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EP2504740B1 - Security module for an automation device - Google Patents

Security module for an automation device Download PDF

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Publication number
EP2504740B1
EP2504740B1 EP20100824262 EP10824262A EP2504740B1 EP 2504740 B1 EP2504740 B1 EP 2504740B1 EP 20100824262 EP20100824262 EP 20100824262 EP 10824262 A EP10824262 A EP 10824262A EP 2504740 B1 EP2504740 B1 EP 2504740B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
safety
communication
input
critical
output
Prior art date
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Application number
EP20100824262
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German (de)
French (fr)
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EP2504740A2 (en
Inventor
Heinrich NEUPÄRTL
Gerd GLÖCKNER
Robert Bohn
Peter Erler
Michael Gölz
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ABB AG Germany
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ABB AG Germany
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    • GPHYSICS
    • G05CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05BCONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B19/00Programme-control systems
    • G05B19/02Programme-control systems electric
    • G05B19/04Programme control other than numerical control, i.e. in sequence controllers or logic controllers
    • G05B19/05Programmable logic controllers, e.g. simulating logic interconnections of signals according to ladder diagrams or function charts
    • G05B19/058Safety, monitoring
    • GPHYSICS
    • G05CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05BCONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B19/00Programme-control systems
    • G05B19/02Programme-control systems electric
    • G05B19/04Programme control other than numerical control, i.e. in sequence controllers or logic controllers
    • G05B19/042Programme control other than numerical control, i.e. in sequence controllers or logic controllers using digital processors
    • G05B19/0428Safety, monitoring
    • GPHYSICS
    • G05CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05BCONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B2219/00Program-control systems
    • G05B2219/10Plc systems
    • G05B2219/14Plc safety
    • G05B2219/14012Safety integrity level, safety integrated systems, SIL, SIS
    • GPHYSICS
    • G05CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05BCONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
    • G05B2219/00Program-control systems
    • G05B2219/10Plc systems
    • G05B2219/15Plc structure of the system
    • G05B2219/15078Modules, construction of system

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a security module for connection to an automation system or automation device, wherein the automation system is provided for controlling safety-critical and non-safety-critical processes and / or system components according to claim 1.
  • the safety module can be either an input safety module, an output safety module or an input and output safety module.
  • the input / output safety module according to the invention finds particular use in process automation or machine control.
  • the modules required for this purpose such as safety-related controllers and connected safe input / output modules, also referred to as I / O safety modules, are described, for example, in US Pat DE 10 2004061 013 A1 disclosed.
  • the input / output modules described therein have, in addition to control interfaces, additional means for monitoring the redundant field device connection modules integrated in the input / output modules, wherein the field device connection module is connected to the monitoring means by means of one of the control interfaces and the monitoring means communicates with a controller via further control interfaces.
  • the field device connection modules are designed, for example, as standard modules for acquiring process data.
  • the invention is accordingly an object of the invention to provide a safe input / output module, which is preferably used in modular automation systems for controlling safety-critical and non-safety-critical processes and / or plant components and avoids the aforementioned disadvantages.
  • the security module according to the invention hereinafter also referred to as an input / output security module or I / O security module, should be suitable for equipping an existing modular non-secure control system with an input / output security module in a simple and cost-effective manner.
  • the input / output safety module according to the invention is provided for connection to an automation device or automation system, which can be used to control safety-critical and non-safety-critical processes and / or system components.
  • the input / output safety module comprises a communication board whose processing unit can be connected to a central unit (CL) via an I / O bus slave and an external input / output bus connected to it not safety-critical process and / or non-safety-critical plant components is provided, as well as for safety-critical processes and / or safety-critical plant components.
  • CL central unit
  • an internal, preferably designed as a serial interface communication master is provided on the communication board, which is connected via at least one connectable first communication link and with secure processing units one or more boards with safety-related input / output circuits for safety-related functions, that at least one safety-related printed circuit board can exchange telegrams with the communication board.
  • field devices for safety-critical processes and / or plant components can be connected to the safety-related input / output circuits via a corresponding interface.
  • a synchronization connection is provided between the secure processing units for synchronization or for data synchronization with one another, as a result of which the secure processing units mutually monitor and synchronize.
  • the monitoring and synchronization mechanisms may be " PROFIsafe - Profile for Safety Technology on PROFIBUS DP and PROFINET IO Profile part, related to IEC 61784-3-3 Specification for PROFIBUS and PROFINET. Version 2.4, March, 2007, Order No: 3.192b or similar
  • the invention provides that safety-oriented telegrams to the processing unit of the communication board's means of at least one of the security processors located on the boards for the safety-related functions and the corresponding internal communication slave a second internal communication connection via the internal communication master are transferable. This ensures that only one of the safety processors sends the safety-related telegrams to the internal communication master of the communication board.
  • the second internal communication connection is designed such that the telegrams sent by the communication board can also be received via it.
  • the communication board carries out the safety-related communication via the external input / output bus master arranged on the central unit using a so-called black channel communication principle to the internal serial communication slaves of the printed circuit boards for the safety-related functions, hereinafter also referred to as Safety Control boards marked, from.
  • the communication board undertakes the task of forwarding the safety-related telegrams to an external input / output bus master arranged on a central unit by means of an integrated safety layer.
  • an I / O safety module such that existing Safety Control Board's are upgraded with the communication board described above and only the internal communication connections between the Safety Control Board's and the communication board are added ,
  • the I / O security module has a redundant internal 1002 (1 of 2) security architecture consisting of two security processors with corresponding units for communicating with each other.
  • the units for data exchange are preferably designed as dual port RAM.
  • the dual-port RAMs are designed so that simultaneous read and / or write accesses are possible at its two access sides, so that a simultaneous access for two otherwise separate systems is possible, working with shared data without the otherwise separate systems each other restrict access speed. This significantly increases the access time to the safety-related telegrams to be transmitted.
  • the I / O security module may also be constructed in a security structure different from the 1002 (1 of 2) architecture, such as a 1003 architecture, etc.
  • the security processor which can communicate directly with the communications board, is unable to detect a Cyclic Redundancy Checksum (CRC) - a method for determining a data check value to detect transmission or storage errors to determine) that is necessary to generate valid secure telegrams over an internal communication connection.
  • CRC Cyclic Redundancy Checksum
  • This CRC determination can only be performed by the redundant processor and communicated to the first processor. This ensures that both processors participate in valid telegrams. This is necessary to ensure the safety of the system in case of failure or malfunction of one of the two processors of the Safety Controller.
  • the input / output safety module with the, preferably two, redundant processing units for the safety-critical input and output circuits can be flexible according to the design of the safety-related input / output circuits on the Safety Control Board's as safe analog and / or digital I / O circuits be used for different functions, for example, for connection to analog and / or digital inputs and outputs of the field devices.
  • the input / output safety module can also be used in larger automation systems as a decentralized input and / or output device in such a decentralized, larger automation system, or in stand-alone automation devices as a locally connectable input / output device.
  • Another advantage of the security module according to the invention results from the fact that a, preferably modular, control system for non-safety-critical applications can be upgraded in a simple and cost-effective manner without extensive hardware expenditure for safety-critical applications.
  • Fig. 1 shows a modular control or automation system with a first control unit 1, which is provided for the control of non-safety-critical processes and / or non-safety critical system components, with attached modules of the central input / output units 11, 21, via a preferably designed as a backplane bus so-called external input / output bus IOB1 and an integrated in the first control unit input / output bus master 1a are each connected to the first control unit 1, and optionally with at least one designed as a field bus master coupler communication coupler module 5, 6th which controls the communication via the fieldbus FB with a plurality of fieldbus slaves 7, 8 and input / output units 71, 72, 81, 82 connected thereto.
  • a field bus master coupler communication coupler module 5 which controls the communication via the fieldbus FB with a plurality of fieldbus slaves 7, 8 and input / output units 71, 72, 81, 82 connected thereto.
  • bus master couplers 5, 6 are each connected to the first control unit 1 via an internal coupler bus, which is constructed similarly to the communication coupler 5, 6.
  • the safety controller 2 comprises at least two processors and a first interface, preferably designed as a dual-port RAM, wherein only one of the two processors is connected to the dual-port RAM.
  • the safety controller 2 communicates with the first control unit 1 via the dual-port RAM.
  • the input / output units comprise both safe units 21, 72, 82 with safety function and non-safe units 11, 71, 81 without safety function.
  • the first control unit 1 forms with the safety controller 2, a power supply unit and a display and / or operating unit a module for the central unit CL of a control or automation system.
  • Decentralized units 71, 72, 81, 82 are likewise connected to one another via a further input / output bus IOB2, IOB3, which is preferably designed as a backplane bus, the respective input / output bus IOB2, IOB3 being connected via a fieldbus slave 7, 8 integrated input / output bus master 1 b, 1 c are connected to the fieldbus.
  • the input / output units 11, 21, 71, 72, 81, 82 preferably three printed circuit boards LP1, LPS1, LPS2 are integrated, which exchange data with each other via at least one internal communication link IKB, IKB1, IKB2.
  • IKB internal communication link
  • IKB1 internal communication link
  • IKB2 internal communication link
  • at least one internal communication slave is provided on safety control boards, which can be connected to the internal communication connections.
  • the communication link IKB is used only in non-safety-related input / output units 11, 71, 81 for non-safety-related data transmission.
  • the safe units 21, 72, 82 comprise, in addition to the first circuit board LP1 for the non-safety-related communication, two further circuit boards LPS1, LPS2 for the safety-critical or safety-related functions.
  • the communication between the further printed circuit boards LPS1, LPS2 takes place by means of a synchronization connection IF2.
  • the security processors synchronize with each other.
  • the structure of the security processors and their operation are known from the relevant prior art.
  • the central unit CL like the input / output units 11, 21 and the communication couplers 5, 6, can be arranged on a differently expandable base plate by means of a module carrier, the input / output units 11, 21 directly to the central unit CL and the communication coupler 5, 6 can be coupled.
  • the baseplate also has a field bus connection for a standard fieldbus connection to the decentralized units 7, 8 and / or decentralized stations.
  • the base plate is snapped onto a DIN standard rail, wherein at least one of the input / output units 11, 21 can also be snapped onto the DIN rail and can be plugged together electrically and mechanically with the respective base plate.
  • modules of the central unit CL, the input / output units 11, 21 and the communication coupler 5, 6 are all electrically connected or connected to one another wirelessly via plug-in connections.
  • the central unit CL, the input / output units 11, 21 and the communication coupler 5, 6 are each detachably connected or connected to each other by means of plug and / or locking means.
  • Fig. 2 shows a detailed embodiment of the inventive I / O safety module in a 1002 architecture with two redundant Safety Control Board's LPS1, LPS2 and the communication within the security module and via the input / output bus IOB1 and the connectable I / O bus module.
  • Master 1 the safety Control Board's LPS1, LPS2 and the communication within the security module and via the input / output bus IOB1 and the connectable I / O bus module.
  • Master 1 shows a detailed embodiment of the inventive I / O safety module in a 1002 architecture with two redundant Safety Control Board's LPS1, LPS2 and the communication within the security module and via the input / output bus IOB1 and the connectable I / O bus module.
  • LPS1 Safety Control Board's
  • the input / output safety module comprises a first printed circuit board LP1 designed as a communication board for providing the non-safety-critical communication via an input / output bus slave 12 and the input / output bus IOB1, which is preferably connected as a backplane bus , with an internal communication master 10 and a connectable thereto, preferably designed as a serial interface, internal communication link IKB1, IKB2.
  • the input / output bus IOB1 is provided for the inventive I / O security module with the central unit CL as shown in FIG Fig. 1 via the integrated in the central unit input / output bus master to connect 1a.
  • the communication board LP1 Via the internal communication connection IKB1, IKB2, the communication board LP1 is connected to two printed circuit boards LPS1, LPS2 with safety-related input / output circuits for safety-related functions, which are also referred to as safety control boards.
  • Safety-related functions of the Safety Control Board are, for example, self-monitoring measures in the input / output safety module, such as comparison tests between the channels, self-tests, paus- ability tests but also monitoring for power failure, short circuit, overvoltage or overrange.
  • Safety Control Board's LPS1, LPS2, a safety-related application 25, 35 is executed, which is used to process safe signals in safe input / output units.
  • a synchronization connection IF2 is provided between the Safety Control Board's LPS1, LPS2.
  • Fig. 3 shows an exemplary hardware structure of the security module according to the invention based on a 1002 security structure.
  • the exemplary hardware structure of the security module shown here is based on a 1002 security structure with the first processing unit 14 arranged on the communication board LP1 and in each case on the safety control Board's LPS1, LPS2 arranged safety processors 24, 34, hereinafter referred to as the first safety processor 24, arranged on the first safety control board LPS1, and as a second safety processor 34, arranged on the second safety control board LPS2, are referred to.
  • the executed as security processors processing units 24, 34 are each assigned corresponding memory and clock.
  • the security processors 24, 34 are designed to monitor each other.
  • the processors 24, 35 synchronize with each other via the synchronization connection IF2.
  • the first safety processor 24 of the first safety control board LPS1 is connected to the communication board LP1 via a separate internal communication channel, also referred to as second internal communication link IKB2, in such a way that the communication Board LP1 can exchange the safety-related telegrams with the Safety Control Board's LPS1.
  • a monitoring unit 40 is provided, which is preferably arranged on the communication board and each with the arranged on the Safety Control Board's LPS1, LPS2 input / output circuits 23, 33 via the connections K1, K2 is connected to enable voltage monitoring in the input / output safety module.
  • the first security processor 24 of the first safety control board LPS1 is designed to transmit safety-related telegrams to the processing unit 14 of the communication board LP1 via the internal second communication link IKB2.
  • the security processor 24 which is capable of exchanging telegrams directly with the communication board LP1, is unable to perform a Cyclic Redundancy Checksum (CRC) Check value for data in order to be able to detect errors during transmission or storage), which is necessary for generating valid secure telegrams over an internal communication connection.
  • CRC Cyclic Redundancy Checksum
  • This CRC calculation can only be performed by the redundant processor 34 and communicated to the first processor 24 via internal connection IF2. This ensures that both processors participate in valid telegrams. This is necessary to ensure the safety of the system in case of failure or malfunction of one of the two processors of the Safety Controller.
  • Field devices for safety-critical processes and / or plant components can be connected to safety control boards LPS1, LPS2 by means of the mutually monitoring safe input / output circuits 23, 33 via an interface 50 and via the input / output bus.
  • Slave 12 and the connected external input and output bus IOB1, for example, the central unit (CL) can be connected.
  • Secure input and / or output channels with interface 50 are redundantly distributed on both secure circuit boards LPS1, LPS2 and processed by secure processing units 24, 34 by means of secure circuits 23, 33.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
  • Programmable Controllers (AREA)
  • Safety Devices In Control Systems (AREA)

Description

Die Erfindung betrifft ein Sicherheitsmodul zum Anschluss an ein Automatisierungssystem oder Automatisierungsgerät, wobei das Automatisierungssystem zum Steuern von sicherheitskritischen und nichtsicherheitskritischen Prozessen und/oder Anlagenkomponenten gemäß Anspruch 1 vorgesehen ist. Das Sicherheitsmodul kann sowohl ein Eingabe- Sicherheitsmodul, ein Ausgabe- Sicherheitsmodul oder auch ein Ein- und Ausgabe- Sicherheitsmodul sein. Das erfindungsgemäße Ein-/ Ausgabe-Sicherheitsmodul findet insbesondere Verwendung in der Prozessautomation oder Maschinensteuerung.The invention relates to a security module for connection to an automation system or automation device, wherein the automation system is provided for controlling safety-critical and non-safety-critical processes and / or system components according to claim 1. The safety module can be either an input safety module, an output safety module or an input and output safety module. The input / output safety module according to the invention finds particular use in process automation or machine control.

Für Automatisierungssysteme zur Steuerung eines technischen Prozesses oder einer technischen Anlage ist es oftmals erforderlich besondere sicherheitskritische Prozess- oder Anlagenkomponenten getrennt von nichtsicherheitskritischen Komponenten zu steuern. Die dazu erforderlichen Baugruppen, wie sicherheitsgerichtete Controller und daran angeschlossene sichere Ein-/ Ausgabemodule, auch als E-/A- Sicherheitsmodule bezeichnet, sind beispielsweise in der DE 10 2004061 013 A1 offenbart. Die dort beschriebenen Ein-/Ausgabebaugruppen weisen neben Steuerschnittstellen zusätzlich Mittel zur Überwachung der in den Ein-/Ausgabebaugruppen integrierten redundant ausgeführten Feldgeräteanschlussbaugruppen auf, wobei die Feldgeräteanschlussbaugruppe mittels einer der Steuerschnittstellen an das Überwachungsmittel angeschlossen ist und das Überwachungsmittel über weiteren Steuerschnittstellen mit einem Controller kommuniziert. Die Feldgeräteanschlussbaugruppen sind beispielsweise als Standard-Baugruppen zur Erfassung von Prozessdaten ausgeführt.For automation systems for controlling a technical process or a technical system, it is often necessary to control special safety-critical process or system components separately from non-safety-critical components. The modules required for this purpose, such as safety-related controllers and connected safe input / output modules, also referred to as I / O safety modules, are described, for example, in US Pat DE 10 2004061 013 A1 disclosed. The input / output modules described therein have, in addition to control interfaces, additional means for monitoring the redundant field device connection modules integrated in the input / output modules, wherein the field device connection module is connected to the monitoring means by means of one of the control interfaces and the monitoring means communicates with a controller via further control interfaces. The field device connection modules are designed, for example, as standard modules for acquiring process data.

Weitere sichere Ein-/ Ausgabemodule sind in der EP 1 703 346 A2 und US 7319 406 B2 beschrieben. Die dort gezeigten als Ein-/ Ausgabeeinheiten arbeitenden Sicherheitsmodule besitzen kein weiteres nichtsicherheitsgerichtetes Kommunikations-Board zur Übertragung von sicheren und nicht sicheren Daten von/zu einer Zentraleinheit. Hiermit fehlt in den vorab genannten Systemen eine einfache Möglichkeit eine Standard-Schnittstelle für sichere und nicht sichere Ein-/ Ausgabemodule zu definieren.Other safe input / output modules are in the EP 1 703 346 A2 and US 7319406 B2 described. The safety modules operating there as input / output units do not have another non-security communication board for transmitting secure and non-secure data to / from a central processing unit. Thus, in the aforementioned systems, there is no easy way to define a standard interface for safe and non-secure input / output modules.

Auch gestaltet es sich oftmals als schwierig, die sicherheitskritischen Funktionen von den nicht sicherheitskritischen Funktionen eindeutig zu trennen.Also, it often turns out to be difficult to unambiguously separate the safety-critical functions from the non-safety-critical functions.

Die vorab beschriebenen sicheren Ein-/ Ausgabemodule sind für einen Einsatz in modular aufgebauten Steuerungssystemen, wie sie beispielsweise in der DE 102004056363 A1 beschrieben sind, nicht geeignet bzw. nur mit einem zusätzlichen Hardware- und Entwicklungsaufwand in ein bestehendes modular aufgebautes Steuerungssystem integrierbar. Ein anderes Beispiel der genannten Art wird in der DE 103 30916 A1 beschrieben.The previously described safe input / output modules are suitable for use in modular control systems, as described, for example, in US Pat DE 102004056363 A1 are described, not suitable or only with an additional hardware and development effort in an existing modular control system integrated. Another example of the type mentioned is in the DE 103 30916 A1 described.

Der Erfindung liegt demgemäß die Aufgabe zugrunde, ein sicheres Ein- / Ausgabemodul anzugeben, welches vorzugsweise in modular aufgebauten Automatisierungssystemen zum Steuern von sicherheitskritischen und nichtsicherheitskritischen Prozessen und/oder Anlagenkomponenten einsetzbar ist und vorgenannte Nachteile vermeidet. Insbesondere soll das erfindungsgemäße Sicherheitsmodul, nachfolgend auch mit Ein-/ Ausgabe- Sicherheitsmodul oder E/A-Sicherheitsmodul bezeichnet, dafür geeignet sein, ein vorhandenes modular aufgebautes nicht sicheres Steuersystem mit einen Ein-/ Ausgabe- Sicherheitsmodul auf einfache und kostengünstige Weise auszustatten.The invention is accordingly an object of the invention to provide a safe input / output module, which is preferably used in modular automation systems for controlling safety-critical and non-safety-critical processes and / or plant components and avoids the aforementioned disadvantages. In particular, the security module according to the invention, hereinafter also referred to as an input / output security module or I / O security module, should be suitable for equipping an existing modular non-secure control system with an input / output security module in a simple and cost-effective manner.

Diese Aufgabe wird erfindungsgemäß durch ein Ein-/Ausgabe- Sicherheitsmodul der eingangs genannten Art mit den im Anspruch 1 angegebenen Merkmalen gelöst. Vorteilhafte Ausgestaltungen und Verbesserungen der erfindungsgemäßen Einrichtung sind in weiteren Ansprüchen und in der Beschreibung angegeben.This object is achieved by an input / output safety module of the type mentioned above with the features specified in claim 1. Advantageous embodiments and improvements of the device according to the invention are specified in further claims and in the description.

Das erfindungsgemäße Ein-/ Ausgabe- Sicherheitsmodul ist zum Anschluss an ein Automatisierungsgerät oder Automatisierungssystem vorgesehen, welches zum Steuern von sicherheitskritischen und nichtsicherheitskritischen Prozessen und/oder Anlagenkomponenten einsetzbar ist.The input / output safety module according to the invention is provided for connection to an automation device or automation system, which can be used to control safety-critical and non-safety-critical processes and / or system components.

Das Ein- /Ausgabe- Sicherheitsmodul umfasst ein Kommunikations- Board, dessen Verarbeitungseinheit über einen Ein/Ausgabe- Bus- Slave und einen daran angeschlossenen externen Ein-/ und Ausgabe- Bus an eine Zentraleinheit (CL) anschließbar ist, die für die Steuerung des nicht sicherheitskritischen Prozesses und/oder der nicht sicherheitskritischen Anlagenkomponenten vorgesehen ist, sowohl als auch für sicherheitskritischen Prozesse und/oder der sicherheitskritischen Anlagenkomponenten.The input / output safety module comprises a communication board whose processing unit can be connected to a central unit (CL) via an I / O bus slave and an external input / output bus connected to it not safety-critical process and / or non-safety-critical plant components is provided, as well as for safety-critical processes and / or safety-critical plant components.

Erfindungsgemäß ist auf dem Kommunikations- Board ein interner, vorzugsweise als serielle Schnittstelle ausgeführter, Kommunikations- Master vorgesehen, der über wenigstens eine daran anschließbare erste Kommunikationsverbindung und mit sicheren Verarbeitungseinheiten einer oder mehreren Leiterplatten mit sicherheitsgerichteten Ein-/Ausgabeschaltungen für sicherheitsgerichtete Funktionen so verbunden ist, dass wenigstens eine sicherheitsgerichtete Leiterplatte mit dem Kommunikations- Board Telegrammen austauschen kann.According to the invention an internal, preferably designed as a serial interface communication master is provided on the communication board, which is connected via at least one connectable first communication link and with secure processing units one or more boards with safety-related input / output circuits for safety-related functions, that at least one safety-related printed circuit board can exchange telegrams with the communication board.

An die sicherheitsgerichteten Ein-/ Ausgabeschaltungen sind weiterhin über eine entsprechende Schnittstelle Feldgeräte für sicherheitskritische Prozessen und/oder Anlagenkomponenten anschließbar.Furthermore, field devices for safety-critical processes and / or plant components can be connected to the safety-related input / output circuits via a corresponding interface.

Zwischen den sicheren Verarbeitungseinheiten ist zur Synchronisation bzw. zum Datenabgleich untereinander eine Synchronisationsverbindung vorgesehen, wodurch sich die sicheren Verarbeitungseinheiten gegenseitig überwachen und synchronisieren.A synchronization connection is provided between the secure processing units for synchronization or for data synchronization with one another, as a result of which the secure processing units mutually monitor and synchronize.

Die Überwachungs- und Synchronisationsmechanismen können beispielsweise nach " PROFlsafe - Profile for Safety Technology on PROFIBUS DP and PROFINET IO Profile part, related to IEC 61784-3-3 Specification for PROFIBUS and PROFINET. Version 2.4, March, 2007, Order No: 3.192b " oder ähnlich ausgeführt werdenFor example, the monitoring and synchronization mechanisms may be " PROFIsafe - Profile for Safety Technology on PROFIBUS DP and PROFINET IO Profile part, related to IEC 61784-3-3 Specification for PROFIBUS and PROFINET. Version 2.4, March, 2007, Order No: 3.192b or similar

Weiterhin ist erfindungsgemäß vorgesehen, dass nur über einen der auf den Leiterplatten für die sicherheitsgerichtete Funktionen befindlichen Sicherheitsprozessoren und den entsprechenden internen Kommunikations-Slave sicherheitsgerichtete Telegramme zur Verarbeitungseinheit des Kommunikations- Board's mittels wenigstens einer zweiten internen Kommunikationsverbindung über den internen Kommunikations- Master übertragbar sind. Dadurch ist sichergestellt, dass von den Sicherheitsprozessoren nur einer die sicherheitsgerichtete Telegramme zum internen Kommunikationsmaster des Kommunikations- Board sendet.Furthermore, the invention provides that safety-oriented telegrams to the processing unit of the communication board's means of at least one of the security processors located on the boards for the safety-related functions and the corresponding internal communication slave a second internal communication connection via the internal communication master are transferable. This ensures that only one of the safety processors sends the safety-related telegrams to the internal communication master of the communication board.

In einer Ausgestaltung des erfindungsgemäßen Ein-/ Ausgabe- Sicherheitsmodul ist die zweite interne Kommunikationsverbindung so ausgeführt, dass darüber auch die vom Kommunikations- Board gesendeten Telegramme empfangbar sind.In one embodiment of the input / output security module according to the invention, the second internal communication connection is designed such that the telegrams sent by the communication board can also be received via it.

In vorteilhafter Weise wickelt das Kommunikations- Board die sicherheitsgerichtete Kommunikation über den auf der Zentraleinheit angeordneten externen Ein-/ Ausgabe- Busmaster unter Nutzung eines sogenannten Black Channel Kommunikationsprinzips zu den internen seriellen Kommunikations- Slaves der Leiterplatten mit für die sicherheitsgerichtete Funktionen, im Folgenden auch als Safety Control Boards bezeichnet, ab.In an advantageous manner, the communication board carries out the safety-related communication via the external input / output bus master arranged on the central unit using a so-called black channel communication principle to the internal serial communication slaves of the printed circuit boards for the safety-related functions, hereinafter also referred to as Safety Control boards marked, from.

Das Kommunikations- Board übernimmt dabei für die sicherheitsgerichtete Kommunikation mit den Safety Control Board's die Aufgabe mittels eines integrierten Sicherheitslayers die sicherheitsgerichteten Telegramme an einen auf einer Zentraleinheit angeordneten externen Ein-/ Ausgabe- Busmaster weiterzuleiten.For safety-related communication with the Safety Control Board, the communication board undertakes the task of forwarding the safety-related telegrams to an external input / output bus master arranged on a central unit by means of an integrated safety layer.

Dazu wird das sogenannte "Black Channel Kommunikationsprinzips" verwendet, welches eine sichere Übertragung sicherheitsgerichteter Protokolle ermöglicht und beispielsweise aus " PROFlsafe - Profile for Safety Technology on PROFIBUS DP and PROFINET IO Profile part, related to IEC 61784-3-3 Specification for PROFIBUS and PROFINET. Version 2.4, March, 2007, Order No: 3.192b " bekannt ist.For this purpose, the so-called "black channel communication principle" is used, which enables a secure transmission of safety-related protocols and, for example, " PROFIsafe - Profile for Safety Technology on PROFIBUS DP and PROFINET IO Profile part, related to IEC 61784-3-3 Specification for PROFIBUS and PROFINET. Version 2.4, March, 2007, Order No: 3.192b "is known.

Durch die Trennung in Kommunikations- Board und Sicherheitsbaugruppen wird in vorteilhafter Weise erreicht, dass die sicherheitsgerichtete Teile in Ein-/Ausgabe- Sicherheitsmodule strikt von der nicht sicherheitskritischen Kommunikation getrennt sind. Hiermit reduziert sich deutlich der Entwicklungsaufwand neuer EIA- Sicherheitsmodule und die sicherheitskritischen Funktionen von den nicht sicherheitskritischen Funktionen strikter getrennt werden können.Due to the separation in communication board and safety modules is achieved in an advantageous manner that the safety-related parts in input / output safety modules are strictly separated from the non-safety-critical communication. This significantly reduces the development effort of new EIA security modules and the safety-critical functions of the non-safety-critical functions can be separated more strictly.

In einer anderen vorteilhaften Ausgestaltung ist vorgesehen, ein E-/A- Sicherheitsmodul dahingehend aufzubauen, dass vorhandene Safety Control Board's mit dem vorab beschriebenen Kommunikations- Board aufgerüstet werden und nur noch die internen Kommunikationsverbindungen zwischen den Safety Control Board's und dem Kommunikations- Board hinzugefügt werden.In another advantageous embodiment, it is provided to construct an I / O safety module such that existing Safety Control Board's are upgraded with the communication board described above and only the internal communication connections between the Safety Control Board's and the communication board are added ,

In einer bevorzugten Ausführungsform weist das E/A- Sicherheitsmodul eine redundante interne 1002 (1 von 2)- Sicherheitsarchitektur, bestehend aus zwei Sicherheitsprozessoren mit entsprechenden Einheiten zum Datenaustausch untereinander auf. Um eine schnelle Synchronisierung und/oder Überwachung zwischen den Sicherheitsprozessoren zu ermöglichen, sind die Einheiten zum Datenaustausch vorzugsweise als Dual Port RAM ausgeführt. Die Dual-Port RAM's sind so ausgeführt, dass an seinen beiden Zugriffsseiten gleichzeitige Lese- und/oder Schreibzugriffe möglich sind, so dass ein gleichzeitiger Zugriff für zwei ansonsten getrennte Systeme möglich ist, die mit gemeinsamen Daten arbeiten ohne dass sich die ansonsten getrennten Systeme gegenseitig in der Zugriffsgeschwindigkeit einzuschränken. Dadurch wird die Zugriffszeit auf die zu übertragenen sicherheitsgerichteten Telegramme deutlich erhöht.In a preferred embodiment, the I / O security module has a redundant internal 1002 (1 of 2) security architecture consisting of two security processors with corresponding units for communicating with each other. In order to enable fast synchronization and / or monitoring between the security processors, the units for data exchange are preferably designed as dual port RAM. The dual-port RAMs are designed so that simultaneous read and / or write accesses are possible at its two access sides, so that a simultaneous access for two otherwise separate systems is possible, working with shared data without the otherwise separate systems each other restrict access speed. This significantly increases the access time to the safety-related telegrams to be transmitted.

Das Ein-/Ausgabe- Sicherheitsmodul kann aber auch in einer von der 1002 (1von 2)-Architektur verschiedenen Sicherheitsstruktur, beispielsweise als eine 1003- Architektur etc, aufgebaut sein. In der beschriebenen 1002- Architektur ist der Sicherheitsprozessor, der sich direkt mit dem Kommunikations- Board Telegramme austauschen kann, nicht in der Lage ein Cyclic Redundancy Checksum (CRC - ein Verfahren zur Bestimmung eines Prüfwerts für Daten, um Fehler bei der Übertragung oder Speicherung erkennen zu können) zu ermitteln, das zum Generieren von gültigen sicheren Telegramme über einer interne Kommunikationsverbindung notwendig ist. Diese CRC- Ermittlung kann nur von dem redundanten Prozessor durchgeführt und zum ersten Prozessor mitgeteilt werden. Hiermit wird sichergestellt, dass beide Prozessoren an gültigen Telegrammen mitwirken. Dies ist erforderlich, um die Sicherheit des Systems beim Ausfall oder fehlerhafter Funktionsweise eines der beiden Prozessoren des Safety Controllers zu gewährleisten.However, the I / O security module may also be constructed in a security structure different from the 1002 (1 of 2) architecture, such as a 1003 architecture, etc. In the described 1002 architecture, the security processor, which can communicate directly with the communications board, is unable to detect a Cyclic Redundancy Checksum (CRC) - a method for determining a data check value to detect transmission or storage errors to determine) that is necessary to generate valid secure telegrams over an internal communication connection. This CRC determination can only be performed by the redundant processor and communicated to the first processor. This ensures that both processors participate in valid telegrams. This is necessary to ensure the safety of the system in case of failure or malfunction of one of the two processors of the Safety Controller.

Das Ein-/Ausgabe- Sicherheitsmodul mit den, vorzugsweise zwei, redundanten Verarbeitungseinheiten für die sicherheitskritischen Ein- und Ausgangsschaltungen kann entsprechend der Ausführung der sicherheitsgerichteten Ein-/Ausgabeschaltungen auf den Safety Control Board's als sichere analoge und/oder digitale E-/A Schaltungen flexibel für unterschiedliche Funktionen eingesetzt werden, beispielsweise zur Verbindung mit analogen und/oder digitalen Ein- und Ausgängen der Feldgeräte.The input / output safety module with the, preferably two, redundant processing units for the safety-critical input and output circuits can be flexible according to the design of the safety-related input / output circuits on the Safety Control Board's as safe analog and / or digital I / O circuits be used for different functions, for example, for connection to analog and / or digital inputs and outputs of the field devices.

Auch ist das Ein-/Ausgabe- Sicherheitsmodul in größeren Automatisierungssystemen, als dezentrales Ein- und/oder Ausgabegerät in einem solchen dezentralisierten größeren Automatisierungssystem, oder in Stand-alone Automatisierungsgeräten als lokal ankoppelbares Ein-/Ausgabegerät einsetzbar.The input / output safety module can also be used in larger automation systems as a decentralized input and / or output device in such a decentralized, larger automation system, or in stand-alone automation devices as a locally connectable input / output device.

Ein weiterer Vorteil des erfindungsgemäßen Sicherheitsmoduls ergibt sich daraus, dass ein, vorzugsweise modular aufgebautes, Steuersystem für nicht sicherheitskritische Anwendungen in einfacher und kostengünstiger Weise ohne umfangreichen Hardwareaufwand auch für sicherheitskritische Anwendungen ertüchtigt werden kann.Another advantage of the security module according to the invention results from the fact that a, preferably modular, control system for non-safety-critical applications can be upgraded in a simple and cost-effective manner without extensive hardware expenditure for safety-critical applications.

Anhand der in der folgenden Figuren dargestellten Ausführungsbeispielen sollen die Erfindung sowie vorteilhafte Ausgestaltungen und Verbesserungen der Erfindung näher erläutert und beschrieben werden.Reference to the embodiments illustrated in the following figures, the invention and advantageous refinements and improvements of the invention will be explained and described in detail.

Es zeigen:

Fig. 1
eine beispielhafte Ausführungsform eines modular aufgebauten Steuerungssystems für die Steuerung sicherheitsgerichteter und nichtsicherheitsgerichteter Prozesse mit den erfindungsgemäßen Sicherheitsmodulen,
Fig. 2
eine detaillierte Ausführungsform des erfindungsgemäßen Sicherheitsmoduls in einer 1002 Architektur und die Kommunikation innerhalb des Sicherheitsmoduls und über den externen Ein-/Ausgabebus zur Zentraleinheit und/oder über die Buskoppler zu weiteren dezentralen Einheiten, und
Fig. 3
eine beispielhafte Hardwarestruktur des Sicherheitsmoduls basierend auf einer 1002 Sicherheitsstruktur.
Show it:
Fig. 1
an exemplary embodiment of a modular control system for the control of safety-related and non-safety-oriented processes with the safety modules according to the invention,
Fig. 2
a detailed embodiment of the security module according to the invention in a 1002 architecture and communication within the security module and via the external input / output bus to the central unit and / or via the bus coupler to other decentralized units, and
Fig. 3
an exemplary hardware structure of the security module based on a 1002 security structure.

Fig. 1 zeigt ein modular aufgebautes Steuer- bzw. Automatisierungssystem mit einer eine ersten Steuereinheit 1, die für die Steuerung von nicht sicherheitskritischen Prozessen und/oder nicht sicherheitskritischen Anlagenkomponenten vorgesehen ist, mit daran angeschlossenen Modulen der zentralen Eingabe-/ Ausgabeeinheiten 11, 21, die über einen vorzugsweise als Rückwandbus ausgeführten sogenannten externen Ein- /Ausgabebus IOB1 und einen in der ersten Steuereinheit integrierten Ein-/Ausgabe- Bus- Master 1a jeweils mit der ersten Steuereinheit 1 verbunden sind, und optional mit wenigstens einem als Feldbus-Masterkoppler ausgeführtem Kommunikationskopplermodul 5, 6, welches die Kommunikation über den Feldbus FB mit einer Vielzahl von Feldbus-Slaves 7, 8 und daran angeschlossenen Eingabe-/ Ausgabeeinheiten 71, 72, 81, 82 steuert. Fig. 1 shows a modular control or automation system with a first control unit 1, which is provided for the control of non-safety-critical processes and / or non-safety critical system components, with attached modules of the central input / output units 11, 21, via a preferably designed as a backplane bus so-called external input / output bus IOB1 and an integrated in the first control unit input / output bus master 1a are each connected to the first control unit 1, and optionally with at least one designed as a field bus master coupler communication coupler module 5, 6th which controls the communication via the fieldbus FB with a plurality of fieldbus slaves 7, 8 and input / output units 71, 72, 81, 82 connected thereto.

Die Bus- Masterkoppler 5, 6 sind beispielsweise jeweils über einen internen Kopplerbus, der gleichartig zum Kommunikationskoppler 5, 6 aufgebaut ist, mit der ersten Steuereinheit 1 verbunden.For example, the bus master couplers 5, 6 are each connected to the first control unit 1 via an internal coupler bus, which is constructed similarly to the communication coupler 5, 6.

Weiterhin ist wenigstens eine zweite Steuereinheit 2, nachfolgend auch als Safety Controller bezeichnet, für die Steuerung von sicherheitskritischen und/oder sicherheitskritischen Anlagenkomponenten vorgesehen. Der Safety Controller 2 umfasst zur Bereitstellung der sicherheitsgerichteten Funktionen wenigstens zwei Prozessoren und eine erste, vorzugsweise als Dual-Port RAM ausgeführte Schnittstelle, wobei nur einer der beiden Prozessoren mit dem Dual-Port RAM verbunden ist. Der Safety Controller 2 kommuniziert über den Dual-Port RAM mit der ersten Steuereinheit 1.Furthermore, at least one second control unit 2, also referred to below as a safety controller, is provided for the control of safety-critical and / or safety-critical system components. To provide the safety-related functions, the safety controller 2 comprises at least two processors and a first interface, preferably designed as a dual-port RAM, wherein only one of the two processors is connected to the dual-port RAM. The safety controller 2 communicates with the first control unit 1 via the dual-port RAM.

Die Ein-/ Ausgabeeinheiten umfassen sowohl sichere Einheiten 21, 72, 82 mit Sicherheitsfunktion als auch nicht sichere Einheiten 11, 71, 81 ohne Sicherheitsfunktion.The input / output units comprise both safe units 21, 72, 82 with safety function and non-safe units 11, 71, 81 without safety function.

Die erste Steuereinheit 1 bildet mit dem Safety Controller 2, einer Spannungsversorgungseinheit und einer Anzeige- und/oder Bedieneinheit ein Modul für die Zentraleinheit CL eines Steuerungs- bzw. Automatisierungssystems.The first control unit 1 forms with the safety controller 2, a power supply unit and a display and / or operating unit a module for the central unit CL of a control or automation system.

Sowohl die direkt mit dem Modul für die Zentraleinheit CL verbundenen Module der sogenannten zentralen Eingabe-/ Ausgabeeinheiten 11, 21 als auch die Module der dezentralen Einheiten 71, 72, 81, 82 können, wie vorab schon ausgeführt, entsprechend ihrer Funktion sowohl als sicherheitsgerichtete als auch nicht sicherheitsgerichtete Geräte ausgeführt sein.Both the module directly connected to the module for the central unit CL of the so-called central input / output units 11, 21 and the modules of the decentralized units 71, 72, 81, 82, as already stated, according to their function both as safety-oriented as also not safety-related devices be executed.

Die in der Fig. 1 dargestellten dezentralen Einheiten 71, 72, 81, 82 sind ebenfalls jeweils über einen weiteren, vorzugsweise als Rückwandbus ausgeführten Ein-/Ausgabebus IOB2, IOB3 miteinander verbunden, wobei der jeweilige Ein-/Ausgabebus IOB2, IOB3 über ein im Feldbus- Slave 7, 8 integrierten Ein-/ Ausgabe-Bus- Master 1 b, 1 c an den Feldbus angeschlossen sind.The in the Fig. 1 Decentralized units 71, 72, 81, 82 are likewise connected to one another via a further input / output bus IOB2, IOB3, which is preferably designed as a backplane bus, the respective input / output bus IOB2, IOB3 being connected via a fieldbus slave 7, 8 integrated input / output bus master 1 b, 1 c are connected to the fieldbus.

In den Eingabe-/ Ausgabeeinheiten 11, 21, 71, 72, 81, 82 sind vorzugsweise jeweils drei Leiterplatten LP1, LPS1, LPS2 integriert, welche über wenigstens eine interne Kommunikationsverbindung IKB, IKB1, IKB2 miteinander Daten austauschen. Dabei werden über die erste Kommunikationsverbindung IKB1 nur Daten zu den Safety Control Board's gesendet. Über die zweite Kommunikationsverbindung IKB2 können Daten von und zu den Safety Control Board's gesendet werden. Dazu ist auf Safety Control Board's jeweils wenigstens ein interner Kommunikations-Slave vorgesehen, der mit den internen Kommunikationsverbindungen verbindbar ist. Die Kommunikationsverbindung IKB wird nur in nicht sicherheitsgerichteten Eingabe-/ Ausgabeeinheiten 11, 71, 81 für nicht sicherheitsgerichtete Datenübertragung verwendet.In the input / output units 11, 21, 71, 72, 81, 82 preferably three printed circuit boards LP1, LPS1, LPS2 are integrated, which exchange data with each other via at least one internal communication link IKB, IKB1, IKB2. In this case, only data is sent to the Safety Control Board's via the first communication link IKB1. Data can be sent to and from the Safety Control Board via the second communication link IKB2. For this purpose, at least one internal communication slave is provided on safety control boards, which can be connected to the internal communication connections. The communication link IKB is used only in non-safety-related input / output units 11, 71, 81 for non-safety-related data transmission.

Die elektrische und/oder mechanische Ausführung der Ein-/ Ausgabegeräte kann beispielsweise dem in der DE 10 2008 058 090 beschriebenen Aufbau der Ein-/ Ausgabemodule entsprechen.The electrical and / or mechanical design of the input / output devices, for example, in the DE 10 2008 058 090 described structure of the input / output modules correspond.

Basierend auf einer bevorzugten 1002 Architektur des in der Figur 1 gezeigten Steuerungssystems umfassen die sicheren Einheiten 21, 72, 82 neben der ersten Leiterplatte LP1 für die nichtsicherheitsgerichtete Kommunikation zwei weitere Leiterplatten LPS1, LPS2 für die sicherheitskritischen bzw. sicherheitsgerichteten Funktionen. Die Kommunikation zwischen den weiteren Leiterplatten LPS1, LPS2 erfolgt mittels einer Synchronisationsverbindung IF2. Dazu sind auf den weiteren Leiterplatten LPS1, LPS2 wenigstens zwei, als Sicherheitsprozessoren ausgeführte, Verarbeitungseinheiten mit zugeordneten Speichern und Taktgebern vorgesehen. Die Sicherheitsprozessoren synchronisieren sich untereinander. Der Aufbau der Sicherheitsprozessoren und ihre Funktionsweise sind aus dem einschlägigen Stand der Technik bekannt.Based on a preferred 1002 architecture of the FIG. 1 In the control system shown, the safe units 21, 72, 82 comprise, in addition to the first circuit board LP1 for the non-safety-related communication, two further circuit boards LPS1, LPS2 for the safety-critical or safety-related functions. The communication between the further printed circuit boards LPS1, LPS2 takes place by means of a synchronization connection IF2. These are on the other circuit boards LPS1, LPS2 at least two, designed as security processors, processing units provided with associated memories and clocks. The security processors synchronize with each other. The structure of the security processors and their operation are known from the relevant prior art.

Die Zentraleinheit CL kann, wie auch die Eingabe-/ Ausgabeeinheiten 11, 21 und die Kommunikationskoppler 5, 6, mittels eines Modulträgers auf einer unterschiedlich ausbaufähigen Grundplatte angeordnet sein, wobei die Eingabe-/ Ausgabeeinheiten 11, 21 direkt an die Zentraleinheit CL und den Kommunikationskoppler 5, 6 ankoppelbar sind. Die Grundplatte weist weiterhin einen Feldbusanschluss für eine Standard-Feldbusverbindung zu den dezentralen Einheiten 7, 8 und/oder dezentralen Stationen auf.The central unit CL, like the input / output units 11, 21 and the communication couplers 5, 6, can be arranged on a differently expandable base plate by means of a module carrier, the input / output units 11, 21 directly to the central unit CL and the communication coupler 5, 6 can be coupled. The baseplate also has a field bus connection for a standard fieldbus connection to the decentralized units 7, 8 and / or decentralized stations.

In einer besonderen Ausgestaltung ist die Grundplatte auf eine Norm- Hutschiene aufgeschnappt, wobei wenigstens eine der Eingabe-/ Ausgabeeinheiten 11, 21 ebenfalls auf die Hutschiene aufschnappbar und mit der jeweiligen Grundplatte elektrisch und mechanisch zusammensteckbar ist.In a particular embodiment, the base plate is snapped onto a DIN standard rail, wherein at least one of the input / output units 11, 21 can also be snapped onto the DIN rail and can be plugged together electrically and mechanically with the respective base plate.

Vorteilhaft erweist sich weiterhin, dass Module der Zentraleinheit CL, der Eingabe-/ Ausgabeeinheiten 11, 21 und der Kommunikationskoppler 5, 6 alle untereinander kabellos über Steckverbindungen elektrisch verbindbar oder verbunden sind. Vorzugsweise sind die Zentraleinheit CL, die Eingabe-/ Ausgabeeinheiten 11, 21 und die Kommunikationskoppler 5, 6 jeweils mittels Steck- und/oder Rastmitteln lösbar miteinander verbindbar oder verbunden.It also proves advantageous that modules of the central unit CL, the input / output units 11, 21 and the communication coupler 5, 6 are all electrically connected or connected to one another wirelessly via plug-in connections. Preferably, the central unit CL, the input / output units 11, 21 and the communication coupler 5, 6 are each detachably connected or connected to each other by means of plug and / or locking means.

Fig. 2 zeigt eine detaillierte Ausführungsform des erfindungsgemäßen E-/A- Sicherheitsmoduls in einer 1002 Architektur mit zwei redundanten Safety Control Board's LPS1, LPS2 sowie die Kommunikation innerhalb des Sicherheitsmoduls und über den Ein-/Ausgabebus IOB1 und den daran anschließbaren Ein-/Ausgabe- Bus- Master 1. Fig. 2 shows a detailed embodiment of the inventive I / O safety module in a 1002 architecture with two redundant Safety Control Board's LPS1, LPS2 and the communication within the security module and via the input / output bus IOB1 and the connectable I / O bus module. Master 1.

Das Ein-/Ausgabe- Sicherheitsmodul umfasst eine als Kommunikations- Board ausgeführte erste Leiterplatte LP1 für Bereitstellung der nicht sicherheitskritischen Kommunikation über einen Ein/Ausgabe- Bus- Slave 12 und den daran anschließbaren, vorzugsweise als Rückwandbus ausgeführten Ein-/ und Ausgabe- Bus IOB1, mit einem internen Kommunikations- Master 10 und eine daran anschließbare, vorzugsweise als serielle Schnittstelle ausgeführte, interne Kommunikationsverbindung IKB1, IKB2.The input / output safety module comprises a first printed circuit board LP1 designed as a communication board for providing the non-safety-critical communication via an input / output bus slave 12 and the input / output bus IOB1, which is preferably connected as a backplane bus , with an internal communication master 10 and a connectable thereto, preferably designed as a serial interface, internal communication link IKB1, IKB2.

Der Ein-/ und Ausgabe- Bus IOB1 ist dafür vorgesehen, das erfindungsgemäße E-/A Sicherheitsmodul mit der Zentraleinheit CL gemäß der Darstellung in Fig. 1 über den in der Zentraleinheit integrierten Ein-/Ausgabe- Bus- Master 1a zu verbinden.The input / output bus IOB1 is provided for the inventive I / O security module with the central unit CL as shown in FIG Fig. 1 via the integrated in the central unit input / output bus master to connect 1a.

Über die interne Kommunikationsverbindung IKB1, IKB2 ist das Kommunikations-Board LP1 mit zwei Leiterplatten LPS1, LPS2 mit sicherheitsgerichteten Ein-/Ausgabeschaltungen für sicherheitsgerichtete Funktionen verbunden, die auch als Safety Control Board's bezeichnet werden. Sicherheitsgerichteten Funktionen der Safety Control Board's sind beispielsweise Selbstüberwachungsmaßnahmen im Ein-/Ausgabe- Sicherheitsmodul, wie Vergleichstests zwischen den Kanälen, Selbsttests, Pausibilitätstests aber auch eine Überwachung auf Spannungsausfall, Kurzschluss, Überspannung oder Bereichsüberschreitung.Via the internal communication connection IKB1, IKB2, the communication board LP1 is connected to two printed circuit boards LPS1, LPS2 with safety-related input / output circuits for safety-related functions, which are also referred to as safety control boards. Safety-related functions of the Safety Control Board are, for example, self-monitoring measures in the input / output safety module, such as comparison tests between the channels, self-tests, paus- ability tests but also monitoring for power failure, short circuit, overvoltage or overrange.

Auf den Safety Control Board's LPS1, LPS2 wird eine sicherheitsgerichtete Applikation 25, 35 ausgeführt, die zur Verarbeitung von sicheren Signalen in sicheren Eingabe-/ Ausgabeeinheiten dient.On the Safety Control Board's LPS1, LPS2, a safety-related application 25, 35 is executed, which is used to process safe signals in safe input / output units.

Für den Datenaustausch bzw. die Synchronisation ist zwischen den Safety Control Board's LPS1, LPS2 eine Synchronisationsverbindung IF2 vorgesehen.For the data exchange or the synchronization, a synchronization connection IF2 is provided between the Safety Control Board's LPS1, LPS2.

Fig. 3 zeigt eine beispielhafte Hardwarestruktur des erfindungsgemäßen Sicherheitsmoduls basierend auf einer 1002 Sicherheitsstruktur. Fig. 3 shows an exemplary hardware structure of the security module according to the invention based on a 1002 security structure.

Die hier dargestellte beispielhafte Hardwarestruktur des Sicherheitsmoduls basiert auf einer 1002 Sicherheitsstruktur mit der ersten auf dem Kommunikationsbord LP1 angeordneten Verarbeitungseinheit 14 und den jeweils auf den Safety Control Board's LPS1, LPS2 angeordneten Sicherheitsprozessoren 24, 34, die nachfolgend als erster Sicherheitsprozessor 24, angeordnet auf dem ersten Safety Control Board LPS1, und als zweiter Sicherheitsprozessor 34, angeordnet auf dem zweiten Safety Control Board LPS2, bezeichnet werden.The exemplary hardware structure of the security module shown here is based on a 1002 security structure with the first processing unit 14 arranged on the communication board LP1 and in each case on the safety control Board's LPS1, LPS2 arranged safety processors 24, 34, hereinafter referred to as the first safety processor 24, arranged on the first safety control board LPS1, and as a second safety processor 34, arranged on the second safety control board LPS2, are referred to.

Den als Sicherheitsprozessoren ausgeführten Verarbeitungseinheiten 24, 34 sind jeweils entsprechende Speicher und Taktgeber zugeordnet. Die Sicherheitsprozessoren 24, 34 sind so ausgeführt, dass sie sich gegenseitig überwachen. Dazu synchronisieren sich die Prozessoren 24, 35 untereinander über die Synchronisationsverbindung IF2.The executed as security processors processing units 24, 34 are each assigned corresponding memory and clock. The security processors 24, 34 are designed to monitor each other. For this purpose, the processors 24, 35 synchronize with each other via the synchronization connection IF2.

Einer der beiden Sicherheitsprozessoren 24, 34, im gezeigtem Beispiel der erste Sicherheitsprozessor 24 des ersten Safety Control Board's LPS1, ist über einen separate internen Kommunikationskanal, auch als zweite interne Kommunikationsverbindung IKB2 bezeichnet, mit dem Kommunikations- Board LP1 so verbunden, dass das Kommunikations- Board LP1 die sicherheitsgerichteten Telegramme mit dem Safety Control Board's LPS1 austauschen kann.One of the two security processors 24, 34, in the example shown, the first safety processor 24 of the first safety control board LPS1, is connected to the communication board LP1 via a separate internal communication channel, also referred to as second internal communication link IKB2, in such a way that the communication Board LP1 can exchange the safety-related telegrams with the Safety Control Board's LPS1.

Zur Spannungsüberwachung, beispielsweise auf Überspannung oder Spannungsausfall, ist eine Überwachungseinheit 40 vorgesehen, die vorzugsweise auf dem Kommunikations- Board angeordnet ist und jeweils mit den auf den Safety Control Board's LPS1, LPS2 angeordneten Ein-/Ausgangsschaltungen 23, 33 über die Verbindungen K1, K2 verbunden ist, um so die Spannungsüberwachung im Ein/Ausgabe- Sicherheitsmodul zu ermöglichen.For voltage monitoring, for example, to overvoltage or power failure, a monitoring unit 40 is provided, which is preferably arranged on the communication board and each with the arranged on the Safety Control Board's LPS1, LPS2 input / output circuits 23, 33 via the connections K1, K2 is connected to enable voltage monitoring in the input / output safety module.

Durch die redundante Anordnung der Sicherheitsprozessoren 24, 34 ist im vorliegendem Ausführungsbeispiel nur der erste Sicherheitsprozessor 24 des ersten Safety Control Board's LPS1 dafür ausgeführt, sicherheitsgerichtete Telegramme zur Verarbeitungseinheit 14 des Kommunikationsbordes LP1 über die interne zweite Kommunikationsverbindung IKB2 zu übertragen.As a result of the redundant arrangement of the security processors 24, 34, in the present exemplary embodiment only the first security processor 24 of the first safety control board LPS1 is designed to transmit safety-related telegrams to the processing unit 14 of the communication board LP1 via the internal second communication link IKB2.

In der beschriebenen 1002- Architektur ist der Sicherheitsprozessor 24, der direkt mit dem Kommunikations- Board LP1 Telegramme austauschen kann, nicht in der Lage ein Cyclic Redundancy Checksum (CRC - ein Verfahren zur Bestimmung eines Prüfwerts für Daten, um Fehler bei der Übertragung oder Speicherung erkennen zu können) zu berechnen, das zum Generieren von gültigen sicheren Telegramme über einer interne Kommunikationsverbindung notwendig ist. Diese CRC-Berechnung kann nur von dem redundanten Prozessor 34 durchgeführt und zum ersten Prozessor 24 über interne Verbindung IF2 mitgeteilt werden. Hiermit wird sichergestellt, dass beide Prozessoren an gültigen Telegrammen mitwirken. Dies ist erforderlich, um die Sicherheit des Systems beim Ausfall oder fehlerhafter Funktionsweise eines der beiden Prozessoren des Safety Controllers zu gewährleisten.In the described 1002 architecture, the security processor 24, which is capable of exchanging telegrams directly with the communication board LP1, is unable to perform a Cyclic Redundancy Checksum (CRC) Check value for data in order to be able to detect errors during transmission or storage), which is necessary for generating valid secure telegrams over an internal communication connection. This CRC calculation can only be performed by the redundant processor 34 and communicated to the first processor 24 via internal connection IF2. This ensures that both processors participate in valid telegrams. This is necessary to ensure the safety of the system in case of failure or malfunction of one of the two processors of the Safety Controller.

An Safety Control Board's LPS1, LPS2 sind Feldgeräte für sicherheitskritische Prozessen und/oder Anlagenkomponenten, auch als sicherheitsgerichtete Feldgeräte bezeichnet, mittels der sich gegenseitig überwachenden sicheren Ein-/Ausgabeschaltungen 23, 33 über eine Schnittstelle 50 anschließbar und über den Ein/Ausgabe- Bus- Slave 12 und den daran angeschlossenen externen Ein-/ und Ausgabe- Bus IOB1 ist beispielsweise die Zentraleinheit (CL) anschließbar.Field devices for safety-critical processes and / or plant components, also referred to as safety-related field devices, can be connected to safety control boards LPS1, LPS2 by means of the mutually monitoring safe input / output circuits 23, 33 via an interface 50 and via the input / output bus. Slave 12 and the connected external input and output bus IOB1, for example, the central unit (CL) can be connected.

Sichere Ein- und/oder Ausgabekanäle mit Schnittstelle 50 werden redundant auf beiden sicheren Leiterplatten LPS1, LPS2 verteilt und mit Hilfe von sicheren Schaltungen 23, 33 von sicheren Verarbeitungseinheiten 24, 34 verarbeitet.Secure input and / or output channels with interface 50 are redundantly distributed on both secure circuit boards LPS1, LPS2 and processed by secure processing units 24, 34 by means of secure circuits 23, 33.

Claims (9)

  1. Safety module for connection to an automation device or automation system, wherein the automation device or automation system is provided for the control of safety-critical and non-safety-critical processes and/or plant components, comprising a communication board (LP1) for providing non-safety-critical communication, the processing unit (14) of which can be connected (CL) via an input/output bus slave (12) and an external input/output bus (IOB1) connected thereto to a central processing unit, characterized in that
    - the safety module, in addition to the communication board (LP1) for providing the non-safety-critical communication, comprises one or more circuit boards (LSP1, LSP2) also having safety-oriented input/output circuits (23), (33) for safety oriented functions,
    - the communication board (LP1) has a serial communication master (10) which is connected via at least one communication link (IKB1) connectable thereto to one or more secure processing units (24), (34) arranged on one or more of the circuit boards (LPS1, LPS2) having safety-oriented input/output circuits (23), (33) for safety-oriented functions, in such a manner that at least one of the circuit boards (LPS1, LPS2) is provided for receiving the messages sent by the communication board,
    - on the circuit boards (LPS1, LPS2) for the safety-oriented functions in each case at least one internal communication slave (20), (30) is provided which can be connected to the serial communication master (10) via the internal communication link (IKB1),
    - further field devices for safety-critical processes and/or plant components can be connected to the safety-oriented input/output circuits (23, 33) via an interface (50),
    - the synchronization between the secure processing units (24), (34) can be carried out by means of a synchronization link (IF2), and
    - safety-oriented messages can be transmitted from and/or to the processing unit (14) of the communication board (LP1) by means of at least one second internal communication link (IKB2) only via one of the secure processing units (24) located on the circuit boards (LPS1, LPS2) for the safety-oriented functions.
  2. Safety module according to Claim 1, characterized in that the secure processing units (24, 34) are in each case connected to the serial communication master (10) of the communication board (LP1) via an internal communication slave (20, 30) and the internal communication links (IKB1, IKB2).
  3. Safety module according to Claim 1 or 2, characterized in that the safety module can be connected via the input/output bus (IOB) to an input/output bus master (1a) of a control unit which is provided for the control of the non-safety-critical process and/or of the non-safety-critical plant components and also for safety-critical and/or safety-critical plant components.
  4. Safety module according to Claim 3, characterized in that safety-oriented messages can be transmitted from and to the circuit boards (LPS1, LPS2) by utilizing the black channel communication principle via the external input/output busmaster (1a) and the internal serial communication slave (20, 30) of the circuit boards (LPS1, LPS2) also for the safety-oriented functions.
  5. Safety module according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the second internal communication link (IKB2) is constructed in such a manner that the messages sent by the communication board (LP1) can also be received via it.
  6. Safety module according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the mutual synchronization and/or monitoring of the secure processing units (24), (34) can be carried out via at least one synchronization link (IF2).
  7. Safety module according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that of the secure processing units (24), (34), only one processing unit sends safety-oriented messages directly to the communication master (10) of the communication board (LP1) via the second internal communication link (IKB2).
  8. Safety module according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that it can be used in a modularly constructed control system.
  9. Use for the safety module according to one of the preceding claims in automation devices or automation systems of process automation or machine control as a central or decentralized input and/or output device.
EP20100824262 2009-11-23 2010-10-26 Security module for an automation device Active EP2504740B1 (en)

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DE102009054155A DE102009054155A1 (en) 2009-11-23 2009-11-23 Input and / or output safety module for an automation device
PCT/EP2010/006520 WO2011060872A2 (en) 2009-11-23 2010-10-26 Security module for an automation device

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WO2011060872A3 (en) 2011-07-14
WO2011060872A2 (en) 2011-05-26
US9104190B2 (en) 2015-08-11
US20120297101A1 (en) 2012-11-22
EP2504740A2 (en) 2012-10-03
CN102713773B (en) 2015-12-09
CN201740999U (en) 2011-02-09
DE102009054155A1 (en) 2011-05-26

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