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EP1678683B1 - Systeme de fermeture et procede de configuration d'un systeme de fermeture - Google Patents

Systeme de fermeture et procede de configuration d'un systeme de fermeture Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1678683B1
EP1678683B1 EP04775530A EP04775530A EP1678683B1 EP 1678683 B1 EP1678683 B1 EP 1678683B1 EP 04775530 A EP04775530 A EP 04775530A EP 04775530 A EP04775530 A EP 04775530A EP 1678683 B1 EP1678683 B1 EP 1678683B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
certificate
lock system
door access
manufacturer
access control
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP04775530A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP1678683A1 (fr
Inventor
Hans Thorsen
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Assa Abloy AB
Original Assignee
Assa Abloy AB
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Assa Abloy AB filed Critical Assa Abloy AB
Publication of EP1678683A1 publication Critical patent/EP1678683A1/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP1678683B1 publication Critical patent/EP1678683B1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00817—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys where the code of the lock can be programmed

Definitions

  • the present invention relates generally to lock systems and more particularly to a lock system which can be set up in an easy and yet secure way and be operated with a high security level.
  • Electronic or electro-mechanical lock systems having locks or the like that are connected to a central computer or system by means of a cable network have been in use for many years.
  • the operation of these systems are managed from the central computer which communicate the applicable rules via a local network (LAN) to individual door access control (DAC) units.
  • LAN local network
  • DAC door access control
  • the DAC units in turn communicate e.g. log information to the central computer.
  • One way of achieving secure communication on a pre-existing network is to use encrypted data for communication between the central computer and the individual DAC units.
  • the different units communicating must have encryption/decryption keys installed. These keys could be installed by skilled personnel that provide each and every unit with the required keys.
  • One problem associated with this solution is that the persons normally installing such lock systems are not skilled personnel in the sense that they are not familiar with computer hardware and software. Thus, installation of encryption/decryption keys would be performed by expensive personnel in a separate step after the physical installation of the system, leading to increased costs. Also, the use of individuals for installing software is a security risk in itself.
  • a problem in prior art is thus to provide a lock system which shows a high degree of security while the installation and set-up of the system can be effected in an easy way.
  • US-B1-6 615 350 discloses computer systems wherein cryptographic policies involving certificates are implemented
  • WO-A-01/66888 discloses secure distribution of key and lock devices between manufacturer, distributor and end users.
  • An object of the present invention is to provide a lock system wherein the prior art drawbacks are avoided and in which encryption keys can be installed in an easy and yet secure way. This means that one specific object is that installation of components must be as simple as possible.
  • Another object is that security breach by customer mistakes must not affect other customers or the manufacturer.
  • Yet another object is to provide a system and method wherein existing standards and implementations are used as much as possible.
  • Still yet another object is to provide a method wherein system requirements are kept as small as possible.
  • the invention is based on the realisation that the use of certificates in combination with asymmetric and symmetric encryption in a lock system provides a secure yet efficient solution to the above described problem.
  • a unique symmetric encryption key is used for each door access control unit. This ensures that the integrity of the lock system is maintained in the case one or more of the DAC units are taken over by a fraudulent person trying to gain unauthorized access to the premise in which the lock system is installed.
  • lock system is intended to cover all types of electronic lock systems wherein the door access units control electronic or electro-mechanical locks, card readers, panic buttons etc. (not shown in the figures) and is thus not limited to systems comprising conventional lock cylinders or the like.
  • FIG. 1 It is there shown a manufacturer computer system 10, which comprises computer hardware with peripherals etc. and access to the Internet.
  • the manufacturer computer system runs software adapted for processing of customer certificates.
  • the management system is divided into a front end system that collects signature request and a back end system that holds the manufacturer's private key used for signing of a customer public key.
  • the subsystem that contain the private key responsible for signing customers certificate is not exposed to public networks
  • a number of customer lock systems each comprises a customer management computer 110 connected to a plurality of door access control (DAC) units 120 via a local area network (LAN) 130.
  • DAC door access control
  • LAN local area network
  • the LAN could be Ethernet-based but the invention does not exclude other kinds of networks.
  • the management computer 110 is the computer wherein all rules relating to the lock system 100 is managed and stored. These rules can be related to which individuals are authorised to open which doors, temporal restrictions to access to doors etc. These rules are downloaded to the individual DAC units 120 which effect the physical control of the doors by means of actuators etc.
  • the present invention uses the well-known Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) which uses techniques for public-key encryption, also referred to as asymmetric encryption.
  • PKI Public Key Infrastructure
  • each entity has a public key and a corresponding private key.
  • the public key defines an encryption transformation
  • the private key defines the associated decryption transformation.
  • Any entity wishing to send a message to another entity A obtains an authentic copy of A's public key, uses the encryption transformation to obtain the cipher text, and transmits this cipher text to A. To decrypt the cipher text, A applies the decryption transformation to obtain the original message.
  • the public key need not be kept secret, and, in fact, may be widely available - only its authenticity is required to guarantee that A is indeed the only party who knows the corresponding private key.
  • a primary advantage of such systems is that providing authentic public keys is generally easier than distributing secret keys securely, as required in symmetric key systems.
  • A's encryption transformation is public knowledge, public-key encryption alone does not provide data origin authentication or data integrity. Such assurances must be provided through use of additional techniques, including message authentication codes and digital signatures. Public-key encryption schemes are typically substantially slower than symmetric-key encryption algorithms.
  • Public-key decryption may also provide authentication guarantees in entity authentication and authenticated key establishment protocols.
  • the Public Key Infrastructure in a lock system will now be described with reference to fig. 2 , wherein part of the environment shown in fig. 1 is detailed. More specifically, the manufacturer computer system 10, a management computer 110, and a DAC unit 120 are shown therein, but not the physical interconnections (the Internet, LAN). It is here seen that the manufacturer functions as an upper level Certificate Authority - CA level 1 - and the lock system owner as a lower level CA - CA level 2. To achieve a scalable installation of the DAC units 120 and to restrict problems of a comprised management computer to a customer domain, part of the PKI have been arranged as this hierarchy.
  • the manufacturer public key is installed in the DAC unit at a trusted factory.
  • a security feature is boot-strapped into the DAC units in the form of a certificate trusting the manufacturer's software. This means that the DAC units' software can only be installed under the manufacturer's control.
  • Each and every DAC unit 120 is thus provided with the manufacturer public key. This is a more efficient and reliable way than providing the public key when the DAC unit already has been installed.
  • This method also provides DAC units that are essentially identical before delivery, facilitating logistics and storage.
  • each DAC unit is provided with a unique serial number. However, this is not important for the present invention.
  • a DAC unit When a DAC unit boots for the first time it retrieves the installer program image, checks the signature against the factory installed manufacturer public key and starts to execute upon match.
  • the temporary installer application is capable of verifying the manufacturer's signature of the customer's public key and could verify that the certificate presented by the management computer 110 has been signed by the manufacturer computer 10.
  • the manufacturer public certificate is bundled with the installer image, which is signed by manufacturer private key.
  • the DAC units only trust the manufacturer at delivery, the customers do not have full control over their own system, which in their view is unacceptable.
  • This certificate is delivered on-line through a procedure, wherein the receiver is obliged to identify himself or herself. More specifically, the receiver is indicated in the certificate as attributes. This ensures that a specific individual is responsible, increasing the security level of the inventive concept.
  • the certificate signed by the manufacturer is used in a further step to install a certificate trusting the customer. In that way, the customer gets full control of the system except for software updating, see below.
  • a lock system owner buys the management computer software and obtains media together with a unique code
  • the name of the lock system owner is registered in the manufacturer computer 10 together with the software version.
  • the lock system owner is then instructed to contact the manufacturer to get its management computer public key signed by the manufacturer, i.e., the upper level CA.
  • the lock system owner's management computer public certificate is then added in a database located in the manufacturer computer 10.
  • the management computer 110 When the lock system owner installs the lock system software or when the lock system 100 is about to be set up, the management computer 110 generates a symmetric encryption key pair and makes available the certificate signed by the manufacturer. In that way, the management computer 110 becomes a CA of itself.
  • the installer program image that has been installed in the DAC unit accepts the management computer public certificate signed by the manufacturer.
  • An encrypted and authenticated channel is then established, such as by means of an SSL-session using asymmetric encryption, between the management computer and the DAC unit.
  • the DAC unit then installs the symmetric secret key from the management computer. From this moment asymmetric methods are replaced by symmetric by terminating the asymmetrically encrypted channel and establishing a symmetrically encrypted tunnel and the DAC unit could thereafter only be controlled by the management computer to prevent hostile takeover from other management computer systems.
  • the factory installed manufacturer public key remains in the DAC unit to verify software from the manufacturer. This prevents customers to remote install unauthorized software in the DAC unit.
  • Asymmetric encryption is more demanding on hardware, which is inconvenient when taking hardware costs into consideration. This is one reason why the lock system according to the invention operates in a secure yet efficient way.
  • the manufacturer public key is distributed on-line.
  • the manufacturer public key can also be distributed on compact disc, for example, when the software product is purchased.
  • the receiver of the manufacturer certificate is indicated as attributes in the certificate.
  • each certificate has a unique serial number distinguishing it from other certificates. It is also preferred that the certificate is protected by means of some kind of password, such as a PIN code.
  • the manufacturer computer system and management computers have been described as interconnected via the Internet. It will be appreciated that some of the management computers are not connected to the outside. In that case communication between the manufacturer computer system and management computers can be effected via other media, such as diskettes, compact discs etc.
  • manufacturer computer system has been described as one single computer. It will be appreciated that there can be more than one computer at the manufacturer having different functions.

Landscapes

  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Exchange Systems With Centralized Control (AREA)
  • Maintenance And Management Of Digital Transmission (AREA)
  • Input Circuits Of Receivers And Coupling Of Receivers And Audio Equipment (AREA)
  • Computer And Data Communications (AREA)
  • Automobile Manufacture Line, Endless Track Vehicle, Trailer (AREA)
  • Interface Circuits In Exchanges (AREA)

Claims (10)

  1. Un procédé de configuration d'un système de verrou (100) qui appartient à un propriétaire du système de verrou et qui comprend un ordinateur de gestion (110) qui est connecté à une pluralité d'unités de contrôle d'accès de porte (120), ledit procédé comprenant les étapes suivantes :
    a) installer dans les unités de contrôle d'accès de porte un premier certificat délivré et signé par le fabricant (10) d'un système de verrou ;
    b) installer dans l'ordinateur de gestion (110) un deuxième certificat assigné au propriétaire de système de verrou et délivré et signé par le fabricant ;
    c) transmettre de l'ordinateur de gestion à une première des unités de contrôle d'accès de porte des unités d'accès de porte le deuxième certificat signé ensemble avec une clé de chiffrage symétrique utilisé par le propriétaire du système de verrou ;
    d) installer le deuxième certificat à la première unité de contrôle d'accès de porte par chiffrage asymétrique après avoir contrôlé l'authenticité du deuxième certificat signé par le premier certificat installé ; et
    e) établir une communication de chiffrage symétrique entre l'ordinateur de gestion et la première unité d'accès de porte.
  2. Le procédé d'après la première revendication, où une clé de chiffrage symétrique unique est utilisée pour chaque unité de contrôle d'accès de porte.
  3. Le procédé d'après la revendication 1 ou 2, où l'étape d'installation d'un premier certificat est exécutée sous le contrôle d'un accessoire de sécurité du type « boot strapp » dans l'unité de contrôle d'accès de porte.
  4. Le procédé d'après une des revendications 1 à 3, où l'étape de fourniture d'un deuxième certificat à l'ordinateur de gestion est exécutée en ligne par une procédure où un récepteur s'identifie lui-même/ellemême.
  5. Le procédé d'après la revendication 4, où l'identité du récepteur est indiquée dans le deuxième certificat comme attributs.
  6. Le procédé d'après une des revendications 1 à 5, où l'étape de fourniture d'un deuxième certificat comprend la fourniture d'une paire de clé de chiffrage symétrique.
  7. Le procédé d'après une des revendications 1 à 6, où l'étape de transmission du deuxième certificat de l'ordinateur de gestion à une première unité de contrôle d'accès de porte est signé est exécuté comme session SSL.
  8. Le procédé d'après une des revendications 1 à 7, où l'étape d'installation du deuxième certificat inclut la garde du premier certificat pour vérifier des données du fabricant.
  9. Un système de verrou (100) appartenait à un propriétaire d'un système de verrou comprenant un ordinateur de management (110) qui est connecté à une pluralité d'unités de contrôle d'accès de porte (120), où le système de verrou est_agencé afin de communiquer avec un système de fabricant (10) d'un fabricant du système de verrou,
    caractérisé par
    - Un premier certificat délivré et signé par le système du fabricant (10) et fourni dans les unités de contrôle d'accès de porte (120) ;
    - un deuxième certificat assigné au système du fabricant, délivré et signé par le système du fabricant et fourni dans l'ordinateur de gestion (110);
    - une paire de clé de chiffrage symétrique qui est fourni dans l'ordinateur gestion et une unité de contrôle d'accès de porte (120) correspondante ; et
    - une clé de chiffrage asymétrique publique pour le fabricant qui est fourni dans les unités de contrôle d'accès de porte.
  10. Le système de verrou d'après la revendication 9, où une clé de chiffrage symétrique unique est fourni pour chaque unité de contrôle d'accès de porte.
EP04775530A 2003-10-16 2004-10-12 Systeme de fermeture et procede de configuration d'un systeme de fermeture Expired - Lifetime EP1678683B1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
SE0302733A SE525847C2 (sv) 2003-10-16 2003-10-16 Sätt att konfigurera ett låssystem samt låssystem
PCT/SE2004/001448 WO2005038727A1 (fr) 2003-10-16 2004-10-12 Systeme de fermeture et procede de configuration d'un systeme de fermeture

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1678683A1 EP1678683A1 (fr) 2006-07-12
EP1678683B1 true EP1678683B1 (fr) 2009-12-09

Family

ID=29398746

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP04775530A Expired - Lifetime EP1678683B1 (fr) 2003-10-16 2004-10-12 Systeme de fermeture et procede de configuration d'un systeme de fermeture

Country Status (7)

Country Link
EP (1) EP1678683B1 (fr)
AT (1) ATE451672T1 (fr)
AU (1) AU2004281437A1 (fr)
DE (1) DE602004024567D1 (fr)
NO (1) NO336212B1 (fr)
SE (1) SE525847C2 (fr)
WO (2) WO2005038727A1 (fr)

Families Citing this family (19)

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US7706778B2 (en) 2005-04-05 2010-04-27 Assa Abloy Ab System and method for remotely assigning and revoking access credentials using a near field communication equipped mobile phone
US8232860B2 (en) 2005-10-21 2012-07-31 Honeywell International Inc. RFID reader for facility access control and authorization
US8074271B2 (en) 2006-08-09 2011-12-06 Assa Abloy Ab Method and apparatus for making a decision on a card
US9985950B2 (en) 2006-08-09 2018-05-29 Assa Abloy Ab Method and apparatus for making a decision on a card
US9704313B2 (en) 2008-09-30 2017-07-11 Honeywell International Inc. Systems and methods for interacting with access control devices
IT1392268B1 (it) * 2008-12-02 2012-02-22 Sata Hts Hi Tech Services S P A Processo di autenticazione mediante token generante one time password
US8878931B2 (en) 2009-03-04 2014-11-04 Honeywell International Inc. Systems and methods for managing video data
EP2408984B1 (fr) 2009-03-19 2019-11-27 Honeywell International Inc. Systèmes et procédés de gestion de dispositifs de contrôle d'accès
FR2945177A1 (fr) * 2009-04-30 2010-11-05 Pascal Metivier Systeme de programmation et de gestion securisees pour serrures comportant des moyens de communication sans contact et commandables par un telephone portable nfc
US9280365B2 (en) 2009-12-17 2016-03-08 Honeywell International Inc. Systems and methods for managing configuration data at disconnected remote devices
WO2012174603A1 (fr) 2011-06-24 2012-12-27 Honeywell International Inc. Systèmes et procédés de présentation d'informations de système dvm
US10362273B2 (en) 2011-08-05 2019-07-23 Honeywell International Inc. Systems and methods for managing video data
US10038872B2 (en) 2011-08-05 2018-07-31 Honeywell International Inc. Systems and methods for managing video data
US9344684B2 (en) 2011-08-05 2016-05-17 Honeywell International Inc. Systems and methods configured to enable content sharing between client terminals of a digital video management system
EP2821972B1 (fr) 2013-07-05 2020-04-08 Assa Abloy Ab Dispositif à clé et procédé associé, programme informatique et produit de programme informatique
EP2821970B2 (fr) 2013-07-05 2019-07-10 Assa Abloy Ab Dispositif de communication de commande d'accès, procédé, programme informatique et produit de programme informatique
US9443362B2 (en) 2013-10-18 2016-09-13 Assa Abloy Ab Communication and processing of credential data
US10523903B2 (en) 2013-10-30 2019-12-31 Honeywell International Inc. Computer implemented systems frameworks and methods configured for enabling review of incident data
SG11201701819PA (en) 2014-09-10 2017-04-27 Assa Abloy Ab First entry notification

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SE517465C2 (sv) * 2000-03-10 2002-06-11 Assa Abloy Ab Metod för att auktorisera en nyckel- eller låsanordning, elektromekanisk nyckel- och låsanordning och nyckel- och låssystem

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US6615350B1 (en) * 1998-03-23 2003-09-02 Novell, Inc. Module authentication and binding library extensions

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
NO20062179L (no) 2006-05-15
EP1678683A1 (fr) 2006-07-12
ATE451672T1 (de) 2009-12-15
NO336212B1 (no) 2015-06-15
WO2005038728A1 (fr) 2005-04-28
SE0302733D0 (sv) 2003-10-16
AU2004281437A1 (en) 2005-04-28
SE525847C2 (sv) 2005-05-10
DE602004024567D1 (de) 2010-01-21
SE0302733L (sv) 2005-04-17
WO2005038727A1 (fr) 2005-04-28

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