction to contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier to authorised users involving a password
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/0021—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/0021—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier
    • G11B20/00217—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier the cryptographic key used for encryption and/or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from the record carrier being read from a specific source
    • G11B20/00224—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier the cryptographic key used for encryption and/or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from the record carrier being read from a specific source wherein the key is obtained from a remote server
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00—Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/0071—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving a purchase action
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B23/00—Record carriers not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Accessories, e.g. containers, specially adapted for co-operation with the recording or reproducing apparatus ; Intermediate mediums; Apparatus or processes specially adapted for their manufacture
    • G11B23/28—Indicating or preventing prior or unauthorised use, e.g. cassettes with sealing or locking means, write-protect devices for discs
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11B—INFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B27/00—Editing; Indexing; Addressing; Timing or synchronising; Monitoring; Measuring tape travel
    • G11B27/36—Monitoring, i.e. supervising the progress of recording or reproducing
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2211/00—Indexing scheme relating to details of data-processing equipment not covered by groups G06F3/00 - G06F13/00
    • G06F2211/007—Encryption, En-/decode, En-/decipher, En-/decypher, Scramble, (De-)compress

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Signal Processing For Digital Recording And Reproducing (AREA)

Abstract

Modules are incorporated in playback and recording machines to make operation dependant on the presence of a key which represents a licence to use, recordings carrying a recorded log of copyright uses that is brought up to date with each transaction. The idea is said to be applicable to other forms of copyright.

Description

SECURE DISTANCE PRODUCTION METHOD FOR OBJECTS COVERED BY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS This invention relates to ensuring the recognition of originators of objects covered by intellectual property rights whenever such an object is generated at a distance by means of a standard method of product ion.
intellectual property riats are associated with patterns in some medium. Owers of intellectual property rights receive royalties of some kind when an Instance of their pattern is generated under licence by any other entity.
The most widely knows intellectual property rights are PATENTS and COPYRIGHTS.
As technology advances both of these will come under pressure from new methods of product ion available to entities whose activities will become difficult to detect unless the nature of the means of product ion of patterns in space time reflects the need to monitor the product ion of instances of patterns as an integral part of the function of the product on of an instance of the pat tern Accordingly, this Invent i on adresses the need for integrated product ion and prosiuction monitoring of such objects.
The required basis for the utilization of this invent ion for each type of pattern is 1 ) Standard formats for the representation of each type of pattern.
2 ) Standard formats for the representation of information identifying both the instantiation of each type of pattern and the instant at ion of the instant at ion of each type of pattern.
3 ) For each (1), (2) pair. a system for securely producing copies of an Instance of each type of pattern under licence.
while monitoring arid recording that product ori 4 ) For each production system (3) , a method of inspecting tat part of the secure production system (the licence) which monitors and records the licenced production events in such a.
way that the er,tity producireg and the space time locat i or of the product i on event are not relevant According to the present I invention there is provided a framework which can be instar,tiated to integrally produce and monitor the production of instances of types of pattern A specific embodiment of the invention will not be described by way of example with referance to the accompanying drawings in which : Figure 1 shows a minimal system which will directly copy a source into another area within which the pattern may exist.
Figure 2 shows a simple module capable of interfacing between the main modules shown in figure 1.
Figure 3 shows an analog =?. I digital transmission module Figure 4 shows a Digital = > Digital Digital transmission module Figure 5 shows a Digital Digital = Digital transmission module.
Figure /. shows a Digital =:. Analog module.
Figure 7 shows an extended monitoriable transmission module.
Figure 8 shows a versi or of this system extended to increace its versatility.
The specific embodiment of the invent ion to be described is a copyright control system for digitally encoded copyright works. The method of the invention requires that a copyright item to be controlled by this system has a standard format used to represent the sensitizable form of the copyrighted work for each type of copyrightable material. It further requires that codes be recorded with the copyright item.
uniquely identifying that item and that a record~history tree position code be recorded with each copyright item uniquely identifying each copy of that copyright item's root and twig record I rig history.
That is to say a representation of a copyright work should contain along with the signal minimally required to represent the sensitatle form of the work a signal describing or associatable with the copyright of the work and the production history of the work The invented method requires that licences exist to enable copies of the pattern to be created. These shall be refer to as keys. They must contain information describing the works produced arid the quantity of each work produced and shall in this instance be assumed to do so using [code. count] pairs. Blank keys would be set to ( [UNCOPYRIGHTED [ANALOG , #], [BROADCAST , #], {~8K*[nil . #]}) and be available through authorisedi outlets.
When a new instance of a standard digital copyright source work is produced the copyright code and appropriate record tree code must be recorded with the new copy; the source copy's recordtree code should be updated to reflect the production event; the key should be Informed of the event, either initializing a new copyright code field. or identifying ar existing code, then incrementing the court field of the appropriate Encode , county pair.
In the case of ANALOG, BROADCAST and UNCOPYRIGHTED source material the algorithm car be similar, however within the key it would be erroneous for the code field not to exist; no change would be made to a non existant field on the source unless the source were to be a digital recording of a previous recording of an ANALOG, BROADCAST or UNCOPYRIGHTED source.
The licence key could either be retained by the authorised inspection center on I rispect I on or set to permit no further production to occur under it 5 control.
The data types flowing through the example system and the system modules and sub modules shall now be identified and their interfaces and the behaviour of system modules and sub~modules shall be specified for the systems in terms of the diagrams. figures 1 arid 2. Figure 3 shall be refered to later.
Main Data types to be processed by hardware modules and sub~modules 1 ) A - copyright work sensitable~form describing data B - copyright~work copyright code data C - copyrightwork record~history~tree data 2 ) A - Type key check data B - Type B key check data < 2A = 2B v 2p'/=2B ) 3 ) key interogation data 4 ) key command modifying data 5 ) key state data A - Ecopyriqht ~code, count3 pairs of data items B - licence inspection state data 6) key present data C.*) complex key present data 7 ) record event occuring data 6 ) reader monitor data 9) writer monitor data 10) transmission monitor data The necessity to maintain the correct relationship between copyright data (1B), instance data (10) and the work to which they refer (1A) during all reasonably predictable events within a configurable system manifests itself in the specificatiores of hardware modules.
Software solutions in terms of extra data (2 and 6) are also being suggested as ways to monitor the configurations of hardware modules and submodules. When the data presented to legal modules indicates legal modules to have been incorrectly configured, they modify their behaviour Type 2 data is used to ensure the presence of a key within a recording system. Type 2A data is generated within the key (M3.3) and passed to both the write~head (M3.1) and the read~head (M1) supplying the write head (M3.1) with data.
Both types of head generate type 2B data to compare with the type 2A data. The comparison must be favourable to permit reading or writing to continue.
An algorithm to scramble the logical~phisical ordering of bits swithin a si signal at read head lock, key arid write head is a possible security oriented extension. Security data passed between other interface componants in a manner designed to ensure the presence of a correct configuration of modules is a further extensi or Main Modules and Sub~modules M1 ) Read module A module capable of reading a representation of a copyright work reads and transmits unaltered all type 1 data. Type 1C data is a special case.Type 7 data is combined with type 1C data to produce type IC data to replace the type 1C data being read from the source on the source.
Inputs source is copyright work : type 1 source is transmission interface : type 7 type 2 source is read monitor : type s Outputs destination is read monitor : tor type 8 destination is copyright work : type 1C < ..= (type 10, type 7) ) destination is transmission interface : type 1 < < = type 1) destination is ANALOG : type ANALOG~signal A head sub~module (M1 arid 11::3.3) is a precision device, hold rig itbs control circuitry within it in such a way as to make the control circuitry innaccessible without disturbing the precice allignment of the device, a precice allignment without which the device will not function, which is only reallignable utillizing very high precision devices.
Ay change accurring to the type 7 data being recieved by a read device results i the read device raising art exception and process I rig it automatically, under control of the internal control circuitry.
The type 7 data car either indicate the addition or the loss of a recording module from the configuration. In the case of an addition the head isolates itself from external control, output would terminate, and the read event would continue at maximum speed, updating all type 1C data to the value written during the valid part of the recording: control would then be permitted to return to the monitor. In the case of a loss, the only change is a rapid update of the head's concept of expected type 7 data, the read event would continue, and the updated type IC data would not change.Were a source to be corrupted due to power failure at some stage during some production event the type 1C data being written Onto a source does not reflect the discontinuity, but updates all parts of the data to the current correct value as indicated by the initial type 10 arid type 7 data.
The read device processes type 1 data into type 2B data which when type 7 data indicates a recording to be progressing is compared with type 2A data being received. If the comparison IS unfavourably made at any time during a recording, an exception is raised, gracefully terninating the play event under internal circuit control as described above for detection of increased recording in type 7 data.
Power connections, start~play, stop~play, play~monitor data conections also exist for such devices (M5 and type 8) M2 ) Transmission modules A transmission module flexibly distributes signals from sources to destinations. To do this requires sub~modules of various types, which may be physically configured and logically connected in may ways. Security should tie retained for all connectable configurations of these types of module.
The encapsulated behavior of transmission modules should tie such that any digital output is identical to the digital input from which it derives, else, deriving from an analog source I it should carry ANALOG, BRODCAST or UNCOPYRIGHTED copyright codes.
The data transmission directions indicate the direction in which the main data is flowing. Type 7 and type 2A data should tie understood to flow in the opposite direction along the same set of connections, arid possibly to be altered while passing through a transmission module.
M2.1 Analog = > Digital This module is required to permit digital recordings to be made of analog source material, be the source material copyright or self created.
It seems difficult to make the types of device required to produce ANALOG BROADCAST or UNCOPYRIGHTED # incompatible or differentiable, as such they shall be considered to tie similarly treated.
The sub~module has the following features.
Inputs : source is ANALOG : type ANALOG~signal source is case (transmission interface ' write) module : type 2 type 7 Outputs : destination is case (transmission interface : write) module : type 1[A, B, C] < # [ANALOG~source, 'BROADCAST' # 'ANALOG' UNCOPYRI6HTED' nil' ] The type 2A arid type 7 data have no purpose in this module but are included for consistancy, They need not be processed in any way.
The analog source signal must be digitised into the standard format expected by the system.
The copyright code to be output derives from an internal constant. It would be expected that acceptable systems would use more ANALOG and BROADCAST sub~modules of this type than UNCOPYRIGHTED sub~modules.
The recor.i~tree code is also a constant. This code represents the root, that recording number user err from which has yet been derived no other recordings.
M2.2 Digital # Digital, Digital This sub ~module is required for signal splitting In the mixer stage of transmission and has the following properties Inputs : source is case (transmission interface : read) module : type 1 source is case (transmission interface I write) module type 2Rv type 7 source is case transm issi on interface : write) module : type 2A, type 7 Outputs destination is case (transmission interface ' read) module [type 2A, type 7) ( # [( type 2A, type 7, type 2A, type 7), (type 7 type 7) ]) destination is case (transmission interface I write) module type 1 ( # (type 1, type 7, type 7)) destination is case (transmission interface : write) module : type 1 ( # (type 1, type 7, type 7) > The type 2A outputs are derived from all type 2A and type 7 inputs.
The type 2A outputs are defied if both type 7 inputs indicate no recording to be occurring. If one type 7 input Indicates a recording is occurring, its type 2A signal is transmitted unchanged. If both type 7 inputs indicate a recording to be occurring, the type 2A signals must be identical for transmission to occur.
The type 7 output derives from both type 7 inputs. Each input indicates the number of recordings bei derived from the associated type 1 output . The derived output sums the inputs such that the type 7 output also reflects the number of record rigs der ivirig through the rode from the type 1 input.
The type 1R and type 1B data are transmitted from the input to both outputs unchanqed.
The output type 1C data varies depend irig on the input type 10 data both input type 7 data arid the output channel through which it is transmitted. This is done I in such a way that unique type 1C data is derived at each processing node.
M2.3 Digital, Digital # Digital This sub~module permits the selection between various Inputs under the control of a user monitor panel (M6). At any one time, only one of the input signals is transmitted.
The following features may be observed.
Inputs : source is case transmission interface : read) module: type 1 source is case (transmission interface g read) module : type 1 source is case transmission interface : write) module: type 2, type 7 source is transmission monitor type 10 Outputs destination is case (transmission interface I read) module : Etype 2A type 73 ( # [(type 2A, type 2A, type 10) (type 7 w type 7. type 10) ] destination is case (transmission interface : read) module : Etype 2A, type 73 [(type 2A, type 2A, type 10), (type 7 , type 7, type 10) e destination is case (transmission interface I write) module : type 1 < # type 1, type 1, type 10) The type 18 data need in this case be a simple two state piece of data. It is the only source of variability in the behaviour of this module.
Whichever source is being indicated by the type 18 data, the type 1, type A and type 7 data fl ow unchanged through the component between the selected input and the output of the component. The unselected input indicates with itts type 7 data that no recording is being derived from it.
M-.4 DIgItal # Analog This module enables the production, for sensitization purposes, of amplifiable signals from digital signals utilizing the following interface features.
Inputs source is case (transmission interface I read) module : type 1 Outputs destination is ANALOG type ANALOG~signal destination is case (transmission interface : read) module : Ctype 2p' type 73 [UNDEFINED, NO~CURRENT~RECORDING]) The input type lA data is converted into its analog form and output. 11 other type 1 data is ignored.
The type 2A and type 7 data derive from internal constants.
M3 ) Write modules A write module processes information recieved from either a read module (3.1) or a transmission module (:3.2) and encodes it onto some medium in the required format for representation of the type of copyright work being produced.
For the secure distance production of copyright works this module requires a number of sut~modules with clearly defined interface behaviours ensuring the sub~modules to be verrifiable. They are Write head (11:3.1) Lock (11:3.2) and Key (M3.3). The behaviour and features of these sub modules shall be defined telow.
This module is only capable of creating art instance of a digital copyrightwork when containing a lock mechanism containing a key with capability to monitor the nature of the recording A key detector (M3.2.1) utilizing a physical presence detector possibly extended to a key emmission detector, is included in the lock (11:3.2) to detect the presence or absence of a key.
A loci: key enables the write sub~module (11:3.1) to perform its task. This enabling takes the form of a digital signal (type 2p') . The signal is derived from the current value of the copyright work code (type lB), and the latest value of other state description codes (type 5).
M.1 Write head This is sub~module checks the enable codes and transfers the copyright~work representation codes onto the medium holding the work. It posesses these features Inputs source I s lock: sub module : type 1, type 2A source is write monitor : type 9 Outputs destination is lock sub mole type 7 ( c= ('1 RECORDING' # n11, type 9) > destination is recording media type 1 ( # (type 1, type 2A)) destination is write monitor :: type 9 The sut~module processes type I input into type 2B data which is compare-d with type 2 data being received, permitting recording of type 1 data iff the comparison is favourable In all other circumstances recording is terminated under internal control Type 7 data is generated by an internal constant of bit width deperidant on the number of bits at each user level of the record ~history (type 10) . When reproduction of a copyrightable work is occurring the type 7 data Indicates such. gt other times the type 7 data indicates zero recording to be teing produced.
The last field of the type 1C data supplied to the key is Incremented before transference to the current outer node of the record tree. The type 10 data recorded on the medium has a zero final fIeld.
Lock lock of the following minimum nimum specifications is required in the system to interface with a replaceable key.
All data to arid from the key is processed by the lock.
Inputs : source is write module : type 7 source is case (transmission interface : read) module type 1 source is key type 1 type 24, type 7 source is key detector type 6 Outputs : destination is write module : (type 1, type 23 ( # [(type 1.key, type 6), (type 2A, type6)]) destination is case (transmission interface : read) module : (type 7, type 2A] ( # [(type 7.key, type 6), (type 2A, type6)]) destination is key: (type 1, type 73 s .= (type 1.case (transmission interface t read) module, type 6), (type 7.write module, type 6) 3 Type 6 data derives from a key detector integral to the lock.It's signal of key present is one necessary condition for any data to be transmitted by the lock.
Type 2A data is derived within the key arid is passed through the lock to both write head and read head, or a transmission # interface but only when the lock detects the physical presence of a key.
Type 1 arid type 7 data, iff a key is detected, is passed unprocessed through the lock.
Security could be tightened by increacing the complexity of type 6 data to include a more complex key detector 11:3.2.1 Key Detector Inputs : source is key : type 6# source Is physical detector BOOLEAN Outputs destination Is lock : BOOLEp'N -- local to lock. This would ------------------------------------ give lock an extra source -- source is key : -- which would derive from -- type 6* -- secure circuitry within ----------------------------------- the key and need to be compared according to some aloqrithm held in secure circuitry within the lock with data held in the lock within secure circuitry.Use of PLA's or circuitry compiled to silicon level for this level of security would increace the level of technology required to subvert key detection by a lock only if the specifications were not cliculated freely to interested manufacturers.
M:3.:3 Key The key is the module, external to read or write heads, generating data derived from copyright works which write heads need access to to continue producing a copyright work and read heads need access to, if they believe the process of generating a new instance of the copyright work is in progress, to continue reading.
The only connection of a key to a system is via a lock.
This is to enable the replacement and inspection of keys at inspection centers . Other conections are supplier for the purpose of such inspect ion arid have no effect o the process of creating art instance of the copyr wight work Inputs source is lock type 1, type 7 source is I inspection panel type 3, type 4 source is monitor panel = type 3 Outputs destination is lock :: [type 1, type 2A, type 7] ( # [(type 1, type 7, type 5) (type SAP type 7, type 5), (type 7 type 5)]) destination is case (inspection panel # monitor panel): type 5 ( # [( key~state, type 3)) The key stores type 5R data in a secure form where the only operation on count is INCREMENT arid a count may only be accessed after a [code,count] pair has beer initialized, It copies type 1 data unchanged from input to output ile ex tract irig a working copy from whIch to derive type 2A and type 5 data for output and recording purposes respectively.Type 7 data flows in the opposite logical direction to the type 1 data. All of these forms of data only flow if the type 7 and type 5 data indicate that recording Is recordable and that only 1 record rig is beig derived from the signal passing through the lock, although this last condition is not absolutely necessary.
Type 5A data derives from the type 1B data and the extant type 5A data. It is extractable for monitoring arid inspection purposes when the key is supplied with type 3 data.
Type 5B data is preset arid remains so until inspected, when it is permanently reset by type 4 data to prevent further use of the key.
If a more complex key detector was teing used, type 6* data would also be transmitted to the key detector section of the lock.
-- destination is key detector -- type 6* -- # infernal data M4 Write Control Monitor This module processes type 9 data to monitor and control a write head (M3.1) as described above and shown in figure 1.
M5 Read Control Monitor Similarly this module interfaces between an entity wishing to control and observe the production process arid a module within a system effecting that process. In this case an M5 so interfaces for an M1 by means of type E data M6 Transmission Control Monitor Similarly an M Interfaces for an 112.3 by means of type 10 data n M6 may also be similarly used with the transmission interface (M2) sub~module (M2.5) as described below. It is a higher level analog of the 112.3 sub~module.
Extension of the System The system described above represents an example of a genre of production systems. It operates on a simple type of object consisting of ore encapsulated description of a copyright work. Rs an example this could be expanded to control the production of composite sets of such encapsulated descriptions. If the initial description described mono or mono ~chrome an expand system could process multi~track or mul t i ~col our or i indeed mul t i ~track mul t i ~col our copyr i qht objects.
Type t data could be recorded on parallel tracks Standard 1 2 or 4 track~width modules would exist for all modules described above. There it possibly redundant data recorded for security that need not be transmitted track~width times (type 1B and 1C). Readers Could check to ensure this data is identical and filter the signal to one copy Whic ch production heads must regenerate at the production node Flexible heads arid head mori I tors are also required in this expanded system as are a new flexible type of transmission module and a associated monitor.
Flexible read and write monitors would need to be able to control with type S: and 9 data the contiguous or disjoint sets of tracks within the fixed array of tracks dependant on the capacity of the medium of the copyright work being accessed by the heads. The heads themselves would ensure the validity of the selected tracks n type of transmission module (112.5) instantiable with a wide range of input output track: widths and an associated monitor able to select sets of tracks from amongst the inputs of the module is required to connect the flexible heads to the standard it section of the system.This transmission module would impose identical conditions on the selected outputs as the read head, and similarly block transmission of incompatible select ions.
Type 2R and Type 7 security data flows through this system in a way consistant with the above description for the simpler version of the system.
Read arid write heads have been described as separate entities. While this is logically correct it need not be the only physical implementation of the description. It may Indeed be preferable to permit logical read and write operations simultaneously within different parts of the same physical recording medium. each operation occurring under the control of logical read and rite monitors logically behavinq as descr I bed above and connected through some Interface such as has been described.
Further information Time coristralnts are critical for the system. Type 1 data from the reader must be able to reach the key to be checked against it's type 5 data and if acceptable permit type 7 data to flow from the key to reach the reader before the read head must update the type 1C data. Either test codes and states must be assigned for the system or a test work should be available.
Security Evasion The simplest solution to the problem of breaching security is to physically short the security circuits out of the system. That is if a record head needs only the signal output from a read head, open the boxes arid take the signal from the read head directly to the write head.If however the control circuitry of a legal head is tightly held within it's body, arid microcircuitry, bearable only by disturbing a precision device, feeds the recording zone with a signal such subversion becomes impossible without a high degree of techn i cal support or the use of illicit Illegally marketed modul 25 compatible with specifications but sold siving no royalties to copyright holders.To discourage such activity, it could be possible to use PLA's arid coded identification pair numbers calculated using mil# tary style prime number techniques, enabling forgery detection on inspection It is futher preferable that the history tree increment event described with M3.1 occur within the key, making the condition described as 'not absolutely necessary' in the description of M3.3 highly relevant.
A simple subversion device would have to generate type 2A data and null type 7 data, and pass type 1 data unmodified to the record head however, both this and analog copies would spawn version with, identical type 1C data.
Recording the 1C data on keys is art expensive possibility.

Claims (8)

1 A production method adressing the need for integrated product ion arid product ion monitoring of objects covered by intellectual property rights.
2 R production method as claimed in Claim 1, wherein each type of object is associated with standard representation formats.
3A A production method as claimed in Claim 1 or Claim 2, wherein standard formats exist for the representation of information identifying the instantiation of each type of object.
4 A production method as claimed in Claim 1, Claim 2 or Claim 3, where in standard formats exist for the representation of information identifying the instantiation of the instantiation of each type of object.
5 n production method as claimed in Claim 1, Claim 2, Claim 3 or Claim 41 wherein each represetation of identification ' information is unique.
6 n product ion met hod as claimed In any preceding claim, wherein a a 1 licence is an Integrated part of the integrated product ion and production monitoring method
7 A production method as claimed In any preceding claims, wherein each tuple of types of identification and representation information is associated with a system for securely producing copies of an object under licence while monitoring and recording that production event.
8 A prodluction system as claimed in any preceding claim in which the user may only increment a count not initialize one, a function performed by an inspection center 21 A production system substantially as described herein with referance to FIgures 1 to S of the accompanying drawings
8 A production method as claimed In any preceding claims, wherein each tuple of type of identification and representation information is associated it a system for securely produc irig copies of an object from art abstract representation of that object under licence while mo ing and recording that production event 9 A production method as claimed In any preceding claim, wherein each production method is associated it a method of inspecting that part of the secure production system (the licence) which monitors, records and enables the licenced proliuction events 10 n production method as claimed in Claim 9, wherein each method of inspection takes no account of the producing entity.
11 p' production method as claimed in Claim 9, where in each method of inspection takes no account of the location at which production occurs 1.2 A production method as claimed in Claim 10 arid laim 11, whereIn both Claims are covered, sImultaneously or selectively.
13 A framework from which production methods as described in the preceding claims may be instantiated.
14 n specific instance of the type of production system describe In the preceding claims to produce or produce at a distance licenced copies of encapsulated mono, stereo or quadrophon i c copyright material.
1 R specific instance of the type of production system described # in Claim 1 through Claim 1.3 to produce or produce at a distance licence copies of manipulable multi track: sound recordings of copyright material.
16 A specific instance of the type of production system descr I bed in Claim 1 through Claim 13 to produce or produce at a distance licenced copies of encapsulated single track visual or audio visual copyright material.
17 n specific instance of the type of production system described in Claim 1 through Claim 13 to produce or produce at a distance licenced copies of manipulable multi~track visual or aio visual copyright material 1 A specific Instance of the prodllstion system claimed in Claim 1 through Claim 1:3 and claimed in instantiated form in Claim 14 through Claim 17, wherein the representation of the copyright material is in a digital form 1 A specific instance of the production system claimed in Claim 18, wherein some or all of the instantiation identification associated with the copyright material is in a digital form.
GB8710212A 1987-04-29 1987-04-29 Secure distance production method for objects covered by intellectual property rights Expired - Lifetime GB2204984B (en)

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GB8710212A GB2204984B (en) 1987-04-29 1987-04-29 Secure distance production method for objects covered by intellectual property rights

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Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GB8710212A GB2204984B (en) 1987-04-29 1987-04-29 Secure distance production method for objects covered by intellectual property rights

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GB8710212D0 GB8710212D0 (en) 1987-06-03
GB2204984A true GB2204984A (en) 1988-11-23
GB2204984B GB2204984B (en) 1992-01-02

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746 Register noted 'licences of right' (sect. 46/1977)
PCNP Patent ceased through non-payment of renewal fee

Effective date: 19960429