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EP0298831B1 - Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Verhindern von Betrügereien für ein selektives Zugangssystem - Google Patents

Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Verhindern von Betrügereien für ein selektives Zugangssystem Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0298831B1
EP0298831B1 EP88401646A EP88401646A EP0298831B1 EP 0298831 B1 EP0298831 B1 EP 0298831B1 EP 88401646 A EP88401646 A EP 88401646A EP 88401646 A EP88401646 A EP 88401646A EP 0298831 B1 EP0298831 B1 EP 0298831B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
memory
card
access
prom
confidential code
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP88401646A
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English (en)
French (fr)
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EP0298831A1 (de
Inventor
Simon Barakat
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Schlumberger SA
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Schlumberger SA
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Filing date
Publication date
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Publication of EP0298831A1 publication Critical patent/EP0298831A1/de
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Publication of EP0298831B1 publication Critical patent/EP0298831B1/de
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1025—Identification of user by a PIN code
    • G07F7/1083—Counting of PIN attempts

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a method and a device intended to prevent the fraudulent use, on a selective access system, of spoofed access titles, by means of an effective detection of the operations for systematic search of the confidential codes assigned to these security titles. access.
  • the invention aims, for example, to prevent fraudulent use, on cash registers, of stolen magnetic credit cards.
  • the method of the invention comprises, in a known manner, the steps consisting in: obtaining, on each presentation to the system of an access ticket, the result of a verification of the validity of a confidential code indicated by the user of this title, this result being interpreted as a success if this code is valid and as a failure otherwise; keep, in a memory, a trace of the failures observed during successive presentations of access tickets; and emitting a fraud indicator signal when the number of these failures exceeds a predetermined limit.
  • each access title consists of, or contains, information, generally public, which makes it possible to verify, thanks to a relationship kept secret, the validity of the confidential code that the user of the access title provided independently, for example via a keyboard.
  • the known solution to prevent this fraud consists in keeping, in a memory of the cash register, a list of numbers or identification codes of the last magnetic cards, for which the confidential code entered by the customer was false.
  • Security is obtained by imposing a limit on the number of appearances of the same number on this list, that is to say by imposing a maximum number of failures for the same magnetic card.
  • the document FR-A-2349181 describes such a method, intended to avoid the fraudulent use of credit cards with magnetic strips used in particular for the distribution of banknotes.
  • any new failure removes from memory the number of the card which was the oldest failure, so that all traces of the latter disappear.
  • the security device can therefore be deceived by searching for the confidential codes of several magnetic cards at the same time, by proceeding in rotation and in such a way that the ratio of the maximum number of numbers stored in the list, to the number of cards tested, remains lower. the limit number of failures whose exceeding would result in the cancellation of a card.
  • the aim of the present invention is to propose a security method and device which, thanks in particular to a great saving in memory space, does not have the faults of the technique described above.
  • the method of the invention is essentially characterized in that the operation consisting in keeping track of failures itself comprises the operations consisting in: defining, in the memory, a plurality of memory areas; assign to each access title presented one of the classes from a set of classes each of which corresponds to a memory area; and keep, in each zone of the memory, the count of the number of failures which are subject to those of the access titles presented which belong to the class to which this zone of memory corresponds, and in that the operation d 'emission of a fraud indicator signal is conditioned by the exceeding, by the number of failures recorded in any of the areas of the memory, of a limit number assigned to this area and constituting said predetermined limit.
  • each magnetic card is assigned at least one intrinsic attribute, such as the confidential code, or an identification number, the class number. assigned to each magnetic card is preferably deduced from the intrinsic attribute of this card by the application of a predetermined surjective function.
  • the number of the class assigned to each magnetic card is given by a set of at least one digit extracted from the identification number of this card, each digit being extracted according to a position it occupies in this number, and this position being predetermined and chosen closer to the end of the identification number, in the writing direction of the latter, than to the beginning of this number, so that all the possible values, from 0 to 9 , of each digit extracted, are substantially equiprobable for all of the cards presented, said limit number then being the same for all the memory areas.
  • each class in a simple embodiment of the invention, the correspondence between each class and a memory area is such that the number of each class defines the address of the memory area to which it corresponds.
  • the method of the invention can comprise a second operation of emission of a fraud signal, conditioned by the overrun, by the number of failures recorded in the set memory areas, a second predetermined limit.
  • the device of the invention comprises, in a known manner: means for entering information suitable for receiving on the one hand at least one intrinsic attribute of the access ticket, this attribute being linked to said exact confidential code of this and on the other hand a confidential code indicated by the user of the access ticket; processing means linked to the input means, capable of verifying the validity of the confidential code indicated by the user; and a memory connected to the processing means, in which the latter record failure data each time that a confidential code turns out to be invalid.
  • this device is essentially characterized in that, the memory being divided into areas accessible to different addresses, the processing means are designed to develop a memory address as a function at least of said attribute of the access ticket, and to save the failure data in the memory zone corresponding to this address.
  • the memory advantageously comprises a read-only memory, in which each failure data item is recorded in the form of a single bit.
  • the memory consists of the PROM memory of a memory card, while the processing means comprise the microprocessor thereof.
  • the invention relates to a method and a device for preventing fraudulent use of a spoofed access document, in combination with a selective access system.
  • selective access system we mean precisely a system capable of granting each of the potential users a certain privilege, such as access to a service or delivery of a product, provided that this user presents to this system a valid access document, the validity of which is confirmed by that of a confidential code also supplied by the user.
  • a computer system managing a database to which users can only access after having indicated their name or user code on the one hand and the exact confidential code assigned to them on the other, constitutes a system with selective access; a cash register, which is equipped with a magnetic credit card reader and a keyboard by means of which the card holder indicates his confidential code, and which accepts payment by card only after verification of the validity another code with selective access.
  • the user's access title is immaterial in nature: it consists, for example, of a series of letters; in the second example, the user's access title is of a physical nature: it is a magnetic card; these two cases are however similar in the sense that, in both cases, the access titles are personalized, vis-à-vis the user, by intrinsic attributes generally devoid of confidentiality, namely the proper name of the user in the first example, and the identification number or code of the user's magnetic card in the second example.
  • access to the system is obtained only after the user has indicated a confidential code which has been assigned to him, and verification of the validity of this code; this verification is for example carried out by the comparison of a function of the confidential code, itself kept secret, with the intrinsic attribute of the access title.
  • the comparison reveals a disparity, its result leads to a failure in terms of access to the system, while this result leads to a success, i.e. access to the system, if the comparison reveals an identity.
  • the SAS selective access system schematically represents a cash register
  • the invention is applicable, as those skilled in the art will perceive, to any other selective access system , and in particular to a computer system managing a database.
  • the SAS cash register comprises in particular, in a known manner, a management unit UG connected to several peripheral organs, including a magnetic card reader LCM, an console interface circuit ICS and a telephone interface circuit ITL.
  • the LCM reader makes it possible to read an attribute of each magnetic card CM, for example the number or identification code CODIDENT of this card.
  • the ICS interface connected to the CS console, is capable of receiving the confidential code CODCONF typed by the user of the CM card.
  • the SAS cash register also has an interface circuit for an ICE electronic card, allowing a bidirectional exchange of information between the management unit UG and an electronic microprocessor card CE.
  • Interface circuits such as ICE, and electronic cards such as CE, are well known to those skilled in the art, so their detailed description is unnecessary here.
  • the electronic microprocessor cards CE comprise an microprocessor mP generally connected to a read-only memory non-programmable ROM, to a read-only memory programmable PROM, and to a random access memory RAM.
  • This CE card is traditionally provided with means, not shown, allowing the mP microprocessor not only to read, but also to write, data in the read-only memory PROM.
  • CE electronic cards are also conventionally provided with means preventing access, from outside the card, to the information recorded in the PROM memory. In fact, these properties are those which are sought for the implementation of the invention, for which the specific recourse to the use of an electronic card remains optional.
  • the merchant owner of the SAS cash register, must insert a CE electronic card in the ICE circuit to allow the cash register to function.
  • the VALPROM signal is for example stored in the PROM memory of the electronic card CE.
  • the microprocessor mP verifies that the electronic card CE has been validated by seeking whether the VALPROM data item is present in the memory with a value representative of its validity.
  • the microprocessor mP sends to the ICE circuit an INVALPROM blocking signal which inhibits the operation of the SAS cash register.
  • the CE electronic card when validated, receives, via the LCM reader, the UG unit and the ICE interface, the CODIDENT identification code of the magnetic card CM, generally consisting of a simple serial number.
  • the electronic card CE receives the confidential code CODCONF introduced by the user of the card CM by means of the console CS, via the interface ICS, the unit UG and the interface ICE.
  • each digit of the CODCONF code is itself coded in the console CS and decoded by the microprocessor mP, so as to avoid any fraudulent interception of the confidential code CODCONF, for example on the line connecting the console CS to the interface circuit ICS.
  • the mP microprocessor having the CODIDENT identification code and the CODCONF confidential code, verifies the validity of the latter by looking, in a manner known per se, if the compatibility conditions which must exist between CODIDENT and CODCONF are actually satisfied.
  • the microprocessor mP issues a VALACCES order authorizing access to the SAS system, that is to say payment by means of the CM card, on the SAS cash register.
  • the method which is the subject of the invention no longer treats the magnetic card CM as the access ticket which is unequivocally defined by its identification code CODIDENT, but as an undifferentiated element of a class. to which corresponds an area of the PROM memory.
  • the method consists in assigning, to the CM card whose CODCONF code is invalid, one of the classes of a set classes whose number is equal to that of the memory areas.
  • the PROM memory usable for the implementation of the invention comprises 4 Kbytes, and is considered to consist of 1000 areas of 32 bits each.
  • the class of each magnetic card is determined by the last three digits of CODIDENT, that is to say the three least significant digits.
  • a magnetic card CM taken at random has a homogeneous probability, equal to 0.001, of belonging to any of the classes.
  • the microprocessor mP reads the number recorded in the area of the PROM memory which corresponds to this class.
  • the microprocessor reads the contents of the PROM memory area of address 357, that is, in other words, the contained the 357 th PROM area.
  • the microprocessor mP issues an INVALPROM command, which inhibits the operation of the SAS cash register.
  • the merchant who owns this box can recover normal use only after having received, in the form of a VALPROM signal transmitted over the telephone network, authorization to use a new CE electronic card. , as previously described.
  • the number read in zone 357 of the PROM memory is not equal to this limit of 32 bits, it is increased by one unit, that is to say modified by setting the first bit to "1" which in the 32-bit series stored in this area is a "0" bit.
  • This operation corresponds to the recording, in the PROM memory, of the failure to access the SAS cash register for the CM magnetic card, or for any other CM card belonging to the same class as it.
  • the microprocessor mP reads all the bits recorded in all the PROM memory, each of which corresponds to an access failure, and compares the total with a second predetermined limit number, for example 96.
  • the mP microprocessor issues an INVALPROM signal.
  • the microprocessor mP In the event of an inequality, the microprocessor mP emits an INVALACCES signal. This last signal has the effect of informing the merchant, and the card holder, of the invalidity of the confidential code, of temporarily refusing payment by card, but of authorizing a new introduction of the confidential code.
  • the probability that a person, ignoring the confidential code CODCONF of a magnetic card, discovers it by successive tests on a SAS cash register equipped with a new CE electronic card is only 0.32%.
  • the assignment, to the CM magnetic card, of a class defined by the last three digits of the CODIDENT code, is of course a non-limiting example.
  • Such an assignment has the advantage of leading to a homogeneous distribution of the magnetic cards CM in the different classes and to the use of the same limit number in each zone (32 for the example chosen).
  • these characteristics although advantageous, are not essential.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Control Of Vending Devices And Auxiliary Devices For Vending Devices (AREA)
  • Credit Cards Or The Like (AREA)
  • Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)

Claims (10)

1. Verfahren zum Schutz eines Systems mit selektivem Zugriff gegen einen betrügerischen Gebrauch wenigstens einer Zugangsberechtigung (CM), der ein vertraulicher Code (CODIDENT) zugewiesen ist, mit den Funktionen des Gewinnens des Prüfergebnisses der Gültigkeit eines vom Benutzer dieser Berechtigung (CM) angegebenen vertraulichen Codes (CODCONF) bei jeder Eingabe einer Zugangsberechtigung (CM) in das System, wobei dieses Ergebnis im Falle der Gültigkeit dieses Codes (CODCONF) als Erfolg und im gegenteiligen Falle als Mißerfolg interpretiert wird; des Festhaltens einer Abfolge von Mißerfolgen, die bei aufeinanderfolgenden Eingaben von Zugangsberechtigungen (CM) festgestellt worden sind, in einem Speicher (PROM); und des Ausgebens eines einen Betrug anzeigenden Signals (INVALPROM), wenn die Anzahl dieser Mißerfolge eine vorgegebene Grenze überschreitet, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Funktion, die aus dem Festhalten einer Abfolge von Mißerfolgen besteht, selbst die Funktionen umfaßt, die aus dem Definieren einer Mehrzahl von Speicherzonen in dem Speicher (PROM); dem Zuweisen einer der Klassen einer Gesamtheit von Klassen, von denen jede einer Speicherzone entspricht, an jede eingegebene Zugangsberechtigung (CM); und dem Halten in jeder Speicherzone (PROM) der gezählten Anzahl von Mißerfolgen, die bei denenigen eingegebenen Zugangsberechtigungen (CM) auftreten, die der Klasse zugehören, die dieser Speicherzone entspricht, bestehen, und daß die Funktion der Ausgabe eines einen Betrug angebenden Signals (INVALPROM) durch die Überschreitung einer irgendeiner bestimmten Zone zugewiesenen Grenzanzahl, die die vorgegebene Grenze bildet, von der in dieser Speicherzone (PROM) eingetragenen Anzahl von Mißerfolgen bedingt ist.
2. Verfahren gemäß Anspruch 1, das auf den Fall angewendet wird, in dem die Zugriffsberechtigungen (CM) Magnetkarten wie etwa Kreditkarten sind, denen jeweils wenigstens eine innere Eigenschaft wie etwa der vertrauliche Code (CODIDENT) oder eine Identifikationsnummer zugewiesen ist, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Nummer der einer jeden Magnetkarte (CM) zugewiesenen Klasse durch die Anwendung einer vorgegebenen surjektiven Funktion aus der inneren Eigenschaft dieser Karte abgeleitet wird.
3. Verfahren gemäß Anspruch 2, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Nummer der einer jeden Magnetkarte (CM) zugewiesenen Klasse durch eine Gesamtheit wenigstens einer der Identifikationsnummer (CODIDENT) dieser Karte entnommenen Ziffer gegeben ist, wobei jede Ziffer in Abhängigkeit von einer Stellung, die sie in dieser Nummer einnimmt, entnommen wird und wobei diese Stellung näher am Ende der Identifikationsnummer (CODIDENT) als am Anfang vorgegeben und gewählt wird, derart, daß sämtliche möglichen Werte zwischen 0 und 9 einer jeden entnommenen Ziffer für die Gesamtheit der eingegebenen Karten (CM) im wesentlichen gleich wahrscheinlich sind, so daß die Grenzanzahl folglich für sämtliche Speicherzonen die gleiche ist.
4. Verfahren gemäß einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 3, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Nummer einer jeden Klasse die Adresse der Speicherzone, der sie entspricht, definiert.
5. Verfahren gemäß einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 4, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß sie eine zweite Funktion des Ausgebens eines Betrugssignals (IVALPROM) umfaßt, die durch die Überschreitung einer zweiten vorgegebenen Grenze von der Anzahl der in der Gesamtheit der Speicherzonen eingetragenen Mißerfolge bedingt ist.
6. Vorrichtung zum Schutz wenigstens einer Zugangsberechtigung (CM) für ein selektives Zugriffssystem, der ein vertraulicher Code (CODIDENT) zugewiesen ist, gegen einen betrügerischen Gebrauch, mit Mitteln zur Erfassung von geeigneter Information (LCM), um einerseits wenigstens eine mit dem richtigen vertraulichen Code (CODIDENT) der Zugangsberechtigung (CM) verbundene innere Eigenschaft und andererseits einen vom Benutzer der Zugangsberechtigung (CM) angegebenen vertraulichen Code (CODCONF) zu empfangen; Verarbeitungsmitteln (mP), die mit den Erfassungsmitteln (LCM) verbunden sind und dazu geeignet sind, die Gültigkeit des vom Benutzer angegebenen vertraulichen Codes (CODCONF) zu prüfen; und einem Speicher (PROM), der mit den Verarbeitungsmitteln (mP) verbunden ist und in den diese letzteren jedesmal, wenn ein ungültiger vertraulicher Code (CODCONF) auftritt, Mißerfolgsdaten eintragen, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß der Speicher in Zonen unterteilt ist, die über verschiedene Adressen zugreifbar sind, wobei die Verarbeitungsmittel (mP) so ausgebildet sind, daß sie eine Speicheradresse in Abhängigkeit wenigstens der Eigenschaft der Zugangsberechtigung (CM) entwickeln und die Mißerfolgsdaten in die dieser Adresse entsprechenden Speicherzonen eintragen können.
7. Vorrichtung gemäß Anspruch 6, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß der Speicher (PROM) ein Nur-Lese-Speicher ist.
8. Vorrichtung gemäß Anspruch 7, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß jedes Mißerfolgsdatum durch ein einziges Bit ausgedrückt wird.
9. Vorrichtung gemäß einem der Ansprüche 6 bis 8, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß der Speicher (PROM) einen PROM-Speicher einer Speicherkarte umfaßt.
10. Vorrichtung gemäß einem der Ansprüche 6 bis 9, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Verarbeitungsmittel (mP) einen Mikroprozessor einer Speicherkarte umfassen.
EP88401646A 1987-07-07 1988-06-28 Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Verhindern von Betrügereien für ein selektives Zugangssystem Expired - Lifetime EP0298831B1 (de)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
FR8709604 1987-07-07
FR8709604A FR2618000B1 (fr) 1987-07-07 1987-07-07 Procede et dispositif antifraude pour un systeme a acces selectif

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0298831A1 EP0298831A1 (de) 1989-01-11
EP0298831B1 true EP0298831B1 (de) 1991-10-16

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EP88401646A Expired - Lifetime EP0298831B1 (de) 1987-07-07 1988-06-28 Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Verhindern von Betrügereien für ein selektives Zugangssystem

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Country Link
US (1) US5006698A (de)
EP (1) EP0298831B1 (de)
JP (1) JPH0198095A (de)
DE (1) DE3865555D1 (de)
ES (1) ES2029336T3 (de)
FR (1) FR2618000B1 (de)

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FR2722018B1 (fr) * 1994-06-29 1996-08-30 Solaic Sa Carte a memoire ameliorant la gestion de la zone d'acces et procede de gestion de cette zone
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US6601048B1 (en) * 1997-09-12 2003-07-29 Mci Communications Corporation System and method for detecting and managing fraud
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US20020184152A1 (en) * 1999-06-30 2002-12-05 Martin David A. Method and device for preventing check fraud
US7266527B1 (en) 1999-06-30 2007-09-04 Martin David A Method and device for preventing check fraud
DE10048939B4 (de) * 1999-12-11 2010-08-19 International Business Machines Corp. Bedingte Unterdrückung der Überprüfung eines Karteninhabers
KR20030029904A (ko) * 2001-07-06 2003-04-16 코닌클리케 필립스 일렉트로닉스 엔.브이. 정보매체 상에 저장된 콘텐트의 보호방법
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JPS629470A (ja) * 1985-07-05 1987-01-17 Casio Comput Co Ltd 個人証明カ−ドにおける本人照合方式

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
ES2029336T3 (es) 1992-08-01
DE3865555D1 (de) 1991-11-21
FR2618000A1 (fr) 1989-01-13
JPH0198095A (ja) 1989-04-17
US5006698A (en) 1991-04-09
EP0298831A1 (de) 1989-01-11
FR2618000B1 (fr) 1989-11-03

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