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CN113810126A - A Dynamic Security Encryption Method for Diffraction-Free Vortex Electromagnetic Wave Channel Characteristics - Google Patents

A Dynamic Security Encryption Method for Diffraction-Free Vortex Electromagnetic Wave Channel Characteristics Download PDF

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CN113810126A
CN113810126A CN202111123988.7A CN202111123988A CN113810126A CN 113810126 A CN113810126 A CN 113810126A CN 202111123988 A CN202111123988 A CN 202111123988A CN 113810126 A CN113810126 A CN 113810126A
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段启箭
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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04BTRANSMISSION
    • H04B10/00Transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio-waves, e.g. infrared, visible or ultraviolet light, or employing corpuscular radiation, e.g. quantum communication
    • H04B10/70Photonic quantum communication
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04BTRANSMISSION
    • H04B10/00Transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio-waves, e.g. infrared, visible or ultraviolet light, or employing corpuscular radiation, e.g. quantum communication
    • H04B10/80Optical aspects relating to the use of optical transmission for specific applications, not provided for in groups H04B10/03 - H04B10/70, e.g. optical power feeding or optical transmission through water
    • H04B10/85Protection from unauthorised access, e.g. eavesdrop protection
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • YGENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02DCLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
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    • Y02D30/70Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks

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Abstract

本发明提出了一种无衍射涡旋电磁波信道特征的动态安全加密方法,涉及无线通信领域。通过获取发送端的待传输信息;根据发送端与合法接收端发送的无衍射涡旋波束建立无衍射涡旋电磁波信道;根据无衍射涡旋电磁波信道中的信道特征对待传输信息进行加密,利用不同无衍射涡旋电磁波模式无线信道之间相位与已调符号矢量叠加实现加密,使期望用户与窃听者在密钥协商阶段接收到不完全相同的密钥包,从而导致窃听者无法获得正常通信用户之间的密钥,达到保障数据安全传输的目的;无衍射涡旋电磁波可以通过障碍后重建,对信道相位误差有一定的容忍度,可解决无线设备通信加密时的复杂性、难度大、泄密风险大等问题,有效提高了通信节点通信的安全性。

Figure 202111123988

The invention provides a dynamic security encryption method without diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel characteristics, and relates to the field of wireless communication. By acquiring the information to be transmitted at the transmitting end; establishing a non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel according to the non-diffraction vortex beam sent by the transmitting end and the legitimate receiving end; The phase and the modulated symbol vector superposition between the diffractive vortex electromagnetic wave mode wireless channels realize encryption, so that the expected user and the eavesdropper receive different key packets in the key negotiation stage, so that the eavesdropper cannot obtain the normal communication between users. The key between the two is to ensure the safe transmission of data; the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave can be reconstructed after passing through obstacles, and has a certain tolerance for the channel phase error, which can solve the complexity, difficulty and leakage risk of wireless device communication encryption. It can effectively improve the security of communication node communication.

Figure 202111123988

Description

一种无衍射涡旋电磁波信道特征的动态安全加密方法A Dynamic Security Encryption Method for Diffraction-Free Vortex Electromagnetic Wave Channel Characteristics

技术领域technical field

本发明涉及无线通信领域,具体而言,涉及一种无衍射涡旋电磁波信道特征的动态安全加密方法。The invention relates to the field of wireless communication, in particular to a dynamic security encryption method without diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel characteristics.

背景技术Background technique

近年来,随着无线通信系统支持数据传输速率的不断提高,无线用户的规模不断扩大,无线通信的安全问题也变得越来越重要。通信的安全性一直是衡量通信质量的重要手段,无线网络通信对安全性提出了更高的要求。另外,针对无线通信容量的不断增长,研究无衍射涡旋电磁波(Vortex Beam)这一新的物理参数维度的射频涡旋波束的调制、复用及解复用等机理,从原理和器件两个层面上寻求其可充分利用的新技术,从而提高无线通信系统频谱效率和容量,对于民用或军用通信系统都具有非常重要的意义。In recent years, with the continuous improvement of the data transmission rate supported by the wireless communication system and the continuous expansion of the scale of wireless users, the security of wireless communication has become more and more important. The security of communication has always been an important measure to measure the quality of communication, and wireless network communication puts forward higher requirements for security. In addition, in view of the continuous growth of wireless communication capacity, the mechanism of modulation, multiplexing and demultiplexing of radio frequency vortex beams in the new physical parameter dimension of the diffraction-free vortex electromagnetic wave (Vortex Beam) is studied. It is of great significance for civil or military communication systems to seek new technologies that can be fully utilized to improve the spectral efficiency and capacity of wireless communication systems.

现有中国专利,公告号为CN104821875B,其公开了一种基于光子轨道角动量编码实现的高容量量子秘密共享方法,构造了两个幺正算符,给出两组完备的本征轨道角动量,利用单光子轨道角动量编码提高了量子秘密共享方案的通信容量和频谱效率,不需要多组分纠缠光子态。此外,还有一中国专利,公告号为CN106899970A,其公开了一种基于角动量的无线通信加密方法,依据无线天线极化状态和角动量信道参数特征,利用不同极化或偏振状态的天线极化状态、不同特征量子数的无衍射涡旋电磁波模式、信号强度指示以及误码率的随机性与独立性所造成的差异性,实现跨层密钥协商,使期望用户与窃听者在密钥协商阶段接收到不完全相同的密钥包,从而导致窃听者无法获得正常通信用户之间的密钥,达到保障数据安全传输的目的。以上现有技术中不足在于轨道角动量在传输中容易湮灭,量子态很难长距离保真传输。There is an existing Chinese patent, the bulletin number is CN104821875B, which discloses a high-capacity quantum secret sharing method based on photon orbital angular momentum coding, constructs two unitary operators, and gives two complete sets of intrinsic orbital angular momentum , using single-photon orbital angular momentum encoding to improve the communication capacity and spectral efficiency of quantum secret sharing schemes without the need for multi-component entangled photon states. In addition, there is a Chinese patent with the publication number of CN106899970A, which discloses a wireless communication encryption method based on angular momentum. According to the polarization state of the wireless antenna and the channel parameter characteristics of the angular momentum, the antenna polarizations of different polarizations or polarization states are used. The difference caused by the randomness and independence of the state, the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave pattern of different characteristic quantum numbers, the signal strength indication and the bit error rate, realize the cross-layer key negotiation, so that the expected user and the eavesdropper can perform the key negotiation. Different key packages are received at the stage, so that the eavesdropper cannot obtain the key between normal communication users, so as to achieve the purpose of ensuring the safe transmission of data. The disadvantage of the above prior art is that orbital angular momentum is easily annihilated during transmission, and it is difficult for quantum states to be transmitted with fidelity over long distances.

发明内容SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

本发明的目的在于提供一种无衍射涡旋电磁波信道特征的动态安全加密方法,用以改善现有技术中轨道角动量在传输中容易湮灭,量子态很难长距离保真传输的问题。The purpose of the present invention is to provide a dynamic security encryption method without diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel characteristics, to improve the problems in the prior art that orbital angular momentum is easily annihilated during transmission, and quantum states are difficult to transmit with fidelity over long distances.

第一方面,本申请实施例提供一种无衍射涡旋电磁波信道特征的动态安全加密方法,其包括。In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a dynamic security encryption method without diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel characteristics, which includes the following steps.

获取发送端的待传输信息;Obtain the information to be transmitted from the sender;

根据发送端与合法接收端发送的无衍射涡旋波束建立无衍射涡旋电磁波信道;Establish a non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel according to the non-diffraction vortex beam sent by the sender and the legitimate receiver;

根据无衍射涡旋电磁波信道中的信道特征对待传输信息进行加密,生成加密信息。The information to be transmitted is encrypted according to the channel characteristics in the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel to generate encrypted information.

上述实现过程中,通过获取发送端的待传输信息;然后根据发送端与合法接收端发送的无衍射涡旋波束建立无衍射涡旋电磁波信道;最后根据无衍射涡旋电磁波信道中的信道特征对待传输信息进行加密,生成加密信息。通过建立无衍射涡旋电磁波信道利用临近时隙物理信道涡旋模式估值与发送涡旋模式同时生成密钥技术,使用临近时隙物理信道涡旋模式估值与发送涡旋模式等物理信息作为密钥种子生成密钥,在调制过程中生成对应的符号,并利用包含以上信息的密钥对所传输业务数据进行加密,利用不同无衍射涡旋电磁波模式无线信道之间相位与已调符号矢量叠加实现加密,提高通信节点上数据传输的安全性,使期望用户与窃听者在密钥协商阶段接收到不完全相同的密钥包,从而导致窃听者无法获得正常通信用户之间的密钥,达到保障数据安全传输,无衍射涡旋电磁波可以经过障碍物后自恢复,长距离传输中能够保持涡旋模式和量子态,因此在无线通信系统中,无衍射涡旋电磁波模式的信道物理特性又决定了涡旋波束模式特性空间的随机性与独立性,从而使得两条不同的无线信道具有丢包差异性。且系统对信道相位误差有一定的容忍度。与目前常用的物理层加密技术相比,生成密钥的方法简单,复杂度很低,同时,其随机性保证了加密的安全性。In the above implementation process, the information to be transmitted at the transmitting end is obtained; then the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel is established according to the non-diffraction vortex beam sent by the transmitting end and the legitimate receiving end; finally, the transmission is to be transmitted according to the channel characteristics in the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel. The information is encrypted to generate encrypted information. By establishing a diffraction-free vortex electromagnetic wave channel, the vortex mode estimation of the adjacent time slot physical channel and the transmission vortex mode are used to generate the key technology at the same time, and the physical information such as the vortex mode estimation of the adjacent time slot physical channel and the transmission vortex mode are used as The key seed generates a key, generates a corresponding symbol during the modulation process, and uses the key containing the above information to encrypt the transmitted service data, and uses the phase and the modulated symbol vector between the wireless channels of different non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave modes. The superposition realizes encryption, improves the security of data transmission on the communication node, and enables the expected user and the eavesdropper to receive different key packages during the key negotiation stage, so that the eavesdropper cannot obtain the key between normal communication users. To ensure the safe transmission of data, the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave can self-recover after passing through obstacles, and the vortex mode and quantum state can be maintained during long-distance transmission. Therefore, in the wireless communication system, the channel physical characteristics of the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave mode are also It determines the randomness and independence of the vortex beam mode characteristic space, so that the two different wireless channels have packet loss differences. And the system has a certain tolerance to the channel phase error. Compared with the currently commonly used physical layer encryption technology, the method of generating the key is simple and the complexity is low, and at the same time, its randomness ensures the security of encryption.

基于第一方面,在本发明的一些实施例中,上述根据无衍射涡旋电磁波信道中的信道特征对待传输信息进行加密,生成加密信息的步骤包括以下步骤:Based on the first aspect, in some embodiments of the present invention, the above-mentioned encrypting the information to be transmitted according to the channel characteristics in the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel, the step of generating the encrypted information includes the following steps:

获取无衍射涡旋电磁波信道中的信道状态信息;Obtain the channel state information in the diffraction-free vortex electromagnetic wave channel;

根据信道状态信息生成加密信道系数;generating encrypted channel coefficients according to the channel state information;

将加密信道系数作为密钥符号与待传输信息中的各个数据符号点进行矢量相乘和矢量叠加,生成加密后的发送符号;The encrypted channel coefficient is used as a key symbol to perform vector multiplication and vector superposition with each data symbol point in the information to be transmitted to generate an encrypted transmission symbol;

将加密后的发送符号添加校验码,生成加密信息。A check code is added to the encrypted transmission symbol to generate encrypted information.

基于第一方面,在本发明的一些实施例中,上述数据符号点包括发送端通过调制将比特数据映射为星座图上的已调符号点。Based on the first aspect, in some embodiments of the present invention, the above-mentioned data symbol points include modulated symbol points that the transmitting end maps the bit data to on the constellation diagram through modulation.

基于第一方面,在本发明的一些实施例中,上述获取无衍射涡旋电磁波信道中的信道状态信息的步骤包括以下步骤:Based on the first aspect, in some embodiments of the present invention, the above step of acquiring channel state information in a diffraction-free vortex electromagnetic wave channel includes the following steps:

同一个时隙内或者相干时间内,合法接收端和发送端同时且分别发送导频进行上行和下行信道的信道探测,发送端得到上行信道系数,合法接收端得到下行信道系数,以得到信道状态信息。In the same time slot or within the coherence time, the legal receiver and the transmitter send pilots at the same time and respectively to perform channel detection of the uplink and downlink channels. The transmitter obtains the uplink channel coefficients, and the legal receiver obtains the downlink channel coefficients to obtain the channel state. information.

基于第一方面,在本发明的一些实施例中,上述根据信道状态信息生成加密信道系数的步骤包括以下步骤;Based on the first aspect, in some embodiments of the present invention, the above-mentioned step of generating an encrypted channel coefficient according to the channel state information includes the following steps;

将发送端的上行信道系数中的上行发射信道系数和上行接收信道系数组成第一六维涡旋模式,即加密信道系数

Figure BDA0003278039950000041
The uplink transmit channel coefficients and the uplink receive channel coefficients in the uplink channel coefficients of the transmitting end are formed into a first six-dimensional vortex pattern, that is, the encrypted channel coefficients
Figure BDA0003278039950000041

将上述合法接收端的下行信道系数中的下行发射信道系数和下行接收信道系数组成第二六维涡旋模式,即加密信道系数

Figure BDA0003278039950000042
The downlink transmit channel coefficients and the downlink receive channel coefficients in the downlink channel coefficients of the legal receiving end are formed into a second six-dimensional vortex pattern, that is, the encrypted channel coefficients
Figure BDA0003278039950000042

基于第一方面,在本发明的一些实施例中,还包括以下步骤:Based on the first aspect, in some embodiments of the present invention, the following steps are further included:

发送端将加密信息发送给合法接收端;The sender sends the encrypted information to the legitimate receiver;

合法接收端利用密钥对加密信息进行按位模二加解密,生成明文信息。The legitimate receiver uses the key to perform bitwise modulo two encryption and decryption on the encrypted information to generate plaintext information.

基于第一方面,在本发明的一些实施例中,还包括以下步骤:Based on the first aspect, in some embodiments of the present invention, the following steps are further included:

发送端与合法接收端按时隙交替发送密钥包。The sender and the legitimate receiver send key packets alternately according to time slots.

基于第一方面,在本发明的一些实施例中,上述密钥包包括发送端发送给合法接收端的密钥包和合法接收端发送给发送端的密钥包。Based on the first aspect, in some embodiments of the present invention, the above key package includes a key package sent by the sender to a legitimate receiver and a key package sent by the legitimate receiver to the sender.

基于第一方面,在本发明的一些实施例中,上述发送端和合法接收端均安装有信道测量模块、涡旋波束量子化模块、密钥协商模块、加密模块和数据处理模块。Based on the first aspect, in some embodiments of the present invention, a channel measurement module, a vortex beam quantization module, a key agreement module, an encryption module, and a data processing module are installed on both the transmitting end and the legitimate receiving end.

第二方面,本申请实施例提供一种电子设备,其包括存储器,用于存储一个或多个程序;处理器。当上述一个或多个程序被上述处理器执行时,实现如上述第一方面中任一项上述的方法。In a second aspect, embodiments of the present application provide an electronic device, which includes a memory for storing one or more programs; and a processor. When the above-mentioned one or more programs are executed by the above-mentioned processor, the above-mentioned method according to any one of the above-mentioned first aspects is implemented.

本发明实施例至少具有如下优点或有益效果:The embodiments of the present invention have at least the following advantages or beneficial effects:

本发明实施例提供一种无衍射涡旋电磁波信道特征的动态安全加密方法,通过获取发送端的待传输信息;然后根据发送端与合法接收端发送的无衍射涡旋波束建立无衍射涡旋电磁波信道;最后根据无衍射涡旋电磁波信道中的信道特征对待传输信息进行加密,生成加密信息。通过建立无衍射涡旋电磁波信道利用临近时隙物理信道涡旋模式估值与发送涡旋模式同时生成密钥技术,使用临近时隙物理信道涡旋模式估值与发送涡旋模式等物理信息作为密钥种子生成密钥,在调制过程中生成对应的符号,并利用包含以上信息的密钥对所传输业务数据进行加密,利用不同无衍射涡旋电磁波模式无线信道之间相位与已调符号矢量叠加实现加密,提高通信节点上数据传输的安全性,使期望用户与窃听者在密钥协商阶段接收到不完全相同的密钥包,从而导致窃听者无法获得正常通信用户之间的密钥,达到保障数据安全传输,无衍射涡旋电磁波可以经过障碍物后自恢复,长距离传输中能够保持涡旋模式和量子态,因此在无线通信系统中,无衍射涡旋电磁波模式的信道物理特性又决定了涡旋波束模式特性空间的随机性与独立性,从而使得两条不同的无线信道具有丢包差异性。且系统对信道相位误差有一定的容忍度。与目前常用的物理层加密技术相比,生成密钥的方法简单,复杂度很低,同时,其随机性保证了加密的安全性。The embodiment of the present invention provides a dynamic security encryption method for the characteristics of a diffraction-free vortex electromagnetic wave channel, by acquiring the information to be transmitted at the sending end; Finally, according to the channel characteristics of the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel, the information to be transmitted is encrypted to generate encrypted information. By establishing a diffraction-free vortex electromagnetic wave channel, the vortex mode estimation of the adjacent time slot physical channel and the transmission vortex mode are used to generate the key technology at the same time, and the physical information such as the vortex mode estimation of the adjacent time slot physical channel and the transmission vortex mode are used as The key seed generates a key, generates a corresponding symbol during the modulation process, and uses the key containing the above information to encrypt the transmitted service data, and uses the phase and the modulated symbol vector between the wireless channels of different non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave modes. The superposition realizes encryption, improves the security of data transmission on the communication node, and enables the expected user and the eavesdropper to receive different key packages during the key negotiation stage, so that the eavesdropper cannot obtain the key between normal communication users. To ensure the safe transmission of data, the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave can self-recover after passing through obstacles, and the vortex mode and quantum state can be maintained during long-distance transmission. Therefore, in the wireless communication system, the channel physical characteristics of the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave mode are also It determines the randomness and independence of the vortex beam mode characteristic space, so that the two different wireless channels have packet loss differences. And the system has a certain tolerance to the channel phase error. Compared with the currently commonly used physical layer encryption technology, the method of generating the key is simple and the complexity is low, and at the same time, its randomness ensures the security of encryption.

附图说明Description of drawings

为了更清楚地说明本发明实施例的技术方案,下面将对实施例中所需要使用的附图作简单地介绍,应当理解,以下附图仅示出了本发明的某些实施例,因此不应被看作是对范围的限定,对于本领域普通技术人员来讲,在不付出创造性劳动的前提下,还可以根据这些附图获得其他相关的附图。In order to illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention more clearly, the following briefly introduces the accompanying drawings used in the embodiments. It should be understood that the following drawings only show some embodiments of the present invention, and therefore do not It should be regarded as a limitation of the scope, and for those of ordinary skill in the art, other related drawings can also be obtained according to these drawings without any creative effort.

图1为本发明实施例提供的一种无衍射涡旋电磁波信道特征的动态安全加密方法流程图;1 is a flowchart of a dynamic security encryption method for a diffraction-free vortex electromagnetic wave channel feature provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

图2为本发明实施例提供的无衍射涡旋电磁波信道特征的动态安全加密架构图;Fig. 2 is the dynamic security encryption architecture diagram of the channel characteristic of the diffraction-free vortex electromagnetic wave provided by the embodiment of the present invention;

图3为本发明实施例提供的无衍射涡旋电磁波信道特征的动态安全加密方法的密钥协商过程示意图;3 is a schematic diagram of a key negotiation process of a dynamic secure encryption method without diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel characteristics provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

图4为本发明实施例提供的无衍射涡旋电磁波信道特征的动态安全加密方法中发送端Alice发送给合法接收端Bob的密钥包的结构示意图;4 is a schematic structural diagram of the key packet sent by the transmitting end Alice to the legal receiving end Bob in the dynamic security encryption method without diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel characteristics provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

图5为本发明实施例提供的发送端Alice和合法接收端Bob的结构示意图;5 is a schematic structural diagram of a transmitting end Alice and a legitimate receiving end Bob provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

图6为本发明实施例提供的根据无衍射涡旋电磁波信道中的信道特征对待传输信息进行加密的流程图;6 is a flowchart of encrypting information to be transmitted according to channel characteristics in a diffraction-free vortex electromagnetic wave channel provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

图7为本发明实施例提供的一种电子设备的结构框图。FIG. 7 is a structural block diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention.

图标:1-第一信道测量模块;2-第一涡旋波束量子化模块;3-第一密钥协商模块;4-第一加密模块;5-第一数据处理模块;6-第二信道测量模块;7-第二涡旋波束量子化模块;8-第二密钥协商模块;9-第二加密模块;10-第二数据处理模块;101-存储器;102-处理器;103-通信接口。Icons: 1-first channel measurement module; 2-first vortex beam quantization module; 3-first key agreement module; 4-first encryption module; 5-first data processing module; 6-second channel measurement module; 7-second vortex beam quantization module; 8-second key agreement module; 9-second encryption module; 10-second data processing module; 101-memory; 102-processor; 103-communication interface.

具体实施方式Detailed ways

为使本申请实施例的目的、技术方案和优点更加清楚,下面将结合本申请实施例中的附图,对本申请实施例中的技术方案进行清楚、完整地描述,显然,所描述的实施例是本申请一部分实施例,而不是全部的实施例。通常在此处附图中描述和示出的本申请实施例的组件可以以各种不同的配置来布置和设计。In order to make the purposes, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present application clearer, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be described clearly and completely below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments It is a part of the embodiments of the present application, but not all of the embodiments. The components of the embodiments of the present application generally described and illustrated in the drawings herein may be arranged and designed in a variety of different configurations.

因此,以下对在附图中提供的本申请的实施例的详细描述并非旨在限制要求保护的本申请的范围,而是仅仅表示本申请的选定实施例。基于本申请中的实施例,本领域普通技术人员在没有作出创造性劳动前提下所获得的所有其他实施例,都属于本申请保护的范围。Thus, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the application provided in the accompanying drawings is not intended to limit the scope of the application as claimed, but is merely representative of selected embodiments of the application. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative work fall within the protection scope of the present application.

实施例Example

下面结合附图,对本申请的一些实施方式作详细说明。在不冲突的情况下,下述的各个实施例及实施例中的各个特征可以相互组合。Some embodiments of the present application will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. The various embodiments described below and various features of the embodiments may be combined with each other without conflict.

请参看图1,图1为本发明实施例提供的一种无衍射涡旋电磁波信道特征的动态安全加密方法流程图。可以构建一种无衍射涡旋电磁波信道特征的动态安全加密架构,由发送端Alice和合法接收端Bob组成。该方法应用模型为三节点的窃听模型,包含一个发送者(Alice),一个合法接收者(Bob)和一个窃听者(Eve)。众所周知,发送端和接收方既可以是终端节点,又可以是网关等类似的网络设备。参见图2所示,图2为本发明实施例提供的无衍射涡旋电磁波信道特征的动态安全加密架构图。假设正常通信双方为Alice和Bob,非法第三方即窃听者为Eve。该无衍射涡旋电磁波信道特征的动态安全加密方法,包括以下步骤:Please refer to FIG. 1 . FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a dynamic security encryption method for a diffraction-free vortex electromagnetic wave channel feature provided by an embodiment of the present invention. A dynamic security encryption architecture without diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel characteristics can be constructed, which consists of the sender Alice and the legitimate receiver Bob. The application model of this method is a three-node eavesdropping model, including a sender (Alice), a legitimate receiver (Bob) and an eavesdropper (Eve). As we all know, the sender and the receiver can be either terminal nodes or similar network devices such as gateways. Referring to FIG. 2 , FIG. 2 is a diagram of a dynamic security encryption architecture diagram of a channel characteristic of a diffraction-free vortex electromagnetic wave provided by an embodiment of the present invention. Assume that the normal communication parties are Alice and Bob, and the illegal third party, the eavesdropper, is Eve. The dynamic security encryption method for the channel characteristics of the diffraction-free vortex electromagnetic wave includes the following steps:

步骤S110:获取发送端的待传输信息;上述待传输信息就是指发送端需要发送出去的信息。上述待传输信息可以是文字信息、图像信息等。上述发送端可以是发送端Alice,也可以是合法接收端Bob。Step S110: Acquire the information to be transmitted by the sender; the above information to be transmitted refers to the information to be sent by the sender. The above-mentioned information to be transmitted may be text information, image information, and the like. The above-mentioned sender may be the sender Alice or the legitimate receiver Bob.

步骤S120:根据发送端与合法接收端发送的无衍射涡旋波束建立无衍射涡旋电磁波信道;上述发送端发送无衍射涡旋波束并接收合法接收端发送的无衍射涡旋波束,合法接收端发送无衍射涡旋波束并接收发送端发送的无衍射涡旋波束,从而通过无衍射涡旋波束建立连接,形成无衍射涡旋电磁波信道。上述发送端和合法接收端均设置有涡旋波束量子化模块,用于产生无衍射涡旋波束。Step S120: Establish a non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel according to the non-diffraction vortex beam sent by the transmitting end and the legitimate receiving end; the above-mentioned transmitting end sends the non-diffraction vortex beam and receives the non-diffraction vortex beam sent by the legal receiving end, and the legal receiving end sends the non-diffractive vortex beam. The non-diffraction vortex beam is sent and the non-diffraction vortex beam sent by the sending end is received, so as to establish a connection through the non-diffraction vortex beam, and form a non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel. Both the sending end and the legitimate receiving end are provided with a vortex beam quantization module for generating a diffraction-free vortex beam.

步骤S130:根据无衍射涡旋电磁波信道中的信道特征对待传输信息进行加密,生成加密信息。上述加密是利用不同无衍射涡旋电磁波模式无线信道之间相位与已调符号矢量叠加实现加密。参见图3所示,图3为本发明实施例提供的无衍射涡旋电磁波信道特征的动态安全加密方法的密钥协商过程示意图。Alice与Bob的通信过程分为四步:信道估计过程,密钥协商过程,密钥加密过程和数据传输过程。请参看图6,图6为本发明实施例提供的根据无衍射涡旋电磁波信道中的信道特征对待传输信息进行加密的流程图上述进行加密的过程包括以下步骤:Step S130: Encrypt the information to be transmitted according to the channel characteristics in the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel to generate encrypted information. The above encryption is implemented by using the phase and modulated symbol vector superposition between wireless channels of different non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave modes. Referring to FIG. 3 , FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a key negotiation process of a dynamic secure encryption method for a diffraction-free vortex electromagnetic wave channel feature provided by an embodiment of the present invention. The communication process between Alice and Bob is divided into four steps: channel estimation process, key negotiation process, key encryption process and data transmission process. Please refer to FIG. 6. FIG. 6 is a flow chart of encrypting information to be transmitted according to channel characteristics in a diffraction-free vortex electromagnetic wave channel provided by an embodiment of the present invention. The above-mentioned encryption process includes the following steps:

首先,获取无衍射涡旋电磁波信道中的信道状态信息;在每次传输开始时都准备信道估计,信道估计就是为了获取发送端Alice和合法接收端Bob之间的CSI(信道状态信息)。信道估计过程可以是发送端Alice与合法接收端Bob在尽可能临近时隙发送涡旋模式并接收对方涡旋模式。上述获取信道状态信息可以是在同一个时隙内或者相干时间内,合法接收端和发送端同时且分别发送导频进行上行和下行信道的信道探测,发送端得到上行信道系数,合法接收端得到下行信道系数,以得到信道状态信息。我们采取一种发送导频的信道探测策略,具体地讲:在每次传输开始时准备信道估计,信道估计是为了获取发端与合法接收端之间的CSI(信道状态信息),同一个时隙内或者相干时间内,合法接收端Bob和发送端Alice同时且分别发送导频进行上行和下行信道的信道探测。发送端Alice得到包含第一信道强度SA、第一天线极化状态{|HA>,|VA>}和第一无衍射涡旋电磁波模式相位{-|lA>,|lA>}的上行信道系数hA;合法接收端Bob得到包含第二信道强SB、第二天线极化状态{|HB>,|VB>}和第二无衍射涡旋电磁波模式相位{-|lB>,|lB>}的下行信道系数hB。由于信道是变化的,因此每隔一段时隙重新进行信道估计,两次估计之间认为信道相对稳定且CSI(信道状态信息)保持不变,仅发送端Alice与合法接收端知晓估计得到的瞬时信道信息,窃听端Eve将无法获得正确的CSI(信道状态信息)。First, the channel state information in the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel is obtained; the channel estimation is prepared at the beginning of each transmission, and the channel estimation is to obtain the CSI (channel state information) between the transmitting end Alice and the legitimate receiving end Bob. The channel estimation process may be that the transmitting end Alice and the legitimate receiving end Bob send the vortex pattern and receive the other party's vortex pattern in a time slot as close as possible. The above-mentioned acquisition of the channel state information may be in the same time slot or within the coherence time, the legitimate receiver and the transmitter send pilots at the same time and respectively to perform channel detection of the uplink and downlink channels, the transmitter obtains the uplink channel coefficient, and the legitimate receiver obtains the channel state information. Downlink channel coefficients to obtain channel state information. We adopt a channel sounding strategy of sending pilots. Specifically, channel estimation is prepared at the beginning of each transmission. The channel estimation is to obtain the CSI (channel state information) between the sender and the legitimate receiver. The same time slot Within the internal or coherent time, the legitimate receiver Bob and the transmitter Alice simultaneously and respectively send pilot frequencies to perform channel detection of the uplink and downlink channels. The transmitting end Alice obtains the first channel intensity S A , the first antenna polarization state {|H A >, |V A >} and the phase of the first non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave mode {-|l A >, |l A > } The upstream channel coefficient h A ; the legal receiver Bob obtains the second channel strength S B , the second antenna polarization state {|H B >, | V B >} and the second diffraction-free vortex electromagnetic wave mode phase {- |l B >, |l B >} downlink channel coefficient h B . Since the channel is changing, the channel estimation is performed again every time slot. It is considered that the channel is relatively stable and the CSI (channel state information) remains unchanged between the two estimations. Only the sender Alice and the legitimate receiver know the estimated instantaneous value. Channel information, the eavesdropping end Eve will not be able to obtain correct CSI (channel state information).

然后,根据信道状态信息生成加密信道系数;假设发送端Alice与合法接收端Bob进行上、下行信道探测时无时延,满足信道互易性准则,以产生下一步涡旋模式组合密钥生成种子。在发送端看来,发送端与合法接收端估计得到的主信道系数hA与h`B一致的(h代表发的状态,h`代表收的状态),接收端亦然;假设发送端Alice以SA=23dB针对不同模式发送导频(|HA>=1,|VA>=1,-|lA>=-3,|lA>=3),合法接收端Bob接收到能够导频信息中进行信道估计,得到接收涡旋模式为(|H`A>=1,|V`A>=1,-|l`A>=-3,|`lA>=3),反之亦然,因此双方信道估计可以作为下一步涡旋模式组合密钥生成种子。合法接收端可以通过此方案避免密钥共享,实现与发端的密钥信息交互。上述生成加密信道系数是指将各自的发射信道与接收信道估计值组成六维涡旋模式

Figure BDA0003278039950000091
六个涡旋模式生成密钥种子,发送端Alice使用某个涡旋模式密钥种子生成密钥,进行发送数据的加密调制。具体包括以下步骤:Then, the encrypted channel coefficient is generated according to the channel state information; it is assumed that there is no delay when the sender Alice and the legitimate receiver Bob perform uplink and downlink channel detection, and the channel reciprocity criterion is satisfied, so as to generate the next vortex mode combined key generation seed . From the perspective of the sender, the main channel coefficients h A and h` B estimated by the sender and the legitimate receiver are consistent (h represents the sending state, and h` represents the receiving state), and the same is true for the receiving end; assuming that the sending end Alice With S A =23dB, pilots are sent for different modes (| HA >=1, |VA >=1, -|l A >=-3, |l A > = 3), and the legitimate receiver Bob receives the Channel estimation is performed in the pilot information, and the received vortex pattern is obtained as (|H` A >=1, |V` A >=1, -|l` A >=-3, |`l A >=3), And vice versa, so the channel estimates of both parties can be used as the seed for the next step of vortex mode combination key generation. The legitimate receiver can avoid key sharing through this scheme and realize the exchange of key information with the sender. The above-mentioned generation of encrypted channel coefficients refers to the formation of a six-dimensional vortex pattern from the estimated values of the respective transmit channels and receive channels.
Figure BDA0003278039950000091
The six vortex modes generate key seeds, and the sender Alice uses a certain vortex mode key seed to generate a key to encrypt and modulate the transmitted data. Specifically include the following steps:

第一步,将发送端的上行信道系数中的上行发射信道系数和上行接收信道系数组成第一六维涡旋模式,即加密信道系数

Figure BDA0003278039950000101
比如发送端Alice的第一六维涡旋模式可以是{SA,S`B}{|HA>,|VA>,-|lA>,|lA>,|H`B>,|V`B>,-|l`B>,|l`B>}。在一个相干时间内,发送端Alice发送N个数据符号给合法接收端Bob,发送端Alice进行信道估计得到的加密信道系数为
Figure BDA0003278039950000102
The first step is to form a first six-dimensional vortex pattern from the uplink transmit channel coefficients and the uplink receive channel coefficients in the uplink channel coefficients of the sender, that is, the encrypted channel coefficients.
Figure BDA0003278039950000101
For example, the first six-dimensional vortex pattern of Alice at the sending end can be {S A , S` B }{|H A >, |V A >, -|l A >, |l A >, |H` B >, | V`B >, -| l`B >, | l`B >}. Within a coherence time, the sender Alice sends N data symbols to the legitimate receiver Bob, and the encrypted channel coefficient obtained by the sender Alice through channel estimation is
Figure BDA0003278039950000102

第二步,将上述合法接收端的下行信道系数中的下行发射信道系数和下行接收信道系数组成第二六维涡旋模式,即加密信道系数

Figure BDA0003278039950000103
In the second step, the downlink transmit channel coefficients and the downlink receive channel coefficients in the downlink channel coefficients of the legal receiving end are formed into a second six-dimensional vortex pattern, that is, the encrypted channel coefficients
Figure BDA0003278039950000103

然后,将加密信道系数作为密钥符号与待传输信息中的各个数据符号点进行矢量相乘和矢量叠加,生成加密后的发送符号;上述数据符号点包括发送端通过调制将比特数据映射为星座图上的已调符号点。发送端Alice可以使用某种调制方法将比特数据映射为星座图上的一个已调符号点

Figure BDA0003278039950000104
Figure BDA0003278039950000105
在此相干时间内,发送端Alice、合法接收端Bob进行信道估计得到对应的信道系数为
Figure BDA0003278039950000106
Figure BDA0003278039950000107
作为密钥符号与数据点进行矢量相乘实现加密,并对每个已调符号点进行矢量叠加的加密操作,得到加密后的发送符号。Then, the encrypted channel coefficient is used as the key symbol to perform vector multiplication and vector superposition with each data symbol point in the information to be transmitted to generate an encrypted transmission symbol; the above-mentioned data symbol points include that the transmitting end maps the bit data into a constellation through modulation Adjusted symbol points on the graph. Alice at the sender can use some modulation method to map the bit data to a modulated symbol point on the constellation
Figure BDA0003278039950000104
Figure BDA0003278039950000105
During this coherence time, the transmitting end Alice and the legitimate receiving end Bob perform channel estimation to obtain the corresponding channel coefficients as
Figure BDA0003278039950000106
Will
Figure BDA0003278039950000107
As the key symbol and the data point, the vector multiplication is performed to realize encryption, and the encryption operation of vector superposition is performed on each adjusted symbol point to obtain the encrypted transmission symbol.

最后,将加密后的发送符号添加校验码,生成加密信息。上述添加校验码可以是添加CRC校验,从而获得发送端Alice加密后的加密信息

Figure BDA0003278039950000108
上述得到加密信息的公式为:,
Figure BDA0003278039950000109
其中,
Figure BDA00032780399500001010
为已调符号点,
Figure BDA00032780399500001011
为加密信息,
Figure BDA00032780399500001012
为密钥,CRC为校验码。Finally, a check code is added to the encrypted transmission symbol to generate encrypted information. The above-mentioned adding check code may be adding a CRC check, so as to obtain the encrypted information encrypted by Alice at the sending end
Figure BDA0003278039950000108
The above formula for obtaining encrypted information is:
Figure BDA0003278039950000109
in,
Figure BDA00032780399500001010
is the adjusted symbol point,
Figure BDA00032780399500001011
To encrypt information,
Figure BDA00032780399500001012
is the key, and CRC is the check code.

上述实现过程中,通过获取发送端的待传输信息;然后根据发送端与合法接收端发送的无衍射涡旋波束建立无衍射涡旋电磁波信道;最后根据无衍射涡旋电磁波信道中的信道特征对待传输信息进行加密,生成加密信息。通过建立无衍射涡旋电磁波信道利用临近时隙物理信道涡旋模式估值与发送涡旋模式同时生成密钥技术,使用临近时隙物理信道涡旋模式估值与发送涡旋模式等物理信息作为密钥种子生成密钥,在调制过程中生成对应的符号,并利用包含以上信息的密钥对所传输业务数据进行加密,利用不同无衍射涡旋电磁波模式无线信道之间相位与已调符号矢量叠加实现加密,提高通信节点上数据传输的安全性,使期望用户与窃听者在密钥协商阶段接收到不完全相同的密钥包,从而导致窃听者无法获得正常通信用户之间的密钥,达到保障数据安全传输,无衍射涡旋电磁波可以经过障碍物后自恢复,长距离传输中能够保持涡旋模式和量子态,因此在无线通信系统中,无衍射涡旋电磁波模式的信道物理特性又决定了涡旋波束模式特性空间的随机性与独立性,从而使得两条不同的无线信道具有丢包差异性。且系统对信道相位误差有一定的容忍度。与目前常用的物理层加密技术相比,生成密钥的方法简单,复杂度很低,同时,其随机性保证了加密的安全性。In the above implementation process, the information to be transmitted at the transmitting end is obtained; then the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel is established according to the non-diffraction vortex beam sent by the transmitting end and the legitimate receiving end; finally, the transmission is to be transmitted according to the channel characteristics in the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel. The information is encrypted to generate encrypted information. By establishing a diffraction-free vortex electromagnetic wave channel, the vortex mode estimation of the adjacent time slot physical channel and the transmission vortex mode are used to generate the key technology at the same time, and the physical information such as the vortex mode estimation of the adjacent time slot physical channel and the transmission vortex mode are used as The key seed generates a key, generates a corresponding symbol during the modulation process, and uses the key containing the above information to encrypt the transmitted service data, and uses the phase and the modulated symbol vector between the wireless channels of different non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave modes. The superposition realizes encryption, improves the security of data transmission on the communication node, and enables the expected user and the eavesdropper to receive different key packages during the key negotiation stage, so that the eavesdropper cannot obtain the key between normal communication users. To ensure the safe transmission of data, the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave can self-recover after passing through obstacles, and the vortex mode and quantum state can be maintained during long-distance transmission. Therefore, in the wireless communication system, the channel physical characteristics of the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave mode are also It determines the randomness and independence of the vortex beam mode characteristic space, so that the two different wireless channels have packet loss differences. And the system has a certain tolerance to the channel phase error. Compared with the currently commonly used physical layer encryption technology, the method of generating the key is simple and the complexity is low, and at the same time, its randomness ensures the security of encryption.

其中,合法接收端进行解密时具体包括以下步骤:Wherein, the decryption by the legitimate receiver specifically includes the following steps:

首先,发送端将加密信息发送给合法接收端;在加密完成后,发送端Alice将密文信息通过信道正确传输给合法接收端Bob。First, the sender sends the encrypted information to the legitimate receiver; after the encryption is completed, the sender Alice correctly transmits the ciphertext information to the legitimate receiver Bob through the channel.

然后,合法接收端利用密钥对加密信息进行按位模二加解密,生成明文信息。合法接收端Bob利用密钥

Figure BDA0003278039950000111
对密文进行按位模二加解密,即可获得明文信息,上述采用模二加运算属于现有技术,相加后达到2就进位,但只保留一位,在此就不再赘述。合法接收端通过解密就可以得到明文,就可以知道传输端传输的信息,从而保证了信息的准确传输。Then, the legitimate receiving end uses the key to perform bitwise modulo two encryption and decryption on the encrypted information to generate plaintext information. The legitimate receiver Bob uses the key
Figure BDA0003278039950000111
The plaintext information can be obtained by performing bitwise modulo-2 encryption and decryption on the ciphertext. The above-mentioned modulo-2 addition operation belongs to the prior art. After the addition reaches 2, it is carried over, but only one bit is reserved, which will not be repeated here. The legitimate receiving end can obtain the plaintext through decryption, and can know the information transmitted by the transmitting end, thus ensuring the accurate transmission of the information.

其中,密钥协商过程中,发送端Alice与合法接收端Bob按时隙交替发送密钥包,具体包括以下步骤:Among them, during the key negotiation process, the sender Alice and the legitimate receiver Bob alternately send key packets according to time slots, which specifically includes the following steps:

发送端与合法接收端按时隙交替发送密钥包。其中,上述密钥包包括发送端发送给合法接收端的密钥包和合法接收端发送给发送端的密钥包。参见图4所示,图4为本发明实施例提供的无衍射涡旋电磁波信道特征的动态安全加密方法中发送端Alice发送给合法接收端Bob的密钥包的结构示意图。发送端Alice发送给合法接收端Bob的密钥包内容包括:第一密钥包序号,伪随机产生长度为L比特的第一密钥内容,第一校验码以及其他传输必要信息;Bob发送给Alice的密钥包内容包括:第二密钥包序号,伪随机产生长度为L比特的第二密钥内容,第二校验码,是否接收到对方发送的第一密钥包以及其他传输必要信息。The sender and the legitimate receiver send key packets alternately according to time slots. Wherein, the above key package includes the key package sent by the sender to the legitimate receiver and the key package sent by the legitimate receiver to the sender. Referring to FIG. 4 , FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a key packet sent by the transmitting end Alice to the legitimate receiving end Bob in the dynamic security encryption method for diffraction-free vortex electromagnetic wave channel characteristics provided by an embodiment of the present invention. The content of the key package sent by the sender Alice to the legitimate receiver Bob includes: the first key package serial number, the first key content with a length of L bits generated by pseudo-random, the first check code and other necessary information for transmission; Bob sends The content of the key package to Alice includes: the second key package serial number, the pseudo-randomly generated second key content with a length of L bits, the second check code, whether the first key package sent by the other party is received and other transmissions necessary information.

在每次传输数据之前,通信双方Alice、Bob先进行密钥协商过程:Before each data transmission, Alice and Bob both parties perform a key negotiation process:

假设发送端Alice已知主信道中包含无衍射涡旋电磁波模式相位信息的信道状态信息(CSI),图2中标为pA,非法窃听者Eve在通信范围内,可以收到发送端Alice发出的消息,窃听信道记为qA。其中,窃听者的攻击方式为智能攻击型,所谓智能攻击型窃听者已知加密方式但未知具体的密钥信息。Assuming that the sender Alice knows that the main channel contains the channel state information (CSI) of the phase information of the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave mode, which is marked as p A in Figure 2, the illegal eavesdropper Eve is within the communication range and can receive the information sent by the sender Alice. message, the eavesdropping channel is denoted as q A . Among them, the attack method of the eavesdropper is an intelligent attack type. The so-called intelligent attack type eavesdropper knows the encryption method but does not know the specific key information.

其中,上述发送端和合法接收端均安装有信道测量模块、涡旋波束量子化模块、密钥协商模块、加密模块和数据处理模块。具体的,请参看图5,图5为本发明实施例提供的发送端Alice和合法接收端Bob的结构示意图。发送端Alice安装有第一信道测量模块1、第一涡旋波束量子化模块2、第一密钥协商模块3、第一加密模块4和第一数据处理模块5,上述第一信道测量模块1用于信道状态测量,以获取信道状态信息;上述第一涡旋波束量子化模块2用于产生无衍射涡旋波束;上述第一密钥协商模块3用于根据涡旋波束特征协商产生密钥;上述第一加密模块4和第一数据处理模块5分别根据密钥协商结果产生加密密钥。合法接收端Bob安装有第二信道测量模块6、第二涡旋波束量子化模块7、第二密钥协商模块8、第二加密模块9和第二数据处理模块10。上述第二信道测量模块6用于测量合法接收端Bob的信道特征,以获取信道状态信息;上述第二涡旋波束量子化模块7用于产生无衍射涡旋波;上述第二密钥协商模块8用于合法接收端Bob密钥协商;上述第二加密模块9和第二数据处理模块10分别用于合法接收端Bob的数据加密处理。Wherein, the above-mentioned sending end and legal receiving end are all installed with a channel measurement module, a vortex beam quantization module, a key agreement module, an encryption module and a data processing module. Specifically, please refer to FIG. 5. FIG. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of a transmitting end Alice and a legitimate receiving end Bob according to an embodiment of the present invention. The transmitting end Alice is installed with a first channel measurement module 1, a first vortex beam quantization module 2, a first key agreement module 3, a first encryption module 4 and a first data processing module 5. The above-mentioned first channel measurement module 1 Used for channel state measurement to obtain channel state information; the above-mentioned first vortex beam quantization module 2 is used to generate a diffraction-free vortex beam; the above-mentioned first key negotiation module 3 is used to generate a key according to the vortex beam feature negotiation ; The above-mentioned first encryption module 4 and first data processing module 5 respectively generate encryption keys according to the results of key negotiation. The legitimate receiving end Bob is installed with a second channel measurement module 6 , a second vortex beam quantization module 7 , a second key agreement module 8 , a second encryption module 9 and a second data processing module 10 . The above-mentioned second channel measurement module 6 is used to measure the channel characteristics of the legitimate receiver Bob to obtain channel state information; the above-mentioned second vortex beam quantization module 7 is used to generate a diffraction-free vortex wave; the above-mentioned second key agreement module 8 is used for the key negotiation of the legal receiver Bob; the above-mentioned second encryption module 9 and the second data processing module 10 are respectively used for the data encryption processing of the legal receiver Bob.

在导频时隙,发送端Alice向合法接收端Bob的第二信道测量模块6发送探测数据包,从合法接收端Bob的第二信道测量模块6接收响应数据包;发送端Alice通过解析响应数据包获得其信道参数序列,并向第一涡旋波束量子化模块2发送上述信道参数序列;合法接收端Bob的第二信道测量模块6与发送端Alice的第一信道测量模块1、第二涡旋波束量子化模块7相连接。合法接收端Bob的第二信道测量模块6从发送端Alice的第一信道测量模块1接收探测数据包,向发送端Alice的第一信道测量模块1发送响应数据包;第二信道测量模块6通过解析探测数据包获得合法接收端Bob的信道参数序列,并向第二涡旋波束量子化模块7发送合法接收端Bob的信道参数序列。In the pilot time slot, the sender Alice sends a probe data packet to the second channel measurement module 6 of the legal receiver Bob, and receives a response packet from the second channel measurement module 6 of the legal receiver Bob; the sender Alice analyzes the response data by analyzing the response data. The packet obtains its channel parameter sequence, and sends the above-mentioned channel parameter sequence to the first vortex beam quantization module 2; the second channel measurement module 6 of the legal receiver Bob and the first channel measurement module 1 and the second vortex of the sender Alice The rotating beam quantization module 7 is connected. The second channel measurement module 6 of the legal receiver Bob receives the probe data packet from the first channel measurement module 1 of the sender Alice, and sends a response data packet to the first channel measurement module 1 of the sender Alice; the second channel measurement module 6 passes the The detection data packet is analyzed to obtain the channel parameter sequence of the legal receiver Bob, and the channel parameter sequence of the legal receiver Bob is sent to the second vortex beam quantization module 7 .

请参阅图7,图7为本申请实施例提供的电子设备的一种示意性结构框图。电子设备包括存储器101、处理器102和通信接口103,该存储器101、处理器102和通信接口103相互之间直接或间接地电性连接,以实现数据的传输或交互。例如,这些元件相互之间可通过一条或多条通讯总线或信号线实现电性连接。存储器101可用于存储软件程序及模块,如本申请实施例所提供的一种无衍射涡旋电磁波信道特征的动态安全加密方法对应的程序指令/模块,处理器102通过执行存储在存储器101内的软件程序及模块,从而执行各种功能应用以及数据处理。该通信接口103可用于与其他节点设备进行信令或数据的通信。Please refer to FIG. 7 , which is a schematic structural block diagram of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the present application. The electronic device includes a memory 101, a processor 102, and a communication interface 103. The memory 101, the processor 102, and the communication interface 103 are directly or indirectly electrically connected to each other to realize data transmission or interaction. For example, these elements may be electrically connected to each other through one or more communication buses or signal lines. The memory 101 can be used to store software programs and modules, such as program instructions/modules corresponding to a dynamic security encryption method without diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel characteristics provided in the embodiments of the present application, the processor 102 executes the program instructions/modules stored in the memory 101. Software programs and modules that perform various functional applications and data processing. The communication interface 103 can be used for signaling or data communication with other node devices.

其中,存储器101可以是但不限于,随机存取存储器(Random Access Memory,RAM),只读存储器(Read Only Memory,ROM),可编程只读存储器(Programmable Read-OnlyMemory,PROM),可擦除只读存储器(Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory,EPROM),电可擦除只读存储器(Electric Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory,EEPROM)等。The memory 101 may be, but not limited to, a random access memory (Random Access Memory, RAM), a read only memory (Read Only Memory, ROM), a programmable read only memory (Programmable Read-Only Memory, PROM), an erasable memory Read-only memory (Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory, EPROM), Electric Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (Electric Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory, EEPROM), etc.

处理器102可以是一种集成电路芯片,具有信号处理能力。该处理器102可以是通用处理器,包括中央处理器(Central Processing Unit,CPU)、网络处理器(NetworkProcessor,NP)等;还可以是数字信号处理器(Digital Signal Processing,DSP)、专用集成电路(Application Specific Integrated Circuit,ASIC)、现场可编程门阵列(Field-Programmable Gate Array,FPGA)或者其他可编程逻辑器件、分立门或者晶体管逻辑器件、分立硬件组件。The processor 102 may be an integrated circuit chip with signal processing capability. The processor 102 may be a general-purpose processor, including a central processing unit (Central Processing Unit, CPU), a network processor (Network Processor, NP), etc.; it may also be a digital signal processor (Digital Signal Processing, DSP), an application-specific integrated circuit (Application Specific Integrated Circuit, ASIC), Field-Programmable Gate Array (Field-Programmable Gate Array, FPGA) or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components.

可以理解,图7所示的结构仅为示意,电子设备还可包括比图7中所示更多或者更少的组件,或者具有与图7所示不同的配置。图7中所示的各组件可以采用硬件、软件或其组合实现。It can be understood that the structure shown in FIG. 7 is only for illustration, and the electronic device may further include more or less components than those shown in FIG. 7 , or have different configurations from those shown in FIG. 7 . Each component shown in FIG. 7 may be implemented in hardware, software, or a combination thereof.

在本申请所提供的实施例中,应该理解到,所揭露的方法,也可以通过其它的方式实现。以上所描述的装置实施例仅仅是示意性的,例如,附图中的流程图和框图显示了根据本申请的多个实施例的装置、方法和计算机程序产品的可能实现的体系架构、功能和操作。在这点上,流程图或框图中的每个方框可以代表一个模块、程序段或代码的一部分,上述模块、程序段或代码的一部分包含一个或多个用于实现规定的逻辑功能的可执行指令。也应当注意,在有些作为替换的实现方式中,方框中所标注的功能也可以以不同于附图中所标注的顺序发生。例如,两个连续的方框实际上可以基本并行地执行,它们有时也可以按相反的顺序执行,这依所涉及的功能而定。也要注意的是,框图和/或流程图中的每个方框、以及框图和/或流程图中的方框的组合,可以用执行规定的功能或动作的专用的基于硬件的系统来实现,或者可以用专用硬件与计算机指令的组合来实现。In the embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed method may also be implemented in other manners. The apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative, for example, the flowcharts and block diagrams in the accompanying drawings illustrate the architectures, functions and possible implementations of apparatuses, methods and computer program products according to various embodiments of the present application. operate. In this regard, each block in the flowchart or block diagrams may represent a module, segment, or portion of code, which contains one or more possible functions for implementing the specified logical function(s) Execute the instruction. It should also be noted that, in some alternative implementations, the functions noted in the block may occur out of the order noted in the figures. For example, two blocks in succession may, in fact, be executed substantially concurrently, or the blocks may sometimes be executed in the reverse order, depending upon the functionality involved. It is also noted that each block of the block diagrams and/or flowchart illustrations, and combinations of blocks in the block diagrams and/or flowchart illustrations, can be implemented in dedicated hardware-based systems that perform the specified functions or actions , or can be implemented in a combination of dedicated hardware and computer instructions.

另外,在本申请各个实施例中的各功能模块可以集成在一起形成一个独立的部分,也可以是各个模块单独存在,也可以两个或两个以上模块集成形成一个独立的部分。In addition, each functional module in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated together to form an independent part, or each module may exist independently, or two or more modules may be integrated to form an independent part.

上述功能如果以软件功能模块的形式实现并作为独立的产品销售或使用时,可以存储在一个计算机可读取存储介质中。基于这样的理解,本申请的技术方案本质上或者说对现有技术做出贡献的部分或者该技术方案的部分可以以软件产品的形式体现出来,该计算机软件产品存储在一个存储介质中,包括若干指令用以使得一台计算机设备(可以是个人计算机,服务器,或者网络设备等)执行本申请各个实施例上述方法的全部或部分步骤。而前述的存储介质包括:U盘、移动硬盘、只读存储器(ROM,Read-Only Memory)、随机存取存储器(RAM,Random Access Memory)、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。If the above functions are implemented in the form of software function modules and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present application can be embodied in the form of a software product in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art or the part of the technical solution. The computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including Several instructions are used to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the above-mentioned methods of the various embodiments of the present application. The aforementioned storage medium includes: U disk, mobile hard disk, Read-Only Memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory), Random Access Memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), magnetic disk or optical disk and other media that can store program codes .

综上,本申请实施例提供的一种无衍射涡旋电磁波信道特征的动态安全加密方法,通过获取发送端的待传输信息;然后根据发送端与合法接收端发送的无衍射涡旋波束建立无衍射涡旋电磁波信道;最后根据无衍射涡旋电磁波信道中的信道特征对待传输信息进行加密,生成加密信息。通过建立无衍射涡旋电磁波信道利用临近时隙物理信道涡旋模式估值与发送涡旋模式同时生成密钥技术,使用临近时隙物理信道涡旋模式估值与发送涡旋模式等物理信息作为密钥种子生成密钥,在调制过程中生成对应的符号,并利用包含以上信息的密钥对所传输业务数据进行加密,利用不同无衍射涡旋电磁波模式无线信道之间相位与已调符号矢量叠加实现加密,提高通信节点上数据传输的安全性,使期望用户与窃听者在密钥协商阶段接收到不完全相同的密钥包,从而导致窃听者无法获得正常通信用户之间的密钥,达到保障数据安全传输,无衍射涡旋电磁波可以经过障碍物后自恢复,长距离传输中能够保持涡旋模式和量子态,因此在无线通信系统中,无衍射涡旋电磁波模式的信道物理特性又决定了涡旋波束模式特性空间的随机性与独立性,从而使得两条不同的无线信道具有丢包差异性。且系统对信道相位误差有一定的容忍度。与目前常用的物理层加密技术相比,生成密钥的方法简单,复杂度很低,同时,其随机性保证了加密的安全性。To sum up, a dynamic security encryption method for the channel characteristics of a diffraction-free vortex electromagnetic wave provided by the embodiment of the present application obtains the information to be transmitted at the sending end; Vortex electromagnetic wave channel; finally, according to the channel characteristics in the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel, the information to be transmitted is encrypted to generate encrypted information. By establishing a diffraction-free vortex electromagnetic wave channel, the vortex mode estimation of the adjacent time slot physical channel and the transmission vortex mode are used to generate the key technology at the same time, and the physical information such as the vortex mode estimation of the adjacent time slot physical channel and the transmission vortex mode are used as The key seed generates a key, generates a corresponding symbol during the modulation process, and uses the key containing the above information to encrypt the transmitted service data, and uses the phase and the modulated symbol vector between the wireless channels of different non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave modes. The superposition realizes encryption, improves the security of data transmission on the communication node, and enables the expected user and the eavesdropper to receive different key packages during the key negotiation stage, so that the eavesdropper cannot obtain the key between normal communication users. To ensure the safe transmission of data, the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave can self-recover after passing through obstacles, and the vortex mode and quantum state can be maintained during long-distance transmission. Therefore, in the wireless communication system, the channel physical characteristics of the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave mode are also It determines the randomness and independence of the vortex beam mode characteristic space, so that the two different wireless channels have packet loss differences. And the system has a certain tolerance to the channel phase error. Compared with the currently commonly used physical layer encryption technology, the method of generating the key is simple and the complexity is low, and at the same time, its randomness ensures the security of encryption.

以上仅为本申请的优选实施例而已,并不用于限制本申请,对于本领域的技术人员来说,本申请可以有各种更改和变化。凡在本申请的精神和原则之内,所作的任何修改、等同替换、改进等,均应包含在本申请的保护范围之内。The above are only preferred embodiments of the present application, and are not intended to limit the present application. For those skilled in the art, the present application may have various modifications and changes. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of this application shall be included within the protection scope of this application.

对于本领域技术人员而言,显然本申请不限于上述示范性实施例的细节,而且在不背离本申请的精神或基本特征的情况下,能够以其它的具体形式实现本申请。因此,无论从哪一点来看,均应将实施例看作是示范性的,而且是非限制性的,本申请的范围由所附权利要求而不是上述说明限定,因此旨在将落在权利要求的等同要件的含义和范围内的所有变化囊括在本申请内。不应将权利要求中的任何附图标记视为限制所涉及的权利要求。It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that the present application is not limited to the details of the above-described exemplary embodiments, but that the present application can be implemented in other specific forms without departing from the spirit or essential characteristics of the present application. Accordingly, the embodiments are to be regarded in all respects as illustrative and not restrictive, and the scope of the application is to be defined by the appended claims rather than the foregoing description, which is therefore intended to fall within the scope of the claims. All changes that come within the meaning and scope of equivalents to are included in this application. Any reference signs in the claims shall not be construed as limiting the involved claim.

Claims (10)

1. A dynamic security encryption method for diffraction-free vortex electromagnetic wave channel characteristics is characterized by comprising the following steps:
acquiring information to be transmitted of a transmitting end;
establishing a non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel according to non-diffraction vortex beams sent by a sending end and a legal receiving end;
and encrypting the information to be transmitted according to the channel characteristics in the diffraction-free vortex electromagnetic wave channel to generate encrypted information.
2. The dynamic security encryption method for the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel characteristics according to claim 1, wherein the step of encrypting the information to be transmitted according to the channel characteristics in the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel to generate the encrypted information comprises the following steps:
acquiring channel state information in a non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel;
generating an encrypted channel coefficient according to the channel state information;
taking the encrypted channel coefficient as a key symbol, and performing vector multiplication and vector superposition on each data symbol point in the information to be transmitted to generate an encrypted sending symbol;
and adding a check code to the encrypted transmission symbol to generate encrypted information.
3. The dynamic security encryption method for the non-diffractive vortex electromagnetic wave channel characteristic of claim 2, wherein the data symbol points comprise modulated symbol points on a constellation map mapped by the transmitting end through modulation.
4. The dynamic security encryption method for the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel characteristics according to claim 2, wherein the step of obtaining the channel state information in the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic wave channel comprises the steps of:
in the same time slot or coherence time, a legal receiving end and a sending end simultaneously and respectively send pilot frequency to perform channel detection of uplink and downlink channels, the sending end obtains an uplink channel coefficient, and the legal receiving end obtains a downlink channel coefficient to obtain channel state information.
5. The dynamic security encryption method for the channel characteristics of the non-diffractive vortex electromagnetic wave of claim 4, wherein the step of generating the encrypted channel coefficients according to the channel state information comprises the steps of;
forming a first six-dimensional vortex mode by an uplink transmitting channel coefficient and an uplink receiving channel coefficient in the uplink channel coefficient of a transmitting end, namely encrypting the channel coefficient
Figure FDA0003278039940000021
Forming a second six-dimensional vortex mode by using the downlink transmitting channel coefficient and the downlink receiving channel coefficient in the downlink channel coefficient of the legal receiving end, namely encrypting the channel coefficient
Figure FDA0003278039940000022
6. The dynamic security encryption method for the non-diffractive vortex electromagnetic wave channel characteristic of claim 1, further comprising the steps of:
the sending end sends the encrypted information to a legal receiving end;
and the legal receiving terminal performs bitwise modulo two encryption and decryption on the encrypted information by using the secret key to generate plaintext information.
7. The dynamic security encryption method for the non-diffractive vortex electromagnetic wave channel characteristic of claim 1, further comprising the steps of:
the sending end and the legal receiving end alternately send the key packages according to the time slot.
8. The dynamic security encryption method for the characteristics of the non-diffractive vortex electromagnetic wave channel according to claim 7, wherein the key packets include a key packet sent by a sending end to a legal receiving end and a key packet sent by a legal receiving end to a sending end.
9. The dynamic security encryption method for the channel characteristics of the non-diffraction vortex electromagnetic waves according to any one of claims 1 to 8, wherein a channel measurement module, a vortex beam quantization module, a key negotiation module, an encryption module and a data processing module are installed at both the sending end and the legal receiving end.
10. An electronic device, comprising:
a memory for storing one or more programs;
a processor;
the one or more programs, when executed by the processor, implement the method of any of claims 1-9.
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