CN110247894A - The method and device of handle server is forged in a kind of identification - Google Patents

Abstract

Embodiments of the present invention provide a method and device for identifying a fake handle server, which relate to the technical field of the Internet and can ensure that the handle server has not been tampered with during the resolution process of the handle system identifier. The method includes: obtaining the target handle code analysis request sent by the client; if it is determined that the target handle code analysis request includes a confidentiality request, then obtaining the first hash value corresponding to the target handle code stored on the block chain after hash transformation The second hash value; match the target home service information according to the target handle code; perform hash transformation on the target home service information to obtain the third hash value; if it is determined that the second hash value is the same as the third hash value, then Make sure the handle server is not forged. The embodiment of the present application is applied to the resolution of the handle system identifier.

Description

A method and device for identifying fake handle servers

technical field

The embodiments of the present invention relate to the technical field of the Internet, and in particular to a method and device for identifying a fake handle server.

Background technique

As a general name service system, the Handle system can provide basic services such as permanent identification, dynamic links and security management for digital objects in the network. In recent years, with the development of the Internet and the rise of new technologies such as the Internet of Things, the handle system Gained a broader application prospect.

The security of the Handle system depends on the security of the client and the handle server. When conducting business, usually the handle system and the client fully trust each other. The integrity of the handle system largely depends on the integrity of the information of the global service, where the information of the global service includes the local handle service, and the local handle service includes the home service. Invalid global service information may not only mislead the client to use an inappropriate local handle service, but the invalid global service information may also allow an attacker to forge the handle server signature. In addition, for the sake of efficiency, the handle server will generate or return a digital signature for the home service response only if the client specifically requests it, and, in order to ensure data integrity, the client must explicitly The handle server is required to return a digital signature. In this case, in order to protect sensitive data from being disclosed, the client can establish a communication session with the handle server and ask the handle server to encrypt any data with the session key.

Therefore, the security of the existing handle system strongly depends on the security of the handle server itself and the client itself during each interaction between the handle server and the client. For the sake of efficiency, the handle system will not generate or return a digital signature for each home service response if it does not receive a request from the client to return a digital signature. In order to ensure data integrity, the client must explicitly request The handle server returns a digital signature. When the data is sensitive, although the client needs to establish a session with the handle server and then the handle server uses the key to encrypt the data, there are still cases where the client explicitly requires the handle system to return a digital signature, and invalid global service information will allow attackers to forge the server Signature, therefore, there are loopholes in the overall security of the existing handle system.

Contents of the invention

Embodiments of the present invention provide a method and device for identifying a fake handle server, which can ensure that the handle server has not been tampered with during the resolution process of the handle system identifier.

In the first aspect, a method for identifying a fake handle server is provided, comprising the steps of: obtaining a target handle code analysis request sent by a client, wherein the target handle code analysis request includes a target handle code; Including a confidentiality request, then obtain the second hash value corresponding to the first hash value after hash transformation of the target handle code stored on the blockchain, wherein the second hash value is pre-stored on the blockchain as The hash value of the home service information matched by the target handle code; match the target home service information according to the target handle code; perform hash transformation on the target home service information to obtain the third hash value; if the second hash value and the third hash value are determined If the hash values are the same, it is determined that the handle server is not forged, wherein the target home service information is used to instruct the client to select the handle server.

In the above solution, the target handle code analysis request sent by the client is obtained, wherein the target handle code analysis request includes the target handle code; if it is determined that the target handle code analysis request includes a confidentiality request, then the target handle stored on the blockchain is obtained The second hash value corresponding to the first hash value after hash transformation of the code, wherein the second hash value is the hash value of the home service information that matches the target handle code pre-stored on the blockchain; according to The target handle code matches the target home service information; performs hash transformation on the target home service information to obtain a third hash value; if it is determined that the second hash value is the same as the third hash value, then it is determined that the handle server has not been forged. In this application, the combination of hash transformation and blockchain storage is used as the basis for judging whether the handle server is forged. When the second hash value of the home service information that matches the target handle code and the client When the third hash value of the target home service information matched by the target handle code that needs to be parsed is the same, it is determined that the handle server is not forged. When the data is sensitive, it can independently identify whether the handle server is correct or not, avoiding the problem of The strength of the resolution process of the handle system identifier depends on the security of the handle server itself and the client itself.

In a second aspect, a device for identifying a fake handle server is provided, including: an acquisition module configured to acquire a target handle code analysis request sent by a client, wherein the target handle code analysis request includes a target handle code; the acquisition module also uses If it is determined that the target handle code parsing request includes a confidentiality request, then obtain the second hash value corresponding to the first hash value after hash transformation of the target handle code stored on the block chain, wherein the second hash value is the hash value of the home service information that matches the target handle code pre-stored on the block chain; the matching module is used to match the target home service information according to the target handle code obtained by the acquisition module; the processing module is used to match the matching module The target home service information is hash transformed to obtain the third hash value; the determination module is used to determine that the handle server does not have the same value as the third hash value obtained by the processing module Forged, where the target home service information is used to instruct the client to select the handle server.

In a third aspect, a device for identifying a fake handle server is provided, including a communication interface, a processor, a memory, and a bus; the memory is used to store computer-executed instructions, and the processor and the memory are connected through the bus, and when the device for identifying a fake handle server is running The processor executes the computer-executable instructions stored in the memory, so that the device for identifying a counterfeit handle server executes the method for identifying a counterfeit handle server according to the first aspect above.

In a fourth aspect, a computer storage medium is provided, including instructions, and when the instructions are run on a computer, the computer is made to execute the method for identifying a fake handle server as described above.

According to a fifth aspect, a computer program product is provided, the computer program product includes instruction codes, and the instruction codes are used to execute the method for identifying fake handle servers as described above.

It can be understood that any device, computer storage medium, or computer program product provided above for identifying a counterfeit handle server is used to execute the method corresponding to the first aspect provided above, and therefore, the beneficial effects it can achieve can be Referring to the method in the first aspect above and the beneficial effects of the corresponding solution in the detailed implementation below, details are not repeated here.

Description of drawings

In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the following will briefly introduce the accompanying drawings that need to be used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art. Obviously, the accompanying drawings in the following description are only some of the present invention. Embodiments, for those of ordinary skill in the art, other drawings can also be obtained based on these drawings without any creative effort.

Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of a handle system architecture provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

Fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of a method for identifying a fake handle server provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of a device for identifying a fake handle server provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

Fig. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of an apparatus for identifying a fake handle server provided by another embodiment of the present invention.

Detailed ways

The following will clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention with reference to the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, not all, embodiments of the present invention. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by persons of ordinary skill in the art without making creative efforts belong to the protection scope of the present invention.

The Handle system adopts a distributed management architecture to realize distributed management of each data storage system. Under the distributed management architecture of the Handle system, a service platform can be built at low cost and quickly, and it can be easily and quickly connected with different systems to support various applications and provide services for them. The distributed service system architecture of the Handle system, as shown in Figure 1, the top layer is composed of a global service, where the global service is called the global handle registry (global handle registry, GHR). The lower layer is composed of all local handle services such as local handle service 1 (local handle service, LHS), local handle service 2, etc., where each local handle service has its own sub-name space, for example, local handle service 1 has a sub-name Space 1, local handle service 2 owns subnamespace 2. A local handle service consists of two parts: naming authority, called home service, also called prefix; and the unique handle under the naming authority, called suffix, which is the handle code in this application , for example, local handle service 1 has home service 11 and home service 12 under sub-namespace 1, among which, the only handle1 under home service 11 and the only handle2 under home service 12; the local handle service 2 is in sub-namespace The namespace 2 has a home service 21 and a home service 22, where the home service 21 corresponds to the unique handle3, and the home service 22 corresponds to the unique handle4.

Based on the above-mentioned distributed service system architecture of the handle system, any sub-namespace of a local handle service can be served by the corresponding local handle service, global service, or both. The global service can be used to send any handle service request to the responsible local handle service. The distributed service structure of the Handle system allows any given handle service to be replicated to service sites under multiple home services, and each service site can further distribute it to a single handle server cluster. The local handle service is the only service that provides resolution and management services for the handle under the home service. Therefore, before parsing the handle, the client must determine the home service of the handle. The home service of each handle is registered in the global handle registry. Clients can find each handle's home service by querying the global handle registry for named authority handles. The client sends a handle resolution request to the global handle registration center; the global handle registration center queries the home service according to the handle resolution request, and returns the service information of the home service to the client, that is, the home service information, where the home service information lists the given home The service site of the service, and the interface of each handle server in each service site; the client selects a service site from the service information, finds the responsible handle server in the site, and sends the handle resolution request to the handle server. For example, the handle code to be parsed is "ncstrl.vatech_cs/te-93-35". Then the client needs to know the home service of "ncstrl.vatech_cs". The home service can be obtained by querying the naming authority handle "0.NA/ncstrl.vatech_cs" in GHR through the handle system. The handle system will return home service information according to the home service. From the home service information, the client can select a service site, find the responsible handle server in the service site, and send the parsing request to the handle server.

Based on the above-mentioned handle system architecture and the method for the client to query the handle server in the global handle registration center, this application provides a method for identifying a fake handle server, as shown in Figure 2, which specifically includes the following steps:

201. Obtain the target handle code parsing request sent by the client.

First of all, since the parsing and management target handle code is provided by the home service, and the home service is also the only provider, the home service information will list the service sites of the given home service, and the address of each handle server in each service site Interface, the client selects a service site from the service information, finds the responsible handle server in the site, and sends the handle resolution request to the handle server. Therefore, the client needs to determine the home service information before parsing the target handle code.

Therefore, preferably, when the target handle code is used for the first time after application, the target handle code is matched with the home service information. That is, when the handle system obtains the target handle code for the first time, it queries the home service for the target handle code in the global handle registration center and obtains the home service information.

Further, the target handle code is hashed to obtain the first hash value. At this time, the globally unique target handle code is hashed to generate a string of 256-bit strings that cannot be reversed by current technology, that is, the first hash value a hash value.

Further, hash transformation is performed on the home service information to obtain a second hash value. Including: if it is determined that the lifetime of the home service information is overtime, re-match the target handle code with new home service information, perform hash transformation on the new home service information, and obtain a second hash value. For example, if the survival time of home service information is 24 hours, after the survival time of home service information for 24 hours, the handle system will query and match the new home service for the target handle code in the global handle registration center, and then hash the service information of the home service , get the second hash value.

Further, associate the first hash value with the second hash value to generate an association result.

Preferably, the first hash value can be associated with the second hash value in the form of a traditional database table to generate an association table. Of course, the first hash value and the second hash value may also be associated in the form of a json key-value pair to generate an associated key-value pair.

Further, the association results are stored in the blockchain.

Secondly, when the client needs to analyze the target handle code, it sends a target handle code analysis request to the handle system, and the handle system obtains the target handle code analysis request sent by the client, wherein the target handle code analysis request includes the target handle code.

202. If it is determined that the target handle code parsing request includes a confidentiality request, obtain a second hash value corresponding to the first hash value of the target handle code stored on the blockchain after hash transformation.

Wherein, the second hash value is the hash value of the home service information that matches the target handle code pre-stored on the block chain, that is, the second hash value in step 201 .

203. Match the target home service information according to the target handle code.

Specifically, the handle system queries the target home service in the global handle registration center according to the target handle code, and obtains the target home service information.

204. Perform hash transformation on the target home service information to obtain a third hash value.

205. If it is determined that the second hash value is the same as the third hash value, determine that the handle server is not forged.

Specifically, the second hash value is the hash value of the home service information that matches the target handle code pre-stored on the blockchain, and the third hash value is the latest target home service information that matches the target handle code sent by the client hash value; since the two times match the home service information for the same target handle code, if the second hash value of the home service information is the same as the third hash value of the target home service information, the target home can be determined The service site and server interface carried in the service information have not been modified, that is, the handle server has not been forged.

Wherein, the target home service information is used to instruct the client to select a handle server.

Specifically, because the target home service information will list the service sites of the given target home service, and the interface of each handle server in each service site. The handle system feeds back the target home service information to the client. The client selects a service site from the service information, finds the responsible handle server in the site, and sends the handle resolution request to the handle server.

Further, in this application, what is associated with the hash value of the target handle code may also be other information and services with globally unique identifiers in the home service.

In the above solution, the target handle code analysis request sent by the client is obtained, wherein the target handle code analysis request includes the target handle code; if it is determined that the target handle code analysis request includes a confidentiality request, then the target handle stored on the blockchain is obtained The second hash value corresponding to the first hash value after hash transformation of the code, wherein the second hash value is the hash value of the home service information that matches the target handle code pre-stored on the blockchain; according to The target handle code matches the target home service information; performs hash transformation on the target home service information to obtain a third hash value; if it is determined that the second hash value is the same as the third hash value, then it is determined that the handle server has not been forged. In this application, the combination of hash transformation and blockchain storage is used as the basis for judging whether the handle server is forged. When the second hash value of the home service information that matches the target handle code and the client When the third hash value of the target home service information matched by the target handle code that needs to be parsed is the same, it is determined that the handle server is not forged. When the data is sensitive, it can independently identify whether the handle server is correct or not, avoiding the problem of The strength of the resolution process of the handle system identifier depends on the security of the handle server itself and the client itself.

The embodiment of the present invention can divide the functional modules of the device for identifying fake handle servers according to the above-mentioned method embodiments, for example, each functional module can be divided corresponding to each function, or two or more functions can be integrated into one processing module. The above-mentioned integrated modules can be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of software function modules. It should be noted that the division of modules in the embodiment of the present invention is schematic, and is only a logical function division, and there may be another division manner in actual implementation.

In the case of dividing each functional module corresponding to each function, FIG. 3 shows a possible structural diagram of the device for identifying a fake handle server involved in the above embodiment. For implementing the above method for identifying a fake handle server, wherein the device for identifying a fake handle server is applied to a handle system. Specifically, including:

The obtaining module 31 is used to obtain the target handle code analysis request sent by the client, wherein the target handle code analysis request includes the target handle code; the obtaining module 31 is also used to determine the target handle code analysis request includes a confidentiality request, then obtain the second hash value corresponding to the first hash value after the hash transformation of the target handle code stored on the block chain, wherein the second hash value is in the The hash value of the home service information pre-stored on the block chain for the target handle code matching; the matching module 32 is used to match the target home service information according to the target handle code obtained by the acquisition module 31; the processing module 33 , used to perform hash transformation on the target home service information matched by the matching module 32 to obtain a third hash value; a determining module 34, used to determine the second hash obtained by the obtaining module 31 If the value is the same as the third hash value obtained by the processing module 33, it is determined that the handle server is not forged, wherein the target home service information is used to instruct the client to select the handle server.

Optionally, the obtaining module 31 is also used to obtain the target handle code; the matching module 32 is also used to match the home service information for the target handle code; the processing module 33 is also used to The target handle code is subjected to hash transformation to obtain a first hash value; the processing module 33 is also configured to perform hash transformation on the home service information to obtain a second hash value; the association module 35 is used to Associating the first hash value with the second hash value to generate an association result; the processing module 33 is further configured to store the association result in a block chain.

Optionally, the association module 35 is specifically configured to associate the first hash value with the second hash value in the form of a traditional database table to generate an association table.

Optionally, the association module 35 is specifically configured to associate the first hash value with the second hash value in the form of a json key-value pair to generate an associated key-value pair.

Optionally, the matching module 32 is further configured to re-match new home service information for the target handle code if it is determined that the lifetime of the home service information is overtime; the processing module 33 is also configured to Perform hash transformation on the new home service information to obtain a second hash value.

In the case of using an integrated module, the device for identifying a fake handle server includes: a storage unit, a processing unit, and an interface unit. The processing unit is used to control and manage actions of the device for identifying a fake handle server. The interface unit is used to exchange information between the device for identifying the fake handle server and other devices. The storage unit is used for storing the program code and data of the device for identifying the counterfeit handle server.

Wherein, the processing unit is a processor, the storage unit is a memory, and the interface unit is a communication interface as an example. Wherein, the device for identifying a fake handle server is shown in FIG.

The processor 402 may be a general-purpose central processing unit (Central Processing Unit, CPU), a microprocessor, a specific application integrated circuit (Application-Specific Integrated Circuit, ASIC), or one or more devices used to control the execution of the program program of this application. integrated circuit.

The memory 403 may be a read-only memory (Read-Only Memory, ROM) or other types of static storage devices that can store static information and instructions, and a random access memory (Random Access Memory, RAM) or other types that can store information and instructions It can also be an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-only Memory, EEPROM), a CD-ROM (Compact Disc Read-Only Memory, CD-ROM) or other optical disk storage, optical disk storage ( including compact discs, laser discs, optical discs, digital versatile discs, blu-ray discs, etc.), magnetic disk storage media or other magnetic storage devices, or can be used to carry or store desired program code in the form of instructions or data structures and can be stored by a computer Any other medium, but not limited to. The memory can exist independently and be connected to the processor through the bus. Memory can also be integrated with the processor.

Wherein, the memory 403 is used to store the application program code for executing the solution of the present application, and the execution is controlled by the processor 402 . The communication interface 401 is used for information exchange with other devices, for example, information exchange between an apparatus supporting identification of a fake handle server and other devices, for example, acquiring data from other devices or sending data to other devices. The processor 402 is configured to execute the application program code stored in the memory 403, so as to implement the method described in the embodiment of the present application.

In addition, a computing storage medium (or medium) is also provided, including instructions for performing the method operations performed by the apparatus for identifying a fake handle server in the above embodiment when executed. In addition, a computer program product including the above computing storage medium (or medium) is also provided.

Wherein, all relevant content of each step involved in the above method embodiment can be referred to the function description of the corresponding function module, and its function will not be repeated here.

It should be understood that in various embodiments of the present invention, the sequence numbers of the above-mentioned processes do not mean the order of execution, and the execution order of each process should be determined by its functions and internal logic, rather than by the embodiment of the present invention. The implementation process constitutes any limitation.

Those skilled in the art can appreciate that the units and algorithm steps of the examples described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented by electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are executed by hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art may use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be regarded as exceeding the scope of the present invention.

Those skilled in the art can clearly understand that for the convenience and brevity of the description, the specific working process of the above-described system, device and unit can refer to the corresponding process in the foregoing method embodiment, which will not be repeated here.

In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed systems, devices and methods may be implemented in other ways. For example, the device embodiments described above are only illustrative. For example, the division of the units is only a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components can be combined or May be integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored, or not implemented. In another point, the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be through some interfaces, and the indirect coupling or communication connection of devices or units may be in electrical, mechanical or other forms.

The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place, or may be distributed to multiple network units. Part or all of the units can be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.

In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present invention may be integrated into one processing unit, each unit may exist separately physically, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.

If the functions described above are realized in the form of software function units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the essence of the technical solution of the present invention or the part that contributes to the prior art or the part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including Several instructions are used to make a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in various embodiments of the present invention. The aforementioned storage media include: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (English full name: read-only memory, English abbreviation: ROM), random access memory (English full name: random access memory, English abbreviation: RAM), magnetic Various media that can store program codes such as discs or optical discs.

The above is only a specific embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Anyone skilled in the art can easily think of changes or substitutions within the technical scope disclosed in the present invention. Should be covered within the protection scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention should be determined by the protection scope of the claims.

Claims (13)

1. a kind of method that handle server is forged in identification, which is characterized in that

Obtain the target handle code analysis request that client is sent, wherein include in the target handle code analysis request Target handle code；

If it is determined that including requested privacy in the target handle code analysis request, then the target stored on block chain is obtained Handle code carries out corresponding second cryptographic Hash of the first cryptographic Hash after hash conversion, wherein second cryptographic Hash is in institute State prestored on block chain be the matched home information on services of the target handle code cryptographic Hash；

Target home information on services is matched according to the target handle code；

The target home information on services is subjected to hash conversion, obtains third cryptographic Hash；

If it is determined that second cryptographic Hash is identical as the third cryptographic Hash, it is determined that the handle server is not pseudo- It makes, wherein the target home information on services is used to refer to client and chooses handle server.

2. the method that handle server is forged in identification according to claim 1, which is characterized in that obtaining client hair Before the target handle code analysis request sent, the method also includes:

Obtain the target handle code；

Home information on services is matched for the target handle code；

The target handle code is subjected to hash conversion, obtains the first cryptographic Hash；

The home information on services is subjected to hash conversion, obtains the second cryptographic Hash；

It is associated with first cryptographic Hash and second cryptographic Hash, generates association results；

The association results are stored in block chain.

3. the method that handle server is forged in identification according to claim 2, which is characterized in that association described first is breathed out Uncommon value and second cryptographic Hash, generate association results, comprising:

First cryptographic Hash and second cryptographic Hash are associated using the form of traditional database table, generate association Table.

4. the method that handle server is forged in identification according to claim 2, which is characterized in that association described first is breathed out Uncommon value and second cryptographic Hash, generate association results, comprising:

First cryptographic Hash and second cryptographic Hash are associated using the key-value pair form of json, generate association key assignments It is right.

5. the method that handle server is forged in identification according to claim 2, which is characterized in that

If it is determined that the life span time-out of the home information on services, then match new home again for the target handle code Information on services；

The new home information on services is subjected to hash conversion, obtains the second cryptographic Hash.

6. the device that handle server is forged in a kind of identification, which is characterized in that

Module is obtained, for obtaining the target handle code analysis request of client transmission, wherein the target handle code solution It include target handle code in analysis request；

The acquisition module is also used to if it is determined that then obtaining area including requested privacy in the target handle code analysis request The target handle code stored on block chain carries out corresponding second cryptographic Hash of the first cryptographic Hash after hash conversion, wherein Second cryptographic Hash be prestored on the block chain be the matched home information on services of the target handle code Kazakhstan Uncommon value；

Matching module, the target handle code for being obtained according to the acquisition module match target home information on services；

Processing module obtains for the matched target home information on services of the matching module to be carried out hash conversion Three cryptographic Hash；

Determining module, for if it is determined that described obtain second cryptographic Hash that module obtains and the institute that the processing module obtains It is identical to state third cryptographic Hash, it is determined that the handle server is not forged, wherein the target home information on services is used To indicate that client chooses handle server.

7. the device that handle server is forged in identification according to claim 6, which is characterized in that

The acquisition module is also used to obtain the target handle code；

The matching module is also used to match home information on services for the target handle code；

The processing module is also used to the target handle code carrying out hash conversion, obtains the first cryptographic Hash；

The processing module is also used to the home information on services carrying out hash conversion, obtains the second cryptographic Hash；

Relating module generates association results for being associated with first cryptographic Hash and second cryptographic Hash；

The processing module is also used to the association results being stored in block chain.

8. the device that handle server is forged in identification according to claim 7, which is characterized in that

The relating module, specifically in the form of traditional database table by first cryptographic Hash and second Hash Value is associated, and generates contingency table.

9. the device that handle server is forged in identification according to claim 7, which is characterized in that

The relating module, specifically for using the key-value pair form of json by first cryptographic Hash and second cryptographic Hash It is associated, generates association key-value pair.

10. the device that handle server is forged in identification according to claim 7, which is characterized in that

The matching module is also used to the life span time-out if it is determined that the home information on services, is then again the target Handle code matches new home information on services；

The processing module is also used to the new home information on services carrying out hash conversion, obtains the second cryptographic Hash.

11. it is a kind of identification forge handle server device, which is characterized in that including communication interface, processor, memory, Bus；For storing computer executed instructions, the processor is connect with the memory by the bus memory, When the device operation of handle server is forged in the identification, the computer that the processor executes the memory storage is held Row instruction, so that the device execution identification as described in any one in claim 1-5 that handle server is forged in the identification is pseudo- The method for making handle server.

12. a kind of computer storage medium, including instruction, which is characterized in that when described instruction is run on computers, so that The computer executes the method that handle server is forged in identification as described in any one in claim 1-5.

13. a kind of computer program product, which is characterized in that the computer program product includes instruction code, described instruction Code is used to execute the method that handle server is forged in identification as described in any one in claim 1-5.