CN120582799B - A cross-domain multi-mode trusted authentication method for highly dynamic networks - Google Patents
A cross-domain multi-mode trusted authentication method for highly dynamic networksInfo
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- CN120582799B CN120582799B CN202511095918.3A CN202511095918A CN120582799B CN 120582799 B CN120582799 B CN 120582799B CN 202511095918 A CN202511095918 A CN 202511095918A CN 120582799 B CN120582799 B CN 120582799B
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Abstract
The invention relates to the technical field of air-sky-land-sea integrated network security, and discloses a cross-domain multimode trusted authentication method of a high-dynamic network, which comprises the steps of initializing elliptic curve parameters and main and public keys in a cooperative manner by a trusted institution and a key generation center; the trusted authority generates a pseudonym with a validity period for the node according to the random number, the key generation center generates a partial key, and the node is complemented locally to form a certificate-free complete key pair. The sender can complete signature by only one dot multiplication, the receiver completes verification by three dot multiplication, and compares message hashes by means of a blockchain intelligent contract, and a legal/malicious node list is maintained in real time, so that conditional privacy protection, unlink, traceability and instant revocation are realized. Experimental results show that the method has the advantages of about 7ms of calculation cost, 184bytes of communication, and low contract average time delay of less than 0.35s under 300TPS concurrency, and has high safety and low resource consumption.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of air-sky-land-sea integrated network security, in particular to a cross-domain multimode trusted authentication method of a high-dynamic network.
Background
With the continuous promotion of space, air, land and ocean integrated network construction, the number of various nodes of the space, air, land and ocean is continuously increased, the network plays an important role in realizing global coverage, situation awareness and multi-platform cooperation, and the security challenges are increasingly highlighted. Wherein the node itself may generate malicious behavior due to benefit driving, such as deliberately broadcasting false situation information or resource status, leading to global network misjudgment or collaborative failure. Therefore, in the communication process of the air-sky-sea integrated network, it is necessary to ensure the authenticity and credibility of the message transmission.
Digital signature technology has been widely used in the security scenario of the internet of things as one of the main means for ensuring trusted secure communication between nodes. However, there is a problem of high certificate maintenance costs in traditional public key infrastructure-based signature schemes, and there is a problem of key escrow in identity-based signature schemes. To overcome the above problems, a certificate-less signature technique is proposed. Different from the two schemes, the scheme based on the certificate-free signature technology does not need to use a public key certificate, and the user private key is generated by the user and a semi-trusted third party entity together, so that the key escrow problem and the overhead problem of the certificate are effectively solved, and the scheme is widely applied to various scenes such as the Internet of things. This technique ensures that the message is not tampered with maliciously during transmission by verifying the signature, however such a verification process cannot be directly linked to the behavior of the node itself. If the node itself deliberately sends an error message and sends the error message to the receiver, the receiver cannot determine the authenticity of the message, and cannot verify the untrustworthy behavior of the node.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides a cross-domain multimode trusted authentication method of a high dynamic network to solve the problems.
The technical scheme II is that the cross-domain multimode trusted authentication method of the high dynamic network comprises a trusted mechanism, a key generation center and nodes, and is characterized by comprising the following steps of S1, generating respective private keys and public parameters by the trusted mechanism and the key generation center, and publishing the public parameters.
S2, the trusted authority selects random numbers for each node, calculates a pseudonym, and sends the pseudonym to the corresponding node and the key generation center, wherein each node comprises a sender node and a receiver node, and the pseudonym comprises a first component, a second component and a valid period.
And S3, after the key generation center receives the pseudonym sent by the trusted authority, checking whether the validity period of the pseudonym is still in the validity period, if so, generating a first part of private keys and a first part of public keys, sending the first part of private keys and the first part of public keys to the corresponding nodes together with the pseudonym, and otherwise, discarding the pseudonym.
And S4, after each node receives the data packet containing the pseudonym, the first part private key and the first part public key, verifying the validity of the first part private key, generating a second part private key and a second part public key when verification passes, combining the second part private key and the first part private key with the first part public key to obtain a complete private key and a complete public key, and otherwise discarding the data packet.
And S5, when the sender node needs to send the message, the sender node generates a digital signature and sends the digital signature together with the message, wherein the digital signature is calculated based on the random number, the pseudonym, the complete public key, the message to be sent and the time stamp.
And S6, after receiving the data packet containing the pseudonym, the complete public key, the message, the digital signature and the timestamp, the receiver node performs timeliness inspection on the timestamp, and when the inspection passes, the digital signature is verified to confirm the integrity of the message and the identity of the sender, otherwise, the data packet is discarded.
And S7, the receiver node performs correctness verification on the content of the message by calling an intelligent contract deployed in the blockchain, updates a legal node list and a malicious node list on the blockchain in real time according to a verification result, marks the sender node as a malicious node when verification fails, and synchronizes the sender node to the whole network.
Further, the S1 is specifically S11 is a selected elliptic curveSetting a groupOrder of groupAnd generating a meta。
S12, the trusted authority TA selects random numbersAs a master private key of the system, and calculates a corresponding master public key as。
S13, selecting random number by key generation centerAs a private key and calculates the corresponding public key as。
S14, selecting a first, a second and a third anti-collision safety hash functions:。
S15, publishing the public parameters 。
Further, the step S2 specifically includes S21 that the trusted authority is each nodeRespectively selecting random numbers, wherein,Representing the sequence number of the node.
S22, based on the generatorCalculate the first component。
S23, system-based master public keyCalculating a shared curve point。
S24, setting the validity period of the pseudonymAnd calculate a second pseudonymous componentWherein, the method comprises the steps of,For the true identity of the node,As the master private key of the system,As a first anti-collision secure hash function,Representing a bitwise exclusive or operation.
S25, combining to obtain node pseudonymsAnd respectively send to the corresponding nodes through the secure channelsAnd a key generation center.
Further, in the step S3, a part of private key is generated and sent to the corresponding node, specifically, S31, the key generation center is the nodeSelecting random numbers。
S32 based on random numberCalculate a first partial public key。
S33 based on node pseudonymsFirst part public keyKey generation center public keyPseudonym expiration dateCalculating hash coefficientsWherein, the method comprises the steps of,Is a second collision-resistant secure hash function.
S34, calculating a first part private key of the nodeWherein, the method comprises the steps of,As a private key of the key generation center,Is a group order. S35, will beTo the corresponding node。
Further, the S4 specifically includes S41, nodeReception ofAfter that, the hash coefficient is calculatedAnd verify the equationIf not, discarding the data packet.
S42, selecting random numberAnd calculates a second partial public key。
S43. based onAndAgain, the hash coefficients are calculated。
S44, calculating the combined public key component。
S45, determining node complete private keyComplete public key。
Further, the step S5 specifically includes the step S51 of the sender nodeSelecting random numbersAnd calculates a temporary public key 。
S52 based on sender nodeIs a pseudonym of (2)Complete public keyTemporary public keyMessage to be sentTime stampCalculating hash coefficients, wherein,Is a third collision-resistant secure hash function.
S53, according to the hash coefficientGenerating signature scalarWherein, the method comprises the steps of,Is a group order.
S54 based on temporary public keySignature scalarObtaining a signatureAnd willTransmitting to a receiver node。
Further, the S6 specifically includes S61, a receiver nodeJudging a time stampWhether the data packet is within the effective time window or not, and discarding the data packet if the data packet is not satisfied.
S62 when the time stampWhen valid, based on pseudonyms of sender nodesFirst part public keyKey generation center public keyExpiration dateCalculating hash coefficients。
S63. pseudonym based on sender nodePublic key of the second partKey generation center public keyExpiration date of kanaCalculating hash coefficients。
S64. pseudonym based on sender nodeComplete public keyTemporary public keyMessageTime stampCalculating hash coefficients。
S65, verifying elliptic curve equationIf the equation is satisfied, the digital signature is valid and receives the message, otherwise, the data packet is discarded.
Further, the step S7 specifically includes the step S71 of the receiver node calling VERIFYMESSAGE functions in the intelligent contract to verify the message to be verifiedPseudonym of sender nodeAs parameter input, contract internal calculationAnd putting the saidComparing with the hash value of the real event pre-stored in the contract state, and outputting the Boolean value。
S72, the receiver node continues to call the intelligent contractFunction of sending node addressAs input, whenAnd if not already existing in the legal node list, adding the sender node into the legal node list.
And S73, writing a list updating result and verification transaction into a blockchain ledger, and synchronizing the legal node list and the malicious node list by all nodes in the blockchain network so as to realize the node reputation state consistent with the whole network.
The invention has the beneficial effects that compared with the prior art, the cross-domain multimode trusted authentication method of the high dynamic network has the following beneficial effects that 1, the cross-domain multimode trusted authentication method of the high dynamic network has the advantages that a node is designed to realize 'reversible analysis by a trusted mechanism by using a pseudonym communication by using a pseudonym mechanism driven by a random number', the pseudonym is continuously updated along with the validity period and the random number, an attacker cannot associate different sessions and can not reversely push out the true identity, and only the T trusted mechanism can restore the true identity once by a main private key when the node is suspected to be bad, so that the effects of conditional privacy protection, non-interlinkability, traceability and non-repudiation are realized.
2. According to the cross-domain multimode trusted authentication method of the high dynamic network, a whole-course elliptic curve certificate-free signature replaces a bilinear pair, a sending end can sign only by one point multiplication, a receiving end needs three point multiplication and five hash times in a signature verification and message verification link, compared with a similar scheme, the calculation and communication cost is obviously reduced, and the identity verification, the content verification and the node reputation judgment are ensured while the lightweight characteristic is maintained.
3. According to the cross-domain multimode trusted authentication method of the high dynamic network, the centralized invalidation and the tampering risk are avoided by updating and writing the message hash comparison and the node black-and-white list into the blockchain intelligent contract, and under a 300 concurrency scene, the average delay of the contract is lower than 0.3 seconds, the throughput is about 200TPS, so that the high efficiency and stability of the scheme in the space-day-earth-sea integrated distributed environment are verified.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic overall flow chart of the method of the present invention.
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of timing interactions provided by the method of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is a schematic diagram of pseudonym generation, partial key generation and key generation processes provided by the method of the present invention.
Fig. 4 is a schematic diagram of a signature generation and signature verification process provided by the method of the present invention.
Fig. 5 is a diagram of experimental results of signature process overhead, verification process overhead and total computation overhead provided by the method of the present invention.
Fig. 6 is a diagram of experimental results of communication overhead provided by the method of the present invention.
Fig. 7 is a graph of experimental results of maximum delay, minimum delay and average delay of intelligence at different concurrency degrees provided by the method of the present invention.
Fig. 8 is a graph of throughput and latency results for the intelligence provided by the method of the present invention at approximately different concurrencies.
Detailed Description
The following description of the embodiments of the present invention will be made clearly and completely with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which it is apparent that the embodiments described are only some embodiments of the present invention, but not all embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be made by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of the invention without making any inventive effort, are intended to be within the scope of the invention.
In order to better understand the aspects of the present invention, the present invention will be described in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and detailed description.
Referring to fig. 1-3, fig. 1 is an overall flow diagram provided by the method of the present invention, fig. 2 is a timing sequence interaction diagram provided by the method of the present invention, fig. 3 is a process diagram of pseudonym generation, partial key generation and key generation provided by the method of the present invention, the present invention provides a cross-domain multimode trusted authentication method of a high dynamic network, and a system is provided, which comprises a trusted mechanism, a key generation center and nodes, wherein the method comprises the following steps that S1, the trusted mechanism and the key generation center generate respective private keys and public parameters, and publish the public parameters.
S2, the trusted authority selects random numbers for each node, calculates a pseudonym, and sends the pseudonym to the corresponding node and the key generation center, wherein each node comprises a sender node and a receiver node, and the pseudonym comprises a first component, a second component and a valid period.
And S3, after the key generation center receives the pseudonym sent by the trusted authority, checking whether the validity period of the pseudonym is still in the validity period, if so, generating a first part of private keys and a first part of public keys, sending the first part of private keys and the first part of public keys to the corresponding nodes together with the pseudonym, and otherwise, discarding the pseudonym.
And S4, after each node receives the data packet containing the pseudonym, the first part private key and the first part public key, verifying the validity of the first part private key, generating a second part private key and a second part public key when verification passes, combining the second part private key and the first part private key with the first part public key to obtain a complete private key and a complete public key, and otherwise discarding the data packet.
And S5, when the sender node needs to send the message, the sender node generates a digital signature and sends the digital signature together with the message, wherein the digital signature is calculated based on the random number, the pseudonym, the complete public key, the message to be sent and the time stamp.
And S6, after receiving the data packet containing the pseudonym, the complete public key, the message, the digital signature and the timestamp, the receiver node performs timeliness inspection on the timestamp, and when the inspection passes, the digital signature is verified to confirm the integrity of the message and the identity of the sender, otherwise, the data packet is discarded.
And S7, the receiver node performs correctness verification on the content of the message by calling an intelligent contract deployed in the blockchain, updates a legal node list and a malicious node list on the blockchain in real time according to a verification result, marks the sender node as a malicious node when verification fails, and synchronizes the sender node to the whole network.
Furthermore, in order to establish a unified and safe cryptography foundation in an air-sky-sea integrated network, the system initialization stage is cooperatively completed by a trusted mechanism and a key generation center, wherein the two parties firstly select elliptic curvesDetermining the order asIs a cyclic group of (a)And its generation elementThe trusted authority then independently generates a system master private keyAnd calculates the master public keyWhile the key generation center independently generates the private keyAnd calculates the public keyOn the basis, three kinds of anti-collision safety hash functions are selected togetherAnd willAs a public parameter. By keying the master private keyWith private keyThe trust root on which the subsequent false name generation, the certificate-free signature and other operations depend is formed, and all key information is prevented from being owned by any single entity. The S1 is specifically that S11 is selected elliptic curveSetting a groupOrder of groupAnd generating a meta。
S12, the trusted authority TA selects random numbersAs a master private key of the system, and calculates a corresponding master public key as。
S13, selecting random number by key generation centerAs a private key and calculates the corresponding public key as。
S14, selecting a first, a second and a third anti-collision safety hash functions:。
S15, publishing the public parameters 。
Furthermore, in order to protect the true identity of the node in the air-sky-land-sea integrated network, the true identity of the node needs to be hidden, that is, a corresponding pseudonym is generated through the true identity, and the node in the pseudonym generation stageIs based on the true identity of the node by a trusted authorityThe method comprises the steps of generating a pseudonym, realizing recovery of the true identity of a malicious node while protecting the identity privacy of the node, namely realizing conditional privacy protection, and enabling any other node to be incapable of calculating the true identity of the node because only a trusted authority has a main private key. The S2 specifically comprises S21 that the trusted authority is each nodeRespectively selecting random numbers, wherein,Representing the sequence number of the node.
S22, based on the generatorCalculate the first component。
S23, system-based master public keyCalculating a shared curve point。
S24, setting the validity period of the pseudonymAnd calculate a second pseudonymous componentWherein, the method comprises the steps of,For the true identity of the node,As the master private key of the system,As a first anti-collision secure hash function,Representing a bitwise exclusive or operation.
S25, combining to obtain node pseudonymsAnd respectively send to the corresponding nodes through the secure channelsAnd a key generation center.
Further, in order to enable the network node to obtain the key material strongly bound with the pseudonym without holding the certificate, the key generating center firstly checks the validity period of the pseudonym after receiving the pseudonym issued by the trusted authority, and if the validity period is still in the validity period, the key generating center is the corresponding nodeSelecting random numbersComputing a first partial public keyAnd by pseudonym、Key generation center public keyKana validity periodObtaining hash coefficients for inputSubsequently, the key generation center uses the private key itselfGenerating a first partial private key of a nodeAnd willAnd the key is sent to the node through a secure channel, so that not only is it ensured that any third party cannot deduce the complete private key only by virtue of the pseudonym, but also the key is tightly bound with the pseudonym and the validity period. In the step S3, a part of private key is generated and sent to the corresponding node, specifically S31, the key generation center is the nodeSelecting random numbers。
S32 based on random numberCalculate a first partial public key。
S33 based on node pseudonymsFirst part public keyKey generation center public keyPseudonym expiration dateCalculating hash coefficientsWherein, the method comprises the steps of,Is a second collision-resistant secure hash function.
S34, calculating a first part private key of the nodeWherein, the method comprises the steps of,As a private key of the key generation center,Is a group order.
S35, will beTo the corresponding node。
Further, to thoroughly eliminate the risk of key escrow and ensure exclusive control of the node over its own private key, the nodeSent at the receiving key generating centerAfter the data packet, firstly, the same hash coefficient is used for verifying the equationAfter verification, the node locally selects a random number to calculate a second part of public keyAnd calculate from thisThereby generating a combined public key componentTo this point, the node willWith self-holdingSplit to complete private keyAnd corresponding complete public keyTherefore, two parts of the complete private key are respectively mastered in the key generation center and the node itself, so that autonomy and non-repudiation of node signature are ensured, and an attack path of any single entity for forging or replacing the key is effectively blocked. The S4 specifically comprises S41, namely a nodeReception ofAfter that, the hash coefficient is calculatedAnd verify the equationIf not, discarding the data packet.
S42, selecting random numberAnd calculates a second partial public key。
S43. based onAndAgain, the hash coefficients are calculated。
S44, calculating the combined public key component。
S45, determining node complete private keyComplete public key。
Further, referring to FIG. 4, FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of signature generation and signature verification process provided by the method of the present invention, wherein the sender node is configured to implement lightweight and non-repudiated identity and content binding before actually sending a service messageFirstly, selecting a one-time random numberAnd calculates a temporary public keyThen, obtaining the hash coefficientAnd generates a signature scalar therefromFinally, a digital signature is formedAnd willThe whole is sent to the receiver node. The process can issue a signature only by one elliptic curve point multiplication, ensures that each message signature is unique and can be prevented from replaying through a random number and a time stamp, and simultaneously ensures that the undeniability and privacy protection of the signature coexist by binding a pseudonym with a complete private key. The S5 specifically comprises S51, a sender nodeSelecting random numbersAnd calculates a temporary public key。
S52 based on sender nodeIs a pseudonym of (2)Complete public keyTemporary public keyMessage to be sentTime stampCalculating hash coefficients, wherein,Is a third collision-resistant secure hash function.
S53, according to the hash coefficientGenerating signature scalarWherein, the method comprises the steps of,Is a group order.
S54 based on temporary public keySignature scalarObtaining a signatureAnd willTransmitting to a receiver node。
Furthermore, to realize the instant, low-cost and double-guarantee identity and content verification of the incoming message at the node of the receiving party, the nodeUpon receipt ofAfter that, first to timestampPerforming window verification to resist replay, and after verification, calculating binding coefficients by using the pseudonym of the sender and the first and second partial public keys thereofAndRe-calculating hash coefficientsThen verify the core equationIf the equation is satisfied, the unique control of the complete private key of the sender and the non-falsification of the message content are simultaneously confirmed, otherwise, the data packet is immediately discarded and the subsequent processing is blocked, so that the signature verification under the high dynamic network environment is completed under the condition that only three elliptic curve point multiplication and three hash operations are needed. The S6 specifically comprises S61, a receiver nodeJudging a time stampWhether the data packet is within the effective time window or not, and discarding the data packet if the data packet is not satisfied.
S62 when the time stampWhen valid, based on pseudonyms of sender nodesFirst part public keyKey generation center public keyExpiration dateCalculating hash coefficients。
S63. pseudonym based on sender nodePublic key of the second partKey generation center public keyExpiration date of kanaCalculating hash coefficients。
S64. pseudonym based on sender nodeComplete public keyTemporary public keyMessageTime stampCalculating hash coefficients。
S65, verifying elliptic curve equationIf the equation is satisfied, the digital signature is valid and receives the message, otherwise, the data packet is discarded.
Further, in order to eliminate the single point failure of centralized verification and synchronize the message authenticity and the node credit state in the whole network, the receiver node calls the blockchain intelligent contract after finishing signature verification, which is generated by calculating the message hash by VERIFYMESSAGE functions and comparing with the real event hash on the chainAnd then immediately callFunction basisAnd if the verification fails, the sender node is moved out of the white list and added into the black list, and otherwise, the sender node is registered or reserved. All verification results and list changes are written into the blockchain along with the transaction and broadcast through consensus, so that end-to-end decentralization message verification that data is not tamperable, publicly auditable and less than 0.3 seconds is realized. The S7 specifically comprises S71 that a receiver node calls VERIFYMESSAGE functions in the intelligent contract to verify the message to be verifiedPseudonym of sender nodeAs parameter input, contract internal calculationAnd putting the saidComparing with the hash value of the real event pre-stored in the contract state, and outputting the Boolean value。
S72, the receiver node continues to call the intelligent contractFunction of sending node addressAs input, whenAnd if not already existing in the legal node list, adding the sender node into the legal node list.
And S73, writing a list updating result and verification transaction into a blockchain ledger, and synchronizing the legal node list and the malicious node list by all nodes in the blockchain network so as to realize the node reputation state consistent with the whole network.
In order to further verify the effect of the scheme of the present invention, please refer to fig. 5-8, fig. 5 is an experimental result diagram of signature process overhead, verification process overhead and total computation overhead provided by the method of the present invention, fig. 6 is an experimental result diagram of communication overhead provided by the method of the present invention, fig. 7 is an experimental result diagram of maximum delay, minimum delay and average delay provided by the method of the present invention at about different concurrency, and fig. 8 is a throughput and delay result diagram provided by the method of the present invention at about different concurrency.
In fig. 5, the experimental result shows that the signature phase of the method is about 2ms, the verification phase is about 5ms, and the total is about 7ms, which is reduced by 83% compared with the total consumption of 41ms of the ECA frame, and is reduced by about 20% -25% compared with the lightweight schemes such as AEP and REL, and the verification that the proposed certificateless ECC process can obviously improve the end-to-end execution efficiency while guaranteeing the security attribute.
In fig. 6, in terms of the message interaction size, the data packet sent by the scheme of the invention is only 184bytes, is equal to the optimal baseline AEP, saves 35% compared with the main stream BBAS framework, saves 66% compared with the ECA scheme introducing certificates, and shows that the message structure of the one-time encapsulation of the pseudonym and the complete public key can compress the link load on the premise of not sacrificing the verification information, and especially accords with the strict constraint of the space-day-earth-sea heterogeneous link on the bandwidth.
In fig. 7, in the on-chain environment simulating 50-300TPS concurrency, the average delay of the intelligent contract in the scheme is always kept below 0.35s, the minimum delay approaches 0s, and the maximum delay does not increase linearly with load for more than 1.1s. The result illustrates that the message Ha Xibi pair and list update logic, after being implemented in Solidity, can maintain sub-second level responses under existing federation chain underlying consensus mechanisms.
In fig. 8, as the concurrency increases from 50TPS to about 230TPS, the contract throughput linearly climbs and stabilizes at around 200TPS, while the corresponding delay only increases smoothly to about 0.35s, after which the load continues to rise, the throughput and delay curves tend to saturate but no significant jitter, verifying the stability and scalability of the contract at high loads. The comprehensive throughput-time delay performance further proves that the design on the write-in chain of message verification and node reputation maintenance gets rid of the bottleneck of a central server and meets the double requirements of space-earth Hiroad on high concurrency and low time delay of a network.
It is noted that relational terms such as first and second, and the like are used solely to distinguish one entity or action from another entity or action without necessarily requiring or implying any actual such relationship or order between such entities or actions. Moreover, the terms "comprises," "comprising," or any other variation thereof, are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements does not include only those elements but may include other elements not expressly listed or inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitation, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one does not exclude the presence of other like elements in a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises an element.
Although embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that various changes, modifications, substitutions and alterations can be made therein without departing from the principles and spirit of the invention, the scope of which is defined in the appended claims and their equivalents.
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| CN120200750A (en) * | 2025-05-26 | 2025-06-24 | 长春工业大学 | Secure communication system and method for vehicle-mounted ad hoc network based on NTRU lattice cryptographic system |
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| CN120200750A (en) * | 2025-05-26 | 2025-06-24 | 长春工业大学 | Secure communication system and method for vehicle-mounted ad hoc network based on NTRU lattice cryptographic system |
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