CN112069515B - Safe EFUSE burning method and system - Google Patents
Safe EFUSE burning method and system Download PDFInfo
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- CN112069515B CN112069515B CN202010842720.8A CN202010842720A CN112069515B CN 112069515 B CN112069515 B CN 112069515B CN 202010842720 A CN202010842720 A CN 202010842720A CN 112069515 B CN112069515 B CN 112069515B
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/602—Providing cryptographic facilities or services
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/606—Protecting data by securing the transmission between two devices or processes
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F8/00—Arrangements for software engineering
- G06F8/60—Software deployment
- G06F8/61—Installation
- G06F8/63—Image based installation; Cloning; Build to order
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Abstract
The invention discloses a safe EFUSE burning method and a safe EFUSE burning system, wherein the method comprises the following steps: the burning software randomly generates a first private key D1 of the burning software, and calculates a first shared key S1 according to the first private key D1; after receiving the shared key of the burning software end, the chip end randomly generates a second private key D2 of the chip end, calculates a second shared key S2 according to the second private key D2, signs the S2, and the signature is Q; the burning software calculates a first communication encryption key E according to the D1 of the software and the S2 of the chip end, and the chip end calculates a second communication encryption key E' according to the D2 of the software and the first shared key S1 of the software end; if e=e' holds, consider that the first communication encryption key E can be a symmetric encryption key of the communication link; the burning software encrypts data to be burned into the EFUSE using the first communication encryption key E. The safe EFUSE burning method and system provided by the invention can effectively protect the data safety in the EFUSE burning process and ensure that the data is acquired by a real burning chip.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of chip burning, relates to a burning method, and particularly relates to a safe EFUSE burning method and system.
Background
EFUSE (one time programmable memory) or OTP plays an important role as a medium for chip data storage. It is well known that encryption keys for chip applications are often burned into the EFUSE built into the chip. Moreover, in the IOT era, the communication encryption key, authentication data and the like of the terminal product and the cloud service are also burnt in the EFUSE built in the chip; it follows that ensuring data security of EFUSE is particularly important.
The built-in EFUSE of the chip can ensure the safety of the data after the burning through setting read-write protection, but cannot ensure the data safety of the EFUSE in the burning process. At present, the mode of burning EFUSE by a chip is basically based on serial port communication, and the communication data is in plaintext, so that the mode is easy to be monitored by a third party, and the monitoring cost is low; moreover, the mode is also easy to be disguised as a chip by a disguiser, and EFUSE data to be burnt is obtained, so that the process of burning EFUSE data has great stealing risk, and great hidden danger is brought to the intellectual property protection of the product.
A common EFUSE burning scenario is shown in fig. 1; EFUSE burning is generally performed in a common electronic factory with extremely low security level, so that a listener can easily steal data on a communication link in the burning process by using the existing mature eavesdropping technology, and a communication protocol or a communication mode is always disclosed. In this burning scenario, the listener can easily parse out the data burned into EFUSE according to the protocol.
In addition, even if the data of the communication link is additionally monitored and protected, due to the disclosure of the communication protocol or the communication mode, a masquerade person can masquerade as a chip to be burned according to the communication protocol, so that the prior safety protection mechanism is broken.
In view of this, there is an urgent need to design a new EFUSE writing method to overcome at least some of the above-mentioned drawbacks of the existing EFUSE writing method.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides a safe EFUSE burning method and a safe EFUSE burning system, which can effectively protect the data safety in the EFUSE burning process, ensure that the data is acquired by a real burning chip, avoid the data from being monitored and stolen in the burning process, and prevent a camouflage person from camouflaging the chip to be burned to steal the EFUSE data to be burned.
In order to solve the technical problems, according to one aspect of the present invention, the following technical scheme is adopted:
a secure EFUSE burning method, the method comprising:
the burning software randomly generates a first private key D1 of the burning software, calculates a first shared key S1 according to the first private key D1, and sends the first shared key S1 to the chip end through the communication interface;
after receiving the shared key of the burning software end, the chip end randomly generates a second private key D2 of the chip end, calculates a second shared key S2 according to the second private key D2, signs the second shared key S2, and sends the second shared key S2 and the signature Q to the burning software through a communication interface;
after the chip burning software receives the second shared secret key S2 and the signature Q, verifying the legitimacy of the second shared secret key S2 according to the chip public key P and the received signature Q; if the second shared secret key S2 is illegal, stopping the burning process; if the second shared secret key S2 is legal, the second shared secret key S2 is considered to be the shared secret key sent by the chip end, and the burning process is continued;
the burning software calculates and obtains a first communication encryption key E according to a first private key D1 of the burning software and a second shared key S2 of the chip end;
the chip end calculates and obtains a second communication encryption key E' according to a second private key D2 of the chip end and a first shared key S1 of the burning software end; if e=e' holds, consider that the first communication encryption key E can be a symmetric encryption key of the communication link;
the burning software encrypts data to be burned into the EFUSE by using a first communication encryption key E, and then sends the encrypted data to a chip end through a communication link;
the chip end uses the second communication encryption key E' to decrypt the data to be burnt into the EFUSE, performs integrity check, and can burn the data into the EFUSE after the check passes, and then returns the burning result to the burning software.
According to another aspect of the invention, the following technical scheme is adopted: a secure EFUSE burning method, the method comprising:
the burning module generates a first private key D1 of the burning module, calculates a first shared key S1 according to the first private key D1, and sends the first shared key S1 to the chip end through the communication interface;
after receiving the shared key of the burning module, the chip end generates a second private key D2 of the chip end, calculates a second shared key S2 based on the second private key D2, signs the second shared key S2, and sends the second shared key S2 and the signature Q to the burning module through a communication interface;
after receiving the second shared secret key S2 and the signature Q, the burning module verifies the legitimacy of the second shared secret key S2 according to the chip public key P and the received signature Q; if the second shared secret key S2 is illegal, stopping the burning process; if the second shared secret key S2 is legal, the second shared secret key S2 is considered to be the shared secret key sent by the chip end, and the burning process is continued;
the burning module calculates and obtains a first communication encryption key E according to a first private key D1 of the burning module and a second shared key S2 of the chip end;
the chip end calculates and obtains a second communication encryption key E' according to a second private key D2 of the chip end and a first shared key S1 of the burning module; if the first communication encryption key e=the second communication encryption key E' is established, the first communication encryption key E is considered to be a symmetric encryption key of the communication link;
the burning module encrypts data to be burned to the EFUSE by using a first communication encryption key E, and then sends the encrypted data to a chip end through a communication link;
the chip end uses the second communication encryption key E' to decrypt the data to be burnt into the EFUSE, performs integrity check, and can burn the data into the EFUSE after the check passes, and then returns the burning result to the burning module.
As an embodiment of the present invention, the burning module randomly generates its own first private key D1.
As an embodiment of the present invention, after the chip end receives the shared key of the burning module, the second private key D2 of the chip end is randomly generated.
As one implementation mode of the invention, the burning module is burning software.
According to a further aspect of the invention, the following technical scheme is adopted: a safe EFUSE burning system comprises a burning module and at least one chip end; the burning module can be connected with the chip end;
the burning module is used for generating a first private key D1 of the burning module, calculating a first shared key S1 according to the first private key D1, and sending the first shared key S1 to the chip end through the communication interface;
the chip end is used for generating a second private key D2 of the chip end after receiving the shared key of the burning module, calculating a second shared key S2 according to the second private key D2, signing the second shared key S2 as Q, and then sending the second shared key S2 and the signature Q to the burning module through the communication interface;
the burning module is used for verifying the validity of the second shared secret key S2 according to the chip public key P and the received signature Q after the second shared secret key S2 and the signature Q are received; if the second shared secret key S2 is illegal, stopping the burning process; if the second shared secret key S2 is legal, the second shared secret key S2 is considered to be the shared secret key sent by the chip end, and the burning process is continued;
the burning module is used for calculating and obtaining a first communication encryption key E according to a first private key D1 of the burning module and a second shared key S2 of the chip end;
the chip end is used for calculating and obtaining a second communication encryption key E' according to a second private key D2 of the chip end and a first shared key S1 of the burning module; if the first communication encryption key e=the second communication encryption key E' is established, the first communication encryption key E is considered to be a symmetric encryption key of the communication link;
the burning module is used for encrypting the data to be burned into the EFUSE by using the first communication encryption key E, and then sending the encrypted data to the chip end through a communication link;
the chip end is used for decrypting the data to be burnt into the EFUSE by using the second communication encryption key E', performing integrity check, and then burning the data into the EFUSE after the check is passed, and returning the burning result to the burning module.
As an embodiment of the present invention, the burning module randomly generates its own first private key D1.
As an embodiment of the present invention, after the chip end receives the shared key of the burning module, the chip end randomly generates its own second private key D2.
As one implementation mode of the invention, the burning module is burning software.
The invention has the beneficial effects that: the safe EFUSE burning method and system provided by the invention can effectively protect the data safety in the EFUSE burning process, ensure that the data is acquired by a real burning chip, avoid the data from being monitored and stolen in the burning process, and prevent a camouflage person from camouflaging the chip to be burned to steal the EFUSE data to be burned.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of a conventional EFUSE burning scenario.
FIG. 2 is a flowchart of a secure EFUSE programming method according to an embodiment of the invention.
Detailed Description
Preferred embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
For a further understanding of the present invention, preferred embodiments of the invention are described below in conjunction with the examples, but it should be understood that these descriptions are merely intended to illustrate further features and advantages of the invention, and are not limiting of the claims of the invention.
The description of this section is intended to be illustrative of only a few exemplary embodiments and the invention is not to be limited in scope by the description of the embodiments. It is also within the scope of the description and claims of the invention to interchange some of the technical features of the embodiments with other technical features of the same or similar prior art.
The invention discloses a safe EFUSE burning method, and FIG. 2 is a flow chart of the safe EFUSE burning method in an embodiment of the invention; referring to fig. 2, the method includes:
step 1, the burning software randomly generates a first private key D1 of the burning software, calculates a first shared key S1 according to the first private key D1, and sends the first shared key S1 to a chip end through a communication interface;
step 2, after the chip end receives the shared key of the burning software end, randomly generating a second private key D2 of the chip end, calculating a second shared key S2 according to the second private key D2, signing the second shared key S2 as Q, and then sending the second shared key S2 and the signature Q to the burning software through a communication interface;
step 3, after the chip burning software receives the second shared secret key S2 and the signature Q, verifying the validity of the second shared secret key S2 according to the chip public key P and the received signature Q; if the second shared secret key S2 is illegal, stopping the burning process; if the second shared secret key S2 is legal, the second shared secret key S2 is considered to be the shared secret key sent by the chip end, and the burning process is continued;
step 4, the burning software calculates a first communication encryption key E according to a first private key D1 of the burning software and a second shared key S2 of the chip end;
step 5, the chip end calculates a second communication encryption key E' according to the second private key D2 and the first shared key S1 of the burning software end; if the first communication encryption key e=the second communication encryption key E' is established, consider E to be a symmetric encryption key for the communication link;
step 6, the burning software encrypts the data to be burned into the EFUSE by using the first communication encryption key E, and then sends the encrypted data to the chip end through a communication link;
and (7) the chip end uses the second communication encryption key E' to decrypt the data to be burnt into the EFUSE, performs integrity check, and can burn the data into the EFUSE after the check passes, and then returns the burning result to the burning software.
The invention also discloses a safe EFUSE burning system, which comprises a burning module and at least one chip end; the burning module can be connected with the chip end.
The burning module is used for generating a first private key D1 of the burning module, calculating a first shared key S1 according to the first private key D1, and sending the first shared key S1 to the chip end through the communication interface. In an embodiment of the present invention, the burning module randomly generates the first private key D1 thereof. In an embodiment, the recording module is recording software.
The chip end is used for generating a second private key D2 of the chip end after receiving the shared key of the burning module, calculating the second shared key S2 according to the second private key D2, signing the second shared key S2 as Q, and then sending the second shared key S2 and the signature Q to the burning module through the communication interface. In an embodiment of the present invention, after the chip end receives the shared key of the burning module, the chip end randomly generates the second private key D2 of the chip end.
The burning module is used for verifying the validity of the second shared secret key S2 according to the chip public key P and the received signature Q after the second shared secret key S2 and the signature Q are received; if the second shared secret key S2 is illegal, stopping the burning process; if the second shared secret key S2 is legal, the second shared secret key S2 is considered to be the shared secret key sent by the chip end, and the burning process is continued.
The burning module is used for calculating and obtaining a first communication encryption key E according to a first private key D1 of the burning module and a second shared key S2 of the chip end.
The chip end is used for calculating and obtaining a second communication encryption key E' according to a second private key D2 of the chip end and a first shared key S1 of the burning module; if the first communication encryption key e=the second communication encryption key E' is established, the first communication encryption key E is considered to be a symmetric encryption key for the communication link.
The burning module is used for encrypting the data to be burned into the EFUSE by using the first communication encryption key E, and then sending the encrypted data to the chip end through a communication link.
The chip end is used for decrypting the data to be burnt into the EFUSE by using the second communication encryption key E', performing integrity check, and then burning the data into the EFUSE after the check is passed, and returning the burning result to the burning module.
In summary, the secure EFUSE burning method and system provided by the invention can effectively protect the data security in the EFUSE burning process, ensure that the data is acquired by a real burning chip, avoid the data from being monitored and stolen in the burning process, and prevent a camouflage person from camouflaging the chip to be burned to steal the EFUSE data to be burned.
The technical features of the above-described embodiments may be arbitrarily combined, and all possible combinations of the technical features in the above-described embodiments are not described for brevity of description, however, as long as there is no contradiction between the combinations of the technical features, they should be considered as the scope of the description.
The description and applications of the present invention herein are illustrative and are not intended to limit the scope of the invention to the embodiments described above. Effects or advantages referred to in the embodiments may not be embodied in the embodiments due to interference of various factors, and description of the effects or advantages is not intended to limit the embodiments. Variations and modifications of the embodiments disclosed herein are possible, and alternatives and equivalents of the various components of the embodiments are known to those of ordinary skill in the art. It will be clear to those skilled in the art that the present invention may be embodied in other forms, structures, arrangements, proportions, and with other assemblies, materials, and components, without departing from the spirit or essential characteristics thereof. Other variations and modifications of the embodiments disclosed herein may be made without departing from the scope and spirit of the invention.
Claims (9)
1. A secure EFUSE burning method, the method comprising:
the burning software randomly generates a first private key D1 of the burning software, calculates a first shared key S1 according to the first private key D1, and sends the first shared key S1 to the chip end through the communication interface;
after receiving the shared key of the burning software end, the chip end randomly generates a second private key D2 of the chip end, calculates a second shared key S2 according to the second private key D2, signs the second shared key S2, and sends the second shared key S2 and the signature Q to the burning software through a communication interface;
after the chip burning software receives the second shared secret key S2 and the signature Q, verifying the legitimacy of the second shared secret key S2 according to the chip public key P and the received signature Q; if the second shared secret key S2 is illegal, stopping the burning process; if the second shared secret key S2 is legal, the second shared secret key S2 is considered to be the shared secret key sent by the chip end, and the burning process is continued;
the burning software calculates and obtains a first communication encryption key E according to a first private key D1 of the burning software and a second shared key S2 of the chip end;
the chip end calculates and obtains a second communication encryption key E' according to a second private key D2 of the chip end and a first shared key S1 of the burning software end; if the first communication encryption key e=the second communication encryption key E' is established, the first communication encryption key E is considered to be a symmetric encryption key of the communication link;
the burning software encrypts data to be burned into the EFUSE by using a first communication encryption key E, and then sends the encrypted data to a chip end through a communication link;
the chip end uses the second communication encryption key E' to decrypt the data to be burnt into the EFUSE, performs integrity check, and can burn the data into the EFUSE after the check passes, and then returns the burning result to the burning software.
2. A secure EFUSE burning method, the method comprising:
the burning module generates a first private key D1 of the burning module, calculates a first shared key S1 according to the first private key D1, and sends the first shared key S1 to the chip end through the communication interface;
after receiving the shared key of the burning module, the chip end generates a second private key D2 of the chip end, calculates a second shared key S2 based on the second private key D2, signs the second shared key S2, and sends the second shared key S2 and the signature Q to the burning module through a communication interface;
after receiving the second shared secret key S2 and the signature Q, the burning module verifies the legitimacy of the second shared secret key S2 according to the chip public key P and the received signature Q; if the second shared secret key S2 is illegal, stopping the burning process; if the second shared secret key S2 is legal, the second shared secret key S2 is considered to be the shared secret key sent by the chip end, and the burning process is continued;
the burning module calculates and obtains a first communication encryption key E according to a first private key D1 of the burning module and a second shared key S2 of the chip end;
the chip end calculates and obtains a second communication encryption key E' according to a second private key D2 of the chip end and a first shared key S1 of the burning module; if the first communication encryption key e=the second communication encryption key E' is established, the first communication encryption key E is considered to be a symmetric encryption key of the communication link;
the burning module encrypts data to be burned to the EFUSE by using a first communication encryption key E, and then sends the encrypted data to a chip end through a communication link;
the chip end uses the second communication encryption key E' to decrypt the data to be burnt into the EFUSE, performs integrity check, and can burn the data into the EFUSE after the check passes, and then returns the burning result to the burning module.
3. The secure EFUSE burning method of claim 2, wherein:
the burning module randomly generates a first private key D1 of the burning module.
4. The secure EFUSE burning method of claim 2, wherein:
after the chip end receives the shared secret key of the burning module, the second private key D2 of the chip end is randomly generated.
5. The secure EFUSE burning method of claim 2, wherein:
the burning module is burning software.
6. The safe EFUSE burning system is characterized by comprising a burning module and at least one chip end; the burning module can be connected with the chip end;
the burning module is used for generating a first private key D1 of the burning module, calculating a first shared key S1 according to the first private key D1, and sending the first shared key S1 to the chip end through the communication interface;
the chip end is used for generating a second private key D2 of the chip end after receiving the shared key of the burning module, calculating a second shared key S2 according to the second private key D2, signing the second shared key S2 as Q, and then sending the second shared key S2 and the signature Q to the burning module through the communication interface;
the burning module is used for verifying the validity of the second shared secret key S2 according to the chip public key P and the received signature Q after the second shared secret key S2 and the signature Q are received; if the second shared secret key S2 is illegal, stopping the burning process; if the second shared secret key S2 is legal, the second shared secret key S2 is considered to be the shared secret key sent by the chip end, and the burning process is continued;
the burning module is used for calculating and obtaining a first communication encryption key E according to a first private key D1 of the burning module and a second shared key S2 of the chip end;
the chip end is used for calculating and obtaining a second communication encryption key E' according to a second private key D2 of the chip end and a first shared key S1 of the burning module; if the first communication encryption key e=the second communication encryption key E' is established, the first communication encryption key E is considered to be a symmetric encryption key of the communication link;
the burning module is used for encrypting the data to be burned into the EFUSE by using the first communication encryption key E, and then sending the encrypted data to the chip end through a communication link;
the chip end is used for decrypting the data to be burnt into the EFUSE by using the second communication encryption key E', performing integrity check, and then burning the data into the EFUSE after the check is passed, and returning the burning result to the burning module.
7. The secure EFUSE burning system of claim 6 wherein:
the burning module randomly generates a first private key D1 of the burning module.
8. The secure EFUSE burning system of claim 6 wherein:
and after the chip end receives the shared secret key of the burning module, randomly generating a second private key D2 of the chip end.
9. The secure EFUSE burning system of claim 6 wherein:
the burning module is burning software.
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CN112994893B (en) * | 2021-02-08 | 2021-12-14 | 无锡众星微系统技术有限公司 | Secret key burning method in chip production test stage |
CN112989356B (en) * | 2021-03-08 | 2023-11-10 | 广州安凯微电子股份有限公司 | Blank security chip burning method, system, blank security chip and storage medium |
CN116614219A (en) * | 2022-02-09 | 2023-08-18 | 兆易创新科技集团股份有限公司 | Secure data burning method, secure module, customizing device, and storage medium |
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